In Re - Cunanan

Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
Resolution March 18, 1954
In the Matter of the Petitions for Admission to the Bar of Unsuccessful Candidates of 1946 to 1953;
ALBINO CUNANAN, ET AL., petitioners.
Jose M. Aruego, M.H. de Joya, Miguel R. Cornejo, and Antonio Enrile Inton for petitioners.Office of the
Solicitor General Juan R. Liwag for respondent.
DIOKNO, J.:
In recent years few controversial issues have aroused so much public interest and concern as Republic
Act No. 972, popularly known as the "Bar Flunkers' Act of 1953." Under the Rules of Court governing
admission to the bar, "in order that a candidate (for admission to the Bar) may be deemed to have
passed his examinations successfully, he must have obtained a general average of 75 per cent in all
subjects, without falling below 50 per cent in any subject." (Rule 127, sec. 14, Rules of Court).
Nevertheless, considering the varying difficulties of the different bar examinations held since 1946 and
the varying degree of strictness with which the examination papers were graded, this court passed and
admitted to the bar those candidates who had obtained an average of only 72 per cent in 1946, 69 per
cent in 1947, 70 per cent in 1948, and 74 per cent in 1949. In 1950 to 1953, the 74 per cent was raised
to 75 per cent.
Believing themselves as fully qualified to practice law as those reconsidered and passed by this court,
and feeling conscious of having been discriminated against (See Explanatory Note to R.A. No. 972),
unsuccessful candidates who obtained averages of a few percentage lower than those admitted to the
Bar agitated in Congress for, and secured in 1951 the passage of Senate Bill No. 12 which, among others,
reduced the passing general average in bar examinations to 70 per cent effective since 1946. The
President requested the views of this court on the bill. Complying with that request, seven members of
the court subscribed to and submitted written comments adverse thereto, and shortly thereafter the
President vetoed it. Congress did not override the veto. Instead, it approved Senate Bill No. 371,
embodying substantially the provisions of the vetoed bill. Although the members of this court reiterated
their unfavorable views on the matter, the President allowed the bill to become a law on June 21, 1953
without his signature. The law, which incidentally was enacted in an election year, reads in full as
follows:
REPUBLIC ACT NO. 972

AN ACT TO FIX THE PASSING MARKS FOR BAR EXAMINATIONS FROM NINETEEN HUNDRED AND FORTY-
SIX UP TO AND INCLUDING NINETEEN HUNDRED AND FIFTY-FIVE.
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the Philippines in Congress assembled:
SECTION 1. Notwithstanding the provisions of section fourteen, Rule numbered one hundred
twenty-seven of the Rules of Court, any bar candidate who obtained a general average of
seventy per cent in any bar examinations after July fourth, nineteen hundred and forty-six up to
the August nineteen hundred and fifty-one bar examinations; seventy-one per cent in the
nineteen hundred and fifty-two bar examinations; seventy-two per cent in the in the nineteen
hundred and fifty-three bar examinations; seventy-three per cent in the nineteen hundred and
fifty-four bar examinations; seventy-four per cent in the nineteen hundred and fifty-five bar
examinations without a candidate obtaining a grade below fifty per cent in any subject, shall be
allowed to take and subscribe the corresponding oath of office as member of the Philippine Bar:
Provided, however, That for the purpose of this Act, any exact one-half or more of a fraction,
shall be considered as one and included as part of the next whole number.
SEC. 2. Any bar candidate who obtained a grade of seventy-five per cent in any subject in any
bar examination after July fourth, nineteen hundred and forty-six shall be deemed to have
passed in such subject or subjects and such grade or grades shall be included in computing the
passing general average that said candidate may obtain in any subsequent examinations that he
may take.
SEC. 3. This Act shall take effect upon its approval.
Enacted on June 21, 1953, without the Executive approval.
After its approval, many of the unsuccessful postwar candidates filed petitions for admission to the bar
invoking its provisions, while others whose motions for the revision of their examination papers were
still pending also invoked the aforesaid law as an additional ground for admission. There are also others
who have sought simply the reconsideration of their grades without, however, invoking the law in
question. To avoid injustice to individual petitioners, the court first reviewed the motions for
reconsideration, irrespective of whether or not they had invoked Republic Act No. 972. Unfortunately,
the court has found no reason to revise their grades. If they are to be admitted to the bar, it must be
pursuant to Republic Act No. 972 which, if declared valid, should be applied equally to all concerned
whether they have filed petitions or not. A complete list of the petitioners, properly classified, affected
by this decision, as well as a more detailed account of the history of Republic Act No. 972, are appended
to this decision as Annexes I and II. And to realize more readily the effects of the law, the following
statistical data are set forth:
(1) The unsuccessful bar candidates who are to be benefited by section 1 of Republic Act No. 972 total
1,168, classified as follows:
1946 (August) 206 121 18

1946 (November) 477 228 43
1947 749 340 0
1948 899 409 11
1949 1,218 532 164
1950 1,316 893 26
1951 2,068 879 196
1952 2,738 1,033 426
1953 2,555 968 284
TOTAL 12,230 5,421 1,168
Of the total 1,168 candidates, 92 have passed in subsequent examination, and only 586 have filed either
motions for admission to the bar pursuant to said Republic Act, or mere motions for reconsideration.
(2) In addition, some other 10 unsuccessful candidates are to be benefited by section 2 of said Republic
Act. These candidates had each taken from two to five different examinations, but failed to obtain a
passing average in any of them. Consolidating, however, their highest grades in different subjects in
previous examinations, with their latest marks, they would be sufficient to reach the passing average as
provided for by Republic Act No. 972.
(3) The total number of candidates to be benefited by this Republic Acts is therefore 1,094, of which
only 604 have filed petitions. Of these 604 petitioners, 33 who failed in 1946 to 1951 had individually
presented motions for reconsideration which were denied, while 125 unsuccessful candidates of 1952,
and 56 of 1953, had presented similar motions, which are still pending because they could be favorably
affected by Republic Act No. 972, although as has been already stated, this tribunal finds no sufficient
reasons to reconsider their grades
UNCONSTITUTIONALITY OF REPUBLIC ACT NO. 972
Having been called upon to enforce a law of far-reaching effects on the practice of the legal profession
and the administration of justice, and because some doubts have been expressed as to its validity, the
court set the hearing of the afore-mentioned petitions for admission on the sole question of whether or
not Republic Act No. 972 is constitutional.
We have been enlightened in the study of this question by the brilliant assistance of the members of the
bar who have amply argued, orally an in writing, on the various aspects in which the question may be
gleaned. The valuable studies of Messrs. E. Voltaire Garcia, Vicente J. Francisco, Vicente Pelaez and
Buenaventura Evangelista, in favor of the validity of the law, and of the U.P. Women's Lawyers' Circle,
the Solicitor General, Messrs. Arturo A. Alafriz, Enrique M. Fernando, Vicente Abad Santos, Carlos A.
Barrios, Vicente del Rosario, Juan de Blancaflor, Mamerto V. Gonzales, and Roman Ozaeta against it,
aside from the memoranda of counsel for petitioners, Messrs. Jose M. Aruego, M.H. de Joya, Miguel R.
Cornejo and Antonio Enrile Inton, and of petitioners Cabrera, Macasaet and Galema themselves, has
greatly helped us in this task. The legal researchers of the court have exhausted almost all Philippine and
American jurisprudence on the matter. The question has been the object of intense deliberation for a
long time by the Tribunal, and finally, after the voting, the preparation of the majority opinion was
assigned to a new member in order to place it as humanly as possible above all suspicion of prejudice or
partiality.
Republic Act No. 972 has for its object, according to its author, to admit to the Bar, those candidates
who suffered from insufficiency of reading materials and inadequate preparation. Quoting a portion of
the Explanatory Note of the proposed bill, its author Honorable Senator Pablo Angeles David stated:
The reason for relaxing the standard 75 per cent passing grade is the tremendous handicap
which students during the years immediately after the Japanese occupation has to overcome
such as the insufficiency of reading materials and the inadequacy of the preparation of students
who took up law soon after the liberation.
Of the 9,675 candidates who took the examinations from 1946 to 1952, 5,236 passed. And now it is
claimed that in addition 604 candidates be admitted (which in reality total 1,094), because they suffered
from "insufficiency of reading materials" and of "inadequacy of preparation."
By its declared objective, the law is contrary to public interest because it qualifies 1,094 law graduates
who confessedly had inadequate preparation for the practice of the profession, as was exactly found by
this Tribunal in the aforesaid examinations. The public interest demands of legal profession adequate
preparation and efficiency, precisely more so as legal problem evolved by the times become more
difficult. An adequate legal preparation is one of the vital requisites for the practice of law that should
be developed constantly and maintained firmly. To the legal profession is entrusted the protection of
property, life, honor and civil liberties. To approve officially of those inadequately prepared individuals
to dedicate themselves to such a delicate mission is to create a serious social danger. Moreover, the
statement that there was an insufficiency of legal reading materials is grossly exaggerated. There were
abundant materials. Decisions of this court alone in mimeographed copies were made available to the
public during those years and private enterprises had also published them in monthly magazines and
annual digests. The Official Gazette had been published continuously. Books and magazines published
abroad have entered without restriction since 1945. Many law books, some even with revised and
enlarged editions have been printed locally during those periods. A new set of Philippine Reports began
to be published since 1946, which continued to be supplemented by the addition of new volumes. Those
are facts of public knowledge.
Notwithstanding all these, if the law in question is valid, it has to be enforced.
The question is not new in its fundamental aspect or from the point of view of applicable principles, but
the resolution of the question would have been easier had an identical case of similar background been
picked out from the jurisprudence we daily consult. Is there any precedent in the long Anglo-Saxon legal
history, from which has been directly derived the judicial system established here with its lofty ideals by
the Congress of the United States, and which we have preserved and attempted to improve, or in our
contemporaneous judicial history of more than half a century? From the citations of those defending the
law, we can not find a case in which the validity of a similar law had been sustained, while those against
its validity cite, among others, the cases of Day (In re Day, 54 NE 646), of Cannon (State vs. Cannon, 240
NW, 441), the opinion of the Supreme Court of Massachusetts in 1932 (81 ALR 1061), of Guaria (24
Phil., 37), aside from the opinion of the President which is expressed in his vote of the original bill and
which the postponement of the contested law respects.
This law has no precedent in its favor. When similar laws in other countries had been promulgated, the
judiciary immediately declared them without force or effect. It is not within our power to offer a
precedent to uphold the disputed law.
To be exact, we ought to state here that we have examined carefully the case that has been cited to us
as a favorable precedent of the law that of Cooper (22 NY, 81), where the Court of Appeals of New
York revoked the decision of the Supreme court of that State, denying the petition of Cooper to be
admitted to the practice of law under the provisions of a statute concerning the school of law of
Columbia College promulgated on April 7, 1860, which was declared by the Court of Appeals to be
consistent with the Constitution of the state of New York.
It appears that the Constitution of New York at that time provided:
They (i.e., the judges) shall not hold any other office of public trust. All votes for either of them
for any elective office except that of the Court of Appeals, given by the Legislature or the
people, shall be void. They shall not exercise any power of appointment to public office. Any
male citizen of the age of twenty-one years, of good moral character, and who possesses the
requisite qualifications of learning and ability, shall be entitled to admission to practice in all the
courts of this State. (p. 93).
According to the Court of Appeals, the object of the constitutional precept is as follows:
Attorneys, solicitors, etc., were public officers; the power of appointing them had previously
rested with the judges, and this was the principal appointing power which they possessed. The
convention was evidently dissatisfied with the manner in which this power had been exercised,
and with the restrictions which the judges had imposed upon admission to practice before
them. The prohibitory clause in the section quoted was aimed directly at this power, and the
insertion of the provision" expecting the admission of attorneys, in this particular section of the
Constitution, evidently arose from its connection with the object of this prohibitory clause.
There is nothing indicative of confidence in the courts or of a disposition to preserve any portion
of their power over this subject, unless the Supreme Court is right in the inference it draws from
the use of the word `admission' in the action referred to. It is urged that the admission spoken
of must be by the court; that to admit means to grant leave, and that the power of granting
necessarily implies the power of refusing, and of course the right of determining whether the
applicant possesses the requisite qualifications to entitle him to admission.
These positions may all be conceded, without affecting the validity of the act. (p. 93.)
Now, with respect to the law of April 7, 1860, the decision seems to indicate that it provided that the
possession of a diploma of the school of law of Columbia College conferring the degree of Bachelor of
Laws was evidence of the legal qualifications that the constitution required of applicants for admission
to the Bar. The decision does not however quote the text of the law, which we cannot find in any public
or accessible private library in the country.
In the case of Cooper, supra, to make the law consistent with the Constitution of New York, the Court of
Appeals said of the object of the law:
The motive for passing the act in question is apparent. Columbia College being an institution of
established reputation, and having a law department under the charge of able professors, the
students in which department were not only subjected to a formal examination by the law
committee of the institution, but to a certain definite period of study before being entitled to a
diploma of being graduates, the Legislature evidently, and no doubt justly, considered this
examination, together with the preliminary study required by the act, as fully equivalent as a
test of legal requirements, to the ordinary examination by the court; and as rendering the latter
examination, to which no definite period of preliminary study was essential, unnecessary and
burdensome.
The act was obviously passed with reference to the learning and ability of the applicant, and for
the mere purpose of substituting the examination by the law committee of the college for that
of the court. It could have had no other object, and hence no greater scope should be given to
its provisions. We cannot suppose that the Legislature designed entirely to dispense with the
plain and explicit requirements of the Constitution; and the act contains nothing whatever to
indicate an intention that the authorities of the college should inquire as to the age, citizenship,
etc., of the students before granting a diploma. The only rational interpretation of which the act
admits is, that it was intended to make the college diploma competent evidence as to the legal
attainments of the applicant, and nothing else. To this extent alone it operates as a modification
of pre-existing statutes, and it is to be read in connection with these statutes and with the
Constitution itself in order to determine the present condition of the law on the subject. (p.89)
xxx xxx xxx

