Mosqueda v Pilipino Banana Growers & Exporters Association, Inc.
, 16 The formalities in enacting an ordinance are laid down in Section 53 and Section
Aug 2016 En Banc [Bersamin]
Facts: The Sangguniang Panlungsod of Davao City enacted Ordinance No. 0309,
Series of 2007, to impose a ban against aerial spraying as an agricultural practice
by all agricultural entities within Davao City. City Mayor Rodrigo Duterte
approved the ordinance and it took effect after its publication in the newspaper
Mindanao Pioneer. Pursuant to Section 5 of the ordinance, the ban against aerial
spraying would be strictly enforced three months thereafter.
Respondents challenged the constitutionality before the RTC alleging that that
the ordinance exemplified the unreasonable exercise of police power; violated
the equal protection clause; amounted to the confiscation of property without
due process of law; and lacked publication pursuant to Section 5116 of Republic
Act No. 7160 (Local Government Code).
The RTC opined that the City of Davao had validly exercised police power under
the General Welfare Clause of the Local Government Code; that the ordinance,
being based on a valid classification, was consistent with the Equal Protection
Clause; that aerial spraying was distinct from other methods of pesticides
application because it exposed the residents to a higher degree of health risk
caused by aerial drift; 15 and that the ordinance enjoyed the presumption of
constitutionality, and could be invalidated only upon a clear showing that it had
violated the Constitution.
CA reversed RTCs judgment.
The main issue is whether or not Ordinance No. 0309-07 is unconstitutional on
due process and equal protection grounds for being unreasonable and
oppressive, and an invalid exercise of police power: (a) in imposing a ban on
aerial spraying as an agricultural practice in Davao City under Section 5; (b) in
decreeing a 3-month transition-period to shift to other modes of pesticide
application under Section 5; and (c) in requiring the maintenance of the 30-
meter buffer zone under Section 6 thereof in all agricultural lands in Davao City.
Ruling:
To be considered as a valid police power measure, an ordinance must pass a
two-pronged test: the formal (i.e., whether the ordinance is enacted within the
corporate powers of the local government unit, and whether it is passed in
accordance with the procedure prescribed by law); and the substantive (i.e.,
involving inherent merit, like the conformity of the ordinance with the limitations
under the Constitution and the statutes, as well as with the requirements of
fairness and reason, and its consistency with public policy).
54 of The Local Government Code. These provisions require the ordinance to be
passed by the majority of the members of the sanggunian concerned, and to be
presented to the mayor for approval. With no issues regarding quorum during its
deliberation having been raised, and with its approval of by City Mayor Duterte
not being disputed, we see no reason to strike down Ordinance No. 0309-07 for
non-compliance with the formal requisites under the Local Government Code.
The corporate powers of the local government unit confer the basic authority to
enact legislation that may interfere with personal liberty, property, lawful
businesses and occupations in order to promote the general welfare. Such
legislative powers spring from the delegation thereof by Congress through either
the Local Government Code or a special law. The General Welfare Clause in
Section 16 of the Local Government Code embodies the legislative grant that
enables the local government unit to effectively accomplish and carry out the
declared objects of its creation, and to promote and maintain local autonomy.
Section 16 comprehends two branches of delegated powers, namely: the
general legislative power and the police power proper.
General legislative power refers to the power delegated by Congress to the
local legislative body, or the Sangguniang Panlungsod in the case of Davao City,
to enable the local legislative body to enact ordinances and make regulations.
This power is limited in that the enacted ordinances must not be repugnant to
law, and the power must be exercised to effectuate and discharge the powers
and duties legally conferred to the local legislative body.
The police power proper, on the other hand, authorizes the local government
unit to enact ordinances necessary and proper for the health and safety,
prosperity, morals, peace, good order, comfort, and convenience of the local
government unit and its constituents, and for the protection of their property.
In terms of the right of the citizens to health and to a balanced and healthful
ecology, the local government unit takes its cue from Section 15 and Section 16,
Article II of the 1987 Constitution. Following the provisions of the Local
Government Code and the Constitution, the acts of the local government unit
designed to ensure the health and lives of its constituents and to promote a
balanced and healthful ecology are well within the corporate powers vested in
the local government unit. Accordingly, the Sangguniang Bayan of Davao City is
vested with the requisite authority to enact an ordinance that seeks to protect
the health and well-being of its constituents.
Advancing the interests of the residents who are vulnerable to the alleged health
risks due to their exposure to pesticide drift justifies the motivation behind the
enactment of the ordinance. The City of Davao has the authority to enact pieces
1
of legislation that will promote the general welfare, specifically the health of its
constituents. Such authority should not be construed, however, as a valid license
for the City of Davao to enact any ordinance it deems fit to discharge its
mandate. A thin but well-defined line separates authority to enact legislations
from the method of accomplishing the same.
Ordinance No. 0309-07 violates the Due Process Clause
A valid ordinance must not only be enacted within the corporate powers of the
local government and passed according to the procedure prescribed by law. In
order to declare it as a valid piece of local legislation, it must also comply with
the following substantive requirements, namely: (1) it must not contravene the
Constitution or any statute; (2) it must be fair, not oppressive; (3) it must not be
partial or discriminatory; (4) it must not prohibit but may regulate trade; (5) it
must be general and consistent with public policy; and (6) it must not be
unreasonable.
In the State's exercise of police power, the property rights of individuals may be
subjected to restraints and burdens in order to fulfill the objectives of the
Government. A local government unit is considered to have properly exercised its
police powers only if it satisfies the following requisites, to wit:
(1) the interests of the public generally, as distinguished from those of
a particular class, require the interference of the State; and
(2) the means employed are reasonably necessary for the attainment of
the object sought to be accomplished and not unduly oppressive.
The first requirement refers to the Equal Protection Clause of
the Constitution; the second, to the Due Process Clause of the
Constitution.
Substantive due process requires that a valid ordinance must have a sufficient
justification for the Government's action. This means that in exercising police
power the local government unit must not arbitrarily, whimsically or despotically
enact the ordinance regardless of its salutary purpose. So long as the ordinance
realistically serves a legitimate public purpose, and it employs means that are
reasonably necessary to achieve that purpose without unduly oppressing the
individuals regulated, the ordinance must survive a due process challenge.
The required civil works for the conversion to truck-mounted boom spraying
alone will consume considerable time and financial resources given the
topography and geographical features of the plantations. As such, the conversion
could not be completed within the short timeframe of three months. Requiring
the respondents and other affected individuals to comply with the consequences
of the ban within the three-month period under pain of penalty like fine,
imprisonment and even cancellation of business permits would definitely be
oppressive as to constitute abuse of police power.
The establishment of the buffer zone is required for the purpose of minimizing
the effects of aerial spraying within and near the plantations. Although Section
3(e) of the ordinance requires the planting of diversified trees within the
identified buffer zone, the requirement cannot be construed and deemed as
confiscatory requiring payment of just compensation. A landowner may only be
entitled to compensation if the taking amounts to a permanent denial of all
economically beneficial or productive uses of the land. The respondents cannot
be said to be permanently and completely deprived of their landholdings because
they can still cultivate or make other productive uses of the areas to be identified
as the buffer zones.
Ordinance No. 0309-07 violates the Equal Protection Clause
A serious challenge being posed against Ordinance No. 0309-07 rests on its
supposed collision with the Equal Protection Clause. The respondents submit that
the ordinance transgresses this constitutional guaranty on two counts, to wit: (1)
by prohibiting aerial spraying per se, regardless of the substance or the level of
concentration of the chemicals to be applied; and (2) by imposing the 30-meter
buffer zone in all agricultural lands in Davao City regardless of the sizes of the
landholding.
The constitutional right to equal protection requires that all persons or things
similarly situated should be treated alike, both as to rights conferred and
responsibilities imposed. It requires public bodies and institutions to treat
similarly situated individuals in a similar manner. The guaranty of equal
protection secures every person within the State's jurisdiction against intentional
and arbitrary discrimination, whether occasioned by the express terms of a
statue or by its improper execution through the State's duly constituted
authorities. The concept of equal justice under the law demands that the State
governs impartially, and not to draw distinctions between individuals
solely on differences that are irrelevant to the legitimate governmental
objective.
Equal treatment neither requires universal application of laws to all persons or
things without distinction, nor intends to prohibit legislation by limiting the object
to which it is directed or by the territory in which it is to operate. The guaranty of
equal protection envisions equality among equals determined according to a valid
classification. If the groupings are characterized by substantial distinctions that
make real differences, one class may be treated and regulated differently from
another. In other words, a valid classification must be: (1) based on substantial
distinctions; (2) germane to the purposes of the law; (3) not limited to existing
conditions only; and (4) equally applicable to all members of the class.
2
The reasonability of a distinction and sufficiency of the justification given by the
Government for its conduct is gauged by using the means-end test. This test
requires analysis of: (1) the interests of the public that generally require its
exercise, as distinguished from those of a particular class; and (2) the means
employed are reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose and
are not unduly oppressive upon individuals.
To determine the propriety of the classification, courts resort to three levels of
scrutiny, viz: the rational scrutiny, intermediate scrutiny and strict scrutiny.
The rational basis scrutiny (also known as the rational relation test or rational
basis test) demands that the classification reasonably relate to the legislative
purpose. The rational basis test often applies in cases involving economics or
social welfare, or to any other case not involving a suspect class.
When the classification puts a quasi-suspect class at a disadvantage, it will be
treated under intermediate or heightened review. Classifications based on
gender or illegitimacy receives intermediate scrutiny. To survive intermediate
scrutiny, the law must not only further an important governmental interest and
be substantially related to that interest, but the justification for the classification
must be genuine and must not depend on broad generalizations.
The strict scrutiny review applies when a legislative classification
impermissibly interferes with the exercise of a fundamental right or operates to
the peculiar class disadvantage of a suspect class. The Government carries the
burden to prove that the classification is necessary to achieve a compelling state
interest, and that it is the least restrictive means to protect such interest.
In our view, the petitioners correctly argue that the rational basis approach
appropriately applies herein. Under the rational basis test, we shall: (1) discern
the reasonable relationship between the means and the purpose of the
ordinance; and (2) examine whether the means or the prohibition against aerial
spraying is based on a substantial or reasonable distinction. A reasonable
classification includes all persons or things similarly situated with respect to the
purpose of the law.
Applying the test, the established classification under Ordinance No. 0309-07 is
to be viewed in relation to the group of individuals similarly situated with respect
to the avowed purpose. This gives rise to two classes, namely: (1) the
classification under Ordinance No. 0309-07 (legislative classification); and
(2) the classification based on purpose (elimination of the mischief). The
legislative classification found in Section 4 of the ordinance refers to "all
agricultural entities" within Davao City. Meanwhile, the classification based on
the purpose of the ordinance cannot be easily discerned because the ordinance
does not make any express or implied reference to it. We have to search the
voluminous records of this case to divine the animus behind the action of the
Sangguniang Panglungsod in prohibiting aerial spraying as an agricultural
activity.
The proposed resolution identified aerial spraying of pesticides as a nuisance
because of the unstable wind direction during the aerial application, which (1)
could potentially contaminate the Davao City watersheds and ground water
sources; (2) was detrimental to the health of Davao City residents, most
especially those living in the nearby plantations; and (3) posed a hazard to
animals and other crops. Plainly, the mischief that the prohibition sought to
address was the fungicide drift resulting from the aerial application; hence, the
classification based on the intent of the proposed ordinance covered all
agricultural entities conducting aerial spraying of fungicides that caused drift.
Davao City justifies the prohibition against aerial spraying by insisting that the
occurrence of drift causes inconvenience and harm to the residents and degrades
the environment. Given this justification, does the ordinance satisfy the
requirement that the classification must rest on substantial distinction?
We answer in the negative.
The occurrence of pesticide drift is not limited to aerial spraying but results from
the conduct of any mode of pesticide application. Even manual spraying or truck-
mounted boom spraying produces drift that may bring about the same
inconvenience, discomfort and alleged health risks to the community and to the
environment. A ban against aerial spraying does not weed out the harm that the
ordinance seeks to achieve." In the process, the ordinance suffers from being
"underinclusive" because the classification does not include all individuals
tainted with the same mischief that the law seeks to eliminate. A classification
that is drastically underinclusive with respect to the purpose or end appears as
an irrational means to the legislative end because it poorly serves the intended
purpose of the law.
The petitioners should be made aware that the rational basis scrutiny is not
based on a simple means-purpose correlation; nor does the rational basis
scrutiny automatically result in a presumption of validity of the ordinance or
deference to the wisdom of the local legislature. To reiterate, aside from
ascertaining that the means and purpose of the ordinance are
reasonably related, the classification should be based on a substantial
distinction.
A substantially overinclusive or underinclusive classification tends to undercut the
governmental claim that the classification serves legitimate political ends. Where
overinclusiveness is the problem, the vice is that the law has a greater
discriminatory or burdensome effect than necessary. In this light, we strike down
3
Section 5 and Section 6 of Ordinance No. 0309-07 for carrying an invidious
classification, and for thereby violating the Equal Protection Clause.
The discriminatory character of the ordinance makes it oppressive and
unreasonable in light of the existence and availability of more permissible and
practical alternatives that will not overburden the respondents and those
dependent on their operations as well as those who stand to be affected by the
ordinance.
The Precautionary Principle still requires scientific basis
In this jurisdiction, the principle of precaution appearing in the Rules of
Procedure for Environmental Cases (A.M. No. 09-6-8-SC) involves matters of
evidence in cases where there is lack of full scientific certainty in establishing a
causal link between human activity and environmental effect. In such an event,
the courts may construe a set of facts as warranting either judicial action or
inaction with the goal of preserving and protecting the environment.
It is notable, therefore, that the precautionary principle shall only be
relevant if there is concurrence of three elements, namely: uncertainty,
threat of environmental damage and serious or irreversible harm. In
situations where the threat is relatively certain, or that the causal link between
an action and environmental damage can be established, or the probability of
occurrence can be calculated, only preventive, not precautionary measures, may
be taken. Neither will the precautionary principle apply if there is no indication of
a threat of environmental harm, or if the threatened harm is trivial or easily
reversible.
We cannot see the presence of all the elements. To begin with, there has been
no scientific study. Although the precautionary principle allows lack of full
scientific certainty in establishing a connection between the serious or
irreversible harm and the human activity, its application is still premised on
empirical studies. Scientific analysis is still a necessary basis for effective policy
choices under the precautionary principle.
Precaution is a risk management principle invoked after scientific inquiry takes
place. This scientific stage is often considered synonymous with risk assessment.
As such, resort to the principle shall not be based on anxiety or emotion, but
from a rational decision rule, based in ethics. As much as possible, a complete
and objective scientific evaluation of the risk to the environment or health should
be conducted and made available to decision-makers for them to choose the
most appropriate course of action.
Furthermore, the positive and negative effects of an activity is also important in
the application of the principle. The potential harm resulting from certain
activities should always be judged in view of the potential benefits they offer,
while the positive and negative effects of potential precautionary measures
should be considered.
We should not apply the precautionary approach in sustaining the ban against
aerial spraying if little or nothing is known of the exact or potential dangers that
aerial spraying may bring to the health of the residents within and near the
plantations and to the integrity and balance of the environment. It is dangerous
to quickly presume that the effects of aerial spraying would be adverse even in
the absence of evidence. Accordingly, for lack of scientific data supporting a ban
on aerial spraying, Ordinance No. 0309-07 should be struck down for being
unreasonable.
Ordinance No. 0309-07 is an ultra vires act
Section 5(c) of the Local Government Code accords a liberal interpretation to its
general welfare provisions. The policy of liberal construction is consistent with
the spirit of local autonomy that endows local government units with sufficient
power and discretion to accelerate their economic development and uplift the
quality of life for their constituents. Verily, the Court has championed the cause
of public welfare on several occasions. In so doing, it has accorded liberality to
the general welfare provisions of the Local Government Code by upholding the
validity of local ordinances enacted for the common good.
The power to legislate under the General Welfare Clause is not meant to be an
invincible authority. In fact, Salaveria and Abendan emphasized the
reasonableness and consistency of the exercise by the local government units
with the laws or policies of the State. More importantly, because the police
power of the local government units flows from the express delegation
of the power by Congress, its exercise is to be construed in strictissimi
juris. Any doubt or ambiguity arising out of the terms used in granting
the power should be construed against the local legislative units.
Judicial scrutiny comes into play whenever the exercise of police power affects
life, liberty or property. The presumption of validity and the policy of liberality
are not restraints on the power of judicial review in the face of questions about
whether an ordinance conforms with the Constitution, the laws or public policy,
or if it is unreasonable, oppressive, partial, discriminating or in derogation of a
common right. The ordinance must pass the test of constitutionality and the test
of consistency with the prevailing laws.
Although the Local Government Code vests the municipal corporations with
sufficient power to govern themselves and manage their affairs and activities,
they definitely have no right to enact ordinances dissonant with the State's laws
and policy. The Local Government Code has been fashioned to delineate the
specific parameters and limitations to guide each local government unit in
exercising its delegated powers with the view of making the local government
4
unit a fully functioning subdivision of the State within the constitutional and
statutory restraints. The Local Government Code is not intended to vest in the
local government unit the blanket authority to legislate upon any subject that it
finds proper to legislate upon in the guise of serving the common good.
The function of pesticides control, regulation and development is within the
jurisdiction of the FPA (Fertilizer and Pesticide Authority) under Presidential
Decree No. 1144.
x x x the FPA was responsible for ensuring the compatibility between the usage
and the application of pesticides in agricultural activities and the demands for
human health and environmental safety. This responsibility includes not only the
identification of safe and unsafe pesticides, but also the prescription of the safe
modes of application in keeping with the standard of good agricultural practices.
On the other hand, the enumerated devolved functions to the local government
units do not include the regulation and control of pesticides and other
agricultural chemicals. The non-inclusion should preclude the Sangguniang Bayan
of Davao City from enacting Ordinance No. 0309-07, for otherwise it would be
arrogating unto itself the authority to prohibit the aerial application of pesticides
in derogation of the authority expressly vested in the FPA by Presidential Decree
No. 1144.
In enacting Ordinance No. 0309-07 without the inherent and explicit authority to
do so, the City of Davao performed an ultra vires act. As a local government unit,
the City of Davao could act only as an agent of Congress, and its every act
should always conform to and reflect the will of its principal.
It is a fundamental principle that municipal ordinances are inferior in status and
subordinate to the laws of the state. An ordinance in conflict with a state law of
general character and statewide application is universally held to be invalid. The
principle is frequently expressed in the declaration that municipal authorities,
under a general grant of power, cannot adopt ordinances which infringe the
spirit of a state law or repugnant to the general policy of the state. In every
power to pass ordinances given to a municipality, there is an implied restriction
that the ordinances shall be consistent with the general law.
For sure, every local government unit only derives its legislative authority from
Congress. In no instance can the local government unit rise above its source of
authority. As such, its ordinance cannot run against or contravene existing laws,
precisely because its authority is only by virtue of the valid delegation from
Congress. As emphasized in City of Manila v. Laguio, Jr.:
The requirement that the enactment must not violate existing law gives
stress to the precept that local government units are able to legislate
only by virtue of their derivative legislative power, a delegation of
legislative power from the national legislature. The delegate cannot be
superior to the principal or exercise powers higher than those of the
latter.
This relationship between the national legislature and the local
government units has not been enfeebled by the new provisions in the
Constitution strengthening the policy of local autonomy. The national
legislature is still the principal of the local government units, which
cannot defy its will or modify or violate it.
Moreover, Ordinance No. 0309-07 proposes to prohibit an activity already
covered by the jurisdiction of the FPA, which has issued its own regulations.
WHEREFORE, the Court DENIES the consolidated petitions for review on
certiorari for their lack of merit; AFFIRMS the decision promulgated on January
9, 2009 in C.A.-G.R. CV No. 01389-MIN. declaring Ordinance No. 0309-07
UNCONSTITUTIONAL; PERMANENTLY ENJOINS respondent City of Davao,
and all persons or entities acting in its behalf or under its authority, from
enforcing and implementing Ordinance No. 0309-07; and ORDERS the petitioners
to pay the costs of suit.
BANAT v COMELEC, 8 Jul 2009
Section 5(2), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution reads in part:
The party-list representatives shall constitute twenty per centum of the
total number of representatives including those under the party-list. x x
x
The 1987 Constitution fixes the ratio of party-list representatives to district
representatives. This ratio automatically applies whenever the number of district
representatives is increased by law.
Number of seats
available
x .20 = Number of seats available to party-
to legislative districts list representatives.
.80
x x x [t]his formula allows for the corresponding increase in the number
of seats available for party-list representatives whenever a legislative
district is created by law. Thus, for every four district representatives, the
1987 Constitution mandates that there shall be one party-list representative.
There is no need for legislation to create an additional party-list seat whenever
four additional legislative districts are created by law. Section 5(2), Article VI of
the 1987 Constitution automatically creates such additional party-list seat.
5
Election Law; Party-List System; The filling-up of all available party-list
seats is not mandatory. Actual occupancy of the party-list seats
depends on the number of participants in the party-list election. If only
ten parties participated in the 2007 party-list election, then, despite the
availability of 54 seats, the maximum possible number of occupied party-list
seats would only be 30 because of the three-seat cap. In such a case, the three-
seat cap prevents the mandatory allocation of all the 54 available seats.
In the second round allocation of additional seats, there is no minimum
vote requirement to obtain a party-list seat because the Court has struck
down the application of the 2% threshold in the allocation of additional seats.
Specifically, the provision in Section 11(b) of the Party-List Act stating that
those garnering more than two percent (2%) of the votes shall be entitled to
additional seats in the proportion to their total number of votes can no longer
be given any effect. Otherwise, the 20 percent party-list seats in the total
membership of the House of Representatives as provided in the 1987
Constitution will mathematically be impossible to fill up.
However, a party-list organization has to obtain a sufficient number of votes to
gain a seat in the second round of seat allocation. What is deemed a sufficient
number of votes is dependent upon the circumstances of each election, such as
the number of participating parties, the number of available party-list seats, and
the number of parties with guaranteed seats received in the first round of seat
allocation. To continue the example above, if only ten parties participated in the
2007 party-list election and each party received only one thousand votes, then
each of the ten parties would receive 10% of the votes cast. All are guaranteed
one seat, and are further entitled to receive two more seats in the second round
of seat allocation.
The allocation of seats under the party-list system is governed by the last phrase
of Section 5(1), which states that the party-list representatives shall be those
who, as provided by law, shall be elected through a party-list system, giving the
Legislature wide discretion in formulating the allocation of party-list seats.The
phrase legislative districts apportioned among the provinces, cities, and the
Metropolitan Manila area in accordance with the number of their respective
inhabitants, and on the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio in Section 5(1)
of Article VI requires that legislative districts shall be apportioned according to
proportional representation. However, this principle of proportional
representation applies only to legislative districts, not to the party-list system.
The allocation of seats under the party-list system is governed by the last phrase
of Section 5(1), which states that the party-list representatives shall be those
who, as provided by law, shall be elected through a party-list system, giving the
Legislature wide discretion in formulating the allocation of party-list seats.
Clearly, there is no constitutional requirement for absolute proportional
representation in the allocation of party-list seats in the House of
Representatives. Section 2, on Declaration of Policy, of R.A. No. 7941 provides
that the State shall promote proportional representation in the election of
representatives to the House of Representatives through a party-list system of
registered national, regional and sectoral parties or organizations or coalitions
thereof x x x. However, this proportional representation in Section 2 is qualified
by Section 11(b) of the same law which mandates a three-seat cap, which is
intended to bar any single party-list organization from dominating the party-list
system. Section 11(b) also qualifies this proportional representation by imposing
a two percent cut-off for those entitled to the guaranteed seats. These statutory
qualifications are valid because they do not violate the Constitution, which does
not require absolute proportional representation for the party-list system.
To summarize, there are four parameters in a Philippine-style party-list election
system:
1) Twenty percent of the total number of the membership of the House of
Representatives is the maximum number of seats available to party-list
organizations, such that there is automatically one party-list seat for
every four existing legislative districts.
2) Garnering two percent of the total votes cast in the party-list elections
guarantees a party-list organization one seat. The guaranteed seats
shall be distributed in a first round of seat allocation to parties receiving
at least two percent of the total party-list votes.
3) The additional seats, that is, the remaining seats after allocation of the
guaranteed seats, shall be distributed to the party-list organizations
including those that received less than two percent of the total votes.
The continued operation of the two percent threshold as it applies to
the allocation of the additional seats is now unconstitutional because
this threshold mathematically and physically prevents the filling up of
the available party-list seats. The additional seats shall be distributed to
the parties in a second round of seat allocation according to the two-
step procedure laid down in the Decision of 21 April 2009 as clarified in
this Resolution.
4) The three-seat cap is constitutional. The three-seat cap is intended by
the Legislature to prevent any party from dominating the party-list
system. There is no violation of the Constitution because the 1987
Constitution does not require absolute proportionality for the party-list
system. The well-settled rule is that courts will not question the wisdom
of the Legislature as long as it is not violative of the Constitution.
These four parameters allow the mathematical and practical fulfillment of the
Constitutional provision that party-list representatives shall comprise twenty
percent of the members of the House of Representatives. At the same time,
6
these four parameters uphold as much as possible the Party-List Act, striking
down only that provision of the Party-List Act that could not be reconciled
anymore with the 1987 Constitution.
Sema v Comelec, 16 Jul 2008
Creation of LGUs
The creation of any of the four local government units province, city, municipality
or barangay must comply with three conditions.
First, the creation of a local government unit must follow the
criteria fixed in the Local Government Code.
Second, such creation must not conflict with any provision of the
Constitution.
Third, there must be a plebiscite in the political units affected.
There is neither an express prohibition nor an express grant of authority in the
Constitution for Congress to delegate to regional or local legislative bodies the
power to create local government units. However, under its plenary legislative
powers, Congress can delegate to local legislative bodies the power to create
local government units, subject to reasonable standards and provided no conflict
arises with any provision of the Constitution. In fact, Congress has delegated to
provincial boards, and city and municipal councils, the power to create barangays
within their jurisdiction, subject to compliance with the criteria established in the
Local Government Code, and the plebiscite requirement in Section 10, Article X
of the Constitution. However, under the Local Government Code, only x x x an
Act of Congress can create provinces, cities or municipalities.
Under Section 19, Article VI of RA 9054, Congress delegated to the ARMM
Regional Assembly the power to create provinces, cities, municipalities and
barangays within the ARMM. Congress made the delegation under its plenary
legislative powers because the power to create local government units is not one
of the express legislative powers granted by the Constitution to regional
legislative bodies. In the present case, the question arises whether the
delegation to the ARMM Regional Assembly of the power to create provinces,
cities, municipalities and barangays conflicts with any provision of the
Constitution.
There is no provision in the Constitution that conflicts with the delegation to
regional legislative bodies of the power to create municipalities and barangays,
provided Section 10, Article X of the Constitution is followed. However, the
creation of provinces and cities is another matter. Section 5 (3), Article VI of the
Constitution provides, Each city with a population of at least two hundred fifty
thousand, or each province, shall have at least one representative in the House
of Representatives. Similarly, Section 3 of the Ordinance appended to the
Constitution provides, Any province that may hereafter be created, or any city
whose population may hereafter increase to more than two hundred fifty
thousand shall be entitled in the immediately following election to at least one
Member x x x.
Clearly, a province cannot be created without a legislative district because it will
violate Section 5 (3), Article VI of the Constitution as well as Section 3 of the
Ordinance appended to the Constitution. For the same reason, a city with a
population of 250,000 or more cannot also be created without a legislative
district. Thus, the power to create a province, or a city with a population of
250,000 or more, requires also the power to create a legislative district. Even the
creation of a city with a population of less than 250,000 involves the power to
create a legislative district because once the citys population reaches 250,000,
the city automatically becomes entitled to one representative under Section 5
(3), Article VI of the Constitution and Section 3 of the Ordinance appended to
the Constitution. Thus, the power to create a province or city inherently
involves the power to create a legislative district.
