Risk-Based Equipment Spacing for Process Safety in Onshore Shale

Development and Production Facilities

Chandra Gulati and Peng Lian
Shell Upstream Americas

This title was presented at the 2014 International Symposium.

Risk-Based Equipment Spacing For Process Safety
in Onshore Shale Development and Production
Facilities

Chandra Gulati,
Peng Lian
Shell Exploration & Production Co.
Duncan Smith
Risktec Solutions, Inc.

There has been a boom in development of North Americas unconventional shale gas and oil in
recent years. Equipment spacing and layout is becoming a more complex issue for
unconventional shale projects. Facilities are equipment-intensive operations, and there is a
desire to minimize surface disturbance and footprint without compromising safety. Therefore,
companies are facing significant challenges to achieve these business goals while remaining
focused on safety and minimizing impacts to the environment. In the United States, there are
regulations specifying minimum spacing from permanent well site equipment to offsite facilities
such as residential housing, public buildings, roads, and highways. However, to our knowledge,
there are no existing federal or state regulations for spacing and layout of equipment on well
sites in the United States.

The Technical Safety Engineering team in Shell Exploration & Production Company assisted
Shells1 onshore unconventional projects and operations to identify risks in the development and
production activities, and developed a series of guidance for equipment spacing. The spacing
guidance includes a spacing table with instructions on when and how to apply the tables. The
tables cover both well pad facilities and central processing facilities. The guidance divides the
tables applicability according to characteristics of the facilities and potential associated risks to
onsite personnel and surrounding properties.

The guidance is based on an extensive survey of existing regulatory, industrial and company
standards. Development of the guidance also employed a risk-based method with consequence
modeling to understand potential physical effects of flammable gas dispersion and heat
radiation from jet fires or pool fires. Release scenarios were identified for equipment from which
release and ignition of flammable hydrocarbon may occur. Scenarios and minimum spacing
distances were selected according to the principle of Managing Risk in Shells 1 HSSE & SP
Control Framework.

The spacing charts will be used at Shells unconventional shale gas and oil facilities in the
United States. The spacing guidance will be integrated into Shells Design and Engineering

1
Each Shell Oil Company subsidiary or affiliated company in the United States is a separate legal entity. In this
document the term "Shell refers to the subsidiary or affiliated company of Shell Oil Company that owns, operates,
or provides services with respect to the assets and operations discussed.
Practice (DEP) standards. The development process provides an opportunity to check through
onsite hydrocarbon release and fire hazards in a systematic way for various operations. The
purpose is to create a standard solution and a practical tool to manage the risk of fire hazards in
onshore shale assets, create more consistency in operations, and elevate the bar for safety
performance in Shell.
1. Introduction and Project Overview
There has been a boom in North Americas unconventional shale gas and oil development in
recent years. Today, companies in unconventional shale gas projects are facing significant
challenges to achieve their business goals around minimizing surface disturbance and footprint
while remaining focused on safety and minimizing the impact to the environment.

Equipment layout and spacing is a fundamental aspect of risk management [1]. A well-designed
facility layout will balance the spacing between potential hazard sources and locations that
could be impacted, resulting in efficient land use, and minimizing the industrys environmental
footprint. Optimal equipment layout is crucial to reducing the potential for injury or death to
people working onsite during fire and explosion incidents, as well as protect equipment from
damage and prevent economic loss.

In Canada, various provincial requirements or recommendations specify spacing for well site
equipment [2, 3]. In the United States, there are regulations specifying minimum spacing from
permanent well site to public areas such as residential housing, public buildings, roads, and
highways. However, to our knowledge, there is no current federal or state regulation for spacing
and layout of equipment on well sites in the United States.

Shell has been operating several onshore unconventional gas facilities in the United States
during the recent years. Shells Technical Safety Engineering Team has assisted Shells
unconventional gas projects and operations with identifying risks in the unconventional gas
production business related to handling of flammable hydrocarbons and implementing effective
measures to control the risks. The team also helps various project and asset teams on fire
hazard assessment for spacing and layout of well site equipment.

In 2014, as part of an effort to standardize engineering practice for process safety assurance in
onshore unconventional projects, the Technical Safety Engineering Team worked with Shells
unconventional gas business and Shells Projects & Technology group to develop a series of
spacing guidelines. The project objective is to produce a set of spacing requirements for
equipment in Shells onshore unconventional sites. Most of the requirements are presented in
the form of recommended minimum spacing distances in a spacing table. The distances aim to
reduce the potential for harm to people and damage to equipment from potential fire hazard
due to hydrocarbon release. The chart will be applied in Shell unconventional gas development
and production facilities in the United States.

