The Thirteenth-Century Notion of Signification

Investigating Medieval Philosophy

Managing Editor

John Marenbon

Editorial Board

Margaret Cameron
Simo Knuuttila
Martin Lenz
Christopher J. Martin

VOLUME 10

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The Thirteenth-Century Notion
of Signification
The Discussions and Their Origin and Development

By

Ana Mara Mora-Mrquez

LEIDEN | BOSTON


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Mora-Mrquez, Ana Mara.

The thirteenth-century notion of signification : the discussions and their origin and development / by Ana
Mara Mora-Mrquez.
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Includes bibliographical references and index.
ISBN 978-90-04-29867-5 (hardback : alk. paper) -- ISBN 978-90-04-30013-2 (e-book) 1. Reference
(Linguistics) 2. Signification (Logic) I. Title.

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Contents

Introduction1

Part 1
Signification of Concepts and Signification of Things

1 Ancient Sources11
1.1 Aristotles Perihermeneias11
Perihermeneias 1.16a38: Utterances as Symbols and Signs13
Perihermeneias 1.16a918: Simple and Compound
Linguistic Items18
Contradiction and Equivocation20
1.2 Boethius Second Commentary on the Perihermeneias21
The Subject Matter of the Perihermeneias according
to Boethius22
Boethius on Perihermeneias 1.16a3823
Concepts and Likenesses in Boethius31

2 Medieval Discussions about Signification of Concepts and Signification

of Things36
2.1 Whether Words (Qua Names) Signify Concepts or Things36
The Semiotic Angle41
The Immediate Signification of Concepts41
The Modist Rejection of the Immediate Signification of
Concepts52
Roger Bacon and Peter John Olivis Rejection of the Immediate
Signification of Concepts61
The Verificational Angle70
2.2 Whether Words Lose Their Signification with the Destruction of
Their Significate76
Anonymus Alanis Omnis Homo De Necessitate Est Animal
(Paris bnf Lat. 16135, ff. 99rb103vb)80
Roger Bacons De Signis iv.287
Boethius of Dacias Sophisma ohnea92
Peter John Olivis Quaestiones logicales q.395
Anonymus Alanis Solution to the Sophisma ohnea98
vi Contents

Part 2
Signification in Logic and in Grammar

3 Names and Verbs in Priscian and in Aristotle109

3.1 Priscian on the Constitution of Parts of Speech and Sentences109
The Role of the Notion of Signification in the Division and Order of
the Parts of Speech111
Names and Verbs and Their Construction according to Priscian115
3.2 Names and Verbs in Aristotles Perihermeneias118

4 The Role of the Significate (significatum) in Grammar and in

Logic123
4.1 The Pre-Modist Tradition123
4.2 The Modist Tradition139

Conclusion157

Bibliography163
Index of Subjects176
Index of Modern Authors180
Index of Ancient and Medieval Authors182
Introduction
Hilary Putnam begins his article The Meaning of Meaning by claiming that
modern linguistic research has greatly illuminated the syntax of natural lan-
guages, but has left their semantic aspect as obscure as ever:

Analysis of the deep structure of linguistic forms gives us an incompara-

bly more powerful description of the syntax of natural languages than we
have ever had before. But the dimension of language associated with the
word meaning is in spite of the usual spate of heroic if misguided
attempts, as much in the dark as it ever was.1

According to Putnam, it is the traditional formulation of the problem in terms

of meaning that is responsible for this dismal progress in semantics: Just as
the modern reformulation of the questions has improved the syntactic analy-
sis of linguistic structures, so too has the poor state of the notion of meaning
perpetuated the obscurity around the semantic dimension of human
language.
In my opinion, however, the poor state of modern semantic enquiries is
mainly due to an ambiguous notion of meaning. In fact, modern linguistic
enquiries intend to answer fundamentally different questions in terms of
meaning. Meaning plays an explanatory role in, at least, these functional
aspects of language: first, communicative how language transmits informa-
tion; next, semiotic what is a linguistic sign; finally, descriptive how lan-
guage accurately or truly represents the objective world. In other words, the
dimension of language associated with the word meaning is as much in the
dark as it ever was, quite likely because there are not one but several dimen-
sions of language associated with the notion of meaning.
It seems this diagnosis also applies, with the necessary qualifications, to the
medieval notion of signification (significatio). For the Latin verb significare
and its derivative noun significatio involve at least the same ambiguity that
underlies our modern notion of meaning. The medieval notion plays indeed
different roles in some ancient traditions with quite different agendas. I intend
to show that the different roles this notion plays in those ancient traditions are
a determining factor in crucial discussions about significatio in thirteenth-
century linguistic literature. Yet, the analysis of the three most important
thirteenth-century discussions about significatio reveals an increasingly coherent

1 H. Putnam, The Meaning of Meaning, in Mind, Language and Reality. Philosophical Papers.
Vol. 2 (Cambridge: cup, 1975), pp. 215271, at p. 215.

koninklijke brill nv, leiden, |doi 10.1163/9789004300132_002

2 Introduction

treatment of this notion: Towards the end of the thirteenth century, the notion
plays a central role only in accounts of the institution of linguistic signs and
next to no role in logical and grammatical accounts.
In the early thirteenth-century, linguistic problems typically arise from the
encounter of the Aristotelian Organon with other linguistic traditions, notably
with Boethius logical corpus and with Priscians grammar. Most of these prob-
lems revolve around the role significatio plays in the institution of linguistic
signs, the grammaticality of sentences and the truth or falsity of assertions,
as well as in the question of linguistic communication. In a span of about
sixtyyears, these discussions lead us to the approach to signification of late
thirteenth-century masters of Arts, such as Boethius of Dacia and Radulphus
Brito. These authors, as we shall see, put forth a notion of signification that is
disconnected from the analyses of grammaticality and truth or falsity, and that
finally retains a central role only in the institution of simple linguistic items: in
impositive grammar (grammatica impositiva). We shall see that the notion of
signification evolving beyond medieval logic and grammar is the common fea-
ture these three discussions share, thus showing a tendency towards a more
coherent use of the notion, which remains fundamental for medieval
semiotics.
This study should also incidentally show the limits of equating the medieval
notion of signification with the modern notion of meaning. Thus, we should
notice that thirteenth-century approaches to signification should not be con-
sidered as a stage in the historical development of the notion of meaning, but
rather as part of a set of linguistic enquiries that arose in a scholarly context
that has no exact counterpart in modern linguistic analyses.
This last remark explains my heavily historical approach to these discus-
sions.2 Rather than analyse from the point of view of modern problems, I
intend to reconstruct the medieval philosophical problems as they were
engaged at that time, using mostly the theoretical tools provided by the medi-
eval philosophical background itself. Hence, I intend to reveal the medieval
problems and their medieval solutions in their own doctrinal context, with the
conviction that precisely the medieval way of positing and treating linguistic
problems presents an alternative way of approaching human language that is
philosophically interesting in itself.

2 For a collection of articles analysing different methodological approaches to the history of

medieval logic, see M. Cameron and J. Marenbon (eds.), Methods and Methodologies.
Aristotelian Logic East and West, 5001500 (Leiden: Brill, 2011) (Investigating Medieval
Philosophy 2).
Introduction 3

The medieval way is remarkable for at least three reasons: First, it describes
and tries to regulate the use of ordinary human language, aiming to navigate its
natural pitfalls in a well-defined set of linguistic situations (namely, teaching,
textual interpretation and philosophical disputation). Second, it analyses
human language mindful of its use in these particular situations insofar as it
is the singular tool for production, communication and interpretation of
human knowledge. Last but not least, based on careful analyses of the linguis-
tic problems that are to be engaged, it intentionally refines theoretical tools fit
to engage those problems and attempts to fix the tools that were diversely used
in e.g. the authoritative ancient literature. As we shall see, all of these aspects
are involved in the thirteenth-century development of the notion of
signification.

***

Signification is a key notion in early thirteenth-century logic, which was mainly

studied on the basis of some of Boethius logical opuscula3 and his translations
of Aristotles Categories and Perihermeneias and of Porphyrys Isagoge. In the
academic context of the medieval faculties of Arts, Boethius logical works and
translations had to interact with other linguistic treatises where the notion
also played a central role and that had rich and long traditions. Signification is,
in fact, also central in grammar, which in the same period was mainly studied
on the basis of Priscians Institutiones grammaticae.4 Even within the medieval
logical corpus, diverse distinctions are made based on this notion. For instance,
the ten Aristotelian categories (substance, quantity, quality, relation etc.) fol-
low a distinction of ten kinds of things that predicates signify, and the same
goes for the distinctions between name and verb in the Perihermeneias and
between the five Porphyrian predicabilia (genus, species, proper, difference
and accident) in the Isagoge.

3 Boethius logical opuscula include his commentaries on Aristotles Categories and

Perihermeneias and on Porphyrys Isagoge, De divisione, De topicis differentiis, De syllogismo
categorico and De hypotheticis syllogismis. The last two treatises, though, were not part of the
academic program of the 13th-century universites of Paris and Oxford.
4 Donatus Ars grammatica was also popular, but for my concerns Priscians is by far the most
influential grammatical treatise. For Donatus influence on the Middle Ages, see S. Ebbesen,
Theories of Language in the Hellenistic Age and in the Twelfth and Thirteenth Centuries, in
D. Frede and B. Inwood (eds.), Language and Learning: Philosophy of Language in the
Hellenistic Age (Cambridge: cup, 2005), pp. 299319 (repr. in S. Ebbesen, Collected Essays of
Sten Ebbesen, 2 vols., Aldershot/Farnham: Ashgate, 20089, vol. 1, pp. 7998).
4 Introduction

Boethius makes us aware of a first conflict in the ancient traditions of the

Categories and the Perihermeneias, by pointing to an opposition between an
immediate signification of things in the Categories and an immediate significa-
tion of concepts in the Perihermeneias. Consequently, medieval commentators
on the Perihermeneias start to discuss the problem of what the immediate sig-
nification of words is concepts or things as early as the 1240s (in e.g. Nicholas
of Paris commentary). The brief treatment of this problem by master Nicholas
and his contemporaries develops, in the second half of the century, into a
sophisticated debate that transcends the faculties of Arts.5 At the turn of the
fourteenth century, John Duns Scotus describes it (in his Ordinatio of 1304) as
a magna altercatio,6 a debate where at least three different linguistic problems
are involved: a semiotic problem, a problem of linguistic communication and
a problem of propositional verification.
The quarrel about the immediate signification of words is closely related to
other questions that deal with the consequences of advocating for an immedi-
ate signification of things. The most important for our purpose are the variants
of the question whether a word loses its signification with the destruction of
the things it signifies; a question at the centre of which are a semiotic problem
and a problem of propositional verification. In the first part of this study, we
will examine these two medieval debates (in sections 2.1 and 2.2), together
with an introductory chapter (Section1) about their ancient sources, namely
Aristotles Perihermeneias and Boethius second commentary on the same
treatise.7
Next, the interaction between Priscians grammar and Aristotelian logic
raises a second conflict between grammaticality and truth and falsity. Medieval
authors had to deal with two different accounts, one logical and one grammati-
cal, of parts of speech (partes orationis) and, particularly, of names and verbs
(nomina and verba). Indeed, the definitions of names and verbs given by
Priscian in his Institutiones and those given by Aristotle in his Perihermeneias,
both of them in terms of what and how they signify, differ in substantial
respects. Consequently, questions about the different approaches to parts of

5 For an analysis of this development, see also A.M. Mora-Mrquez, A New Perspective on the
Origin of the Debate on Signification at the End of the 13th Century, in C.T. Thrnqvist and
B. Bydn (eds.), Papers on Aristotelian Logic and Metaphysics Presented to the Danish-Swedish
Network for the Aristotelian Tradition in the Middle Ages (20092011) (Toronto: pims,
forthcoming).
6 Cf. Duns Scotus, Ordinatio, d. 27, q.1.
7 For the late ancient and medieval reception of Aristotles Perihermeneias, see M. Cameron
and J. Marenbon (eds.), Aristotelian Logic East and West, 5001500: On Interpretation and Prior
Analytics in Two Traditions, Vivarium 48.12 (2010).
Introduction 5

speech in Aristotelian logic and in Priscians grammar are ubiquitous in com-

mentaries on the Perihermeneias and on Priscians Institutiones. More precisely,
medieval authors raise a question about the different roles played by the
notion of signification in grammar and in logic; a question that we shall anal-
yse, including its ancient sources Priscian and Aristotle, in Part 2.
The three questions studied here testify to a somewhat common origin and
development of thirteenth-century discussions about significatio: They all
start by opposing certain positions of earlier authorities and develop into
sophisticated linguistic discussions, where we can perceive the underlying
intention, by remarkable authors, of giving the notion a more coherent treat-
ment. This coherence, as we shall see, is achieved by letting signification play
an important role only in the explanation of the institution of simple linguistic
items and by radically reducing its use in the solution of logical and grammati-
cal problems.

***

Let us consider the corpus I use, the time frame it covers and the authors and
texts it includes (and consequently the ones left out). For the sake of narrow-
ing the research to a manageable and reasonable time frame, I have studied the
logical tradition that began with the founding of the University of Paris in the
early thirteenth century, until the emergence of nominalism in the first quarter
of the fourteenth century. Thus, twelfth-century literature is included only
when its influence on the thirteenth century is undeniable, as in the case
of Peter Helias Summa grammaticae. Regarding early thirteenth-century
commentaries on the Ars vetus (i.e. the Isagoge, the Categories and the
Perihermeneias), the direct and main source is Boethius logical corpus, and
there is very little in the early commentary tradition that cannot be related in
one way or another to Boethius works.8 This is the principal reason for not
taking into consideration the logical literature from the twelfth century.
Given the richness of the thirteenth-century scholarly corpus, my research
will focus on texts and discussions that emerged in and stayed within the fac-
ulty of Arts, with the notable exception of the Franciscan theologians Roger
Bacon and Peter John Olivi, who take a stand on the artistic discussions in a
couple of remarkable linguistic treatises the De signis and the Quaestiones
logicales, respectively. I take into account the most important edited material

8 For a partial example, see the introduction in A.M. Mora-Mrquez, Anonymus Oxford,
Commentary on De interpretatione 1 (ms Oxford, BodlL Can. misc. 403, ff. 31ra34vb), cimagl
83 (2014), 135206.
6 Introduction

that was produced in the faculties of Arts of the universities of Paris and Oxford
and that contains one or more of the three questions that are analysed in Parts 1
and 2 the three questions that, to the best of my knowledge, embrace prob-
lems directly associated with the notion of signification. I also take into
account unedited material I regard as most influential and relevant (e.g.
Nicholas of Paris and Robert Kilwardbys commentaries on the Perihermeneias).
Finally, for the second half of the century I focus on masters that represent
important points of dissent and/or development, such as Martin of Dacia,
Boethius of Dacia and Radulphus Brito, and leave aside or briefly mention
other masters, such as Siger of Brabant and Simon of Faversham, whose
positions do not command distinction. Thomas Aquinas commentary on
the Perihermeneias9 is also left aside, for it neither clearly influenced the
thirteenth-century commentary tradition, nor took a noteworthy stand on the
discussions with which this study is concerned.
Furthermore, important discussions such as the ones about the possibility
of naming God and the mechanisms of angelic communication are left aside,
principally because of their theological nature. The theological material has
been thoroughly and extensively studied and discussed by prominent scholars
to whose work I refer the interested reader.10
Finally, since Augustines treatises were not part of the faculty of Arts cur-
riculum, I do not include him in the presentation of ancient sources. However,
I do briefly present his accounts when I introduce Roger Bacon and Peter John
Olivi the only two authors of the corpus whose logical discussions are beyond
doubt influenced by Augustines linguistic accounts.

***

9 Thomas Aquinas, Expositio in librum Perihermeneias, ed. R.-A. Gauthier (Rome/Paris:

Edition lonine/Vrin, 1989) (Opera omnia 1*/1). For the commentarys relation with the
13th-century commentary tradition of the Perihermeneias, see J. Isaac, Le Perihermeneias
en occident de Boce Saint Thomas (Paris: Vrin, 1953).
10 In this book I shall focus on linguistic literature, but the notion of signification played also
a role in other contexts. For instance, medieval readers and commentators on Peter
Lombards Sentences had to discuss the problem of divine names when reading the dis-
tinctions xxixxvi of book I, where the Lombard raises questions about the possible
ways of talking about God. In order to tackle these questions, theologians not only
appealed to Aristotelian notions, but they also let these notions interplay with theological
sources, of which the most influential are undoubtedly Augustines De doctrina christiana
and De magistro, and (Pseudo) Dionysus the Areopagites On Divine Names. For this aspect
of the discussion, see the work (see bibliography) of John Marenbon and Luisa Valente for
the 12th century and of Jenniffer Ashworth and Irne Rosier-Catach for the 13th century.
Introduction 7

Although this study is mainly intended for historians of medieval philosophy, I

strove to make it accessible to linguists, logicians and philosophers of language
interested in this rich period in the history of linguistic enquiries. Accordingly,
in the philosophical analyses I try to minimise my use of technical language,
from the point of view of both modern and medieval terminology. In cases
where use of medieval technical language proved unavoidable, I provide a
brief introduction to the terms needed to properly understand the subsequent
discussion. Translations are also provided (my own, unless otherwise indi-
cated) of Latin and Greek passages essential to the analysis, with the Latin or
Greek text in the footnotes.

