1. G.R. No.

L-16749 January 31, 1963

IN THE MATTER OF THE TESTATE ESTATE OF EDWARD E. CHRISTENSEN, DECEASED.

ADOLFO C. AZNAR, Executor and LUCY CHRISTENSEN, Heir of the deceased, Executor and Heir-appellees,
vs.
HELEN CHRISTENSEN GARCIA, oppositor-appellant.

M. R. Sotelo for executor and heir-appellees.

Leopoldo M. Abellera and Jovito Salonga for oppositor-appellant.

LABRADOR, J.:

This is an appeal from a decision of the Court of First Instance of Davao, Hon. Vicente N. Cusi, Jr., presiding, in Special Proceeding No. 622 of said court, dated
September 14, 1949, approving among things the final accounts of the executor, directing the executor to reimburse Maria Lucy Christensen the amount of P3,600
paid by her to Helen Christensen Garcia as her legacy, and declaring Maria Lucy Christensen entitled to the residue of the property to be enjoyed during her
lifetime, and in case of death without issue, one-half of said residue to be payable to Mrs. Carrie Louise C. Borton, etc., in accordance with the provisions of the will
of the testator Edward E. Christensen. The will was executed in Manila on March 5, 1951 and contains the following provisions:

3. I declare ... that I have but ONE (1) child, named MARIA LUCY CHRISTENSEN (now Mrs. Bernard Daney), who was born in the Philippines about
twenty-eight years ago, and who is now residing at No. 665 Rodger Young Village, Los Angeles, California, U.S.A.

4. I further declare that I now have no living ascendants, and no descendants except my above named daughter, MARIA LUCY CHRISTENSEN DANEY.

xxx xxx xxx

7. I give, devise and bequeath unto MARIA HELEN CHRISTENSEN, now married to Eduardo Garcia, about eighteen years of age and who,
notwithstanding the fact that she was baptized Christensen, is not in any way related to me, nor has she been at any time adopted by me, and who, from
all information I have now resides in Egpit, Digos, Davao, Philippines, the sum of THREE THOUSAND SIX HUNDRED PESOS (P3,600.00), Philippine
Currency the same to be deposited in trust for the said Maria Helen Christensen with the Davao Branch of the Philippine National Bank, and paid to her at
the rate of One Hundred Pesos (P100.00), Philippine Currency per month until the principal thereof as well as any interest which may have accrued
thereon, is exhausted..

xxx xxx xxx

12. I hereby give, devise and bequeath, unto my well-beloved daughter, the said MARIA LUCY CHRISTENSEN DANEY (Mrs. Bernard Daney), now
residing as aforesaid at No. 665 Rodger Young Village, Los Angeles, California, U.S.A., all the income from the rest, remainder, and residue of my
property and estate, real, personal and/or mixed, of whatsoever kind or character, and wheresoever situated, of which I may be possessed at my death
and which may have come to me from any source whatsoever, during her lifetime: ....

It is in accordance with the above-quoted provisions that the executor in his final account and project of partition ratified the payment of only P3,600 to Helen
Christensen Garcia and proposed that the residue of the estate be transferred to his daughter, Maria Lucy Christensen.

Opposition to the approval of the project of partition was filed by Helen Christensen Garcia, insofar as it deprives her (Helen) of her legitime as an acknowledged
natural child, she having been declared by Us in G.R. Nos. L-11483-84 an acknowledged natural child of the deceased Edward E. Christensen. The legal grounds
of opposition are (a) that the distribution should be governed by the laws of the Philippines, and (b) that said order of distribution is contrary thereto insofar as it
denies to Helen Christensen, one of two acknowledged natural children, one-half of the estate in full ownership. In amplification of the above grounds it was alleged
that the law that should govern the estate of the deceased Christensen should not be the internal law of California alone, but the entire law thereof because several
foreign elements are involved, that the forum is the Philippines and even if the case were decided in California, Section 946 of the California Civil Code, which
requires that the domicile of the decedent should apply, should be applicable. It was also alleged that Maria Helen Christensen having been declared an
acknowledged natural child of the decedent, she is deemed for all purposes legitimate from the time of her birth.

The court below ruled that as Edward E. Christensen was a citizen of the United States and of the State of California at the time of his death, the successional rights
and intrinsic validity of the provisions in his will are to be governed by the law of California, in accordance with which a testator has the right to dispose of his
property in the way he desires, because the right of absolute dominion over his property is sacred and inviolable (In re McDaniel's Estate, 77 Cal. Appl. 2d 877, 176
P. 2d 952, and In re Kaufman, 117 Cal. 286, 49 Pac. 192, cited in page 179, Record on Appeal). Oppositor Maria Helen Christensen, through counsel, filed various
motions for reconsideration, but these were denied. Hence, this appeal.

The most important assignments of error are as follows:

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN IGNORING THE DECISION OF THE HONORABLE SUPREME COURT THAT HELEN IS THE ACKNOWLEDGED NATURAL
CHILD OF EDWARD E. CHRISTENSEN AND, CONSEQUENTLY, IN DEPRIVING HER OF HER JUST SHARE IN THE INHERITANCE.

II

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN ENTIRELY IGNORING AND/OR FAILING TO RECOGNIZE THE EXISTENCE OF SEVERAL FACTORS, ELEMENTS AND
CIRCUMSTANCES CALLING FOR THE APPLICATION OF INTERNAL LAW.

III

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO RECOGNIZE THAT UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW, PARTICULARLY UNDER THE RENVOI DOCTRINE, THE
INTRINSIC VALIDITY OF THE TESTAMENTARY DISPOSITION OF THE DISTRIBUTION OF THE ESTATE OF THE DECEASED EDWARD E. CHRISTENSEN
SHOULD BE GOVERNED BY THE LAWS OF THE PHILIPPINES.