The Legislature has not taken from the court its jurisdiction over the question of admission, that
has simply prescribed what shall be competent evidence in certain cases upon that question.
(p.93)
From the foregoing, the complete inapplicability of the case of Cooper with that at bar may be clearly
seen. Please note only the following distinctions:
(1) The law of New York does not require that any candidate of Columbia College who failed in the bar
examinations be admitted to the practice of law.
(2) The law of New York according to the very decision of Cooper, has not taken from the court its
jurisdiction over the question of admission of attorney at law; in effect, it does not decree the admission
of any lawyer.
(3) The Constitution of New York at that time and that of the Philippines are entirely different on the
matter of admission of the practice of law.
In the judicial system from which ours has been evolved, the admission, suspension, disbarment and
reinstatement of attorneys at law in the practice of the profession and their supervision have been
disputably a judicial function and responsibility. Because of this attribute, its continuous and zealous
possession and exercise by the judicial power have been demonstrated during more than six centuries,
which certainly "constitutes the most solid of titles." Even considering the power granted to Congress by
our Constitution to repeal, alter supplement the rules promulgated by this Court regarding the
admission to the practice of law, to our judgment and proposition that the admission, suspension,
disbarment and reinstatement of the attorneys at law is a legislative function, properly belonging to
Congress, is unacceptable. The function requires (1) previously established rules and principles, (2)
concrete facts, whether past or present, affecting determinate individuals. and (3) decision as to
whether these facts are governed by the rules and principles; in effect, a judicial function of the highest
degree. And it becomes more undisputably judicial, and not legislative, if previous judicial resolutions on
the petitions of these same individuals are attempted to be revoked or modified.
We have said that in the judicial system from which ours has been derived, the act of admitting,
suspending, disbarring and reinstating attorneys at law in the practice of the profession is concededly
judicial. A comprehensive and conscientious study of this matter had been undertaken in the case of
State vs. Cannon (1932) 240 NW 441, in which the validity of a legislative enactment providing that
Cannon be permitted to practice before the courts was discussed. From the text of this decision we
quote the following paragraphs:
This statute presents an assertion of legislative power without parallel in the history of the
English speaking people so far as we have been able to ascertain. There has been much
uncertainty as to the extent of the power of the Legislature to prescribe the ultimate
qualifications of attorney at law has been expressly committed to the courts, and the act of
admission has always been regarded as a judicial function. This act purports to constitute Mr.
Cannon an attorney at law, and in this respect it stands alone as an assertion of legislative
power. (p. 444)
Under the Constitution all legislative power is vested in a Senate and Assembly. (Section 1, art.
4.) In so far as the prescribing of qualifications for admission to the bar are legislative in
character, the Legislature is acting within its constitutional authority when it sets up and
prescribes such qualifications. (p. 444)
But when the Legislature has prescribed those qualifications which in its judgment will serve the
purpose of legitimate legislative solicitude, is the power of the court to impose other and
further exactions and qualifications foreclosed or exhausted? (p. 444)
Under our Constitution the judicial and legislative departments are distinct, independent, and
coordinate branches of the government. Neither branch enjoys all the powers of sovereignty
which properly belongs to its department. Neither department should so act as to embarrass
the other in the discharge of its respective functions. That was the scheme and thought of the
people setting upon the form of government under which we exist. State vs. Hastings, 10 Wis.,
525; Attorney General ex rel. Bashford vs. Barstow, 4 Wis., 567. (p. 445)
The judicial department of government is responsible for the plane upon which the
administration of justice is maintained. Its responsibility in this respect is exclusive. By
committing a portion of the powers of sovereignty to the judicial department of our state
government, under 42a scheme which it was supposed rendered it immune from
embarrassment or interference by any other department of government, the courts cannot
escape responsibility fir the manner in which the powers of sovereignty thus committed to the
judicial department are exercised. (p. 445)
The relation at the bar to the courts is a peculiar and intimate relationship. The bar is an attache
of the courts. The quality of justice dispense by the courts depends in no small degree upon the
integrity of its bar. An unfaithful bar may easily bring scandal and reproach to the administration
of justice and bring the courts themselves into disrepute. (p.445)
Through all time courts have exercised a direct and severe supervision over their bars, at least in
the English speaking countries. (p. 445)
After explaining the history of the case, the Court ends thus:
Our conclusion may be epitomized as follows: For more than six centuries prior to the adoption
of our Constitution, the courts of England, concededly subordinate to Parliament since the
Revolution of 1688, had exercise the right of determining who should be admitted to the
practice of law, which, as was said in Matter of the Sergeant's at Law, 6 Bingham's New Cases
235, "constitutes the most solid of all titles." If the courts and judicial power be regarded as an
entity, the power to determine who should be admitted to practice law is a constituent element
of that entity. It may be difficult to isolate that element and say with assurance that it is either a
part of the inherent power of the court, or an essential element of the judicial power exercised
by the court, but that it is a power belonging to the judicial entity and made of not only a
sovereign institution, but made of it a separate independent, and coordinate branch of the
government. They took this institution along with the power traditionally exercise to determine
who should constitute its attorney at law. There is no express provision in the Constitution
which indicates an intent that this traditional power of the judicial department should in any
manner be subject to legislative control. Perhaps the dominant thought of the framers of our
constitution was to make the three great departments of government separate and
independent of one another. The idea that the Legislature might embarrass the judicial
department by prescribing inadequate qualifications for attorneys at law is inconsistent with the
dominant purpose of making the judicial independent of the legislative department, and such a
purpose should not be inferred in the absence of express constitutional provisions. While the
legislature may legislate with respect to the qualifications of attorneys, but is incidental merely
to its general and unquestioned power to protect the public interest. When it does legislate a
fixing a standard of qualifications required of attorneys at law in order that public interests may
be protected, such qualifications do not constitute only a minimum standard and limit the class
from which the court must make its selection. Such legislative qualifications do not constitute
the ultimate qualifications beyond which the court cannot go in fixing additional qualifications
deemed necessary by the course of the proper administration of judicial functions. There is no
legislative power to compel courts to admit to their bars persons deemed by them unfit to
exercise the prerogatives of an attorney at law. (p. 450)
Furthermore, it is an unlawful attempt to exercise the power of appointment. It is quite likely

true that the legislature may exercise the power of appointment when it is in pursuance of a
legislative functions. However, the authorities are well-nigh unanimous that the power to admit
attorneys to the practice of law is a judicial function. In all of the states, except New Jersey (In re
Reisch, 83 N.J. Eq. 82, 90 A. 12), so far as our investigation reveals, attorneys receive their
formal license to practice law by their admission as members of the bar of the court so
admitting. Cor. Jur. 572; Ex parte Secombre, 19 How. 9,15 L. Ed. 565; Ex parte Garland, 4 Wall.
333, 18 L. Ed. 366; Randall vs. Brigham, 7 Wall. 53, 19 L. Ed. 285; Hanson vs. Grattan, 48 Kan,
843, 115 P. 646, 34 L.R.A. 519; Danforth vs. Egan, 23 S. D. 43, 119 N.W. 1021, 130 Am. St. Rep.
1030, 20 Ann. Cas. 413.
The power of admitting an attorney to practice having been perpetually exercised by the courts,
it having been so generally held that the act of the court in admitting an attorney to practice is
the judgment of the court, and an attempt as this on the part of the Legislature to confer such
right upon any one being most exceedingly uncommon, it seems clear that the licensing of an
attorney is and always has been a purely judicial function, no matter where the power to
determine the qualifications may reside. (p. 451)
In that same year of 1932, the Supreme Court of Massachusetts, in answering a consultation of the
Senate of that State, 180 NE 725, said:
It is indispensible to the administration of justice and to interpretation of the laws that there be
members of the bar of sufficient ability, adequate learning and sound moral character. This
arises from the need of enlightened assistance to the honest, and restraining authority over the
knavish, litigant. It is highly important, also that the public be protected from incompetent and
vicious practitioners, whose opportunity for doing mischief is wide. It was said by Cardoz, C.L., in
People ex rel. Karlin vs. Culkin, 242 N.Y. 456, 470, 471, 162 N.E. 487, 489, 60 A.L.R. 851:
"Membership in the bar is a privilege burden with conditions." One is admitted to the bar "for
something more than private gain." He becomes an "officer of the court", and ,like the court
itself, an instrument or agency to advance the end of justice. His cooperation with the court is
due "whenever justice would be imperiled if cooperation was withheld." Without such attorneys
at law the judicial department of government would be hampered in the performance of its
duties. That has been the history of attorneys under the common law, both in this country and
England. Admission to practice as an attorney at law is almost without exception conceded to be
a judicial function. Petition to that end is filed in courts, as are other proceedings invoking
judicial action. Admission to the bar is accomplish and made open and notorious by a decision of
the court entered upon its records. The establishment by the Constitution of the judicial
department conferred authority necessary to the exercise of its powers as a coordinate
department of government. It is an inherent power of such a department of government
ultimately to determine the qualifications of those to be admitted to practice in its courts, for
assisting in its work, and to protect itself in this respect from the unfit, those lacking in sufficient
learning, and those not possessing good moral character. Chief Justice Taney stated succinctly
and with finality in Ex parte Secombe, 19 How. 9, 13, 15 L. Ed. 565, "It has been well settled, by
the rules and practice of common-law courts, that it rests exclusively with the court to
determine who is qualified to become one of its officers, as an attorney and counselor, and for
what cause he ought to be removed." (p.727)
In the case of Day and others who collectively filed a petition to secure license to practice the legal
profession by virtue of a law of state (In re Day, 54 NE 646), the court said in part:
In the case of Ex parte Garland, 4 Wall, 333, 18 L. Ed. 366, the court, holding the test oath for
attorneys to be unconstitutional, explained the nature of the attorney's office as follows: "They
are officers of the court, admitted as such by its order, upon evidence of their possessing
sufficient legal learning and fair private character. It has always been the general practice in this
country to obtain this evidence by an examination of the parties. In this court the fact of the
admission of such officers in the highest court of the states to which they, respectively, belong
for, three years preceding their application, is regarded as sufficient evidence of the possession
of the requisite legal learning, and the statement of counsel moving their admission sufficient
evidence that their private and professional character is fair. The order of admission is the
judgment of the court that the parties possess the requisite qualifications as attorneys and
counselors, and are entitled to appear as such and conduct causes therein. From its entry the
parties become officers of the court, and are responsible to it for professional misconduct. They
hold their office during good behavior, and can only be deprived of it for misconduct ascertained
and declared by the judgment of the court after opportunity to be heard has been afforded. Ex
parte Hoyfron, admission or their exclusion is not the exercise of a mere ministerial power. It is
the exercise of judicial power, and has been so held in numerous cases. It was so held by the
court of appeals of New York in the matter of the application of Cooper for admission. Re
Cooper 22 N. Y. 81. "Attorneys and Counselors", said that court, "are not only officers of the
court, but officers whose duties relate almost exclusively to proceedings of a judicial nature; and
hence their appointment may, with propriety, be entrusted to the court, and the latter, in
performing his duty, may very justly considered as engaged in the exercise of their appropriate
judicial functions." (pp. 650-651).
We quote from other cases, the following pertinent portions:
Admission to practice of law is almost without exception conceded everywhere to be the

exercise of a judicial function, and this opinion need not be burdened with citations in this point.
Admission to practice have also been held to be the exercise of one of the inherent powers of
the court. Re Bruen, 102 Wash. 472, 172 Pac. 906.
Admission to the practice of law is the exercise of a judicial function, and is an inherent power of
the court. A.C. Brydonjack, vs. State Bar of California, 281 Pac. 1018; See Annotation on
Power of Legislature respecting admission to bar, 65, A.L. R. 1512.
On this matter there is certainly a clear distinction between the functions of the judicial and legislative
departments of the government.
The distinction between the functions of the legislative and the judicial departments is that it is
the province of the legislature to establish rules that shall regulate and govern in matters of
transactions occurring subsequent to the legislative action, while the judiciary determines rights
and obligations with reference to transactions that are past or conditions that exist at the time
of the exercise of judicial power, and the distinction is a vital one and not subject to alteration or
change either by legislative action or by judicial decree.
The judiciary cannot consent that its province shall be invaded by either of the other
departments of the government. 16 C.J.S., Constitutional Law, p. 229.
If the legislature cannot thus indirectly control the action of the courts by requiring of them
construction of the law according to its own views, it is very plain it cannot do so directly, by
settling aside their judgments, compelling them to grant new trials, ordering the discharge of
offenders, or directing what particular steps shall be taken in the progress of a judicial inquiry.
Cooley's Constitutional Limitations, 192.
In decreeing the bar candidates who obtained in the bar examinations of 1946 to 1952, a general
average of 70 per cent without falling below 50 per cent in any subject, be admitted in mass to the
practice of law, the disputed law is not a legislation; it is a judgment a judgment revoking those
promulgated by this Court during the aforecited year affecting the bar candidates concerned; and
although this Court certainly can revoke these judgments even now, for justifiable reasons, it is no less
certain that only this Court, and not the legislative nor executive department, that may be so. Any
attempt on the part of any of these departments would be a clear usurpation of its functions, as is the
case with the law in question.
That the Constitution has conferred on Congress the power to repeal, alter or supplement the rule
promulgated by this Tribunal, concerning the admission to the practice of law, is no valid argument.
Section 13, article VIII of the Constitution provides:
Section 13. The Supreme Court shall have the power to promulgate rules concerning pleading,
practice, and procedure in all courts, and the admission to the practice of law. Said rules shall be
uniform for all courts of the same grade and shall not diminish, increase or modify substantive
rights. The existing laws on pleading, practice and procedure are hereby repealed as statutes,
and are declared Rules of Court, subject to the power of the Supreme Court to alter and modify
the same. The Congress shall have the power to repeal, alter, or supplement the rules
concerning pleading, practice, and procedure, and the admission to the practice of law in the
Philippines. Constitution of the Philippines, Art. VIII, sec. 13.
It will be noted that the Constitution has not conferred on Congress and this Tribunal equal
responsibilities concerning the admission to the practice of law. the primary power and responsibility
which the Constitution recognizes continue to reside in this Court. Had Congress found that this Court
has not promulgated any rule on the matter, it would have nothing over which to exercise the power
granted to it. Congress may repeal, alter and supplement the rules promulgated by this Court, but the
authority and responsibility over the admission, suspension, disbarment and reinstatement of attorneys
at law and their supervision remain vested in the Supreme Court. The power to repeal, alter and
supplement the rules does not signify nor permit that Congress substitute or take the place of this
Tribunal in the exercise of its primary power on the matter. The Constitution does not say nor mean that
Congress may admit, suspend, disbar or reinstate directly attorneys at law, or a determinate group of
individuals to the practice of law. Its power is limited to repeal, modify or supplement the existing rules
on the matter, if according to its judgment the need for a better service of the legal profession requires
it. But this power does not relieve this Court of its responsibility to admit, suspend, disbar and reinstate
attorneys at law and supervise the practice of the legal profession.
Being coordinate and independent branches, the power to promulgate and enforce rules for the
admission to the practice of law and the concurrent power to repeal, alter and supplement them may
and should be exercised with the respect that each owes to the other, giving careful consideration to
the responsibility which the nature of each department requires. These powers have existed together
for centuries without diminution on each part; the harmonious delimitation being found in that the
legislature may and should examine if the existing rules on the admission to the Bar respond to the
demands which public interest requires of a Bar endowed with high virtues, culture, training and
responsibility. The legislature may, by means of appeal, amendment or supplemental rules, fill up any
deficiency that it may find, and the judicial power, which has the inherent responsibility for a good and
efficient administration of justice and the supervision of the practice of the legal profession, should
consider these reforms as the minimum standards for the elevation of the profession, and see to it that
with these reforms the lofty objective that is desired in the exercise of its traditional duty of admitting,
suspending, disbarring and reinstating attorneys at law is realized. They are powers which, exercise
within their proper constitutional limits, are not repugnant, but rather complementary to each other in
attaining the establishment of a Bar that would respond to the increasing and exacting necessities of the
administration of justice.
The case of Guaria (1913) 24 Phil., 37, illustrates our criterion. Guaria took examination and failed by
a few points to obtain the general average. A recently enacted law provided that one who had been
appointed to the position of Fiscal may be admitted to the practice of law without a previous
examination. The Government appointed Guaria and he discharged the duties of Fiscal in a remote
province. This tribunal refused to give his license without previous examinations. The court said:
Relying upon the provisions of section 2 of Act No. 1597, the applicant in this case seeks
admission to the bar, without taking the prescribed examination, on the ground that he holds
the office of provincial fiscal for the Province of Batanes.
Section 2 of Act No. 1597, enacted February 28, 1907, is as follows:
Sec. 2. Paragraph one of section thirteen of Act Numbered One Hundred and ninety, entitled
"An Act providing a Code of Procedure in Civil Actions and Special Proceedings in the Philippine
Islands," is hereby amended to read as follows:
1. Those who have been duly licensed under the laws and orders of the Islands under the
sovereignty of Spain or of the United States and are in good and regular standing as members of
the bar of the Philippine Islands at the time of the adoption of this code; Provided, That any
person who, prior to the passage of this act, or at any time thereafter, shall have held, under the
authority of the United States, the position of justice of the Supreme Court, judge of the Court
of First Instance, or judge or associate judge of the Court of Land Registration, of the Philippine
Islands, or the position of Attorney General, Solicitor General, Assistant Attorney General,
assistant attorney in the office of the Attorney General, prosecuting attorney for the City of
Manila, city attorney of Manila, assistant city attorney of Manila, provincial fiscal, attorney for
the Moro Province, or assistant attorney for the Moro Province, may be licensed to practice law
in the courts of the Philippine Islands without an examination, upon motion before the Supreme
Court and establishing such fact to the satisfaction of said court.
The records of this court disclose that on a former occasion this appellant took, and failed to
pass the prescribed examination. The report of the examining board, dated March 23, 1907,
shows that he received an average of only 71 per cent in the various branches of legal learning
upon which he was examined, thus falling four points short of the required percentage of 75.
We would be delinquent in the performance of our duty to the public and to the bar, if, in the
face of this affirmative indication of the deficiency of the applicant in the required qualifications
of learning in the law at the time when he presented his former application for admission to the
bar, we should grant him license to practice law in the courts of these Islands, without first
satisfying ourselves that despite his failure to pass the examination on that occasion, he now
"possesses the necessary qualifications of learning and ability."
But it is contented that under the provisions of the above-cited statute the applicant is entitled
as of right to be admitted to the bar without taking the prescribed examination "upon motion
before the Supreme Court" accompanied by satisfactory proof that he has held and now holds
the office of provincial fiscal of the Province of Batanes. It is urged that having in mind the
object which the legislator apparently sought to attain in enacting the above-cited amendment
to the earlier statute, and in view of the context generally and especially of the fact that the
amendment was inserted as a proviso in that section of the original Act which specifically
provides for the admission of certain candidates without examination. It is contented that this
mandatory construction is imperatively required in order to give effect to the apparent intention
of the legislator, and to the candidate's claim de jure to have the power exercised.
And after copying article 9 of Act of July 1, 1902 of the Congress of the United States, articles 2, 16 and
17 of Act No. 136, and articles 13 to 16 of Act 190, the Court continued:
Manifestly, the jurisdiction thus conferred upon this court by the commission and confirmed to
it by the Act of Congress would be limited and restricted, and in a case such as that under
consideration wholly destroyed, by giving the word "may," as used in the above citation from
Act of Congress of July 1, 1902, or of any Act of Congress prescribing, defining or limiting the
power conferred upon the commission is to that extent invalid and void, as transcending its
rightful limits and authority.
Speaking on the application of the law to those who were appointed to the positions enumerated, and
with particular emphasis in the case of Guaria, the Court held:
In the various cases wherein applications for the admission to the bar under the provisions of
this statute have been considered heretofore, we have accepted the fact that such
appointments had been made as satisfactory evidence of the qualifications of the applicant. But
in all of those cases we had reason to believe that the applicants had been practicing attorneys
prior to the date of their appointment.
In the case under consideration, however, it affirmatively appears that the applicant was not
and never had been practicing attorney in this or any other jurisdiction prior to the date of his
appointment as provincial fiscal, and it further affirmatively appears that he was deficient in the
required qualifications at the time when he last applied for admission to the bar.
In the light of this affirmative proof of his defieciency on that occasion, we do not think that his
appointment to the office of provincial fiscal is in itself satisfactory proof if his possession of the
necessary qualifications of learning and ability. We conclude therefore that this application for
license to practice in the courts of the Philippines, should be denied.
In view, however, of the fact that when he took the examination he fell only four points short of
the necessary grade to entitle him to a license to practice; and in view also of the fact that since
that time he has held the responsible office of the governor of the Province of Sorsogon and
presumably gave evidence of such marked ability in the performance of the duties of that office
that the Chief Executive, with the consent and approval of the Philippine Commission, sought to
retain him in the Government service by appointing him to the office of provincial fiscal, we
think we would be justified under the above-cited provisions of Act No. 1597 in waiving in his
case the ordinary examination prescribed by general rule, provided he offers satisfactory
evidence of his proficiency in a special examination which will be given him by a committee of
the court upon his application therefor, without prejudice to his right, if he desires so to do, to
present himself at any of the ordinary examinations prescribed by general rule. (In re
Guaria, pp. 48-49.)
It is obvious, therefore, that the ultimate power to grant license for the practice of law belongs
exclusively to this Court, and the law passed by Congress on the matter is of permissive character, or as
other authorities say, merely to fix the minimum conditions for the license.
The law in question, like those in the case of Day and Cannon, has been found also to suffer from the
fatal defect of being a class legislation, and that if it has intended to make a classification, it is arbitrary
and unreasonable.
In the case of Day, a law enacted on February 21, 1899 required of the Supreme Court, until December
31 of that year, to grant license for the practice of law to those students who began studying before
November 4, 1897, and had studied for two years and presented a diploma issued by a school of law, or
to those who had studied in a law office and would pass an examination, or to those who had studied
for three years if they commenced their studies after the aforementioned date. The Supreme Court
declared that this law was unconstitutional being, among others, a class legislation. The Court said:
This is an application to this court for admission to the bar of this state by virtue of diplomas
from law schools issued to the applicants. The act of the general assembly passed in 1899, under
which the application is made, is entitled "An act to amend section 1 of an act entitled "An act to
revise the law in relation to attorneys and counselors," approved March 28, 1884, in force July 1,
1874." The amendment, so far as it appears in the enacting clause, consists in the addition to
the section of the following: "And every application for a license who shall comply with the rules
of the supreme court in regard to admission to the bar in force at the time such applicant
commend the study of law, either in a law or office or a law school or college, shall be granted a
license under this act notwithstanding any subsequent changes in said rules". In re Day et al,
54 N.Y., p. 646.
. . . After said provision there is a double proviso, one branch of which is that up to December
31, 1899, this court shall grant a license of admittance to the bar to the holder of every diploma
regularly issued by any law school regularly organized under the laws of this state, whose
regular course of law studies is two years, and requiring an attendance by the student of at least
36 weeks in each of such years, and showing that the student began the study of law prior to
November 4, 1897, and accompanied with the usual proofs of good moral character. The other
branch of the proviso is that any student who has studied law for two years in a law office, or
part of such time in a law office, "and part in the aforesaid law school," and whose course of
study began prior to November 4, 1897, shall be admitted upon a satisfactory examination by
the examining board in the branches now required by the rules of this court. If the right to
admission exists at all, it is by virtue of the proviso, which, it is claimed, confers substantial rights
and privileges upon the persons named therein, and establishes rules of legislative creation for
their admission to the bar. (p. 647.)
Considering the proviso, however, as an enactment, it is clearly a special legislation, prohibited