***

This monograph is the result of ten years of research and it was written with
the financial support of the Danish Carlsberg Foundation. At a first stage of
this research period (20042009), I was a Master and PhD student of Prof.
Annick Jaulin and Prof. Christophe Grellard, with the financial support of the
Ecole Doctorale de Philosophie, at University Paris 1, Panthon-Sorbonne.
Later (20102013), I was a postdoctoral researcher at the Saxo Institute
(University of Copenhagen), under the supervision of Prof. Sten Ebbesen, with
the financial support of the Carlsberg Foundation. During all these years I
benefited in various ways from discussions with many friends and colleagues.
My teachers Annick Jaulin, Christophe Grellard and Sten Ebbesen have given
me their unconditional support and sensible advise throughout all these years
and to them I owe a special debt of gratitude. Jocelyn Benoist, Jol Biard and
Irne Rosier-Catach opponents at my PhD defense gave me a number of
criticisms and suggestions that were fundamental for the improvement of the
first stage of my work. Karin Margareta Fredborg, Chris Martin and Steffen
Lund Jrgensen carefully read and commented upon a first version of this
monograph that was discussed at a workshop in Copenhagen. Mary Sirridge
and Paul Thom read parts of this monograph and provided me with great
advise for its improvement. I also benefited from many good ideas thanks to
informal discussions with Pierre Pellegrin, Michel Crubellier, Costantino
Marmo, Claude Panaccio, Jenny Ashworth, Paolo Crivelli, Jean Baptiste
Gourinat, David Bloch, Julie Brumberg-Chaumont, Aurlien Robert, Iacopo
Costa, Catarina Dutilh Novaes, Sara Uckleman, Rodrigo Guerizoli, Alfredo
Stork, Frdric Goubier, Ernesto Perini Santos, Juliette Lemaire, Valeria Buffon,
Gustavo Fernndez Walker, Leone Gazziero and Taki Suto. An anonymous ref-
eree was the fairest and sharpest reader an author could hope for. John
Marenbon, the editor of this series, was of great help during the process of
8 Introduction

submission and publication. The head of my department at the University of

Gothenburg, Christina Thomsen Thrnqvist, has given me all the moral and
financial support needed to bring this monograph to good term. Finally, Debbie
Axlid and Kirez Reynolds did a tremendous work of revision of the English
prose. To all these people I owe all my gratitude. Last but not least, I say again
many thanks to my partner Sren, who during all these years never failed to be
there for me, at times with remarkable stoicism.
 PART 1
Signification of Concepts and
Signification of Things

 chapter 1

Ancient Sources

1.1 Aristotles Perihermeneias

Aristotles Perihermeneias is generally considered to contain his account of sig-

nification, specifically its first chapter. Thirteenth-century scholars, who fol-
lowed Boethius lead, were also of this opinion. Therefore, this chapter exerted
a strong influence on their discussions on signification and hence we begin
this study with a brief presentation of Perihermeneias 1.
Most modern interpreters hold that Perihermeneias 1 deals with the ques-
tion of how language represents the world.1 The idea has often been presented
as if Aristotle started his inquiry by assuming that language is perfectly univo-
cal and proceeded to describe how this language accurately represents the
world through its representation of thoughts.2 It is no surprise then that
Aristotle is considered to be the origin of a long history of misguided attempts
to explain how language has univocal signification and reference.3

1 Cf. J.L. Ackrill, Aristotle. Categories and De interpretatione (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1963),
p. 113; L.M. de Rijk, Aristotles Semantics and Ontology. Volume I: General Introduction. The
Works on Logic (Leiden: Brill, 2002) (Philosophia Antiqua XCI/I), p. 192; C.W.A. Whitaker,
Aristotles De interpretatione. Contradiction and Dialectic (Oxford: oup, 1996), p. 8;
P. Aubenque, Sens et unit du trait aristotlicien De linterprtation, in S. Husson (ed.),
Interprter le De interpretatione (Paris: Vrin, 2009), pp. 3750, at p. 41.
2 For instance P. Aubenque says [in Sens et unit, at p. 42 and p. 44]: Ce sera un problme
largement dbattu au Moyen ge de savoir si les fictions comme la chimreont une essence,
et ds lors, sont un certain type dtresAristote anonce ce problme, mais nen dbat pas ici.
Car il pare au plus press et le plus urgent pour luiest de fixer des rgles techniques qui
permettront de traiter le langage comme sil tait parfaitement univoque, transparent, et
navait pas bsoin dtre interprt; and En vrit, le trait se demande quelles conditions
le langage peut slver au dessus de sa fonction symbolique lannuler si possible pour
devenir comme la reprsentation, une image de la chose, un dcalque de la ralit, et auto-
riser ainsi une conclusion qui va des mots aux choses. For a similar claim, see also
N. Kretzmann, Medieval Logicians on the Meaning of the Propositio, Journal of Philosophy 67
(1970), 767787, at p. 768.
3 Cf. H. Putnam, Meaning, Other People and the World, in Representation and Reality
(Cambridge ma: mit Press, 1988), p. 19.

koninklijke brill nv, leiden, |doi 10.1163/9789004300132_003

12 chapter 1

While it is true that the Perihermeneias relies on an implicit notion of

signification,4 in fact it does not directly treat the problem of a true or accurate
linguistic representation of the world,5 nor does it address verification. Rather,
it aims to identify what is necessary for an assertion to be assigned a truth-
value, in order that it can be contradicted.
This problem, essential to dialectics (a linguistic practice whose starting
point is the assumption that its initial assertion is true and whose aim is its
refutation), is not the same as the one that asks how one actually determines
the truth value of an assertion, nor the one that asks what is necessary for an
assertion to be true or false. Consequently, Perihermeneias 1 does not put forth
a semantic analysis of an ideal univocal language. In fact the possibility of
ambiguity is considered further in the treatise (in Chapters 86 and 11), with the
underlying intention of introducing rules into the uses of a language that is
naturally susceptible to ambiguity, in order to enable interlocutors to accu-
rately communicate their thoughts about some topic.
Ancient and medieval scholars grasped and used this communicational
aspect of the treatise, as seen in their interpretation of the influential passage
Perihermeneias 1.16a39. They rightly noticed that Aristotles use of an inexact
notion of signification is here guided by his intent to explain how assertions
serve their purpose of accurately communicating, to another, someones

4 There is only one use of the word (i.e. signification) in the whole Corpus Aristotelicum,
namely in Pr. 919b36. When talking about the semantic properties of human language, most
of the time Aristotle uses conjugations of the verb , and occasionally of the verb
, but there is no equivalent of the Latin terms significatio, denotatio, suppositio and so
on, or of the modern terms meaning, sense and reference. For an analysis of the most influ-
ential attempts to reconstruct Aristotles theory of meaning followed by his own reconstruc-
tion, see M. Wheeler, Semantics in Aristotles Organon, Journal of the History of Philosophy
37.2 (1999), 191226.
5 This does not mean that attemps to reconstruct what would have been Aristotles (or any
other ancient or medieval author for that matter) reply to this problem are futile. In my opi
nion, such attempts are an interesting and legitimate philosophical exercise, as long as this
attempt of reconstruction is explicitly stated and as long as ancient or medieval authors are
not presented as intentionally putting forth such accounts.
6 For a thorough analysis of Chapter 8, see S. Bobzien, Aristotles De interpretatione 8 is about
ambiguity, in D. Scott (ed.), Maieusis. Essays in Ancient Philosophy in Honour of Myles
Burnyeat (New York: oup, 2007), pp. 301321. For an exhaustive account of Aristotles notion
of ambiguity, see C. Shields, Order in Multiplicity: Homonymy in the Philosophy of Aristotle
(Oxford: oup, 1999).
Ancient Sources 13

thought that (some or every) A is B.7 Let us start, then, by spelling out the
details of a communicational reading of Perihermeneias 1.8

Perihermeneias 1.16a38: Utterances as Symbols and Signs

The passage Perihermeneias 1.16a38, where Aristotle introduces the commu-
nicative dimension of human language, starts with a general semiotic state-
ment that describes utterances as both symbols () and signs ()
of thoughts, as well as thoughts as likenesses () of objects.9
The passage goes like this:

Utterances are symbols of affections in the soul, and written expressions

are symbols of utterances; and just as letters are not the same for every-
one, utterances are not the same either; however, the things of which
these [utterances] are primarily10 signs, the affections of the soul, are the

7 For the case of Nicholas of Paris (1240s) and Radulphus Brito (1290s), see my case-study in
S. Ebbesen, D. Bloch, J. Fink, H. Hansen and A.M. Mora-Mrquez, History of Philosophy in
Reverse. Reading Aristotle through the Lenses of Scholars from the Twelfth to the Sixteenth
Centuries (Copenhagen: The Royal Danish Academy of Sciences and Letters, 2014)
(Scientia Danica. Series H. Humanistica 8. vol. 7), at pp. 131140.
8 For an exhaustive study of Perihermeneias 1, see S. Noriega-Olmos, Aristotles Psychology of
Signification. A Commentary on De interpretatione 16a318 (Berlin: De Gruyter, 2013).
However, Noriega-Olmos hesitates all along his book about the emphasis that should be
put on the communicational character of the chapter; for this, see A.M. Mora-Mrquez,
(Review of) Simon Noriega-Olmos, A Commentary on De interpretatione 16a38, The
Classical Review 64.2 (2014), 402404.
9 For other discussions of this passage, see W. Belardi, Riconsiderando la seconda frase del
De interpretatione, Studi et saggi linguistici 21 (1981), 7983; N. Kretzmann, Aristotle on
Spoken Sounds Significant by Convention, in J. Corcoran (ed.), Ancient Logic and its
Modern Interpretation (Dordrecht: Reidel, 1974), pp. 321; E. Montanari, La Sezione linguis-
tica del Peri hermeneias di Aristotele. 2 vols. (Florence: Studi et testi 5 & 8, 1988); J. Ppin,
Sumbola, Smeia, Homoimata: A propos de De interpretatione 1.16a38 et Politique viii
5, 1340a6-39, in J. Wiesner (ed.), Aristoteles. Werk and Wirkung. t. 1 (Berlin: 1985), pp. 2244;
Whitaker, Aristotles De interpretatione, pp. 925. In his article Aristotle on Signification
and Truth [in G. Anagnostopoulos (ed.), A Companion to Aristotle (Oxford: Blackwell,
2009), pp. 81100] Crivelli interprets the passage as a token-oriented semiotic statement.
10 Minio-Paluellos edition, following the Latin translations by Boethius and William of Moerbeke,
as well as the Armenian and the Syrian translations, reads . N. Kretzmann, J. Ppin and
W. Belardi, following the Greek manuscript tradition, choose the adverbial reading .
Kretzmann and Ppin suggest that the adverb qualifies signs so that utterances are
primarily signs of affections of the soul and only secondarily their symbols. W. Belardi suggests
that qualifies utterances so that utterances are primarily signs of thoughts, in
opposition to written expressions that are secondarily signs of thoughts. Note that the reading
14 chapter 1

same for everyone; and the things of which these [affections] are like-
nesses, the things, are also the same.11

I translate as utterances to cover both complex and simple

utterances: sentences, assertions, names and attributes.12 The alternative
translation, words, would misrepresent the general character of the passage,
and the same goes for written words, to which I prefer written expressions.
I shall, however, paraphrase utterance as word when it is clear that we are
dealing with simple expressions such as man or runs. Affections in the soul,
in turn, can be paraphrased as thoughts, also for the sake of maintaining the
general character of the passage.
Aristotle introduces two key notions when he says that utterances are sym-
bols and signs of thoughts.13 Let me start by elucidating the import of qualify-
ing utterances as symbols ().
When Aristotle qualifies utterances as symbols, he continues a discussion
going back to at least Platos Cratylus.14 In this dialogue, Socrates and
Hermogenes discuss the natural or conventional character of names. Socrates
presents us with a position (not necessarily his own) according to which, since

, which is the one I (and medieval scholars) follow and read in an adverbial way, rules out
both Kretzmann and Ppins as well as Belardis interpretations.
11 Arist., Int. 1.16a38: ,
. ,
, ,
.
12 A rhma, as we shall see, refers to whatever can be said of a name, whether it is an action,
a disposition, a quality and so on. So, the grammatical category of verbs covers only some
of the possible rhmata considered by Aristotle. Since I think that the modern use of the
word verb has a heavy grammatical value, I dismiss this translation as misleading and
use instead the word attribute.
13 For another discussion of and , see C. Chiesa, Symbole et signe dans le De
interpretatione, in H. Joly (ed.), Philosophie du langage et grammaire dans lantiquit
(Bruxelles: Editions Ousia, 1986) (Cahiers de Philosophie Ancienne 5), pp. 203218.
14 Hermogenes is supposed to be defending Democritus position that names are not signifi-
cant by nature. Cf. Plato, Crat. 388a8b13. For an account of language in Democritus, see
A. Brancacci, Les mots et les choses: La philosophie du langage chez Dmocrite, in H. Joly
(ed.), Philosophie du langage et grammaire, pp. 928. For general studies on the Cratylus,
see R. Barney, Names and Nature in Platos Cratylus (New York/London: Routledge, 2001)
and D. Sedley, Platos Cratylus (Cambridge: cup, 2003). Shorter discussions are found in
D. Sedley, Platos Cratylus, Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, http://plato.stanford.edu/
entries/plato-cratylus/; and N. Kretzmann, Plato on the correctness of names, American
Philosophical Quarterly 8 (1971), 126138.
Ancient Sources 15

naming is an action and every action has a proper nature, names are natural
tools for the action of naming and ought to be chosen according to the proper
nature of this action. Aristotle is opposed to the position that names are natu-
ral tools for naming and instead proposes in the Perihermeneias that utterances
in general, names included, are a matter of human convention. Therefore, his
description of utterances as symbols is better understood against the back-
ground of the opposition between conventional and natural tools.
In one of its most common uses, the Greek word stands for some
token that is used as a proof of a contract between two parties usually a tally
that is broken into two pieces so that each contracting part keeps one piece
as a proof that the contract was sealed.15 But the tally can be round or squared,
metallic or wooden, red or blue, and so on, so that the material aspects of the
tally (shape, colour, material, size etc.) are not univocally dictated by the nature
of the act of sealing a contract. Different sorts of tallies can be the proof of the
same sort of contract and the same sort of tally can be the proof of different
sorts of contract. The indication of the contract by some sort of tally follows
from a somewhat arbitrary choice rather than from the nature of an action.
Accordingly, just as the tally that seals a contract is not a natural tool, utter-
ances are not natural tools for human communication either, but rather sym-
bols chosen by human convention. In the case of, let us say, stones, some
utterance other than stone could have served the purpose of naming them. A
good indication of this, as Aristotle himself suggests, is that the same thing can
be spoken of by means of different utterances in different languages. Aristotles
qualification of utterances as symbols aims thus to underscore the conven-
tional character of human language as a tool for communication.16

15 In another common use, the word stands for tokens serving as proofs of iden-
tity, cf. e.g. Lysias, Orat. 19.25.
16 The conventional character of language is recalled in Chapters 2 and 4. In Chapter 2,
Aristotle claims that names are conventional because no utterance is a name unless it is
first a symbol that is, until it is conventionally chosen to indicate a certain thing. Hence,
it is not the inferential character of utterances that makes them names (or attributes or
sentences), but rather the fact that they were conventionally chosen. Conventionality
separates thus human language from animal sounds, which also indicate something, but
not in the same way as human linguistic signs do (cf. Int. 2.16a2728). In Chapter 4,
Aristotle recalls again the conventional character of language when he claims that sen-
tences are significative, not as a tool, but by convention (cf. Int. 4.17a12). For a more
thorough discussion of the conventional character of human language as opposed to ani-
mal utterances, see Whitaker, Aristotles De interpretatione, pp. 4552. Although I basi-
cally agree with Whitakers claim that for Aristotle linguistic articulation and rationality
go together, it seems nevertheless untrue that Aristotle reserves the verb
16 chapter 1

After having stated the conventional character of human language in lines

1.16a36, Aristotle moves from qualifying utterances as symbols to qualifying
them as signs. Aristotles most common use of the word makes refer-
ence to a proof a piece of evidence that something else is or has been the
case. The sort of evidence that he has in mind is described in detail in the last
chapter of Prior Analytics, where he distinguishes proofs from likelihoods and
describes proofs as that which coexists with something else, or before or after
whose happening something else has happened,17 and which can be one of the
three terms of an enthymeme (the kind of syllogism used in rhetorical
settings).18 Examples of proofs are for a woman to have milk, which is a piece
of evidence of her having given birth, or for Pittacus to be good, which is a
piece of evidence that the wise are good.19
Therefore, that an utterance is the sign of a thought ought to mean that a
speakers utterance is a piece of evidence of the occurrence of a thought in her
mind. In fact, it is revealing that here Aristotle emphasises the primary relation
of signification between utterances and thoughts, while in other places (e.g. in
the Categories20) he rather talks of words that signify things. The reason for this
emphasis must be that primarily, in the Perihermeneias, points to the primary
content that the production of an utterance intends to transmit. Of course, this
does not rule out the possibility that the utterance also points to the thing that

only to human utterances. There is for instance a passage in the Topics where Aristotle
mentions a fact thatindicates and produces health (
, cf. Top. I.15.107b8). Aristotles use of the verbs and seems
to be interchangeable and almost always their intended sense is the same to indicate x,
i.e. to direct someones attention to x. He thereafter adds explicit qualifications to the way
in which something indicates something else, e.g. when he adds that articulate human
sounds indicate something by convention.
17 Translation by Harold P. Cooke in Loeb Classical Library 325 at p. 525. Cf. Arist., Pr. An.
ii.27.70a810.
18 This use of the word is very common in his philosophical and scientific treatises,
where after having stated that S is P, he goes on to provide a piece of evidence by saying:
and a proof () of this is that. There is another use of that makes refer-
ence to a mark, such as the mark that is left on the wax by a ring. Cf. Arist., De an.
ii.12.424a1821. Aristotle uses the ring/wax example in order to illustrate how sensation
amounts to the reception of a form without the matter; but this use is obviously ruled out
by the qualification of utterances as symbols, because the form of the mark left by a ring
on the wax is univocally dictated by the shape of the ring, and therefore such a use does
not involve the conventionality of human utterances that Aristotle intends to put forth in
the Perihermeneias.
19 Cf. Arist., Pr. An. ii.27.70a1123.
20 Cf. Arist., Cat. 4.1b2527.
Ancient Sources 17

is the content of that thought,21 when underscoring that relation happens to

be useful (as in the case of e.g. the context of the Categories, where a division
of attributes is made in terms of their signification of different sorts of things).
Nevertheless, since in the context of Perihermeneias 1 the main concern is to
explain how the accurate communication of thoughts takes place, we are told
that thoughts (and not things) are primarily indicated by utterances.
It is also noteworthy that the interpretation of the sign as a piece of evi-
dence entails the intervention of someone for whom the sign is a piece of
evidence, namely a listener in the case of utterances. Aristotles view on lin-
guistic signification is thus inscribed in a context of communication of
thoughts, where at least a speaker and a listener are involved, so that an utter-
ance is significative if it is for a listener a piece of evidence of the occurrence of
a thought in the speakers mind. This interpretation is supported by a passage
in Chapter 3, where Aristotle himself considers the understanding by the
listener a sufficient condition for an utterance (a name in this case) to be
significative:

Then, the attributes, when they are said themselves by themselves, are
names and signify a certain thing; for the speaker stops [his] thinking and
the listener came to rest.22

Aristotle is thus pointing out in the short and influential passage 1.16a38 of
the Perihermeneias the following two features of human language: It primarily

21 Thoughts (both simple, such as the concept of man, and compound, such as the thought
that every man is an animal) are described as likenesses of things. This roughly means
that thoughts are somehow their objects (cf. De an. iii.6.431b2223). In other words, when
grasping an object, the soul becomes not exactly its object, but similar to it. This similarity
consists in the thought sharing something with its object, namely its formal aspect (Arist.,
De an. iii.8.431b2630: The sensitive and knowing faculties of the soul are in potency [the
objects] the object of knowledge and the sense-object. And it is necessary that they are
either the objects themselves or the forms. But not the objects themselves; for the stone is
not in the soul, but its form.) Now, since objects (and more precisely their formal aspect)
remain always the same, different human beings can have formally the same thought of a
determinate object, so that in their act of communication it is possible that they attribute
the same predicate to the same object of thought it is possible for two interlocutors to
talk about the same thing. For a thorough reconstruction of the Aristotelian account of
intellection, see S. Noriega-Olmos, Aristotles Psychology; and D. Charles, Aristotle on
Meaning and Essence (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2000).
22 Arist., Int. 3.16b2021:
, , .
18 chapter 1

signifies thoughts it gives the listener evidence of a thought occurring in the

speakers mind and it does so, not as a natural tool for communication, but as
the result of human convention.