IV

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT DECLARING THAT THE SCHEDULE OF DISTRIBUTION SUBMITTED BY THE EXECUTOR IS CONTRARY TO THE
PHILIPPINE LAWS.
 V

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT DECLARING THAT UNDER THE PHILIPPINE LAWS HELEN CHRISTENSEN GARCIA IS ENTITLED TO ONE-HALF (1/2)
OF THE ESTATE IN FULL OWNERSHIP.

There is no question that Edward E. Christensen was a citizen of the United States and of the State of California at the time of his death. But there is also no
question that at the time of his death he was domiciled in the Philippines, as witness the following facts admitted by the executor himself in appellee's brief:

In the proceedings for admission of the will to probate, the facts of record show that the deceased Edward E. Christensen was born on November 29,
1875 in New York City, N.Y., U.S.A.; his first arrival in the Philippines, as an appointed school teacher, was on July 1, 1901, on board the U.S. Army
Transport "Sheridan" with Port of Embarkation as the City of San Francisco, in the State of California, U.S.A. He stayed in the Philippines until 1904.

In December, 1904, Mr. Christensen returned to the United States and stayed there for the following nine years until 1913, during which time he resided
in, and was teaching school in Sacramento, California.

Mr. Christensen's next arrival in the Philippines was in July of the year 1913. However, in 1928, he again departed the Philippines for the United States
and came back here the following year, 1929. Some nine years later, in 1938, he again returned to his own country, and came back to the Philippines the
following year, 1939.

Wherefore, the parties respectfully pray that the foregoing stipulation of facts be admitted and approved by this Honorable Court, without prejudice to the
parties adducing other evidence to prove their case not covered by this stipulation of facts. 1wph1.t

Being an American citizen, Mr. Christensen was interned by the Japanese Military Forces in the Philippines during World War II. Upon liberation, in April
1945, he left for the United States but returned to the Philippines in December, 1945. Appellees Collective Exhibits "6", CFI Davao, Sp. Proc. 622, as
Exhibits "AA", "BB" and "CC-Daney"; Exhs. "MM", "MM-l", "MM-2-Daney" and p. 473, t.s.n., July 21, 1953.)

In April, 1951, Edward E. Christensen returned once more to California shortly after the making of his last will and testament (now in question herein)
which he executed at his lawyers' offices in Manila on March 5, 1951. He died at the St. Luke's Hospital in the City of Manila on April 30, 1953. (pp. 2-3)

In arriving at the conclusion that the domicile of the deceased is the Philippines, we are persuaded by the fact that he was born in New York, migrated to California
and resided there for nine years, and since he came to the Philippines in 1913 he returned to California very rarely and only for short visits (perhaps to relatives),
and considering that he appears never to have owned or acquired a home or properties in that state, which would indicate that he would ultimately abandon the
Philippines and make home in the State of California.

Sec. 16. Residence is a term used with many shades of meaning from mere temporary presence to the most permanent abode. Generally, however, it is
used to denote something more than mere physical presence. (Goodrich on Conflict of Laws, p. 29)

As to his citizenship, however, We find that the citizenship that he acquired in California when he resided in Sacramento, California from 1904 to 1913, was never
lost by his stay in the Philippines, for the latter was a territory of the United States (not a state) until 1946 and the deceased appears to have considered himself as
a citizen of California by the fact that when he executed his will in 1951 he declared that he was a citizen of that State; so that he appears never to have intended to
abandon his California citizenship by acquiring another. This conclusion is in accordance with the following principle expounded by Goodrich in his Conflict of Laws.

The terms "'residence" and "domicile" might well be taken to mean the same thing, a place of permanent abode. But domicile, as has been shown, has
acquired a technical meaning. Thus one may be domiciled in a place where he has never been. And he may reside in a place where he has no domicile.
The man with two homes, between which he divides his time, certainly resides in each one, while living in it. But if he went on business which would
require his presence for several weeks or months, he might properly be said to have sufficient connection with the place to be called a resident. It is clear,
however, that, if he treated his settlement as continuing only for the particular business in hand, not giving up his former "home," he could not be a
domiciled New Yorker. Acquisition of a domicile of choice requires the exercise of intention as well as physical presence. "Residence simply requires
bodily presence of an inhabitant in a given place, while domicile requires bodily presence in that place and also an intention to make it one's domicile."
Residence, however, is a term used with many shades of meaning, from the merest temporary presence to the most permanent abode, and it is not safe
to insist that any one use et the only proper one. (Goodrich, p. 29)

The law that governs the validity of his testamentary dispositions is defined in Article 16 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, which is as follows:

ART. 16. Real property as well as personal property is subject to the law of the country where it is situated.

However, intestate and testamentary successions, both with respect to the order of succession and to the amount of successional rights and to the
intrinsic validity of testamentary provisions, shall be regulated by the national law of the person whose succession is under consideration, whatever may
be the nature of the property and regardless of the country where said property may be found.

The application of this article in the case at bar requires the determination of the meaning of the term "national law"is used therein.

There is no single American law governing the validity of testamentary provisions in the United States, each state of the Union having its own private law applicable
to its citizens only and in force only within the state. The "national law" indicated in Article 16 of the Civil Code above quoted can not, therefore, possibly mean or
apply to any general American law. So it can refer to no other than the private law of the State of California.

The next question is: What is the law in California governing the disposition of personal property? The decision of the court below, sustains the contention of the
executor-appellee that under the California Probate Code, a testator may dispose of his property by will in the form and manner he desires, citing the case of Estate
of McDaniel, 77 Cal. Appl. 2d 877, 176 P. 2d 952. But appellant invokes the provisions of Article 946 of the Civil Code of California, which is as follows:

If there is no law to the contrary, in the place where personal property is situated, it is deemed to follow the person of its owner, and is governed by the
law of his domicile.