2. General Philosophy and Objectives

The philosophy applied is to control the risks to people, asset, and environment) to be As Low
As Reasonably Practicable (ALARP). The objective is to provide a simple tool that enables a
facility to manage layout risks to ALARP without the need for a detailed risk analysis for each
site. The tool provides simple spacing tables which provide the optimum/minimum required
spacing between major items of equipment that are commonly found on upstream wellpad sites
and gathering facilities. The separation distances provided in the table are based on detailed
assessment of consequences from potential hazardous events and risk-based analysis of the
events. This tool should enable sites to be quickly laid out, while achieving onsite and offsite
risk levels which can be demonstrated to meet the ALARP principle.

To design the spacing requirements, it is important to have a proper understanding on the risk
profiles at various types of facilities. In this work, surface facilities in onshore unconventional
shale gas/oil fields consist of generally the following type of sites:

1. Well pad, which typically contains equipment from production wellheads and headers, oil
and gas separation vessels, storage, to the sales point on the sites;
2. Central processing facility (CPF), which is used in the field for centralized bulk
separation treatment of oil and gas, compression, dewpoint control, storage, and sales.
CPFs are usually used to separate, treat, store or otherwise handle raw production
streams in order to get those material processed to sales specification and on to market.
For larger CPF facilities in liquid rich fields, it may also include LPG/NGL extraction as
well as associated pressurized storage and distribution/sales equipment (such as water
hub, compressor station, oil battery, gas plant, NGL extraction, NLG storage).

Facilities are classified into either of two categories below based on associated risk levels:

remote AND unmanned site, and

non-remote OR manned site.

This classification was derived from definitions of location classes in ASME B31.8 (2014). In
ASME B31.8, locations are classified according to factors such as number of buildings for
occupancy within a certain distance range and their desired functionalities (e.g suburban
housing development, shopping center, etc.).

In the remote AND unmanned site, the major risk is asset damage. Accordingly, for this type of
site, the emphasis for applying spacing requirements is to minimize the potential for ignition
following a potential loss of containment of flammable hydrocarbons and address the potential
for escalation of fire hazards.

In non-remote OR manned site, the evaluation of major risks also include more emphasis on
safety of onsite personnel, potential impact on offsite residential areas, as well as the potential
for asset damage. So for non-remote OR manned site, besides ignition prevention of potentially
leaked hydrocarbons, the spacing requirements also aim to protect people during hydrocarbon
release incidents. This is realized by defining minimum separating distances from equipment
containing flammable hydrocarbons to locations where people may be present, such as
occupied buildings, or material loading/unloading stations, where people carry out job tasks
related to operations.

Accordingly, this work consists of two main parts:

Part 1: identify required minimum spacing between equipment. This part will be covered
in Section 3.
 Part 2: identify required minimum spacing between equipment and locations with
personnel activities, such as occupied buildings. This second part will be covered in
Section 4.

Results from Part 1 are a table containing spacing distances applicable to both types of sites
regarding to layout of onsite equipment. The results from Part 2 also include spacing distances
addressing locations with personnel and should be applied to the second type non-remote OR
manned site, in addition to requirements from Part 1.

The methodology utilized is a risk-based approach, which includes a detailed assessment of

risks for various hazardous scenarios. The approach is similar to the risk-based method in IP-15
for Area Classification by the Energy Institute in UK. This work is a derivation of the method and
practical application of it in the relatively new unconventional gas and oil industry.

3. Spacing between Equipment

Spacing between equipment can reduce the potential for equipment damage due to ignition
and fire when hydrocarbon leaks occur. For each type of hydrocarbon containing equipment,
various Loss-of-Containment events may occur with different levels of severity and probability.
The severity of the hazard depends on various factors including process conditions (e.g.
pressure, temperature, flow rate, etc.) and environmental conditions (e.g. wind speed and
direction). Different severities can result in different hazardous distances from the point of
release. Usually a less severe case requires lower minimum distance to prevent ignition of
leaked hydrocarbons, although it may have higher occurrence frequency. So distances which
can prevent ignition in such cases may not be sufficient to prevent ignition of more severe leaks,
which may need to be considered and addressed according to projects risk acceptability criteria.
However an over conservative leak case may result in over large distances between equipment,
which may result in extra capital expenditure on process piping without corresponding benefits,
as well as excessive use of land, and greater environmental impact.