Perihermeneias 1.16a918: Simple and Compound Linguistic Items

After having stated that utterances are conventionally and primarily significa-
tive of thoughts, Aristotle proceeds to a division of linguistic utterances accord-
ing to the sort of thought they indicate:

And it is the case that, just as in the soul sometimes there is a thought
without truth or falsity and sometimes [a thought] where there is already
necessarily one of them, in the same way also in the utterance. For both
truth and falsity are about composition and division. Therefore, the
names themselves and the attributes are like the thought without com-
position and division, e.g. man or white, when nothing is added; for it is
not yet true or false. And here is a proof: Goat-stag signifies something,
but is not yet true or false, unless that it is or that it is not is added either
simply or with respect to time.23

Since thoughts can be either compound or simple, utterances too are either
compound or simple. Compound thoughts are the opinion or the judgment
that something is the case or is not the case (e.g. that Homer is a poet), and
they can be given a truth-value precisely because they are compound because
they state that something is or is not the case about an object.24 These thoughts
are communicated by means of assertoric sentences, i.e. assertions that can
also be given a truth-value if and only if they preserve the compound form of
the thought that they communicate, i.e. if and only if they are composed of a
name and an attribute that indicate the simple thoughts involved in the com-
pound thought.
Simple thoughts that are not susceptible of truth or falsity are just the intel-
lectual understanding of a kind of being (e.g. being a man or being white).
These thoughts are indicated by means of simple utterances, such as names

23 Arist., Int. 1.16a918: ,

,
.
, ,
. ,
, .
24 For Aristotles account of truth, see P. Crivelli, Aristotle on Truth (Cambridge: cup, 2004).
Ancient Sources 19

and attributes.25 Names and attributes are not susceptible of truth-value

because they indicate thoughts that do not state the occurrence or non-
occurrence of a state of affairs. For instance, when someone says man, she is
not stating that there is actually some man. But although names and attributes
indicate simple thoughts that are not susceptible of truth-value, they can pro-
duce assertions that are susceptible, when a simple utterance an attribute
is added to another simple utterance a name. Accordingly, assertions preserve
the thoughts susceptibility of truth-value if and only if they preserve its logical
compound form by being composed of a name and an attribute that indicate
the parts of the compound thought.
An assertion transmits a judgment or an opinion, which can be true or false
because it states a fact by comparing (composing or dividing) simple thoughts.
Here Aristotle seems again to make an anti-platonic statement, for his point
seems to be that names do not by themselves state the existence of their sig-
nificate, e.g. Good does not by itself state the existence of the Good. Statements
can only result from composing something with or separating it from a bearer.
Since by saying goat-stag a non-existing entity we do not state its non-
existence and it is still necessary to say goat-stags do not exist, a fortiori by
simply uttering man or white we do not state anything about man or white,
unless we use a compound statement like a man is running or Socrates is
white.
In sum, for an utterance to be an assertion that can be given a truth-value, it
has to be composed of a name and an attribute it has to preserve the logical
form of a judgment or opinion that can be given a truth-value, because it is a
compound of the thing we think something about (what is indicated by the
name) and what we think is the case or is not the case about this thing (what
is indicated by the attribute). Consequently, this whole chapter is about the
possibility for assertions to preserve the compound logical form and hence
the susceptibility of truth-value of the thoughts they intend to communicate
to someone else. This concern is most important in the case of dialectics,
where an assertions susceptibility of being granted as true or rejected as false
is the condition sine qua non for its refutation by its contradictory assertion.
Hence, after having thus introduced the name, the attribute, the sentence and
the affirmation and negation in Chapters 26, Aristotle proceeds to introduce
the contradictory pair and the principle of bivalence (PoB) in Chapter 7.

25 Note that names and attributes are simple not because they are one word, but rather because
they indicate a simple thought. In other words, their simplicity follows from the simplicity
of the thought that they indicate, rather than from the simplicity of their utterance.
20 chapter 1

Contradiction and Equivocation

The contradictory pair is defined by Aristotle as the set of an affirmation and a
negation of the same thing about the same thing. This definition entails a fur-
ther requirement a name and an attribute ought to meet in order to bring about
an assertion that complies with the PoB the name and the attribute ought to
indicate exactly the same thing both in the affirmation and in the negation (i.e.
they have to indicate the same thing both for the one who grants a proposition
as true and for the one who aims to reject it as false). This requirement is crucial
for Aristotles analysis because of a feature of human language that he consi
ders both natural and the most common cause of linguistic misunderstandings:
ambiguity.26 Thus, when Aristotle says that the affirmation and the negation
ought to be of the same thing about the same thing, he intends to guard his
readers against one of the possible cases in which a contradictory pair will not
comply with the PoB, namely when the name or the attribute in the affirmation
and in the negation is used equivocally by the speaker and the listener.
In Chapter 8 of the Perihermeneias,27 Aristotle tells us that an affirmation
(or a negation) is a unity when it indicates that one thing holds of one thing,
e.g. every man is white.28 An affirmation (or a negation) that fails to meet this
requirement is not one, but plural. Aristotle illustrates the case of a plural affir-
mation by means of the following situation. Let us suppose that the name
cloak () was given to both man and horse. In this case, the affirmation
a cloak is white is not one but two affirmations, as it states both that a man is
white and that a horse is white. Now, when someone says a cloak is white and
her thought is about a horse, while her interlocutor thinks of a man, their
exchange can go on without there being real contradiction. For if the speaker
claims that a cloak is white and her interlocutor claims that a cloak is not
white, and one is talking about a man while the other is talking about a horse,
the assertions do not form a contradictory pair that complies with the PoB, and
hence the latter will not refute the former.29
Consequently, for a name and an attribute to bring about an assertion that
complies with the PoB, not only do they need to indicate simple thoughts, they
also have to be used by the speaker and the listener as indicating the same
simple thoughts.

26 Cf. Arist., se 1.165a313.

27 For a thorough analysis of Chapter 8, see Bobzien, Aristotles De interpretatione 8.
28 Cf. Arist., Int. 8.18a1218.
29 Cf. Arist., Int. 8.18a1827.
Ancient Sources 21

The treatment that Aristotle gives to linguistic signification both in the

Perihermeneias and in the dialectical treatises to which he explicitly refers (i.e.
the Topics and the Sophistical Refutations) shows that Aristotles semiotic state-
ment in Perihermeneias 1.16a38 does not intend to explain the nature of a
truthful linguistic representation of the world, but rather the assertions func-
tion of conveying information to someone else. Aristotle wants to explain how
there can be unambiguous linguistic exchange about our opinions or judg-
ments, so that assertions can be susceptible of affirmation as true or rejection
as false and of subsequent contradiction. For an assertion to be granted as true
or rejected as false, it has to be composed of a name and an attribute, and both
its name and its attribute ought to signify one and the same simple thoughts to
both interlocutors. Only when these conditions are satisfied can the assertion
be given a truth-value and comply with the PoB it can be the starting point of
a dialectical discussion.
Thirteenth-century scholars were well aware of the communicational
dimension behind the claim that utterances are primarily signs of thoughts, as
well as of its importance for dialectical practices, and hence this dimension
surfaces repeatedly in medieval developments of Aristotelian logic. However,
readers of the Perihermeneias at least as early as Porphyry also begin to wonder
about the truthful linguistic representation of the world and start to produce
interpretations of the treatise in that sense. Boethius, in turn, incorporates
these interpretations and transmits them to the late Middle Ages in his own
commentaries on the treatise. Since Boethius was undoubtedly the source for
thirteenth-century scholars, his interpretation greatly shaped theirs and
endowed them with a verificational aspect that was to co-exist with the com-
municational one, albeit not without some confusion. In order to see this more
clearly, let me now turn to Boethius reception of Aristotles Perihermeneias 1.

1.2 Boethius Second Commentary on the Perihermeneias

Anicius Manlius Severinus Boethius (ca. 486ca. 525) provided thirteenth-

century scholars with two commentaries on and a translation of the
Perihermeneias, as well as with translations of and commentaries on Porphyrys
Isagoge and Aristotles Categories. These translations and commentaries had
an enormous impact on the way scholastics interpreted the linguistic ideas in
the Organon. They also transmitted to the Middle Ages pieces of information
of long-lost commentaries on the Organon belonging to the peripatetic and
neo-platonic traditions, such as those of Alexander of Aphrodisias, Aspasius,
Herminus and Porphyry. Alexander and Porphyrys commentaries exerted a
22 chapter 1

strong influence on Boethius, and through him important peripatetic and neo-
platonic notions were passed to the thirteenth century.30 In what follows we
shall focus on Boethius interpretation of Perihermeneias 1, taking his second
commentary on the Perihermeneias as the main source, but drawing from
other texts when necessary.31

The Subject Matter of the Perihermeneias according to Boethius

Boethius is responsible for the translation of the Greek Perihermeneias into the
Latin De interpretatione. An interpretation (i.e. a rendering), which is accord-
ing to him the subject matter of the Perihermeneias, is defined as an articulate
sound that is significative by itself.32 The Roman commentator reaches this
definition after a process of division that goes from sounds (a blow through the
throat, e.g. a coughing), to utterances (voces) (a sound produced by beating the
air with the tongue, e.g. a barking), to expressions (locutio) (an articulate utter-
ance that can be written with letters, e.g. blityri or et), and down to interpre-
tations (expressions that are significative by themselves, e.g. homo).33 Hence,
being significative by itself is the feature that separates interpretations from
other kinds of expressions, and then the subject matter of the Perihermeneias
are articulate utterances that are significative by themselves (i.e. names, verbs
and assertions).34 Boethius stresses that the treatise is not only about expres-
sions (locutio/lexis), because being significative by itself is an essential part of
its subject matter, and it is not only about sentences (oratio/logos) either,

30 See S. Ebbesen, Boethius as an Aristotelian Commentator, in R. Sorabji (ed.), Aristotle

Transformed. The Ancient Commentators and their Influence (London: Duckworth, 1990),
pp. 373391.
31 The main studies about Boethius commentaries on the Perihermeneias are John Magees
Boethius on Signification and Mind (Leiden: Brill, 1989) (Philosophia Antiqua 52) and Taki
Sutos Boethius on Mind, Grammar and Logic: A Study of Boethius Commentary on Peri
hermeneias (Leiden: Brill, 2012) (Philosophia Antiqua 127). For a comprehensive study of
Boethius philosophical thinking see J. Marenbon, Boethius (Oxford: oup, 2003). For his
life and influence, see also J. Marenbon, Boethius.
32 Boethius, In Perih.2 (ed. Meiser, 4:2628): Illa quoque potest esse definitio vocis, ut eam
dicamus sonum esse cum quadam imaginatione significandi. In: Commentarii in librum
Aristotelis , ed. C. Meiser, 2 vols. (Leipzig: Teubner, 18771880).
33 Boethius, In Perih.2 (ed. Meiser, 6:15): Concurrentibus igitur his tribus: linguae percus-
sione, articulato vocis sonitu, imaginatione aliqua proferendi fit interpretatio. Interpretatio
namque est vox articulata per se ipsam significans.
34 Boethius, In perih.2 (ed. Meiser, 6:2021): Interpretationis vero partes hoc libro constituit
nomen et verbum. Note that by Boethius time, name and verb (nomen and verbum) his
translations of onoma and rhma are already well established grammatical categories.
Ancient Sources 23

because names and verbs are also significative by themselves and therefore
should be treated as interpretations in their own right. Accordingly, the trea-
tise deals with any kind of utterance that is significative by itself, putting thus
the focus of Perihermeneias 1 on the very notion of signification.

Boethius on Perihermeneias 1.16a38

Boethius narrows his analysis of Perihermeneias 1.16a38 to only names
(nomina) and verbs (verba) on the grounds that the passage is the logical con-
tinuation of Perihermeneias 1.16a12,35 where Aristotle stated the intention of
the treatise:

It must be established what is a name and a verb, and then what is a nega-
tion and an affirmation, as well as an assertion and a sentence.36

This would mean that Aristotle intends to open his enquiry with a description
of the significative character of names and verbs.
At the very beginning of his own enquiry about names and verbs, the Roman
commentator introduces the influential semantic triangle resintellectusvox:

Whether in the case of a question and an answer, or in the case of the

continuous sequence of a sentence and someone elses understanding
and listening, or in the case that [the master] teaches and [the pupil]
learns, the whole arrangement of speech (ordo orandi) is achieved with
these three elements: things, thoughts and utterances.37

He proceeds to explain the relations between these elements, claiming that:

35 Boethius, In Perih.2 (ed. Meiser, 31:914): Quare non est disiuncta sententia sed primae
propositioni continua. Nam cum quid sit verbum, quid nomen definire constituit, cum
nominis et verbi natura sit multiplex, de quo verbo et nomine tractare vellet clara signifi-
catione distinxit. Cf. Arist., Int. 1.16a12. Recall that in Aristotle the extent of this passage
is general and not restricted to only names and verbs; see Section1.1.
36 Aristoteles latinus, Int. 1.16a12: Primus oportet constituere quid sit nomen et quid ver-
bum, postea quid est negatio et adfirmatio et enuntiatio et oratio. (Boethius
translation).
37 Boethius, In Perih.2 (ed. Meiser, 20:1217): Sive enim quaelibet interrogatio sit atque
responsio, sive perpetua cuiuslibet orationis continuatio atque alterius auditus et intelli-
gentia, sive hic quidem doceat ille vero discat, tribus his totus orandi ordo perficitur:
rebus, intellectibus, vocibus.
24 chapter 1

The thing is conceived by the intellect, the utterance signifies the

thoughts and concepts of the soul and the thoughts both conceive the
things that are their objects and are signified by the utterances.38

Things, Boethius tells us, are there in the world presumably as the result of
some providence and have a nature that is distinctively arranged. Thoughts, in
turn, are always concomitant to and produced by things that have a distinct
nature and that stand before the human senses. Finally, utterances are always
the expression of thoughts.39 These elements are arranged40 so that:

The thing precedes the thought, the thought [precedes] the utterance,
and the utterance [precedes] the letters but this cannot be
converted.41

38 Boethius, In Perih.2 (ed. Meiser, 20:1720): Res enim ab intellectu concipitur, vox vero
conceptiones animi intellectusque significat, ipsi vero intellectus et concipiunt subiectas
res et significantur a vocibus.
39 Cf. Boethius, In Perih.2 (ed. Meiser, 20:2821:5): intellectus autem concipiant res, quae
scilicet habent quandam non confusam neque fortuitam consequentiam sed terminata
naturae suae ordinatione constant. Res enim semper comitantur eum qui ab ipsis conci-
pitur intellectumRebus enim ante propositis et in propria substantia constitutis intel-
lectus oriuntur. Rerum enim semper intellectus sunt, quibus iterum constitutis mox
significatio vocis exoritur. Praeter intellectum namque vox penitus nihil designat.
40 In his book Boethius on Signification and Mind, John Magee raises the question of what
sort of priority is at stake here and comes to the conclusion that it is a logical priority, so
that things are a sufficient, but not a necessary, condition for thoughts and utterances (cf.
Magee, Boethius on Signification, pp. 72 and 92). However, Magees conclusion cannot fol-
low from the second commentary on the Perihermeneias alone; for in fact things are inde-
pendent of our knowledge of them, as it is suggested in the following claim [Boethius, In
Perih.2 (ed. Meiser, 22:911)]: Cum res est, eius quoque esse intellectum, quod si non apud
homines, certe apud eum, qui propriae divinitate substantiae in propria natura ipsius rei
nihil ignorat. So, Boethius clearly considers the possibility for a thing to exist without
being known by men, even if it is never unknown to God, who always has the thoughts of
all things in his divine mind. It is also clear that a thing is not a necessary condition for a
thought; for in fact Boethius accepts the occurrence of empty thoughts, such as the
thought of chimeras and of centaurs [Boethius, In Perih.2 (ed. Meiser, 22:35)]: Sunt enim
intellectus sine re ulla subiecta, ut quos centauros uel chimeras poetae fixerunt. Horum
enim sunt intellectus quibus subiecta nulla substantia est. Consequently, things are nei-
ther a necessary nor a sufficient condition for thoughts, so no logical priority between
things and thoughts can be established on the basis of the second commentary on the
Perihermeneias alone (and thereby not between things and utterances either).
41 Boethius, In Perih.2 (ed. Meiser, 21:2830): Praecedit autem res intellectum, intellectus
vero vocem, vox litteras sed hoc converti non potest.
Ancient Sources 25

What is at stake here is a natural priority, so that when a thing of a determinate

sort, and whose existence is independent of and prior to its knowledge by men,
stands before a human mind, it triggers a natural process of understanding
it natural in the sense that this process can be described by a natural disci-
pline, such as psychology. Significative utterances, in turn, which are given as
names of things by a conventional choice (ad placitum), are produced because
thoughts trigger in their possessor the will to communicate them and, thereby,
the psychological process leading to this communication. Hence, Boethius
description of this ordo orandi has to do with the natural and temporal arrange-
ment of the items resintellectusvox.
After his discussion of the ordo orandi, Boethius goes on to comment on the
passage 1.16a38 of the Perihermeneias, which in his own translation goes as
follows:

Sunt ergo ea quae sunt in voce earum quae sunt in anima passionum
notae et ea quae scribuntur eorum quae sunt in voce. Et quemadmodum
nec litterae omnibus eaedem, sic nec voces eaedem. Quorum autem haec
primorum notae, eaedem omnibus passiones animae et quorum hae
similitudines, res etiam eaedem. De his quidem dictum est in his quae
sunt dicta de anima, alterius est enim negotii. (al, Int. 1.16a38, Boethius
translation)

Perhaps the most remarkable feature of Boethius translation of this passage is

the Latin nota as the rendering of both and . As Taki Suto
shows, nota covers both the idea of being a conventional token (i.e. being a
) and the idea of being a piece of evidence that something else is the
case (i.e. being a ), and hence it does not seem to be a poor translation
choice for both terms.42 But Boethius had other possibilities at hand, namely
to render as symbolum and as signum, so why did he not
do so?
Symbolum for , Suto explains, was not a suitable choice, because
at Boethius time the word had a loaded meaning, i.e. symbolum stood either
negatively for a mystical sign in a pagan cult or positively for the Apostles
Creed.43 Signum for did not look like a good choice either (at least

42 In his article Medieval Logicians on the Meaning of the Propositio, Journal of Philosophy
67 (1970), 767787, N. Kretzmann considers this translation choice as a serious mistake.
43 Cf. Suto, Boethius on Mind, pp. 5258. Suto bases her argument on a careful analysis of the
use of the word in passages by Plautus, Pliny, Tertullian, Augustine, Firmicus Maternus
and Cyprian.
26 chapter 1

not to Boethius). In fact, signum was Boethius translation of in the

Prior Analytics, but he saw an important difference between a sign in the con-
text of the Prior Analytics, where he takes it to stand only for propositional
items, and in the context of the Perihermeneias, where he takes it to stand for
any utterance significative by itself, names and verbs included.44 Suto proposes
that the Roman commentator avoided signum to prevent his readers here (i.e.
in the Perihermeneias) from an association between signa and propositional
items; an association that she claims to be widely acknowledged in the ancient
traditions of logic, not only among the peripatetics but also the stoics.45
There are, however, ancient uses of the word signum signum as a proof
or piece of evidence that something else is or has been the case that would
cover properly what Aristotle intends to express in the Perihermeneias with the
word , and then it would have been a suitable translation choice. Suto
quotes indeed a passage from Ciceros De inventione where the sense of sig-
num is the one at stake in the Perihermeneias:

A sign is something that falls under some of the senses and indicates
something that seems to arise from it; [something] that may have hap-
pened before or at the same time or that may have followed it; and yet it
requires proof and stronger corroboration e.g. blood, flight, paleness,
dust and things that are similar to these.46

Signum, as Cicero uses it here, would have properly rendered the sense of
Aristotles in the Perihermeneias passage the significative utterance
as a piece of evidence of the occurrence of a thought in the speakers mind.
Boethius reason for not using signum could rather be that this Latin word
usually stands for an event that is the proof or piece of evidence of some other
event being the case, and it rarely, if ever, applies to linguistic expressions. But
it did not have to apply only to linguistic expressions, since Aristotles point is
precisely that utterances, just as any other sign, are pieces of evidence that
something else is the case. At any rate, perhaps rendering both and
with nota was not as big a mistake as Kretzmann thought it to be, as

