HILADO v.

CA

Roberto S. Benedicto died intestate on 15 May 2000. He was survived by his wife, private respondent Julita Campos
Benedicto (administratrix Benedicto), and his only daughter, Francisca Benedicto-Paulino.

At the time of his death, two civil cases were pending against Benedicto involving the petitioners. Administratrix Benedicto,
then submitted an Inventory of the Estate, Lists of Personal and Real Properties, and Liabilities of the Estate of her deceased
husband, which included as among the liabilities, the liability corresponding to the two cases as P136,045,772.50 for Civil
Case No. 95-9137 andP35,198,697.40 for Civil Case No. 11178. Thereafter, the Manila RTC required private respondent to
submit a complete and updated inventory and appraisal report pertaining to the estate.

On September 24, 2001, petitioners filed with the Manila RTC: (1) Manifestation/Motion Ex Abundanti Cautela, praying
that they be furnished with copies of all processes and orders pertaining to the intestate proceedings; (2) Omnibus motion
praying that the Manila RTC set a deadline for the submission by private respondent of the required inventory of the
decedents estate; and (3) pleadings or motions with the Manila RTC, alleging lapses on the part of private respondent in
her administration of the estate, and assailing the inventory that had been submitted thus far as unverified, incomplete and
inaccurate.

On 2 January 2002, the Manila RTC issued an order denying the manifestation/motion, on the ground that petitioners are
not interested parties within the contemplation of the Rules of Court to intervene in the intestate proceedings. A petition
for certiorari was filed with the Court of Appeals. The petition argued in general that petitioners had the right to intervene
in the intestate proceedings of Roberto Benedicto, the latter being the defendant in the civil cases they lodged with the
Bacolod RTC. But on 27 February 2004, the Court of Appeals dismissed the petition and declared that the Manila RTC did
not abuse its discretion in refusing to allow petitioners to intervene in the intestate proceedings.

ISSUE

Whether the petitioners have the right to intervene in the intestate proceedings of the deceased Benedicto.

HELD

The disposition of the RTC and the Court of Appeals is correct. Petitioners be furnished with copies of all processes and
orders issued in connection with the intestate proceedings, as well as the pleadings filed by the administrator of the estate.

Petitioners' stated main purpose for accessing the records was to monitor prompt compliance with the Rules governing the
preservation and proper disposition of the assets of the estate, e.g., the completion and appraisal of the Inventory and the
submission by the Administratrix of an annual accounting appears legitimate, for, as the plaintiffs in the complaints for
sum of money against Roberto Benedicto, et al., they have an interest over the outcome of the settlement of his estate. They
are in fact "interested persons" under Rule 135, Sec. 2 of the Rules of Court x x x.

Nonetheless, in the instances that the Rules on Special Proceedings do require notice to any or all "interested parties" the
petitioners as "interested parties" will be entitled to such notice. The instances when notice has to be given to interested
parties are provided in: (1) Sec. 10, Rule 85 in reference to the time and place of examining and allowing the account of the
executor or administrator; (2) Sec. 7(b) of Rule 89 concerning the petition to authorize the executor or administrator to sell
personal estate, or to sell, mortgage or otherwise encumber real estates; and; (3) Sec. 1, Rule 90 regarding the hearing for
the application for an order for distribution of the estate residue.

A deadline be set for the submission by administratrix Benedicto to submit a verified and complete inventory of the estate,
and upon submission thereof Section 1 of Rule 83 requires the administrator to return to the court a true inventory and
appraisal of all the real and personal estate of the deceased within three (3) months from appointment, while Section 8 of
Rule 85 requires the administrator to render an account of his administration within one (1) year from receipt of the letters
testamentary or of administration.

We do not doubt that there are reliefs available to compel an administrator to perform either duty, but a person whose
claim against the estate is still contingent is not the party entitled to do so. Still, even if the administrator did delay in the
performance of these duties in the context of dissipating the assets of the estate, there are protections enforced and available
under Rule 88 to protect the interests of those with contingent claims against the estate.