by the constitution, and invalid as such. If the legislature had any right to admit attorneys to
practice in the courts and take part in the administration of justice, and could prescribe the
character of evidence which should be received by the court as conclusive of the requisite
learning and ability of persons to practice law, it could only be done by a general law, persons or
classes of persons. Const. art 4, section 2. The right to practice law is a privilege, and a license
for that purpose makes the holder an officer of the court, and confers upon him the right to
appear for litigants, to argue causes, and to collect fees therefor, and creates certain
exemptions, such as from jury services and arrest on civil process while attending court. The law
conferring such privileges must be general in its operation. No doubt the legislature, in framing
an enactment for that purpose, may classify persons so long as the law establishing classes in
general, and has some reasonable relation to the end sought. There must be some difference
which furnishes a reasonable basis for different one, having no just relation to the subject of the
legislation. Braceville Coal Co. vs. People, 147 Ill. 66, 35 N.E. 62; Ritchie vs. People, 155 Ill. 98, 40
N.E. 454; Railroad Co. vs. Ellis, 165 U.S. 150, 17 Sup. Ct. 255.
The length of time a physician has practiced, and the skill acquired by experience, may furnish a
basis for classification (Williams vs. People 121 Ill. 48, II N.E. 881); but the place where such
physician has resided and practiced his profession cannot furnish such basis, and is an arbitrary
discrimination, making an enactment based upon it void (State vs. Pennyeor, 65 N.E. 113, 18 Atl.
878). Here the legislature undertakes to say what shall serve as a test of fitness for the
profession of the law, and plainly, any classification must have some reference to learning,
character, or ability to engage in such practice. The proviso is limited, first, to a class of persons
who began the study of law prior to November 4, 1897. This class is subdivided into two classes
First, those presenting diplomas issued by any law school of this state before December 31,
1899; and, second, those who studied law for the period of two years in a law office, or part of
the time in a law school and part in a law office, who are to be admitted upon examination in
the subjects specified in the present rules of this court, and as to this latter subdivision there
seems to be no limit of time for making application for admission. As to both classes, the
conditions of the rules are dispensed with, and as between the two different conditions and
limits of time are fixed. No course of study is prescribed for the law school, but a diploma
granted upon the completion of any sort of course its managers may prescribe is made all-
sufficient. Can there be anything with relation to the qualifications or fitness of persons to
practice law resting upon the mere date of November 4, 1897, which will furnish a basis of
classification. Plainly not. Those who began the study of law November 4th could qualify
themselves to practice in two years as well as those who began on the 3rd. The classes named in
the proviso need spend only two years in study, while those who commenced the next day must
spend three years, although they would complete two years before the time limit. The one who
commenced on the 3rd. If possessed of a diploma, is to be admitted without examination before
December 31, 1899, and without any prescribed course of study, while as to the other the
prescribed course must be pursued, and the diploma is utterly useless. Such classification
cannot rest upon any natural reason, or bear any just relation to the subject sought, and none is
suggested. The proviso is for the sole purpose of bestowing privileges upon certain defined
persons. (pp. 647-648.)
In the case of Cannon above cited, State vs. Cannon, 240 N.W. 441, where the legislature attempted by
law to reinstate Cannon to the practice of law, the court also held with regards to its aspect of being a
class legislation:
But the statute is invalid for another reason. If it be granted that the legislature has power to
prescribe ultimately and definitely the qualifications upon which courts must admit and license
those applying as attorneys at law, that power can not be exercised in the manner here
attempted. That power must be exercised through general laws which will apply to all alike and
accord equal opportunity to all. Speaking of the right of the Legislature to exact qualifications of
those desiring to pursue chosen callings, Mr. Justice Field in the case of Dent. vs. West Virginia,
129 U.S. 114, 121, 9 S. Ct. 232, 233, 32 L. Ed. 626, said: "It is undoubtedly the right of every
citizen of the United States to follow any lawful calling, business or profession he may choose,
subject only to such restrictions as are imposed upon all persons of like age, sex, and condition."
This right may in many respects be considered as a distinguishing feature of our republican
institutions. Here all vocations are all open to every one on like conditions. All may be pursued
as sources of livelihood, some requiring years of study and great learning for their successful
prosecution. The interest, or, as it is sometimes termed, the "estate" acquired in them that is,
the right to continue their prosecution is often of great value to the possessors and cannot be
arbitrarily taken from them, any more than their real or personal property can be thus taken. It
is fundamental under our system of government that all similarly situated and possessing equal
qualifications shall enjoy equal opportunities. Even statutes regulating the practice of medicine,
requiring medications to establish the possession on the part of the application of his proper
qualifications before he may be licensed to practice, have been challenged, and courts have
seriously considered whether the exemption from such examinations of those practicing in the
state at the time of the enactment of the law rendered such law unconstitutional because of
infringement upon this general principle. State vs. Thomas Call, 121 N.C. 643, 28 S.E. 517; see,
also, The State ex rel. Winkler vs. Rosenberg, 101 Wis. 172, 76 N.W. 345; State vs. Whitcom, 122
Wis. 110, 99 N.W. 468.
This law singles out Mr. Cannon and assumes to confer upon him the right to practice law and to
constitute him an officer of this Court as a mere matter of legislative grace or favor. It is not
material that he had once established his right to practice law and that one time he possessed
the requisite learning and other qualifications to entitle him to that right. That fact in no matter
affect the power of the Legislature to select from the great body of the public an individual upon
whom it would confer its favors.
A statute of the state of Minnesota (Laws 1929, c. 424) commanded the Supreme Court to admit
to the practice of law without examination, all who had served in the military or naval forces of
the United States during the World War and received a honorable discharge therefrom and who
(were disabled therein or thereby within the purview of the Act of Congress approved June 7th,
1924, known as "World War Veteran's Act, 1924 and whose disability is rated at least ten per
cent thereunder at the time of the passage of this Act." This Act was held |unconstitutional on
the ground that it clearly violated the quality clauses of the constitution of that state. In re
Application of George W. Humphrey, 178 Minn. 331, 227 N.W. 179.
A good summary of a classification constitutionally acceptable is explained in 12 Am. Jur. 151-153 as