44 Cf. Magee, Boethius on Signification, p. 63 and Suto, Boethius on Mind, p. 59.

45 Suto, Boethius on Mind, p. 64.
46 Cicero, De inv. I.30, 48: Signum est quod sub sensum aliquem cadit et quiddam significat
quod ex ipso profectum videtur, quod aut ante fuerit aut in ipso negotio aut post sit con-
secutum et tamen indiget testimonii et gravioris confirmationis, ut cruor, fuga, pallor,
pulvis, et quae his sunt similia.
Ancient Sources 27

the word seems to have properly conveyed the idea of being a conventional
linguistic indication of thoughts.
When commenting on Perihermeneias 1.16a38, Boethius raises the ques-
tion why Aristotle inserted this elliptic and elusive passage at the beginning of
the treatise. He also tells us that before him, at least Herminus, Alexander of
Aphrodisias and Porphyry had raised the same question. After having dis-
missed Herminus explanation, we are given Alexanders, who claimed that
Aristotle inserted the passage because the value of significative [words] comes
from what is signified Aristotle intended to state what is the semiotic value
of words.47 We are also told that Porphyrys explanation is the most accurate;
Aristotle was, in fact, taking a position in an old discussion about the value of
significative words:

But Porphyry expounded the cause and the origin of this statement more
fully, he who retraced the whole controversy and argument of the ancient
philosophers concerning the value of signification. He says that the opin-
ions of the ancient philosophers had been uncertain as to what words
exactly signified. Some believed that words signified things and that what
resounded in words were their names. Others thought of incorporeal
natures Others believed that sensations [were signified], others again
that images were signified by words.48

Presumably, the discussion regarded the nature of the words semiotic content.
In his passage, Aristotle would be dismissing the positions according to which
words signify: (a) external things, (b) Platonic Ideas49 and (c) mental items,

47 Boethius, In Perih.2 (ed. Meiser, 26:911): quocirca quoniam significantium momentum

ex his quae significantur oritur.
48 Boethius, In Perih.2 (ed. Meiser, 26:1727:6): Sed Porphyrius ipsam plenius causam origi-
nemque sermonis huius ante oculos conlocavit, qui omnem apud priscos philosophos de
significationis vi contentionem litemque retexuit. Ait enim dubie apud antiquorum phi-
losophorum sententias constitisse quid esset proprie quod vocibus significaretur.
Putabant namque alii res vocibus designari earumque vocabula esse ea quae sonarent in
vocibus arbitrabantur. Alii vero incorporeas quasdam naturas meditabanturAlii vero
sensus, alii imaginationes significari vocibus arbitrabantur. This translation is a slight
modification of Arens translation. Cf. H. Arens, Aristotles Theory of Language and its
Tradition (Amsterdam: John Benjamins, 1984), p. 167.
49 Boethius does not discuss this possibility, not because he denies the existence of incorpo-
real natures, but because for him, following Porphyry, logic is a discipline about human
language, whose extension is the sensible world. See S. Ebbesen, Porphyrys Legacy to
Logic: a Reconstruction, in Sorabji (ed.), Aristotle Transformed, pp. 141172. Suto and
28 chapter 1

such as sensations or images. Boethius proceeds to explain first the reason why
Aristotle dismisses sensations and images as the significates of names and
verbs.
Sensations cannot be the passions of the soul Aristotle is talking about in
Perihermeneias 1.16a38, because for him sensations are not passions of the
soul but passions of the body.50 The situation is more complicated in the case
of images;51 for they seem to be a legitimate instance of passions of the soul.52
Boethius goes about this problem by recalling a passage in De anima,53 where
Aristotle considers images as something incomplete with respect to concepts,54
because, even though images are a necessary condition for the formation of
concepts, it is not possible to produce a mental judgment out of images. Hence,
following in the footsteps of Aristotle, Boethius tells us that, since images can-
not produce compound thoughts, they cannot be the significates of names and
verbs either:

Wherefore the image is something incomplete, but names and verbs sig-
nify something complete and not something that falls short.55

The passions of the soul to which Aristotle is referring in this passage must,
then, be concepts. The common feature of names and verbs is, thus, to be utter-
ances conventionally significative of concepts.56 An utterance such as garalus
may, because of its appearance (figura), look like a name to the grammarian,

Magee propose that Boethius has Proclus theory of names in mind, according to which
man signifies primarily the Idea of Man and only secondarily instantiated men. See
Magee, Boethius on Signification, p. 95, n. 9 and Suto, Boethius on Mind, p. 28.
50 Boethius, In Perih.2 (ed. Meiser, 27:1820): Sed qui passiones animae a uocibus significari
dicit, is non de sensibus loquitur. Sensus enim corporis passiones sunt.
51 Note that image refers here to the impression left by a form in the imaginative part of the
soul the phantasia.
52 Boethius, In Perih.2 (ed. Meiser, 27:2528:1): Sed quoniam imaginatio quoque res animae
est, dubitauerit aliquis ne forte passiones animae imaginationes, quas Graeci *phanta-
sias* nominant, dicat.
53 Cf. Arist., De an. iii.8.432a1014.
54 Cf. Boethius, In Perih.2 (ed. Meiser, 29:610): Nam cum res aliqua sub sensum vel sub cogi-
tationem cadit, prius eius quaedam necesse est imaginatio nascatur, post vero plenior
superveniat intellectus cunctas eius explicans partes quae confuse fuerant imaginatione
praesumptae.
55 Boethius, In Perih.2 (ed. Meiser, 29:1113): Quocirca imperfectum quiddam est imaginatio,
nomina uero et uerba non curta quaedam sed perfecta significant.
56 Cf. Boethius, In Perih.2 (ed. Meiser, 3132).
Ancient Sources 29

yet is not a name for the philosopher as it has not yet been imposed in order to
signify a concept.57
So far, however, there is no mention of possibility (a) that the significates
of words are things. Perhaps in order to fill this void, Boethius proceeds to
introduce the crucial idea that the immediate significates of names and verbs
are concepts, things being their significates only secondarily:

[U]tterances signify thoughts and things, but thoughts principally, [and

they signify] the things that the intelligence itself understands by a sec-
ondary signification with the mediation of thoughts.58

Boethius, who seems to be more interested than Aristotle himself in explain-

ing the nature of the link between language and the world, reads the primary
link between words and concepts as a semantic link that entails a secondary
one between words and things, thereby introducing, for the first time in an
extant Latin commentary on Aristotles Perihermeneias, the idea of a second-
ary signification of things by words.
Surely, it is possible to account for the signification of things by means of the
signification of concepts. Suto nicely explains how this can happen by propos-
ing two situations in which we see something through something else: (a)
When we see a planet through the lens of a telescope. (b) When we see some-
one approaching through a mirror. In the first case we see both the lens and the
planet, but the planet through the lens. In the second case, by contrast, it would
be fair to say that we only see the mirror and that we see the person approach-
ing in the mirror. The signification of things through concepts in Boethius
would be analogous to the situation of the telescope:59 through the significa-
tion of the concept the name also signifies the concepts object and does not
stay stuck in the concept itself. However, this would also suggest that, just as in
the situation of the telescope the main target of vision is the planet, in the same
way the main target of the signification of words would be the external world.
Consequently, the reader is invited to lay an emphasis on the relation between
language and world that is not at all evident in the Aristotelian passage.
Boethius neither develops a positive argument for the immediate significa-
tion of concepts by names and verbs nor explains why Aristotle would dismiss

57 Cf. Boethius, In Perih.2 (ed. Meiser, 32).

58 Boethius, In Perih.2 (ed. Meiser, 33:2731): ea quae sunt in uoce res intellectusque sig-
nificent, principaliter quidem intellectus, res uero quas ipsa intellegentia comprehendit
secundaria significatione per intellectuum medietatem.
59 Cf. Suto, Boethius on Mind, p. 33.
30 chapter 1

things as their immediate significates. As to the signification of things, Boethius

only tells us that Alexander of Aphrodisias had already raised the question why
Aristotle says that names are primarily significative of concepts, even though
they are names of things. Thereafter, Boethius spends a few lines telling us that,
according to Alexander, names name things but are primarily significative, i.e.
indicative, of concepts, because their primary function is to make thoughts
public.60 Note that Alexanders explanation would point to a communicational
reading of the passage in question similar to the one that was given in
Section1.1; an explanation that, in passing, Boethius neither grants nor rejects.
As to the immediate signification of concepts, there is a passage at the very
beginning of his commentary where Boethius says that:

Insofar as the word itself signifies a concept, it is divided into two parts,
as it was already said, i.e. into name and verb; but insofar as the word
signifies, by means of the concepts, the things that are the objects of
thought, Aristotle divides the number of significative words into ten ca
tegoriesName and verb are a certain quality of the word and, of course,
they signify the ten categories; for the ten categories are never uttered
without the quality of the name or of the verb. Wherefore, the intention
of this book is to treat significative words insofar as they signify concepts
of the soul and of the intellect. The intention of the Categories was
described in its commentary: Since it is about words that signify things,
their signification can be divided into as many parts as things that are
objects of thought can be indicated by words through sensations and
concepts.61

The approach to significative simple utterances names and verbs in the

Perihermeneias is thus explained in opposition to the approach to significative

60 Cf. Boethius, In Perih.2 (ed. Meiser, 41).

61 Boethius, In Perih.2 (ed. Meiser, 7:128:7): Et quantum vox ipsa quidem intellectus signifi-
cat, in duas (ut dictum est) secatur partes, nomen et verbum, in quantum vero vox per
intellectuum medietatem subiectas intellectui res demonstrat, significantium vocum
Aristoteles numerum in decem praedicamenta partitus estVocis enim quaedam quali-
tas est nomen et verbum, quae nimirum ipsa illa decem praedicamenta significant.
Decem namque praedicamenta numquam sine aliqua verbi qualitate vel nominis profe-
rentur. Quare erit libri huius intentio de significativis vocibus in tantum quantum con-
ceptiones animi intellectusque significent. De decem praedicamentis autem libri intentio
in eius commentario dicta est, quoniam sit de significativis rerum vocibus, quot partibus
distribui possit earum significatio in tantum quantum per sensuum atque intellectuum
medietatem res subiectas intellectibus voces ipsae valeant designare.
Ancient Sources 31

simple utterances the ten Aristotelian categories in the Categories. A word

is qualified as a name or a verb insofar as it indicates a concept, but the same
word falls under a certain Aristotelian category depending on the sort of thing
that it indicates through that concept. Here again, Boethius does not explain
why for a significative word to be qualified as a name or as a verb it has to
indicate a concept. However, his opposition between signification of things (in
the Categories) and signification of concepts (in the Perihermeneias) will pro-
vide medieval scholars with the starting point of more developed explanations
of the immediate signification of concepts by names and verbs.

Concepts and Likenesses in Boethius

Boethius suggestion that names and verbs signify things secondarily by means
of their signification of concepts leads us to the question whether concepts
could somehow distort the way we understand things and, thereby, the way we
speak about them.
In his commentaries on both the Isagoge and the Perihermeneias, following
in Aristotles footsteps Boethius describes the concept as a likeness:

[A]ristotle called the passion of the soul a likeness, which, according to

Aristotle, grasps nothing different from the essential feature of the thing
that is the object [of thought].62

Which sort of likeness is at stake here? Let us consider the case of the concept
of man and raise the problem in the following way: (a) Is the concept of man
an understanding of the human nature itself or is it the understanding of an
agreement between several men?63 (b) Is the concept of man formally identi-
cal with the form of any given man?

62 Boethius, In Perih.2 (ed. Meiser, 43:1215): Similitudinem uero passionem animae uocauit,
quod secundum Aristotelem nihil aliud intellegere nisi cuiuslibet subiectae rei
proprietatem.
63 As could be suggested by this passage from Boethius commentary on the Isagoge [In
Isag.2 (ed. Brandt, 166)]: Then, their likeness is gathered from the individuals in which
they [i.e. the species] exist just as the likeness of humanity [is gathered] from the indi-
viduals of men , likeness which becomes species when it is thought by the rational soul
and truly known. [Tunc ex singulis in quibus sunt eorum similitudo colligitur ut ex
singulis hominibus inter se dissimilibus humanitatis similitudo, quae similitudo cogitata
animo ueraciterque perspecta fit species. In: In Porphyrii Isagogen commentarium, ed.
G. Schepps and S. Brandt (Vindobonae: F. Tempsky, 1906) (csel xxxxviii)] Note that this
passage does not entail that the likeness cannot be gathered from one individual alone.
32 chapter 1

In his book Lart des gnralits, Alain de Libera puts forth the following
reply to these questions: (a) For Boethius a specific concept, for instance, rep-
resents an agreement between individuals of the same species:

La similitude des espces exprime leur convenientia une convenance,

cest--dire la fois une rencontre et un accord, fonds dans lordre de
lessencela similitudo est un concept exprimant une relation entre plu-
sieurs choses (la rencontre de plusieurs en une mme essence) ou le fait
que des choses x1, x2,, xn, possdent chacune une proprit essentielle
P1, P2,, Pn, qui dtermine leur rencontre avec les autresla similitude
conceptuelle est moins collecte partir delles que collective.64

Consequently, (b) the concept is a likeness insofar as it represents in a unique

understanding the agreement of several individuals as regards their essential fea-
tures. This would seem to prevent the concept from being formally identical with
the form of the external thing, since it would be a mental construct rather than the
impression or the transfer of a form. De Libera explains that there is in Boethius
the cohabitation of two models of concept formation one inductive and one
non-inductive a cohabitation that is already present in Alexander of Aphrodisias
and that, whether consciously or not, passed on to Boethius. The latter would
finally adopt the inductive model, in order to make the concept the representation
of a relation of essential agreement between individuals numerically different.
However, this reply to the questions is problematic. De Libera grounds his
position in the following passage from De divisione:

It is particularly useful to know that a genus is in a sense a unified like-

ness between a number of species, a likeness such as points to the sub-
stantial agreement between them all. Hence a genus is collective of a
plurality of species whereas the species are disjunctive of a single genus.65
(Trans. Magee, p. 33)

Admittedly, Boethius talks here of the genus as expressing a substantial

agreement between species, which could also apply to species that are the

64 A. de Libera, Lart des gnralits. Thories de labstraction (Paris: Aubier, 1999), p. 275.
65 Boethius, De divisione (ed. Magee, 32): Illud autem scire perutile est, quoniam genus una quo-
dammodo multarum specierum similitudo est quae earum omnium substantialem convenien-
tiam monstret, atque collectivum plurimarum specierum genus est, disiunctivae vero unius
generis species. In: De divisione, ed. J. Magee (Leiden: Brill, 1998) (Philosophia Antiqua 77).
Ancient Sources 33

expression of a substantial agreement between individuals. Nevertheless, this

move does not seem to be valid regarding the species that are immediately
related to individuals the species specialissimae.
In his commentary on Porphyrys Isagoge, Boethius indeed puts forth a dif-
ference between species that can be further divided into subspecies and spe-
cies that cannot be further divided:

For some species can also be genera, but some other remain only in the
species essential feature and do not move on to the nature of the genus.66

The latter the species specialissimae:

are called species specialissimae, because the whole name of a certain

thing is borne by such entities, which are constituted purely and without
admixture by the essential property in case.67

In other words, the name of a species specialissima, e.g. man, applies to all
the individuals whose essential feature is to be a man. These species represent
the substance of all their individuals:

In fact, since the species points out to one substance, which would be the
substance of all the individuals that are put under the species, thus [the
species] was preferable, if someone wanted to look upon the substance.68

Furthermore, some of these species are associated with an essential feature,

e.g. to be a sun or to be a phoenix, which is actually instantiated in only one
individual:

Sometimes, the species can be at the top of only one individual; for if the
phoenix is unique, as the tale goes, the species of the phoenix is predicated

66 Boethius, In Isag.2 (ed. Brandt, 166): Aliae enim sunt species, quae et genera esse possunt,
aliae, quae in sola speciei permanent proprietate neque in naturam generis transeunt.
67 Boethius, In Isag.2 (ed. Brandt, 207): Specialissimae species appellantur, idcirco quoniam
integrum cuiuslibet rei vocabulum illa suscipiunt, quae pura inmixtaque in ea de qua
quaeritur proprietate sunt constituta.
68 Boethius, In Isag.2 (ed. Brandt, 166): Nam cum species substantiam monstret unam, quae
omnium individuorum sub specie positorum substantia sit, quodammodo nulli prae-
posita est, si ad substantiam quis velit aspicere.
34 chapter 1

of only one individual. It is thought that the species of the sun also has
only one sun as a subject, so that the species does not contain in itself any
multiplicity.69

Consequently, genera and superior species would represent something an

essential agreement that does not seem to be the same as what is represented
by a species specialissima, because such agreement would require the existence
of at least two individuals of the species, and, as we just saw, some species spe-
cialissimae represent a substance that exists in only one individual.
Accordingly, Boethius seems to put forth an account that articulates two
models of concept formation one inductive and the other non-inductive so
that the non-inductive model serves to explain the formation of concepts of
species specialissimae, while the inductive model serves to explain the forma-
tion of genera and of superior species. Therefore, concepts can be either the
understanding of a nature as if it were separated from individuals or the under-
standing of the agreement of several species in one essential feature.
In the case of the non-inductive model, since there is a sharing of form
between object and concept, for the same thing, [when it is] in the soul, is an
affection, and it is a likeness of the thing,70 the formal identity follows evi-
dently, which would thereby assure and ground the secondary signification of
external things.