The existence of this provision is alleged in appellant's opposition and is not denied. We have checked it in the California Civil Code and it is there. Appellee, on the
other hand, relies on the case cited in the decision and testified to by a witness. (Only the case of Kaufman is correctly cited.) It is argued on executor's behalf that
as the deceased Christensen was a citizen of the State of California, the internal law thereof, which is that given in the abovecited case, should govern the
determination of the validity of the testamentary provisions of Christensen's will, such law being in force in the State of California of which Christensen was a citizen.
Appellant, on the other hand, insists that Article 946 should be applicable, and in accordance therewith and following the doctrine of the renvoi, the question of the
validity of the testamentary provision in question should be referred back to the law of the decedent's domicile, which is the Philippines.

The theory of doctrine of renvoi has been defined by various authors, thus:
 The problem has been stated in this way: "When the Conflict of Laws rule of the forum refers a jural matter to a foreign law for decision, is the reference to
the purely internal rules of law of the foreign system; i.e., to the totality of the foreign law minus its Conflict of Laws rules?"

On logic, the solution is not an easy one. The Michigan court chose to accept the renvoi, that is, applied the Conflict of Laws rule of Illinois which referred
the matter back to Michigan law. But once having determined the the Conflict of Laws principle is the rule looked to, it is difficult to see why the reference
back should not have been to Michigan Conflict of Laws. This would have resulted in the "endless chain of references" which has so often been criticized
be legal writers. The opponents of the renvoi would have looked merely to the internal law of Illinois, thus rejecting the renvoi or the reference back. Yet
there seems no compelling logical reason why the original reference should be the internal law rather than to the Conflict of Laws rule. It is true that such
a solution avoids going on a merry-go-round, but those who have accepted the renvoi theory avoid this inextricabilis circulas by getting off at the second
reference and at that point applying internal law. Perhaps the opponents of the renvoi are a bit more consistent for they look always to internal law as the
rule of reference.

Strangely enough, both the advocates for and the objectors to the renvoi plead that greater uniformity will result from adoption of their respective views.
And still more strange is the fact that the only way to achieve uniformity in this choice-of-law problem is if in the dispute the two states whose laws form
the legal basis of the litigation disagree as to whether the renvoi should be accepted. If both reject, or both accept the doctrine, the result of the litigation
will vary with the choice of the forum. In the case stated above, had the Michigan court rejected the renvoi, judgment would have been against the
woman; if the suit had been brought in the Illinois courts, and they too rejected the renvoi, judgment would be for the woman. The same result would
happen, though the courts would switch with respect to which would hold liability, if both courts accepted the renvoi.

The Restatement accepts the renvoi theory in two instances: where the title to land is in question, and where the validity of a decree of divorce is
challenged. In these cases the Conflict of Laws rule of the situs of the land, or the domicile of the parties in the divorce case, is applied by the forum, but
any further reference goes only to the internal law. Thus, a person's title to land, recognized by the situs, will be recognized by every court; and every
divorce, valid by the domicile of the parties, will be valid everywhere. (Goodrich, Conflict of Laws, Sec. 7, pp. 13-14.)

X, a citizen of Massachusetts, dies intestate, domiciled in France, leaving movable property in Massachusetts, England, and France. The question arises
as to how this property is to be distributed among X's next of kin.

Assume (1) that this question arises in a Massachusetts court. There the rule of the conflict of laws as to intestate succession to movables calls for an
application of the law of the deceased's last domicile. Since by hypothesis X's last domicile was France, the natural thing for the Massachusetts court to
do would be to turn to French statute of distributions, or whatever corresponds thereto in French law, and decree a distribution accordingly. An
examination of French law, however, would show that if a French court were called upon to determine how this property should be distributed, it would
refer the distribution to the national law of the deceased, thus applying the Massachusetts statute of distributions. So on the surface of things the
Massachusetts court has open to it alternative course of action: (a) either to apply the French law is to intestate succession, or (b) to resolve itself into a
French court and apply the Massachusetts statute of distributions, on the assumption that this is what a French court would do. If it accepts the so-
called renvoidoctrine, it will follow the latter course, thus applying its own law.

This is one type of renvoi. A jural matter is presented which the conflict-of-laws rule of the forum refers to a foreign law, the conflict-of-laws rule of which,
in turn, refers the matter back again to the law of the forum. This is renvoi in the narrower sense. The German term for this judicial process is
'Ruckverweisung.'" (Harvard Law Review, Vol. 31, pp. 523-571.)

After a decision has been arrived at that a foreign law is to be resorted to as governing a particular case, the further question may arise: Are the rules as
to the conflict of laws contained in such foreign law also to be resorted to? This is a question which, while it has been considered by the courts in but a
few instances, has been the subject of frequent discussion by textwriters and essayists; and the doctrine involved has been descriptively designated by
them as the "Renvoyer" to send back, or the "Ruchversweisung", or the "Weiterverweisung", since an affirmative answer to the question postulated and
the operation of the adoption of the foreign law in toto would in many cases result in returning the main controversy to be decided according to the law of
the forum. ... (16 C.J.S. 872.)

Another theory, known as the "doctrine of renvoi", has been advanced. The theory of the doctrine of renvoi is that the court of the forum, in determining
the question before it, must take into account the whole law of the other jurisdiction, but also its rules as to conflict of laws, and then apply the law to the
actual question which the rules of the other jurisdiction prescribe. This may be the law of the forum. The doctrine of the renvoi has generally been
repudiated by the American authorities. (2 Am. Jur. 296)

The scope of the theory of renvoi has also been defined and the reasons for its application in a country explained by Prof. Lorenzen in an article in the Yale Law
Journal, Vol. 27, 1917-1918, pp. 529-531. The pertinent parts of the article are quoted herein below:

The recognition of the renvoi theory implies that the rules of the conflict of laws are to be understood as incorporating not only the ordinary or internal law
of the foreign state or country, but its rules of the conflict of laws as well. According to this theory 'the law of a country' means the whole of its law.

xxx xxx xxx

Von Bar presented his views at the meeting of the Institute of International Law, at Neuchatel, in 1900, in the form of the following theses:

(1) Every court shall observe the law of its country as regards the application of foreign laws.