In light of this, in order to establish a set of minimum spacing distances between equipment
which can provide optimum risk reduction, a methodology to identify the release scenarios with
a constant level of risk, or the design base scenarios, is required. The concept of design base
scenario corresponds to the Worst-Case Credible Scenarios (WCC Scenarios) as defined in the
manual of Managing Risk in the Shell HSSE & SP Control Framework. According to the Shell
HSSE & SP Control Framework, HSSE hazards in Shell businesses need to be identified. For
each HSSE hazard, Worst-Case Credible Scenarios should be determined and risk of such
scenarios should be assessed, so measures can be taken to reduce the risk to ALARP. Once
defined, these design base scenarios are used to determine the minimum spacing distances in
the spacing chart. Different design base scenarios are defined for the two site risk levels
considered.

To determine the design base scenarios, it is crucial to have a defined acceptable level of risk.
For the approach in this project, the risk criteria are based on likelihood of release. The constant
level of risk was determined by using the risk based approach similar to that adopted in IP-15 [4]
by the Energy Institute in UK.

Although area classification is not the prime tool for determining facility layout, relevant codes
and standards have been frequently referenced during equipment layout practice in the industry.
API RP 500 provides guidance on determination of Class I, Division 1 and Class I, Division 2
areas for petroleum installations. But the extent of API classified areas is mainly limited to
locations where flammable hydrocarbon may exist under normal operations. The code does not
provide details on how to take into consideration the occurrence of abnormal LOC events when
determining hazardous areas. Instead, the European area classification code IP-15 addresses
the abnormal events by dividing hazardous areas into three regimes, Zone 0, 1, and 2, with
Zone 2 referring to the part of a hazardous area in which a flammable atmosphere is not likely
to occur in normal operation but may occur during abnormal situations. IP-15 provides further
background information on how abnormal releases can be determined based on equipment
types and various risk levels. The IP 15 methodology serves as the basis for the approach in
this project, which will be introduced in more details below.

3.1 Identification of Process Equipment and Loss-of-Containment

Scenarios
The first step in development of the spacing chart is to identify the equipment which are present
at unconventional oil and gas production sites under the works scope. The equipment is further
categorized as either:

1) Release sources (hydrocarbon containing equipment, wellheads, flowlines, vessels)

2) Ignition sources (unclassified electrical equipment, open flames and internal combustion
engines), and Identified equipment is listed in the Table 1.

After the equipment is identified, the next step is to identify hydrocarbon release scenarios and
the potential consequences of such leaks. This was done in a team workshop effort. A
brainstorming approach was used to identify possible LOC scenarios for each type of equipment.

Table 1 Equipment for Onshore Production Facilities

Equipment Release Source? Ignition Source?

Hydrocarbon wellhead and choke Yes No
Injection wellhead (water, CO2, N2, etc.) Yes No
Production header and manifold Yes No
Separators and other unfired process equipment Yes No
Gas Compressors skids and sheds (>200 hp) Yes No
Vapor recovery units and compressors (<200 hp) Yes No
Gas metering station, or skid Yes No
Process hydrocarbon pumps, LACT unit Yes No
 Equipment Release Source? Ignition Source?

Hydrocarbon Pipeline Pumps Yes No

Atmospheric/LP flammable hydrocarbon storage tanks Yes No
Produced Water Tanks Yes No
Hydrocarbon Truck Loading/Unloading Point Yes No
Produced Water Truck Loading/Unloading Point Yes No
Sumps and manholes with hydrocarbon Yes No
Internal Combustion Engines No Yes
Fired process heaters and boilers (protected) Yes Yes
Fired process heaters and boilers (unprotected) Yes Yes
Flares No Yes
Vent stacks (not burning) Yes No
Natural gas liquid storage vessel (pressurized) Yes No
Major pipe racks and pipeways Yes No
Note: Typical equipment applicable to a regular onshore oil and gas production facility. Other equipment not listed
could be in existence and would be evaluated separately.

Figure 1 shows how the spacing chart looks like when filled up with the identified equipment.
 Figure 1 Blank Template for Spacing Chart for Shells Onshore Unconventional
Facilities in US

3.2 Establishment of Risk Levels for LOC Scenarios

The key part of the risk-based methodology is to identify potential release scenarios with
consistent and appropriate levels of risk. Guidance from IP-15 has been adopted to establish
the risk level criteria.In IP-15, two types of releases are defined: primary and secondary grade
release. A primary grade release represents releases during normal operations, such as venting
and draining. While a secondary grade release includes releases which would not be
anticipated to occur during normal operation. Examples of the secondary grade release include
failure of pump/compressor seals, leaks from corrosion holes and flanges, or operational error.
Spacing requirements in this work are based on the secondary grade releases.