follows:
The general rule is well settled by unanimity of the authorities that a classification to be valid
must rest upon material differences between the person included in it and those excluded and,
furthermore, must be based upon substantial distinctions. As the rule has sometimes avoided
the constitutional prohibition, must be founded upon pertinent and real differences, as
distinguished from irrelevant and artificial ones. Therefore, any law that is made applicable to
one class of citizens only must be based on some substantial difference between the situation of
that class and other individuals to which it does not apply and must rest on some reason on
which it can be defended. In other words, there must be such a difference between the
situation and circumstances of all the members of the class and the situation and circumstances
of all other members of the state in relation to the subjects of the discriminatory legislation as
presents a just and natural cause for the difference made in their liabilities and burdens and in
their rights and privileges. A law is not general because it operates on all within a clause unless
there is a substantial reason why it is made to operate on that class only, and not generally on
all. (12 Am. Jur. pp. 151-153.)
Pursuant to the law in question, those who, without a grade below 50 per cent in any subject, have
obtained a general average of 69.5 per cent in the bar examinations in 1946 to 1951, 70.5 per cent in
1952, 71.5 per cent in 1953, and those will obtain 72.5 per cent in 1954, and 73.5 per cent in 1955, will
be permitted to take and subscribe the corresponding oath of office as members of the Bar,
notwithstanding that the rules require a minimum general average of 75 per cent, which has been
invariably followed since 1950. Is there any motive of the nature indicated by the abovementioned
authorities, for this classification ? If there is none, and none has been given, then the classification is
fatally defective.
It was indicated that those who failed in 1944, 1941 or the years before, with the general average
indicated, were not included because the Tribunal has no record of the unsuccessful candidates of those
years. This fact does not justify the unexplained classification of unsuccessful candidates by years, from
1946-1951, 1952, 1953, 1954, 1955. Neither is the exclusion of those who failed before said years under
the same conditions justified. The fact that this Court has no record of examinations prior to 1946 does
not signify that no one concerned may prove by some other means his right to an equal consideration.
To defend the disputed law from being declared unconstitutional on account of its retroactivity, it is
argued that it is curative, and that in such form it is constitutional. What does Rep. Act 972 intend to
cure ? Only from 1946 to 1949 were there cases in which the Tribunal permitted admission to the bar of
candidates who did not obtain the general average of 75 per cent: in 1946 those who obtained only 72
per cent; in the 1947 and those who had 69 per cent or more; in 1948, 70 per cent and in 1949, 74 per
cent; and in 1950 to 1953, those who obtained 74 per cent, which was considered by the Court as
equivalent to 75 per cent as prescribed by the Rules, by reason of circumstances deemed to be
sufficiently justifiable. These changes in the passing averages during those years were all that could be
objected to or criticized. Now, it is desired to undo what had been done cancel the license that was
issued to those who did not obtain the prescribed 75 per cent ? Certainly not. The disputed law clearly
does not propose to do so. Concededly, it approves what has been done by this Tribunal. What Congress
lamented is that the Court did not consider 69.5 per cent obtained by those candidates who failed in
1946 to 1952 as sufficient to qualify them to practice law. Hence, it is the lack of will or defect of
judgment of the Court that is being cured, and to complete the cure of this infirmity, the effectivity of
the disputed law is being extended up to the years 1953, 1954 and 1955, increasing each year the
general average by one per cent, with the order that said candidates be admitted to the Bar. This
purpose, manifest in the said law, is the best proof that what the law attempts to amend and correct are
not the rules promulgated, but the will or judgment of the Court, by means of simply taking its place.
This is doing directly what the Tribunal should have done during those years according to the judgment
of Congress. In other words, the power exercised was not to repeal, alter or supplement the rules, which
continue in force. What was done was to stop or suspend them. And this power is not included in what
the Constitution has granted to Congress, because it falls within the power to apply the rules. This
power corresponds to the judiciary, to which such duty been confided.
Article 2 of the law in question permits partial passing of examinations, at indefinite intervals. The grave
defect of this system is that it does not take into account that the laws and jurisprudence are not
stationary, and when a candidate finally receives his certificate, it may happen that the existing laws and
jurisprudence are already different, seriously affecting in this manner his usefulness. The system that
the said law prescribes was used in the first bar examinations of this country, but was abandoned for
this and other disadvantages. In this case, however, the fatal defect is that the article is not expressed in
the title will have temporary effect only from 1946 to 1955, the text of article 2 establishes a permanent
system for an indefinite time. This is contrary to Section 21 (1), article VI of the Constitution, which
vitiates and annuls article 2 completely; and because it is inseparable from article 1, it is obvious that its
nullity affect the entire law.
Laws are unconstitutional on the following grounds: first, because they are not within the legislative
powers of Congress to enact, or Congress has exceeded its powers; second, because they create or
establish arbitrary methods or forms that infringe constitutional principles; and third, because their
purposes or effects violate the Constitution or its basic principles. As has already been seen, the
contested law suffers from these fatal defects.
Summarizing, we are of the opinion and hereby declare that Republic Act No. 972 is unconstitutional
and therefore, void, and without any force nor effect for the following reasons, to wit:
1. Because its declared purpose is to admit 810 candidates who failed in the bar examinations of 1946-
1952, and who, it admits, are certainly inadequately prepared to practice law, as was exactly found by
this Court in the aforesaid years. It decrees the admission to the Bar of these candidates, depriving this
Tribunal of the opportunity to determine if they are at present already prepared to become members of
the Bar. It obliges the Tribunal to perform something contrary to reason and in an arbitrary manner. This
is a manifest encroachment on the constitutional responsibility of the Supreme Court.
2. Because it is, in effect, a judgment revoking the resolution of this Court on the petitions of these 810
candidates, without having examined their respective examination papers, and although it is admitted
that this Tribunal may reconsider said resolution at any time for justifiable reasons, only this Court and
no other may revise and alter them. In attempting to do it directly Republic Act No. 972 violated the
Constitution.
3. By the disputed law, Congress has exceeded its legislative power to repeal, alter and supplement the
rules on admission to the Bar. Such additional or amendatory rules are, as they ought to be, intended to
regulate acts subsequent to its promulgation and should tend to improve and elevate the practice of
law, and this Tribunal shall consider these rules as minimum norms towards that end in the admission,
suspension, disbarment and reinstatement of lawyers to the Bar, inasmuch as a good bar assists
immensely in the daily performance of judicial functions and is essential to a worthy administration of
justice. It is therefore the primary and inherent prerogative of the Supreme Court to render the ultimate
decision on who may be admitted and may continue in the practice of law according to existing rules.
4. The reason advanced for the pretended classification of candidates, which the law makes, is contrary
to facts which are of general knowledge and does not justify the admission to the Bar of law students
inadequately prepared. The pretended classification is arbitrary. It is undoubtedly a class legislation.
5. Article 2 of Republic Act No. 972 is not embraced in the title of the law, contrary to what the
Constitution enjoins, and being inseparable from the provisions of article 1, the entire law is void.
6. Lacking in eight votes to declare the nullity of that part of article 1 referring to the examinations of
1953 to 1955, said part of article 1, insofar as it concerns the examinations in those years, shall continue
in force.
RESOLUTION
Upon mature deliberation by this Court, after hearing and availing of the magnificent and impassioned
discussion of the contested law by our Chief Justice at the opening and close of the debate among the
members of the Court, and after hearing the judicious observations of two of our beloved colleagues
who since the beginning have announced their decision not to take part in voting, we, the eight
members of the Court who subscribed to this decision have voted and resolved, and have decided for
the Court, and under the authority of the same:
1. That (a) the portion of article 1 of Republic Act No. 972 referring to the examinations of 1946 to 1952,
and (b) all of article 2 of said law are unconstitutional and, therefore, void and without force and effect.
2. That, for lack of unanimity in the eight Justices, that part of article 1 which refers to the examinations
subsequent to the approval of the law, that is from 1953 to 1955 inclusive, is valid and shall continue to
be in force, in conformity with section 10, article VII of the Constitution.
Consequently, (1) all the above-mentioned petitions of the candidates who failed in the examinations of
1946 to 1952 inclusive are denied, and (2) all candidates who in the examinations of 1953 obtained a
general average of 71.5 per cent or more, without having a grade below 50 per cent in any subject, are
considered as having passed, whether they have filed petitions for admission or not. After this decision
has become final, they shall be permitted to take and subscribe the corresponding oath of office as
members of the Bar on the date or dates that the chief Justice may set. So ordered.
Bengzon, Montemayor, Jugo, Labrador, Pablo, Padilla, and Reyes, JJ., concur.
ANNEX I
PETITIONERS UNDER REPUBLIC ACT NO. 972
A resume of pertinent facts concerning the bar examinations of 1946 to 1953 inclusive follows:
August, 19461
Board of Examiners: Hon. Pedro Tuason, Chairman, Prof. Gerardo Florendo, Atty. Bernardino Guerrero,
Atty. Joaquin Ramirez, Atty. Crispin Oben, Hon. Jose Teodoro, Atty. Federico Agrava, Atty. Jose Perez
Cardenas, and Hon. Bienvenido A. Tan, members.
Number of candidates 206
Number of candidates whose grades were raised 12
73'S 6
72'S 6
Number of candidates who passed 85
Number of candidates who failed 121
Number of those affected by Republic Act No. 972 18
Percentage of success (per cent) 41.62
Percentage of failure (per cent) 58.74
Passing grade (per cent) 72
November, 1946
Board of Examiners: The same as that of August, 1946, except Hon. Jose Teodoro who was substituted
by Atty. Honesto K. Bausan.
(72 per cent and above 73 per cent ---
Minutes of March 31, 1947)
(By resolution of the Court).
October, 1947
Board of Examiners: Hon. Cesar Bengzon, Chairman, Hon. Guillermo B. Guevara, Atty. Antonio Araneta,
Atty. Simon Cruz, Hon. Sixto de la Costa, Atty. Celso B. Jamora, Hon. Emilio Pea, Atty. Federico Agrava,
Atty. Carlos B. Hilado, Members.
70.55 per cent with 2 subject below 50 per cent 1
69 per cent 40
68 per cent 2
(by resolution of the Court).
Note.--In passing the 2 whose grades were 68.95 per cent and 68.1 per cent respectively, the Court
found out that they were not benefited at all by the bonus of 12 points given by the Examiner in Civil
Law.
August, 1948
Board of Examiners: Hon. Marceliano R. Montemayor, Chairman Hon. Luis P. Torres, Hon. Felipe
Natividad, Hon. Jose Teodoro, Sr., Atty. Federico Agrava, Atty. Macario Peralta, Sr., Hon. Jesus G.
Barrera, Hon. Rafael Amparo, Atty. Alfonso Ponce Enrile, Members.
71's 29
70's 35
August, 1949
Board of Examiners: Hon. Sabino Padilla, Chairman, Hon. Fernando Jugo, Hon. Enrique Filamor, Atty.
Salvador Araneta, Hon. Pastor M. Endencia, Atty. Federico Agrava, Hon. Mariano H. de Joya, Hon. Felipe
Natividad, Atty. Emeterio Barcelon, Members.
Number of candidates 1,218
Number of candidates whose grades were raised (74's) 55
August, 1950
Board of Examiners: Hon. Fernando Jugo,2 Chairman, Hon. Guillermo B. Guevara, Atty. Enrique Altavas,
Atty. Marcial P. Lichauco, Atty. Carlos B. Hilado, Atty. J. Antonio Araneta, Hon. Enrique V. Filamor, Hon.
Francisco A. Delgado, Hon. Antonio Horrilleno, Members.
(The grade of 74 was raised to 75 per cent by recommendation and authority
of the examiner in Remedial Law, Atty. Francisco Delgado).
August, 1951
Board of Examiners: Hon. Guillermo F. Pablo, Chairman, Hon. Pastor M. Endencia, Atty. Enrique Altavas,
Hon. Manuel Lim, Hon. Felipe Natividad, Hon. Vicente Albert, Atty. Arturo Alafriz, Hon. Enrique V.
Filamor, Hon. Alfonso Felix, Members.
Number of candidates who passed 1,189
August, 1952
Board of Examiners: Hon. Sabino Padilla, Chairman, Hon. Pastor M. Endencia, Hon. Enrique V. Filamor,
Atty. Francisco Ortigas, Hon. Emilio Pea, Atty. Emilio P. Virata, Hon. Alfonso Felix, Hon. Felipe
Natividad, Atty. Macario Peralta, Sr., Members.
Number of candidates who failed 1,033
August, 1953
Board of Examiners: Hon. Fernando Jugo, Chairman, Hon. Pastor M. Endencia, Atty. Enrique Altavas,
Atty. Francisco Ortigas, Jr., Hon. Emilio Pea, Atty. Jose S. de la Cruz, Hon. Alfonso Felix, Hon. Felipe
Natividad, Hon. Mariano L. de la Rosa, Members.
A list of petitioners for admission to the Bar under Republic Act No. 972, grouped by the years in which
they took the bar examinations, with annotations as to who had presented motions for reconsideration
which were denied (MRD), and who filed mere motions for reconsideration without invoking said law,
which are still pending, follows:
PETITIONER UNDER THE BAR FLUNKERS' LAW
Civ Land Merc In Pol Crim Rem. Leg Gen. Av.
. . t. . . .
MRD- 1. Agunod, Filemon L. 66 71 61 7 80 83 73 75 71.4
6
MRD- 2. Cunanan, Albino 76 72 74 7 70 70 65 72 71.45
5
MRD- 3. Mejia, Flaviano V. 64 64 65 6 83 74 68 80 69.85
8
1948
MRD- 4. Orlina, Soledad R. 71 68 66 7 63 75 70 88 69.9
5
MRD- 5. Vivero, Antonio Lu. 75 73 73 6 63 66 65 80 69.95
5
MRD- 6. Gatchalian, Salud 72 66 71 7 78 68 65 50 69.65
5
1949
7. Abaya, Jesus A. 69 79 75 7 71 89 55 75 70.8
5
MRD- 8. Advincula, David D. 76 80 62 8 81 72 60 65 70.5
6
9. Agraviador, Alfredo L. 63 85 70 7 80 81 65 80 71.8
7
10. Alacar, Pascual C. 61 63 83 7 71 85 65 80 72.05
9
11. Amog, Pedro M. 75 66 76 7 81 74 55 85 72.2
8
12. Apolinario, Miguel S. 75 84 78 7 70 70 60 75 71.95
8
13. Aquino, Maximo G. 82 77 71 7 76 77 60 75 73.15
7
14. Asinas, Candido D. 75 83 69 8 81 83 55 85 72.65
0
15. Baldivino, Jose B. 75 65 72 8 82 69 60 80 71.95
2
16. Balintona, Bernardo 75 80 64 7 74 67 65 70 70
8
17. Banawa, Angel L. 78 70 70 7 81 83 60 60 72.3
5
18. Bandala, Anacleto A. 66 80 66 7 93 72 55 70 69.6
1
19. Bandon, Alawadin L. 74 79 69 7 91 73 60 80 73.35
7
20. Baquero, Benjamin 76 79 64 7 85 72 65 75 72.5
7
21. Blanco, Jose 75 75 70 7 77 76 60 90 72.5
5
22. Buenaluz, Victoriano T. 75 71 72 7 67 82 60 75 70.85
8
23. Canda, Benjamin S. 75 72 75 8 76 77 65 75 73.55
2
24. Canon, Guillermo 77 86 67 8 75 69 70 85 73.9
8
25. Carlos, Estela S. 75 81 81 7 72 73 65 70 73.8
9
26. Cerezo, Gregorio O. 69 76 76 7 71 80 55 80 70.4
9
27. Clarin, Manuel L. 75 82 76 8 73 69 70 75 73.95
1
28. Claudo, Conrado O. 76 62 78 7 73 72 60 70 71.4
7
29. Condevillamar, Antonio V. 68 65 74 8 85 75 60 75 71.65
0
MRD- 30. Cornejo, Crisanto R. 72 75 69 8 83 79 65 80 73.4
2
31. Corona, Olvido D. 68 76 73 8 81 72 60 75 71.15
1
32. Dizon, Marcial C. 76 86 69 8 75 74 65 80 73.1
3
33. Enriquez, Agustin P. 75 77 70 8 81 77 65 80 73.75
1
34. Espiritu, Irineo E. 80 88 69 7 76 77 65 75 73.8
5
35. Fernandez, Macario J. 63 82 76 7 81 84 65 75 72.95
5
36. Gallardo, Amando C. 78 79 67 7 76 75 60 65 70.95
7
37. Garcia, Freidrich M. 76 80 66 7 72 70 60 75 69.7
5
38. Garcia, Julian L. 64 77 68 8 89 77 65 75 72.15
2
39. Garcia, Leon Mo. 77 86 71 8 60 82 65 75 71.85
0
40. Garcia, Pedro V. 76 82 73 8 74 83 60 85 73.6
1
41. Garcia, Santiago C. 62 91 79 7 72 75 65 80 71.8
5
42. Genoves, Pedro 75 83 70 7 87 76 55 80 72.7
8
43. Gonzales, Amado P. 75 71 71 7 86 75 60 75 72.65
5
44. Guia, Odon R. de 77 76 66 8 74 76 60 75 70.9
1
45. Fernandez, Simeon 62 68 71 8 74 90 65 75 70.85
0
46. Jakosalem, Filoteo 82 83 73 8 61 87 65 70 73.6
2
47. Jesus, Felipe D. de 75 83 67 7 78 85 60 75 72.45
9
48. Jocom, Jacobo M. 77 77 74 7 74 64 55 85 70.65
7
49. Juares, Nicolas 77 84 56 7 73 82 60 85 70
6
50. Kalalang, Remigio 65 75 74 8 70 70 65 85 70.3
0
51. Layumas, Vicente L. 67 84 65 7 89 66 60 80 70.3
5
52. Leyson, Amancio F. 69 83 75 7 81 75 65 75 73.15
6
53. Libanan, Marcelino 71 83 61 7 80 81 65 85 71.75
7
54. Lim, Jose E. 77 77 72 7 72 64 65 70 71.15
6
55. Lim, Jose F. 70 75 62 8 80 71 65 80 70.4
3
56. Linao, Mariano M. 66 84 76 7 80 75 60 75 71.75
8
57. Lopez, Angelo P. 67 81 75 7 79 81 55 80 71
2
58. Lopez, Eliezar M. 77 75 60 7 77 85 60 75 70.7
5
59. Lopez, Nicanor S. 72 71 70 7 77 84 60 75 71.55
8
60. Manoleto, Proceso D. 72 70 65 7 81 90 60 80 71.95
8
61. Mancao, Alfredo P. 67 64 71 8 76 76 65 80 70.95
3
62. Manera, Mariano A. 75 78 75 7 68 79 60 65 71
5
63. Mercado, Arsenio N. 67 64 71 8 76 76 65 80 70.95
3
64. Miranda, Benjamin G. 76 81 67 8 74 77 65 80 72.55
2
65. Manad, Andres B. 77 75 68 8 69 72 65 75 71.15
2
1948
66. Orosco, Casimiro P. 72 84 69 8 70 82 65 75 71.9
1
67. Padua, Manuel C. 76 76 68 8 79 79 50 75 70.1
0
68. Palang, Basilio S. 71 75 82 7 55 87 55 75 69.6
1
69. Palma, Cuadrato 62 75 69 9 80 79 55 80 69.5
3
70. Paganiban, Jose V. 67 83 61 8 91 74 60 75 70.6
1
71. Pareja, Felipe 66 71 75 8 67 74 60 70 68.75
1
72. Patalinjug, Eriberto 73 77 78 7 78 71 55 75 71.25
3
73. Paulin, Jose C. 66 69 71 7 83 82 65 75 72.1
7
74. Pido, Serafin C. 72 78 63 8 71 85 70 80 72.05
0
75. Pimentel, Luis P. 77 75 76 8 76 68 55 80 71.6
1
76. Plantilla, Rodrigo C. 72 78 68 8 79 81 65 85 73.55
9
77. Regalario, Benito B. 72 80 64 8 75 81 55 80 69.55
0
78. Robis, Casto P. 62 77 74 7 68 80 70 80 70.9
3
79. Rodil, Francisco C. 68 69 70 8 76 75 65 75 70.75
1
80. Rodriguez, Mariano I. 80 75 69 8 72 80 65 80 73.35
0
81. Romero, Crispulo P. 78 75 66 7 76 83 65 75 72.85
7
82. Saez, Porfirio D. 75 75 72 8 69 77 60 75 71
1
83. Saliguma, Crisogono D. 79 79 74 7 69 65 65 70 71.8
8
84. Samano, Fortunato A. 75 84 72 7 70 82 60 75 71.9
7
85. Santos, Faustina C. 71 68 68 7 75 85 55 75 69.5
6
86. Santos, Josefina R. 68 69 76 7 77 82 65 75 72.3
1
87. Seludo, Ananias G. 75 80 69 7 77 82 65 75 73.25
9
88. Semilia, Rafael I. 68 85 55 8 89 79 65 80 71.25
3
89. Telan, Gaudencio 77 79 70 7 70 75 60 75 70.85
5
90. Tesorero, Leocadio T. 75 71 63 7 82 62 65 63 69.65
5
91. Torre, Valentin S. de la 85 81 71 7 69 65 55 70 70.4
6
92. Torres, Ariston L. 78 71 72 8 61 84 55 85 70.4
1
93. Veyra, Zosimo C. de 70 75 71 7 65 80 65 80 70.65
9
94. Viado, Jose 67 70 74 7 75 90 55 80 70.7
5
95. Villacarlos, Delfin A. 73 87 71 8 69 70 75 85 73.85
2
96. Villamil, Leonor S. 73 81 76 8 86 73 55 85 73.6
6
97. Zabala, Amando A. 76 70 67 7 76 76 60 75 70.6
5
1950
MRD-98. Cruz, Filomeno de la 70 71 78 8 76 72 64 96 73.4
1
99. Espaola, Pablo S. 71 78 55 7 85 69 65 93 70.2
6
100. Foronda, Clarencio J. 60 78 68 7 84 88 62 93 71.9
9
101. Hechanova, Vicente 59 76 75 7 69 68 75 96 71.3
5
MRD-102. Pealosa, Osias R. 80 78 61 7 61 77 66 85 70.2
6
103. Sarmiento, Floro A. 65 86 63 8 89 72 60 72 70.15
2
MRD-104. Torre, Catalino P. 75 85 68 7 69 67 65 69 70.25
8
105. Ungson, Fernando S. 61 87 75 7 57 85 83 82 72.8
0
1951
106. Abasolo, Romulo 77 70 64 6 76 70 76 64 71.7
5
107. Adeva, Daniel G. 75 59 74 6 69 51 78 67 70.4
5
108. Aguilar, Vicente Z. 73 63 68 7 70 69 75 75 71.25
5
109. Amodia, Juan T. 75 76 66 7 76 60 77 76 72.35
5
MRD-110. Aosa, Pablo S. 76 78 63 7 74 61 75 79 71.6
5
111. Antiola, Anastacio R. 68 76 75 7 71 70 81 66 73.05
0
112. Aquino, S. Rey A. 70 71 71 6 74 62 76 77 71.1
0
113. Atienza, Manuel G. 71 78 68 8 86 51 82 75 73.85
0
114. Avancea, Alfonso 71 71 65 7 70 72 78 80 71.8
5
MRD-115. Balacuit, Camilo N. 75 73 75 7 72 65 75 76 73.25
0
116. Barinaga, Jeremias L. 68 69 73 7 74 50 80 79 71.2
0
MRD-117. Barrientos, Ambrosio D. 76 60 67 5 74 63 77 62 70.25
5
MRD-118. Benitez, Tomas P. 67 75 75 6 73 72 75 78 72.2
0
119. Biason, Sixto F. 73 82 67 6 66 72 77 68 71.25
5
MRD-120. Brias, Isagani A. 71 69 74 7 76 52 79 72 71.95
0
121. Buela, Arcadio P. 72 77 61 7 71 58 79 71 69.75
0
122. Cabilao, Leonardo S. 73 50 75 7 75 60 71 79 71.25
5
123. Cabrera, Ireneo M. 75 66 70 6 72 81 70 79 72.4
5
124. Cacacho, Emilio V.
125. Calilung, Soledad C. 64 73 73 8 73 57 75 59 69.65
0
MRD-126. Calimlim, Jose B. 64 73 73 8 73 57 75 59 69.65
0
127. Calimlim, Pedro B. 66 82 69 6 69 52 83 75 70
0
128. Camello, Sotero H. 70 77 63 6 75 66 84 64 71.55
5
129. Campos, Juan A. 71 88 70 7 64 69 71 62 70.15
5
130. Castillo, Antonio del 78 78 70 6 79 67 69 76 72.65
0
MRD-131. Castillo, Dominador Ad. 75 61 72 7 74 71 67 66 71.1
5
MRD-132. Castro, Jesus B. 72 86 72 7 65 75 76 71 72.85
5
133. Casuga, Bienvenido B. 75 72 72 7 69 61 75 60 70.95
0
134. Cabangbang, Santiago B. 77 67 61 8 73 59 83 76 72.2
0
135. Cruz, Federico S. 69 74 75 7 68 65 76 70 71.65
5
136. Dacanay, Eufemio P. 70 73 62 7 72 69 85 71 72.05
5
137. Deysolong, Felisberto 66 62 72 7 70 62 83 62 70.85
5
MRD-138. Dimaano, Jr., Jose N. 78 79 63 7 73 75 81 59 73.5
5
139. Espinosa, Domingo L. 78 63 58 7 70 67 87 63 71.6
0
MRD-140. Farol, Evencia C. 80 78 66 7 81 72 62 73 72.25
5
141. Felix, Conrado S. 71 71 75 6 70 58 75 69 70.75
5
142. Fernan, Pablo L. 67 88 66 8 73 68 78 75 72.35
5
143. Gandioco, Salvador G. 64 58 66 6 76 70 89 75 72.1
5
144. Gastardo, Crispin B. 70 69 68 7 78 66 86 72 73.9
5
145. Genson, Angelo B. 75 57 73 6 67 54 78 56 69.55
5
146. Guiani, Guinald M. 68 60 75 6 74 67 75 77 71.5
5
147. Guina, Graciano P. 66 69 67 6 78 52 83 61 69.6
0
MRD-148. Homeres, Praxedes P. 74 74 75 7 71 69 75 71 73.35
5
149. Ibarra, Venancio M. 60 75 74 7 74 70 80 75 71.9
0
150. Imperial, Monico L. 72 78 75 7 72 56 82 77 73.7
5
MRD-151. Ibasco, Jr., Emiliano M. 71 70 63 8 71 60 85 53 70.85
5
152. Inandan, Fortunato C. 77 77 67 5 73 75 79 57 72.5
3
153. Jimenez, Florencio C. 75 70 70 7 72 61 75 78 72.05
5
154. Kintanar, Woodrow M. 70 83 72 6 76 73 75 69 72.95
5
155. Languido, Cesar V. 63 71 63 8 70 61 85 79 70.55
5
156. Lavilles, Cesar L. 61 89 75 5 73 63 75 78 70.55
5
157. Llenos, Francisco U. 64 70 65 6 72 65 92 75 71.75
0
158. Leon, Marcelo D. de 63 73 60 8 75 75 90 70 72.75
5
159. Llanto, Priscilla 72 68 60 6 76 67 84 68 71.35
5
160. Machachor, Oscar 68 59 78 7 67 57 75 75 70.15
0
MRD-161. Magsino, Encarnacion 77 66 70 7 76 71 75 61 72.75
0
MRD-162. Maligaya, Demetrio M. 70 61 75 6 75 50 91 51 72.3
5
163. Manio, Gregorio 67 67 69 8 71 67 75 75 70.65
0
164. Puzon, Eduardo S. 72 82 60 6 69 70 68 72 62.05
0
MRD-165. Marcial, Meynardo R. 66 75 74 7 75 67 81 75 73.15
0
166. Martin, Benjamin S. 68 72 63 7 69 63 84 62 70.1
5
MRD-167. Monterroyo, Catalina S. 70 80 75 8 76 66 82 51 73.95
0
MRD-168. Montero, Leodegario C. 73 67 66 8 81 65 81 75 73.75
0
169. Monzon, Candido T. 70 72 74 7 67 70 77 69 72.05
5
170. Natividad, Alberto M. 73 79 68 6 73 69 75 79 72.2
5
MRD-171. Navallo, Capistrano C. 70 72 68 8 81 66 71 74 72.1
5
172. Nisce, Camilo Z. 66 66 75 6 79 68 85 62 73.5
5
MRD-173. Ocampo, Antonio F. de 75 81 76 6 74 67 75 69 73.75
5
174. Olaviar, Jose O. 72 70 69 5 66 70 77 75 70.5
5
MRD-175. Perez, Cesario Z. 75 76 66 8 72 63 82 69 72.95
0
176. Pogado, Causin O. 70 66 65 7 75 64 75 70 69.95
0
177. Ramos-Balmori, Manuela 75 73 62 6 78 59 75 66 70.2
5
178. Recinto, Ireneo I. 73 76 68 7 74 68 80 53 72.3
5
MRD-179. Redor, Francisco K. 62 77 73 7 69 64 76 69 70
5
MRD-180. Regis, Deogracias A. 76 74 68 6 65 65 88 75 73.35
5
181. Rigor, Estelita C. 67 78 61 8 71 77 79 65 70.9
0
MRD-182. Rimorin-Gordo, Estela 70 72 62 6 88 66 67 79 70.15
0
183. Rosario, Prisco del 70 64 70 7 72 73 85 57 72.65
0
184. Rosario, Vicente D. del 75 91 65 7 68 68 79 62 72.2
5
185. Saavedra, Felipe 73 80 63 7 76 73 68 62 70.35
5
186. Salazar, Alfredo N. 66 72 73 7 67 68 77 69 70.85
5
187. Salem, Romulo R. 77 81 72 6 73 60 76 75 73
5
188. Foz, Julita A. 75 72 75 7 65 70 76 64 72.5
5
189. Santa Ana, Candido T. 77 69 65 7 81 75 70 75 73
5
190. Santos, Aquilino 72 66 69 6 68 70 81 71 71.7
5
191. Santos, Valeriano V. 76 72 75 7 68 62 76 79 73.1
5
192. Suico, Samuel 73 79 72 7 71 59 84 65 73.3
5
193. Suson, Teodorico 74 68 66 8 66 59 79 67 70.35
0
194. Tado, Florentino P. 64 76 67 6 76 72 76 53 69.7
5
195. Tapayan, Domingo A. 69 72 69 7 76 73 82 79 73.75
0
MRD-196. 67 60 71 7 79 67 84 60 72.7
Tiausas, Miguel V.
5
197. Torres, Carlos P. 68 71 71 7 70 63 82 71 71.6
0
198. Tria, Hipolito 69 72 75 6 69 54 78 66 70.05
0
199. Velasco, Avelino A. 65 72 75 7 71 67 78 76 72.1
5
200. Villa, Francisco C. 65 80 73 7 68 79 65 75 70.2
5
201. Villagonzalo, Job R. 78 67 74 6 72 51 69 71 70.25
5
202. Villarama, Jr., Pedro 75 74 75 5 75 66 67 75 71.45
5
1952
203. Abacon, Pablo 75 72 78 8 78 72 64 55 72.7
1
MRP-204. Abad, Agapito 73 76 73 8 75 63 62 75 70.95
5
MRP-205. Abella, Ludovico B. 70 81 76 8 70 66 77 58 72.7
1
MRP-206. Abellera, Geronimo F. 75 79 79 8 76 51 63 70 71.7
7
MRP-207. Abenojar, Agapito N. 71 72 78 8 70 75 69 70 72.9
4
208. Alandy, Doroteo R. 64 83 93 9 68 59 60 60 71.2
1
209. Alano, Fabian T. 70 83 61 8 72 87 72 70 71.9
3
MRP-210. Alcantara, Pablo V. 71 79 80 8 73 70 72 62 73.65
1
211. Arcangel, Agustin Ag. 75 85 71 7 76 65 68 65 71.85
3