(2) Provided that no express provision to the contrary exists, the court shall respect:

(a) The provisions of a foreign law which disclaims the right to bind its nationals abroad as regards their personal statute, and desires that said
personal statute shall be determined by the law of the domicile, or even by the law of the place where the act in question occurred.

(b) The decision of two or more foreign systems of law, provided it be certain that one of them is necessarily competent, which agree in
attributing the determination of a question to the same system of law.

xxx xxx xxx

If, for example, the English law directs its judge to distribute the personal estate of an Englishman who has died domiciled in Belgium in accordance with
the law of his domicile, he must first inquire whether the law of Belgium would distribute personal property upon death in accordance with the law of
domicile, and if he finds that the Belgian law would make the distribution in accordance with the law of nationality that is the English law he must
accept this reference back to his own law.

We note that Article 946 of the California Civil Code is its conflict of laws rule, while the rule applied in In re Kaufman, Supra, its internal law. If the law on
succession and the conflict of laws rules of California are to be enforced jointly, each in its own intended and appropriate sphere, the principle cited In re Kaufman
should apply to citizens living in the State, but Article 946 should apply to such of its citizens as are not domiciled in California but in other jurisdictions. The rule laid
down of resorting to the law of the domicile in the determination of matters with foreign element involved is in accord with the general principle of American law that
the domiciliary law should govern in most matters or rights which follow the person of the owner.

When a man dies leaving personal property in one or more states, and leaves a will directing the manner of distribution of the property, the law of the
state where he was domiciled at the time of his death will be looked to in deciding legal questions about the will, almost as completely as the law of situs
is consulted in questions about the devise of land. It is logical that, since the domiciliary rules control devolution of the personal estate in case of intestate
succession, the same rules should determine the validity of an attempted testamentary dispostion of the property. Here, also, it is not that the domiciliary
has effect beyond the borders of the domiciliary state. The rules of the domicile are recognized as controlling by the Conflict of Laws rules at the situs
property, and the reason for the recognition as in the case of intestate succession, is the general convenience of the doctrine. The New York court has
said on the point: 'The general principle that a dispostiton of a personal property, valid at the domicile of the owner, is valid anywhere, is one of the
universal application. It had its origin in that international comity which was one of the first fruits of civilization, and it this age, when business intercourse
and the process of accumulating property take but little notice of boundary lines, the practical wisdom and justice of the rule is more apparent than ever.
(Goodrich, Conflict of Laws, Sec. 164, pp. 442-443.)

Appellees argue that what Article 16 of the Civil Code of the Philippines pointed out as the national law is the internal law of California. But as above explained the
laws of California have prescribed two sets of laws for its citizens, one for residents therein and another for those domiciled in other jurisdictions. Reason demands
that We should enforce the California internal law prescribed for its citizens residing therein, and enforce the conflict of laws rules for the citizens domiciled abroad.
If we must enforce the law of California as in comity we are bound to go, as so declared in Article 16 of our Civil Code, then we must enforce the law of California in
accordance with the express mandate thereof and as above explained, i.e., apply the internal law for residents therein, and its conflict-of-laws rule for those
domiciled abroad.

It is argued on appellees' behalf that the clause "if there is no law to the contrary in the place where the property is situated" in Sec. 946 of the California Civil Code
refers to Article 16 of the Civil Code of the Philippines and that the law to the contrary in the Philippines is the provision in said Article 16 that the national law of the
deceased should govern. This contention can not be sustained. As explained in the various authorities cited above the national law mentioned in Article 16 of our
Civil Code is the law on conflict of laws in the California Civil Code, i.e., Article 946, which authorizes the reference or return of the question to the law of the
testator's domicile. The conflict of laws rule in California, Article 946, Civil Code, precisely refers back the case, when a decedent is not domiciled in California, to
the law of his domicile, the Philippines in the case at bar. The court of the domicile can not and should not refer the case back to California; such action would leave
the issue incapable of determination because the case will then be like a football, tossed back and forth between the two states, between the country of which the
decedent was a citizen and the country of his domicile. The Philippine court must apply its own law as directed in the conflict of laws rule of the state of the
decedent, if the question has to be decided, especially as the application of the internal law of California provides no legitime for children while the Philippine law,
Arts. 887(4) and 894, Civil Code of the Philippines, makes natural children legally acknowledged forced heirs of the parent recognizing them.

The Philippine cases (In re Estate of Johnson, 39 Phil. 156; Riera vs. Palmaroli, 40 Phil. 105; Miciano vs. Brimo, 50 Phil. 867; Babcock Templeton vs. Rider
Babcock, 52 Phil. 130; and Gibbs vs. Government, 59 Phil. 293.) cited by appellees to support the decision can not possibly apply in the case at bar, for two
important reasons, i.e., the subject in each case does not appear to be a citizen of a state in the United States but with domicile in the Philippines, and it does not
appear in each case that there exists in the state of which the subject is a citizen, a law similar to or identical with Art. 946 of the California Civil Code.

We therefore find that as the domicile of the deceased Christensen, a citizen of California, is the Philippines, the validity of the provisions of his will depriving his
acknowledged natural child, the appellant, should be governed by the Philippine Law, the domicile, pursuant to Art. 946 of the Civil Code of California, not by the
internal law of California..

WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby reversed and the case returned to the lower court with instructions that the partition be made as the Philippine
law on succession provides. Judgment reversed, with costs against appellees.