For Congress to delegate validly the power to create a province or city, it must
also validly delegate at the same time the power to create a legislative district.
The threshold issue then is, can Congress validly delegate to the ARMM Regional
Assembly the power to create legislative districts for the House of
Representatives? The answer is in the negative.
Legislative Districts are Created or Reapportioned Only by an Act of Congress
Under the present Constitution, as well as in past Constitutions, the power to
increase the allowable membership in the House of Representatives, and to
reapportion legislative districts, is vested exclusively in Congress in Section 5,
Article VI of the Constitution.
Section 5 (1), Article VI of the Constitution vests in Congress the power to
increase, through a law, the allowable membership in the House of
Representatives. Section 5 (4) empowers Congress to reapportion legislative
districts. The power to reapportion legislative districts necessarily includes the
power to create legislative districts out of existing ones. Congress exercises
these powers through a law that Congress itself enacts, and not
through a law that regional or local legislative bodies enact. The
allowable membership of the House of Representatives can be
increased, and new legislative districts of Congress can be created,
only through a national law passed by Congress. In Montejo v. COMELEC,
we held that the power of redistricting x x x is traditionally regarded as part of
the power (of Congress) to make laws, and thus is vested exclusively in
Congress.
7
This textual commitment to Congress of the exclusive power to create or
reapportion legislative districts is logical. Congress is a national legislature and
any increase in its allowable membership or in its incumbent membership
through the creation of legislative districts must be embodied in a national law.
Only Congress can enact such a law. It would be anomalous for regional or local
legislative bodies to create or reapportion legislative districts for a national
legislature like Congress. An inferior legislative body, created by a superior
legislative body, cannot change the membership of the superior legislative body.
The creation of the ARMM, and the grant of legislative powers to its Regional
Assembly under its organic act, did not divest Congress of its exclusive authority
to create legislative districts.
Nothing in Section 20, Article X of the Constitution authorizes autonomous
regions, expressly or impliedly, to create or reapportion legislative districts for
Congress.
On the other hand, Section 3, Article IV of RA 9054 amending the ARMM Organic
Act, provides, The Regional Assembly may exercise legislative power x x x except
on the following matters: x x x (k) National elections. x x x. Since the ARMM
Regional Assembly has no legislative power to enact laws relating to national
elections, it cannot create a legislative district whose representative is elected in
national elections. Whenever Congress enacts a law creating a legislative district,
the first representative is always elected in the next national elections from the
effectivity of the law.
Indeed, the office of a legislative district representative to Congress is a national
office, and its occupant, a Member of the House of Representatives, is a national
official. It would be incongruous for a regional legislative body like the ARMM
Regional Assembly to create a national office when its legislative powers extend
only to its regional territory. The office of a district representative is maintained
by national funds and the salary of its occupant is paid out of national funds. It is
a self-evident inherent limitation on the legislative powers of every local or
regional legislative body that it can only create local or regional offices,
respectively, and it can never create a national office.
To allow the ARMM Regional Assembly to create a national office is to
allow its legislative powers to operate outside the ARMMs territorial
jurisdiction. This violates Section 20, Article X of the Constitution
which expressly limits the coverage of the Regional Assemblys
legislative powers [w]ithin its territorial jurisdiction x x x.
In summary, we rule that Section 19, Article VI of RA 9054, insofar as it grants
to the ARMM Regional Assembly the power to create provinces and cities, is void
for being contrary to Section 5 of Article VI and Section 20 of Article X of the
Constitution, as well as Section 3 of the Ordinance appended to the Constitution.
Only Congress can create provinces and cities because the creation of
provinces and cities necessarily includes the creation of legislative
districts, a power only Congress can exercise under Section 5, Article
VI of the Constitution and Section 3 of the Ordinance appended to the
Constitution. The ARMM Regional Assembly cannot create a province
without a legislative district because the Constitution mandates that
every province shall have a legislative district. Moreover, the ARMM
Regional Assembly cannot enact a law creating a national office like
the office of a district representative of Congress because the
legislative powers of the ARMM Regional Assembly operate only within
its territorial jurisdiction as provided in Section 20, Article X of the
Constitution. Thus, we rule that MMA Act 201, enacted by the ARMM Regional
Assembly and creating the Province of Shariff Kabunsuan, is void.
Manalo v Sistoza, 11 Aug 1999
SYNOPSIS
The case under consideration is a special civil action for prohibition under
Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court filed by petitioner questioning the
constitutionality and legality of the permanent appointments issued by former
President Corazon Aquino to the respondent senior officers of the Philippine
National Police who were promoted to the ranks of Chief Superintendent and
Director without their appointments submitted to the Commission on
Appointments for confirmation under Section 16, Article VII of the 1987
Constitution and Republic Act 6975 otherwise known as the Local Government
Act of 1990. Impleaded in the case was the former Secretary of Budget and
Management Salvador Enriquez III, who approved and effected the
disbursements for the salaries and other emoluments of subject police officers.
The Court found the petition not meritorious. The Court ruled that there
was no need for the confirmation of respondent officers by the Commission on
Appointments because these were not included in the first group of officers of
the government enumerated under Section 16, Article VII of the Constitution
requiring the confirmation of the Commission on Appointments. Consequently,
unconstitutional were Sections 26 and 31 of Republic Act 6975 which empowered
the Commission on Appointments to confirm the appointments of public officials
whose appointments are not required by the Constitution to be confirmed. In
view thereof, former Secretary Enriquez of the Department of Budget and
Management did not act with grave abuse of discretion in authorizing and
effecting disbursements for the salaries and other emoluments of the respondent
police officers whose appointments are valid. Accordingly, the petition under
consideration was dismissed for lack of merit.
8
SYLLABUS
1. POLITICAL LAW; CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; THE CONSTITUTION DOES
NOT REQUIRE THE CONFIRMATION OF THE APPOINTMENTS OF
OFFICERS OF THE PHILIPPINE NATIONAL POLICE FROM THE
RANK OF SENIOR SUPERINTENDENT AND HIGHER BY THE
COMMISSION ON APPOINTMENTS; CASE AT BAR.- Conformably, as
consistently interpreted and ruled in the leading case of Sarmiento III vs.
Mison, and in the subsequent cases of Bautista vs. Salonga, Quintos-Deles
vs. Constitutional Commission, and Calderon vs. Carale; under Section 16,
Article VII, of the Constitution, there are four groups of officers of the
government to be appointed by the President:
First, the heads of the executive departments, ambassadors, other public
ministers and consuls, officers of the armed forces from the rank of colonel or
naval captain, and other officers whose appointments are vested in him in this
Constitution;
Second, all other officers of the Government whose appointments are not
otherwise provided for by law;
Third, those whom the President may be authorized by law to appoint;
Fourth, officers lower in rank whose appointments the Congress may by law
vest in the President alone.
It is well-settled that only presidential appointments belonging to the first group
require the confirmation by the Commission on Appointments. The appointments
of respondent officers who are not within the first category, need not be
confirmed by the Commission on Appointments. As held in the case of Tarrosa
vs. Singson, Congress cannot by law expand the power of confirmation
of the Commission on Appointments and require confirmation of
appointments of other government officials not mentioned in the first
sentence of Section 16 of Article VII of the 1987 Constitution.
Consequently, unconstitutional are Sections 26 and 31 of Republic Act 6975
which empower the Commission on Appointments to confirm the appointments
of public officials whose appointments are not required by the Constitution to be
confirmed. But the unconstitutionality of the aforesaid sections notwithstanding,
the rest of Republic Act 6975 stands. It is well-settled that when provisions of
law declared void are severable from the main statute and the removal of the
unconstitutional provisions would not affect the validity and enforceability of the
other provisions, the statute remains valid without its voided sections.
2. REPUBLIC ACT 6975; THE PHILIPPINE NATIONAL POLICE IS
SEPARATE AND DISTINCT FROM THE ARMED FORCES OF THE
PHILIPPINES; CASE AT BAR.- The Philippine National Police is separate
and distinct from the Armed Forces of the Philippines. The Constitution, no
less, sets forth the distinction. Under Section 4 of Article XVI of the 1987
Constitution, The Armed Forces of the Philippines shall be composed of a
citizen armed force which shall undergo military training and service, as
may be provided by law. It shall keep a regular force necessary for the
security of the State. On the other hand, Section 6 of the same Article of
the Constitution ordains that: The State shall establish and maintain one
police force, which shall be national in scope and civilian in character to be
administered and controlled by a national police commission. The authority
of local executives over the police units in their jurisdiction shall be
provided by law. To so distinguish the police force from the armed forces,
Congress enacted Republic Act 6975 which states in part: Section 2.
Declaration of policy - It is hereby declared to be the policy of the State to
promote peace and order, ensure public safety and further strengthen local
government capability aimed towards the effective delivery of the basic
services to the citizenry through the establishment of a highly efficient and
competent police force that is national in scope and civilian in character. x x
x The policy force shall be organized, trained and equipped primarily for the
performance of police functions. Its national scope and civilian character
shall be paramount. No element of the police force shall be military nor
shall any position thereof be occupied by active members of the Armed
Forces of the Philippines. Thereunder, the police force is different from and
independent of the armed forces and the ranks in the military are not
similar to those in the Philippine National Police. Thus, directors and chief
superintendents of the PNP, such as the herein respondent police officers,
do not fall under the first category of presidential appointees requiring the
confirmation by the Commission on Appointments.
Matibag v Benipayo, 2 April 2002
Administrative Law; Public Officers; Appointments; Words and Phrases; An ad
interim appointment is a permanent appointment because it takes
effect immediately and can no longer be withdrawn by the President
once the appointee has qualified into officethe fact that it is subject
to confirmation by the Commission on Appointments does not alter its
permanent character.The Constitution itself makes an ad interim
appointment permanent in character by making it effective until disapproved by
the Commission on Appointments or until the next adjournment of Congress. The
second paragraph of Section 16, Article VII of the Constitution provides as
follows: The President shall have the power to make appointments during the
recess of the Congress, whether voluntary or compulsory, but such appointments
shall be effective only until disapproval by the Commission on Appointments or
until the next adjournment of the Congress. Thus, the ad interim appointment
remains effective until such disapproval or next adjournment, signifying that it
can no longer be withdrawn or revoked by the President. The fear that the
9
President can withdraw or revoke at any time and for any reason an ad interim
appointment is utterly without basis.
The Constitution imposes no condition on the effectivity of an ad
interim appointment, and thus an ad interim appointment takes effect
immediately; In case of an appointment made by the President when
Congress is in session, the President nominates, and only upon the
consent of the Commission on Appointments may the person thus
named assume office, while with reference to an ad interim
appointment, it takes effect at once, and the individual chosen may
thus qualify and perform his function without loss of time.The
Constitution imposes no condition on the effectivity of an ad interim
appointment, and thus an ad interim appointment takes effect immediately. The
appointee can at once assume office and exercise, as a de jure officer, all the
powers pertaining to the office. In Pacete vs. Secretary of the Commission on
Appointments, this Court elaborated on the nature of an ad interim appointment
as follows: A distinction is thus made between the exercise of such presidential
prerogative requiring confirmation by the Commission on Appointments when
Congress is in session and when it is in recess. In the former, the President
nominates, and only upon the consent of the Commission on Appointments may
the person thus named assume office. It is not so with reference to ad interim
appointments. It takes effect at once. The individual chosen may thus qualify
and perform his function without loss of time. His title to such office is complete.
In the language of the Constitution, the appointment is effective until
disapproval by the Commission on Appointments or until the next adjournment
of the Congress.
The term ad interim appointment, as used in letters of appointment
signed by the President, means a permanent appointment made by the
President in the meantime that Congress is in recess.It does not mean
a temporary appointment that can be withdrawn or revoked at any time. The
term, although not found in the text of the Constitution, has acquired a definite
legal meaning under Philippine jurisprudence. The Court had again occasion to
explain the nature of an ad interim appointment in the more recent case of
Marohombsar vs. Court of Appeals, where the Court stated: We have already
mentioned that an ad interim appointment is not descriptive of the nature of the
appointment, that is, it is not indicative of whether the appointment is temporary
or in an acting capacity, rather it denotes the manner in which the appointment
was made. In the instant case, the appointment extended to private respondent
by then MSU President Alonto, Jr. was issued without condition nor limitation as
to tenure. The permanent status of private respondents appointment as
Executive Assistant II was recognized and attested to by the Civil Service
Commission Regional Office No. 12. Petitioners submission that private
respondents ad interim appointment is synonymous with a temporary
appointment which could be validly terminated at any time is clearly untenable.
Ad interim appointments are permanent but their terms are only until the Board
disapproves them.
An ad interim appointment becomes complete and irrevocable once the
appointee has qualified into office, and the withdrawal or revocation of
an ad interim appointment is possible only if it is communicated to the
appointee before the moment he qualifies, as any withdrawal or
revocation thereafter is tantamount to removal from office.An ad
interim appointee who has qualified and assumed office becomes at that
moment a government employee and therefore part of the civil service. He
enjoys the constitutional protection that [n]o officer or employee in the civil
service shall be removed or suspended except for cause provided by law. Thus,
an ad interim appointment becomes complete and irrevocable once the
appointee has qualified into office. The withdrawal or revocation of an ad interim
appointment is possible only if it is communicated to the appointee before the
moment he qualifies, and any withdrawal or revocation thereafter is tantamount
to removal from office. Once an appointee has qualified, he acquires a legal right
to the office which is protected not only by statute but also by the Constitution.
He can only be removed for cause, after notice and hearing, consistent with the
requirements of due process.
An ad interim appointment can be terminated for two causes specified
in the Constitutionfirst, by the disapproval of his ad interim
appointment by the Commission on Appointments, and, second, by the
adjournment of Congress without the Commission on Appointments
acting on his appointment.These two causes are resolutory conditions
expressly imposed by the Constitution on all ad interim appointments. These
resolutory conditions constitute, in effect, a Sword of Damocles over the heads
of ad interim appointees. No one, however, can complain because it is the
Constitution itself that places the Sword of Damocles over the heads of the ad
interim appointees.
Security of Tenure; An appointment or designation in a temporary or
acting capacity is the kind of appointment that the Constitution
prohibits the President from making to the three independent
constitutional commissions.While an ad interim appointment is permanent
and irrevocable except as provided by law, an appointment or designation in
a temporary or acting capacity can be withdrawn or revoked at the
pleasure of the appointing power. A temporary or acting appointee does not
enjoy any security of tenure, no matter how briefly. This is the kind of
appointment that the Constitution prohibits the President from making to the
three independent constitutional commissions, including the COMELEC.
10
Constitutional Commissions; Commission on Elections; Statutory Construction; again be considered by the Commission. Hence, under the Rules of the
To hold that the independence of the COMELEC requires the Commission on Appointments, a by-passed appointment can be considered again
Commission on Appointments to first confirm ad interim appointees if the President renews the appointment.
before the appointees can assume office will negate the Presidents
Statutory Construction; Guevara was decided under the 1935 Constitution from
power to make ad interim appointments.While the Constitution mandates
where the second paragraph of Section 16, Article VII of the present Constitution
that the COMELEC shall be independent, this provision should be harmonized
on ad interim appointments was lifted verbatim. The jurisprudence under the
with the Presidents power to extend ad interim appointments. To hold that the
1935 Constitution governing ad interim appointments by the President is
independence of the COMELEC requires the Commission on Appointments to first
doubtless applicable to the present Constitution. The established practice under
confirm ad interim appointees before the appointees can assume office will
the present Constitution is that the President can renew the appointments of by-
negate the Presidents power to make ad interim appointments. This is contrary
passed ad interim appointees. This is a continuation of the well-recognized
to the rule on statutory construction to give meaning and effect to every
practice under the 1935 Constitution, interrupted only by the 1973 Constitution
provision of the law. It will also run counter to the clear intent of the framers of
which did not provide for a Commission on Appointments but vested sole
the Constitution.
appointing power in the President.
Commission on Appointments; Principle of Check and Balance; An ad interim
The prohibition on reappointment in Section 1 (2), Article IX-C of the
appointee disapproved by the Commission on Appointments can no
Constitution applies neither to disapprove nor by-passed ad interim
longer be extended a new appointmentthe disapproval is a final
appointments. A disapproved ad interim appointment cannot be
decision of the Commission on Appointments in the exercise of its
revived by another ad interim appointment because the disapproval is
checking power on the appointing authority of the President.The
final under Section 16, Article VII of the Constitution, and not because a
disapproval is a decision on the merits, being a refusal by the Commission on
reappointment is prohibited under Section 1 (2), Article IX-C of the Constitution.
Appointments to give its consent after deliberating on the qualifications of the
A by-passed ad interim appointment can be revived by a new ad
appointee. Since the Constitution does not provide for any appeal from such
interim appointment because there is no final disapproval under Section
decision, the disapproval is final and binding on the appointee as well as on the
16, Article VII of the Constitution, and such new appointment will not result in
appointing power. In this instance, the President can no longer renew the
the appointee serving beyond the fixed term of seven years.
appointment not because of the constitutional prohibition on
reappointment, but because of a final decision by the Commission on The framers of the Constitution made it quite clear that any person who has
Appointments to withhold its consent to the appointment. served any term of office as COMELEC memberwhether for a full term of seven
years, a truncated term of five or three years, or even for an unexpired term of
A by-passed appointment is one that has not been finally acted upon on the
any length of timecan no longer be reappointed to the COMELEC.
merits by the Commission on Appointments at the close of the session of
Commissioner Foz succinctly explained this intent in this manner: MR. FOZ. But
Congress.An ad interim appointment that is by-passed because of lack of time
there is the argument made in the concurring opinion of Justice Angelo Bautista
or failure of the Commission on Appointments to organize is another matter. A
in the case of Visarra vs. Miraflor, to the effect that the prohibition on
by-passed appointment is one that has not been finally acted upon on the merits
reappointment applies only when the term or tenure is for seven years. But in
by the Commission on Appointments at the close of the session of Congress.
cases where the appointee serves only for less than seven years, he would be
There is no final decision by the Commission on Appointments to give or
entitled to reappointment. Unless we put the qualifying words without
withhold its consent to the appointment as required by the Constitution. Absent
reappointment in the case of those appointed, then it is possible that an
such decision, the President is free to renew the ad interim appointment of a by-
interpretation could be made later on their case, they can still be reappointed to
passed appointee. This is recognized in Section 17 of the Rules of the
serve for a total of seven years. Precisely, we are foreclosing that possibility by
Commission on Appointments, which provides as follows: Section 17. Unacted
making it clear that even in the case of those first appointed under the
Nominations or Appointments Returned to the President. Nominations or
Constitution, no reappointment can be made.
appointments submitted by the President of the Philippines which are not finally
acted upon at the close of the session of Congress shall be returned to the An ad interim appointment that has lapsed by inaction of the Commission on
President and, unless new nominations or appointments are made, shall not Appointments does not constitute a term of office. The period from the time

11
the ad interim appointment is made to the time it lapses is neither a fixed term
nor an unexpired term. To hold otherwise would mean that the President by his
unilateral action could start and complete the running of a term of office in the
COMELEC without the consent of the Commission on Appointments. This
interpretation renders inutile the confirming power of the Commission on
Appointments.
The phrase without reappointment applies only to one who has been
appointed by the President and confirmed by the Commission on
Appointments, whether or not such person completes his term of
office. There must be a confirmation by the Commission on Appointments of
the previous appointment before the prohibition on reappointment can apply. To
hold otherwise will lead to absurdities and negate the Presidents power to make
ad interim appointments.
The Supreme Court will not subscribe to a proposition that will wreak havoc on
vital government services.In the great majority of cases, the Commission on
Appointments usually fails to act, for lack of time, on the ad interim
appointments first issued to appointees. If such ad interim appointments can no
longer be renewed, the President will certainly hesitate to make ad interim
appointments because most of her appointees will effectively be disapproved by
mere inaction of the Commission on Appointments. This will nullify the
constitutional power of the President to make ad interim appointments, a power
intended to avoid disruptions in vital government services. This Court cannot
subscribe to a proposition that will wreak havoc on vital government services.
The prohibition on reappointment is common to the three constitutional
commissions. The framers of the present Constitution prohibited reappointments
for two reasons. The first is to prevent a second appointment for those who have
been previously appointed and confirmed even if they served for less than seven
years. The second is to insure that the members of the three constitutional
commissions do not serve beyond the fixed term of seven years.
One who has been given an ad interim appointment as COMELEC Chairman is a
de jure officer, and consequently, he has full authority to exercise all the powers
of that office for so long as his ad interim appointment remains effective; The
Chairman, as the Chief Executive of the COMELEC, is expressly empowered on
his own authority, without having to secure the approval of the COMELEC en
banc, to transfer or reassign COMELEC personnel in accordance with Civil Service
Law.Petitioners posturing will hold water if Benipayo does not possess any
color of title to the office of Chairman of the COMELEC. We have ruled, however,
that Benipayo is the de jure COMELEC Chairman, and consequently he has full
authority to exercise all the powers of that office for so long as his ad interim
appointment remains effective. Under Section 7 (4), Chapter 2, Subtitle C, Book
V of the Revised Administrative Code, the Chairman of the COMELEC is vested
with the following power: Section 7. Chairman as Executive Officer; Powers and
Duties. The Chairman, who shall be the Chief Executive Officer of the
Commission, shall: x x x (4) Make temporary assignments, rotate and transfer
personnel in accordance with the provisions of the Civil Service Law. The
Chairman, as the Chief Executive of the COMELEC, is expressly empowered on
his own authority to transfer or reassign COMELEC personnel in accordance with
the Civil Service Law. In the exercise of this power, the Chairman is not required
by law to secure the approval of the COMELEC en banc.
Transfers; Security of Tenure; Career Executive Service; One who is not a
Career Executive Service (CES) officer, nor a holder of a Career
Executive Service Eligibility, which are necessary qualifications for holding
the position of Director IV as prescribed in the Qualifications Standards (Revised
1987) issued by the Civil Service Commission, does not enjoy security of
tenure as Director IV.Petitioners appointment papers dated February 2, 1999,
February 15, 2000 and February 15, 2001, attached as Annexes X, Y and Z
to her Petition, indisputably show that she held her Director IV position in the
EID only in an acting or temporary capacity. Petitioner is not a Career Executive
Service (CES) officer, and neither does she hold Career Executive Service
Eligibility, which are necessary qualifications for holding the position of Director
IV as prescribed in the Qualifications Standards (Revised 1987) issued by the
Civil Service Commission. Obviously, petitioner does not enjoy security of tenure
as Director IV. In Secretary of Justice Serafin Cuevas vs. Atty. Josefina G. Bacal,
this Court held that: As respondent does not have the rank appropriate for the
position of Chief Public Attorney, her appointment to that position cannot be
considered permanent, and she can claim no security of tenure in respect of that
position.
The COMELEC Chairman is the sole officer specifically vested with the
power to transfer or reassign COMELEC personnel, the COMELEC en
banc cannot arrogate unto itself this power because that will mean
amending the Revised Administrative Code, an act the COMELEC en
banc cannot legally do.The proviso in COMELEC Resolution No. 3300,
requiring due notice and hearing before any transfer or reassignment can be
made within thirty days prior to election day, refers only to COMELEC field
personnel and not to head office personnel like the petitioner. Under the Revised
Administrative Code, the COMELEC Chairman is the sole officer specifically
vested with the power to transfer or reassign COMELEC personnel. The
COMELEC Chairman will logically exercise the authority to transfer or reassign
COMELEC personnel pursuant to COMELEC Resolution No. 3300. The COMELEC
en banc cannot arrogate unto itself this power because that will mean amending
the Revised Administrative Code, an act the COMELEC en banc cannot legally do.
12
Election Period; COMELEC Resolution No. 3300 does not require that every
transfer or reassignment of COMELEC personnel, should carry the concurrence of
the COMELEC as a collegial body.COMELEC Resolution No. 3300 does not
require that every transfer or reassignment of COMELEC personnel should carry
the concurrence of the COMELEC as a collegial body. Interpreting Resolution No.
3300 to require such concurrence will render the resolution meaningless since
the COMELEC en banc will have to approve every personnel transfer or
reassignment, making the resolution utterly useless. Resolution No. 3300 should
be interpreted for what it is, an approval to effect transfers and reassignments of
personnel, without need of securing a second approval from the COMELEC en
banc to actually implement such transfer or reassignment.
Pimentel, Jr. vs. Ermita, 13 Oct 2005
1. Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Prohibition; As a rule, the writ of prohibition
will not lie to enjoin acts already done. However, as an exception to the rule on
mootness, courts will decide a question otherwise moot if it is capable of
repetition yet evading review. In the present case, the mootness of the petition
does not bar its resolution. The question of the constitutionality of the Presidents
appointment of department secretaries in an acting capacity while Congress is in
session will arise in every such appointment.
2. Constitutional Law; Appointments; Executive Department; Congress; The
power to appoint is essentially executive in nature, and the legislature
may not interfere with the exercise of this executive power except in
those instances when the Constitution expressly allows it to interfere.
Limitations on the executive power to appoint are construed strictly against the
legislature. The scope of the legislatures interference in the executives power to
appoint is limited to the power to prescribe the qualifications to an
appointive office. Congress cannot appoint a person to an office in the guise
of prescribing qualifications to that office. Neither may Congress impose on the
President the duty to appoint any particular person to an office.
3. Constitutional Law; Appointments; Commission on Appointments; Even if the
Commission on Appointments is composed of members of Congress, the exercise
of its powers is executive and not legislative. The Commission on
Appointments does not legislate when it exercises its power to give or
withhold consent to presidential appointments. Thus: x x x The
Commission on Appointments is a creature of the Constitution. Although its
membership is confined to members of Congress, said Commission is
independent of Congress. The powers of the Commission do not come
from Congress, but emanate directly from the Constitution. Hence, it is
not an agent of Congress. In fact, the functions of the Commissioner are purely
executive in nature. x x x
4. Constitutional Law; Appointments; Commission on Appointments;
Considering the independence of the Commission on Appointments
from Congress, it is error for petitioners to claim standing in the
present case as members of Congress. President Arroyos issuance of acting
appointments while Congress is in session impairs no power of Congress. Among
the petitioners, only the following are members of the Commission on
Appointments of the 13th Congress: Senator Enrile as Minority Floor Leader,
Senator Lacson as Assistant Minority Floor Leader, and Senator Angara, Senator
Ejercito-Estrada, and Senator Osmea as members. Thus, on the impairment of
the prerogatives of members of the Commission on Appointments, only Senators
Enrile, Lacson, Angara, Ejercito-Estrada, and Osmea have standing in the
present petition. This is in contrast to Senators Pimentel, Estrada, Lim, and
Madrigal, who, though vigilant in protecting their perceived prerogatives as
members of Congress, possess no standing in the present petition.
5. Constitutional Law; Appointments; Commission on Appointments; Congress,
through a law, cannot impose on the President the obligation to
appoint automatically the undersecretary as her temporary alter ego.-
The essence of an appointment in an acting capacity is its temporary
nature. It is a stop-gap measure intended to fill an office for a limited time until
the appointment of a permanent occupant to the office. In case of vacancy in an
office occupied by an alter ego of the President, such as the office of a
department secretary, the President must necessarily appoint an alter ego of her
choice as acting secretary before the permanent appointee of her choice could
assume office. Congress, through a law, cannot impose on the President the
obligation to appoint automatically the undersecretary as her temporary alter
ego. An alter ego, whether temporary or permanent, holds a position of great
trust and confidence. Congress, in the guise of prescribing qualifications to an
office, cannot impose on the President who her alter ego should be.
6. Constitutional Law; Appointments; Commission on Appointments; Statutes;
The law expressly allows the President to make such acting appointment. Section
17, Chapter 5, Title I, Book III of EO 292 states that [t]he President may
temporarily designate an officer already in the government service or any other
competent person to perform the functions of an office in the executive branch.