On complaints against the general competence of the administrator, the proper remedy is to seek the removal of the
administrator in accordance with Section 2, Rule 82. While the provision is silent as to who may seek with the court the
removal of the administrator, we do not doubt that a creditor, even a contingent one, would have the personality to seek
such relief. After all, the interest of the creditor in the estate relates to the preservation of sufficient assets to answer for the
debt, and the general competence or good faith of the administrator is necessary to fulfill such purpose.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED, subject to the qualification that petitioners, as persons interested in the intestate
estate of Roberto Benedicto, are entitled to such notices and rights as provided for such interested persons in the Rules on
Settlement of Estates of Deceased Persons under the Rules on Special Proceedings. No pronouncements as to costs.
 FULE v. CA

Virginia G. Fule (illegitimate sister) filed with the CFI of Laguna a petition for letters of administration
alleging that on April 26, 1973, Amado G. Garcia, a property owner of Calamba, Laguna, died intestate
in the City of Manila, leaving real estate and personal properties in Calamba, Laguna, and in other
places, within the jurisdiction of the Honorable Court. At the same time, she moved ex parte for her
appointment as special administratrix over the estate. Judge Malvar granted the motion.

A motion for reconsideration was filed by Preciosa Garcia, the surviving spouse of the deceased,
contending that: 1) The decedent resided in QC for 3 months before his death as shown by his death
certificate and therefore have an improper venue; and 2) The CFI of Calamba lacks jurisdiction over
the petition.

CFI denied the motion. CA reversed and affirmed making Preciosa the administratrix. Thus, Fule
elevated the matter to the SC on appeal by certiorari.

ISSUEs

(a) Are venue and jurisdiction the same? How can it be determined in the present case?
(b) What does the word resides in Revised Rules of Court, Rule 73, Section 1 mean?
(c) Who is entitled as special administratix of the estate?

HELD

(a) No, jurisdiction is defined as the authority to try, hear and decide a case base on the merits or the
substance of the facts. It is a substantive aspect of the trial proceeding. It is granted by law or by the
constitution and cannot be waived or stipulated.

On the other hand, Rule 4 of Rules of Court define venue as the proper court which has jurisdiction
over the area wherein real property involved or a portion thereof is situated. Venue is the location
of the court with jurisdiction. It is more on convenience purposes. Its more on procedural aspect of
the case. In some cases, it may be waived or stipulated by the parties.

Section 1, Rule 73 of the Revised Rules of Court provides: If the decedent is an inhabitant of the
Philippines at the time of his death, whether a citizen or an alien, his will shall be proved, or letters
of administration granted, and his estate settled, in the Court of First Instance in the province in
which he resides at the time of his death, and if he is an inhabitant of a foreign country, the Court
of First Instance of any province in which he had estate.

(b) Resides should be viewed or understood in its popular sense, meaning, the personal, actual or
physical habitation of a person, actual residence or place of abode. It signifies physical presence in
a place and actual stay thereat. In this popular sense, the term means merely residence, that is,
personal residence, not legal residence or domicile. Residence simply requires bodily presence as
an inhabitant in a given place, while domicile requires bodily presence in that place and also an
intention to make it ones domicile. No particular length of time of residence is required though;
however, the residence must be more than temporary.
(c) In the present case, SC ruled that the last place of residence of the deceased should be the venue of
the court. Amado G. Garcia was in Quezon City, and not at Calamba, Laguna base on his death
certificate. A death certificate is admissible to prove the residence of the decedent at the time of his
death.

Withal, the conclusion becomes imperative that the venue for Virginia C. Fules petition for letters
of administration was improperly laid in the Court of First Instance of Calamba, Laguna. Therefore
Preciosa B. Garcia was granted as a special administratix.
 CUENCO v. CA

(The court first taking cognizance of the settlement of the estate of a decedent, shall exercise jurisdiction
to the exclusion of all other courts)

Senator Mariano Jesus Cuenco died in Manila. He was survived by his widow and two minor sons,
residing in Quezon City, and children of the first marriage, residing in Cebu. Lourdes, one of the
children from the first marriage, filed a Petition for Letters of Administration with the CFI Cebu,
alleging that the senator died intestate in Manila but a resident of Cebu with properties in Cebu and
Quezon City.