2. G.R. No. L-23678 June 6, 1967

TESTATE ESTATE OF AMOS G. BELLIS, deceased.

PEOPLE'S BANK and TRUST COMPANY, executor.
MARIA CRISTINA BELLIS and MIRIAM PALMA BELLIS, oppositors-appellants,
vs.
EDWARD A. BELLIS, ET AL., heirs-appellees.

Vicente R. Macasaet and Jose D. Villena for oppositors appellants.

Paredes, Poblador, Cruz and Nazareno for heirs-appellees E. A. Bellis, et al.
Quijano and Arroyo for heirs-appellees W. S. Bellis, et al.
J. R. Balonkita for appellee People's Bank & Trust Company.
Ozaeta, Gibbs and Ozaeta for appellee A. B. Allsman.

BENGZON, J.P., J.:

This is a direct appeal to Us, upon a question purely of law, from an order of the Court of First Instance of Manila dated April 30, 1964, approving the project of
partition filed by the executor in Civil Case No. 37089 therein.1wph1.t

The facts of the case are as follows:

Amos G. Bellis, born in Texas, was "a citizen of the State of Texas and of the United States." By his first wife, Mary E. Mallen, whom he divorced, he had five
legitimate children: Edward A. Bellis, George Bellis (who pre-deceased him in infancy), Henry A. Bellis, Alexander Bellis and Anna Bellis Allsman; by his second
wife, Violet Kennedy, who survived him, he had three legitimate children: Edwin G. Bellis, Walter S. Bellis and Dorothy Bellis; and finally, he had three illegitimate
children: Amos Bellis, Jr., Maria Cristina Bellis and Miriam Palma Bellis.

On August 5, 1952, Amos G. Bellis executed a will in the Philippines, in which he directed that after all taxes, obligations, and expenses of administration are paid
for, his distributable estate should be divided, in trust, in the following order and manner: (a) $240,000.00 to his first wife, Mary E. Mallen; (b) P120,000.00 to his
three illegitimate children, Amos Bellis, Jr., Maria Cristina Bellis, Miriam Palma Bellis, or P40,000.00 each and (c) after the foregoing two items have been satisfied,
the remainder shall go to his seven surviving children by his first and second wives, namely: Edward A. Bellis, Henry A. Bellis, Alexander Bellis and Anna Bellis
Allsman, Edwin G. Bellis, Walter S. Bellis, and Dorothy E. Bellis, in equal shares.1wph1.t

Subsequently, or on July 8, 1958, Amos G. Bellis died a resident of San Antonio, Texas, U.S.A. His will was admitted to probate in the Court of First Instance of
Manila on September 15, 1958.

The People's Bank and Trust Company, as executor of the will, paid all the bequests therein including the amount of $240,000.00 in the form of shares of stock to
Mary E. Mallen and to the three (3) illegitimate children, Amos Bellis, Jr., Maria Cristina Bellis and Miriam Palma Bellis, various amounts totalling P40,000.00 each in
satisfaction of their respective legacies, or a total of P120,000.00, which it released from time to time according as the lower court approved and allowed the various
motions or petitions filed by the latter three requesting partial advances on account of their respective legacies.
On January 8, 1964, preparatory to closing its administration, the executor submitted and filed its "Executor's Final Account, Report of Administration and Project of
Partition" wherein it reported, inter alia, the satisfaction of the legacy of Mary E. Mallen by the delivery to her of shares of stock amounting to $240,000.00, and the
legacies of Amos Bellis, Jr., Maria Cristina Bellis and Miriam Palma Bellis in the amount of P40,000.00 each or a total of P120,000.00. In the project of partition, the
executor pursuant to the "Twelfth" clause of the testator's Last Will and Testament divided the residuary estate into seven equal portions for the benefit of the
testator's seven legitimate children by his first and second marriages.

On January 17, 1964, Maria Cristina Bellis and Miriam Palma Bellis filed their respective oppositions to the project of partition on the ground that they were deprived
of their legitimes as illegitimate children and, therefore, compulsory heirs of the deceased.

Amos Bellis, Jr. interposed no opposition despite notice to him, proof of service of which is evidenced by the registry receipt submitted on April 27, 1964 by the
executor.1

After the parties filed their respective memoranda and other pertinent pleadings, the lower court, on April 30, 1964, issued an order overruling the oppositions and
approving the executor's final account, report and administration and project of partition. Relying upon Art. 16 of the Civil Code, it applied the national law of the
decedent, which in this case is Texas law, which did not provide for legitimes.

Their respective motions for reconsideration having been denied by the lower court on June 11, 1964, oppositors-appellants appealed to this Court to raise the
issue of which law must apply Texas law or Philippine law.

In this regard, the parties do not submit the case on, nor even discuss, the doctrine of renvoi, applied by this Court in Aznar v. Christensen Garcia, L-16749,
January 31, 1963. Said doctrine is usually pertinent where the decedent is a national of one country, and a domicile of another. In the present case, it is not
disputed that the decedent was both a national of Texas and a domicile thereof at the time of his death.2 So that even assuming Texas has a conflict of law rule
providing that the domiciliary system (law of the domicile) should govern, the same would not result in a reference back (renvoi) to Philippine law, but would still
refer to Texas law. Nonetheless, if Texas has a conflicts rule adopting the situs theory (lex rei sitae) calling for the application of the law of the place where the
properties are situated, renvoi would arise, since the properties here involved are found in the Philippines. In the absence, however, of proof as to the conflict of law
rule of Texas, it should not be presumed different from ours. 3 Appellants' position is therefore not rested on the doctrine of renvoi. As stated, they never invoked nor
even mentioned it in their arguments. Rather, they argue that their case falls under the circumstances mentioned in the third paragraph of Article 17 in relation to
Article 16 of the Civil Code.