Thus, the President may even appoint in an acting capacity a person not yet in
the government service, as long as the President deems that person competent.
7. Constitutional Law; Appointments; Commission on Appointments; Ad interim
appointments must be distinguished from appointments in an acting
capacity. Both of them are effective upon acceptance. But ad interim
appointments are extended only during a recess of Congress, whereas
acting appointments may be extended any time there is a vacancy.
Moreover ad interim appointments are submitted to the Commission on
13
Appointments for confirmation or rejection; acting appointments are
not submitted to the Commission on Appointments. Acting
appointments are a way of temporarily filling important offices but, if
abused, they can also be a way of circumventing the need for
confirmation by the Commission on Appointments.
IN RE APPOINTMENTS DATED March 30, 1998 OF HON. MATEO A.
VALENZUELA and HON. PLACIDO B. VALLARTA AS JUDGES OF THE
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF BRANCH 62, BAGO CITY AND OF BRANCH
24, CABANATUAN CITY, respectively.
Statutory Construction; Midnight Appointments; Section 15, Article VII is
directed against two types of appointments: (1) those made for buying
votes; and (2) those made for partisan considerations. The first refers to those
appointments made within the two months preceding a Presidential election and
are similar to those which are declared election offenses in the Omnibus Election
Code. x x x The second type of appointments prohibited by Section 15, Article
VII consists of the so-called midnight appointments. In Aytona v. Castillo, it
was held that after the proclamation of Diosdado Macapagal as duly elected
President, President Carlos P. Garcia, who was defeated in his bid for reelection,
became no more than a caretaker administrator whose duty was to prepare judicial resolution of the controversy.Since petitioner has not successfully
for the orderly transfer of authority to the incoming President.
IBP v Zamora
Integrated Bar of the Philippines; The mere invocation by the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines of its duty to preserve the rule of law and
nothing more, while undoubtedly true, is not sufficient to clothe it with
standing in this casethis is too general an interest which is shared by
other groups and the whole citizenry.The IBP primarily anchors its
standing on its alleged responsibility to uphold the rule of law and the
Constitution. Apart from this declaration, however, the IBP asserts no other basis
in support of its locus standi. The mere invocation by the IBP of its duty to
preserve the rule of law and nothing more, while undoubtedly true, is not
sufficient to clothe it with standing in this case. This is too general an interest
which is shared by other groups and the whole citizenry. Based on the standards
above-stated; the IBP has failed to present a specific and substantial interest in
the resolution of the case. Its fundamental purpose which, under Section 2, Rule
139-A of the Rules of Court, is to elevate the standards of the law profession and
to improve the administration of justice is alien to, and cannot be affected by the
deployment of the Marines.
The interest of the National President of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
who signed the petition, is his alone, absent a formal board resolution
authorizing him to file the present action.It should also be noted that the
interest of the National President of the IBP who signed the petition, is his alone,
absent a formal board resolution authorizing him to file the present action. To be
sure, members of the BAR, those in the judiciary included, have varying opinions
on the issue. Moreover, the IBP, assuming that it has duly authorized the
National President to file the petition, has not shown any specific injury which it
has suffered or may suffer by virtue of the questioned governmental act. Indeed,
none of its members, whom the IBP purportedly represents, has sustained any
form of injury as a result of the operation of the joint visibility patrols. Neither is
it alleged that any of its members has been arrested or that their civil liberties
have been violated by the deployment of the Marines. What the IBP projects as
injurious is the supposed militarization of law enforcement which might
threaten Philippine democratic institutions and may cause more harm than good
in the long run. Not only is the presumed injury not personal in character, it is
likewise too vague, highly speculative and uncertain to satisfy the requirement of
standing.
The Supreme Court, however, does not categorically rule that the Integrated Bar
of the Philippines has absolutely no standing to raise constitutional issues how or
in the future, but the Integrated Bar of the Philippines must, by way of
allegations and proof, satisfy the Court that it has sufficient stake to obtain
established a direct and personal injury as a consequence of the questioned act,
it does not possess the personality to assail the validity of the deployment of the
Marines. This Court, however, does not categorically rule that the IBP has
absolutely no standing to raise constitutional issues now or in the future. The IBP
must, by way of allegations and proof, satisfy this Court that it has sufficient
stake to obtain judicial resolution of the controversy.
The Supreme Court has the discretion to take cognizance of a suit which does
not satisfy the requirement of legal standing when paramount interest is
involved; In this case, a reading of the petition shows that the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines has advanced constitutional issues which deserve the attention of
the Supreme Court in view of their seriousness, novelty and weight as
precedents.Having stated the foregoing, it must be emphasized that this Court
has the discretion to take cognizance of a suit which does not satisfy the
requirement of legal standing when paramount interest is involved. In not a few
cases, the Court has adopted a liberal attitude on the locus standi of a petitioner
where the petitioner is able to craft an issue of transcendental significance to the
people. Thus, when the issues raised are of paramount importance to the public,
the Court may brush aside technicalities of procedure. In this case, a reading of
the petition shows that the IBP has advanced constitutional issues which deserve
the attention of this Court in view of their seriousness, novelty and weight as
14
precedents. Moreover, because peace and order are under constant threat and
lawless violence occurs in increasing tempo, undoubtedly aggravated by the
Mindanao insurgency problem, the legal controversy raised in the petition almost
certainly will not go away. It will stare us in the face again. It, therefore,
behooves the Court to relax the rules on standing and to resolve the issue now,
rather than later.
Presidency; Commander-in-Chief Clause; Calling Out Power; As
framed by the parties, the underlying issues are the scope of presidential powers
and limits, and the extent of judicial review. But, while this Court gives
considerable weight to the parties formulation of the issues, the resolution of the
controversy may warrant a creative approach that goes beyond the narrow
confines of the issues raised. Thus, while the parties are in agreement that the
power exercised by the President is the power to call out the armed forces, the
Court is of the view that the power involved may be no more than the
maintenance of peace and order and promotion of the general welfare. For one,
the realities on the ground do not show that there exist a state of warfare,
widespread civil unrest or anarchy. Secondly, the full brunt of the military is not
brought upon the citizenry, a point discussed in the latter part of this decision.
Political Questions; Separation of Powers; As a general proposition, a
controversy is justiciable if it refers to a matter which is appropriate for court
review. It pertains to issues which are inherently susceptible of being decided on
grounds recognized by law. Nevertheless, the Court does not automatically
assume jurisdiction over actual constitutional cases brought before it even in
instances that are ripe for resolution. One class of cases wherein the Court
hesitates to rule on are political questions. The reason is that political questions
are concerned with issues dependent upon the wisdom, not the legality, of a
particular act or measure being assailed. Moreover, the political question
being a function of the separation of powers, the courts will not normally
interfere with the workings of another co-equal branch unless the case shows a
clear need for the courts to step in to uphold the law and the Constitution.
The 1987 Constitution expands the concept of judicial review by providing that
(T)he Judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower
courts as may be established by law. Judicial power includes the duty of the
courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally
demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part
of any branch or instrumentality of the Government. Under this definition, the
Court cannot agree with the Solicitor General that the issue involved is a political
question beyond the jurisdiction of this Court to review. When the grant of
power is qualified, conditional or subject to limitations, the issue of whether the
prescribed qualifications or conditions have been met or the limitations
respected, is justiciablethe problem being one of legality or validity, not its
wisdom. Moreover, the jurisdiction to delimit constitutional boundaries has been
given to this Court. When political questions are involved, the Constitution limits
the determination as to whether or not there has been a grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of the official
whose action is being questioned.
Words and Phrases; By grave abuse of discretion is meant simply capricious
or whimsical exercise of judgment that is patent and gross as to amount to an
evasion of positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, or
to act at all in contemplation of law, as where the power is exercised in an
arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion or hostility; A showing that
plenary power is granted either department of government, may not be an
obstacle to judicial inquiry, for the improvident exercise or abuse thereof may
give rise to justiciable controversy.
Commander-in-Chief Clause; Calling Out Power;When the President
calls the armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or
rebellion, he necessarily exercises a discretionary power solely vested in his
wisdom. This is clear from the intent of the framers and from the text of the
Constitution itself. The Court, thus, cannot be called upon to overrule the
Presidents wisdom or substitute its own. However, this does not prevent an
examination of whether such power was exercised within permissible
constitutional limits or whether it was exercised in a manner constituting grave
abuse of discretion. In view of the constitutional intent to give the President full
discretionary power to determine the necessity of calling out the armed forces, it
is incumbent upon the petitioner to show that the Presidents decision is totally
bereft of factual basis. The present petition fails to discharge such heavy burden
as there is no evidence to support the assertion that there exist no justification
for calling out the armed forces. There is, likewise, no evidence to support the
proposition that grave abuse was committed because the power to call was
exercised in such a manner as to violate the constitutional provision on civilian
supremacy over the military. In the performance of this Courts duty of
purposeful hesitation before declaring an act of another branch as
unconstitutional, only where such grave abuse of discretion is clearly shown shall
the Court interfere with the Presidents judgment. To doubt is to sustain.
Statutory Construction; Unlike in the power to suspend the privilege of the writ
of habeas corpus or the power to proclaim martial law in relation to which the
Constitution has empowered Congress to revoke such suspension or
proclamation and the Supreme Court to review the sufficiency of the factual
basis thereof there is no such equivalent provision dealing with the revocation or
review of the Presidents action to call out the armed forces, a distinction which
places the calling out power in a different category from the power to declare
15
martial law and the power to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus.Under the foregoing provisions, Congress may revoke such
proclamation or suspension and the Court may review the sufficiency of the
factual basis thereof. However, there is no such equivalent provision dealing with
the revocation or review of the Presidents action to call out the armed forces.
The distinction places the calling out power in a different category from the
power to declare martial law and the power to suspend the privilege of the writ
of habeas corpus, otherwise, the framers of the Constitution would have simply
lumped together the three powers and provided for their revocation and review
without any qualification. Expressio unius est exclusio alterius. Where the terms
are expressly limited to certain matters, it may not, by interpretation or
construction, be extended to other matters. That the intent of the Constitution is
exactly what its letter says, i.e., that the power to call is fully discretionary to the
President, is extant in the deliberation of the Constitutional Commission.
The reason for the difference in the treatment of the power to suspend the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, the power to declare martial law and the
power to call out the armed forces highlights the intent to grant the
President the widest leeway and broadest discretion in using the
power to call out because it is considered as the lesser and more
benign power compared to the two other powers.---The reason for the
difference in the treatment of the aforementioned powers highlights the intent to
grant the President the widest leeway and broadest discretion in using the power
to call out because it is considered as the lesser and more benign power
compared to the power to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus and
the power to impose martial law, both of which involve the curtailment and
suppression of certain basic civil rights and individual freedoms, and
thus necessitating safeguards by Congress and review by this Court. Moreover,
under Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution, in the exercise of the power to
suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus or to impose martial law, two
conditions must concur: (1) there must be an actual invasion or rebellion and,
(2) public safety must require it. These conditions are not required in the case of
the power to call out the armed forces. The only criterion is that whenever it
becomes necessary, the President may call the armed forces to prevent or
suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion. The implication is that the
President is given full discretion and wide latitude in the exercise of the power to
call as compared to the two other powers.
If the petitioner fails, by way of proof to support the assertion that the President
acted without factual basis, then the Supreme Court cannot undertake an
independent investigation beyond the pleadings.The factual necessity of calling
out the armed forces is not easily quantifiable and cannot be objectively
established since matters considered for satisfying the same is a combination of
several factors which are not always accessible to the courts. Besides the
absence of textual standards that the court may use to judge necessity,
information necessary to arrive at such judgment might also prove
unmanageable for the courts. Certain pertinent information might be difficult to
verify, or wholly unavailable to the courts. In many instances, the evidence upon
which the President might decide that there is a need to call out the armed
forces may be of a nature not constituting technical proof.
Judicial Notice; The Court takes judicial notice of the recent bombings
perpetrated by lawless elements in shopping malls, public utilities, and other
public places.The President has already determined the necessity and factual
basis for calling the armed forces. In his Memorandum, he categorically asserted
that, [V]iolent crimes like bank/store robberies, holdups, kidnappings and
carnappings continue to occur in Metro Manila . . . We do not doubt the veracity
of the Presidents assessment of the situation, especially in the light of present
developments. The Court takes judicial notice of the recent bombings
perpetrated by lawless elements in the shopping malls, public utilities, and other
public places. These are among the areas of deployment described in the LOI
2000. Considering all these facts, we hold that the President has sufficient
factual basis to call for military aid in law enforcement and in the exercise of this
constitutional power.
Civilian Supremacy Clause The deployment of the Marines does not
constitute a breach of the civilian supremacy clause. The calling of the Marines in
this case constitutes permissible use of military assets for civilian law
enforcement. The participation of the Marines in the conduct of joint visibility
patrols is appropriately circumscribed. The limited participation of the Marines is
evident in the provisions of the LOI itself, which sufficiently provides the metes
and bounds of the Marines authority. It is noteworthy that the local police forces
are the ones in charge of the visibility patrols at all times, the real authority
belonging to the PNP. In fact, the Metro Manila Police Chief is the overall leader
of the PNP-Philippine Marines joint visibility patrols. Under the LOI, the police
forces are tasked to brief or orient the soldiers on police patrol procedures. It is
their responsibility to direct and manage the deployment of the Marines. It is,
likewise, their duty to provide the necessary equipment to the Marines and
render logistical support to these soldiers. In view of the foregoing, it cannot be
properly argued that military authority is supreme over civilian authority.
Moreover, the deployment of the Marines to assist the PNP does not unmake the
civilian character of the police force. Neither does it amount to an insidious
incursion of the military in the task of law enforcement in violation of Section
5(4), Article XVI of the Constitution.
Philippine National Police (PNP); Where none of the Marines was incorporated or
enlisted as members of the Philippine National Police, there can be no
16
appointment to a civilian position to speak ofthe deployment of the Marines in
the joint visibility patrols does not destroy the civilian character of the Philippine
National Police.In this regard, it is not correct to say that General Angelo
Reyes, Chief of Staff of the AFP, by his alleged involvement in civilian law
enforcement, has been virtually appointed to a civilian post in derogation of the
aforecited provision. The real authority in these operations, as stated in the LOI,
is lodged with the head of a civilian institution, the PNP, and not with the
military. Such being the case, it does not matter whether the APP Chief actually
participates in the Task Force Tulungan since he does not exercise any authority
or control over the same. Since none of the Marines was incorporated or enlisted
as members of the PNP, there can be no appointment to a civilian position to
speak of. Hence, the deployment of the Marines in the joint visibility patrols does
not destroy the civilian character of the PNP.
Words and Phrases; Regulatory Power Proscriptive Power, and Compulsory
Power, Distinguished.A power regulatory in nature is one which controls or
directs. It is proscriptive if it prohibits or condemns and compulsory if it exerts
some coercive force.
Even if the Court were to apply the rigid standards to determine whether there is
permissible use of the military in civilian law enforcement, the conclusion is
inevitable that no violation of the civilian supremacy clause in the Constitution is
committed. On this point, the Court agrees with the observation of the Solicitor
General: 3. The designation of tasks in Annex A does not constitute the exercise
of regulatory, proscriptive, or compulsory military power. First, the soldiers do
not control or direct the operation. This is evident from Nos. 6, 8(k) and 9(a) of
Annex A. These soldiers, second, also have no power to prohibit or condemn. In
No. 9(d) of Annex A, all arrested persons are brought to the nearest police
stations for proper disposition. And last, these soldiers apply no coercive force.
The materials or equipment issued to them, as shown in No. 8(c) of Annex A, are
all low impact and defensive in character. The conclusion is that there being no
exercise of regulatory, proscriptive or compulsory military power, the deployment
of a handful of Philippine Marines constitutes no impermissible use of military
power for civilian law enforcement.
Unless the petitioner can show that in the deployment of the Marines, the
President has violated the fundamental law, exceeded his authority or
jeopardized the civil liberties of the people, the Supreme Court is not inclined to
overrule the Presidents determination of the factual basis for the calling of the
Marines to prevent or suppress lawless violence.It appears that the present
petition is anchored on fear that once the armed forces are deployed, the
military will gain ascendancy, and thus place in peril our cherished liberties. Such
apprehensions, however, are unfounded. The power to call the armed forces is
just thatcalling out the armed forces. Unless, petitioner IBP can show, which it
has not, that in the deployment of the Marines, the President has violated the
fundamental law, exceeded his authority or jeopardized the civil liberties of the
people, this Court is not inclined to overrule the Presidents determination of the
factual basis for the calling of the Marines to prevent or suppress lawless
violence.
Freedom; Civil Liberties; Freedom and democracy will be in full bloom only when
people feel secure in their homes and in the streets, not when the shadows of
violence and anarchy constantly lurk in their midst.Since the institution of the
joint visibility patrol in January, 2000, not a single citizen has complained that his
political or civil rights have been violated as a result of the deployment of the
Marines. It was precisely to safeguard peace, tranquility and the civil liberties of
the people that the joint visibility patrol was conceived.
Monsanto v Factoran, Jr., 9 Feb 1989
1. Pardon does not ipso facto restore a convicted felon to public office
necessarily relinquished or forfeited by reason of such conviction.-
Pardon granted after conviction frees the individual from all the
penalties and legal disabilities and restores him to all his civil rights.
But unless expressly grounded on the persons innocence (which is rare), it
cannot bring back lost reputation for honesty, integrity and fair dealing. This
must be constantly kept in mind lest we lose track of the true character and
purpose of the privilege. Thus, notwithstanding the expansive and effusive
language of the Garland case, we are in full agreement with the commonly-held
opinion that pardon does not ipso facto restore a convicted felon to public office
necessarily relinquished or forfeited by reason of the conviction although such
pardon undoubtedly restores his eligibility for appointment to that office.
2. The pardon granted to petitioner resulted in removing her
disqualification from holding public employment, but to regain her
former post, she must reapply and undergo the usual procedure
required for a new appointment.- For petitioner Monsanto, this is the bottom
line: the absolute disqualification or ineligibility from public office forms part of
the punishment prescribed by the Revised Penal Code for estafa thru falsification
of public documents. It is clear from the authorities referred to that when her
guilt and punishment were expunged by her pardon, this particular disability was
likewise removed. Henceforth, petitioner may apply for reappointment to the
office which was forfeited by reason of her conviction. And in considering her
qualifications and suitability for the public post, the facts constituting her offense
must be and should be evaluated and taken into account to determine ultimately
whether she can once again be entrusted with public funds.
3. The pardon granted to herein petitioner did not extinguish the civil
liability arising from the crime she has been convicted of.- Finally,
17
petitioner has sought exemption from the payment of the civil indemnity
imposed upon her by the sentence. The Court cannot oblige her. Civil liability
arising from crime is governed by the Revised Penal Code. It subsists
notwithstanding service of sentence, or for any reason the sentence is not served
by pardon, amnesty or commutation of sentence. Petitioners civil liability may
only be extinguished by the same causes recognized in the Civil Code, namely:
payment, loss of the thing due, remission of the debt, merger of the rights of
creditor and debtor, compensation and novation.
4. Petitioner is deemed to have abandoned her appeal when she
accepted the pardon granted to her.- The 1981 amendments had deleted
the earlier rule that clemency could be extended only upon final conviction,
implying that clemency could be given even before conviction. Thus, petitioners
unconditional pardon was granted even as her appeal was pending in the High
Court. It is worth mentioning that under the 1987 Constitution, the former
limitation of final conviction was restored. But be that as it may, it is our view
that in the present case, it is not material when the pardon was bestowed,
whether before or after conviction, for the result would still be the same. Having
accepted the pardon, petitioner is deemed to have abandoned her appeal and
her unreversed conviction by the Sandiganbayan assumed the character of
finality.
5. A public officer, like herein petitioner, who has been convicted of
Estafa Through Falsification of Public Documents, though subsequently
pardoned, is deemed to have lost her right to public office, unless such
right is expressly restored by the pardon.- An examination of the
presidential pardon in question shows that, while petitioner was granted an
absolute and unconditional pardon and restored to full civil and political rights,
yet, nothing therein expressly provides that the right to hold public office was
thereby restored to the petitioner. In view of the express exclusion by Art. 36,
R.P.C., of the right to hold public office, notwithstanding a pardon unless the
right is expressly restored by the pardon, it is my considered opinion that, to the
extent that the pardon granted to the petitioner did not expressly restore the
right to hold public office as an effect of such pardon, that right must be kept
away from the petitioner. It is a recognized principle in public lawhopefully to
be honored more in its compliance rather than in its breachthat a public office
is a public trust. The restoration of the right to hold public office to one who has
lost such right by reason of conviction in a criminal case, but subsequently
pardoned, cannot be left to inference, no matter how intensely arguable, but
must be stated in express, explicit, positive and specific language. To require this
would not be asking too much.
Risos-Vidal v Commission on Elections, 21 Jan 2015
1. By definition, an ineligible individual is not even a candidate in the first place.
It is, therefore, erroneous to refer to him or her as a winner, that is, as the
winning candidate, should he or she obtain the plurality of votes.
Consequently, it is illogical to refer to the candidates who are trailing in the vote
count as losers, which is what labels like second-placer entail. As his or her
ineligibility as a candidate remains, the number of votes cast for him or her is
ultimately not decisive of who must be proclaimed as winner: The ballot cannot
override the constitutional and statutory requirements for qualifications and
disqualifications of candidates. When the law requires certain qualifications to be
possessed or that certain disqualifications be not possessed by persons desiring
to serve as elective public officials, those qualifications must be met before one
even becomes a candidate. When a person who is not qualified is voted for and
eventually garners the highest number of votes, even the will of the electorate
expressed through the ballot cannot cure the defect in the qualifications of the
candidate. To rule otherwise is to trample upon and rent asunder the very law
that sets forth the qualifications and disqualifications of candidates. We might as
well write off our election laws if the voice of the electorate is the sole
determinant of who should be proclaimed worthy to occupy elective positions in
our republic.
2. Constitutional Law; Criminal Law; Pardon; Former President Estrada was
granted an absolute pardon that fully restored all his civil and political
rights, which naturally includes the right to seek public elective office,
the focal point of this controversy.The wording of the pardon extended to
former President Estrada is complete, unambiguous, and unqualified. It is
likewise unfettered by Articles 36 and 41 of the Revised Penal Code. The only
reasonable, objective, and constitutional interpretation of the language of the
pardon is that the same in fact conforms to Articles 36 and 41 of the Revised
Penal Code.
3. The 1987 Constitution, specifically Section 19 of Article VII and Section 5 of
Article IX-C, provides that the President of the Philippines possesses the power
to grant pardons, along with other acts of executive clemency; The only
instances in which the President may not extend pardon remain to be
in: (1) impeachment cases; (2) cases that have not yet resulted in a
final conviction; and (3) cases involving violations of election laws,
rules and regulations in which there was no favorable recommendation
coming from the Commission on Elections (COMELEC).Therefore, it can
be argued that any act of Congress by way of statute cannot operate to delimit
the pardoning power of the President.
4. This doctrine of non-diminution or non-impairment of the Presidents power of
pardon by acts of Congress, specifically through legislation, was strongly adhered
to by an overwhelming majority of the framers of the 1987 Constitution when
18
they flatly rejected a proposal to carve out an exception from the pardoning
power of the President in the form of offenses involving graft and corruption
that would be enumerated and defined by Congress through the enactment of a
law.
5. Statutory Construction; It is well-entrenched in this jurisdiction that where the
words of a statute are clear, plain, and free from ambiguity, it must be given its
literal meaning and applied without attempted interpretation.It is well-
entrenched in this jurisdiction that where the words of a statute are clear, plain,
and free from ambiguity, it must be given its literal meaning and applied without
attempted interpretation. Verba legis non est recedendum. From the words of a
statute there should be no departure. It is this Courts firm view that the phrase
in the presidential pardon at issue which declares that former President Estrada
is hereby restored to his civil and political rights substantially complies with the
requirement of express restoration.
6. Constitutional Law; Separation of Powers; The form or manner by which the
President, or Congress for that matter, should exercise their respective
Constitutional powers or prerogatives cannot be interfered with unless it is so
provided in the Constitution.With due respect, I disagree with the overbroad
statement that Congress may dictate as to how the President may exercise
his/her power of executive clemency. The form or manner by which the
President, or Congress for that matter, should exercise their respective
Constitutional powers or prerogatives cannot be interfered with unless it is so
provided in the Constitution. This is the essence of the principle of separation of
powers deeply ingrained in our system of government which ordains that each
of the three great branches of government has exclusive cognizance of and is
supreme in matters falling within its own constitutionally allocated sphere. More
so, this fundamental principle must be observed if non-compliance with the form
imposed by one branch on a coequal and coordinate branch will result into the
diminution of an exclusive Constitutional prerogative. For this reason, Articles 36
and 41 of the Revised Penal Code should be construed in a way that will give full
effect to the executive clemency granted by the President, instead of indulging in
an overly strict interpretation that may serve to impair or diminish the import of
the pardon which emanated from the Office of the President and duly signed by
the Chief Executive himself/herself. The said codal provisions must be construed
to harmonize the power of Congress to define crimes and prescribe the penalties
for such crimes and the power of the President to grant executive clemency. All
that the said provisions impart is that the pardon of the principal penalty does
not carry with it the remission of the accessory penalties unless the President
expressly includes said accessory penalties in the pardon. It still recognizes the
Presidential prerogative to grant executive clemency and, specifically, to decide
to pardon the principal penalty while excluding its accessory penalties or to
pardon both. Thus, Articles 36 and 41 only clarify the effect of the pardon so
decided upon by the President on the penalties imposed in accordance with law.
7. From both law and jurisprudence, the right to seek public elective office is
unequivocally considered as a political right. Hence, the Court reiterates its
earlier statement that the pardon granted to former President Estrada admits no
other interpretation other than to mean that, upon acceptance of the pardon
granted to him, he regained his FULL civil and political rights including the
right to seek elective office.
8. Jurisprudence educates that a preamble is not an essential part of an act as it
is an introductory or preparatory clause that explains the reasons for the
enactment, usually introduced by the word whereas. Whereas clauses do not
form part of a statute because, strictly speaking, they are not part of the
operative language of the statute. In this case, the whereas clause at issue is
not an integral part of the decree of the pardon, and therefore, does
not by itself alone operate to make the pardon conditional or to make
its effectivity contingent upon the fulfilment of the aforementioned
commitment nor to limit the scope of the pardon.
9. The pardon granted to former President Estrada was absolute,
meaning, it was not only unconditional, it was unrestricted in scope,
complete and plenary in character, as the term political rights
adverted to has a settled meaning in law and jurisprudence.
Bayan v Zamora 10 Oct 2000
Judicial Review; Parties; Locus Standi; Taxpayers Suits; Statutes; A party
bringing a suit challenging the constitutionality of a law, act, or statute must
show not only that the law is invalid, but also that he has sustained or is in
immediate, or imminent danger of sustaining some direct injury as a result of its
enforcement, and not merely that he suffers thereby in some indefinite wayHe
must show that he has been, or is about to be, denied some right or privilege to
which he is lawfully entitled, or that he is about to be subjected to some burdens
or penalties by reason of the statute complained of.
It bears stressing that a taxpayers suit refers to a case where the act
complained of directly involves the illegal disbursement of public funds derived
from taxation.In the case before us, petitioners failed to show, to the
satisfaction of this Court, that they have sustained, or are in danger of sustaining
any direct injury as a result of the enforcement of the VFA. As taxpayers,
petitioners have not established that the VFA involves the exercise by Congress
of its taxing or spending powers. On this point, it bears stressing that a
taxpayers suit refers to a case where the act complained of directly involves the
illegal disbursement of public funds derived from taxation. Thus, in Bugnay
Const. & Development Corp. vs. Laron, we held: x x x it is exigent that the
19
taxpayer-plaintiff sufficiently show that he would be benefited or injured by the
judgment or entitled to the avails of the suit as a real party in interest. Before he
can invoke the power of judicial review, he must spe cifically prove that he has
sufficient interest in preventing the illegal expenditure of money raised by
taxation and that he will sustain a direct injury as a result of the enforcement of
the questioned statute or contract. It is not sufficient that he has merely a
general interest common to all members of the public.