Boethius logical works considerably shaped the reception of Aristotles

Perihermeneias 1 and, thereby, the development of the thirteenth-century
notion of signification. The main Boethian elements that will be retained in
the late medieval period and that are not evident features of the Aristotelian
treatise are: (a) the strong focus on the notion of signification itself; (b) the
strong focus on the semiotic content of simple words names and verbs in
the passage 1.16a38; and (c) the idea of a secondary signification of things

69 Boethius, In Isag.2 (ed. Brandt, 215): At vero species etiam uni aliquando individuo
praeesse potest. Si enim unus, ut perhibetur, est phoenix, phoenicis species de uno tan-
tum individuo praedicatur; solis etiam species unum solem intelligitur habere subiectum.
Ita nullam multitudinem species per se continet.
70 Cf. Boethius, In Perih.2 (ed. Meiser, 35:1521): Quare quoniam passiones animae quas
intellectus uocauit rerum quaedam similitudines sunt, idcirco Aristoteles, cum paulo
post de passionibus animae loqueretur, continenti ordine ad similitudines transitum
fecit, quoniam nihil differt utrum passiones diceret an similitudines. Eadem namque res
in anima quidem passio est, rei uero similitudo.
Ancient Sources 35

through the primary signification of concepts by virtue of a formal identity

between concepts and things. These Boethian elements will be to a great
extent accountable for the semiotic and verificational approaches to significa-
tion, which are superposed over the communicational one and which will be
at the centre of the discussions about signification of concepts and significa-
tion of things that we analyse in the following two sections.
 chapter 2

Medieval Discussions about Signification of

Concepts and Things

2.1 Whether Words (Qua Names) Signify Concepts or Things

As John Duns Scotus relates in his Ordinatio (ca. 1304), the question whether
words immediately signify concepts or things was highly debated in his time.1
In fact, the question is extant in at least twelve logical treatises from the thir-
teenth century, two of them by the Franciscans Roger Bacon (De signis, ca.
1267) and Peter John Olivi (Quaestiones logicales, ca. 1287) and the rest by mas-
ters of Arts. It is usually raised in commentaries on Aristotles Perihermeneias,
but also in commentaries on the passages in Metaphysics iv.4 about the signi-
fication of names and on the passage 1.165a68 of the Sophistical Refutations,
where we are told that we use words in place of things. The main extant ver-
sions of the question are by Martin of Dacia (In Perih., 1270s), Peter of Auvergne
(In Perih., 1270s), Siger of Brabant (In Met., 1270s), the Incertus sf (In se, late
1270s), Simon of Faversham (In Perih., 1280s), Radulphus Brito (In Perih. and In
Met., 1290s) and John Duns Scotus (In Perih.1 and In Perih.2, perhaps 1290s).
Scotus commentaries, late witnesses to the thirteenth-century debate, pres-
ent us with an extensive summary of diverse and opposite positions. The
debate, however, seems to be rather ancient, for in his second commentary on
the Perihermeneias, Boethius gives us the impression that the controversy goes
back to at least Alexander of Aphrodisias, who asked himself why Aristotle
claims that names signify concepts, even though they are names of things:

1 Duns Scotus, Ordinatio d.27 q.1 (ed. Vatican, 97:35): Licet magna altercatio fiat de voce,
utrum sit signum rei vel conceptus, tamen breviter concedo quod illud quod signatur per
vocem proprie est res. For other discussions of this question, namely the ones that were the
source of inspiration for my own study, see G. Pini, Signification of Names in Duns Scotus
and Some of his Contemporaries, Vivarium 39 (2001), 2051; and id., Species, Concept and
Thing: Theories of Signification in the Second Half of the Thirteenth Century, Medieval
Philosophy and Theology 8 (1997), 2152. For signification in Scotus, see C. Marmo, Ontology
and Semantics in the Logic of Duns Scotus, in U. Eco and C. Marmo (eds.), On the Medieval
Theory of Signs (Amsterdam: John Benjamins, 1989), pp. 143193; D. Perler, Duns Scotuss
Philosophy of Language, in T. Williams (ed.), The Cambridge Companion to Duns Scotus
(Cambridge: cup, 2003), pp. 161192; and id., Duns Scotus on Signification, Medieval
Philosophy and Theology 3 (1993), 97120.

koninklijke brill nv, leiden, |doi 10.1163/9789004300132_004

SIGNIFICATION OF CONCEPTS AND THINGS 37

But since Aristotle says: The things of which these are primarily
marks the passions of the soul are the same for every one, Alexander
asks: If the names are [names] of things, why would Aristotle say that
utterances are primarily marks of the intellect? For the name is given to a
thing, as when we say homo, we signify certain concept, but [homo] is
the name of a thing, i.e. of a mortal rational animal. Why then wouldnt
utterances be primarily marks of the things to which they are given,
rather than of the concepts? But perhaps someone would object that
utterances are names of things, however we do not use utterances in
order to signify things, but in order to [signify] those passions of the soul
that are born in us out of things. Whence, since utterances themselves
are uttered in order to signify them, [Aristotle] rightly said that they are
primarily marks of [the passions].2

Alexander would reply to his own question by establishing a distinction between

the act of naming and the act of signifying, so that a name signifies that which
it primarily intends to communicate when it is uttered a concept.3
Furthermore, as we already saw, Boethius tells us that Porphyry, in his lost
commentary, relates about an ancient controversy about the signification of
words whether they signify things, ideas, sensations or imaginations.4 So it is
probable that the two remarks about this controversy by Albert the Great and
Roger Bacon, in the 1260s, make reference to that ancient controversy, and that
the debate mentioned by Scotus is indeed its thirteenth-century revival.5

2 Boethius, In Perih.2 (ed. Meiser, 40:2841:13): Sed quoniam ita dixit Aristoteles: quorum autem
haec primorum notae, eaedem omnibus passiones animae sunt, quaerit Alexander: si rerum
nomina sunt, quid causae est ut primorum intellectuum notas esse voces diceret Aristoteles?
Rei enim ponitur nomen, ut cum dicimus homo significamus quidem intellectum, rei tamen
nomen est, id est animalis rationalis mortalis. Cur ergo non primarum magis rerum notae sint
voces quibus ponuntur potius quam intellectuum? Sed fortasse quidem ob hoc dictum est,
inquit, quod licet voces rerum nomina sint, tamen non idcirco utimur vocibus, ut res sig-
nificemus, sed ut eas quae ex rebus nobis innatae sunt animae passiones. Quocirca propter
quorum significantiam voces ipsae proferentur, recte eorum primorum esse dixit notas.
3 Note that this reading is very similar to the one that I proposed in Section1.1.
4 Cf. Boethius, In Perih.2 (ed. Meiser, 26:1727:6); see full quotation above, in Section1.2, p. 27,
n. 48.
5 Albert the Great, In Perih. (ed. Borgnet, 381): Consideratur enim vox significativa ad placitum
dupliciter, scilicet secundum institutionem et usum et secundum causam institutionis.
(Nota hanc distinctionem: quia per eam solvuntur multa argumenta et salvatur quod voces
primo significent res, et etiam quod primo significent conceptus sub diversis respectus). In:
Liber Perihermeneias, ed. A. Borgnet (Paris: Vivs, 1890) (Opera Omnia 1). Roger Bacon, De
signis (ed. Fredborg et al., 162163): Et est difficilis dubitatio utrum vox significet species
38 chapter 2

As I have shown in Section1, there are conflicting claims in the authoritative

literature of the period about the signification of words. Boethius, for instance,
tells us on the one hand that according to Aristotles Perihermeneias, words
signify concepts; on the other hand, he claims in his commentary on the
Categories that this treatise deals with words that signify things.6 Furthermore,
in the Sophistical Refutations, Aristotle himself claims that we use words in
place of things, and he is usually taken to be saying in Metaphysics iv.4
(1066a3135) that names signify the essence of things. Finally, Priscian claims
too that words represent concepts,7 but he also defines e.g. the name as a word
that signifies a substance with a quality (both of which are Aristotelian catego-
ries of things or res praedicamentales).8
While Priscians claims are only rarely brought into the discussion, Aristotle
and Boethius are systematically quoted in arguments of authority in favour of
both the immediate signification of concepts and the immediate signification
of things. Now, a closer look at the different objections against the immediate
signification of concepts in Scotus commentary reveals that this position is
attacked from at least three different angles, which I shall call the semiotic
angle, the categorial angle and the verificational angle.
As to the categorial angle, a number of arguments against the immediate
signification of concepts are based on the Aristotelian categories. If, as Boethius
suggests in his commentary on the Categories, a words category is determined
by the ontological category of its significate, then, if words signified concepts,
all words would fall under the category of quality; for, ontologically speaking,
concepts are qualities of the human soul.9

apud animam an res, et quomodo potest significare species et habitus et conceptus mentis.
In: De signis, ed. K.M. Fredborg, L. Nielsen and J. Pinborg, in An Unedited Part of Roger
Bacons Opus Maius: De signis, Traditio 34 (1978), 75136.
6 Cf. Boethius, In Cat. (pl 64, 160A): Est igitur huius operis intentione vocibus res significanti-
bus in eo quod significantes sunt pertractare. In: In Categorias Aristotelis libri quattuor, ed.
J.-P. Migne (Paris: Migne, 1860) (Patrologia Latina 64).
7 Priscian, ig xi.2 (ed. Hertz, 552): Quid enim est aliud pars orationis nisi vox indicans men-
tis conceptum, id est cogitationem? In: Institutiones grammaticae libri xviii, 2 vols., ed.
M. Hertz (Leipzig: Teubner, 18551859) (gl iiiii).
8 For this definition of names and the particular questions that emerge from its comparison
with Aristotles definition, see below, Part 2.
9 Cf. Duns Scotus, In Perih.1 (ed. Bonaventure, 50:45): Tum quia tunc omne nomen signifi-
caret accidens, quia illa species est in anima ut in subiecto, sicut species visibilis in oculo. In:
Quaestiones in duos libros Perihermeneias, ed. R. Andrews et al. (St. Bonaventure, ny: The
Franciscan Institute, 2004) (Opera philosophica 2). Recent translation in E. Buckner and
J. Zupko, Duns Scotus on Time and Existence. The Questions on Aristotles De interpretatione
(Washington DC: CUAP, 2014).
SIGNIFICATION OF CONCEPTS AND THINGS 39

To the best of my knowledge, only two authors use a categorial argument

against the immediate signification of concepts, namely Radulphus Brito and
Walter Burley. Brito, for instance, says:

Likewise, if every name signified a concept, then, since the concept is an

accident, the name would signify an accident, and since it falls under a
category by means of what is signified, then the name would fall under
the category of the accident.10

Yet, as Scotus remarks in his commentary, this argument is easily refuted as con-
cepts can be seen from two perspectives: (i) As accidents of the soul, and as such
they do not determine the category of the word. (ii) As likenesses of external things,
so that the category of the concepts object determines the category of the word:

10 Radulphus Brito, In Met. (ed. Ebbesen, 111): Item, si omne nomen significaret intellectum,
tunc, cum intellectus sit accidens, tunc nomen significaret accidens, et cum per id quod
significatur per aliquid reponatur in praedicamento, tunc nomen esset in praedicamento
accidentium. In: Quaestiones super Metaphysicam, partial edition in S. Ebbesen, Words
and Signification in 13th-century Questions on Aristotles Metaphysics, cimagl 71 (2000),
107114. For a reconstruction of Britos theory of signification, see A.M. Mora-Mrquez,
Radulphus Brito on Common Names, Concepts and Things, in J. Fink, H. Hansen and
A.M. Mora-Mrquez (eds.), Logic and Language in the Middle Ages: A Volume in Honour of
Sten Ebbesen (Leiden: Brill, 2013) (Investigating Medieval Philosophy 4), pp. 357372. See
also S. Ebbesen, Radulphus Brito: The last of the great masters, or Philosophy and
Freedom, in J.A. Aertsen and A. Speer (eds.), Geistesleben im 13. Jahrhundert (Berlin: De
Gruyter, 2000), pp. 231251. Cf. Walter Burley, In Perih. (ed. Brown, 51): Vel aliter, ut dicit
Boethius super Praedicamenta quod in libro Praedicamentorum determinatur de vocibus
ut res significant et hic in isto libro determinatur de vocibus ut significant intellectus. Et
sic in libro Praedicamentorum determinatur de vocibus primae impositionis sed in isto
libro determinatur de vocibus secundae impositionis. Voces primae impositionis sunt
quae significant res, distinguendo res contra voces, et dicuntur nomina rerum. Sed voces
secundae impositionis sunt quae significant voces et dicuntur nomina nominum. Unde
nomina primae intentionis et nomina secundae intentionis sunt nomina primae imposi-
tionis, quia significant res; sed nomen, verbum et hoc quod dico terminumdicuntur
nomina secundae impositionis. In: Commentarius in librum Perihermeneias, in S.F. Brown,
Walter Burleys Middle Commentary on Aristotles Perihermeneias, Franciscan Studies 33
(1973), 45134. For other discussions of Burleys theory of signification, see J. Biard,
Logique et thorie du signe au 14e sicle (Paris: Vrin, 1989), pp. 136161; L. Cesalli, Meaning
and Truth, in A. Conti (ed.), A Companion to Walter Burley (Leiden: Brill, 2013), pp. 87134;
id., Le ralisme propositionnel: smantique et ontologie des propositions chez Jean Duns
Scot, Gauthier Burley, Richard Brinkley et Jean Wyclif (Paris: Vrin, 2007); and A. Conti,
Significato e verit in Walter Burley, Documenti e studi sulla tradizione filosofica medi-
evale 11 (2000), 317350. For Walter Burley in general, see A. Conti (ed.), A Companion.
40 chapter 2

To the first [position], one must answer that it is not inconvenient for the
name to immediately signify an accident, not insofar as it [i.e. the acci-
dent] is something in itself, but insofar as it is a sign of a thing. And thus,
some utterances signify a substance as the ultimate significate, and thus
they are said to signify substance absolutely.11

Another objection proposes that if names signified concepts (which are acci-
dents of the soul) and, through concepts, things that fall under any of the ten
Aristotelian categories (e.g. a substance), every name would be equivocal as it
would signify both a substance and an accident. However, a further reply
remarks that names are equivocal when they have different significates in dif-
ferent acts of signification, but a word signifies the concept and the thing in
the same act of signification (i.e. the thing by means of the concept), and thus
there is no equivocation:

Against these [arguments]: No substantial notion is the same for the sub-
stance and for the accident, since they do not have the same general
genus. But the likeness of a substance is an accident. Therefore, if these
[i.e. the substance and the accident] are signified with some name, both
of them would have only the name in common, but diverse substantial
notion. Hence, every name would be equivocal To this, it is said that the
equivocal name signifies many things in different acts of signification;
but the utterance signifies the thing and the likeness with respect to the
same act, because with respect to the same act the utterance is sign of the
sign qua sign and of its content (signati).12

No trace of this argument can be found in the extant versions of the question
about the immediate signification of words, nor could I find a discussion of
such an issue in the commentaries on the Categories from the same period.

11 Duns Scotus, In Perih.1 (ed. Bonaventure, 52:2153:4): Ad primam respondetur quod non
est inconveniens omne nomen significare accidens immediate, non in quantum est quid
in se, sed ut signum rei. Et ita aliquae voces significant substantiam ut ultimum significa-
tum, et ita dicuntur absolute significare substantiam.
12 Duns Scotus, In Perih.1 (ed. Bonaventure, 51:1552:9): Contra ista: substantiae et accidenti
nulla ratio substantialis est eadem, cum nec habeant idem genus generalissimum; sed rei
quae est substantia, similitudo illius est accidens; ergo si haec significentur per aliquod
nomen, istis duobus erit solum nomen commune et ratio substantiae diversa; igitur
omne nomen erit aequivocum Ad illud dicitur quod aequivocum diversis actibus sig-
nificandi significat multa; sed vox est significans rem et similitudinem eodem actu, quia
eodem actu est vox signum signi in quantum signum et signati eius.
SIGNIFICATION OF CONCEPTS AND THINGS 41

There is indeed a discussion about the double categorisation of words such as

body and science, but in this discussion the problem at stake is different; for
the problem of double categorisation deals with the possibility that one word
with one and the same significate falls under more than one category (e.g.
quantity and substance in the case of body and quality and relation in the
case of science). Hence, body, for instance, is not considered an equivocal
word it does not have different significates but rather a univocal word with
a double categorisation. Medieval commentators on the Categories are con-
cerned with the notion of predicability, or with sayables (dicibiles), or with
significant words insofar as they are susceptible of being attributed to a sub-
ject.13 Furthermore, there is some agreement that metaphysical categories and
categories of attribution are not necessarily the same, so that things qua beings
only fall under one category of being, even though words can have a double
category of attribution. The way to tackle the problem of the double categori-
sation of words differs from one author to another and goes beyond the pur-
pose of this study it is a complex logico-metaphysical problem that, to the
best of my knowledge, has no outstanding implications for the development of
the notion of signification in the thirteenth century. I shall therefore leave the
categorial argument aside and focus on the semiotic and verificational angles.

The Semiotic Angle

The Immediate Signification of Concepts
From the semiotic angle the question of the immediate signification of words
is closely related to the question of their imposition on their content and hence
the question amounts to asking whether words qua signs are related to con-
cepts or to things. In the case of the so-called common names of first imposi-
tion (e.g. man, horse and stone),14 which are at the core of most of the
discussions from the second half of the century, the conundrum is their appli-
cability to many things.15 The question, then, asks on which kind of item the

13 See e.g. Nicholas of Paris, In Praed. L1 ([Rationes super Praedicamenta, ms Mnich,

Bayerische Staatsbibliothek Clm. 14460, ff. 42ra62ra] ed. Hansen, forthcoming): Est ergo
causa materialis sive subiectum huius libri dicibile incomplexum ordinabile.
14 Names of second imposition are e.g. name, verb, subject, predicate etc.
15 Contrary to some medieval theologians (e.g. Thomas Aquinas) for whom the object of
imposition and the object of signification are not necessarily the same thing, for the authors
under consideration in this study a words significate is that on which the utterance is
imposed. The distinction between object of imposition and object of signification is at least
as old as Boethius, for whom names are imposed on the things they name, although they
signify thoughts. In the 12th century a similar distinction is made by e.g. Peter Abelard; see
C.J. Martin, The Development of Logic, in R. Pasnau (ed.), The Cambridge History of
42 chapter 2

common name of first imposition is imposed a thing or its concept and

how one further explains its applicability to many things.
Contrary to Boethius, who in the beginning of his commentary on the
Categories claims that names of first imposition are imposed on things,16 most
authors from the first half of the thirteenth century hold that words are
imposed on, and consequently signify, concepts. The question they raise is
rather why concepts are signified by an object of the sense of hearing an
utterance and not by the object of any other sense.17 Their common answer
to the question is that a sign and its significate ought to have the same sort of

Medieval Philosophy. 2 vols. (Cambridge: cup, 2010), Vol. 1, pp. 129132; and id., Imposition
and Essence: Whats new in Abelards theory of meaning, in T. Shimizu and C. Burnett
(eds.), The Word in Medieval Logic, Theology and Psychology (Turnhout: Brepols, 2009),
pp. 173214. It is also common to find this distinction in 12th-century theological discussions
about language, as well as in 12th-century grammar. For 12th-century grammar, see I. Rosier-
Catach, Grammar, in R. Pasnau (ed.), The Cambridge History, Vol. 1, pp. 196218, at pp. 196
200. For 12th-century theologians, see L. Valente, Logique et thologie (Paris: Vrin, 2008); and
J. Marenbon, Gilbert of Poitierss Contextual Theory of Meaning, in Fink et al. (eds.), Logic
and Language, pp. 4964. For Thomas Aquinas, see J.E. Ashworth, Signification and Modes
of Signifying in Thirteenth-Century Logic: A Preface to Aquinas in Analogy, Medieval
Philosophy and Theology 1 (1991), 3967; and I. Rosier-Catach, Res significata et modi signifi-
candi: les implications dune distinction mdivale, in S. Ebbesen (ed.), Sprachteorien in
Sptantiken und Mittelalter (Tbingen: Gunter Narr Verlag, 1995), pp. 135168.
16 Boethius, In Cat. (pl 64, 159BC): Prima igitur illa fuit nominum positio, per quam vel
intellectui subiecta vel sensibus designaret. Secunda consideratio, qua singulas proprie-
tates nominum figurasque perspicerent, ita ut primum nomen sit ipsum rei vocabulum:
ut, verbi gratia, cum quaelibet res homo dicatur. Quod autem ipsum vocabulum, id est
homo, nomen vocatur, non ad significationem nominis ipsius refertur sed ad figuram,
idcirco quod possit casibus inflecti. Ergo prima positio nominis secundum significatio-
nem vocabuli facta est, secunda vero secundum figuram: et est prima positio, ut nomina
rebus imponerentur, secunda vero ut aliis nominibus ipsa nomina designarentur.
17 Robert Kilwardby, Notulae super Perihermeneias ([mss Cambridge, Peterhouse 206,
ff. 13va21ra; Madrid, Biblioteca Universitaria 73, ff. 44ra66va; Venezia, Biblioteca Marciana
L.vi.66, 2r18v] M46rb; P67vb; V3r): Quaeritur postea propter quid passio sive intellectus
significatur per obiectum auditus sicut per vocem, et per obiectum visus sicut per litteram,
et non per obiectum aliorum sensuum; Nicholas of Paris, In Perih. (ed. Hansen and
Mora-Mrquez, 27:2324): Quaeritur propter quid per vocem intellectus repraesentatur
potius quam per aliud sensibile signum. In: H. Hansen and A.M. Mora-Mrquez, Nicholas
of Paris on Aristotles Perihermeneias 1-3, cimagl 80 (2011), 188. Cf. AnOx, In Perih.
(ed. Mora-Mrquez, 187:1015): Quia primo dicit quod figura est signum vocis et quod vox
sit signum passionis, cum ergo vox sit obiectum auditus, figura autem visus, cum sint
alia sensibilia, propter quid magis ista duo (sensibile visus et sensibile auditus) imponun-
tur ad significandum quam sensibilia aliorum sensuum imponuntur. In: Mora-Mrquez,
SIGNIFICATION OF CONCEPTS AND THINGS 43

being. Since the words significate (i.e. the concept) is a mental being, the being
of signs has to agree with the mental being of concepts. Yet only utterances
(and more precisely articulate utterances) are as such; for, contrary to things
whose only cause is nature (e.g. men and horses), the causes of articulate utter-
ances are both nature and the rational faculty of the soul, because humans
produce articulate utterances as the result of their rational will to communi-
cate. Utterances are thus partly mental by virtue of their efficient cause and
are, therefore, suitable to be imposed on concepts. In Robert Kilwardbys words
(perhaps 1240s):