Article 16, par. 2, and Art. 1039 of the Civil Code, render applicable the national law of the decedent, in intestate or testamentary successions, with regard to four
items: (a) the order of succession; (b) the amount of successional rights; (e) the intrinsic validity of the provisions of the will; and (d) the capacity to succeed. They
provide that

ART. 16. Real property as well as personal property is subject to the law of the country where it is situated.

However, intestate and testamentary successions, both with respect to the order of succession and to the amount of successional rights and to the
intrinsic validity of testamentary provisions, shall be regulated by the national law of the person whose succession is under consideration, whatever may
he the nature of the property and regardless of the country wherein said property may be found.

ART. 1039. Capacity to succeed is governed by the law of the nation of the decedent.

Appellants would however counter that Art. 17, paragraph three, of the Civil Code, stating that

Prohibitive laws concerning persons, their acts or property, and those which have for their object public order, public policy and good customs shall not be
rendered ineffective by laws or judgments promulgated, or by determinations or conventions agreed upon in a foreign country.

prevails as the exception to Art. 16, par. 2 of the Civil Code afore-quoted. This is not correct. Precisely, Congress deleted the phrase, "notwithstanding the
provisions of this and the next preceding article" when they incorporated Art. 11 of the old Civil Code as Art. 17 of the new Civil Code, while reproducing without
substantial change the second paragraph of Art. 10 of the old Civil Code as Art. 16 in the new. It must have been their purpose to make the second paragraph of
Art. 16 a specific provision in itself which must be applied in testate and intestate succession. As further indication of this legislative intent, Congress added a new
provision, under Art. 1039, which decrees that capacity to succeed is to be governed by the national law of the decedent.

It is therefore evident that whatever public policy or good customs may be involved in our System of legitimes, Congress has not intended to extend the same to the
succession of foreign nationals. For it has specifically chosen to leave, inter alia, the amount of successional rights, to the decedent's national law. Specific
provisions must prevail over general ones.

Appellants would also point out that the decedent executed two wills one to govern his Texas estate and the other his Philippine estate arguing from this that
he intended Philippine law to govern his Philippine estate. Assuming that such was the decedent's intention in executing a separate Philippine will, it would not alter
the law, for as this Court ruled in Miciano v. Brimo, 50 Phil. 867, 870, a provision in a foreigner's will to the effect that his properties shall be distributed in
accordance with Philippine law and not with his national law, is illegal and void, for his national law cannot be ignored in regard to those matters that Article 10
now Article 16 of the Civil Code states said national law should govern.

The parties admit that the decedent, Amos G. Bellis, was a citizen of the State of Texas, U.S.A., and that under the laws of Texas, there are no forced heirs or
legitimes. Accordingly, since the intrinsic validity of the provision of the will and the amount of successional rights are to be determined under Texas law, the
Philippine law on legitimes cannot be applied to the testacy of Amos G. Bellis.

Wherefore, the order of the probate court is hereby affirmed in toto, with costs against appellants. So ordered.
 3. G.R. No. L-35694 December 23, 1933

ALLISON G. GIBBS, petitioner-appelle,

vs.
THE GOVERNMENT OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, oppositor-appellant.
THE REGISTER OF DEEDS OF THE CITY OF MANILA, respondent-appellant.

Office of the Solicitor-General Hilado for appellants.

Allison D. Gibbs in his own behalf.

BUTTE, J.:

This is an appeal from a final order of the Court of First Instance of Manila, requiring the register of deeds of the City of Manila to cancel certificates of title Nos.
20880, 28336 and 28331, covering lands located in the City of Manila, Philippine Islands, and issue in lieu thereof new certificates of transfer of title in favor of
Allison D. Gibbs without requiring him to present any document showing that the succession tax due under Article XI of Chapter 40 of the Administrative Code has
been paid.

The said order of the court of March 10, 1931, recites that the parcels of land covered by said certificates of title formerly belonged to the conjugal partnership of
Allison D. Gibbs and Eva Johnson Gibbs; that the latter died intestate in Palo Alto, California, on November 28, 1929; that at the time of her death she and her
husband were citizens of the State of California and domiciled therein.

It appears further from said order that Allison D. Gibbs was appointed administrator of the state of his said deceased wife in case No. 36795 in the same court,
entitled "In the Matter of the Intestate Estate of Eva Johnson Gibbs, Deceased"; that in said intestate proceedings, the said Allison D. Gibbs, on September 22,1930,
filed an ex partepetition in which he alleged "that the parcels of land hereunder described belong to the conjugal partnership of your petitioner and his wife, Eva
Johnson Gibbs", describing in detail the three facts here involved; and further alleging that his said wife, a citizen and resident of California, died on November
28,1929; that in accordance with the law of California, the community property of spouses who are citizens of California, upon the death of the wife previous to that
of the husband, belongs absolutely to the surviving husband without administration; that the conjugal partnership of Allison D. Gibbs and Eva Johnson Gibbs,
deceased, has no obligations or debts and no one will be prejudiced by adjucating said parcels of land (and seventeen others not here involved) to be the absolute
property of the said Allison D. Gibbs as sole owner. The court granted said petition and on September 22, 1930, entered a decree adjucating the said Allison D.
Gibbs to be the sole and absolute owner of said lands, applying section 1401 of the Civil Code of California. Gibbs presented this decree to the register of deeds of
Manila and demanded that the latter issue to him a "transfer certificate of title".

Section 1547 of Article XI of Chapter 40 of the Administrative Code provides in part that:

Registers of deeds shall not register in the registry of property any document transferring real property or real rights therein or any chattel mortgage, by
way of gifts mortis causa, legacy or inheritance, unless the payment of the tax fixed in this article and actually due thereon shall be shown. And they shall
immediately notify the Collector of Internal Revenue or the corresponding provincial treasurer of the non payment of the tax discovered by them. . . .