Congress; The standing of members of Congress as proper party cannot be
upheld in the absence of a clear showing of any direct injury to their person or to
the institution to which they belong.Similarly, Representatives Wigberto
Taada, Agapito Aquino and Joker Arroyo, as petitioners-legislators, do not
possess the requisite locus standi to maintain the present suit. While this Court,
in Phil. Constitution Association vs. Hon. Salvador Enriquez, sustained the legal
standing of a member of the Senate and the House of Representatives to
question the validity of a presidential veto or a condition imposed on an item in
an appropriation bill, we cannot, at this instance, similarly uphold petitioners
standing as members of Congress, in the absence of a clear showing of any
direct injury to their person or to the institution to which they belong.
Integrated Bar of the Philippines;In the same vein, petitioner Integrated Bar of
the Philippines (IBP) is stripped of standing in these cases. As aptly observed by
the Solicitor General, the IBP lacks the legal capacity to bring this suit in the
absence of a board resolution from its Board of Governors authorizing its
National President to commence the present action.
The Supreme Court may, in the exercise of its sound discretion, brush aside
procedural barrier and take cognizance of petitions raising issues of paramount
importance and constitutional significance.Notwithstanding, in view of the
paramount importance and the constitutional significance of the issues raised in
the petitions, this Court, in the exercise of its sound discretion, brushes aside the
procedural barrier and takes cognizance of the petitions, as we have done in the
early Emergency Powers Cases, where we had occasion to rule: x x x ordinary
citizens and taxpayers were allowed to question the constitutionality of several
executive orders issued by President Quirino although they were involving only
an indirect and general interest shared in common with the public. The Court
dismissed the objection that they were not proper parties and ruled that
transcendental importance to the public of these cases demands that they be
settled promptly and definitely, brushing aside, if we must, technicalities of
procedure. We have since then applied the exception in many other cases.
Constitutional Law; Treaties; Section 21, Article VII of the Constitution deals
with treaties or international agreements in general, while Section 25, Article
XVIII is a special provision that applies to treaties which involve the presence of
foreign military bases, troops or facilities in the Philippines.
Section 21, Article VII deals with treaties or international agreements in general,
in which case, the concurrence of at least two-thirds (2/3) of all the Members of
the Senate is required to make the subject treaty, or international agreement,
valid and binding on the part of the Philippines. This provision lays down the
general rule on treaties or international agreements and applies to any form of
treaty with a wide variety of subject matter, such as, but not limited to,
extradition or tax treaties or those economic in nature. All treaties or
international agreements entered into by the Philippines, regardless of subject
matter, coverage, or particular designation or appellation, requires the
concurrence of the Senate to be valid and effective.
In contrast, Section 25, Article XVIII is a special provision that applies to treaties
which involve the presence of foreign military bases, troops or facilities in the
Philippines. Under this provision, the concurrence of the Senate is only one of
the requisites to render compliance with the constitutional requirements and to
consider the agreement binding on the Philippines. Section 25, Article XVIII
further requires that foreign military bases, troops, or facilities may be allowed
in the Philippines only by virtue of a treaty duly concurred in by the Senate,
ratified by a majority of the votes cast in a national referendum held for that
purpose if so required by Congress, and recognized as such by the other
contracting state.
Visiting Forces Agreement; Section 25, Article XVIII of the Constitution
should apply to the Visiting Forces Agreement.Undoubtedly, Section 25, Article
XVIII, which specifically deals with treaties involving foreign military bases,
troops, or facilities, should apply in the instant case. To a certain extent and in a
limited sense, however, the provisions of Section 21, Article VII will find
applicability with regard to the issue and for the sole purpose of determining the
number of votes required to obtain the valid concurrence of the Senate, as will
be further discussed hereunder.
Statutory Construction; It is a finely-imbedded principle in statutory construction
that a special provision or law prevails over a general one. Lex specialis derogant
generali. Thus, where there is in the same statute a particular enactment and
also a general one which, in its most comprehensive sense, would include what
is embraced in the former, the particular enactment must be operative, and the
general enactment must be taken to affect only such cases within its general
language which are not within the provision of the particular enactment.
There is nothing in Section 25, Article XVIII that requires foreign
troops or facilities to be stationed or placed permanently in the
Philippineswhen no distinction is made by law, the Court should not
20
distinguish.Moreover, it is specious to argue that Section 25, Article XVIII is terms are employed, in which case the significance thus attached to them
inapplicable to mere transient agreements for the reason that there is no prevails.
permanent placing of structure for the establishment of a military base. On this
International Law; Treaties; Executive Agreements; Visiting Forces Agreement;
score, the Constitution makes no distinction between transient and
As long as the VFA possesses the elements of an agreement under
permanent. Certainly, we find nothing in Section 25, Article XVIII that requires
international law, the said agreement is to be taken equally as a
foreign troops or facilities to be stationed or placed permanently in the
treaty.Moreover, it is inconsequential whether the United States treats the
Philippines. It is a rudiment in legal hermeneutics that when no distinction is
VFA only as an executive agreement because, under international law, an
made by law, the Court should not distinguishUbi lex non distinguit nec nos
executive agreement is as binding as a treaty. To be sure, as long as the VFA
distinguire debemos.
possesses the elements of an agreement under international law, the said
The use of comma and the disjunctive word or clearly signifies disassociation agreement is to be taken equally as a treaty.
and independence of one thing from the others included in the enumeration.In
Words and Phrases; A treaty, as defined by the Vienna Convention on the Law
like manner, we do not subscribe to the argument that Section 25, Article XVIII
of Treaties, is an international instrument concluded between States in
is not controlling since no foreign military bases, but merely foreign troops and
written form and governed by international law, whether embodied in
facilities, are involved in the VFA. Notably, a perusal of said constitutional
a single instrument or in two or more related instruments, and
provision reveals that the proscription covers foreign military bases, troops, or
whatever its particular designation.There are many other terms used for
facilities. Stated differently, this prohibition is not limited to the entry of troops
a treaty or international agreement, some of which are: act, protocol,
and facilities without any foreign bases being established. The clause does not
agreement, compromis d arbitrage, concordat, convention, declaration,
refer to foreign military bases, troops, or facilities collectively but treats them
exchange of notes, pact, statute, charter and modus vivendi. All writers, from
as separate and independent subjects. The use of comma and the disjunctive
Hugo Grotius onward, have pointed out that the names or titles of international
word or clearly signifies disassociation and independence of one thing from the
agreements included under the general term treaty have little or no legal
others included in the enumeration, such that, the provision contemplates three
significance. Certain terms are useful, but they furnish little more than mere
different situationsa military treaty the subject of which could be either (a)
description.
foreign bases, (b) foreign troops, or (c) foreign facilitiesany of the three
standing alone places it under the coverage of Section 25, Article XVIII. Thus, in international law, there is no difference between treaties and
executive agreements in their binding effect upon states concerned, as
Conditions Before Military Bases, Troops or Facilities May Be Allowed.Section
long as the negotiating functionaries have remained within their
25, Article XVIII disallows foreign military bases, troops, or facilities in
powers. International law continues to make no distinction between
the country, unless the following conditions are sufficiently met, viz:
treaties and executive agreements: they are equally binding
(a) it must be under a treaty; (b) the treaty must be duly concurred in
obligations upon nations.
by the Senate and, when so required by Congress, ratified by a
majority of the votes cast by the people in a national referendum; and In this jurisdiction, we have recognized the binding effect of executive
(c) recognized as a treaty by the other contracting state. agreements even without the concurrence of the Senate or Congress.
In Commissioner of Customs vs. Eastern Sea Trading, we had occasion to
International Law; Executive Agreements; Words and Phrases;This Court is of
pronounce: x x x the right of the Executive to enter into binding agreements
the firm view that the phrase recognized as a treaty means that the other
without the necessity of subsequent Congressional approval has been confirmed
contracting party accepts or acknowledges the agreement as a treaty. To require
by long usage. From the earliest days of our history we have entered into
the other contracting state, the United States of America in this case, to submit
executive agreements covering such subjects as commercial and consular
the VFA to the United States Senate for concurrence pursuant to its Constitution,
relations, most-favored-nation rights, patent rights, trademark and copyright
is to accord strict meaning to the phrase.
protection, postal and navigation arrangements and the settlement of claims.
Statutory Construction; Well-entrenched is the principle that the words used in The validity of these has never been seriously questioned by our courts, x x x x
the Constitution are to be given their ordinary meaning except where technical x x x x x Furthermore, the United States Supreme Court has expressly

21
recognized the validity and constitutionality of executive agreements entered into
without Senate approval.
Visiting Forces Agreement; The records reveal that the United States
Government, through Ambassador Thomas C. Hubbard, has stated that the
United States government has fully committed to living up to the terms of the
VFA. For as long as the United States of America accepts or acknowledges the
VFA as a treaty, and binds itself further to comply with its obligations under the
treaty, there is indeed marked compliance with the mandate of the Constitution.
Words and Phrases; Ratification is generally held to be an executive act,
undertaken by the head of the state or of the government, as the case
may be, through which the formal acceptance of the treaty is proclaimed.A
State may provide in its domestic legislation the process of ratification of a
treaty. The consent of the State to be bound by a treaty is expressed by
ratification when: (a) the treaty provides for such ratification, (b) it is otherwise
established that the negotiating States agreed that ratification should be
required, (e) the representative of the State has signed the treaty subject to
ratification, or (d) the intention of the State to sign the treaty subject to
ratification appears from the full powers of its representative, or was expressed
during the negotiation. In our jurisdiction, the power to ratify is vested in
the President and not, as commonly believed, in the legislature. The
role of the Senate is limited only to giving or withholding its consent,
or concurrence, to the ratification.
With the ratification of the VFA, which is equivalent to final acceptance, and with
the exchange of notes between the Philippines and the United States of America,
it now becomes obligatory and incumbent on our part, under the principles of
international law, to be bound by the terms of the agreement.Thus, no less
than Section 2, Article II of the Constitution, declares that the Philippines adopts
the generally accepted principles of international law as part of the law of the
land and adheres to the policy of peace, equality, justice, freedom, cooperation
and amity with all nations.
Pacta Sunt Servanda; As a member of the family of nations, the Philippines
agrees to be bound by generally accepted rules for the conduct of its
international relations. While the international obligation devolves upon the state
and not upon any particular branch, institution, or individual member of its
government, the Philippines is nonetheless responsible for violations committed
by any branch or subdivision of its government or any official thereof. As an
integral part of the community of nations, we are responsible to assure that our
government, Constitution and laws will carry out our international obligation.
Hence, we cannot readily plead the Constitution as a convenient excuse for non-
compliance with our obligations, duties and responsibilities under international
law.
Under the principle of pacta sunt servanda, every treaty in force is
binding upon the parties to it and must be performed by them in good
faith.Beyond this, Article 13 of the Declaration of Rights and Duties of States
adopted by the International Law Commission in 1949 provides: Every State has
the duty to carry out in good faith its obligations arising from treaties and other
sources of international law, and it may not invoke provisions in its constitution
or its laws as an excuse for failure to perform this duty. Equally important is
Article 26 of the Convention which provides that Every treaty in force is binding
upon the parties to it and must be performed by them in good faith, This is
known as the principle of pacta sunt servanda which preserves the sanctity of
treaties and have been one of the most fundamental principles of positive
international law, supported by the jurisprudence of international tribunals.
Presidency; Diplomatic Power; Separation of Powers;
By constitutional fiat and by the intrinsic nature of his office, the
President, as head of State, is the sole organ and authority in the
external affairs of the country. In many ways, the President is the chief
architect of the nations foreign policy; his dominance in the field of foreign
relations is (then) conceded. Wielding vast powers and influence, his conduct in
the external affairs of the nation, as Jefferson describes, is executive
altogether. As regards the power to enter into treaties or international
agreements, the Constitution vests the same in the President, subject only to the
concurrence of at least two-thirds vote of all the members of the Senate. In this
light, the negotiation of the VFA and the subsequent ratification of the
agreement are exclusive acts which pertain solely to the President, in the lawful
exercise of his vast executive and diplomatic powers granted him no less than by
the fundamental law itself. Into the field of negotiation the Senate cannot
intrude, and Congress itself is powerless to invade it. Consequently, the acts or
judgment calls of the President involving the VFAspecifically the acts of
ratification and entering into a treaty and those necessary or incidental to the
exercise of such principal actssquarely fall within the sphere of his
constitutional powers and thus, may not be validly struck down, much less
calibrated by this Court, in the absence of clear showing of grave abuse of power
or discretion.
Judicial Review; Political Questions;For while it is conceded that Article VIII,
Section 1, of the Constitution has broadened the scope of judicial inquiry into
areas normally left to the political departments to decide, such as those relating
to national security, it has not altogether done away with political questions such
as those which arise in the field of foreign relations. The High Tribunals function,
as sanctioned by Article VIII, Section 1, is merely (to) check whether or not the
22
governmental branch or agency has gone beyond the constitutional limits of its Distinguished from the general notion of judicial power, the power of judicial
jurisdiction, not that it erred or has a different view. In the absence of a review specially refers to both the authority and the duty of this Court to
showing. . . (of) grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction, there determine whether a branch or an instrumentality of government has acted
is no occasion for the Court to exercise its corrective power . . . It has no power beyond the scope of the latters constitutional powers. As articulated in Section
to look into what it thinks is apparent error. 1, Article VIII of the Constitution, the power of judicial review involves the power
to resolve cases in which the questions concern the constitutionality or validity of
Treaties; Separation of Powers; Senate; Judicial Review; Political Questions;As
any treaty, international or executive agreement, law, presidential decree,
to the power to concur with treaties, the Constitution lodges the same with the
proclamation, order, instruction, ordinance, or regulation. In Angara v. Electoral
Senate alone. Thus, once the Senate performs that power, or exercises its
Commission, 63 Phil. 139 (1936), this Court exhaustively discussed this
prerogative within the boundaries prescribed by the Constitution, the
moderating power as part of the system of checks and balances under the
concurrence cannot, in like manner, be viewed to constitute an abuse of power,
Constitution. In our fundamental law, the role of the Court is to determine
much less grave abuse thereof. Corollarily, the Senate, in the exercise of its
whether a branch of government has adhered to the specific restrictions and
discretion and acting within the limits of such power, may not be similarly faulted
limitations of the latters power.
for having simply performed a task conferred and sanctioned by no less than the
fundamental law. Actual Case or Controversy; The performance of an official act by the Executive
Department that led to the entry into force of an executive agreement was
Checks and Balances; The role of the Senate in relation to treaties is
sufficient to satisfy the actual case or controversy requirement.We find that the
essentially legislative in characterthe Senate, as an independent body
matter before us involves an actual case or controversy that is already ripe for
possessed of its own erudite mind, has the prerogative to either accept or reject
adjudication. The Executive Department has already sent an official confirmation
the proposed agreement, and whatever action it takes in the exercise of its wide
to the U.S. Embassy that all internal requirements of the Philippines x x x have
latitude of discretion, pertains to the wisdom rather than the legality of the act,
already been complied with. By this exchange of diplomatic notes, the Executive
and in this sense, the Senate partakes a principal, yet delicate, role in keeping
Department effectively performed the last act required under Article XII(1) of
the principles of separation of powers and of checks and balances alive and
EDCA before the agreement entered into force. Section 25, Article XVIII of the
vigilantly ensures that these cherished rudiments remain true to their form in a
Constitution, is clear that the presence of foreign military forces in the country
democratic government. The Constitution thus animates, through this treaty-
shall only be allowed by virtue of a treaty concurred in by the Senate. Hence, the
concurring power of the Senate, a healthy system of checks and balances
performance of an official act by the Executive Department that led to the entry
indispensable toward our nations pursuit of political maturity and growth. True
into force of an executive agreement was sufficient to satisfy the actual case or
enough, rudimentary is the principle that matters pertaining to the wisdom of a
controversy requirement.
legislative act are beyond the ambit and province of the courts to inquire.
Locus Standi; The question of locus standi or legal standing focuses on the
Judicial Review;In fine, absent any clear showing of grave abuse of discretion
determination of whether those assailing the governmental act have the right of
on the part of respondents, this Courtas the final arbiter of legal controversies
appearance to bring the matter to the court for adjudication. They must show
and staunch sentinel of the rights of the peopleis then without power to
that they have a personal and substantial interest in the case, such that they
conduct an incursion and meddle with such affairs purely executive and
have sustained or are in immediate danger of sustaining, some direct injury as a
legislative in character and nature. For the Constitution no less, maps out the
consequence of the enforcement of the challenged governmental act.The
distinct boundaries and limits the metes and bounds within which each of the
question of locus standi or legal standing focuses on the determination of
three political branches of government may exercise the powers exclusively and
whether those assailing the governmental act have the right of appearance to
essentially conferred to it by law.
bring the matter to the court for adjudication. They must show that they have a
Saguisag v Executive Secretary Ochoa, 12 Jan 2016 personal and substantial interest in the case, such that they have sustained or
are in immediate danger of sustaining, some direct injury as a consequence of
Judicial Review; Distinguished from the general notion of judicial power, the the enforcement of the challenged governmental act. Here, interest in the
power of judicial review specially refers to both the authority and the duty of the question involved must be material an interest that is in issue and will be
Supreme Court (SC) to determine whether a branch or an instrumentality of affected by the official act as distinguished from being merely incidental or
government has acted beyond the scope of the latters constitutional powers.

23
general. Clearly, it would be insufficient to show that the law or any
governmental act is invalid, and that petitioners stand to suffer in some indefinite
way. They must show that they have a particular interest in bringing the suit,
and that they have been or are about to be denied some right or privilege to
which they are lawfully entitled, or that they are about to be subjected to some
burden or penalty by reason of the act complained of. The reason why those
who challenge the validity of a law or an international agreement are required to
allege the existence of a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy is to
assure the concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon
which the court so largely depends for illumination of difficult constitutional
questions.
Taxpayers Suit; The Supreme Court (SC) emphasizes that a taxpayers suit
contemplates a situation in which there is already an appropriation or a
disbursement of public funds. A reading of Article X(1) of Enhanced Defense
Cooperation Agreement (EDCA) would show that there has been neither an
appropriation nor an authorization of disbursement of funds.A taxpayers suit
concerns a case in which the official act complained of directly involves the illegal
disbursement of public funds derived from taxation. Here, those challenging the
act must specifically show that they have sufficient interest in preventing the
illegal expenditure of public money, and that they will sustain a direct injury as a
result of the enforcement of the assailed act. Applying that principle to this case,
they must establish that EDCA involves the exercise by Congress of its taxing or
spending powers. We agree with the OSG that the petitions cannot qualify as
taxpayers suits. We emphasize that a taxpayers suit contemplates a situation in
which there is already an appropriation or a disbursement of public funds. A
reading of Article X(1) of EDCA would show that there has been neither an
appropriation nor an authorization of disbursement of funds.
Legislators Suit; In a legislators suit, those Members of Congress who are
challenging the official act have standing only to the extent that the alleged
violation impinges on their right to participate in the exercise of the powers of
the institution of which they are members.We emphasize that in a legislators
suit, those Members of Congress who are challenging the official act have
standing only to the extent that the alleged violation impinges on their right to
participate in the exercise of the powers of the institution of which they are
members. Legislators have the standing to maintain inviolate the prerogatives,
powers, and privileges vested by the Constitution in their office and are allowed
to sue to question the validity of any official action, which they claim infringes
their prerogatives as legislators. As legislators, they must clearly show that
there was a direct injury to their persons or the institution to which they belong.
Constitutional Law; Treaties; Power to Concur in a Treaty;As correctly
argued by respondent, the power to concur in a treaty or an
international agreement is an institutional prerogative granted by the
Constitution to the Senate, not to the entire Legislature. In Pimentel, Jr.
v. Office of the Executive Secretary, 462 SCRA 622 (2005), this Court did not
recognize the standing of one of the petitioners therein who was a member of
the House of Representatives. The petition in that case sought to compel the
transmission to the Senate for concurrence of the signed text of the Statute of
the International Criminal Court. Since that petition invoked the power of the
Senate to grant or withhold its concurrence in a treaty entered into by the
Executive Department, only then incumbent Senator Pimentel was allowed to
assert that authority of the Senate of which he was a member.
Judicial Review; When those who challenge the official act are able to craft an
issue of transcendental significance to the people, the Supreme Court (SC) may
exercise its sound discretion and take cognizance of the suit.In a number of
cases, this Court has indeed taken a liberal stance towards the requirement of
legal standing, especially when paramount interest is involved. Indeed, when
those who challenge the official act are able to craft an issue of transcendental
significance to the people, the Court may exercise its sound discretion and take
cognizance of the suit. It may do so in spite of the inability of the petitioners to
show that they have been personally injured by the operation of a law or any
other government act.
Executive Power; The duty to faithfully execute the laws of the land is inherent in
executive power and is intimately related to the other executive functions.The
duty to faithfully execute the laws of the land is inherent in executive power and
is intimately related to the other executive functions. These functions include the
faithful execution of the law in autonomous regions; the right to prosecute
crimes; the implementation of transportation projects; the duty to ensure
compliance with treaties, executive agreements and executive orders; the
authority to deport undesirable aliens; the conferment of national awards under
the Presidents jurisdiction; and the overall administration and control of the
executive department.
Presidency; Foreign Military Bases; Despite the Presidents roles as defender of
the State and sole authority in foreign relations, the 1987 Constitution expressly
limits his ability in instances when it involves the entry of foreign military bases,
troops or facilities.Despite the Presidents roles as defender of the State
and sole authority in foreign relations, the 1987 Constitution expressly
limits his ability in instances when it involves the entry of foreign
military bases, troops or facilities. The initial limitation is found in Section 21
of the provisions on the Executive Department: No treaty or international
agreement shall be valid and effective unless concurred in by at least two--thirds
of all the Members of the Senate. The specific limitation is given by Section 25
of the Transitory Provisions, the full text of which reads as follows: SECTION 25.
24
After the expiration in 1991 of the Agreement between the Republic of the
Philippines and the United States of America concerning Military Bases, foreign
military bases, troops, or facilities shall not be allowed in the Philippines except
under a treaty duly concurred in by the Senate and, when the Congress so
requires, ratified by a majority of the votes cast by the people in a national
referendum held for that purpose, and recognized as a treaty by the other
contracting State.
The President is not authorized by law to allow foreign military bases,
troops, or facilities to enter the Philippines, except under a treaty
concurred in by the Senate.To this Court, a plain textual reading of Article
XIII, Section 25, inevitably leads to the conclusion that it applies only to a
proposed agreement between our government and a foreign government,
whereby military bases, troops, or facilities of such foreign government would be
allowed or would gain entry Philippine territory. Note that the provision shall
not be allowed is a negative injunction. This wording signifies that the President
is not authorized by law to allow foreign military bases, troops, or facilities to
enter the Philippines, except under a treaty concurred in by the Senate. Hence,
the constitutionally restricted authority pertains to the entry of the bases, troops,
or facilities, and not to the activities to be done after entry.
Verba Legis; Under the principles of constitutional construction, of paramount
consideration is the plain meaning of the language expressed in the Constitution,
or the verba legis rule.Under the principles of constitutional construction, of
paramount consideration is the plain meaning of the language expressed in the
Constitution, or the verba legis rule. It is presumed that the provisions have been
carefully crafted in order to express the objective it seeks to attain. It is
incumbent upon the Court to refrain from going beyond the plain meaning of the
words used in the Constitution. It is presumed that the framers and the people
meant what they said when they said it, and that this understanding was
reflected in the Constitution and understood by the people in the way it was
meant to be understood when the fundamental law was ordained and
promulgated.
Foreign Military Bases; It is evident that the constitutional restriction refers solely
to the initial entry of the foreign military bases, troops, or facilities. Once entry is
authorized, the subsequent acts are thereafter subject only to the limitations
provided by the rest of the Constitution and Philippine law, and not to the
Section 25 requirement of validity through a treaty.It is evident that the
constitutional restriction refers solely to the initial entry of the foreign military
bases, troops, or facilities. Once entry is authorized, the subsequent acts are
thereafter subject only to the limitations provided by the rest of the Constitution
and Philippine law, and not to the Section 25 requirement of validity through a
treaty.
Presidency; The President has the inherent power to enter into agreements with
other states, including the prerogative to conclude binding executive agreements
that do not require further Senate concurrence.As the sole organ of our foreign
relations and the constitutionally assigned chief architect of our foreign policy,
the President is vested with the exclusive power to conduct and manage the
countrys interface with other states and governments. Being the principal
representative of the Philippines, the Chief Executive speaks and listens for the
nation; initiates, maintains, and develops diplomatic relations with other states
and governments; negotiates and enters into international agreements;
promotes trade, investments, tourism and other economic relations; and settles
international disputes with other states. As previously discussed, this
constitutional mandate emanates from the inherent power of the President to
enter into agreements with other states, including the prerogative to conclude
binding executive agreements that do not require further Senate concurrence.
The existence of this presidential power is so well-entrenched that Section
5(2)(a), Article VIII of the Constitution, even provides for a check on its exercise.
As expressed below, executive agreements are among those official
governmental acts that can be the subject of this Courts power of judicial
review: (2) Review, revise, reverse, modify, or affirm on appeal or certiorari, as
the law or the Rules of Court may provide, final judgments and orders of lower
courts in: (a) All cases in which the constitutionality or validity of any treaty,
international or executive agreement, law, presidential decree, proclamation,
order, instruction, ordinance, or regulation is in question.
Executive Agreements; Words and Phrases; In Commissioner of Customs v.
Eastern Sea Trading, 3 SCRA 351 (1961), executive agreements are defined as
international agreements embodying adjustments of detail carrying out well-
established national policies and traditions and those involving arrangements of a
more or less temporary nature.In Commissioner of Customs v. Eastern Sea
Trading, 3 SCRA 351 (1961), executive agreements are defined as international
agreements embodying adjustments of detail carrying out well-established
national policies and traditions and those involving arrangements of a more or
less temporary nature. In Bayan Muna v. Romulo, 641 SCRA 244 (2011), this
Court further clarified that executive agreements can cover a wide array of
subjects that have various scopes and purposes. They are no longer limited to
the traditional subjects that are usually covered by executive agreements as
identified in Eastern Sea Trading.
International Agreements; After noted constitutionalist Fr. Joaquin Bernas quoted
the Supreme Courts (SCs) ruling in Commissioner of Customs v. Eastern Sea
Trading, 3 SCRA 351 (1961), the Constitutional Commission members ultimately
decided that the term international agreements as contemplated in Section 21,
Article VII, does not include executive agreements, and that a proviso is no
25
longer needed.One of the distinguishing features of executive agreements is
that their validity and effectivity are not affected by a lack of Senate
concurrence. This distinctive feature was recognized as early as in Eastern Sea
Trading (1961), viz.: Treaties are formal documents which require ratification
with the approval of two-thirds of the Senate. Executive agreements become
binding through executive action without the need of a vote by the Senate or by
Congress. x x x x [T]he right of the Executive to enter into binding agreements
without the necessity of subsequent Congressional approval has been confirmed
by long usage. From the earliest days of our history we have entered into
executive agreements covering such subjects as commercial and consular
relations, most-favored-nation rights, patent rights, trademark and copyright
protection, postal and navigation arrangements and the settlement of claims.
The validity of these has never been seriously questioned by our courts.