212. Acosta, Dionisio N. 75 81 78 8 56 65 77 70 72.8
7
MRP-213. Abinguna, Agapito C. 66 85 80 8 75 58 76 75 73.65
4
214. Adove, Nehemias C. 76 86 78 7 66 78 69 62 73.55
7
215. Adrias, Inocencio C. 75 83 61 8 76 67 79 75 73.4
8
216. Aglugub, Andres R. 75 83 73 8 72 62 72 62 72.65
8
217. Andrada, Mariano L. 76 85 66 8 63 77 75 77 73.
7
MRP-218. Almeda, Serafin V. 72 72 75 8 61 67 73 65 70.75
1
219. Almonte-Peralta, Felicidad 73 71 72 9 75 67 65 53 70.7
1
MRP-220. Amodia, Juan T. 75 79 68 8 62 64 75 78 71.4
5
MRP-221. Antonio, Felino A. 71 76 81 8 79 52 72 70 73.3
3
MRP-222. Antonio, Jose S. 75 92 90 6 65 64 68 60 73.75
8
223. Aonuevo, Ramos B. 71 87 78 8 64 63 74 76 72.7
1
224. Aquino, S. Rey A. 67 77 57 7 69 70 69 80 67.7
8
225. Arteche, Filomeno D. 78 83 50 8 76 77 70 70 70.8
9
MRP-226. Arribas, Isaac M. 75 78 70 8 73 70 67 78 72.2
1
MRP-227. Azucena, Ceferino D. 72 67 78 8 72 67 77 65 73.95
9
228. Atienza, Ricardo 72 87 70 7 66 55 75 75 70.85
9
229. Balacuit, Camilo N. 75 78 89 7 70 54 66 75 73.3
5
MRP-230. Baclig, Cayetano S. 77 84 83 8 69 70 61 65 73
0
231. Balcita, Oscar C. 75 77 79 9 64 60 67 50 70.65
0
232. Barilea, Dominador Z. 71 67 82 7 64 61 65 80 70.5
7
MRP-233. Banta, Jose Y. 75 80 77 8 75 63 71 75 73.95
1
MRP-234. Barrientos, Ambrosio D. 76 70 67 8 67 65 70 81 70.7
0
235. Batucan, Jose M. 66 76 78 8 62 76 67 78 71.2
8
236. Bautista, Atilano C. 70 82 84 8 58 61 71 62 71.25
5
237. Bautista, Celso J. 71 68 63 8 80 67 80 70 72.75
7
238. Belderon, Jose 76 81 76 9 70 66 67 62 72.65
2
MRP-239. Belo, Victor B. 76 77 64 7 75 71 76 76 72.85
3
MRP-240. Bejec, Conceso D. 79 80 73 8 63 77 75 50 73.15
2
MRP-241. Beltran, Gervasio M. 72 75 81 7 75 57 75 80 73.95
3
MRP-242. Benaojan, Robustiano O. 74 84 77 8 75 63 68 62 72.85
4
MRP-243. Beria, Roger C. 70 80 79 7 68 72 64 78 71.85
9
MRP-244. Bihis, Marcelo M. 75 86 65 9 64 64 84 75 73.45
2
MRP-245. Binaoro, Vicente M. 73 69 78 8 73 59 70 82 72.75
3
MRP-246. Bobila, Rosalio B. 76 86 76 8 68 59 71 78 73.05
3
247. Buenafe, Avelina R. 78 80 75 7 70 55 72 80 72.75
5
248. Bueno, Anastacio F. 73 78 71 7 71 67 71 60 71.15
8
249. Borres, Maximino L. 67 85 62 9 72 63 76 80 70.9
1
MRP-250. Cabegin, Cesar V. 72 71 76 7 74 70 71 60 72.2
5
MRP-251. Cabello, Melecio F. 72 78 78 8 58 70 67 71 70.5
9
MRP-252. Cabrera, Irineo M. 79 88 53 9 71 85 75 76 73.3
1
253. Cabreros, Paulino N. 71 79 83 8 60 62 71 50 70.85
4
254. Calayag, Florentino R. 69 79 66 8 69 75 68 76 70.6
8
MRP-255. Calzada, Cesar de la 76 72 80 6 62 71 66 62 70.85
7
256. Canabal, Isabel 70 82 81 7 78 51 75 75 73.7
7
MRP-257. Cabugao, Pablo N. 76 87 69 8 58 64 78 75 71.8
0
258. Calagi, Mateo C. 73 93 71 8 70 66 69 62 71.8
7
259. Canda, Benjamin S. 72 71 77 9 62 75 66 82 71.95
0
260. Cantoria, Eulogio 71 80 71 8 70 55 72 75 71
9
261. Capacio, Jr., Conrado 67 78 71 9 65 75 72 60 70.65
0
262. Capitulo, Alejandro P. 75 70 53 8 78 63 76 91 71.2
7
MRP-263. Calupitan, Jr., Alfredo 75 93 81 7 64 75 68 56 73.15
6
MRP-264. Caluya, Arsenio V. 75 86 70 8 77 52 77 82 73.9
7
MRP-265. Campanilla, Mariano B. 80 75 78 7 73 71 63 76 73.65
7
MRP-266. Campos, Juan A. 66 85 83 8 67 61 80 57 73.25
4
267. Cardoso, Angelita G. 78 71 73 7 79 56 69 60 71.8
6
268. Cartagena, Herminio R. 71 72 65 8 64 73 80 70 71.65
9
MRP-269. Castro, Daniel T. 65 75 77 7 85 60 75 69 73.15
6
270. Cauntay, Gaudencio V. 70 78 72 7 77 69 64 80 71.2
3
271. Castro, Pedro L. de 70 68 69 8 76 75 72 70 73.35
7
272. Cerio, Juan A. 75 82 75 8 60 54 76 75 71.75
6
273. Colorado, Alfonso R. 68 75 80 7 77 66 67 80 72.6
4
274. Chavez, Doroteo M. 73 65 79 8 73 69 66 84 73.1
4
275. Chavez, Honorato A. 77 76 79 8 74 53 71 75 73.65
6
MRP-276. Cobangbang, Orlando B. 69 81 74 8 76 61 78 80 73.85
2
277. Cortez, Armando R. 78 60 88 8 60 66 69 64 73.1
6
278. Crisostomo, Jesus L. 76 87 74 7 62 55 76 66 71.45
6
MRP-279. Cornejo, Crisanto R. 68 87 78 8 79 50 80 60 73.7
6
MRP-280. Cruz, Raymundo 75 81 79 8 72 57 68 75 72.95
5
MRP-281. Cunanan, Jose C. 78 92 63 8 76 72 68 65 72.4
3
282. Cunanan, Salvador F. 70 82 64 9 67 75 73 76 71.45
2
283. Cimafranca, Agustin B. 71 76 76 8 70 71 75 71 73.35
0
284. Crisol, Getulio R. 70 91 78 8 68 55 71 50 70.8
5
MRP-285. Dusi, Felicisimo R. 76 82 69 8 66 62 80 71 72.85
2
MRP-286. Datu, Alfredo J. 70 75 72 8 80 55 68 79 71.5
6
287. Dacuma, Luis B. 71 67 87 8 71 50 65 70 71.25
3
MRP-288. Degamo, Pedro R. 73 80 82 7 80 67 67 57 73.65
4
289. Delgado, Vicente N. 70 84 82 8 77 52 73 50 72.65
4
MRP-290. Diolazo, Ernesto A. 75 83 86 7 54 54 75 75 72.25
3
291. Dionisio, Jr., Guillermo 73 84 64 8 71 78 75 66 72.8
9
MRP-292. Dichoso, Alberto M. 71 77 71 8 69 75 80 70 73.65
1
MRP-293. Dipasupil, Claudio R. 70 76 82 7 79 70 72 56 73.9
3
MRP-294. Delgado, Abner 75 84 63 6 64 60 70 72 68.35
7
MRP-295. Domingo, Dominador T. 70 69 81 8 68 63 71 75 72.2
2
296. Ducusin, Agapito B. 70 78 53 8 75 77 62 76 68.05
8
MRP-297. Duque, Antonio S. 75 77 78 8 76 72 64 75 73.9
6
298. Duque, Castulo 75 80 73 8 66 67 65 66 70.65
3
299. Ebbah, Percival B. 70 80 85 7 66 63 76 75 73.95
6
300. Edisa, Sulpicio 65 77 75 8 75 62 75 65 72
9
301. Edradan, Rosa C. 70 75 84 8 71 59 69 86 73.4
4
MRP-302. Enage, Jacinto N. 66 70 88 9 72 67 65 75 73.2
3
MRP-303. Encarnacion, Alfonso B. 75 86 73 8 63 77 69 75 72.65
1
304. Encarnacion, Cesar 65 78 58 6 66 64 75 78 67.1
8
305. Estoista, Agustin A. 78 76 74 8 58 67 70 76 71.7
6
MRP-306. Fabros, Jose B. 66 75 80 8 80 71 67 70 73.05
2
MRP-307. Fajardo, Balbino P. 77 69 82 8 65 60 75 75 73.9
3
308. Fajardo, Genaro P. 70 79 77 7 79 50 73 75 72.5
9
309. Evangelista, Felicidad P. 75 75 72 8 63 63 77 70 72.15
7
310. Familara, Raymundo Z. 68 75 87 8 64 65 68 65 71.85
3
311. Farias, Dionisio 70 78 89 6 65 75 70 50 72.75
6
312. Favila, Hilario B. 71 84 74 7 75 67 73 59 72.2
0
MRP-313. Feliciano, Alberto I. 71 69 70 8 69 81 72 70 72.25
5
MRP-314. Fernando, Lope F. 73 77 86 7 70 76 64 50 73
9
MRP-315. Flores, Dionisio S. 78 72 77 8 67 60 68 73 72.05
3
MRP-316. Fortich, Benjamin B. 70 82 70 7 78 65 64 75 70.35
0
MRP-317. Fuente, Jose S. de la 76 88 72 7 60 71 79 79 73.55
4
318. Fohmantes, Nazario S. 72 79 71 7 68 61 76 60 70.9
7
MRP-319. Fuggan, Lorenzo B. 76 81 74 6 71 71 73 60 72.85
9
320. Gabuya, Jesus S. 70 83 82 8 70 63 75 65 73.75
3
321. Galang, Victor N. 69 83 84 7 70 57 71 60 71.95
6
322. Gaerlan, Manuel L. 73 87 77 9 67 61 72 75 73.15
0
323. Galem, Nestor R. 72 79 86 7 60 61 75 70 73.05
8
324. Gallardo, Jose Pe B. 75 88 75 7 63 70 70 65 71.85
5
MRP-325. Gallos, Cirilo B. 70 78 84 9 80 51 65 70 72.85
1
326. Galindo, Eulalio D. 70 89 87 6 78 71 62 62 73.4
5
327. Galman, Patrocinio G. 72 72 80 8 71 56 70 53 71.15
5
328. Gamalinda, Carlos S. 76 79 81 8 67 63 69 55 72.55
6
329. Gamboa, Antonio G. 71 67 70 7 76 60 75 68 70.95
2
330. Gannod, Jose A. 69 80 75 8 68 62 73 68 71.25
1
MRP-331. Garcia, Matias N. 67 78 74 9 79 59 76 65 72.8
0
MRP-332. Ganete, Carmelo 75 87 77 8 74 57 68 81 73.3
2
333. Gilbang, Gaudioso R. 75 67 80 8 67 57 64 70 70.5
2
334. Gofredo, Claro C. 68 78 72 8 78 52 70 76 70.9
6
335. Gomez, Jose S. 71 76 71 8 76 63 69 62 70.85
1
MRP-336. Gosiaoco, Lorenzo V. 68 93 85 7 64 69 70 54 72.35
8
MRP-337. Gonzales, Rafael C. 77 75 71 8 55 70 70 60 70.05
9
MRP-338. Gracia, Eulalia L. de 66 68 90 8 77 59 69 65 73.3
4
339. Grageda, Jose M. A. 70 85 72 6 70 60 73 73 70.75
7
340. Guzman, Juan de 75 86 69 8 64 79 75 76 73.6
4
MRP-341. Guzman, Mateo de 76 79 79 7 72 69 68 80 73.9
3
342. Guzman, Salvador B. 71 61 74 7 61 66 78 75 70.75
2
343. Guzman, Salvador T. de 75 84 64 8 74 61 78 58 71.75
1
344. Habelito, Geronimo E. 71 76 71 8 73 60 67 55 69.65
7
345. Hedriana, Naterno G. 75 68 84 7 66 58 76 60 72.9
6
346. Hernandez, Quintin B. 67 75 72 8 72 72 66 76 70.6
1
1952
347. Homeres, Agustin R. 73 84 65 8 70 77 63 76 70.7
6
348. Ines, Leonilo F. 65 88 71 8 77 73 61 70 70.55
8
349. Jamer, Alipio S. 68 75 83 8 80 61 65 50 72
9
MRP-350. Ibasco, Jr., Emiliano M. 75 65 68 8 76 70 83 54 73.8
5
MRP-351. Jardinico, Jr., Emilio 73 86 72 7 82 67 67 64 72.8
8
MRP-352. Jaen, Justiniano F. 76 75 78 8 71 66 70 77 73.85
4
353. Jaring, Antonio S. 72 77 79 7 72 57 71 50 70.75
0
MRP-354. Javier, Aquilino M. 75 84 79 7 77 61 66 66 73.05
8
355. Jomuad, Francisco 75 75 72 8 78 58 76 43 72.4
8
MRP-356. Jose, Nestor L. 78 61 64 7 68 76 64 80 69.7
3
357. La Q, Jose M. 75 71 75 7 70 67 81 59 73.5
2
358. Leon, Brigido C. de 67 75 78 9 78 51 72 80 72.55
1
359. Leones, Constante B. 68 81 79 8 73 60 77 60 73
4
360. Liboro, Horacio T. 72 69 80 8 73 62 70 61 72.4
7
361. Llanera, Cesar L. 77 81 80 7 64 59 75 63 73
8
362. Lomontod, Jose P. 75 76 69 7 73 76 74 75 73.2
0
363. Luna, Lucito 70 75 69 8 59 53 74 75 68.4
3
MRP-364. Luz, Lauro L. 76 90 78 8 64 58 75 77 73.95
8
MRP-365. Macasaet, Tomas S. 73 81 72 8 66 75 72 70 72.5
3
366. Magbiray, Godofredo V. 80 67 84 7 70 62 65 68 73.05
6
367. Majarais, Rodolfo P. 70 62 64 8 88 75 71 79 72.85
2
MRP-368. Makabenta, Eduardo 75 90 77 8 59 71 72 78 73.3
3
MRP-369. Malapit, Justiniano S. 74 83 74 8 58 60 72 76 71.1
9
370. Maloles, Iluminado M. 70 87 73 7 77 50 76 76 72.3
6
371. Maniquis, Daniel R. 75 80 73 9 69 71 65 70 72.1
1
372. Maraa, Arsenio 65 79 60 7 73 51 75 86 67.9
2
373. Marasigan, Napoleon 75 71 83 7 69 62 69 70 72.75
5
MRP-374. Marco, Jaime P. 75 67 74 7 64 75 75 57 71.9
6
MRP-375. Martir, Osmundo P. 70 86 76 7 72 71 75 53 72.95
8
MRP-376. Masancay, Amando E. 73 87 75 7 72 50 78 80 73.2
7
MRP-377. Mati-ong, Ignacio T. 62 87 72 7 73 76 69 77 71.3
9
378. Mara, Guillermo L. 70 78 78 8 75 67 66 65 72.35
9
MRP-379. Mercado, Felipe A. 73 77 82 8 78 52 69 85 73.9
2
MRP-380. Miculob, Eugenio P. 70 82 73 8 77 52 79 65 72.8
6
381. Mison, Rafael M. Jr., 79 78 73 7 71 68 69 53 71.95
5
MRP-382. Monponbanua, Antonio D. 79 79 68 8 64 78 69 83 73.1
8
MRP-383. Montero, Leodegario C. 72 89 69 8 70 68 70 75 72.15
9
384. Morada, Servillano S. 75 76 67 7 65 66 75 76 70.9
1
385. Mocorro, Generoso 78 84 78 8 60 73 68 70 73
4
MRP-386. Mosquera, Estanislao L. 75 78 75 8 72 55 77 66 73.15
5
387. Motus, Rodentor P. 80 78 70 9 72 75 70 57 73.75
4
388. Macario, Pedro R. 70 67 74 8 78 63 72 66 72.15
6
MRP-389. Nadela, Geredion T. 72 64 64 8 73 50 75 75 69.15
1
MRP-390. Nazareno, Romeo P. 67 70 71 7 76 79 75 57 72.05
6
391. Nieto, Benedicto S. 69 79 77 7 72 62 76 76 72.9
7
MRP-392. Noguera, Raymundo 71 86 81 8 73 56 72 70 73.15
0
MRP-393. Nodado, Domiciano R. 70 70 69 7 57 37 64 72 63.6
3
394. Nono, Pacifico G. 67 77 78 6 75 59 71 76 71.35
7
MRP-395. Nuval, Manuel R. 78 72 67 9 72 68 78 67 73.65
0
396. Ocampo, Augusto 75 90 77 7 69 55 65 67 60.7
2
397. Oliveros, Amado A. 72 75 68 7 84 50 75 79 71.9
2
398. Opia, Jr., Pedro 76 77 74 6 73 66 68 70 71.85
7
MRP-399. Olaviar, Jose O. 70 62 85 8 74 50 68 79 71.8
1
MRP-400. Olandesca, Per O. 70 91 76 8 72 66 70 79 73.45
7
401. Orden, Apolonio J. 72 65 84 8 66 50 72 68 71.45
6
402. Ortiz, Melencio T. 71 75 78 8 66 67 70 78 72.1
1
MRP-403. Pablo, Fedelino S. 72 64 76 8 72 61 76 75 72.95
6
404. Pacifico, Vicente V. 76 79 69 8 76 52 72 80 71.95
0
MRP-405. Paderna, Perfecto D. 75 69 72 7 78 58 75 70 72.6
5
406. Padlan, Crispin M. 71 66 76 7 68 67 74 66 71.65
9
407. Padilla, Jose C. 70 65 67 8 78 75 78 75 73.3
2
408. Padilla, Jr., Estanislao E. 71 88 78 8 59 75 78 50 72.95
6
MRP-409. Palma, Bartolome 67 81 80 8 71 75 69 75 73.25
2
MRP-410. Papa, Angel A. 75 72 85 8 77 59 63 71 73.45
5
MRP-411. Parayno, Mario V. 71 88 74 8 69 66 76 73 73.65
9
412. Paria, Santos L. 70 87 85 7 64 67 63 76 71.85
7
MRP-413. Pasion, Anastacio 63 80 68 8 82 79 76 58 72.55
1
414. Pastrana, Rizal R. 69 76 71 7 68 63 77 83 71.65
6
MRP-415. Paulin, Jose O. 70 66 80 8 75 50 65 80 70.9
7
MRP-416. Pelaez, Jr., Vicente C. 79 87 73 8 69 71 68 65 73.2
3
417. Pea, Jesus 75 75 75 6 75 70 60 66 70.4
2
418. Perez, Toribio R. 71 64 81 9 69 58 67 70 71.25
2
419. Pestao, Melquiades 77 81 74 8 59 68 76 75 73.2
7
MRP-420. Pido, Serafin C. 77 81 72 8 69 71 60 75 71.15
2
421. Pinlac, Filemon 67 76 74 8 65 79 65 72 70.55
6
422. Poblete, Celso B. 72 79 82 7 66 64 74 50 72.15
6
MRP-423. Piza, Luz 68 70 75 8 74 67 64 75 70.8
7
424. Puzon, Eduardo S. 72 80 81 6 72 53 67 70 71.05
9
425. Quetulio, Josefina D. 75 90 60 9 64 78 76 83 72.9
3
MRP-426. Quipanes, Melchor V. 69 88 79 8 65 62 71 66 71.55
2
MRP-427. Quietson, Bayani R. 73 75 76 7 70 81 71 53 72.85
7
428. Racho, Macario D. 68 75 81 8 78 53 66 54 70.55
2
429. Ramirez, Sabas P. 71 80 73 8 62 62 75 80 71.65
7
MRP-430. Raffian, Jose A. 80 83 79 7 62 72 68 65 73.25
9
MRP-431. Ramos, Patricio S. 75 87 76 7 72 72 61 75 72.25
5
MRP-432. Ramos-Balmori, Manuela 78 84 76 9 48 75 80 65 73.45
0
MRP-433. Raro, Celso 75 81 76 6 75 77 55 77 71.4
7
MRP-434. Rayos, Victor S. 75 86 79 9 71 67 67 70 73.9
1
435. Revilla, Mariano S. 75 78 81 9 70 54 69 81 73.35
0
436. Reyes, Abdon L. 72 64 81 7 76 73 69 53 72.85
8
437. Reyes, Domingo B. 72 87 78 8 72 75 62 70 72.7
3
438. Reyes, Francisco M. 75 85 84 6 75 71 68 50 73.9
8
439. Reyes, Lozano M. 80 57 78 7 78 65 64 79 73.35
9
MRP-440. Reyes, Oscar R. 75 75 82 8 76 64 68 60 73.65
2
441. Rigonan, Cesar V. 71 85 65 8 75 70 76 70 72.7
6
442. Rivera, Honorio 71 56 70 9 71 65 75 71 71.2
0
MRP-443. Rivero, Buenaventura A. 72 88 72 9 68 73 66 80 72.6
4
MRP-444. Robles, Enrique 75 77 75 7 82 64 69 70 73.7
7
445. Rodriguez, Orestes Arellano 76 75 76 6 69 77 65 78 72.25
3
446. Roldan, Jose V. 67 80 79 8 73 71 75 70 73.9
3
447. Rosario, Adelaida R. del 80 75 65 7 68 72 80 70 73.15
0
448. Rosario, Restituto F. del 75 75 79 9 68 65 66 63 72.1
0
MRP-449. Sabelino, Conrado S. 71 81 69 7 77 71 75 70 72.95
5
450. San Juan, Damaso 77 86 72 8 59 76 65 72 71.6
9
451. Saiel, Felix L. 72 93 76 8 67 75 66 62 72.1
0
452. Samaniego, Jesus B. 75 80 76 7 60 67 68 70 70.6
2
MRP-453. Sandoval, Emmanuel M. 75 83 70 8 77 67 77 60 73.95
3
MRP-454. Sanidad, Emmanuel Q. 71 75 81 9 62 64 76 68 72.95
0
455. Santiago, Jr., Cristobal 75 76 84 9 63 65 59 70 71.8
3
456. Santillan, Juanito Ll. 76 89 83 8 63 58 65 52 71.25
3
MRP-457. Santos, Rodolfo C. 75 75 78 8 73 76 66 70 73.7
2
MRP-458. Santos, Ruperto M. 67 54 69 7 63 64 71 60 66.75
6
MRP-459. Santos, Aquilino C. 72 71 73 7 73 79 71 85 73.8
9
MRP-460. Santos, Rufino A. 75 81 79 8 74 72 66 54 73.3
5
461. Suanding, Bantas 75 67 67 9 79 59 76 76 73.1
2
MRP-462. Sulit, Feliz M. 76 79 76 7 72 75 68 67 73.5
8
463. Songco, Felicisimo G. 70 68 82 8 60 69 76 65 73.35
4
464. Soriano, Aniceto S. 64 79 77 8 80 53 70 65 70.7
0
465. Suarez, Pablo D. 73 85 70 8 76 70 64 70 71.9
7
MRP-466. Sybico, Jesus L. 79 70 70 7 75 75 72 60 73.05
2
467. Tabaque, Benjamin R. 69 68 77 7 74 68 72 60 71.85
9
MRP-468. Tan Kiang, Clarita 81 79 72 8 62 75 73 80 73.95
0
MRP-469. Tando, Amado T. 71 82 78 8 71 61 71 60 72
3
470. Tasico, Severo E. 71 69 75 8 70 75 67 63 71.65
9
471. Tiburcio, Ismael P. 73 82 72 9 76 57 68 54 71.15
3
MRP-472. Tiongson, Federico T. 70 70 76 8 77 75 75 50 73.45
4
MRP-473. Tolentino, Jesus C. 75 89 63 8 85 73 73 50 73.4
4
474. Torrijas, Alfredo A. 77 66 67 8 68 75 71 63 71.3
3
MRP-475. Tobias, Artemio M. 69 58 74 8 71 55 65 57 67.55
1
MRP-476. Trillana, Jr., Apolonio 76 86 76 8 70 68 75 50 73.8
6
MRP-477. Trinidad, Manuel O. 66 91 83 7 63 66 67 65 70.8
5
478. Trinidad, Pedro O. 66 78 78 8 78 51 64 75 70.8
5
MRP-479. Udarbe, Flavio J. 80 82 77 8 67 56 68 75 72.6
2
480. Umali, Osmundo C. 68 75 81 8 71 69 68 60 71.7
0
481. Umayam, Juanito C. 77 75 87 8 56 56 66 60 71
5
MRP-482. Usita, Gelacio U. 75 72 75 7 73 76 71 70 73.55
4
483. Valino, Francisco M. 72 81 80 8 62 78 71 75 73.7
4
484. Varela, Dominador M. 67 75 81 8 72 57 81 70 73.85
6
485. Vega, Macairog L. de 78 62 79 8 70 70 71 65 73.8
7
MRP-486. Velasco, Emmanuel D. 71 80 74 8 60 66 76 76 71.85
5
487. Velez, Maria E. 73 70 89 8 56 50 72 67 71.05
0
MRP-488. Venal, Artemio V. 78 91 58 6 76 55 75 73 73.65
7
489. Venus, Conrado B. 69 81 74 8 62 66 72 77 77.05
5
MRP-490. Verzosa, Federico B. 75 79 72 8 76 68 74 59 73.7
8
MRP-491. Villafuerte, Eduardo V. 75 83 70 7 64 64 75 65 71.2
6
MRP-492. Villanueva, Cecilio C. 75 85 79 8 66 77 67 70 73.95
8
493. Villar, Custodio R. 73 69 70 8 76 66 69 50 70.75
8
MRP-494. Villaseor, Leonidas F. 80 85 67 7 62 75 76 73 73.15
7
495. Viterbo, Jose H. 80 77 65 9 70 65 65 65 70.65
3
496. Yaranon, Pedro 70 77 76 8 72 50 75 75 71.85
5
MRP-497. Yasay, Mariano R. 75 75 72 7 63 77 70 60 71.1
6
MRP-498. Ygay, Venancio M. 73 80 83 8 62 59 72 77 72.65
4
499. Yulo, Jr., Teodoro 73 82 78 7 60 81 75 75 73.95
5
500. Zamora, Alberto 70 65 76 7 62 77 69 82 71.3
9
501. Rigonan, Felipe C. 70 79 69 8 76 62 71 64 71.2
9
A list of those who petitioned for the consolidation of their grades in subjects passed in previous
examinations, showing the years in which they took the examinations together with their grades and
averages, and those who had filed motions for reconsideration which were denied, indicated by the
initials MRD, follows:
Civ. Land Merc. Int Pol. Crim. Rem. Leg. Gen. Av.
.
1. Amao, Sulpicio M.
1946 68 67 76 76 73 73 49 50 66.5
1950 59 80 67 77 62 80 71 57 67.4
2. Baldo, Olegario Ga.
1951 65 76 58 55 59 63 75 72 64.9
1952 65 68 75 84 72 59 73 57 69.75
1953 57 74 68 68 76 52 71 76 66.7
3. Blanco, Jose B.
MRD-1949 75 75 70 75 77 76 60 90 72.15
1951 64 71 58 65 68 70 75 71 66.95
4. Condeno, Mateo
1950 71 80 62 75 75 81 55 92 69.3
1951 70 60 61 65 77 64 67 81 67.85
5. Ducusin, Agapito B.
MRD-1949 69 70 76 73 76 71 55 60 68.65
1950 60 71 55 67 67 75 56 89 68.1
6. Garcia, Manuel N.
MRD-1949 60 70 82 79 70 69 60 80 69.25
1950 57 65 51 69 54 85 56 84 60.3
7. Luna, Lucito A.
1946 63 53 69 76 75 76 57 69 66.55
1952 70 75 69 83 59 53 74 75 68.4
8. Maraa, Arsenio s.
1949 72 68 68 75 75 72 60 75 69.35
1952 65 79 60 72 73 51 75 86 67.9
9. Montano, Manuel M.
1951 61 60 58 60 70 63 75 64 64.8
1952 70 77 65 79 66 52 70 50 66.4
1953 78 64 66 68 81 50 71 78 70.65
10. Pea, Jesus S.
1950 25 75 45 75 45 52 46 71 46.2
1951 70 77 65 79 66 52 70 50 66.4
1952 75 75 75 62 75 70 60 66 70.4
11. Placido, Sr., Isidro
1950 68 78 70 75 69 70 58 69 67.75
1951 65 62 75 60 73 57 75 71 66.8
12. Rementizo, Filemon S.
1949 65 75 72 75 60 75 55 85 66.65
1951 68 57 48 60 91 66 55 75 64.05
1952 68 53 68 67 58 56 75 64 65.7
13. Amao, Sulpicio M.
1952 67 80 51 69 69 77 73 53 66.35
1953 65 67 78 74 75 62 69 80 70.9
14. Rodulfa, Juan T.
1951 67 60 70 65 68 56 75 66 67.75
1952 70 71 67 78 67 75 71 70 70.1
15. Sanchez, Juan J.
1948 39 69 82 75 76 72 55 50 63.5
MRD-1949 67 56 69 75 72 77 60 75 68
1951 70 59 55 60 68 57 78 67 65.8
16. Santos, Constantino
1952 62 76 54 82 72 77 66 65 66.65
1953 73 71 70 65 78 64 65 78 70.4
17. Santos, Salvador H.
1951 60 64 55 70 68 52 70 75 62.85
1952 75 64 70 81 76 55 61 75 69.1
1953 70 71 79 65 72 54 66 80 70
18. Sevilla, Macario C.
MRD-1948 50 64 76 66 66 69 60 52 63.1
MRD-1949 47 66 78 64 71 86 65 85 68
1950 35 65 40 75 63 57 27 49 45
MRD-1951 68 59 72 55 69 65 75 75 69.3
1953 70 73 74 70 81 56 69 71 71.05
Finally, with regards to the examinations of 1953, while some candidates--85 in all--presented motions
for reconsideration of their grades, others invoked the provisions of Republic Act No. 972. A list of those
candidates separating those who filed mere motions for reconsideration (56) from those who invoked
the aforesaid Republic act, is as follows:
1953 PETITIONERS FOR RECONSIDERATION
.
1. Acenas, Calixto R. 73 70 68 62 82 51 67 77 73.45
2. Alcantara, Pedro N. 67 70 75 85 87 54 71 80 72.8
3. Alejandro, Exequiel 67 72 71 75 80 76 75 77 73.4
4. Andres, Gregorio M. 70 73 86 58 79 50 71 78 72.7
5. Arnaiz, Antonio E. 66 80 76 58 79 68 77 81 73.4
6. Asis, Floriano U. de 66 78 75 81 77 55 73 69 71.25
7. Bacaiso, Celestino M. 71 65 76 68 76 50 75 70 70.95
8. Bala, Florencio F. 64 82 47 70 82 58 75 82 67
9. Baldo, Olegario A. 57 74 68 68 76 52 71 76 66.7
10. Barrios, Benjamin O. 65 71 76 75 80 62 83 73 73.95
11. Buhay, Eduardo L. 73 76 71 91 76 61 74 78 73.35
12. Burgos, Dominador C. 72 80 89 61 66 37 69 68 70.05
13. Cario, Eldo J. 79 81 60 75 74 74 76 74 73
14. Casar, Dimapuro 67 73 84 79 77 61 71 74 73.35
15. Castaeda, Gregorio 70 73 80 71 75 70 73 78 73.95
16. Estrellado, Benjamin R. 67 79 64 73 82 62 71 74 70.2
17. Fabunan, Edilberto C. 70 72 68 69 77 60 76 74 71.1
18. Feril, Domingo B. 75 71 84 65 70 60 65 70 71.6
19. Fernandez, Alejandro G. 65 75 87 80 81 63 61 80 72.8
20. Gapus, Rosita S. (Miss) 76 80 86 77 64 74 66 69 73.9
21. Garcia, Rafael B. 70 86 70 75 73 63 73 75 71.65
22. Gracia, Miguel L. de 73 68 75 59 80 51 72 71 71
23. Gungon, Armando G. 68 76 76 84 77 57 77 83 73.6
24. Gutierrez, Antonio S. 68 77 66 70 72 59 71 74 69.1
25. Ilejay, Abraham I. 77 70 76 77 81 62 70 68 73.7
26. Leon, Benjamin La. De 66 66 75 70 77 55 71 82 70.35
27. Lugtu, Felipe L. 62 70 78 65 78 56 69 81 69.9
28. Lukman, Abdul-Hamid 76 64 67 69 73 59 73 75 70.45
29. Maloles, Jr., Benjamin G. 77 76 68 68 71 51 75 78 70.85
30. Maloles, Julius G. 77 71 60 71 79 62 68 72 69.75
31. Mandi, Santiago P. 65 76 70 61 79 68 75 72 71.1
32. Margete, Rufino C. 70 76 66 75 85 73 71 75 72.75
33. Melocoton, Nestorio B. 70 81 73 78 83 52 72 75 72.35
34. Molina, Manuel C. 75 78 70 61 75 63 66 85 70.95
35. Muoz, Mariano A. 75 80 86 67 74 57 68 76 73.75
36. Navarro, Buenaventura M. 80 75 65 75 83 55 73 79 73
37. Nodado, Domiciano R. 60 67 67 50 70 50 56 75 61.7
38. Papas, Sisenando B. 65 62 71 61 70 56 66 67 66
39. Pagulayan-Sy, Fernando 63 75 71 62 83 67 70 72 70.4
40. Padula, Benjamin C. 70 77 54 62 74 78 75 68 69.05
41. Pasno, Enrique M. 78 72 66 54 71 58 72 78 69.85
42. Pea, Jr., Narciso 70 95 81 78 67 66 67 73 72.55
43. Peralta, Rodolfo P. 70 70 52 81 68 63 59 69 63.7
44. Pigar, Leopoldo R. 76 75 78 61 72 72 71 79 73.75
45. Publico, Paciano L. 68 69 76 76 70 59 74 67 70.6
46. Radaza, Leovigildo 75 78 76 61 77 50 71 86 72.2
47. Ramos, Bernardo M. 64 62 75 93 81 52 66 80 70.1
48. Rabaino, Andres D. 68 72 75 73 78 55 69 76 70.65
49. Ravanera, Oscar N. 70 77 80 71 82 62 69 78 73.6
50. Renovilla, Jose M. 65 75 80 68 79 52 62 78 69.5
51. Sabaot, Solomon B. 69 73 80 69 82 69 69 79 73.85
52. Sumaway, Ricardo S. 66 76 69 76 74 56 72 68 69.1
53. Torrefiel, Sofronio O. 70 77 74 75 73 50 68 72 69.55
54. Vera, Federico V. de 60 61 47 77 69 50 67 77 60.9
55. Viray, Venancio Bustos 65 67 67 52 73 64 71 65 67.15
56. Ylaya, Angela P. (Miss) 63 70 56 75 68 54 70 77 64.5
.
1. Ala, Narciso 70 71 73 59 73 74 81 77 73.5
2. Alcantara, Pedro N. 67 70 75 85 87 54 71 80 72.8
3. Arellano, Antonio L. 74 66 73 60 78 63 78 72 72.9
4. Buhay, Eduardo L. 73 76 71 91 76 61 74 78 73.35
5. Calautit, Celestino R. 71 78 84 75 75 61 68 72 73.2
6. Casuncad, Sulvio P. 61 73 82 69 81 68 71 84 73.05
7. Enriquez, Pelagio y Concepcion 84 69 76 75 82 50 58 79 72.05
8. Estonina, Severino 80 74 64 89 81 56 68 82 72.4
9. Fernandez, Alejandro Q. 65 75 87 80 81 63 61 80 72.8
10. Fernandez, Luis N. 70 75 77 75 78 67 72 73 73.35
11. Figueroa, Alfredo A. 70 75 87 78 75 50 68 68 72.3
12. Formilleza, Pedro 65 75 89 68 83 51 70 75 73.25
13. Garcia, Manuel M. 69 68 83 83 73 62 62 70 71
14. Grospe, Vicente E. 68 75 78 66 79 61 69 82 71.6
15. Galema, Nestor R. (1952) 72 79 86 78 60 61 75 70 73.05
16. Jacobo, Rafael F. 76 76 75 74 76 50 72 76 72.3
17. Macalindong, Reinerio L. 67 77 79 79 74 72 68 77 72.75
18. Mangubat, Antonio M. 70 70 78 61 80 74 62 70 71.45
19. Montano, Manuel M. 78 64 66 68 81 50 71 78 70.65
20. Plomantes, Marcos 73 67 74 58 68 70 76 71 71.6
21. Ramos, Eugenio R. 70 80 76 67 72 69 72 79 72.6
22. Reyes, Juan R. 71 73 77 76 81 59 72 74 73.2
23. Reyes, Santiago R. 65 78 83 60 76 75 70 70 72.9
24. Rivera, Eulogio J. 65 67 78 74 75 62 69 80 70.9
25. Santos, Constantino P. 73 71 70 65 78 64 65 78 70.4
26. Santos, Salvador H. 70 71 79 65 72 54 66 80 70
27. Sevilla, Macario C. 70 73 74 70 81 56 69 71 71.05
28. Villavicencio, Jose A. 78 75 70 67 69 77 64 77 73.2
29. Viray, Ruperto G. 76 73 76 73 80 58 68 83 73.25
There are the unsuccessful candidates totaling 604 directly affected by this resolution. Adding 490
candidates who have not presented any petition, they reach a total of 1,094.
The Enactment of Republic Act No. 972
As will be observed from Annex I, this Court reduced to 72 per cent the passing general average in the
bar examination of august and November of 1946; 69 per cent in 1947; 70 per cent in 1948; 74 per cent
in 1949; maintaining the prescribed 75 per cent since 1950, but raising to 75 per cent those who
obtained 74 per cent since 1950. This caused the introduction in 1951, in the Senate of the Philippines of
Bill No. 12 which was intended to amend Sections 5, 9, 12, 14 and 16 of Rule 127 of the Rules of Court,
concerning the admission of attorneys-at-law to the practice of the profession. The amendments
embrace many interesting matters, but those referring to sections 14 and 16 immediately concern us.
The proposed amendment is as follows:
SEC. 14. Passing average. In order that a candidate may be deemed to have passed the
examinations successfully, he must have obtained a general average of 70 per cent without
falling below 50 per cent in any subject. In determining the average, the foregoing subjects shall
be given the following relative weights: Civil Law, 20 per cent; Land Registration and Mortgages,
5 per cent; Mercantile Law, 15 per cent; Criminal Law, 10 per cent; Political Law, 10 per cent;
International Law, 5 per cent; Remedial Law, 20 per cent; Legal Ethics and Practical Exercises, 5
per cent; Social Legislation, 5 per cent; Taxation, 5 per cent. Unsuccessful candidates shall not be
required to take another examination in any subject in which they have obtained a rating of 70
per cent or higher and such rating shall be taken into account in determining their general
average in any subsequent examinations: Provided, however, That if the candidate fails to get a
general average of 70 per cent in his third examination, he shall lose the benefit of having
already passed some subjects and shall be required to the examination in all the subjects.
SEC. 16. Admission and oath of successful applicants. Any applicant who has obtained a
general average of 70 per cent in all subjects without falling below 50 per cent in any
examination held after the 4th day of July, 1946, or who has been otherwise found to be
entitled to admission to the bar, shall be allowed to take and subscribe before the Supreme
Court the corresponding oath of office. (Arts. 4 and 5, 8, No. 12).
With the bill was an Explanatory Note, the portion pertinent to the matter before us being:
It seems to be unfair that unsuccessful candidates at bar examinations should be compelled to