Acting upon the authority of said section, the register of deeds of the City of Manila, declined to accept as binding said decree of court of September 22,1930, and
refused to register the transfer of title of the said conjugal property to Allison D. Gibbs, on the ground that the corresponding inheritance tax had not been paid.
Thereupon, under date of December 26, 1930, Allison D. Gibbs filed in the said court a petition for an order requiring the said register of deeds "to issue the
corresponding titles" to the petitioner without requiring previous payment of any inheritance tax. After due hearing of the parties, the court reaffirmed said order of
September 22, 1930, and entered the order of March 10, 1931, which is under review on this appeal.

On January 3, 1933, this court remanded the case to the court of origin for new trial upon additional evidence in regard to the pertinent law of California in force at
the time of the death of Mrs. Gibbs, also authorizing the introduction of evidence with reference to the dates of the acquisition of the property involved in this suit
and with reference to the California law in force at the time of such acquisition. The case is now before us with the supplementary evidence.

For the purposes of this case, we shall consider the following facts as established by the evidence or the admissions of the parties: Allison D. Gibbs has been
continuously, since the year 1902, a citizen of the State of California and domiciled therein; that he and Eva Johnson Gibbs were married at Columbus, Ohio, in July
1906; that there was no antenuptial marriage contract between the parties; that during the existence of said marriage the spouses acquired the following lands,
among others, in the Philippine Islands, as conjugal property:lawphil.net

1. A parcel of land in the City of Manila represented by transfer certificate of title No. 20880, dated March 16, 1920, and registered in the name of "Allison D. Gibbs
casado con Eva Johnson Gibbs".

2. A parcel of land in the City of Manila, represented by transfer certificate of title No. 28336, dated May 14, 1927, in which it is certified "that spouses Allison D.
Gibbs and Eva Johnson Gibbs are the owners in fee simple" of the land therein described.

3. A parcel of land in the City of Manila, represented by transfer certificate of title No. 28331, dated April 6, 1927, which it states "that Allison D. Gibbs married to
Eva Johnson Gibbs" is the owner of the land described therein; that said Eva Johnson Gibbs died intestate on November 28, 1929, living surviving her her husband,
the appellee, and two sons, Allison J. Gibbs , now age 25 and Finley J. Gibbs, now aged 22, as her sole heirs of law.

Article XI of Chapter 40 of the Administrative Code entitled "Tax on inheritances, legacies and other acquisitions mortis causa" provides in section 1536 that "Every
transmission by virtue of inheritance ... of real property ... shall be subject to the following tax." It results that the question for determination in this case is as follows:
Was Eva Johnson Gibbs at the time of her death the owner of a descendible interest in the Philippine lands above-mentioned?

The appellee contends that the law of California should determine the nature and extent of the title, if any, that vested in Eva Johnson Gibbs under the three
certificates of title Nos. 20880, 28336 and 28331 above referred to, citing article 9 of the Civil Code. But that, even if the nature and extent of her title under said
certificates be governed by the law of the Philippine Islands, the laws of California govern the succession to such title, citing the second paragraph of article 10 of
the Civil Code.

Article 9 of the Civil Code is as follows:

The laws relating to family rights and duties, or to the status, condition, and legal capacity of persons, are binding upon Spaniards even though they
reside in a foreign country." It is argued that the conjugal right of the California wife in community real estate in the Philippine Islands is a personal right
and must, therefore, be settled by the law governing her personal status, that is, the law of California. But our attention has not been called to any law of
California that incapacitates a married woman from acquiring or holding land in a foreign jurisdiction in accordance with the lex rei sitae. There is not the
slightest doubt that a California married woman can acquire title to land in a common law jurisdiction like the State of Illinois or the District of Columbia,
subject to the common-law estate by the courtesy which would vest in her husband. Nor is there any doubt that if a California husband acquired land in
such a jurisdiction his wife would be vested with the common law right of dower, the prerequisite conditions obtaining. Article 9 of the Civil Code treats of
 purely personal relations and status and capacity for juristic acts, the rules relating to property, both personal and real, being governed by article 10 of the
Civil Code. Furthermore, article 9, by its very terms, is applicable only to "Spaniards" (now, by construction, to citizens of the Philippine Islands).

The Organic Act of the Philippine Islands (Act of Congress, August 29, 1916, known as the "Jones Law") as regards the determination of private rights,
grants practical autonomy to the Government of the Philippine Islands. This Government, therefore, may apply the principles and rules of private
international law (conflicts of laws) on the same footing as an organized territory or state of the United States. We should, therefore, resort to the law of
California, the nationality and domicile of Mrs. Gibbs, to ascertain the norm which would be applied here as law were there any question as to her status.

But the appellant's chief argument and the sole basis of the lower court's decision rests upon the second paragraph of article 10 of the Civil Code which is as
follows:

Nevertheless, legal and testamentary successions, in respect to the order of succession as well as to the amount of the successional rights and the
intrinsic validity of their provisions, shall be regulated by the national law of the person whose succession is in question, whatever may be the nature of
the property or the country in which it may be situated.

In construing the above language we are met at the outset with some difficulty by the expression "the national law of the person whose succession is in question",
by reason of the rather anomalous political status of the Philippine Islands. (Cf. Manresa, vol. 1, Codigo Civil, pp. 103, 104.) We encountered no difficulty in applying
article 10 in the case of a citizen of Turkey. (Miciano vs. Brimo, 50 Phil., 867.) Having regard to the practical autonomy of the Philippine Islands, as above stated, we
have concluded that if article 10 is applicable and the estate in question is that of a deceased American citizen, the succession shall be regulated in accordance
with the norms of the State of his domicile in the United States. (Cf. Babcock Templeton vs. Rider Babcock, 52 Phil., 130, 137; In re Estate of Johnson, 39 Phil.,
156, 166.)