(Emphases supplied) That notion was carried over to the present Constitution. In
fact, the framers specifically deliberated on whether the general term
international agreement included executive agreements, and whether it was
necessary to include an express proviso that would exclude executive
agreements from the requirement of Senate concurrence. After noted
constitutionalist Fr. Joaquin Bernas quoted the Courts ruling in Eastern Sea
Trading, the Constitutional Commission members ultimately decided that the
term international agreements as contemplated in Section 21, Article VII, does
not include executive agreements, and that a proviso is no longer needed.
International practice has accepted the use of various forms and designations of
international agreements, ranging from the traditional notion of a treaty which
connotes a formal, solemn instrument to engagements concluded in modern,
simplified forms that no longer necessitate ratification.The special nature of an
executive agreement is not just a domestic variation in international agreements.
International practice has accepted the use of various forms and designations of
international agreements, ranging from the traditional notion of a treaty which
connotes a formal, solemn instrument to engagements concluded in modern,
simplified forms that no longer necessitate ratification. An international
agreement may take different forms: treaty, act, protocol, agreement, concordat,
compromis darbitrage, convention, covenant, declaration, exchange of notes,
statute, pact, charter, agreed minute, memorandum of agreement, modus
vivendi, or some other form. Consequently, under international law, the
distinction between a treaty and an international agreement or even an
executive agreement is irrelevant for purposes of determining international rights
and obligations.
Section 9 of Executive Order (EO) No. 459, or the Guidelines in the Negotiation
of International Agreements and its Ratification, thus, correctly reflected the
inherent powers of the President when it stated that the Department of Foreign
Affairs (DFA) shall determine whether an agreement is an executive agreement
or a treaty.Indeed, in the field of external affairs, the President must be given
a larger measure of authority and wider discretion, subject only to the least
amount of checks and restrictions under the Constitution. The rationale behind
this power and discretion was recognized by the Court in Vinuya v. Romulo, 619
SCRA 533 (2010), cited earlier. Section 9 of Executive Order No. 459, or the
Guidelines in the Negotiation of International Agreements and its Ratification,
thus, correctly reflected the inherent powers of the President when it stated that
the DFA shall determine whether an agreement is an executive agreement or a
treaty. Accordingly, in the exercise of its power of judicial review, the Court
does not look into whether an international agreement should be in the form of a
treaty or an executive agreement, save in cases in which the Constitution or a
statute requires otherwise. Rather, in view of the vast constitutional powers and
prerogatives granted to the President in the field of foreign affairs, the task of
the Court is to determine whether the international agreement is consistent with
the applicable limitations.
Foreign Military Bases; Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement; Visiting
Forces Agreement; The admission and presence of United States (U.S.) military
and civilian personnel in Philippine territory are already allowed under the Visiting
Forces Agreement (VFA), the treaty supposedly being implemented by Enhanced
Defense Cooperation Agreement (EDCA). What EDCA has effectively done, in
fact, is merely provide the mechanism to identify the locations in which U.S.
personnel may perform allowed activities pursuant to the VFA.The admission
and presence of U.S. military and civilian personnel in Philippine territory are
already allowed under the VFA, the treaty supposedly being implemented by
EDCA. What EDCA has effectively done, in fact, is merely provide the mechanism
to identify the locations in which U.S. personnel may perform allowed activities
pursuant to the VFA. As the implementing agreement, it regulates and limits the
presence of U.S. personnel in the country.
Nowhere in Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement (EDCA) are United States
(U.S.) contractors guaranteed immediate admission into the Philippines; It is
neither mandatory nor obligatory on the part of the Philippines to admit United
States (U.S.) contractors into the country.Nowhere in EDCA are U.S.
contractors guaranteed immediate admission into the Philippines. Articles III and
IV, in fact, merely grant them the right of access to, and the authority to conduct
certain activities within the Agreed Locations. Since Article II(3) of EDCA
specifically leaves out U.S. contractors from the coverage of the VFA, they shall
not be granted the same entry accommodations and privileges as those enjoyed
by U.S. military and civilian personnel under the VFA. Consequently, it is neither
mandatory nor obligatory on the part of the Philippines to admit U.S. contractors
into the country. We emphasize that the admission of aliens into Philippine
26
territory is a matter of pure permission and simple tolerance which creates no
obligation on the part of the government to permit them to stay. Unlike U.S.
personnel who are accorded entry accommodations, U.S. contractors are subject
to Philippine immigration laws. The latter must comply with our visa and
passport regulations and prove that they are not subject to exclusion under any
provision of Philippine immigration laws. The President may also deny them entry
pursuant to his absolute and unqualified power to prohibit or prevent the
admission of aliens whose presence in the country would be inimical to public
interest.
Visiting Forces Agreement; Presidency; The President may exercise the plenary
power to expel or deport U.S. contractors as may be necessitated by national
security, public safety, public health, public morals, and national interest; In
contrast, Article 111(5) of the Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA) requires a request
for removal from the Philippine government before a member of the U.S.
personnel may be dispos[ed] x x x outside of the Philippines.In the same and may be further described in implementing arrangements. Preliminarily,
vein, the President may exercise the plenary power to expel or deport U.S.
contractors as may be necessitated by national security, public safety, public
health, public morals, and national interest. They may also be deported if they
are found to be illegal or undesirable aliens pursuant to the Philippine
Immigration Act and the Data Privacy Act. In contrast, Article 111(5) of the VFA
requires a request for removal from the Philippine government before a member
of the U.S. personnel may be dispos[ed] x x x outside of the Philippines.
Certain privileges denied to aliens are likewise denied to foreign military
contractors.EDCA requires that all activities within Philippine territory be in
accordance with Philippine law. This means that certain privileges denied to
aliens are likewise denied to foreign military contractors. Relevantly, providing
security and carrying, owning, and possessing firearms are illegal for foreign
civilians. The laws in place already address issues regarding the regulation of
contractors. In the 2015 Foreign Investment Negative list, the Executive
Department has already identified corporations that have equity restrictions in
Philippine jurisdiction. Of note is No. 5 on the list private security agencies
that cannot have any foreign equity by virtue of Section 4 of Republic Act No.
5487; and No. 15, which regulates contracts for the construction of defense-
related structures based on Commonwealth Act No. 541.
United States (U.S.) contractors are explicitly excluded from the coverage of the
Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA). As visiting aliens, their entry, presence, and
activities are subject to all laws and treaties applicable within the Philippine
territory.We emphasize that U.S. contractors are explicitly excluded from the
coverage of the VFA. As visiting aliens, their entry, presence, and activities are
subject to all laws and treaties applicable within the Philippine territory. They
may be refused entry or expelled from the country if they engage in illegal or
undesirable activities. There is nothing that prevents them from being detained
in the country or being subject to the jurisdiction of our courts. Our penal laws,
labor laws, and immigrations laws apply to them and therefore limit their
activities here. Until and unless there is another law or treaty that specifically
deals with their entry and activities, their presence in the country is subject to
unqualified Philippine jurisdiction.
Agreed Locations; The latest agreement is Enhanced Defense Cooperation
Agreement (EDCA), which proposes a novel concept termed Agreed
Locations.The latest agreement is EDCA, which proposes a novel concept
termed Agreed Locations. By definition, Agreed Locations are facilities and
areas that are provided by the Government of the Philippines through the AFP
and that United States forces, United States contractors, and others as mutually
agreed, shall have the right to access and use pursuant to this Agreement. Such
Agreed Locations may be listed in an annex to be appended to this Agreement,
respondent already claims that the proviso that the Philippines shall retain
ownership of and title to the Agreed Locations means that EDCA is consistent
with Article II of the VFA which recognizes Philippine sovereignty and jurisdiction
over locations within Philippine territory.
Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement (EDCA) explicitly provides that
ownership of the Agreed Locations remains with the Philippine government.
What United States (U.S.) personnel have a right to, pending mutual agreement,
is access to and use of these locations.Once ownership is established, then the
rights of ownership flow freely. Article 428 of the Civil Code provides that [t]he
owner has the right to enjoy and dispose of a thing, without other limitations
than those established by law. Moreover, the owner has also a right of action
against the holder and possessor of the thing in order to recover it. Philippine
civil law therefore accords very strong rights to the owner of property, even
against those who hold the property. Possession, after all, merely raises a
disputable presumption of ownership, which can be contested through normal
judicial processes. In this case, EDCA explicitly provides that ownership of the
Agreed Locations remains with the Philippine government. What U.S. personnel
have a right to, pending mutual agreement, is access to and use of these
locations.
So long as the right of ownership itself is not transferred, then whatever rights
are transmitted by agreement does not completely divest the owner of the rights
over the property, but may only limit them in accordance with law.The right of
the owner of the property to allow access and use is consistent with the Civil
Code, since the owner may dispose of the property in whatever way deemed fit,
subject to the limits of the law. So long as the right of ownership itself is not
transferred, then whatever rights are transmitted by agreement does not
27
completely divest the owner of the rights over the property, but may only limit
them in accordance with law. Hence, even control over the property is something
that an owner may transmit freely. This act does not translate into the full
transfer of ownership, but only of certain rights. In Roman Catholic Apostolic
Administrator of Davao, Inc. v. Land Registration Commission, 102 Phil. 596
(1957), we stated that the constitutional proscription on property ownership is
not violated despite the foreign nationals control over the property.
For actual operations, Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement (EDCA) is clear
that any activity must be planned and preapproved by the Mutual Defense
Board-Security Engagement Board (MDB-SEB).The legal concept of operational
control involves authority over personnel in a commander-subordinate
relationship and does not include control over the Agreed Locations in this
particular case. Though not necessarily stated in EDCA provisions, this
interpretation is readily implied by the reference to the taking of appropriate
measures to protect United States forces and United States contractors. It is but
logical, even necessary, for the U.S. to have operational control over its own
forces, in much the same way that the Philippines exercises operational control
over its own units. For actual operations, EDCA is clear that any activity must be
planned and preapproved by the MDB-SEB. This provision evinces the
partnership aspect of EDCA, such that both stakeholders have a say on how its
provisions should be put into effect.
The Philippines retains primary responsibility for security with respect to the
Agreed Locations.From the text of EDCA itself, Agreed Locations are territories
of the Philippines that the U.S. forces are allowed to access and use. By
withholding ownership of these areas and retaining unrestricted access to them,
the government asserts sovereignty over its territory. That sovereignty exists so
long as the Filipino people exist. Significantly, the Philippines retains primary
responsibility for security with respect to the Agreed Locations. Hence, Philippine
law remains in force therein, and it cannot be said that jurisdiction has been
transferred to the U.S. Even the previously discussed necessary measures for
operational control and defense over U.S. forces must be coordinated with
Philippine authorities. Jurisprudence bears out the fact that even under the
former legal regime of the MBA, Philippine laws continue to be in force within the
bases. The difference between then and now is that EDCA retains the primary
jurisdiction of the Philippines over the security of the Agreed Locations, an
important provision that gives it actual control over those locations. Previously, it
was the provost marshal of the U.S. who kept the peace and enforced Philippine
law in the bases. In this instance, Philippine forces act as peace officers, in stark
contrast to the 1947 MBA provisions on jurisdiction.
Even if the lawfulness of the attack were not in question, international
humanitarian law standards prevent participants in an armed conflict from
targeting nonparticipants.Even if the lawfulness of the attack were not in
question, international humanitarian law standards prevent participants in an
armed conflict from targeting nonparticipants. International humanitarian law,
which is the branch of international law applicable to armed conflict, expressly
limits allowable military conduct exhibited by forces of a participant in an armed
conflict. Under this legal regime, participants to an armed conflict are held to
specific standards of conduct that require them to distinguish between
combatants and non-combatants, as embodied by the Geneva Conventions and
their Additional Protocols.
There is ample legal protection for the Philippines under international law that
would ensure its territorial integrity and national security in the event an Agreed
Location is subjected to attack.Any armed attack by forces of a third state
against an Agreed Location can only be legitimate under international
humanitarian law if it is against a bona fide U.S. military base, facility, or
installation that directly contributes to the military effort of the U.S. Moreover,
the third states forces must take all measures to ensure that they have complied
with the principle of distinction (between combatants and non-combatants).
There is, then, ample legal protection for the Philippines under international law
that would ensure its territorial integrity and national security in the event an
Agreed Location is subjected to attack. As EDCA stands, it does not create the
situation so feared by petitioners one in which the Philippines, while not
participating in an armed conflict, would be legitimately targeted by an enemy of
the U.S.
The Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA) already authorizes the presence of United
States (U.S.) military equipment in the country.The provisions in EDCA dealing
with Agreed Locations are analogous to those in the aforementioned executive
agreements. Instead of authorizing the building of temporary structures as
previous agreements have done, EDCA authorizes the U.S. to build permanent
structures or alter or improve existing ones for, and to be owned by, the
Philippines. EDCA is clear that the Philippines retains ownership of altered or
improved facilities and newly constructed permanent or non-relocatable
structures. Under EDCA, U.S. forces will also be allowed to use facilities and
areas for training; x x x; support and related activities; x x x; temporary
accommodation of personnel; communications and agreed activities. Concerns
on national security problems that arise from foreign military equipment being
present in the Philippines must likewise be contextualized. Most significantly, the
VFA already authorizes the presence of U.S. military equipment in the country.
Article VII of the VFA already authorizes the U.S. to import into or acquire in the
Philippines equipment, materials, supplies, and other property that will be used
in connection with activities contemplated therein. The same section also
28
recognizes that [t]itle to such property shall remain with the US and that they
have the discretion to remove such property from the Philippines at any time.
BILL OF RIGHTS
Pp v CA, 26 June 1998
Search and Seizure
Constitutional Law; Search Warrants; The place the police officers have in mind
in applying for a search warrant must be the same place the Judge should have
in mind when he issues the warrant.The Government insists that the police
officers who applied to the Quezon City RTC for the search warrant had direct,
personal knowledge of the place to be searched and the things to be seized. It
claims that one of said officers, in fact, had been able to surreptitiously enter the
place to be searched prior to the search: this being the first of four (4) separate
apartments behind the Abigail Variety Store; and they were also the same police
officers who eventually effected the search and seizure. They thus had personal
knowledge of the place to be searched and had the competence to make a
sketch thereof; they knew exactly what objects should be taken therefrom; and
they had presented evidence sufficient to establish probable cause. That may be
so; but unfortunately, the place they had in mindthe first of four (4) separate
apartment units (No. 1) at the rear of Abigail Variety Storewas not what the
Judge who issued the warrant himself had in mind, and was not what was
ultimately described in the search warrant.
Same; Same; It is neither fair nor licit to allow police officers to search a place
different from that stated in the warrant on the claim that the place actually
searchedalthough not that specified in the warrantis exactly what they had in
view when they applied for the warrant and had demarcated in their supporting
evidence. What is material in determining the validity of a search is the place
stated in the warrant itself, not what the applicants had in their thoughts, or had
represented in the proofs they submitted to the court issuing the warrant.The
case at bar, however, does not deal with the correction of an obvious
typographical error involving ambiguous descriptions of the place to be
searched, as in Burgos, but the search of a place different from that clearly and
without ambiguity identified in the search warrant. In Burgos, the inconsistency
calling for clarification was immediately perceptible on the face of the warrants in
question. In the instant case, there is no ambiguity at all in the warrant. The
ambiguity lies outside the instrument, arising from the absence of a meeting of
minds as to the place to be searched between the applicants for the warrant and
the Judge issuing the same; and what was done was to substitute for the place
that the Judge had written down in the warrant, the premises that the executing
officers had in their mind. This should not have been done. It is neither fair nor
licit to allow police officers to search a place different from that stated in the
warrant on the claim that the place actually searchedalthough not that
specified in the warrantis exactly what they had in view when they applied for
the warrant and had demarcated in their supporting evidence. What is material
in determining the validity of a search is the place stated in the warrant itself,
not what the applicants had in their thoughts, or had represented in the proofs
they submitted to the court issuing the warrant. Indeed, following the officers
theory, in the context of the facts of this case, all four (4) apartment units at the
rear of Abigails Variety Store would have been fair game for a search.
The place to be searched, as set out in the warrant, cannot be amplified or
modified by the officers own personal knowledge of the premises, or the
evidence they adduced in support of their application for the warrantthe
particularization of the description of the place to be searched may properly be
done only by the Judge, and only in the warrant itself.The place to be
searched, as set out in the warrant, cannot be amplified or modified by the
officers own personal knowledge of the premises, or the evidence they adduced
in support of their application for the warrant. Such a change is proscribed by
the Constitution which requires inter alia the search warrant to particularly
describe the place to be searched as well as the persons or things to be seized.
It would concede to police officers the power of choosing the place to be
searched, even if it not be that delineated in the warrant. It would open wide the
door to abuse of the search process, and grant to officers executing a search
warrant that discretion which the Constitution has precisely removed from them.
The particularization of the description of the place to be searched may properly
be done only by the Judge, and only in the warrant itself; it cannot be left to the
discretion of the police officers conducting the search.
Exclusionary Rule; Infringement of the constitutional requirement that a search
warrant particularly describe the place to be searched necessarily brings into
operation the concomitant provision that (a)ny evidence obtained in violation **
(inter alia of the search-and-seizure provision) shall be inadmissible for any
purpose in any proceeding.It does not suffice, for a search warrant to be
deemed valid, that it be based on probable cause, personally determined by the
judge after examination under oath, or affirmation of the complainant and the
witnesses he may produce; it is essential, too, that it particularly describe the
place to be searched, the manifest intention being that the search be confined
strictly to the place so described. There was therefore in this case an
infringement of the constitutional requirement that a search warrant particularly
describe the place to be searched; and that infringement necessarily brought into
operation the concomitant provision that (a)ny evidence obtained in violation **
(inter alia of the search-and-seizure provision) shall be inadmissible for any
purpose in any proceeding.
29
Criminal Procedure; Pleadings and Practice; Motions to Quash Warrant; Where a
search warrant is issued by one court and the criminal action based on the
results of the search is afterwards commenced in another court, it is not the rule
that a motion to quash the warrant (or to retrieve things thereunder seized) may
be filed only with the issuing Courtsuch a motion may be filed for the first time
in either the issuing Court or that in which the criminal action is pending.The
guidelines have been misconstrued. Where a search warrant is issued by one
court and the criminal action based on the results of the search is afterwards
commenced in another court, it is not the rule that a motion to quash the
warrant (or to retrieve things thereunder seized) may be filed only with the
issuing Court. Such a motion may be filed for the first time in either the issuing
Court or that in which the criminal action is pending. However, the remedy is
alternative, not cumulative. The Court first taking cognizance of the motion does
so to the exclusion of the other, and the proceedings thereon are subject to the
Omnibus Motion Rule and the rule against forum-shopping. This is clearly stated
in the third policy guideline which indeed is what properly applies to the case at
bar.
Pp v Belocura, 29, Aug 2012
Search and seizure
Constitutional Law; Searches and Seizures; Exclusionary Rules; The consequence
of a violation of the guarantees against a violation of personal security and
privacy and against unreasonable searches and seizures is the exclusion of the
evidence thereby obtained.No arrest, search and seizure can be made without
a valid warrant issued by a competent judicial authority. So sacred are the right
of personal security and privacy and the right from unreasonable searches and
seizures that no less than the Constitution ordains in Section 2 of its Article III,
viz.: Section 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever
nature and for any purpose, shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or
warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined
personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the
complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the
place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized. The consequence
of a violation of the guarantees against a violation of personal security and
privacy and against unreasonable searches and seizures is the exclusion of the
evidence thereby obtained. This rule of exclusion is set down in Section 3(2),
Article III of the Constitution, to wit: Section 3. xxx (2) Any evidence obtained in
violation of this or the preceding section shall be inadmissible for any purpose in
any proceeding.
Warrantless Arrests; There are circumstances in which the arrest, or search and
seizure, although warrantless, are nonetheless valid or reasonable. Among the
circumstances are those mentioned in Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules of
Court.The right against warrantless arrest, and the right against warrantless
search and seizure are not absolute. There are circumstances in which the arrest,
or search and seizure, although warrantless, are nonetheless valid or reasonable.
Among the circumstances are those mentioned in Section 5, Rule 113 of the
Rules of Court, which lists down when a warrantless arrest may be lawfully made
by a peace officer or a private person, namely: (a) When, in his presence, the
person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to
commit an offense; (b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he
has personal knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested has
committed it; and (c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has
escaped from a penal establishment or place where he is serving final judgment
or temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has escaped while being
transferred from one confinement to another.
Warrantless Searches and Seizures; The constitutional proscription against
warrantless searches and seizures admits of exceptions.The constitutional
proscription against warrantless searches and seizures admits of the following
exceptions, namely: (a) warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest
recognized under Section 13, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court; (b) seizure of
evidence under plain view; (c) search of a moving vehicle; (d) consented
warrantless search; (e) customs search; (f) stop-and-frisk situations (Terry
search); and (g) exigent and emergency circumstances. In these exceptional
situations, the necessity for a search warrant is dispensed with.
Criminal Law; Dangerous Drugs Act; Elements of Illegal Possession of
Marijuana.The elements of illegal possession of marijuana under Republic Act
No. 6425, as amended, are that: (a) the accused is in possession of an item or
object that is identified to be marijuana, a prohibited drug; (b) such possession is
not authorized by law; and (c) the accused freely and consciously possessed the
said drug. What must be proved beyond reasonable doubt is the fact of
possession of the prohibited drug itself. This may be done by presenting the
police officer who actually recovered the prohibited drugs as a witness, being the
person who has the direct knowledge of the possession.
Evidence; Chain of Custody Rule; In every criminal prosecution for possession of
illegal drugs, the Prosecution must account for the custody of the incriminating
evidence from the moment of seizure and confiscation until the moment it is
offered in evidence.In every criminal prosecution for possession of illegal
drugs, the Prosecution must account for the custody of the incriminating
evidence from the moment of seizure and confiscation until the moment it is
offered in evidence. That account goes to the weight of evidence. It is not
30
enough that the evidence offered has probative value on the issues, for the
evidence must also be sufficiently connected to and tied with the facts in issue.
The evidence is not relevant merely because it is available but that it has an
actual connection with the transaction involved and with the parties thereto. This
is the reason why authentication and laying a foundation for the introduction of
evidence are important.
The chain-of-custody requirement ensures that all doubts concerning the identity
of the evidence are removed.The chain-of-custody requirement ensures that all
doubts concerning the identity of the evidence are removed. The requirement
has come to be associated with prosecutions for violations of Republic Act No.
9165 (Comprehensive Drugs Act of 2002), by reason of Section 21 of Republic
Act No. 9165 expressly regulating the actual custody and disposition of
confiscated and surrendered dangerous drugs, controlled precursors, essential
chemicals, instruments, paraphernalia, and laboratory equipment.
That the case was prosecuted under Republic Act No. 6425 (Dangerous Drugs
Act of 1972), as amended by Republic Act No. 7659, did not matter. The chain-
of-custody requirement applied under both laws by virtue of the universal need
to competently and sufficiently establish the corpus delicti.That this case was a
prosecution brought under Republic Act No. 6425 (Dangerous Drugs Act of
1972), as amended by Republic Act No. 7659, did not matter. The chain-of-
custody requirement applied under both laws by virtue of the universal need to
competently and sufficiently establish the corpus delicti. It is basic under the
Rules of Court, indeed, that evidence, to be relevant, must throw light upon, or
have a logical relation to, the facts in issue to be established by one party or
disproved by the other. The test of relevancy is whether an item of evidence will
have any value, as determined by logic and experience, in proving the
proposition for which it is offered, or whether it would reasonably and actually
tend to prove or disprove any matter of fact in issue, or corroborate other
relevant evidence. The test is satisfied if there is some logical connection either
directly or by inference between the fact offered and the fact to be proved.
Pp v Obrero, 17 May 2000
Involuntary or coerced confessions under Sec 12 and presumptions
Criminal Law; Custodial Investigations; Extrajudicial Confessions;There are
two kinds of involuntary or coerced confessions treated in this
constitutional provision:
(1) those which are the product of third degree methods such as
torture, force, violence, threat, intimidation, which are dealt with in
paragraph 2 of 12, and
(2) those which are given without the benefit of Miranda warnings,
which are the subject of paragraph 1 of the same 12.
Extrajudicial confessions are presumed voluntary, and, in the absence
of conclusive evidence showing the declarants consent in executing
the same has been vitiated, such confession will be sustained.Nor can
it be inferred that the confession was involuntarily executed from the fact that
accused-appellant refused to sign the booking and information sheet. For if he
were simply forced to execute the extrajudicial confession and sign it for five
times, there is no reason the police was not able to make him sign the said sheet
as well. The inference rather was that no force was used to make accused-
appellant execute the confession, otherwise, he could also have been forced to
sign the booking and information sheet. Extrajudicial confessions are presumed
voluntary, and, in the absence of conclusive evidence showing the declarants
consent in executing the same has been vitiated, such confession will be
sustained.
Voluntariness of a confession may be inferred from its being replete with details
which could possibly be supplied only by the accused, reflecting spontaneity and
coherence which cannot be said of a mind on which violence and torture have
been applied. When the details narrated in an extrajudicial confession are such
that they could not have been concocted by one who did not take part in the
acts narrated, where the claim of maltreatment in the extraction of the
confession is unsubstantiated and where abundant evidence exists showing that
the statement was voluntarily executed, the confession is admissible against the
defendant.The confession contains details that only the perpetrator of the
crime could have given. No one except accused-appellant could have stated that
it was he who killed the younger maid of Emma Cabrera (Remedios Hitta), that
he committed the crime together with his townmate, Ronnie Liwanag, and that
he used the same weapon given to him by Ronnie after the latter had stabbed
and killed the other helper (Nena Berjuega), details which are consistent with the
medico-legal findings that the wounds sustained by the two victims were possibly
caused by one and the same bladed weapon. It has been held that voluntariness
of a confession may be inferred from its being replete with details which could
possibly be supplied only by the accused, reflecting spontaneity and coherence
which cannot be said of a mind on which violence and torture have been applied.
When the details narrated in an extrajudicial confession are such that they could
not have been concocted by one who did not take part in the acts narrated,
where the claim of maltreatment in the extraction of the confession is
unsubstantiated and where abundant evidence exists showing that the statement
was voluntarily executed, the confession is admissible against the declarant.
There is greater reason for finding a confession to be voluntary where it is
31
corroborated by evidence aliunde which dovetails with the essential facts
contained in such confession.
Miranda Warnings; Under the Constitution, an uncounseled statement is
presumed to be psychologically coerced.But what renders the confession
of accused-appellant inadmissible is the fact that accused-appellant was not
given the Miranda warnings effectively. Under the Constitution, an uncounseled
statement, such as it is called in the United States from which Art. III, 12(1)
was derived, is presumed to be psychologically coerced. Swept into an
unfamiliar environment and surrounded by intimidating figures typical
of the atmosphere of police interrogation, the suspect really needs the
guiding hand of counsel.
Rights of Suspects.Under the first paragraph of this provision, it is required
that the suspect in custodial interrogation must be given the following warnings:
(1) he must be informed of his right to remain silent; (2) he must be warned that
anything he says can and will be used against him; and (3) he must be told that
he has a right to counsel, and that if he is indigent, a lawyer will be appointed to
represent him.
Where there is only a perfunctory reading of the Miranda rights to
accused without any effort to find out from him whether he wanted to
have counsel and, if so, whether he had his own counsel or he wanted
the police to appoint one for him, is merely ceremonial and inadequate
to transmit meaningful information to the suspect.There was thus only
a perfunctory reading of the Miranda rights to accused-appellant without any
effort to find out from him whether he wanted to have counsel and, if so,
whether he had his own counsel or he wanted the police to appoint one for him.
This kind of giving of warnings, in several decisions of this Court, has been found
to be merely ceremonial and inadequate to transmit meaningful information to
the suspect. Especially in this case, care should have been scrupulously observed
by the police investigator that accused-appellant was specifically asked these
questions considering that he only finished the fourth grade of the elementary
school.