repeat even those subjects which they have previously passed. This is not the case in any other
government examination. The Rules of Court have therefore been amended in this measure to
give a candidate due credit for any subject which he has previously passed with a rating of 75
per cent or higher."
Senate Bill No. 12 having been approved by Congress on May 3, 1951, the President requested the
comments of this Tribunal before acting on the same. The comment was signed by seven Justices while
three chose to refrain from making any and one took no part. With regards to the matter that interests
us, the Court said:
The next amendment is of section 14 of Rule 127. One part of this amendment provides that if a
bar candidate obtains 70 per cent or higher in any subject, although failing to pass the
examination, he need not be examined in said subject in his next examination. This is a sort of
passing the Bar Examination on the installment plan, one or two or three subjects at a time. The
trouble with this proposed system is that although it makes it easier and more convenient for
the candidate because he may in an examination prepare himself on only one or two subjects so
as to insure passing them, by the time that he has passed the last required subjects, which may
be several years away from the time that he reviewed and passed the firs subjects, he shall have
forgotten the principles and theories contained in those subjects and remembers only those of
the one or two subjects that he had last reviewed and passed. This is highly possible because
there is nothing in the law which requires a candidate to continue taking the Bar examinations
every year in succession. The only condition imposed is that a candidate, on this plan, must pass
the examination in no more that three installments; but there is no limitation as to the time or
number of years intervening between each examination taken. This would defeat the object and
the requirements of the law and the Court in admitting persons to the practice of law. When a
person is so admitted, it is to be presumed and presupposed that he possesses the knowledge
and proficiency in the law and the knowledge of all law subjects required in bar examinations, so
as presently to be able to practice the legal profession and adequately render the legal service
required by prospective clients. But this would not hold true of the candidates who may have
obtained a passing grade on any five subjects eight years ago, another three subjects one year
later, and the last two subjects the present year. We believe that the present system of
requiring a candidate to obtain a passing general average with no grade in any subject below 50
per cent is more desirable and satisfactory. It requires one to be all around, and prepared in all
required legal subjects at the time of admission to the practice of law.
xxx xxx xxx