The trial court found that under the law of California, upon the death of the wife, the entire community property without administration belongs to the surviving
husband; that he is the absolute owner of all the community property from the moment of the death of his wife, not by virtue of succession or by virtue of her death,
but by virtue of the fact that when the death of the wife precedes that of the husband he acquires the community property, not as an heir or as the beneficiary of his
deceased wife, but because she never had more than an inchoate interest or expentancy which is extinguished upon her death. Quoting the case of Estate of
Klumpke (167 Cal., 415, 419), the court said: "The decisions under this section (1401 Civil Code of California) are uniform to the effect that the husband does not
take the community property upon the death of the wife by succession, but that he holds it all from the moment of her death as though required by himself. ... It
never belonged to the estate of the deceased wife."

The argument of the appellee apparently leads to this dilemma: If he takes nothing by succession from his deceased wife, how can the second paragraph of article
10 be invoked? Can the appellee be heard to say that there is a legal succession under the law of the Philippine Islands and no legal succession under the law of
California? It seems clear that the second paragraph of article 10 applies only when a legal or testamentary succession has taken place in the Philippines and in
accordance with the law of the Philippine Islands; and the foreign law is consulted only in regard to the order of succession or the extent of the successional rights;
in other words, the second paragraph of article 10 can be invoked only when the deceased was vested with a descendible interest in property within the jurisdiction
of the Philippine Islands.

In the case of Clarke vs. Clarke (178 U. S., 186, 191; 44 Law ed., 1028, 1031), the court said:

It is principle firmly established that to the law of the state in which the land is situated we must look for the rules which govern its descent, alienation, and
transfer, and for the effect and construction of wills and other conveyances. (United States vs. Crosby, 7 Cranch, 115; 3 L. ed., 287; Clark vs. Graham, 6
Wheat., 577; 5 L. ed., 334; McGoon vs. Scales, 9 Wall., 23; 19 L. ed., 545; Brine vs. Hartford F. Ins. Co., 96 U. S., 627; 24 L. ed., 858.)" (See also Estate
of Lloyd, 175 Cal., 704, 705.) This fundamental principle is stated in the first paragraph of article 10 of our Civil Code as follows: "Personal property is
subject to the laws of the nation of the owner thereof; real property to the laws of the country in which it is situated.

It is stated in 5 Cal. Jur., 478:

In accord with the rule that real property is subject to the lex rei sitae, the respective rights of husband and wife in such property, in the absence of an
antenuptial contract, are determined by the law of the place where the property is situated, irrespective of the domicile of the parties or to the place where
the marriage was celebrated. (See also Saul vs. His Creditors, 5 Martin [N. S.], 569; 16 Am. Dec., 212 [La.]; Heidenheimer vs. Loring, 26 S. W., 99
[Texas].)

Under this broad principle, the nature and extent of the title which vested in Mrs. Gibbs at the time of the acquisition of the community lands here in question must
be determined in accordance with the lex rei sitae.

It is admitted that the Philippine lands here in question were acquired as community property of the conjugal partnership of the appellee and his wife. Under the law
of the Philippine Islands, she was vested of a title equal to that of her husband. Article 1407 of the Civil Code provides:

All the property of the spouses shall be deemed partnership property in the absence of proof that it belongs exclusively to the husband or to the wife.
Article 1395 provides:

"The conjugal partnership shall be governed by the rules of law applicable to the contract of partnership in all matters in which such rules do not conflict with the
express provisions of this chapter." Article 1414 provides that "the husband may dispose by will of his half only of the property of the conjugal partnership." Article
1426 provides that upon dissolution of the conjugal partnership and after inventory and liquidation, "the net remainder of the partnership property shall be divided
share and share alike between the husband and wife, or their respective heirs." Under the provisions of the Civil Code and the jurisprudence prevailing here, the
wife, upon the acquisition of any conjugal property, becomes immediately vested with an interest and title therein equal to that of her husband, subject to the power
of management and disposition which the law vests in the husband. Immediately upon her death, if there are no obligations of the decedent, as is true in the present
case, her share in the conjugal property is transmitted to her heirs by succession. (Articles 657, 659, 661, Civil Code; cf. also Coronel vs. Ona, 33 Phil., 456, 469.)

It results that the wife of the appellee was, by the law of the Philippine Islands, vested of a descendible interest, equal to that of her husband, in the Philippine lands
covered by certificates of title Nos. 20880, 28336 and 28331, from the date of their acquisition to the date of her death. That appellee himself believed that his wife
was vested of such a title and interest in manifest from the second of said certificates, No. 28336, dated May 14, 1927, introduced by him in evidence, in which it is
certified that "the spouses Allison D. Gibbs and Eva Johnson Gibbs are the owners in fee simple of the conjugal lands therein described."

The descendible interest of Eva Johnson Gibbs in the lands aforesaid was transmitted to her heirs by virtue of inheritance and this transmission plainly falls within
the language of section 1536 of Article XI of Chapter 40 of the Administrative Code which levies a tax on inheritances. (Cf. Re Estate of Majot, 199 N. Y., 29; 92 N.
E., 402; 29 L. R. A. [N. S.], 780.) It is unnecessary in this proceeding to determine the "order of succession" or the "extent of the successional rights" (article 10, Civil
Code, supra) which would be regulated by section 1386 of the Civil Code of California which was in effect at the time of the death of Mrs. Gibbs.

The record does not show what the proper amount of the inheritance tax in this case would be nor that the appellee (petitioner below) in any way challenged the
power of the Government to levy an inheritance tax or the validity of the statute under which the register of deeds refused to issue a certificate of transfer reciting
that the appellee is the exclusive owner of the Philippine lands included in the three certificates of title here involved.
The judgment of the court below of March 10, 1931, is reversed with directions to dismiss the petition, without special pronouncement as to the costs.