Right to Counsel; A lawyer who is also a station commander of the WPD
cannot be considered as an independent counsel.Art. III, 12(1)
requires that counsel assisting suspects in custodial interrogations be competent
and independent. Here, accused-appellant was assisted by Atty. De los Reyes,
who, though presumably competent, cannot be considered an independent
counsel as contemplated by the law for the reason that he was station
commander of the WPD at the time he assisted accused-appellant.
A lawyer who is part of the police force could not be expected to effectively and
scrupulously assist a suspect in the custodial investigation.As observed in
People v. Bandula, the independent counsel required by Art. III, 12(1)
cannot be a special counsel, public or private prosecutor, municipal
attorney, or counsel of the police whose interest is admittedly adverse
to the accused. In this case, Atty. De los Reyes, as PC Captain and Station
Commander of the WPD, was part of the police force who could not be expected
to have effectively and scrupulously assisted accused-appellant in the
investigation, his claim to the contrary notwithstanding. To allow such a
happenstance would render illusory the protection given to the suspect during
custodial investigation.
Evidence; It does not matter that accused failed to object to the
introduction of the constitutionally proscribed evidencethe lack of
objection did not satisfy the heavy burden of proof which rested on the
prosecution.And while there is evidence of homicide consisting of the corpus
delicti, there is no evidence of the robbery except the confession of accused-
appellant which, as already stated, is inadmissible. It does not matter that
accused-appellant failed to object to the introduction of these constitutionally
proscribed evidence. The lack of objection did not satisfy the heavy burden of
proof which rested on the prosecution. We cannot thus affirm the conviction of
accused-appellant because of the procedural irregularities committed during
custodial investigation and the trial of the case. It may be that by this decision a
guilty person is set free because the prosecution stumbled, but we are
committed to the principle that it is far better to acquit several guilty persons
than to convict one single innocent person.
Pp v Andan, 3 Mar 1997
Criminal Law; Constitutional Law; Custodial Investigation; Exclusionary Rule;
Evidence; Plainly, any person under investigation for the commission of an
offense shall have the right: (1) to remain silent; (2) to have competent and
independent counsel preferably of his own choice; and (3) to be informed of
such rights. These rights cannot be waived except in writing and in the presence
of counsel. Any confession or admission obtained in violation of this provision is
inadmissible in evidence against him. The exclusionary rule is premised on the
presumption that the defendant is thrust into an unfamiliar atmosphere and runs
through menacing police interrogation procedures where the potentiality for
compulsion, physical and psychological, is forcefully apparent. The
incommunicado character of custodial interrogation or investigation also obscures
a later judicial determination of what really transpired.
It should be stressed that the rights under Section 12 are accorded to [a]ny
person under investigation for the commission of an offense. An investigation
begins when it is no longer a general inquiry into an unsolved crime but starts to
focus on a particular person as a suspect, i.e., when the police investigator starts
interrogating or exacting a confession from the suspect in connection with an
32
alleged offense. As intended by the 1971 Constitutional Convention, this covers
investigation conducted by police authorities which will include investigations
conducted by the municipal police, the PC and the NBI and such other police
agencies in our government.
Fruits of the Poisonous Tree Doctrine; Where the police failed to inform the
accused of his constitutional rights when he was investigated and
interrogated, his confession secured thereby, as well as the fruits of his
uncounselled confession, is inadmissible in evidence.Appellant was
already under custodial investigation when he confessed to the police. It is
admitted that the police failed to inform appellant of his constitutional rights
when he was investigated and interrogated. His confession is therefore
inadmissible in evidence. So too were the two bags recovered from appellants
house. x x x The victims bags were the fruits of appellants uncounselled
confession to the police. They are tainted evidence, hence also inadmissible.
When the accused talked with the mayor as a confidant and not as a
law enforcement officer, his uncounselled confession did not violate his
constitutional rights.The police detained appellant after his initial
confession. The following day, Mayor Trinidad visited the appellant. Appellant
approached the mayor and requested for a private talk. They went inside a room
and appellant confessed that he alone committed the crime. He pleaded for
forgiveness. x x x Under these circumstances, it cannot be successfully claimed
that appellants confession before the mayor is inadmissible. It is true that a
municipal mayor has operational supervision and control over the local police
and may arguably be deemed a law enforcement officer for purposes of applying
Section 12 (1) and (3) of Article III of the Constitution. However, appellants
confession to the mayor was not made in response to any interrogation by the
latter. In fact, the mayor did not question appellant at all. No police authority
ordered appellant to talk to the mayor. It was appellant himself who
spontaneously, freely and voluntarily sought the mayor for a private meeting.
The mayor did not know that appellant was going to confess his guilt to him.
The constitutional procedures on custodial investigation do not apply
to a spontaneous statement, not elicited through questioning by the
authorities but given in an ordinary manner whereby the suspect orally
admits having committed the crime.What the Constitution bars is the
compulsory disclosure of incriminating facts or confessions. The rights under
Section 12 are guaranteed to preclude the slightest use of coercion by the state
as would lead the accused to admit something false, not to prevent him from
freely and voluntarily telling the truth. Hence, we hold that appellants confession
to the mayor was correctly admitted by the trial court.
Confessions to the media in response to questions by news reporters,
not by the police or any other investigating officer, are admissible.
Appellants confessions to the media were likewise properly admitted. The
confessions were made in response to questions by news reporters, not by the
police or any other investigating officer. We have held that statements
spontaneously made by a suspect to news reporters on a televised interview are
deemed voluntary and are admissible in evidence.
The Bill of Rights does not concern itself with the relation between a
private individual and another individualit governs the relationship
between the individual and the State.We rule that appellants verbal
confessions to the newsmen are not covered by Section 12 (1) and (3) of Article
III of the Constitution. The Bill of Rights does not concern itself with the relation
between a private individual and another individual. It governs the relationship
between the individual and the State. The prohibitions therein are primarily
addressed to the State and its agents. They confirm that certain rights of the
individual exist without need of any governmental grant, rights that may not be
taken away by government, rights that government has the duty to protect.
Governmental power is not unlimited and the Bill of Rights lays down these
limitations to protect the individual against aggression and unwarranted
interference by any department of government and its agencies.
Rape; Absence of spermatozoa in the vagina does not negate the commission of
rape nor does the lack of complete penetration or rupture of the hymen.We
have also ruled in the past that the absence of spermatozoa in the vagina does
not negate the commission of rape nor does the lack of complete penetration or
rupture of the hymen. What is essential is that there be penetration of the
female organ no matter how slight. Dr. Aguda testified that the fact of
penetration is proved by the lacerations found in the victims vagina. The
lacerations were fresh and could not have been caused by any injury in the first
autopsy.
Pp v Endino, 20 Feb 2001
Admissibility of video-taped media confessions
Criminal Law; Flight; An accuseds attempt at jailbreak reveals a guilty
conscience.Corroborating further accused-appellants guilt, probably with
intense incriminating effect, were his immediate flight after the slaying, and his
attempt at jailbreak revealing a guilty conscience, hence, his persistent effort to
evade the clutches of the law.
Custodial Investigation; Extrajudicial Confessions; Admissions; Mass Media; A
videotaped interview showing the accused unburdening his guilt
willingly, openly and publicly in the presence of newsmen does not
form part of custodial investigation if it was not given to police officers
33
but to media men in an attempt to elicit sympathy and forgiveness
from the public.Apropos the court a quos admission of accused-appellants
videotaped confession, we find such admission proper. The interview was
recorded on video and it showed accused-appellant unburdening his guilt
willingly, openly and publicly in the presence of newsmen. Such confession does
not form part of custodial investigation as it was not given to police officers but
to media men in an attempt to elicit sympathy and forgiveness from the public.
Besides, if he had indeed been forced into confessing, he could have easily
sought succor from the newsmen who, in all likelihood, would have been
sympathetic with him.
However, because of the inherent danger in the use of television as a medium
for admitting ones guilt, and the recurrence of this phenomenon in several
cases, it is prudent that trial courts are reminded that extreme caution must be
taken in further admitting similar confessions. For in all probability, the police,
with the connivance of unscrupulous media practitioners, may attempt to
legitimize coerced extrajudicial confessions and place them beyond the
exclusionary rule by having an accused admit an offense on television. Such a
situation would be detrimental to the guaranteed rights of the accused and thus
imperil our criminal justice system.
A word of counsel then to lower courts: we should never presume that all
media confessions described as voluntary have been freely given. This
type of confession always remains suspect and therefore should be
thoroughly examined and scrutinized. Detection of coerced confessions is
admittedly a difficult and arduous task for the courts to make. It requires
persistence and determination in separating polluted confessions from untainted
ones. We have a sworn duty to be vigilant and protective of the rights
guaranteed by the Constitution.
Murder; Aggravating Circumstances; Treachery; The crime committed is murder
where the victim was stabbed while he was simply standing on the pavement
with his girlfriend waiting for a ride, blissfully oblivious of the accuseds criminal
design.With all the evidence tightly ringed around accused-appellant, the
question that next presents itself is whether the trial court correctly denominated
the crime as murder qualified by treachery. Doubtless, the crime committed is
one of murder considering that the victim was stabbed while he was simply
standing on the pavement with his girlfriend waiting for a ride, blissfully oblivious
of the accuseds criminal design. The suddenness of the assault on an
unsuspecting victim, without the slightest provocation from him who had no
opportunity to parry the attack, certainly qualifies the killing to murder.
Lavides v CA, 1 Feb 2000
Bail condition imposed by the judge is invalid
Criminal Procedure; Bail; In cases where it is authorized, bail should be
granted before arraignment, otherwise the accused may be precluded
from filing a motion to quash.For if the information is quashed and the
case is dismissed, there would then be no need for the arraignment of the
accused. In the second place, the trial court could ensure the presence of
petitioner at the arraignment precisely by granting bail and ordering his presence
at any stage of the proceedings, such as arraignment. Under Rule 114, 2(b) of
the Rules on Criminal Procedure, one of the conditions of bail is that the
accused shall appear before the proper court whenever so required by the court
or these Rules, while under Rule 116, 1(b) the presence of the accused at the
arraignment is required.
To condition the grant of bail to an accused on his arraignment would be to
place him in a position where he has to choose between (1) filing a motion to
quash and thus delay his release on bail because until his motion to quash can
be resolved, his arraignment cannot be held, and (2) foregoing the filing of a
motion to quash so that he can be arraigned at once and thereafter he released
on bail.These scenarios certainly undermine the accuseds constitutional right
not to be put on trial except upon valid complaint or information sufficient to
charge him with a crime and his right to bail.
It is the condition in the trial courts order that approval of the bail bonds shall
be made only after arraignment, which the Court of Appeals should have
declared void, instead of the condition that the accused cannot waive his
appearance at the trial but that he must be present at the hearings of the
case.The condition imposed in the trial courts order of May 16, 1997 that the
accused cannot waive his appearance at the trial but that he must be present at
the hearings of the case is valid and is in accordance with Rule 114. For another
condition of bail under Rule 114, 2(c) is that The failure of the accused to
appear at the trial without justification despite due notice to him or his
bondsman shall be deemed an express waiver of his right to be present on the
date specified in the notice. In such case, trial shall proceed in absentia.
Trials in Absentia; Stages of Trial Where Presence of Accused Required.Art. III,
14(2) of the Constitution authorizing trials in absentia allows the accused to be
absent at the trial but not at certain stages of the proceedings, to wit: (a) at
arraignment and plea, whether of innocence or of guilt, (b) during trial whenever
necessary for identification purposes, and (c) at the promulgation of sentence,
unless it is for a light offense, in which case the accused may appear by counsel
or representative. At such stages of the proceedings, his presence is required
and cannot be waived. As pointed out x x x there can be no trial in absentia
unless the accused has been arraigned.
34
Although a condition for the grant of bail to an accused is invalid, it does not
follow that his arraignment and the subsequent proceedings against him are
invalid.Contrary to petitioners contention, the arraignment did not emanate
from the invalid condition that approval of the bail bonds shall be made only
after the arraignment. Even without such a condition, the arraignment of
petitioner could not be omitted. In sum, although the condition for the grant of
bail to petitioner is invalid, his arraignment and the subsequent proceedings
against him are valid.
Criminal Law; Child Prostitution and Other Sexual Abuse; Pleadings and Practice;
Certiorari; While certiorari will not lie from a denial of a motion to quash, there
may be cases where there are special circumstances clearly demonstrating the
inadequacy of an appeal, and the accused may resort to the appellate court to
raise the issue decided against him; Whether an accused is liable for just one
crime regardless of the number of sexual acts allegedly committed by him and
the number of children with whom he had sexual intercourse, or whether each
act of intercourse constitutes one crime is a question that bears on the
presentation of evidence by either party.It is important to petitioner as well as
to the prosecution how many crimes there are. For instance, if there is only one
offense of sexual abuse regardless of the number of children involved, it will not
matter much to the prosecution whether it is able to present only one of the
complainants. On the other hand, if each act of sexual intercourse with a child
constitutes a separate offense, it will matter whether the other children are
presented during the trial.
Elements.The elements of the offense are as follows: (1) the accused commits
the act of sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct; (2) that said act is performed
with a child exploited in prostitution or subjected to other sexual abuse; and (3)
the child, whether male or female, is or is deemed under 18 years of age.
Exploitation in prostitution or other sexual abuse occurs when the child indulges
in sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct (a) for money, profit, or any other
consideration; or (b) under the coercion or influence of any adult, syndicate, or
group.
Each incident of sexual intercourse and lascivious act with a child under the
circumstances mentioned in Article III, 5 of Republic Act No. 7160 is a separate
and distinct offense.Each incident of sexual intercourse and lascivious act with
a child under the circumstances mentioned in Art. III, 5 of R.A. No. 7160 is thus
a separate and distinct offense. The offense is similar to rape or act of
lasciviousness under the Revised Penal Code in which each act of rape or
lascivious conduct should be the subject of a separate information.
Government of Hong Kong Special Administrative Region v Olalia, Jr.,
19 Apr 2007
The right to bail and extradition
International Law; Extradition; Jurisprudence on extradition is but in its infancy
in this jurisdiction.Jurisprudence on extradition is but in its infancy in this
jurisdiction. Nonetheless, this is not the first time that this Court has an occasion
to resolve the question of whether a prospective extraditee may be granted bail.
Human Rights; The modern trend in public international law is the
primacy placed on the worth of the individual person and the sanctity
of human rights.At first glance, the above ruling applies squarely to private
respondents case. However, this Court cannot ignore the following trends in
international law: (1) the growing importance of the individual person in public
international law who, in the 20th century, has gradually attained global
recognition; (2) the higher value now being given to human rights in the
international sphere; (3) the corresponding duty of countries to observe these
universal human rights in fulfilling their treaty obligations; and (4) the duty of
this Court to balance the rights of the individual under our fundamental law, on
one hand, and the law on extradition, on the other. The modern trend in public
international law is the primacy placed on the worth of the individual person and
the sanctity of human rights. Slowly, the recognition that the individual person
may properly be a subject of international law is now taking root. The vulnerable
doctrine that the subjects of international law are limited only to states was
dramatically eroded towards the second half of the past century. For one, the
Nuremberg and Tokyo trials after World War II resulted in the unprecedented
spectacle of individual defendants for acts characterized as violations of the laws
of war, crimes against peace, and crimes against humanity. Recently, under the
Nuremberg principle, Serbian leaders have been persecuted for war crimes and
crimes against humanity committed in the former Yugoslavia. These significant
events show that the individual person is now a valid subject of international law.
Due Process; Universal Declaration of Human Rights; International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights; While on a treaty, the principles contained in the said
Universal Declaration of Human Rights are now recognized as customarily
binding upon the members of the international community; Fundamental among
the rights enshrined in the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights are
the rights of every person to life, liberty, and due process.On a more positive
note, also after World War II, both international organizations and states gave
recognition and importance to human rights. Thus, on December 10, 1948, the
United Nations General Assembly adopted the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights in which the right to life, liberty and all the other fundamental rights of
every person were proclaimed. While not a treaty, the principles contained in the
said Declaration are now recognized as customarily binding upon the members of
the international community. Thus, x x x this Court, in granting bail to a
prospective deportee, held that under the Constitution, the principles set forth in
35
that Declaration are part of the law of the land. In 1966, the UN General
Assembly also adopted the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
which the Philippines signed and ratified. Fundamental among the rights
enshrined therein are the rights of every person to life, liberty, and due process.
While this Court in Government of the United States of America v. Purganan, 389
SCRA 623 (2002), limited the exercise of the right to bail to criminal proceedings,
however, in light of the various international treaties giving recognition
and protection to human rights, particularly the right to life and liberty,
a reexamination of this Courts ruling in Purganan is in order.The
Philippines, along with the other members of the family of nations, committed to
uphold the fundamental human rights as well as value the worth and dignity of
every person. This commitment is enshrined in Section II, Article II of our
Constitution which provides: The State values the dignity of every human
person and guarantees full respect for human rights. The Philippines, therefore,
has the responsibility of protecting and promoting the right of every person to
liberty and due process, ensuring that those detained or arrested can participate
in the proceedings before a court, to enable it to decide without delay on the
legality of the detention and order their release if justified. In other words, the
Philippine authorities are under obligation to make available to every person
under detention such remedies which safeguard their fundamental right to
liberty. These remedies include the right to be admitted to bail. While this Court
in Purganan limited the exercise of the right to bail to criminal proceedings,
however, in light of the various international treaties giving recognition and
protection to human rights, particularly the right to life and liberty, a
reexamination of this Courts ruling in Purganan is in order.
If bail can be granted in deportation cases, the Court sees no
justification why it should not also be allowed in extradition cases
clearly, the right of a prospective extraditee to apply for bail must be
viewed in the light of the various treaty obligations of the Philippines
concerning respect for the promotion and protection of human rights.
x x x foreign nationals against whom no formal criminal charges have been filed
may be released on bail pending the finality of an order of deportation. As
previously stated, the Court in Mejoff relied upon the Universal declaration of
Human Rights in sustaining the detainees right to bail. If bail can be granted in
deportation cases, we see no justification why it should not also be allowed in
extradition cases. Likewise, considering that the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights applies to deportation cases, there is no reason why it cannot be invoked
in extradition cases. After all, both are administrative proceedings where the
innocence or guilt of the person detained is not in issue. Clearly, the right of a
prospective extraditee to apply for bail in this jurisdiction must be viewed in the
light of the various treaty obligations of the Philippines concerning respect for
the promotion and protection of human rights. Under these treaties, the
presumption lies in favor of human liberty. Thus, the Philippines should see to it
that the right to liberty of every individual is not impaired.
Extradition has thus been characterized as the right of a foreign power,
created by treaty, to demand the surrender of one accused or convicted
of a crime within its territorial jurisdiction, and the correlative duty of
the other state to surrender him to the demanding state.Section 2(a) of
Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1069 (The Philippine Extradition Law) defines
extradition as the removal of an accused from the Philippines with the
object of placing him at the disposal of foreign authorities to enable the
requesting state or government to hold him in connection with any criminal
investigation directed against him or the execution of a penalty imposed on him
under the penal or criminal law of the requesting state or government. It is not
a criminal proceeding. Even if the potential extraditee is a criminal, an extradition
proceeding is not by its nature criminal, for it is not punishment for a crime, even
though such punishment may follow extradition. It is sui generis, tracing its
existence wholly to treaty obligations between different nations. It is not a trial
to determine the guilt or innocence of the potential extraditee. Nor is it a full-
blown civil action, but one that is merely administrative in character. Its object is
to prevent the escape of a person accused or convicted of a crime and to secure
his return to the state from which he fled, for the purpose of trial or punishment.
While extradition is not a criminal proceeding, it is characterized by the
following: (a) it entails a deprivation of liberty on the part of the
potential extraditee and (b) the means employed to attain the purpose
of extradition is also the machinery of criminal lawobviously, an
extradition proceeding, while ostensibly administrative, bears all
earmarks of a criminal process.This is shown by Section 6 of P.D. No. 1069
(The Philippine Extradition Law) which mandates the immediate arrest and
temporary detention of the accused if such will best serve the interest of
justice. We further note that Section 20 allows the requesting state in case of
urgency to ask for the provisional arrest of the accused, pending receipt of the
request for extradition; and that release from provisional arrest shall not
prejudice re-arrest and extradition of the accused if a request for extradition is
received subsequently. Obviously, an extradition proceeding, while ostensibly
administrative, bears all earmarks of a criminal process. A potential extraditee
may be subjected to arrest, to a prolonged restraint of liberty, and forced to
transfer to the demanding state following the proceedings. Temporary
detention may be a necessary step in the process of extradition, but the length
of time of the detention should be reasonable.
By any standard, detention for an extended period of more than two (2) years is
a serious deprivation of a potential extraditees fundamental right to liberty;
36
While our extradition law does not provide for the grant of bail to an
extraditee, however, there is no provision prohibiting him or her from
filing a motion for bail, a right to due process under the Constitution.
Records show that private respondent was arrested on September 23, 1999, and
remained incarcerated until December 20, 2001, when the trial court ordered his
admission to bail. In other words, he had been detained for over two (2) years
without having been convicted of any crime. By any standard, such an extended
period of detention is a serious deprivation of his fundamental right to liberty. In
fact, it was this prolonged deprivation of liberty which prompted the extradition
court to grant him bail.
Burden of Proof; The applicable standard of due process, however, should not
be the same as that in criminal proceedingsin the latter, the standard of due
process is premised on the presumption of innocence of the accused, in the
former, the assumption is that such extraditee is a fugitive from justice; The
prospective extraditee thus bears the onus probandi of showing that
he or she is not a flight risk and should be granted bail.As Purganan
correctly points out, it is from this major premise that the ancillary presumption
in favor of admitting to bail arises. Bearing in mind the purpose of extradition
proceedings, the premise behind the issuance of the arrest warrant and the
temporary detention is the possibility of flight of the potential extraditee.
Pacta Sunt Servanda; While the time-honored principle of pacta sunt
servanda demands that the Philippines honor its obligations under the
Extradition Treaty, it does not necessarily mean that in keeping with its
treaty obligations, the Philippines should diminish a potential
extraditees rights to life, liberty, and due process; An extraditee
should not be deprived of his right to apply for bail, provided that a
certain standard for the grant is satisfactorily met.
Standard of Proof; An extradition proceeding being sui generis, the
standard of proof required in granting or denying bail can neither be
the proof beyond reasonable doubt in criminal cases nor the standard
of proof of preponderance of evidence in civil casesthe potential
extraditee must prove by clear and convincing proof that he is not a
flight risk and will abide with all the orders and processes of the
extradition court.
Enrile vs. Sandiganbayan (Third Division), 18 Aug 2015
Constitutional Law; Criminal Procedure; Presumption of Innocence;In all
criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be presumed innocent until the contrary
is proved. The presumption of innocence is rooted in the guarantee of
due process, and is safeguarded by the constitutional right to be
released on bail, and further binds the court to wait until after trial to impose
any punishment on the accused.
Bail; The purpose of bail is to guarantee the appearance of the accused
at the trial, or whenever so required by the trial court.It is worthy to
note that bail is not granted to prevent the accused from committing additional
crimes. The purpose of bail is to guarantee the appearance of the accused at the
trial, or whenever so required by the trial court. The amount of bail should be
high enough to assure the presence of the accused when so required, but it
should be no higher than is reasonably calculated to fulfill this purpose. Thus,
bail acts as a reconciling mechanism to accommodate both the accuseds interest
in his provisional liberty before or during the trial, and the societys interest in
assuring the accuseds presence at trial.
The general rule is that any person, before being convicted of any
criminal offense, shall be bailable, unless he is charged with a capital
offense, or with an offense punishable with reclusion perpetua or life
imprisonment, and the evidence of his guilt is strong.A capital offense
in the context of the rule refers to an offense that, under the law existing at the
time of its commission and the application for admission to bail, may be
punished with death. The general rule is, therefore, that any person, before
being convicted of any criminal offense, shall be bailable, unless he is charged
with a capital offense, or with an offense punishable with reclusion perpetua or
life imprisonment, and the evidence of his guilt is strong. Hence, from the
moment he is placed under arrest, or is detained or restrained by the
officers of the law, he can claim the guarantee of his provisional liberty
under the Bill of Rights, and he retains his right to bail unless he is
charged with a capital offense, or with an offense punishable with reclusion
perpetua or life imprisonment, and the evidence of his guilt is strong. Once
it has been established that the evidence of guilt is strong, no right to bail shall
be recognized.
All criminal cases within the competence of the Metropolitan Trial Court
(MeTC), Municipal Trial Court (MTC), Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC),
or Municipal Circuit Trial Court (MCTC) are bailable as matter of right
because these courts have no jurisdiction to try capital offenses, or
offenses punishable with reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment.
Likewise, bail is a matter of right prior to conviction by the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) for any offense not punishable by death, reclusion
perpetua, or life imprisonment, or even prior to conviction for an
offense punishable by death, reclusion perpetua, or life imprisonment
when evidence of guilt is not strong.
The granting of bail is discretionary:
37
(1) upon conviction by the RTC of an offense not punishable by death, reclusion
perpetua or life imprisonment; or
(2) if the RTC has imposed a penalty of imprisonment exceeding six years,
provided none of the circumstances enumerated under paragraph 3 of Section 5,
Rule 114 is present, as follows: (a) That he is a recidivist, quasi-recidivist, or
habitual delinquent, or has committed the crime aggravated by the circumstance
of reiteration; (b) That he has previously escaped from legal confinement,
evaded sentence, or violated the conditions of his bail without valid justification;
(c) That he committed the offense while under probation, parole, or conditional
pardon; (d) That the circumstances of his case indicate the probability of flight if
released on bail; or (e) That there is undue risk that he may commit another
crime during the pendency of the appeal.
For purposes of admission to bail, the determination of whether or not evidence
of guilt is strong in criminal cases involving capital offenses, or offenses
punishable with reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment lies within the discretion
of the trial court. But, as the Court has held in Concerned Citizens v. Elma, 241
SCRA 84 (1995), such discretion may be exercised only after the hearing
called to ascertain the degree of guilt of the accused for the purpose of whether
or not he should be granted provisional liberty. It is axiomatic, therefore, that
bail cannot be allowed when its grant is a matter of discretion on the part of the
trial court unless there has been a hearing with notice to the Prosecution.
In resolving bail applications of the accused who is charged with a capital
offense, or an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, the
trial judge is expected to comply with the guidelines outlined in Cortes v. Catral,
279 SCRA 1 (1997), to wit:
1. In all cases, whether bail is a matter of right or of discretion, notify the
prosecutor of the hearing of the application for bail or require him to submit his
recommendation (Section 18, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court, as amended);
2. Where bail is a matter of discretion, conduct a hearing of the application for
bail regardless of whether or not the prosecution refuses to present evidence to
show that the guilt of the accused is strong for the purpose of enabling the court
to exercise its sound discretion; (Section 7 and 8, supra)
3. Decide whether the guilt of the accused is strong based on the summary of
evidence of the prosecution;
4. If the guilt of the accused is not strong, discharge the accused upon the
approval of the bailbond. (Section 19, supra) Otherwise petition should be
denied.
This national commitment to uphold the fundamental human rights as well as
value the worth and dignity of every person has authorized the grant of bail not
only to those charged in criminal proceedings but also to extraditees upon a clear
and convincing showing: (1) that the detainee will not be a flight risk or a danger
to the community; and (2) that there exist special, humanitarian and compelling
circumstances.In our view, his social and political standing and his having
immediately surrendered to the authorities upon his being charged in court
indicate that the risk of his flight or escape from this jurisdiction is highly
unlikely. His personal disposition from the onset of his indictment for plunder,
formal or otherwise, has demonstrated his utter respect for the legal processes
of this country. We also do not ignore that at an earlier time many years ago
when he had been charged with rebellion with murder and multiple frustrated
murder, he already evinced a similar personal disposition of respect for the legal
processes, and was granted bail during the pendency of his trial because he was
not seen as a flight risk. With his solid reputation in both his public and his
private lives, his long years of public service, and historys judgment of him being
at stake, he should be granted bail. The currently fragile state of Enriles health
presents another compelling justification for his admission to bail, but which the
Sandiganbayan did not recognize.