While the petition was still pending, Rosa Cayetano Cuenco, the second wife, filed a petition with CFI
of Rizal for the probate of the last will and testament, where she was named executrix. Rosa also filed
an opposition and motion to dismiss in CFI Cebu but this court held in abeyance resolution over the
opposition until CFI Quezon shall have acted on the probate proceedings.

Lourdes filed an opposition and motion to dismiss in CFI Quezon, on ground of lack of jurisdiction
and/or improper venue, considering that CFI Cebu already acquired exclusive jurisdiction over the
case. The opposition and motion to dismiss were denied. Upon appeal, CA ruled in favor of Lourdes
and issued a writ of prohibition to CFI Quezon.

ISSUEs

Whether the CA erred in issuing the writ of prohibition.

Whether the CFI Quezon acted without jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion in taking cognizance
and assuming exclusive jurisdiction over the probate proceedings in pursuance to CFI Cebu's order
expressly consenting in deference to the precedence of probate over intestate proceedings

HELD

The Supreme Court found that CA erred in law in issuing the writ of prohibition against the Quezon
City court from proceeding with the testate proceedings and annulling and setting aside all its orders
and actions, particularly its admission to probate the last will and testament of the deceased and
appointing petitioner-widow as executrix thereof without bond pursuant to the deceased testator's
wish.

On Venue and Jurisdiction

Under Rule 73, the court first taking cognizance of the settlement of the estate of a decent, shall exercise
jurisdiction to the exclusion of all other courts.

The residence of the decedent or the location of his estate is not an element of jurisdiction over the
subject matter but merely of venue. If this were otherwise, it would affect the prompt administration
of justice.

The court with whom the petition is first filed must also first take cognizance of the settlement of the
estate in order to exercise jurisdiction over it to the exclusion of all other courts.
 MONSERRAT v. IBANEZ

Vicenta Salamanca died intestate leaving as heirs 1 son and 4 daughters. Ramon (son) filed with the
CFI of Laguna a petition for his appointment as administrator of the properties of his deceased mother.
His sisters (respondents) opposed saying that they are all of age; the debts and obligations of the estate
has already been paid; that they did not want to be burdened with admin proceedings; and that
Ramons remedy was to sue for partition under Rule 74 of ROC.

Judge Ibanez issued an order stating that in accordance with Fule v. Fule, the proper remedy should be
an action for partition because all the heirs were of age and there were no debts of the estate. He
required the sisters to institute partition proceedings and that the litigation begun by Ramon will be
held in abeyance. The sisters filed an action for partition.

Ramon filed a special civil action alleging that the respondent judge had committed grave abuse of
discretion. He prayed for the court to proceed with the hearing of his petition for administration.
Petitioner Ramon asserts that it is not known whether there are any debts because these may be shown
only in the administration proceedings, but he did not assert otherwise when respondents affidavit
says that there was no debt.

He argues that only when the heirs do not have any dispute as to the bulk of hereditary estate but only
in the manner of partition does Section 1 Rule 74 of ROC apply, and that in this case the parties are at
loggerheads as to the corpus of the hereditary estate because respondents succeeded in sequestering
some assets of the intestate.

ISSUE

Whether the administration proceedings should be held in abeyance.

HELD

Yes. The case of Fule v. Fule applies: where there are no debts, the heirs are not bound to submit the
property to a judicial administration which is always long and costly, or to apply for an appointment
of an admin by the court. These proceedings are superfluous and unnecessary.

The creditors are protected even if, without benefit of the administration, the estate is distributed in an
action for partition. Questions as to what property belonged to the deceased (and to the heirs) may
properly be ventilated in the partition proceedings, especially where such property is in the hands of
one heir.

The questions he seeks to raise in the admin proceedings may equally de decided in the partition suit.
Since the sisters constitute 4/5 of the heirs, the majority interest usually gets to select the administrator.
The SC also said that the admin proceedings will be dismissed soon, inasmuch as the partition suit has
already been instituted, because the court has already intimated that the proceedings will be suspended
pending the presentation of the other suit.