It must be said that, since the sign and its content are proportional, and
the content is a likeness of the thing in the rational soul, it is necessary for
this sign to have something on the part of the rational soul and some-
thing on the part of the thing. But sense-objects other than the utterance
and the letter are totally by nature and in no way by will or by the rational
soul, and because of this it is manifest that they could not be signs of
conceptsAnd thus, it is evident that the utterance is a sign of the con-
cept; for it has something on the part of the thing matter; for air is its
matter and something on the part of the rational soul, since [the ratio-
nal soul] is its efficient cause18

Anonymus Oxford. I owe thanks to Alessandro Conti for having given me access to Lewrys
transcription of Kilwardbys commentary.
18 Robert Kilwardby, Not. sup. Perih. (M46rb; P67vb; V3r): Dicendum quod cum signum et
signatum sit proportionalia, et signatum est similitudo rei in anima rationali, oportet
quod signum huiusmodi habet aliquid ab anima rationali et aliquid a re. Set sensibilia alia
a voce et figura omnino sunt a natura et nullo modo a voluntate sive ab anima rationali,
et propter hoc manifestum est quod non poterant esse signa intellectuum Et sic patet
quod vox sit signum intellectus: haec enim aliquid habet a re, scilicet materiam, materia
enim eius est aer, et aliquid ab anima rationali, cum sit eius principium effectivum. Cf.
AnOx, In Perih. (ed. Mora-Mrquez, 190:18): Ad illud quod primo quaeritur, dicendum
quod sunt quaedam sensibilia quorum natura est principium solum, quaedam vero quo-
rum natura et anima. Sensibile illud cuius natura est principium solum est sicut color et
durum et molle, <et> huiusmodi non imponitur ad significandum; aliud est autem sensi-
bile cuius natura est principium et anima, sicut vox, quia vox est sonus procedens ab ore
animalis, et huiusmodi potius debet imponi ad significandum, eo quod signum et signa-
tum convenientiam debent habere inter se. For Robert Kilwardbys semantics, see
P.O. Lewry, Robert Kilwardby on Meaning: A Parisian Course on the Logica Vetus, in
J.P. Beckmann et al. (eds.), Sprache und Erkenntis im Mittelalter (Berlin: De Gruyter, 1981),
pp. 376384; and id., Robert Kilwardbys Writings on the Logica Vetus with Regard to their
Teaching and Method (Oxford: Ph.D. dissertation, 1978). For a recent collection of articles
on Robert Kilwardby, see H. Lagerlund and P. Thom (eds.), A Companion to the Philosophy
44 chapter 2

Some years later Ps.-Kilwardby addresses this issue and explains in detail the
mechanisms of the imposition of utterances on concepts. The first question he
raises is whether the imposition of utterances with the purpose of signification
is possible at all.19 There is first the claim that such imposition is not possible,
because to impose an utterance is to provide it with signification by joining it
to a significate. Yet the union of an utterance and a concept is impossible,
because the utterance is a material thing and the concept is a mental thing, and
things that are substantially different, and in different places, cannot be joined.
Therefore, the imposition of utterances on concepts is not possible at all.20
Ps.-Kilwardby opposes that it is evident that words have signification by
imposition words do not come to being naturally, but they are coined; for, as
Aristotle himself remarks, words are not the same for all people, therefore they
do not have natural signification, and hence they signify by convention (ex
institutione):

Likewise, the Philosopher says in Perihermeneias 1 that utterances are

signs of concepts. Concepts and things are the same for everyone, but
utterances are not the same for everyone. From this, it is argued: If signifi-
cative utterances, as names and verbs, are not the same for everyone,

of Robert Kilwardby (Leiden: Brill, 2013) (Brills Companions to the Christian Tradition 37);
for Kilwardbys philosophy, see J.F. da Silva, Robert Kilwardby on the Human Soul. Plurality
of Forms and Censorship in the Thirteenth Century (Leiden: Brill, 2013) (Investigating
Medieval Philosophy 3).
19 Ps.-Kilwardby, In Prisc. mai. (ed. Fredborg et al., 49): Quaeritur ergo primo an sit possibi-
lis institutio vocis ad significandum. In: Commentum super Priscianum maiorum, ed.
K.M. Fredborg, N.J. Green-Pedersen, L. Nielsen and J. Pinborg, in The commentary on
Priscianus Maior ascribed to Robert Kilwardby, cimagl 15 (1975), 1146. Cf. John of
Dacia, Summa (ed. Otto, 178:1428), in: John of Dacia, Summa grammatica, in Johannis
Daci Opera, ed. A. Otto (Copenhagen: gad, 1955) (CPhD I.12). See also C. Marmo,
Semiotica e linguaggio nella Scolastica: Parigi, Bologna, Erfurt 12701330. La semiotica dei
modisti (Rome: Istituto Storico Italiano per il Medioevo, 1994), Ch. 1.
20 Ps.-Kilwardby, In Prisc. mai. (ed. Fredborg et al., 4950): Videtur quod non. Ad hoc quod
sit institutio vocis ad significandum necesse est speciem intelligibilem uniri voci. Sed
haec unio est impossibilis, ergo institutio est impossibilis. Maior patet quia instituere
vocem ad significandum nihil aliud est quam dare voci significationem quam prius non
habebat. Dare autem voci significationem quam prius non habebat est ei unire significa-
tionem. Significatio autem non est nisi species intelligibilis Minor patet quia quae-
cumque necesse est distare secundum substantiam et situm impossibile est ea coniungi.
Sed species intelligibilis quae dicitur significatio et vox sunt huiusmodiquod patet quia
species intelligibilis est in anima, vox autem sensibilis in aere extra Quare impossibili
est ea coniungi. Note that this is the same concern that we find in Kilwardby and AnOx.
SIGNIFICATION OF CONCEPTS AND THINGS 45

therefore they do not signify naturally, because natural things are the
same for everyone. Therefore they only signify by institution.21

Having determined that the imposition of utterances on concepts is indeed

possible, Ps-Kilwardby goes on to discuss the character of the union that results
from the imposition of an utterance on a concept. Several possibilities are put
forth, the first being that the concept and the utterance are joined just as form
is joined to matter. This possibility is rejected because utterances perish but
concepts remain, which would not be the case if concepts were joined to utter-
ances as their form.22 Another possibility is that they are joined just as a thing
and its likeness, and this can happen either immaterially or materially.
Immaterially, just as the objects of intellectual knowledge and their intellec-
tual representation; materially, just as an object and its image in a sensitive
organ or in a mirror. Yet the utterance is not an object of intellectual knowl-
edge because it is a sensible thing, and as a result it cannot be immaterially
joined to the concept; and the concept is not corporeal, so it cannot be materi-
ally joined to the utterance.23

21 Ps.-Kilwardby, In Prisc. mai. (ed. Fredborg et al., 51): Item: I. Perihermeneias dicit
Philosophus quod voces sunt signa intellectuum. Sed intellectus et res sunt eadem apud
omnes, voces autem non sunt eaedem apud omnes. Ex quo arguitur: si voces significativae
ut sunt nomina vel verba non sunt eaedem apud omnes, ergo non significant naturaliter,
quia naturalia sunt eadem apud omnes; ergo ex institutione significant solum. Note that
for Ps.-Kilwardby institution and imposition are equivalent; see e.g. the following passage
[Ps.-Kilwardby, In Prisc. mai. (ed. Fredborg et al., 5152)]: Item: patet per rationes; quia
illud videtur possibile seu contingens quo non existente positum in esse nullum accidit
inconveniens. Sed dato quod nulla facta fuisset impositio sive institutio vocis ad signifi-
candum sicut quondam fuit, ex ipsa institutione facta nullum accideret inconveniens sed
potius multae commoditates. Ergo ipsa institutio ad significandum est possibilis.
22 Ps.-Kilwardby, In Prisc. mai. (ed. Fredborg et al., 5354): Sed tunc supposito quod intel-
lectus uniatur aliquo genere unionis quaeritur quid sit illud. Aut enim unitur ei secun-
dum substantiam ut forma materiae Non primo modo quia cum intellectus naturaliter
praecedat ipsam vocem, quare non unitur ei ut forma materiae, tum quia vox fluxibilis est
et intellectus manet, quod non contingeret si esset eius forma.
23 Ps.-Kilwardby, In Prisc. mai. (ed. Fredborg et al., 5455): aut secundum sui similitudi-
nem et hoc dupliciter: aut per modum spiritualem ut res cognoscibiles ab anima uniuntur
sibi per sui similitudinem vel speciem spiritualem, aut per modum corporalem et hoc
dupliciter: aut sicut idolum in organo cognoscendiaut sicut idolum in speculo materi-
aliquod non contingit, quia nihil unitur alicui per modum spiritualem nisi ipsum sit
sensus spiritualis. Vox autem sensibilis non est huiusmodi Si uniretur sicut idolum
organo cognoscendi, tunc illud iterum esset impossibile, cum ipsa vox non sit sicut orga-
num cognoscendi. Item: solum corporale idolum habet. Species autem intelligibilis non
46 chapter 2

Along the lines of Kilwardby and of AnOx, Ps.-Kilwardby places the concept
and the utterance in the mental realm by introducing the idea of a mental
utterance, so that the external utterance would be imposed through the impo-
sition of the mental utterance on a concept:

[I]t is askedwith respect to which utterance is the institution made and

how whether with respect to the internal mental utterance or to the
external utterance that is a sense-object; [and] it must be said that with
respect to both, but the institution of the exterior [utterance is made] by
means of the interior [utterance].24

However, Ps.-Kilwardby takes a step further by explaining in detail the psycho-

logical mechanisms that take place during the production of a word. Once a
speaker has acquired the concept of a thing and once the will to communicate
it to someone else has arisen, the rational part of the soul devises a mental
utterance that is joined to the concept, thus producing a mental word.
Thereafter, since a listener cannot understand an utterance unless it has a
material bearer, the rational soul provokes the movement of the bodily organs
that participate in the production of utterances, so that the mental word takes
an external utterance as a sensible vehicle capable of reaching the intellect of
a listener:

Hence, once the soul has an intention susceptible of being signified,

immediately a pre-invention of the utterance is produced by which such
intention or intellection must be signified; and the intention susceptible
of being signified is attached to the intention of the utterance, just as the
end [is attached] to that which is directed towards the end. Consequently,
since a sensible sign is required in order to make public this concept to

est corporalis, ergo non unitur voci ut idolum organo cognoscendi. Nec etiam ut species
obiecti corporis speculo materiali, quia tunc contingeret quod spirituale per sui unionem
cum materiali fieret materiale. The possibilities that the utterance and the concept are
joined as a means to the end, as the mover to the moved, as the wax to the ring and as a
sign to its significate are also taken into consideration.
24 Ps.-Kilwardby, In Prisc. mai. (ed. Fredborg et al., 57): quaeriturscilicet in qua voce fiat
institutio et qualiter an scilicet in voce mentali interiori aut in voce sensibili exteriori,
dicendum quod in utraque, sed in exteriori fit institutio interiori mediante. See also
C. Panaccio, Grammar and Mental Language in the Pseudo-Kilwardby, in S. Ebbesen and
R. Friedman (eds.), Medieval Analyses in Language and Cognition: Acts of the symposium
The Copenhagen School of Medieval Philosophy, January 1013, 1996 (Copenhagen: Royal
Danish Academy of Sciences and Letters, 1999), pp. 397414.
SIGNIFICATION OF CONCEPTS AND THINGS 47

someone else (because there is nothing in the intellect that was not in
the senses before), the rational soul moves by its desire and imagina-
tionthe bodily parts whose purpose is the formation of the utterance
and the perceptible utterance is formed along with the intention of the
utterance that was pre-invented and pre-conceived in the mind of
the speaker, as well as is produced the external speech which embraces
and represents the same thing that was embraced and represented by the
internal speech.25

The external utterance qua word signifies the same thing that is signified by
the mental utterance qua mental word. This external utterance is therefore
related to: (i) the mental utterance of which it is a likeness as a natural sign
(because the effect is a natural sign of its cause), (ii) the mental word com-
posed of the mental utterance and the concept, (iii) the concept and (iv) the
external thing. Regarding the relations (ii), (iii) and (iv), the external word is in
general a sign by imposition,26 since the act of the will by which the mental
word was produced plays an essential role in the coming into being of these
three relations. Thus, Ps.-Kilwardby resolves the problem raised by earlier
authors by splitting the production of the utterance into a mental part and an
external part and by spelling out in great detail the mechanisms of the utter-
ances transition from the mental realm to the external world.
The requirement that utterances must be imposed on concepts
undoubtedly lies behind Martin of Dacias argument in favour of the immedi-
ate signification of concepts (in question 3 of his commentary on the

25 Ps.-Kilwardby, In Prisc. mai. (ed. Fredborg et al., 59): Apud animam igitur statim cum
habet intentionem significabilem fit praeexcogitatio vocis, qua talem intentionem sive
intelligentiam deceat vel oporteat significari, et illi intentioni vocis applicatur intentio
significabilis sicut finis ei quod est ad finem. Consequenter quia ad hoc quod huiusmodi
intellectus alii manifestetur exigitur aliquod signum sensibile, quia nihil est in intellectu
quod prius non fuerit in sensu, movet anima rationalis per appetitum et imaginationem
membra deputata ad formationem vociset formatur vox sensibilis iuxta intentionem
vocis praecogitatae et praeconceptae apud animam proferentis eam, et fit sermo exterior
idem continens et repraesentans quod per sermonem interiorem continebatur et
repraesentabatur.
26 Ps.-Kilwardby, In Prisc. mai. (ed. Fredborg et al., 59): Et igitur vox exterior sensibilis habet
quadruplicem comparationem: unam ad intentionem vocis interioris ad cuius similitudi-
nem figuratur, aliam ad intellectum seu similitudinem rei, tertiam ad ipsum sermonem
interiorem complentem tam speciem significabilem quam vocis intentionem, quartam
ad rem extra quae per vocem significatur intellectu movente. Respectu primi est signum
naturalesed respectu secundi, tertii et quarti est significativum ex institutione.
48 chapter 2

Perihermeneias perhaps the earliest extant version of the question about the
immediate signification of words in a question-commentary).27 In his reply to
the question, Martin first puts forth Boethius claim that names of first imposi-
tion are imposed on things as an argument in favour of the immediate signifi-
cation of things.28 Thereafter, Martin briefly defends his own position of an
immediate signification of concepts by saying that names of first imposition
signify both a concept and an external thing, but primarily the concept, and
the thing through the concept, because names of first imposition are imposed
on things according to their mental being:

If [the question regards] the thing according to its third mode [i.e. the
thing that exists outside the soul, such as wood, stone etc.], then I say that
the utterance signifies both the passion in the soul and the thing out-
sidethe soul, however the signification of the passion is prior. The proof
of this is evident from Metaphysics iv, where it is said that utterances are
imposed on things only according to their being imagined in the intel-
lect. Therefore, [utterances] signify priorly the passions.29

27 Martin of Dacia, In Perih. (ed. Roos, 242:12): Quaestio est utrum voces primo significant
passionem in anima aut res extra animam. In: Quaestiones super Peri hermeneias, in
Martini de Dacia opera, ed. H. Roos (Copenhagen: gad, 1961) (CPhD ii). For an exhaustive
analysis of Martins question, see A.M. Mora-Mrquez, Martinus Dacus and Boethius
Dacus on the Signification of Terms and the Truth-value of Assertions, Vivarium 52 (2014),
2348; see also J. Pinborg, Bezeichnung in der Logik des xiii. Jahrhunderts, in A.
Zimmermann (ed.), Der Begriff der repraesentatio im Mittelalter (Berlin: De Gruyter, 1971)
(Miscellanea Mediaevalia 8), pp. 238281.
28 Martin of Dacia, In Perih. (ed. Roos, 242:810): Oppositum patet per Boethium qui dicit,
quod intellectus rebus quas vidit nomen imponit. Sed res quas vidit sunt extra animam.
Ergo et cetera. Cf. Boethius, In Cat., cited above, p. 42, n. 16.
29 Martin of Dacia, In Perih. (ed. Roos, 243:49): Si de re tertio modo (i.e. res extra animam ut
lignum, lapis et huiusmodi), sic dico quod vox significat et passionem in anima et rem
extra animam, per prius tamen est significatum passionis. Cuius probatio patet ex iv.
Metaphysicae, ubi dicitur, quod voces non imponuntur rebus nisi secundum quod habent
esse imaginatum in intellectu. Ergo per prius significant passiones. Martin supposedly
refers to Met. 4.1015a1113, where there is neither mention of imposition nor of imagined
being. Met. 4 deals with the different senses of nature, and the passage in question talks
about metaphor, i.e. the transfer of a name. However, Aristotle explicitly says in De an.
ii.8.420b29421a6 that significative utterances always indicate an image (a phantasia). It
is also worth mentioning that Thomas Aquinas indeed talks about prior and posterior
imposition in his own commentary on the Metaphysics. Cf. Thomas Aquinas, In Met. V, c.4,
l.5, n. 824: Nomina enim imponuntur a nobis secundum quod nos intelligimus, quia
nomina sunt intellectuum signa. Intelligimus autem quandoque priora ex posterioribus.
SIGNIFICATION OF CONCEPTS AND THINGS 49

Despite the elusive character of Martins argument, it suggests not only that it
is possible to impose names of first imposition on concepts, but also that for
names to be applied to things they must first be imposed on their concepts
an argument that stands very close to the explanation that we saw in earlier
authors such as Kilwardby and Ps.-Kilwardby.
This is also what is at stake for Albert the Great, who rejects the possibility
of a cognitive access to the essences of external things and, thereby, rejects the
possibility of directly imposing names on them. Albert claims that according
to their imposition, utterances signify concepts, because at the moment of
imposition the intellect only has cognitive access to the concept of the thing:

In fact, the conventional significative utterance is considered in two

ways: according to its institution and use, and according to the cause of
its institution According to its institution and use, it is a mark of the
concept in the soul. However, when instituting [it], the one who insti-
tutes only has a [cognitive] relation to this or that which he already con-
ceives in the soul.30

Nevertheless, he grants that according to the cause of the imposition (i.e. the
final cause), names signify things, because they are imposed in order to allow
human communication about the world:

The cause of the institution: Since we cannot carry things with us, articu-
late utterances were invented in order to communicate with each other
by means of a [re]presentation of the thing; [utterances] by means of
which we talk about the things themselves or about their intentions, so
that we communicate with each other with them. And in this last way,
utterances are referred to the signification of things.31