For the secondary grade release, IP-15 suggests three levels of release frequency (Level I, II,
III).
Level I release has highest frequency of 10-2/yr.
Level II has the frequency of 10-3/yr.
Level III has the frequency of10-4/yr.
For different types of equipment, IP-15 further provides example leak hole sizes associated to
each level. For example, for a standard pump without throttle bushes and handling flammable
liquids capable of rapid vaporization upon release, a 5.75 mm leak hole is used to represent the
Level I release, and correspondingly the hazardous radius is 10 m (Table 5.1(a) in IP 15 3rd
edition, July 2005). A 10 mm leak hole is used for Level II release and the hazardous radius is
16 m. A 30 mm leak hole is used ofr Level III release. It can be seen that as the release
frequency becomes lower from Level I to Level III, consequence of the release becomes more
severe, and the hazardous radius, or minimum spacing distance, becomes larger.

Also, it can be seen that release conditions can be related to certain risk levels, and LOC
scenarios can be assigned to different risk level categories based on their release conditions.

So identified LOC scenarios were further classified into three categories: Major LOC (M-LOC),
Most Likely LOC (ML-LOC), and Credible Worst-Case LOC (CWC-LOC). The aim is to assure a
constant level of risk for the scenarios within each category. Design base case scenarios will
then be selected from the groups according to targeted risk levels.

Details of the three release categories based on characteristics of the release conditions are
listed below:

a) Major Loss-of-Containment (M-LOC)

This is the worst-case possible release scenario that may happen. M-LOC involves the
release of inventory in a large amount or an escape through a very large opening, which
essentially establishes the metrics for the furthest extent for a flammable cloud or
damaging fire heat flux. Generally, an M-LOC corresponds to a Level III release as in IP-
15, which is considered unlikely and therefore not usually applied as a design basis for
equipment spacing.
 b) Most Likely Loss-of-Containment (ML-LOC)
This is the less severe release cases than M-LOCs. However, MLLOCs are more likely
to happen than M-LOCs. An ML-LOC corresponds to a Level I release as in IP-15.

c) Credible Worst Case Loss-of-Containment (CWC-LOC)

CWC-LOCs are release cases that are less severe than worst-case M-LOC scenarios,
but more severe than ML-LOCs. CWCLOCs are usually based on the ML-LOCs, but
with worse release conditions and more severe consequences, which are reviewed for
conservative purposes. A CWC-LOC corresponds to a Level II release as in IP-15.

Table 2 lists identified potential release scenarios using flowback equipment as an example.

Table 2 Examples of Three Levels of Release Scenarios for Production Equipment

Equipment Scenario Type and Description

M-LOC Scenario
A full-bore gas flowline rupture due to pipe connection failure. The flow line
carries mainly gas, and flow rate is limited by the maximum output from the
production well based on a conservative estimate.
Release of the entire liquid inventory from a condensate tank, and ignition
of vapor above the liquid pool.
Release from a full-bore ruptured pipe, or a hole with a diameter of 150
mm or larger on a vessel.
Release of gas from rupture or opening on a producing wellhead during
loss of well control.

Process separator ML-LOC Scenario

A gas leak occurs on production equipment. A 10-mm diameter hole is
assumed under 1440 psi pressure.
Local minor release of natural gas from low-pressure or atmospheric
systems.
Local minor release of liquid hydrocarbons within bund area.

CWC-LOC Scenario
A gas leak occurs on production equipment. Instead of a 10 mm hole, a
larger hole size of 20-mm diameter is assumed for conservative purposes,
under 1440 psi pressure in the vessel and associated piping.

Note: Examples of release scenarios are not all inclusive. Other examples may exist for any particular production site
or equipment.