Bail for the provisional liberty of the accused, regardless of the crime
charged, should be allowed independently of the merits of the charge,
provided his continued incarceration is clearly shown to be injurious to his
health or to endanger his life. Indeed, denying him bail despite imperiling his
health and life would not serve the true objective of preventive incarceration
during the trial.
Narciso v Sta. Romana-Cruz, 17 Mar 2000
Bail
When the penalty prescribed by law is death, reclusion perpetua or life
imprisonment, a hearing must be conducted by the trial judge before bail can be
granted to the accused. Absent such hearing, the order granting bail is void for
having been issued with grave abuse of discretion.
Criminal Procedure; Bail; Judges are compelled to conduct hearings in bail
applications in which the accused stands charged with a capital
offense.Jurisprudence is replete with decisions compelling judges to conduct
the required hearings in bail applications, in which the accused stands charged
with a capital offense. The absence of objection from the prosecution is never a
basis for the grant of bail in such cases, for the judge has no right to presume
that the prosecutor knows what he is doing on account of familiarity with the
case. Said reasoning is tantamount to ceding to the prosecutor the duty of
exercising judicial discretion to determine whether the guilt of the accused is
strong. Judicial discretion is the domain of the judge before whom the petition
38
for provisional liberty will be decided. The mandated duty to exercise discretion
has never been reposed upon the prosecutor.
A hearing is plainly indispensable before a judge can aptly be said to be
in a position to determine whether the evidence for the prosecution is
weak or strong.The grant of bail is a matter of right except in cases involving
capital offenses when the matter is left to the sound discretion of the court. That
discretion lies, not in the determination whether or not a hearing should be held
but in the appreciation and evaluation of the prosecutions evidence of guilt
against the accused. x x x A hearing is plainly indispensable before a judge can
aptly be said to be in a position to determine whether the evidence for the
prosecution is weak or strong.
Duties of the trial judge in a petition for bail in a capital case.Basco v. Rapatalo
summarized several cases that emphasized the mandatory character of a hearing
in a petition for bail in a capital case. It enunciated the following duties of the
trial judge in such petition: (1) Notify the prosecutor of the hearing of the
application for bail or require him to submit his recommendation (Section 18,
Rule 114 of the Rules of Court as amended); (2) Conduct a hearing of the
application for bail regardless of whether or not the prosecution refuses to
present evidence to show that the guilt of the accused is strong for the purpose
of enabling the court to exercise its sound discretion (Sections 7 and 8, supra);
(3) Decide whether the evidence of guilt of the accused is strong based on the
summary of evidence of the prosecution (Baylon v. Sison, supra); (4) If the guilt
of the accused is not strong, discharge the accused upon the approval of the
bailbond. (Section 19, supra). Otherwise, petition should be denied.
Courts grant or refusal of bail must contain a summary of the evidence
for the prosecution; Its absence will invalidate the grant or the denial
of the application for bail.The courts grant or refusal of bail must contain a
summary of the evidence for the prosecution, on the basis of which should be
formulated the judges own conclusion on whether such evidence is strong
enough to indicate the guilt of the accused. The summary thereof is considered
an aspect of procedural due process for both the prosecution and the defense;
its absence will invalidate the grant or the denial of the application for bail.
Actions; Parties; The offended parties in criminal cases have sufficient interest
and personality as persons aggrieved to file the special civil action of
prohibition and certiorari.In Paredes vs. Gopengco, 29 SCRA 688 (1969), this
Court ruled that the offended parties in criminal cases have sufficient interest
and personality as person(s) aggrieved to file the special civil action of
prohibition and certiorari under Sections 1 and 2 of Rule 65 in line with the
underlying spirit of the liberal construction of the Rules of Court in order to
promote their object.
A party cannot be left without recourse to address a substantive issue in law.
To rule otherwise would leave the private respondent without any recourse to
rectify the public injustice brought about by the trial courts Order, leaving her
with only the standing to file administrative charges for ignorance of the law
against the judge and the prosecutor. A party cannot be left without recourse to
address a substantive issue in law.
Accused who is charged with parricide cannot be regarded as an offended
party.Corollary to the question of standing, petitioner submits that even if the
exception were made to apply, private respondent is not an offended party
who is granted the right to challenge the assailed RTC Order. He maintains that
only the compulsory heirs of the deceased, who are the accused himself and his
minor child, may file the instant action. We disagree. It should be remembered
that the crime charged against the private respondent is parricide; hence, the
accused cannot be regarded as an offended party. That would be a contradiction
in terms and an absurdity in fact. Nor can one expect the minor child to think
and to act for himself. Hence, we rule that in view of the peculiar circumstances
of this case, the sister of the deceased is a proper party-litigant who is akin to
the offended party, she being a close relative of the deceased. There is no
closer kin who may be expected to take up the cudgels of justice for the
deceased.
Mapa, Jr. v Sandiganbayan, 26 Apr 1994
Right against self-incrimination; Immunity of witnesses
Criminal Procedure; Witnesses; Immunity Statutes; Origin and kinds of immunity
statutes.Our immunity statutes are of American origin. In the United States,
there are two types of statutory immunity granted to a witness. They are the
transactional immunity and the use-and-derivative-use immunity. Transactional
immunity is broader in the scope of its protection. By its grant, a witness can no
longer be prosecuted for any offense whatsoever arising out of the act or
transaction. In contrast, by the grant of use-and-derivative-use immunity, a
witness is only assured that his or her particular testimony and evidence derived
from it will not be used against him or her in a subsequent prosecution.
Presidential Commission on Good Government; Powers granted the PCGG under
Sections 4 and 5 of Executive Order No. 14, as amended.There are obvious
differences between the powers granted to the PCGG under sections 4 and 5.
Section 4 deals with the power which PCGG can use to compel an unwilling
witness to testify. On the other hand, section 5 speaks of the power which PCGG
can wield to secure information from a friendly witness. Under section 4, the
hostile witness compelled to testify is not immunized from prosecution. He can
still be prosecuted but no testimony or other information compelled under the
39
order (or any information directly or indirectly derived from such testimony or should be extended the privilege, the timing of its grant, are questions addressed
other information) may be used against the witness in any criminal case . . . . In solely to the sound judgment of the prosecution. The power to prosecute
contrast, under section 5, the friendly witness is completely immunized from includes the right to determine who shall be prosecuted and the corollary right to
prosecution. decide whom not to prosecute. In reviewing the exercise of prosecutorial
discretion in these areas, the jurisdiction of the respondent court is limited. For
Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction to review immunity granted by PCGG.The first
the business of a court of justice is to be an impartial tribunal, and not to get
issue is whether the respondent court has jurisdiction to review the immunity
involved with the success or failure of the prosecution to prosecute. Every now
granted by PCGG in favor of the petitioners. We sustain the jurisdiction of the
and then, the prosecution may err in the selection of its strategies, but such
respondent court. To be sure, we have grappled with this once slippery issue in
errors are not for neutral courts to rectify, any more than courts should correct
the case of Republic vs. Sandiganbayan, 173 SCRA 76, 80-81.
the blunders of the defense. For fairness demands that courts keep the scales of
Where the intent is to endow courts with the power to review and reverse justice at equipoise between and among all litigants. Due process demands that
tactical moves of the prosecution, the law confers the power in clear and certain courts should strive to maintain the legal playing field perfectly even and
language.In instances, where the intent is to endow courts of justice with the perpetually level.
power to review and reverse tactical moves of the prosecution, the law confers
In reviewing the grant of immunity made by the PCGG, the power of the
the power in clear and certain language. Thus, under section 9 of Rule 119, the
Sandiganbayan can go no further than to pass upon its procedural regularity.
prosecution in the exercise of its discretion may tactically decide to discharge an
Prescinding from these baseline propositions, we hold that in reviewing the grant
accused to be a state witness but its decision is made subject to the approval of
of a section 5 immunity made by the PCGG to the petitioners, the power of the
the court trying the case. It has to file a proper motion and the motion may be
respondents court can go no further than to pass upon its procedural regularity.
denied by the court if the prosecution fails to prove that it has satisfied the
The respondent court should only ascertain: (a) whether the person claiming
requirements of the rule on discharge of a witness. The rule is crafted as to leave
immunity has provided information or testimony in any investigation conducted
no iota of doubt on the power of the court to interfere with the discretion of the
by the PCGG in the discharge of its functions; (b) whether in the bona fide
prosecution on the matter. In the case at bench, E.O. 14, as amended, is
judgment of the PCGG, the information or testimony given would establish the
eloquently silent with regard to the range and depth of the power of the
unlawful manner in which the respondent, defendant or accused has acquired or
respondent court to review the exercise of discretion by the PCGG granting a
accumulated the property or properties in question; and (c) whether in the bona
section 5 immunity. This silence argues against the thesis that the respondent
fide judgment of the PCGG, such information or testimony is necessary to
court has full and unlimited power to reverse PCGGs exercise of discretion
ascertain or prove the guilt or civil liability of the respondent, defendant or
granting a section 5 immunity. Legitimate power cannot arise from a vacuum.
accused. Respondent court cannot substitute its judgment to the discretion of
E.O. No. 14 confers on the PCGG the power to grant immunity alone and on its the PCGG without involving itself in prosecution and without ceasing to be a
own authority, and the power of the Sandiganbayan to review the same is court catering untilted justice.
limited.We observe that in contrast to our other laws on immunity, section 5 of
Failure of the persons granted immunity to testify due to no fault of theirs can
E.O. No. 14, as amended, confers on the PCGG the power to grant immunity
not nullify their immunity.Contrary to the ruling of the respondent court, the
alone and on its own authority. The exercise of the power is not shared with any
failure of petitioners to testify in the RICO cases against the Marcoses in New
other authority. Nor is its exercise subject to the approval or disapproval of
York can not nullify their immunity. They have satisfied the requirements both of
another agency of government. The basic reason for vesting the power
the law and the parties implementing agreements. Under section 5 of E.O. No.
exclusively on the PCGG lies in the principle of separation of power. The decision
14, as amended, their duty was to give information to the prosecution, and they
to grant immunity from prosecution forms a constituent part of the prosecution
did. Under their Memorandum of Agreement, they promised to make themselves
process. It is essentially a tactical decision to forego prosecution of a person for
available as witnesses in the said RICO cases, and they did. Petitioners were
government to achieve a higher objective. It is a deliberate renunciation of the
ready to testify but they were not called to testify by the US prosecutors of the
right of the State to prosecute all who appear to be guilty of having committed a
RICO case. Their failure to testify was not of their own making. It was brought
crime. Its justification lies in the particular need of the State to obtain the
about by the decision of the US prosecutors who may have thought that their
conviction of the more guilty criminals who, otherwise, will probably elude the
evidence was enough to convict the Marcoses. Since petitioners failure to testify
long arm of the law. Whether or not the delicate power should be exercised, who

40
was not of their own choosing nor was it due to any fault of their own, justice
and equity forbid that they be penalized by the withdrawal of their immunity.
Indeed, initially, the PCGG itself adopted the posture that the immunity of
petitioners stayed and should not be disturbed. It joined the motion to dismiss
filed by petitioners in the respondent court. When the respondent court denied
the motion, PCGG stuck to its previous position as it again joined the petitioners
in their motion for reconsideration. It is only in this petition for review on
certiorari that PCGG, after a change of Chairman, flip-flopped in its position.
E.O. 14 does not prohibit the PCGG from granting immunity to persons already
charged in court and undergoing trial.We also rule that there was nothing
irregular when PCGG granted a section 5 immunity to petitioners while they were
already undergoing trial in Criminal Case No. 11960. Section 5 of E.O. 14, as
amended, does not prohibit the PCGG from granting immunity to persons already
charged in court and undergoing trial. As long as the privilege of immunity so
given will in the judgment of the PCGG assist it in attaining its greater objectives,
the PCGG is well within legal grounds to exercise this power at any stage of the
proceedings. This section 5 immunity frees and releases one from liability, and as
it inures to the benefit of an accused, it can be invoked at any time after its
acquisition and before his final conviction. Our regard for the rights of an
accused dictates this result. Thus, we have consistently held that laws that
decriminalize an act or a grant of amnesty may be given retroactive effect. They
constitute a bar against the further prosecution of their beneficiaries regardless
of the appearance of their guilt.
Right Against Self-Incrimination; Immunity statutes are to be liberally construed
in favor of the grantees since such laws tend to erode the preeminent right
against self-incrimination and right to be silent.Finally, we reject respondent
courts ruling that the grant of section 5 immunity must be strictly construed
against the petitioners. It simplistically characterized the grant as a special
privilege, as if it was gifted by the government, ex gratia. In taking this posture,
it misread the raison detre and the long pedigree of the right against self-
incrimination vis-a-vis immunity statutes. The days of inquisition brought about
the most despicable abuses against human rights. Not the least of these abuses
is the expert use of coerced confessions to send to the guillotine even the
guiltless. To guard against the recurrence of this totalitarian method, the right
against self-incrimination was ensconced in the fundamental laws of all civilized
countries. Over the years, however, came the need to assist government in its
task of containing crime for peace and order is a necessary matrix of public
welfare. To accommodate the need, the right against self-incrimination was
stripped of its absoluteness. Immunity statutes in varying shapes were enacted
which would allow government to compel a witness to testify despite his plea of
the right against self-incrimination. To insulate these statutes from the virus of
unconstitutionally, a witness is given what has come to be known as
transactional or a use-derivative-use immunity, as heretofore discussed. Quite
clearly, these immunity statutes are not a bonanza from government. Those
given the privilege of immunity paid a high price for itthe surrender of their
precious right to be silent. Our hierarchy of values demands that the right
against self-incrimination and the right to be silent should be accorded greater
respect and protection. Laws that tend to erode the force of these preeminent
rights must necessarily be given a liberal interpretation in favor of the individual.
The government has a right to solve crimes but it must do it, rightly.
Magallona v Ermita, 16 Aug 2011
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS III); UNCLOS III has
nothing to do with the acquisition or loss of territory.It is a multilateral treaty
regulating, among others, sea-use rights over maritime zones (i.e., the territorial
waters [12 nautical miles from the baselines], contiguous zone [24 nautical miles
from the baselines], exclusive economic zone [200 nautical miles from the
baselines]), and continental shelves that UNCLOS III delimits. UNCLOS III was
the culmination of decades-long negotiations among United Nations members to
codify norms regulating the conduct of States in the worlds oceans and
submarine areas, recognizing coastal and archipelagic States graduated
authority over a limited span of waters and submarine lands along their coasts.
Archipelagic Baselines of the Philippines (Republic Act No. 9522); Baselines laws
such as RA 9522 are enacted by United Nations Convention on the Law of the
Sea (UNCLOS III) States parties to mark-out specific basepoints along their
coasts from which baselines are drawn, either straight or contoured, to serve as
geographic starting points to measure the breadth of the maritime zones and
continental shelf.Baselines laws such as RA 9522 are enacted by UNCLOS III
States parties to mark-out specific basepoints along their coasts from which
baselines are drawn, either straight or contoured, to serve as geographic starting
points to measure the breadth of the maritime zones and continental shelf.
Article 48 of UNCLOS III on archipelagic States like ours could not be any
clearer: Article 48. Measurement of the breadth of the territorial sea, the
contiguous zone, the exclusive economic zone and the continental shelf.The
breadth of the territorial sea, the contiguous zone, the exclusive economic zone
and the continental shelf shall be measured from archipelagic baselines drawn in
accordance with article 47.
Baselines laws are nothing but statutory mechanisms for United Nations
Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS III) States parties to delimit
with precision the extent of their maritime zones and continental
shelves.In turn, this gives notice to the rest of the international community of
41
the scope of the maritime space and submarine areas within which States parties
exercise treaty-based rights, namely, the exercise of sovereignty over territorial
waters (Article 2), the jurisdiction to enforce customs, fiscal, immigration, and
sanitation laws in the contiguous zone (Article 33), and the right to exploit the
living and non-living resources in the exclusive economic zone (Article 56) and
continental shelf (Article 77).
RA 9522 increased the Philippines total maritime space by 145,216 square
nautical miles.Petitioners assertion of loss of about 15,000 square nautical
miles of territorial waters under RA 9522 is similarly unfounded both in fact and
law. On the contrary, RA 9522, by optimizing the location of basepoints,
increased the Philippines total maritime space (covering its internal waters,
territorial sea and exclusive economic zone) by 145,216 square nautical miles.
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS III); Congress
decision to classify the Kalayaan Island Group (KIG) and the Scarborough Shoal
as Regime[s] of Islands manifests the Philippine States responsible observance
of its pacta sunt servanda obligation under UNCLOS III.Far from surrendering
the Philippines claim over the KIG and the Scarborough Shoal, Congress
decision to classify the KIG and the Scarborough Shoal as Regime[s] of
Islands under the Republic of the Philippines consistent with Article 121 of
UNCLOS III manifests the Philippine States responsible observance of its pacta
sunt servanda obligation under UNCLOS III. Under Article 121 of UNCLOS III,
any naturally formed area of land, surrounded by water, which is
above water at high tide, such as portions of the KIG, qualifies under the
category of regime of islands, whose islands generate their own applicable
maritime zones.
The recognition of archipelagic States archipelago and the waters
enclosed by their baselines as one cohesive entity prevents the
treatment of their islands as separate islands under UNCLOS III.
Separate islands generate their own maritime zones, placing the waters between
islands separated by more than 24 nautical miles beyond the States territorial
sovereignty, subjecting these waters to the rights of other States under UNCLOS
III.
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS III) creates a sui
generis maritime spacethe exclusive economic zonein waters previously part
of the high seas.UNCLOS III favors States with a long coastline like the
Philippines. UNCLOS III creates a sui generis maritime spacethe exclusive
economic zonein waters previously part of the high seas. UNCLOS III grants
new rights to coastal States to exclusively exploit the resources found
within this zone up to 200 nautical miles. UNCLOS III, however,
preserves the traditional freedom of navigation of other States that
attached to this zone beyond the territorial sea before UNCLOS III.
Absent an United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS III)
compliant baselines law, an archipelagic State like the Philippines will find itself
devoid of internationally acceptable baselines from where the breadth of its
maritime zones and continental shelf is measured.This is recipe for a two-
fronted disaster: first, it sends an open invitation to the seafaring powers to
freely enter and exploit the resources in the waters and submarine areas around
our archipelago; and second, it weakens the countrys case in any international
dispute over Philippine maritime space. These are consequences Congress wisely
avoided.
Archipelagic Baselines of the Philippines (Republic Act No. 9522); The enactment
of United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS III) compliant
baselines law for the Philippine archipelago and adjacent areas, as embodied in
RA 9522, allows an internationally-recognized delimitation of the
breadth of the Philippines maritime zones and continental shelf.The
enactment of UNCLOS III compliant baselines law for the Philippine archipelago
and adjacent areas, as embodied in RA 9522, allows an internationally-
recognized delimitation of the breadth of the Philippines maritime zones and
continental shelf. RA 9522 is therefore a most vital step on the part of the
Philippines in safeguarding its maritime zones, consistent with the Constitution
and our national interest.
Carpio-Morales v Court of Appeals (Sixth Division), 10 Nov 2015
Remedial Law; Special Civil Actions; Certiorari; Prohibition; A common
requirement to both a petition for certiorari and a petition for prohibition taken
under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure is that the petitioner has no
other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.A
common requirement to both a petition for certiorari and a petition for
prohibition taken under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure is that the
petitioner has no other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary
course of law.
Motion for Reconsideration; As a general rule, a motion for reconsideration must
first be filed with the lower court prior to resorting to the extraordinary remedy
of certiorari or prohibition since a motion for reconsideration may still be
considered as a plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of
law; Exceptions.As a general rule, a motion for reconsideration must first be
filed with the lower court prior to resorting to the extraordinary remedy of
certiorari or prohibition since a motion for reconsideration may still be considered
as a plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. The
42
rationale for the prerequisite is to grant an opportunity for the lower court or
agency to correct any actual or perceived error attributed to it by the
reexamination of the legal and factual circumstances of the case. Jurisprudence
states that [i]t is [the] inadequacy, [and] not the mere absence of all other legal
remedies and the danger of failure of justice without the writ, that must usually
determine the propriety of certiorari [or prohibition]. A remedy is plain, speedy[,]
and adequate if it will promptly relieve the petitioner from the injurious effects of
the judgment, order, or resolution of the lower court or agency. x x x. In this
light, certain exceptions were crafted to the general rule requiring a prior motion
for reconsideration before the filing of a petition for certiorari, which exceptions
also apply to a petition for prohibition. These are: (a) where the order is a patent
nullity, as where the court a quo has no jurisdiction; (b) where the questions
raised in the certiorari proceedings have been duly raised and passed upon by
the lower court, or are the same as those raised and passed upon in the lower
court; (c) where there is an urgent necessity for the resolution of the question
and any further delay would prejudice the interests of the Government or of the
petitioner or the subject matter of the action is perishable; (d) where, under the
circumstances, a motion for reconsideration would be useless; (e) where
petitioner was deprived of due process and there is extreme urgency for relief;
(f) where, in a criminal case, relief from an order of arrest is urgent and the
granting of such relief by the trial court is improbable; (g) where the proceedings
in the lower court are a nullity for lack of due process; (h) where the
proceedings were ex parte or in which the petitioner had no opportunity to
object; and (i) where the issue raised is one purely of law or where public
interest is involved.
Courts; Jurisdiction; A courts jurisdiction over the subject matter may be raised
at any stage of the proceedings.Albeit raised for the first time by the
Ombudsman in her Memorandum, it is nonetheless proper to resolve the issue
on the CAs lack of subject matter jurisdiction over the main petition for certiorari
in C.A.-G.R. S.P. No. 139453, in view of the well-established rule that a courts
jurisdiction over the subject matter may be raised at any stage of the
proceedings. The rationale is that subject matter jurisdiction is conferred by law,
and the lack of it affects the very authority of the court to take cognizance of
and to render judgment on the action. Hence, it should be preliminarily
determined if the CA indeed had subject matter jurisdiction over the main C.A.-
G.R. S.P. No. 139453 petition, as the same determines the validity of all
subsequent proceedings relative thereto. It is noteworthy to point out that Binay,
Jr. was given the opportunity by this Court to be heard on this issue, as he, in
fact, duly submitted his opposition through his comment to the Ombudsmans
Memorandum. That being said, the Court perceives no reasonable objection
against ruling on this issue.
Ombudsman Act; The first paragraph of Section 14, Republic Act (RA) No. 6770
is a prohibition against any court (except the Supreme Court [SC]) from issuing a
writ of injunction to delay an investigation being conducted by the Office of the
Ombudsman.The first paragraph of Section 14, RA 6770 is a prohibition
against any court (except the Supreme Court) from issuing a writ of injunction to
delay an investigation being conducted by the Office of the Ombudsman.
Generally speaking, [i]njunction is a judicial writ, process or proceeding
whereby a party is ordered to do or refrain from doing a certain act. It may be
the main action or merely a provisional remedy for and as an incident in the
main action. Considering the textual qualifier to delay, which connotes a
suspension of an action while the main case remains pending, the writ of
injunction mentioned in this paragraph could only refer to injunctions of the
provisional kind, consistent with the nature of a provisional injunctive relief. The
exception to the no injunction policy is when there is prima facie evidence that
the subject matter of the investigation is outside the offices jurisdiction. The
Office of the Ombudsman has disciplinary authority over all elective and
appointive officials of the government and its subdivisions, instrumentalities, and
agencies, with the exception only of impeachable officers, Members of Congress,
and the Judiciary. Nonetheless, the Ombudsman retains the power to investigate
any serious misconduct in office allegedly committed by officials removable by
impeachment, for the purpose of filing a verified complaint for impeachment, if
warranted. Note that the Ombudsman has concurrent jurisdiction over certain
administrative cases which are within the jurisdiction of the regular courts or
administrative agencies, but has primary jurisdiction to investigate any act or
omission of a public officer or employee who is under the jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan.
The second paragraph of Section 14, Republic Act (RA) No. 6770 provides that
no appeal or application for remedy may be heard against the decision or
findings of the Ombudsman, with the exception of the Supreme Court (SC) on
pure questions of law.On the other hand, the second paragraph of Section 14,
RA 6770 provides that no appeal or application for remedy may be heard against
the decision or findings of the Ombudsman, with the exception of the Supreme
Court on pure questions of law. This paragraph, which the Ombudsman
particularly relies on in arguing that the CA had no jurisdiction over the main
C.A.-G.R. S.P. No. 139453 petition, as it is supposedly this Court which has the
sole jurisdiction to conduct a judicial review of its decisions or findings, is vague
for two (2) reasons: (1) it is unclear what the phrase application for remedy or
the word findings refers to; and (2) it does not specify what procedural remedy
is solely allowable to this Court, save that the same be taken only against a pure
question of law. The task then, is to apply the relevant principles of statutory
construction to resolve the ambiguity.
43
Statutory Construction; In case of doubt as to what a provision of a statute
means, the meaning put to the provision during the legislative deliberations may
be adopted, albeit not controlling in the interpretation of the law.As an aid to
construction, courts may avail themselves of the actual proceedings of the
legislative body in interpreting a statute of doubtful meaning. In case of doubt as
to what a provision of a statute means, the meaning put to the provision during
the legislative deliberations may be adopted, albeit not controlling in the
interpretation of the law.
As a general rule, the second paragraph of Section 14, Republic Act (RA) No.
6770 bans the whole range of remedies against issuances of the Ombudsman, by
prohibiting: (a) an appeal against any decision or finding of the Ombudsman,
and (b) any application of remedy against the same.As a general rule, the
second paragraph of Section 14, RA 6770 bans the whole range of remedies
against issuances of the Ombudsman, by prohibiting: (a) an appeal against any
decision or finding of the Ombudsman, and (b) any application of remedy
(subject to the exception below) against the same. To clarify, the phrase
application for remedy, being a generally worded provision, and being
separated from the term appeal by the disjunctive or, refers to any remedy
(whether taken mainly or provisionally), except an appeal, following the maxim
generalia verba sunt generaliter intelligenda: general words are to be understood
in a general sense. By the same principle, the word findings, which is also
separated from the word decision by the disjunctive or, would therefore refer
to any finding made by the Ombudsman (whether final or provisional), except a
decision. The subject provision, however, crafts an exception to the foregoing
general rule. While the specific procedural vehicle is not explicit from its text, it is
fairly deducible that the second paragraph of Section 14, RA 6770 excepts, as
the only allowable remedy against the decision or findings of the Ombudsman,
a Rule 45 appeal, for the reason that it is the only remedy taken to the Supreme
Court on pure questions of law, whether under the 1964 Rules of Court or the
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
Doctrine of Non-Interference; Appeals; Petition for Review on Certiorari;
Congress cannot interfere with matters of procedure; hence, it cannot alter the
scope of a Rule 45 appeal so as to apply to interlocutory findings issued by the
Ombudsman.Of course, the second paragraph of Section 14, RA 6770s
extremely limited restriction on remedies is inappropriate since a Rule 45 appeal
which is within the sphere of the rules of procedure promulgated by this Court
can only be taken against final decisions or orders of lower courts, and not
against findings of quasi-judicial agencies. As will be later elaborated upon,
Congress cannot interfere with matters of procedure; hence, it cannot alter the
scope of a Rule 45 appeal so as to apply to interlocutory findings issued by the
Ombudsman. More significantly, by confining the remedy to a Rule 45 appeal,
the provision takes away the remedy of certiorari, grounded on errors of
jurisdiction, in denigration of the judicial power constitutionally vested in courts.