We now come to the last amendment, that of section 16 of Rule 127. This amendment provides
that any application who has obtained a general average of 70 per cent in all subjects without
failing below 50 per cent in any subject in any examination held after the 4th day of July, 1946,
shall be allowed to take and subscribe the corresponding oath of office. In other words, Bar
candidates who obtained not less than 70 per cent in any examination since the year 1946
without failing below 50 per cent in any subject, despite their non-admission to the Bar by the
Supreme Court because they failed to obtain a passing general average in any of those years,
will be admitted to the Bar. This provision is not only prospective but retroactive in its effects.
We have already stated in our comment on the next preceding amendment that we are not
exactly in favor of reducing the passing general average from 75 per cent to 70 per cent to
govern even in the future. As to the validity of making such reduction retroactive, we have
serious legal doubts. We should not lose sight of the fact that after every bar examinations, the
Supreme Court passes the corresponding resolution not only admitting to the Bar those who
have obtained a passing general average grade, but also rejecting and denying the petitions for
reconsideration of those who have failed. The present amendment would have the effect of
repudiating, reversing and revoking the Supreme Court's resolution denying and rejecting the
petitions of those who may have obtained an average of 70 per cent or more but less than the
general passing average fixed for that year. It is clear that this question involves legal
implications, and this phase of the amendment if finally enacted into law might have to go thru
a legal test. As one member of the Court remarked during the discussion, when a court renders
a decision or promulgate a resolution or order on the basis of and in accordance with a certain
law or rule then in force, the subsequent amendment or even repeal of said law or rule may not
affect the final decision, order, or resolution already promulgated, in the sense of revoking or
rendering it void and of no effect.
Another aspect of this question to be considered is the fact that members of the bar are officers
of the courts, including the Supreme Court. When a Bar candidate is admitted to the Bar, the
Supreme Court impliedly regards him as a person fit, competent and qualified to be its officer.
Conversely, when it refused and denied admission to the Bar to a candidate who in any year
since 1946 may have obtained a general average of 70 per cent but less than that required for
that year in order to pass, the Supreme Court equally and impliedly considered and declared
that he was not prepared, ready, competent and qualified to be its officer. The present
amendment giving retroactivity to the reduction of the passing general average runs counter to
all these acts and resolutions of the Supreme Court and practically and in effect says that a
candidate not accepted, and even rejected by the Court to be its officer because he was
unprepared, undeserving and unqualified, nevertheless and in spite of all, must be admitted and
allowed by this Court to serve as its officer. We repeat, that this is another important aspect of
the question to be carefully and seriously considered.
The President vetoed the bill on June 16, 1951, stating the following:
I am fully in accord with the avowed objection of the bill, namely, to elevate the standard of the
legal profession and maintain it on a high level. This is not achieved, however, by admitting to
practice precisely a special class who have failed in the bar examination, Moreover, the bill
contains provisions to which I find serious fundamental objections.
Section 5 provides that any applicant who has obtained a general average of 70 per cent in all
subjects without failing below 50 per cent in any subject in any examination held after the 4th
day of July, 1946, shall be allowed to take and subscribed the corresponding oath of office. This
provision constitutes class legislation, benefiting as it does specifically one group of persons,
namely, the unsuccessful candidates in the 1946, 1947, 1948, 1949 and 1950 bar examinations.
The same provision undertakes to revoke or set aside final resolutions of the Supreme Court
made in accordance with the law then in force. It should be noted that after every bar
examination the Supreme Court passes the corresponding resolution not only admitting to the
Bar those who have obtained a passing general average but also rejecting and denying the
petitions for reconsideration of those who have failed. The provision under consideration would
have the effect of revoking the Supreme Court's resolution denying and rejecting the petitions
of those who may have failed to obtain the passing average fixed for that year. Said provision
also sets a bad precedent in that the Government would be morally obliged to grant a similar
privilege to those who have failed in the examinations for admission to other professions such
as medicine, engineering, architecture and certified public accountancy.
Consequently, the bill was returned to the Congress of the Philippines, but it was not repassed by 2/3
vote of each House as prescribed by section 20, article VI of the Constitution. Instead Bill No. 371 was
presented in the Senate. It reads as follows:
AN ACT TO FIX THE PASSING MARKS FOR BAR EXAMINATIONS FROM 1946 UP TO AND INCLUDING
1953
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the Philippines in Congress assembled:
SECTION 1. Notwithstanding the provisions of section 14, Rule 127 of the Rules of Court, any bar
candidate who obtained a general average of 70 per cent in any bar examinations after July 4,
1946 up to the August 1951 Bar examinations; 71 per cent in the 1952 bar examinations; 72 per
cent in the 1953 bar examinations; 73 per cent in the 1954 bar examinations; 74 per cent in
1955 bar examinations without a candidate obtaining a grade below 50 per cent in any subject,
shall be allowed to take and subscribe the corresponding oath of office as member of the
Philippine Bar; Provided, however, That 75 per cent passing general average shall be restored in
all succeeding examinations; and Provided, finally, That for the purpose of this Act, any exact
one-half or more of a fraction, shall be considered as one and included as part of the next whole
number.
SEC. 2. Any bar candidate who obtained a grade of 75 per cent in any subject in any bar
examination after July 4, 1945 shall be deemed to have passed in such subject or subjects and
such grade or grades shall be included in computing the passing general average that said
candidate may obtain in any subsequent examinations that he may take.
SEC. 3. This bill shall take effect upon its approval.
With the following explanatory note:
This is a revised Bar bill to meet the objections of the President and to afford another
opportunity to those who feel themselves discriminated by the Supreme Court from 1946 to
1951 when those who would otherwise have passed the bar examination but were arbitrarily
not so considered by altering its previous decisions of the passing mark. The Supreme Court has
been altering the passing mark from 69 in 1947 to 74 in 1951. In order to cure the apparent
arbitrary fixing of passing grades and to give satisfaction to all parties concerned, it is proposed
in this bill a gradual increase in the general averages for passing the bar examinations as follows;
For 1946 to 1951 bar examinations, 70 per cent; for 1952 bar examination, 71 per cent; for 1953
bar examination, 72 per cent; for 1954 bar examination, 73 percent; and for 1955 bar
examination, 74 per cent. Thus in 1956 the passing mark will be restored with the condition that
the candidate shall not obtain in any subject a grade of below 50 per cent. The reason for
relaxing the standard 75 per cent passing grade, is the tremendous handicap which students
during the years immediately after the Japanese occupation has to overcome such as the
insufficiency of reading materials and the inadequacy of the preparation of students who took
up law soon after the liberation. It is believed that by 1956 the preparation of our students as
well as the available reading materials will be under normal conditions, if not improved from
those years preceding the last world war.
In this will we eliminated altogether the idea of having our Supreme Court assumed the
supervision as well as the administration of the study of law which was objected to by the
President in the Bar Bill of 1951.
The President in vetoing the Bar Bill last year stated among his objections that the bill would
admit to the practice of law "a special class who failed in the bar examination". He considered
the bill a class legislation. This contention, however, is not, in good conscience, correct because
Congress is merely supplementing what the Supreme Court have already established as
precedent by making as low as 69 per cent the passing mark of those who took the Bar
examination in 1947. These bar candidates for who this bill should be enacted, considered
themselves as having passed the bar examination on the strength of the established precedent
of our Supreme Court and were fully aware of the insurmountable difficulties and handicaps
which they were unavoidably placed. We believe that such precedent cannot or could not have
been altered, constitutionally, by the Supreme Court, without giving due consideration to the
rights already accrued or vested in the bar candidates who took the examination when the
precedent was not yet altered, or in effect, was still enforced and without being inconsistent
with the principles of their previous resolutions.
If this bill would be enacted, it shall be considered as a simple curative act or corrective statute
which Congress has the power to enact. The requirement of a "valid classification" as against
class legislation, is very expressed in the following American Jurisprudence:
A valid classification must include all who naturally belong to the class, all who possess a
common disability, attribute, or classification, and there must be a "natural" and substantial
differentiation between those included in the class and those it leaves untouched. When a class
is accepted by the Court as "natural" it cannot be again split and then have the dissevered
factions of the original unit designated with different rules established for each. (Fountain Park
Co. vs. Rensier, 199 Ind. 95, N. E. 465 (1926).
Another case penned by Justice Cardozo: "Time with its tides brings new conditions which must
be cared for by new laws. Sometimes the new conditions affect the members of a class. If so,
the correcting statute must apply to all alike. Sometimes the condition affect only a few. If so,
the correcting statute may be as narrow as the mischief. The constitution does not prohibit
special laws inflexibly and always. It permits them when there are special evils with which the
general laws are incompetent to cope. The special public purpose will sustain the special form. .
. . The problem in the last analysis is one of legislative policy, with a wide margin of discretion
conceded to the lawmakers. Only in the case of plain abuse will there be revision by the court.
(In Williams vs. Mayor and City Council of Baltimore, 286 U. S. 36, 77 L. Ed. 1015, 53 Sup. Ct.
431). (1932)
This bill has all the earmarks of a corrective statute which always retroacts to the extent of the
care of correction only as in this case from 1946 when the Supreme Court first deviated from
the rule of 75 per cent in the Rules of Court.
For the foregoing purposes the approval of this bill is earnestly recommended.
(Sgd.) PABLO ANGELES DAVID