3.3 Selection of Design-Basis Scenarios

A workshop was held to select design base scenarios for each type of equipment. Based on
group discussion, the project team in the workshop uses expert judgment and experience to
select the design base scenario for each type of equipment. Physical effects from identified
design base scenarios were studied using a Shell proprietary software package for modeling the
consequences, including flammable gas dispersion and fire heat radiation. The minimum
spacing distances for the equipment were identified.
 1. A Credible Worst Case (CWC) LOC (level II) scenario is used as design base scenario
for the type of equipment when it is aimed to use spacing to prevent ignition of
flammable hydrocarbons leaked from the equipment. Based on the gas dispersion
contour from consequence analysis of the scenario, a distance from the release source
to gas concentration of lower flammability limit (LFL) is identified. The distance is used
as the minimum spacing to prevent ignition of released gas.
2. A Most Likely (ML) LOC (level I) scenario is used as design base scenario for the type of
equipment when it is aimed to use spacing to prevent hazard escalation to nearby
equipment due to fire from ignited hydrocarbons. Based on the fire heat radiation
contour from consequence analysis of the scenario, several distances are identified
according to levels of the heat flux, each with different potentials to harm people or
damage equipment. The heat flux levels are based on relevant Shell standards and
industry guidelines. A distance from the release source to a heat flux level of 37.5 kW/m2
is used as the minimum distance to avoid damage to equipment in a short-term period. A
distance to 6.3 kW/m2 is used to avoid injury to properly trained personnel during short-
term exposure.

When selection of the distances is finished for all the equipment, the distances are entered into
the spacing chart.

It should be noted that current spacing distances on process equipment focuses on fire risk. In
most cases the explosion risk at well pad site and gathering stations is considered to be low.
When there are potential explosion hazards due to confinement and congestion in the process
areas, for example when equipment is located inside buildings, relevant procedure for
assessment of explosion risk should be conducted and risks addressed. This is described in
more details in Section 4.2.

4 Spacing between Equipment and Locations with Personnel

4.1 General Strategy
Separation of hydrocarbon containing equipment from area where personnel may be present is
crucial to protect people during abnormal situations such as release of flammable process fluids.
The locations include occupied buildings (e.g. control rooms), truck loading/unloading stations,
etc. Particularly, safe siting of occupied buildings has been listed as one of the Process Safety
Basic Requirements (PSBR) in Shells HSSE & SP Control Framework. The philosophy behind
the PSBR requirements is to reduce the potential for re-occurrence of known major process
safety incidents in the industry by focusing on the main causes to the incidents and the key
barriers.

Personnel working in hydrocarbon facilities are subject mainly to two types of potential
hydrocarbon hazards: explosion overpressure and thermal radiation. The following strategy is
used to assess risks from both hazards on building occupants.

1. To protect people from injury or death due to heat radiation from fire in the process unit
and facilitate their escape, level II (IP 15) scenarios from equipment in section 3.1 are
 assessed using FRED consequence modeling, the distance from the equipment to the
level of 6.3 kW/m2 heat radiation is used as minimum distance to the locations with
personnel.
2. To protect people in occupied buildings from injury or death due to overpressure of
explosion, follow risk-based approach and criteria as specified in API RP 752.

4.2 Explosion Hazard Assessment

Usually for onshore unconventional facilities, risk of explosion is low when process area, e.g.
central processing units and tank batteries, is built in open areas with low congestion level.
However, for the facilities in regions where cold climate makes it necessary to protect
equipment from freezing conditions, plant buildings or containment have been used to enclose
process vessels or machineries (e.g. pumps, compressors.). When such conditions exist, the
case-specific explosion risk assessment is conducted for the building, besides meeting the
minimum distance in the spacing table.

Methodology for the assessment follows the basic methodology for Quantitative Risk
Assessment (QRA) as described in the Center for Chemical Process Safety (CCPS) guidelines
and API RP 752. The assessment makes use of the Shepherd Process Risk Tool software
developed by Shell Global Solutions. The Shell Shepherd desktop software has been designed
as an aid to the decision making process for facility layout. The tool is intended for analysis of
the typical process plant. Risk contributions are built-up systematically starting from a release
and working through ignition sources to the calculation of the effects of cloud fires, jet fires,
explosions and toxics exposures for unignited releases. Based on the event failure frequency
data, the risk for the operation under review is calculated and results are used as a yardstick to
measure safety, identify areas of concern, raise awareness for the potential of certain accidents,
and thereby develop measures to prevent them. The main uses of the risk tool are to help in the
layout of new or expanding sites, for internal use to identify higher risk areas, for efficient site
improvement and to demonstrate that risk levels are tolerable.

5 Special Spacing Considerations

5.1 Sour Gas
Unconventional shale gas reservoirs may contain high levels of hydrogen sulfide (H2S or sour
gas). In Shell, managing risks due to exposure to H2S is listed also as a Process Safety Basic
Requirement (PSBR) in the HSSE & SP Control Framework, which requires assessment of
safety risks in H2S operations, particularly for concurrent operations or SIMOPs.