In this light, the second paragraph of Section 14, RA 6770 also increased this
Courts appellate jurisdiction, without a showing, however, that it gave its
consent to the same. The provision is, in fact, very similar to the fourth
paragraph of Section 27, RA 6770 (as above cited), which was invalidated in the
case of Fabian v. Desierto, 295 SCRA 470 (1998).
Judicial Power; The concept of Ombudsman independence cannot be invoked as
basis to insulate the Ombudsman from judicial power constitutionally vested unto
the courts.The concept of Ombudsman independence cannot be invoked as
basis to insulate the Ombudsman from judicial power constitutionally vested unto
the courts. Courts are apolitical bodies, which are ordained to act as impartial
tribunals and apply even justice to all. Hence, the Ombudsmans notion that it
can be exempt from an incident of judicial power that is, a provisional writ of
injunction against a preventive suspension order clearly strays from the
concepts rationale of insulating the office from political harassment or pressure.
Remedial Law; Courts; Hierarchy of Courts; Certiorari; The Court of Appeals
(CAs) certiorari jurisdiction is not only original but also concurrent with the
Regional Trial Courts (RTCs) (under Section 21[1], Chapter II of Batas Pambansa
[BP] Blg. 129), and the Supreme Court (SC) (under Section 5, Article VIII of the
1987 Philippine Constitution). In view of the concurrence of these courts
jurisdiction over petitions for certiorari, the doctrine of hierarchy of courts should
be followed.Note that the CAs certiorari jurisdiction, as above stated, is not
only original but also concurrent with the Regional Trial Courts (under Section
21[1], Chapter II of BP 129), and the Supreme Court (under Section 5, Article
VIII of the 1987 Philippine Constitution). In view of the concurrence of these
courts jurisdiction over petitions for certiorari, the doctrine of hierarchy of courts
should be followed. In People v. Cuaresma, 172 SCRA 415 (1989), the doctrine
was explained as follows: [T]his concurrence of jurisdiction is not x x x to be
taken as according to parties seeking any of the writs an absolute, unrestrained
freedom of choice of the court to which application therefor will be directed.
There is after all a hierarchy of courts. That hierarchy is determinative of the
venue of appeals, and should also serve as a general determinant of the
appropriate forum for petitions for the extraordinary writs. A becoming regard for
that judicial hierarchy most certainly indicates that petitions for the issuance of
extraordinary writs against first level (inferior) courts should be filed with the
Regional Trial Court, and those against the latter, with the Court of Appeals.
When a court has subject matter jurisdiction over a particular case, as conferred
unto it by law, said court may then exercise its jurisdiction acquired over that
case, which is called judicial power.
44
Judicial Power; Words and Phrases; Judicial power, as vested in the Supreme
Court (SC) and all other courts established by law, has been defined as the
totality of powers a court exercises when it assumes jurisdiction and hears and
decides a case.Judicial power, as vested in the Supreme Court and all other
courts established by law, has been defined as the totality of powers a court
exercises when it assumes jurisdiction and hears and decides a case. Under
Section 1, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution, it includes the duty of the courts
of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally
demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part
of any branch or instrumentality of the Government.wor
Same; While the power to define, prescribe, and apportion the jurisdiction of the
various courts is, by constitutional design, vested unto Congress, the power to
promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional
rights, pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts belongs exclusively to the
Supreme Court (SC).Judicial power is never exercised in a vacuum. A courts
exercise of the jurisdiction it has acquired over a particular case conforms to the
limits and parameters of the rules of procedure duly promulgated by this Court.
In other words, procedure is the framework within which judicial power is
exercised. In Manila Railroad Co. v. Attorney-General, 20 Phil. 523 (1911), the
Court elucidated that [t]he power or authority of the court over the subject
matter existed and was fixed before procedure in a given cause began.
Procedure does not alter or change that power or authority; it simply directs the
manner in which it shall be fully and justly exercised. To be sure, in certain
cases, if that power is not exercised in conformity with the provisions of the
procedural law, purely, the court attempting to exercise it loses the power to
exercise it legally. This does not mean that it loses jurisdiction of the subject
matter. While the power to define, prescribe, and apportion the jurisdiction of
the various courts is, by constitutional design, vested unto Congress, the power
to promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional
rights, pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts belongs exclusively to this
Court.
Remedial Law; Temporary Restraining Order; Preliminary Injunction; It is well-
settled that the sole object of a temporary restraining order (TRO) or a writ of
preliminary injunction (WPI), whether prohibitory or mandatory, is to preserve
the status quo until the merits of the case can be heard.A temporary
restraining order and a writ of preliminary injunction both constitute temporary
measures availed of during the pendency of the action. They are, by nature,
ancillary because they are mere incidents in and are dependent upon the result
of the main action. It is well-settled that the sole object of a temporary
restraining order or a writ of preliminary injunction, whether prohibitory or
mandatory, is to preserve the status quo until the merits of the case can be
heard. They are usually granted when it is made to appear that there is a
substantial controversy between the parties and one of them is committing an
act or threatening the immediate commission of an act that will cause irreparable
injury or destroy the status quo of the controversy before a full hearing can be
had on the merits of the case. In other words, they are preservative remedies for
the protection of substantive rights or interests, and, hence, not a cause of
action in itself, but merely adjunct to a main suit. In a sense, they are regulatory
processes meant to prevent a case from being mooted by the interim acts of the
parties.
Same; Same; Same; The Supreme Court (SC) rules that when Congress passed
the first paragraph of Section 14, Republic Act (RA) No. 6770 and, in so doing,
took away from the courts their power to issue a Temporary Restraining Order
(TRO) and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction (WPI) to enjoin an investigation
conducted by the Ombudsman, it encroached upon the Courts constitutional
rule-making authority.With these considerations in mind, the Court rules that
when Congress passed the first paragraph of Section 14, RA 6770 and, in so
doing, took away from the courts their power to issue a TRO and/or WPI to
enjoin an investigation conducted by the Ombudsman, it encroached upon this
Courts constitutional rule-making authority. Clearly, these issuances, which are,
by nature, provisional reliefs and auxiliary writs created under the provisions of
the Rules of Court, are matters of procedure which belong exclusively within the
province of this Court. Rule 58 of the Rules of Court did not create, define, and
regulate a right but merely prescribed the means of implementing an existing
right since it only provided for temporary reliefs to preserve the applicants right
in esse which is threatened to be violated during the course of a pending
litigation.
Political Law; Separation of Powers; When Congress creates a court and delimits
its jurisdiction, the procedure for which its jurisdiction is exercised is fixed by the
Court through the rules it promulgates.That Congress has been vested with the
authority to define, prescribe, and apportion the jurisdiction of the various courts
under Section 2, Article VIII, supra, as well as to create statutory courts under
Section 1, Article VIII, supra, does not result in an abnegation of the Courts own
power to promulgate rules of pleading, practice, and procedure under Section
5(5), Article VIII, supra. Albeit operatively interrelated, these powers are
nonetheless institutionally separate and distinct, each to be preserved under its
own sphere of authority. When Congress creates a court and delimits its
jurisdiction, the procedure for which its jurisdiction is exercised is fixed by the
Court through the rules it promulgates. The first paragraph of Section 14, RA
6770 is not a jurisdiction-vesting provision, as the Ombudsman misconceives,
because it does not define, prescribe, and apportion the subject matter
45
jurisdiction of courts to act on certiorari cases; the certiorari jurisdiction of
courts, particularly the CA, stands under the relevant sections of BP 129 which
were not shown to have been repealed. Instead, through this provision,
Congress interfered with a provisional remedy that was created by this Court
under its duly promulgated rules of procedure, which utility is both integral and
inherent to every courts exercise of judicial power. Without the Courts consent
to the proscription, as may be manifested by an adoption of the same as part of
the rules of procedure through an administrative circular issued therefor, there
thus, stands to be a violation of the separation of powers principle.
Judicial Power; To give true meaning to the judicial power contemplated by the
Framers of our Constitution, the Courts duly promulgated rules of procedure
should therefore remain unabridged, this, even by statute.It should be pointed
out that the breach of Congress in prohibiting provisional injunctions, such as in
the first paragraph of Section 14, RA 6770, does not only undermine the
constitutional allocation of powers; it also practically dilutes a courts ability to
carry out its functions. This is so since a particular case can easily be mooted by
supervening events if no provisional injunctive relief is extended while the court
is hearing the same. Accordingly, the courts acquired jurisdiction, through which
it exercises its judicial power, is rendered nugatory. Indeed, the force of judicial
power, especially under the present Constitution, cannot be enervated due to a
courts inability to regulate what occurs during a proceedings course. As earlier
intimated, when jurisdiction over the subject matter is accorded by law and has
been acquired by a court, its exercise thereof should be unclipped. To give true
meaning to the judicial power contemplated by the Framers of our Constitution,
the Courts duly promulgated rules of procedure should therefore remain
unabridged, this, even by statute. Truth be told, the policy against provisional
injunctive writs in whatever variant should only subsist under rules of procedure
duly promulgated by the Court given its sole prerogative over the same.
Administrative Law; Preventive Suspension; A preventive suspension order is not
a penalty but only a preventive measure.By nature, a preventive suspension
order is not a penalty but only a preventive measure. In Quimbo v. Acting
Ombudsman Gervacio, 466 SCRA 277 (2005), the Court explained the distinction,
stating that its purpose is to prevent the official to be suspended from using his
position and the powers and prerogatives of his office to influence potential
witnesses or tamper with records which may be vital in the prosecution of the
case against him: Jurisprudential law establishes a clear-cut distinction between
suspension as preventive measure and suspension as penalty. The distinction, by
considering the purpose aspect of the suspensions, is readily cognizable as they
have different ends sought to be achieved. Preventive suspension is merely a
preventive measure, a preliminary step in an administrative investigation. The
purpose of the suspension order is to prevent the accused from using his
position and the powers and prerogatives of his office to influence potential
witnesses or tamper with records which may be vital in the prosecution of the
case against him. If after such investigation, the charge is established and the
person investigated is found guilty of acts warranting his suspension or removal,
then he is suspended, removed or dismissed. This is the penalty.
The law sets forth two (2) conditions that must be satisfied to justify the
issuance of an order of preventive suspension pending an investigation.The
law sets forth two (2) conditions that must be satisfied to justify the issuance of
an order of preventive suspension pending an investigation, namely: (1) The
evidence of guilt is strong; and (2) Either of the following circumstances coexist
with the first requirement: (a) The charge involves dishonesty, oppression or
grave misconduct or neglect in the performance of duty; (b) The charge would
warrant removal from the service; or (c) The respondents continued stay in
office may prejudice the case filed against him.
Condonation; Words and Phrases; Generally speaking, condonation has been
defined as [a] victims express or implied forgiveness of an offense, [especially]
by treating the offender as if there had been no offense.The condonation
doctrine which connotes this same sense of complete extinguishment of
liability as will be herein elaborated upon is not based on statutory law. It is a
jurisprudential creation that originated from the 1959 case of Pascual v. Hon.
Provincial Board of Nueva Ecija, 106 Phil. 466 (Pascual), which was therefore
decided under the 1935 Constitution.
Condonation Doctrine; The Court, citing Civil Service Commission v. Sojor,
554 SCRA 160 (2008), also clarified that the condonation doctrine would not
apply to appointive officials since, as to them, there is no sovereign will to
disenfranchise.
Civil Service; Public Officers; The 1987 Constitution strengthened and solidified
what has been first proclaimed in the 1973 Constitution by commanding public
officers to be accountable to the people at all times.After the turbulent decades
of Martial Law rule, the Filipino People have framed and adopted the 1987
Constitution, which sets forth in the Declaration of Principles and State Policies in
Article II that [t]he State shall maintain honesty and integrity in the public
service and take positive and effective measures against graft and corruption.
Learning how unbridled power could corrupt public servants under the regime of
a dictator, the Framers put primacy on the integrity of the public service by
declaring it as a constitutional principle and a State policy. More significantly, the
1987 Constitution strengthened and solidified what has been first proclaimed in
the 1973 Constitution by commanding public officers to be accountable to the
people at all times: Section 1. Public office is a public trust. Public officers and
employees must at all times be accountable to the people, serve them with
46
utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty, and efficiency and act with patriotism and
justice, and lead modest lives. In Belgica v. Ochoa, Jr., 710 SCRA 1 (2013), it
was explained that: [t]he aphorism forged under Section 1, Article XI of the 1987
Constitution, which states that public office is a public trust, is an overarching
reminder that every instrumentality of government should exercise their official
functions only in accordance with the principles of the Constitution which
embodies the parameters of the peoples trust. The notion of a public trust
connotes accountability x x x. The same mandate is found in the Revised
Administrative Code under the section of the Civil Service Commission, and also,
in the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees.
For local elective officials like Binay, Jr., the grounds to discipline, suspend or
remove an elective local official from office are stated in Section 60 of Republic
Act No. 7160, otherwise known as the Local Government Code of 1991 (LGC),
which was approved on October 10 1991, and took effect on January 1, 1992:
Section 60.
Grounds for Disciplinary Action.An elective local official may be disciplined,
suspended, or removed from office on any of the following grounds: (a)
Disloyalty to the Republic of the Philippines; (b) Culpable violation of the
Constitution; (c) Dishonesty, oppression, misconduct in office, gross negligence,
or dereliction of duty; (d) Commission of any offense involving moral turpitude or
an offense punishable by at least prisin mayor; (e) Abuse of authority; (f)
Unauthorized absence for fifteen (15) consecutive working days, except in the
case of members of the sangguniang panlalawigan, sangguniang panlungsod,
sangguniang bayan, and sangguniang barangay; (g) Application for, or
acquisition of, foreign citizenship or residence or the status of an immigrant of
another country; and (h) Such other grounds as may be provided in this Code
and other laws. An elective local official may be removed from office on the
grounds enumerated above by order of the proper court.
Section 40(b) of the Local Government Code (LGC) states that those removed
from office as a result of an administrative case shall be disqualified from
running for any elective local position.Related to this provision is Section 40(b)
of the LGC which states that those removed from office as a result of an
administrative case shall be disqualified from running for any elective local
position: Section 40. Disqualifications.The following persons are disqualified
from running for any elective local position: x x x x (b) Those removed from
office as a result of an administrative case.
Condonation Doctrine; The doctrine of condonation is actually bereft of legal
bases.Section 52(a) of the RRACCS provides that the penalty of dismissal from
service carries the accessory penalty of perpetual disqualification from holding
public office: Section 52. Administrative Disabilities Inherent in Certain
Penalties.a. The penalty of dismissal shall carry with it cancellation of eligibility,
forfeiture of retirement benefits, perpetual disqualification from holding public
office, and bar from taking the civil service examinations. In contrast, Section
66(b) of the LGC states that the penalty of suspension shall not exceed the
unexpired term of the elective local official nor constitute a bar to his candidacy
for as long as he meets the qualifications required for the office. Note, however,
that the provision only pertains to the duration of the penalty and its effect on
the officials candidacy. Nothing therein states that the administrative liability
therefor is extinguished by the fact of reelection: Section 66. Form and Notice of
Decision.x x x. x x x x (b) The penalty of suspension shall not exceed the
unexpired term of the respondent or a period of six (6) months for every
administrative offense, nor shall said penalty be a bar to the candidacy of the
respondent so suspended as long as he meets the qualifications required for the
office. Reading the 1987 Constitution together with the above cited legal
provisions now leads this Court to the conclusion that the doctrine of
condonation is actually bereft of legal bases.
Election is not a mode of condoning an administrative offense, and
there is simply no constitutional or statutory basis in our jurisdiction to
support the notion that an official elected for a different term is fully
absolved of any administrative liability arising from an offense done
during a prior term.The concept of public office is a public trust and the
corollary requirement of accountability to the people at all times, as mandated
under the 1987 Constitution, is plainly inconsistent with the idea that an elective
local officials administrative liability for a misconduct committed during a prior
term can be wiped off by the fact that he was elected to a second term of office,
or even another elective post. Election is not a mode of condoning an
administrative offense, and there is simply no constitutional or statutory basis in
our jurisdiction to support the notion that an official elected for a different term
is fully absolved of any administrative liability arising from an offense done
during a prior term. In this jurisdiction, liability arising from administrative
offenses may be condoned by the President in light of Section 19, Article VII of
the 1987 Constitution which was interpreted in Llamas v. Orbos, 202 SCRA 844
(1991), to apply to administrative offenses.
Nothing in Section 66(b) states that the elective local officials
administrative liability is extinguished by the fact of reelection. Thus,
at all events, no legal provision actually supports the theory that the
liability is condoned.At best, Section 66(b) of the LGC prohibits the
enforcement of the penalty of suspension beyond the unexpired portion of the
elective local officials prior term, and likewise allows said official to still run for
reelection. This treatment is similar to People ex rel. Bagshaw v. Thompson, (55
Cal. App. 2d 147; 130 P.2d.237 [1942]), and Montgomery v. Nowell, (183 Ark.
47
1116; 40 S.W.2d 418 [1931]), both cited in Pascual, wherein it was ruled that an Civil Service; Public Officers; Condonation Doctrine; The Supreme Court (SC)
officer cannot be suspended for a misconduct committed during a prior term. deems it apt to clarify that the mootness of the issue regarding the validity of the
However, as previously stated, nothing in Section 66(b) states that the elective preventive suspension order subject of this case does not preclude any of its
local officials administrative liability is extinguished by the fact of reelection. foregoing determinations, particularly, its abandonment of the condonation
Thus, at all events, no legal provision actually supports the theory that the doctrine.This Court deems it apt to clarify that the mootness of the issue
liability is condoned. regarding the validity of the preventive suspension order subject of this case
does not preclude any of its foregoing determinations, particularly, its
The Supreme Courts (SCs) abandonment of the condonation doctrine
abandonment of the condonation doctrine. As explained in Belgica v. Ochoa, Jr.,
should be prospective in application for the reason that judicial
the moot and academic principle is not a magical formula that can
decisions applying or interpreting the laws or the Constitution, until
automatically dissuade the Court in resolving a case. The Court will decide cases,
reversed, shall form part of the legal system of the Philippines.This
otherwise moot, if: first, there is a grave violation of the Constitution; second,
Court simply finds no legal authority to sustain the condonation doctrine in this
the exceptional character of the situation and the paramount public interest is
jurisdiction. As can be seen from this discourse, it was a doctrine adopted from
involved; third, when the constitutional issue raised requires formulation of
one class of US rulings way back in 1959 and thus, out of touch from and now
controlling principles to guide the bench, the bar, and the public; and fourth, the
rendered obsolete by the current legal regime. In consequence, it is high time
case is capable of repetition yet evading review.
for this Court to abandon the condonation doctrine that originated from Pascual,
and affirmed in the cases following the same, such as Aguinaldo v. Santos, 212 It would be a violation of the Supreme Courts (SCs) own duty to uphold and
SCRA 768 (1992), Salalima v. Guingona, Jr., 257 SCRA 55 (1996), Mayor Garcia defend the Constitution if it were not to abandon the condonation doctrine now
v. Mojica, 314 SCRA 207 (1999), and Governor Garcia, Jr. v. CA, 586 SCRA 799 that its infirmities have become apparent.As extensively discussed, the
(2009), which were all relied upon by the CA. It should, however, be clarified continued application of the condonation doctrine is simply impermissible under
that this Courts abandonment of the condonation doctrine should be prospective the auspices of the present Constitution which explicitly mandates that public
in application for the reason that judicial decisions applying or interpreting the office is a public trust and that public officials shall be accountable to the people
laws or the Constitution, until reversed, shall form part of the legal system of the at all times.
Philippines. Unto this Court devolves the sole authority to interpret what the
The condonation doctrine is a peculiar jurisprudential creation that has persisted
Constitution means, and all persons are bound to follow its interpretation. As
as a defense of elective officials to escape administrative liability.It is the first
explained in De Castro v. Judicial Bar Council, 618 SCRA 639 (2010): Judicial
time that the legal intricacies of this doctrine have been brought to light; thus,
decisions assume the same authority as a statute itself and, until authoritatively
this is a situation of exceptional character which this Court must ultimately
abandoned, necessarily become, to the extent that they are applicable, the
resolve. Further, since the doctrine has served as a perennial obstacle against
criteria that must control the actuations, not only of those called upon to abide
exacting public accountability from the multitude of elective local officials
by them, but also of those duty-bound to enforce obedience to them.
throughout the years, it is indubitable that paramount public interest is involved.
Grave Abuse of Discretion; It is well-settled that an act of a court or tribunal can
In any event, the abandonment of a doctrine is wholly within the prerogative of
only be considered as with grave abuse of discretion when such act is done in a
the Court. As mentioned, it is its own jurisprudential creation and may therefore,
capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of
pursuant to its mandate to uphold and defend the Constitution, revoke it
jurisdiction.It is well-settled that an act of a court or tribunal can only be
notwithstanding supervening events that render the subject of discussion
considered as with grave abuse of discretion when such act is done in a
moot.The defense of condonation has been consistently invoked by elective
capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of
local officials against the administrative charges filed against them. To provide a
jurisdiction. The abuse of discretion must be so patent and gross as to amount to
sample size, the Ombudsman has informed the Court that for the period of July
an evasion of a positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by
2013 to December 2014 alone, 85 cases from the Luzon Office and 24 cases
law, or to act at all in contemplation of law, as where the power is exercised in
from the Central Office were dismissed on the ground of condonation. Thus, in
an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion and hostility. It has also
just one and a half years, over a hundred cases of alleged misconduct
been held that grave abuse of discretion arises when a lower court or tribunal
involving infractions such as dishonesty, oppression, gross neglect of duty and
patently violates the Constitution, the law or existing jurisprudence.
grave misconduct were placed beyond the reach of the Ombudsmans

48
investigatory and prosecutorial powers. Evidently, this fortifies the finding that
the case is capable of repetition and must therefore, not evade review. In any
event, the abandonment of a doctrine is wholly within the prerogative of the
Court. As mentioned, it is its own jurisprudential creation and may therefore,
pursuant to its mandate to uphold and defend the Constitution, revoke it
notwithstanding supervening events that render the subject of discussion moot.
Bersamin, J., Concurring and Dissenting Opinion:
The Ombudsmans Act; View that Section 14 of Republic Act (RA) No. 6770
should be struck down for authorizing the undue interference with the
prerogatives of the courts of law to adopt whatever means were allowed by law
and procedure to exercise their jurisdiction in the cases properly cognizable by
them.I am writing this separate opinion to memorialize my concurrence with
the declaration of the ineffectiveness of the first paragraph of Section 14 of
Republic Act No. 6770, and of the unconstitutionality of the second paragraph
thereof. The main opinion has been written well by our esteemed colleague,
Associate Justice Estela M. Perlas-Bernabe, who has exhibited her scholarly bent
once again. But let me assure my colleagues in the Majority that if I submit this
concurrence, I do not mean to diminish in any way or degree the forcefulness
and correctness of the justification for the declaration. I simply want to
underscore that Section 14 of Republic Act No. 6770 should be struck down for
authorizing the undue interference with the prerogatives of the courts of law to
adopt whatever means were allowed by law and procedure to exercise their
jurisdiction in the cases properly cognizable by them.
Ombudsman; Preventive Suspension; Administrative Cases; View that in line with
the power to investigate administrative cases, the Ombudsman is vested with the
authority to preventively suspend respondent public officials and employees
pursuant to Section 24 of Republic Act (RA) No. 6770.In line with the power to
investigate administrative cases, the Ombudsman is vested with the authority to
preventively suspend respondent public officials and employees pursuant to
Section 24 of Republic Act No. 6770, which provides: Section 24. Preventive
Suspension.The Ombudsman or his Deputy may preventively suspend any
officer or employee under his authority pending an investigation, if in his
judgment the evidence of guilt is strong, and (a) the charge against such officer
or employee involves dishonesty, oppression or grave misconduct or neglect in
the performance of duty; (b) the charges would warrant removal from the
service; or (c) the respondents continued stay in office may prejudice the case
filed against him. The preventive suspension shall continue until the case is
terminated by the Office of the Ombudsman but not more than six (6) months,
without pay, except when the delay in the disposition of the case by the Office of
the Ombudsman is due to the fault, negligence or petition of the respondent, in
which case the period of such delay shall not be counted in computing the period
of suspension herein provided.
View that the Ombudsman has no authority to issue the preventive suspension
order in connection with criminal investigations of government officials or
employees because such authority rests in the courts in which the criminal cases
are filed.It is important to note, however, that the Ombudsman has no
authority to issue the preventive suspension order in connection with criminal
investigations of government officials or employees because such authority rests
in the courts in which the criminal cases are filed.
Civil Service; Public Officers; Condonation Doctrine; View that condonation shall
apply only in case of the reelection of a public officer who is sought to be
permanently removed from office as a result of his misconduct, not while such
public officer is undergoing investigation.It is clear to me that, based on the
language and the factual milieu of Aguinaldo v. Santos, 212 SCRA 768 (1992),
and Salalima v. Guingona, Jr., 257 SCRA 55 (1996), which both cited Pascual v.
Provincial Board of Nueva Ecija, 106 Phil. 466 (1959), and of other akin rulings,
condonation shall apply only in case of the reelection of a public officer who is
sought to be permanently removed from office as a result of his misconduct, not
while such public officer is undergoing investigation. Condonation necessarily
implies that the condoned act has already been found to have been committed
by the public officer. Hence, condonation applies to the penalty or punishment
imposed after the conduct of an administrative investigation. Under the
circumstances, the pronouncements in Aguinaldo, Salalima and the others could
not be applicable to the preventive suspension order issued to Binay, Jr. pending
his administrative investigation because preventive suspension pending the
conduct of an investigation was not yet a penalty in itself, but a mere measure of
precaution to enable the disciplining authority to investigate the charges by
precluding the respondent from influencing the witnesses against him.
Suspension; View that the Supreme Court (SC) notably stated in Garcia, Jr. v.
Court of Appeals, 586 SCRA 799 (2009), and Joson III v. Court of Appeals, 482
SCRA 360 (2006), that suspension from office of an elective official would
deprive the electorate of the services of the person they voted into office in the
context of determining the propriety of the issuance of the preventive suspension
order.As I see it, the CA misconstrued the milieu in Garcia, Jr. v. Court of
Appeals, 586 SCRA 799 (2009), and Joson III v. Court of Appeals, 482 SCRA 360
(2006), as an application of the doctrine of condonation. The Court notably
stated in Garcia, Jr. and Joson III that suspension from office of an elective
official would deprive the electorate of the services of the person they voted into
office in the context of determining the propriety of the issuance of the
preventive suspension order. In other words, the statement only served to
remind the Ombudsman to issue the preventive suspension orders with utmost
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caution in view of the gravity of the effects of suspending an incumbent elective
local official. Hence, Garcia, Jr. and Joson III did not apply the doctrine of
condonation.
Preventive Suspension; View that the preventive suspension order, being an
ancillary issuance, was dissolved upon the Ombudsmans resolution of the
administrative charges on the merits.In the meanwhile, the Ombudsman found
Binay, Jr. administratively liable, and dismissed him from the service. By such
dismissal, the questions raised against the CAs issuance of the writ of
preliminary injunction against the Ombudsman were rendered moot and
academic. I join the Majority in saying that the preventive suspension order,
being an ancillary issuance, was dissolved upon the Ombudsmans resolution of
the administrative charges on the merits. Thus, to dwell on the preventive
suspension of Binay, Jr. and his co-respondents any further would be
superfluous, for, as the Court said in Philippine Savings Bank v. Senate
Impeachment Court, 686 SCRA 35 (2012): It is a rule of universal application
that courts of justice constituted to pass upon substantial rights will not consider
questions in which no actual interests are involved; they decline jurisdiction of
moot cases. And where the issue has become moot and academic, there is no
justiciable controversy, so that a declaration thereon would be of no practical use
or value. There is no actual substantial relief to which petitioners would be
entitled and which would be negated by the dismissal of the petition.

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