Senator
Without much debate, the revised bill was passed by Congress as above transcribed. The President again
asked the comments of this Court, which endorsed the following:
Respectfully returned to the Honorable, the Acting Executive Secretary, Manila, with the
information that, with respect to Senate Bill No. 371, the members of the Court are taking the
same views they expressed on Senate Bill No. 12 passed by Congress in May, 1951, contained in
the first indorsement of the undersigned dated June 5, 1951, to the Assistant Executive
Secretary.
(Sgd.) RICARDO PARAS
The President allowed the period within which the bill should be signed to pass without vetoing it, by
virtue of which it became a law on June 21, 1953 (Sec. 20, Art. VI, Constitution) numbered 972 (many
times erroneously cited as No. 974).
It may be mentioned in passing that 1953 was an election year, and that both the President and the
author of the Bill were candidates for re-election, together, however, they lost in the polls.

In Re - Cunanan

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Republic of the Philippines

Resolution March 18, 1954

REPUBLIC ACT NO. 972

SEC. 3. This Act shall take effect upon its approval.

Enacted on June 21, 1953, without the Executive approval.

1946 (August) 206 121 18

UNCONSTITUTIONALITY OF REPUBLIC ACT NO. 972

Notwithstanding all these, if the law in question is valid, it has to be enforced.

It appears that the Constitution of New York at that time provided:

xxx xxx xxx

Furthermore, it is an unlawful attempt to exercise the power of appointment. It is quite likely

We quote from other cases, the following pertinent portions:

Admission to practice of law is almost without exception conceded everywhere to be the

Section 2 of Act No. 1597, enacted February 28, 1907, is as follows:

Considering the proviso, however, as an enactment, it is clearly a special legislation, prohibited

A good summary of a classification constitutionally acceptable is explained in 12 Am. Jur. 151-153 as

PETITIONERS UNDER REPUBLIC ACT NO. 72

1953 PETITIONERS FOR RECONSIDERATION

The Enactment of Republic Act No. 972

It seems to be unfair that unsuccessful candidates at bar examinations should be compelled to

xxx xxx xxx

SEC. 3. This bill shall take effect upon its approval.

With the following explanatory note:

(Sgd.) PABLO ANGELES DAVID

(Sgd.) RICARDO PARAS

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