Shell International Exploration and Production developed a special concept called Time to
Protect as a layout methodology for operations in high-pressure and high-H2S-concentration
facilities [7]. According to the Time-to-Protect methodology, when activities are ongoing in areas
nearby a facility where H2S is present, a safe separation distance must be established to allow
safe evacuation of personnel upon early detection of an H2S release. Therefore, larger
equipment spacing might be needed based on this methodology.
Because the spacing chart is designed for standard or sweet gas facilities, facilities where H2S
is present must follow relevant Shell procedures to assess layout and equipment spacing to
take H2S presence into account, such as using dispersion models to determine the dimensions
of a theoretical 300-ppm H2S plume from a potential credible release event and locating the
occupied buildings, personnel work areas and evacuation route outside of the plumes footprint.

5.2 Simultaneous Operations (SIMOPs)

Simultaneous Operations (SIMOPs) are being carried out more often in the unconventional oil
and gas fields, due to complex development schedules and equipment-intensive procedures
(e.g. hydraulic fracturing). SIMOPs include drilling, completion, workover, well intervention,
flowback, and production. Besides well operations, the concept of SIMOPs also includes
construction, commissioning, modifications, and maintenance. Unlike continuous production
from wells, many SIMOPs activities are temporary in nature and therefore bring an additional
dimension of risk to the asset. Various simultaneously ongoing activities may place large
numbers of personnel in close proximity to operating equipment in use for other activities.

The Shell Technical Safety Engineering team previously developed a spacing chart for SIMOPS
to help field supervisors and personnel make decisions about equipment layout for SIMOPs [8].
The chart has already been used at Shells unconventional shale gas facilities in the United
States and is integrated into Shells overall risk management system for SIMOPs.

6. Summary
A spacing chart for equipment layout in Shells onshore unconventional gas/oil production
facilities has been developed by Shells Technical Safety Engineering team. The chart was
developed using a risk-based methodology, combining both consequence assessment and
likelihood analysis for various hazardous events from the process equipment, to develop a
series of design base scenarios. The design base scenarios are used to develop minimum
spacing distances between equipment and locations with personnel existence, so that the risks
to personnel and asset can be minimized and demonstrated to be ALARP. As a simple and
practical tool, the spacing chart helps to create more consistency in operations and elevate the
bar for safety performance in Shell.

Use of the chart enables rapid layout of equipment for sites to be conducted without the need
for bespoke risk modeling for each potential layout option. Maintaining the link back to the
source of the risk and a use of a consistent methodology when developing the charts allows the
user to understand the risk basis for the recommended spacing and to perform additional case
specific modeling if an alternate layout may be appropriate.

Acknowledgement
Certain key people enabled success in this project. Support from the Operations in Shell
Exploration and Production Company is appreciated, especially because any changes and
improvements in safety can only be realized with demonstrated leadership.
We are also grateful for the support, time, and valuable input of the following members of Shell
Technical Safety Engineering Team: Natalie Salter, Julie Mialaret, Kiran Krishna, Matt Childs,
and John Pruitt.

Reference
[1] CCPS. Guidelines for Facility Siting and Layout. Center for Chemical Process Safety. AIChE,
2003

[2] British Columbia Oil & Gas Commission, 2013, Well Completion, Maintenance and
Abandonment Guideline, April 2013.

[3] ENFORM The Safety Association for Canadas Upstream Oil and Gas Industry, 2008,
Industry Recommended Practice (IRP) Volume 20, Wellsite Design Spacing Recommendations.

[4] IP 15 Area Classification Code for Installations Handling Flammable Fluids

[5] API 500 Recommended Practice for Classification of Locations for Electrical Installations at
Petroleum Facilities Classified as Class 1, Division 1 and Division 2.

[6] Failure to Learn, the BP Texas City Refinery disaster, Andrew Hopkins, CCH, 2010

[7] Blyth, A., Time to Protect: Layout Methodology for Safe SimOps in High-Pressure, High-%
H2S Facilities, SPE Americas E&P Environment & Safety Conference, San Antonio, Texas,
USA, March 23-25, 2009.

[8] Gulati, C., Mialaret, J., Lian, P., Smith, D., Development and Application of Spacing Chart
for Simultaneous Operations (SIMOPs) in Unconventional Shale Gas Fields, 10th Global
Congress on Process Safety, New Orleans, LA, March 30 April 2, 2014.