Unde aliquid per prius apud nos sortitur nomen, cui res nominis per posterius convenit: et
sic est in proposito. See also Mora-Mrquez, Martinus Dacus and Boethius Dacus, 2831.
30 Albert the Great, In Perih. (ed. Borgnet, 381): Consideratur enim vox significativa ad placi-
tum dupliciter, scilicet secundum institutionem et usum et secundum causam institutio-
nis Secundum institutionem quidem et usum nota est conceptus qui est in anima.
Instituens autem non habet respectum in instituendo nisi ad id vel illud quod jam in
anima concepit. In: Liber Perihermeneias, ed. A. Borgnet (Paris: Vivs, 1890) (Opera Omnia
1). For logic at the time of Albert the Great, see J. Brumberg-Chaumont (ed.), LOrganon
dans la translatio studiorum lpoque dAlbert le Grand (Turnhout: Brepols, 2013).
31 Albert the Great, In Perih. (ed. Borgnet, 381): Causa autem institutionis, quia cum res efferre
non possumus, ut nobis invicem communicemus rerum praesentatione, inventae sunt
voces articulatas, quibus ipsas res sive intentiones rerum exprimamus, ut nobis invicem
50 chapter 2

Hence, Albert maintains that from a semiotic point of view, utterances are
immediately imposed on concepts because imposition on x requires cognition
of x, but the intellect has direct cognitive access only to concepts. However,
from the point of view of the purpose of communication, utterances signify
things, because words are coined with the purpose of public communication
about the world. In this way, Albert articulates the ancient communicational
approach to the question of the immediate signification of utterances32 with
the semiotic approach to the question, which had gained the upper hand in
the first half of the thirteenth century. Consequently, Albert presents us with a
semiotic explanation of the immediate signification of concepts, while at the
same time accepting that insofar as words are used in order to talk about the
world, they signify things. Thus, to signify x has both the sense of to be a
conventional sign of x (primarily a concept) and the sense of to refer to or to
mark out x as the object of communication (primarily a thing).
Moreover, Albert associates the first imposition on concepts with the appli-
cability of names to many external things; a problem that is essentially related
to the logico-ontological problem of universals. In his commentary on Porphyrys
Isagoge, Albert tells us that the intellect has cognitive access only to the concept
of the thing, because the object of intellectual knowledge needs to be universal,
yet for Albert everything that exists outside the intellect is ineluctably singular:

The utterance, insofar as it is referred to the concept of someone who

wants to discover what is unknown by means of what is known, is divided
into common (or appellative or universal) and proper (or singular); for
the utterance is neither of them [i.e. neither common nor singular], inso-
far as it is referred to the thing that was marked out. In fact, all the things
that fall under the senses, and according to their natural constitution, are
singular, and whatever is common in them is taken by the intellect.33

vocibus communicemus. Et hoc modo ultimo voces ad significata rerum referuntur. Here
Albert makes reference to Aristotles se 1.165a1013, where we are told that we use names in
the place of things.
32 With the difference that Alberts focus, following in Boethius footsteps, is on the trans-
mission of information about the world, and not exclusively on the transmission of judg-
ments or opinions, which was Aristotles focus.
33 Albert the Great, In Isag. (ed. Santo Noya, 9:6810:3): Adhuc autem vox, secundum quod
refertur ad intellectum eius, qui quaerit invenire ignotum per notum, habet quod dividitur
in commune sive appellativum sive universale, et proprium sive singulare. Talium enim
nihil accidit ei, secundum quod ad rem designatam refertur. Res enim omnes sunt singu-
lares, quae cadunt sub sensu et secundum quod constituuntur a natura, et commune,
quod est in eis, accipitur ab intellectu. In Albert the Great, Super Porphyrium De quinque
SIGNIFICATION OF CONCEPTS AND THINGS 51

Hence, the names that are used as terms in a syllogism the logical method
that leads to the discovery of what is unknown from what is known are said
to be universal only insofar as they indicate universal concepts, because there
is nothing universal in material things and, therefore, names cannot be univer-
sal insofar as they stand for things.34
Accordingly, Albert also strongly suggests that a common name can be applied
to many things through its signification of something that is common a
concept which is formally identical to the singular essences of external things:

It must be said that it is true that the universal essence is one in number
in the soul, in itself and in the singular, and it only differs according to the
being that determines it as this and that.35

universalibus, ed. M. Santos Noya (Mnster: Aschendorff, 2004) (Opera Omnia, Editio
Coloniensis, 1.1). Here Albert appeals to Ps.-Kilwardbys idea that the external utterance is
the expression of an internal utterance, but taking as his immediate source Damascenas
De fide orthodoxa. See Albert the Great, In Isag. (ed. Santos Noya, 7:713): Tali autem ser-
mone, secundum quod sic designativus est concepti, utitur homo et ad se ipsum et ad
alium. Propter quod dicit Damascenus quod in duo dividitur, scilicet in endiadentum, hoc
est sermonem interius in mente dispositum, et in eum qui, exterius prolatus, angelus intel-
ligentiae est sive cordis nuntius, qui conceptus cordis nuntiat ad alterum. Cf. Damascenus,
De fide orthodoxa. Versions of Burgundio and Cerbanus, E.M. Buytaert ed. (New York: The
Franciscan Institute, 1955), p. 135.
34 The formation of the universal concept consists in a series of separations from matter,
which result in the reception of an intelligible form in the possible intellect the cognitive
faculty of the soul where essences exist as universals and as objects of knowledge; cf.
Albert the Great, In De anima (ed. Stroick, 101:62102:15): Dicimus igitur, quod omne
apprehendere est accipere formam apprehensi, non secundum esse, quod habet in eo
quod apprehenditur, sed secundum quod est intentio ipsius et species, sub qua aliqua sen-
sibilis vel intellectualis notitia apprehensi habetur. Haec autem apprehensio, ut universali-
ter loquendo, quattuor habet gradus. Quorum primus et infimus est, quod abstrahitur et
separatur forma a materia Secundum autem gradus est, quod separatur forma a materia
et a praesentia materiae Tertius gradus apprehensionis est, quo accipimus non tantum
sensibilia, sed etiam quasdam intentiones quae non imprimuntur sensibus, sed tamen
sine sensibilibus numquam nobis innotescunt Quartus autem et ultimus gradus est, qui
apprehendit rerum quiditates denudatas ab omnibus appendiciis materiae nec accipit
ipsas cum sensibilium intentionibus, sed potius simplices et separatas ab eis. Et ista appre-
hensio solius est intellectus. In: De anima, ed. C. Stroick, omi (Mnster: Aschendorff, 1968)
(Opera Omnia, Editio Coloniensis 7.1). For Albert the Greats theory of abstraction, see
A. de Libera, Mtaphysique et notique. Albert le Grand (Paris: Vrin, 2005), Ch. V.
35 Albert the Great, In Isag. (ed. Santos Noya, 34:5053): Dicendum pro certo quod univer-
sale unum numero essentiae est in anima et in seipso et in singulari, nec differt nisi
secundum esse determinans ipsum ad hoc vel illud.
52 chapter 2

There is a formal identity between the essence of an external thing and the
form of its concept, which allows the application of the name to all the exter-
nal things where that essence is individuated. Hence, not only names are
imposed on concepts because they somehow share a sort of existence men-
tal existence but also because in order to be applicable to many things names
must signify something universal and only concepts are as such.
This is how the semiotic problem of the articulation of utterance and con-
cept in order to produce a linguistic sign a word gets entangled with the
problem of the applicability of common names to many things. Albert the
Great provides us, indeed, with a somewhat coherent explanation of the impo-
sition of common names on concepts and their applicability to many things.
Yet, he also presents us with at least a double use of the notion of signification:
a use derived from the notions of imposition and universal applicability and a
use derived from the idea of linguistic communication about the world. As we
shall see this double use occurs in most of the authors who deal with the ques-
tions about signification during the second half of the century.

The Modist Rejection of the Immediate Signification of Concepts

Most masters of Arts from the second half of the thirteenth century reject the
position that utterances can only be imposed on concepts, without necessarily
rejecting the idea that the universality of common names is somehow
grounded in a certain universality of their significate. Peter of Auvergne, for
instance, in his question whether utterances signify affections of the soul or
the things themselves,36 puts forth an argument that recalls Alberts claim
about the universality of concepts and the singularity of individuated essences:

Furthermore, the same [position] about the common term is argued in

this way: The common term signifies something common; in fact, it is
only said to be common, because it signifies something common. But if it
signified something real, it would not signify something common. There
fore, it seems that it signifies something in the intellect.37

36 Peter of Auvergne, In Perih. (ed. Ebbesen, 152): Et tunc quaeritur de primo, utrum ipsae
voces significent passiones intellectus vel significent ipsas res. In: S. Ebbesen, Animal est
omnis homo: Questions and sophismata by Peter of Auvergne, Radulphus Brito, William
of Bonkes and Others, cimagl 63 (1993), 145208, at pp.150155. For Peter of Auvergnes
semiotics, see also Marmo, Semiotica e linguaggio, Ch. 3.
37 Peter of Auvergne, In Perih. (ed. Ebbesen, 152): Praeterea, hoc idem arguitur de termino
communi sic: Terminus communis significat aliquid commune, immo ex alio non dicitur
communis nisi quia significat aliquid commune; sed si significaret aliquid quod esset in
SIGNIFICATION OF CONCEPTS AND THINGS 53

Peters own argument in favour of the immediate signification of essences is

based on the commonly used idea that signification follows understanding (sig-
nificare sequitur intelligere); an idea that, as we shall see in Part 2, is deeply
engrained in thirteenth-century accounts of the grammatical categorisation of
words.38 Since signification follows understanding, and since the intellect under-
stands things by means of concepts, utterances also signify things by means of
concepts; for the intellect understands the thing itself through its likeness, and
therefore it also imposes the utterance on the thing itself through its likeness:

About the second question, it must be understoodthat just as it goes in

understanding, it goes in signifying, because the act of signifying follows
the act of understanding. Hence, it must be said that the utterances sig-
nify the same thing that the intellect understands; but the intellect
understands by means of likenesses Thus, when the intellect under-
stands the thing itself, and this by means of its likeness, the intellect
imposes the utterance in order to signify the thing itself, and this by
means of the things likeness Hence, Aristotle said meaningfully that
utterances are marks of the passions in the soul, because utterances sig-
nify nothing, unless by means of the passions or likenesses.39

re, non significaret aliquid commune; quare videtur quod significet aliquid quod est apud
intellectum.
38 This idea is also widely used in theology. It is indeed used by Alexander of Hales,
Bonaventure and Thomas Aquinas and is rejected by Henry of Ghent and Duns Scotus.
According to Rosier-Catach, the common source of these authors would be Pseudo-Denys
claim that the different ways of understanding a thing result from different intellectual
faculties, rather than from different features of the thing understood. For instance, in the
case of God, who is essentially simple, our understanding of him is necessarily compound,
because our cognitive faculties prevent us from understanding him as simple. Consequently,
our way of naming him cannot be simple either. Cf. Ps.-Denys, De divinis nominis I.I. For
the theological use of this principle and its rejection by Henry of Ghent and Duns Scotus,
see J.E. Ashworth, Can I speak more clearly than I understand? A Problem of Religious
Language in Henry of Ghent, Duns Scotus and Ockham, Historiographia linguistica 7
(1980), 2938; Rosier-Catach, Res significata; and id., Henri de Gand, le De dialectica
dAugustin et linstitution des noms divins, Documenti e studi sulla tradizione filosofica
medievale 6 (1995), 145253. The principle in question, however, is rarely (if ever) referred
to Ps.-Denys in grammatical or logical treatises from the faculties of Arts. In my opinion,
one could also explain the wide use of this idea by masters of Arts from the second half of
the 13th century as a logical development of earlier medieval interpretations of Priscians
Institutiones that go in this direction. For these interpretations, see below, Part 2, Section2.
39 Peter of Auvergne, In Perih. (ed. Ebbesen, 154): De secundo quaesito intelligendum
quod sicut est in intelligendo, ita est in significando, quia significare sequitur intelligere.
54 chapter 2

Thus, the likeness the concept is not what is immediately signified, but
rather a cognitive requirement for the immediate imposition of the name on
the thing that is the concepts content. This is to say that the concept is an
epistemological, and not a semiotic, condition for the signification of an
essence.
Peter closes his discussion with an objection to the argument that appeals
to the singularity of individuated essences. A common name like homo does
not need to signify something actually common, but only something poten-
tially common the essence itself. An individuated essence, although it is
actually singular, is also potentially universal, thus it can be understood and
signified by a common term as universal:

When it is said that the common term signifies something common, it

must be said that the common term, e.g. man and animal, does not sig-
nify something actually common, but only potentially [common]. In fact,
it signifies only the quidity of man or of animal, and this quidity is not
actually universal or particular, but it is universal or particular only
potentially. Hence, it must be said that nothing prevents the common
term, even when it signifies something that exists in reality, from signify-
ing something that is potentially common.40

Hence, Alberts position that external things are singular is not challenged.
What is challenged is his position that there cannot be cognitive access to
external essences, because external essences are potentially universal and this
potentiality grounds their cognition as universal.
Peters position is found in a more developed way in an anonymous author
the Incertus sf who in his commentary on the Sophistical Refutations provides

Et ideo dicendum quod ipsae voces significant idem quod intellectus intelligit; sed intel-
lectus intelligit res per similitudines, sicut visum est Ita quod cum intellectus intelligit
ipsam rem, et hoc per similitudinem ipsius rei, intellectus imponit ipsam vocem ad sig-
nificandum ipsam rem, et hoc per similitudinem ipsius rei Et ideo significanter dicit
Aristoteles quod voces sunt notae earum passionum quae sunt in anima, quia voces nihil
significant nisi per passiones sive per similitudines.
40 Peter of Auvergne, In Perih. (ed. Ebbesen, 155): Ad aliud quod dicitur quod terminus com-
munis aliquid commune significat, dicendum quod terminus communis, ut homo vel
animal, non significat aliquid commune in actu sed tantum in potentia; significat enim
tantum quiditatem hominis vel animalis, et ista quiditas non est universalis nec particu-
laris in actu, sed tantum in potentia se habet ad hoc quod sit universalis vel particularis.
Et ideo dicendum quod nihil prohibet quin terminus communis, et quamvis significet
aliquid quod sit in re, significet aliquid commune in potentia.
SIGNIFICATION OF CONCEPTS AND THINGS 55

us with a thorough description of the mechanisms of the immediate significa-

tion of real essences. As most masters from his period, the Incertus sf presents
us with the Porphyrian division of names into names of first and second imposi-
tion. Names of second imposition signify second intentions logical notions
that qualify our knowledge of external things. For instance, universal is a name
of second imposition that signifies the universal understanding of things, and
genus and species signify their generic and specific understanding, and so
on.41 In contrast, names of first imposition signify real essences in the external
world.42
The proof that words of first imposition signify real essences, the author
says, is that the significate of a word is the content of the concept that is formed
in the mind of the listener when she understands the word. Now, when a
speaker utters a man runs, the listener does not understand that the concept
of man runs, but that a real man runs, because man provokes the formation of
the concept of a real man and hence it signifies a real man:

The proof comes from Aristotle in Perihermeneias I [i.e. Int. 3]: To signify
is to form a conceptHence, the utterance signifies that whose concept
is formed, insofar as the listener grasps [it] by means of the [utterance].
However, the listener grasps a real external thing by means of a word of
first imposition; for when someone says a man runs, if by means of man
were formed the concept of a likeness or of a passion that only exists in
the soul, and not the concept of a real external thing, it would follow that
such intellectual compositions would be impossible, and similarly the
propositions and the compositions that signify them; for it is impossible

41 Incertus sf, In se (ed. Ebbesen, 279:2833): Ad hoc (i.e. utrum possibile sit vocem rem
veram significare) dicendum quod quaedam sunt nomina quae dicuntur esse nomina
secundae impositionis quae significant res secundarum intentionum, cuiusmodi sunt illa
quae significant non rem veram, sed intentiones quasdam quas fundat anima in rebus
ipsis secundum quod intellectae, ut genus species et universale et sic de aliis. In:
Auctores incerti, Quaestiones super Sophisticos Elenchos, ed. S. Ebbesen (Copenhagen:
gad, 1977) (CPhD vii). Jan Pinborg attributed Incertus sfs commentary to Boethius of
Dacia, but Sten Ebbesen rejected this attribution, as well as a possible attribution to Peter
of Auvergne, in his article Questions and Sophismata: Tracking Peter of Auvergne, in
H.A.G. Braakhuis and al. (eds.), Aristotles Peri hermeneias in the Latin Middle Ages: Essays
on the Commentary Tradition (Groningen: Ingenium, 2003), pp. 3149.
42 Incertus sf, In se (ed. Ebbesen, 279:3335): Alia autem sunt nomina primae impositionis
significantia res primarum intentionum, ut homo asinus lapis et similia et illa rem
veram extra significant.
56 chapter 2

that a real predicate, such as to run inheres in the species or likeness in

the intellect.43

Notice, however, that here the author moves from the problems of imposition
and of the universal applicability of a name to the problem of the signification
of a word in an assertoric context. If the name man signified the concept as
such, and not the content of the concept insofar as it exists in an external
thing, it would be impossible for the listener to understand the assertion a
man runs, let alone to grant it as true or reject it as false, because the composi-
tion of a concept and a real predicate like running is impossible. Therefore, at
least in the case of singular accidental predication, it would be evident that the
terms of an assertion stand for signify external things. The anonymous
author underscores in this way that some linguistic utterances, namely some
assertions composed of names of first imposition, intend to transmit informa-
tion about real facts i.e. they are fundamentally constative.
Nonetheless, names do not signify real essences insofar as they exist, but
insofar as they are understood a name signifies an essence insofar as the lat-
ter is an object of imposition, and as such it has been intellectually separated
from the existence that it has in individuals. The essence has indeed been sepa-
rated from any sort of existence:

It must be understood that names [of first imposition], although they

signify a real external thing, however they do not signify itinsofar as it
hasactual existence; for then, it would follow that with a change in the
thing with respect to actual existence, the signification of the word would
change But a name signifies a real external thing as it is understood by
the intellect; for the utterance becomes significative only because of the
relation of signification that is given to it by the one who imposes it. But
the one who gives a significate to the utterance cannot attribute it, unless
she first conceives that significate in the mind, since she is a cognitive

43 Incertus sf, In se (ed. Ebbesen, 279:3548): Cuius probatio nam per Aristotelem primo
Perihermeneias significare est intellectum constituere Igitur vox illud significat cuius
intellectum constituit secundum quod audiens per eam comprehendit. Per illas autem
voces primae impositionis audiens rem veram extra apprehendit, nam dicendo homo
curritsi per hominemconstituitur intellectus non rei verae sed alicuius similitudinis
vel passionis existentis in anima tantum, sequeretur quod omnes tales compositiones
intellectus essent impossibiles, et similiter compositiones et propositiones illas signifi-
cantes, nam impossibile est aliquod praedicatum reale, cuiusmodo est currereinesse
speciei vel similitudini existenti in intellectu.
SIGNIFICATION OF CONCEPTS AND THINGS 57

agent, and hence, just as the one who imposes understands a thing, in the
same way she imposes [the utterance] on the thing in order to signify it.44

Along the lines of Avicennas (9801037 ad) theory of the indifference of the
essence, masters from the last quarter of the thirteenth century maintain that
essences are understood and signified in themselves, and in themselves they
are indifferent both to actual existence and to mental existence, even though
actual existence or mental existence (or both) are always their concomitant
accidents. Thus, existence outside the soul and existence in the soul are not
essential features of essences, but essences always exist either outside the soul
or in the soul (or both). Nevertheless, the signification of external essences
that follows from the imposition of the utterance does not involve the actual
existence of the essence; for this would entail the instability of the words sig-
nification, given that external things are constantly changing, not with respect
to what they are essentially, but with respect to the events in which they are
accidentally involved.
At the turn of the fourteenth century, Radulphus Brito presents us with the
most philosophically sophisticated version of this position. Just as Peter of
Auvergne and the Incertus sf, Brito rejects the immediate signification of con-
cepts and defends the immediate signification of essences, and does so from a
semiotic perspective. However, he prefers to explain the reference to actual
things in the external world in assertoric contexts (e.g. the reference to an indi-
vidual of man in a man runs) in terms of second intentions, rather than in
terms of signification.
Britos argument for the immediate signification of essences is basically the
same that we found in the Incertus sf:

(a) To signify x is to provoke the understanding of x in the mind of the

listener.
(b) But when someone hears the utterance x, the essence of x is understood,
and not its concept, because what is understood (i.e. the essence of the

44 Incertus sf, In se (ed. Ebbesen, 279:50280:62): Intelligendum tamen est quod nomina
illa, etsi rem veram extra significent, ipsam tamen non significantsecundum quod
existentiam actualem habet, sic enim sequeretur quod re ipsa transmutata quantum ad
esse in effectu transmutatur vocis significatio Sed significant nomina rem veram extra
ut ipsa ab intellectu est apprehensa, non enim redditur vox significativa nisi per rationem
significandi sibi concessam ab imponente, imponens autem significatum voci non potest
tribuere nisi prius illud significatum in mente conceperit, cum sit agens per cognitionem,
et ideo sicut imponens rem aliquam intelligit, sic ei imponit vocem ad significandum.
58 chapter 2

thing itself) is different from that through which it is understood (i.e. the
concept).
(c) Since the essence (through a concept) is primarily understood, it is also
primarily signified by x.45

Brito defends the idea that the essence is the first object of the intellect in his
commentary on the De anima in a passage that reveals his position as regards
a debate about the first object of understanding. This thirteenth-century
debate46 is placed in the crossroads of a metaphysical debate and an epistemo-
logical debate, debates that overlap and make the round trip between the
Parisian faculties of Arts and Theology. The metaphysical debate has its theo-
logical origin in the sacrament of Eucharist and in the related discussion about
the separation of accidents from substances. The epistemological debate,
on the other hand, revolves around the possibility of knowing essences with-
out their accidents. Contrary to Franciscan authors (who claim that it is impos-
sible to have immediate cognitive access to essences, which can only be known
in a mediate way through their accidents), Brito defends the possibility of an
immediate cognitive access to essences, even if this access requires the knowl-
edge of their proper accidents.47

45 Radulphus Brito, In Perih. q. 3 (ed. Pinborg, 276): Modo in nominibus primae impositionis
voces significant res et non conceptus rerum Maior patet, quia sicut dicit Phylosophus
significare est intellectum constituere Item probatur: essentia rei est quod intelligitur,
quia illud quod est primum obiectum intellectus est illud quod intelligitur per vocem.
Modo conceptus non est primum obiectum intellectus, immo rei essentia et ipsum quod
quid est est primum obiectum intellectus, sicut apparet ii. De anima. Ergo essentia rei est
quod intelligitur, et per consequens est illud quod significatur per vocem primae imposi-
tionis. Question edited in: J. Pinborg, Bezeichnung in der Logik des xiii. Jahrhunderts,
pp. 275281. For a thorough analysis of Britos account of the signification of common
names, see A.M. Mora-Mrquez, Radulphus Brito on Common Names, Concepts and
Things.
46 Aurlien Robert provides a thorough study of this debate in his unpublished dissertation
Penser la substance: tude dune question mdivale (University of Nantes, 2005). I owe
him thanks for giving me access to it.
47 Radulphus Brito, In De an. (quoted by Robert, p. 197): Aliter dicitur a quibusdam, et istam
viam alias tenui, supponendo primo quod quando virtutes sunt connexae et ordinatae ad
invicem, una illarum, scilicet inferiori, existente in sua operatione ex hoc statim superior
potest aliquid cognoscere quod non est cognitum a virtute inferiori [M]odo virtus
intellectiva superior est ad virtutem fantasticam et ideo quando virtus fantastica est in
fantasiando aliquod proprium accidens fantasiat, virtute intellectus agentis abstrahentis
aliquam rationem intelligendi a fantasmatibus, tunc intellectus possibilis intelligit ipsum
quod quid est sine hoc quod intelligat aliquod accidens prius et hoc est quod dicit
SIGNIFICATION OF CONCEPTS AND THINGS 59

Knowledge of the essence can be analysed into a neutral cognitive access to

it (which allows the imposition of a word of first imposition) and the cognitive
modality of this neutral access. These modalities are cognitive approaches
modes of understanding that are ultimately grounded in potential properties
of the essence itself, i.e. its possible modes of being. Accordingly, words of first
imposition have further logical properties e.g. predicability, universality,
being a species and being a genus because of these cognitive approaches to
the essence itself. Thus, in his analysis of the term intentio in his commentary
on the Isagoge, Brito tells us that the term intentio stands for four related,
albeit notionally different, things: (a) a real external essence insofar as it is
understood, which he calls a concrete first intention; (b) the concept of this
essence as separated from any cognitive modality, which he calls an abstract
first intention; (c) the essence itself insofar as it is understood under a certain
cognitive modality, which he calls a concrete second intention; and (d) this
cognitive modality itself, which he calls an abstract second intention:

For instance, the intellect must first understand the man, absolutely, as a
reasoning being, or the animal as a perceiving being, and this first and
essential thought of the thing is called a first abstract intention, and the
thing thus understood is called a first concrete intention. Then, once the
intellect has understood the thing absolutely, it can afterwards under-
stand it with a secondary thought, as [the thing] falls under some mode
of being or under some regard, e.g. being predicable of many things. For

Philosophus in littera sic: cum enim habeamus tradere secundum fantasiam de acci-
dentibus aut omnibus aut pluribus, tunc de substantia habebimus dicere optime. Unde
non vult quod fantasia cognoscat ipsum quod quid est, nec quod intellectus cognoscat
ipsum accidens, sed quando fantasia fantasiatur ipsa fantasmata, tunc intellectus fertur
in ipsum quod quid est virtute intellectus agentis abstrahentis aliquam rationem intelli-
gendi ab ipsis fantasmatibus. This is also related to the notion of modus essendi or appar-
ens, whose earliest proponent is perhaps Siger of Brabant. Brito adopts this notion,
according to which the intellect grasps the essences of things, not in themselves, but
through the sensible properties and operations by means of which an essence presents
itself to the intellect. These properties and operations are also called modi essendi or
apparentia. This notion also plays an important role in Britos explanation of the forma-
tion of second-order concepts, as well as in his argument in favor of the unity of the
notion of being. For this latter use, see S. Donati, Apparentia and Modi essendi in
Radulphus Britos Doctrine of the Concepts: The Concept of Being, in Fink et al. (eds.),
Logic and Language, pp. 337355; for the former use, see S. Ebbesen, Radulphus Brito on
the Metaphysics, in J. Aertsen, K. Emery and A. Speer (eds.), Nach der Verurteilung von
1277 (Berlin: De Gruyter, 2001) (Miscellanea Mediaevalia 28), pp. 450492 (repr. in
Ebbesen, Collected Essays, vol. 2, pp. 197208).
60 chapter 2

instance, when the intellect understands the man, which it had formerly
understood in itself, as it is sayable of several things numerically differ-
ent, the thing thus understood is a concrete species and such intention of
the thing is the abstract species; and when it understands the man as it is
sayable of several things specifically different as regards the quidity, it
grounds there the intention genus. And the other intentions must also
be understood in this way.48

Take for instance Socrates. (a) When the intellect understands Socrates as a
rational being as a human being then Socrates humanity is a concrete first
intention, and (b) the understanding of Socrates humanity is an abstract first
intention. (c) When the intellect understands Socrates humanity as some-
thing that can be found in several numerically different individuals, Socrates
humanity is a concrete second intention. Finally, (d) the understanding of
humanity as something that can be found in several numerically different indi-
viduals is an abstract second intention a species. It is thanks to (a) and (b)
that we have a neutral cognitive access to the essence of human beings, which
allows the imposition of a name of first imposition e.g. man on it. However,
it is thanks to (c) and (d) that this name is, for instance, a specific and universal
term. For it is thanks to (c) and (d) that the essence falls under a certain mode
of understanding that determines the mode of signifying whereby man is a
specific universal term a term that is applicable to and predicable of many
things.
It is noteworthy that the different cognitive modalities are grounded in real
properties of things their modes of being and thus the logical properties of
a name of first imposition are ultimately grounded in the ontological structure
of reality:

48 Radulphus Brito, In Isag. (ed. Pinborg, 105): Verbi gratia sic oportet quod intellectus
primo intelligat hominem absolute ut ratiocinantem vel quod intelligat animal ut sen-
tiens, et iste intellectus primus et essentialis de re sive primus conceptus de re dicitur
prima intentio in abstracto, et res sic intellecta dicitur prima intentio in concreto. Et tunc
cum intellectus intellexit rem absolute potest postea ipsam intelligere secundario intel-
lectu ut est sub aliquo modo essendi sive sub aliquo respectu ut scilicet est praedicabilis
de pluribus. Verbi gratia, sicut intellectus intelligit hominem, quem prius secundum se
intellexit, ut est dicibilis de pluribus differentibus numero, et res sic intellecta est species
in concreto, et talis intellectio rei est species in abstracto; et intelligit animal ut est dicibile
de pluribus differentibus specie in eo quod quid, et sic fundat ibi intentionem generis. Et
sic intelligendum est de aliis intentionibus. In J. Pinborg, Radulphus Brito on Universals,
cimagl 35 (1980), 56142.
SIGNIFICATION OF CONCEPTS AND THINGS 61

The things themselves understood in this way are the concrete universal.
All these notions of understanding are taken from certain modes of being
in things, just as this notion of understanding the thing as it is in several
numerically or specifically different individuals is taken from the mode
of being to be in several individuals different in form or in quantity.
Then, I argue: Just as the mode of being from which the universal inten-
tion in general is taken is related to the modes of being from which these
five universal intentions are taken, the second intentions taken from
those modes of being are related in the same way.49

Hence, Britos logic of second intentions which accounts for logical proper-
ties of thought and language, such as universality, universal predicability,
predicability, capability of being a subject, inferential validity etc. is entirely
grounded in ontological properties of the external world. More importantly,
the signification of a word the one that follows from its imposition does not
seem to play an immediate role in the explanation of those logical properties
in Britos logic. He seems then to take a step further with respect to his prede-
cessors when he narrows the use of the notion of signification to the logically
neutral first institution of linguistic signs, the logical properties thereof in turn
being systematically explained in terms of second intentions.
Let us now see how these same issues were engaged in fundamentally differ-
ent ways by the Franciscan authors Roger Bacon and Peter John Olivi.

Roger Bacon and Peter John Olivis Rejection of the Immediate

Signification of Concepts
The positions taken by Roger Bacon and Peter John Olivi differ from the
modists positions, largely because of the friars strong commitment to
Augustinian semiotics.
In De doctrina Christiana, Augustine (354430 ad) introduces a division of
signs into natural signs (signa naturalia) and given signs (signa data), depend-
ing on whether they are intentionally produced or not. Natural signs are those
that provoke the knowledge of something else without someones intention of

49 Radulphus Brito, In Isag. (ed. Pinborg, 70): Universale autem in concreto sunt ipsae res sic
intellectae. Modo omnes istae rationes intelligendi sumuntur ab aliquibus modis essendi
in re, sicut ista ratio quae est ratio intelligendi rem ut est in pluribus differentibus numero
vel specie sumitur ab isto modo essendi qui est esse in pluribus differentibus formaliter
vel per quantitatem. Tunc arguo: sicut se habet modus essendi a quo sumitur intentio
universalis in communi et modi essendi a quibus sumuntur istae intentiones 5 universa-
lium ad invicem, sic se habent istae intentiones secundae sumptae ex illis modis essendi.
62 chapter 2

doing so. An example of this sort of sign is the smoke that indicates fire.50
Given signs, in turn, are intentionally produced by animated beings in order to
communicate to each other their thoughts and sensations,51 human words
being the given signs par excellence.52
The distinctive feature of Augustines definition of signs with respect to the
Aristotelian tradition lies in Augustines strong focus on their reception in
someones intellect rather than in the purpose of their production a sign is
not a sign unless it is interpreted as such through an understanding of its con-
tent. Thus, according to Augustine:

A sign is a thing that, besides the form (species) that it presents to the
sense, evokes something different in the mind.53

In a passage from De magistro, Augustine describes words as the union of

utterance and signification. An utterance is that whereby the word can present
something to the senses of an interpreter. Signification, in turn, takes place
when the interpreter evokes an understanding of the thing that the utterance
indicates, thereby providing the word with a value:

Therefore, the understanding of words is achieved when the things are

understood, and not when the words are heard; for we do not learn [the
signification of the] words that we [already] know, nor can we claim to
have learned those that we dont know, unless we have understood their
signification, which doesnt happen with the hearing of uttered words,
but with the understanding of the things signified.54

50 Augustine, De Doct. Ch. ii.I.1: Naturalia sunt, quae sine voluntate atque ullo appetitu sig-
nificandi praeter se aliquid aliud ex se cognosci faciunt, sicut est fumus significans ignem.
In: Augustine, De doctrina christiana, in La doctrine chrtienne (Paris: Institut dEtudes
Augustiniennes, 1997) (Oeuvres de Saint Augustin 11/2). For Augustines semiotics, see
E. Bermon, La signification et lenseignement. Texte latin, traduction franaise et commen-
taire du De magistro de saint Augustin (Paris: Vrin, 2007); and R.A. Markus, St. Augustine
on Signs, Phronesis 2 (1957), 6083.
51 Augustine, De Doct. Ch. ii.ii.3: Data vero signa sunt, quae sibi quaeque viventia invicem
dant ad demonstrandos, quantum possunt, motus animi vel sensa aut intellecta quaelibet.
52 Augustine, De Doct. Ch. ii.iii.4: Verba enim prorsus inter homines obtinuerunt principa-
tum significandi quaecumque animo concipiuntur, si ea quisque prodere velit.
53 Augustine, De Doct. Ch. ii.i.1: Signum est enim res praeter speciem, quam ingerit sensi-
bus, aliud aliquid ex se faciens in cognitationem venire.
54 Augustine, De mag. xi.36: Rebus ergo cognitis verborum quoque cognitio perficitur; ver-
bis vero auditis nec verba discuntur; non enim ea verba, quae novimus discimus, aut quae
SIGNIFICATION OF CONCEPTS AND THINGS 63

The understanding of the value of a word by an interpreter is thus the essential

feature of Augustines account of linguistic signs.55
The two crucial features of Augustinian linguistic signs, namely that they
are produced intentionally with the purpose of communication and that they
need to be interpreted in order to be signs, are widely used in the linguistic
treatises by the Franciscan authors Roger Bacon and Peter John Olivi.
Roger Bacon presents us with an account of signification largely associated
with the problem of linguistic communication. Bacon claims that the relation
to an interpreter is an essential feature of the sign, so that without this relation
a material item is a sign only potentially:

The sign is in the category of relation, and it is called [a sign] essentially

in relation to the one for whom it signifies, because [the interpreter] is in
action, when the sign itself is in action, and in potency when [the sign] is
in potency, because if someone could not conceive [something] through the
sign, [the sign] would be empty and vain indeed it would not be a sign.56

Accordingly, for Bacon a sign is a perceptible or intelligible item whose signifi-

cation depends on a double relation: an accusative relation to its significate
and a dative relation to its interpreter. However, the accusative relation, which
in the case of linguistic signs is established by imposition, is only potential
until its actualisation by an interpreter. The relation between word and signifi-
cate is accidental and subordinated to the more essential relation between
word and interpreter:

non novimus didicisse non possumus confiteri, nisi eorum significatione percepta, quae
non auditione vocum emissarum, sed rerum significatarum cognitione contingit. In:
E. Bermon, La signification et lenseignement.
55 In De magistro we are also told that the knowledge of the value of a sign can only be
acquired by means of other signs, in a process where the master is only leading his pupil
to the recollection of a knowledge that he already has in his mind. Thus, properly speak-
ing the master is not teaching anything but only leading his pupil to the recollection of
something that he knew already. See Bermon, La signification et lenseignement, 2nd part.
56 Roger Bacon, De signis (ed. Fredborg et al., 81): Signum est in praedicamento relationis et
dicitur essentialiter ad illud cui significat, quoniam illud ponit in actu cum ipsum signum
sit in actu, et in potentia cum ipsum est in potentia. Quia nisi posset aliquis concipere per
signum, cassum esset et vanum, immo non erit signum. For Bacons semiotics, see
I. Rosier-Catach, La parole comme acte. Sur la grammaire et la smantique au xiiie sicle
(Paris: Vrin, 1994), Chs. 34; Marmo, Semiotica e linguaggio, Ch. 1; Jol Biard, Logique et
thorie du signe (Paris: Vrin, 1989), Ch. 1; and T.S. Maloney, The Semiotics of Roger Bacon,
Medieval Studies 45 (1983), 120154.
64 chapter 2

This verb I signify regards principally and most essentially the one by
whom something is acquired the thing signified by the dative rather
than [the one signified] by the accusative.57

Finally, utterances are intentionally imposed on whatever can be understood,

whether it exists or not, whether it is a concept, a fictional entity, or an external
thing, and whether it is universal or singular:

In fact, if we can understand, we can at once impose a name by will. And

further, names are upon our own decree (ad placitum), and hence we can
impose names by will and give them to beings or non-beings.58

With this semiotic background, Bacon replies to the question whether names
immediately signify concepts or external things. However, he rephrases the
question as follows: Supposing that the name was imposed on an external
thing, does the name signify the thing or the concept whereby the imposition
was made? Bacons solution puts a strong focus on the intentional imposition
of the utterance by the speaker. His argument goes as follows:

(a) Let us suppose that the name was intentionally imposed on an external
thing.
(b) Let us also suppose that because of this imposition it is a sign by will.
(c) Could then the name be a sign by will (ad placitum) of the things
concept?
(d) No, because in that case it would not be a sign by will of the thing on
which it was intentionally imposed.
(e) And since the name was not intentionally imposed on the concept, it is
not a sign by will of the concept either.59

57 Roger Bacon, De signis (ed. Freborg et al., 82): Hoc verbum significo essentialius et prin-
cipaliter rescipit illud cui adquiritur aliquid, hoc est rem per dativum significatam, quam
per accusativum. Et propter hoc ad rem quam habet significare non refertur nisi per acci-
dens, hoc est sicut scibile ad scientiam.
58 Roger Bacon, De signis (ed. Fredborg et al., 8788): Si enim possumus intelligere, possumus
nomen imponere secundum quod ipse vult ibidem. Et iterum nomina sunt ad placitum
nostrum, et ideo pro voluntate possumus nomina imponere et dare sive enti sive non enti.
59 Roger Bacon, De signis (ed. Fredborg et al., 132133): Et certum est inquirenti quod facta
impositione soli rei extra animam, impossibile est quod vox significet speciem rei
tamquam rei signum datum ab anima et significativum ad placitum, quia vox significa-
tiva ad placitum non significat nisi per impositionem et institutionem. Sed concessum est
vocem soli rei imponi et non speciei.
SIGNIFICATION OF CONCEPTS AND THINGS 65

Thus, the potential signification of a word its accusative relation to a

significate entirely depends on the intention of communication of the one
who imposes the name. That is, it regards the thing about which the speaker
intends to transmit information to someone else.
Bacon also reads Priscians claim that parts of speech signify concepts tak-
ing conceptum, not as the accusative of the noun conceptus, us, but as the
neuter accusative of the passive participle conceptus, a, um (i.e. that which
is conceived):

If one objects with Priscian that being a part of speech is nothing differ-
ent from signifying a concept of the mindit must be said that concept
of the mind in this authority is not taken as the accusative case of the
noun concept, but as the substantivated adjective conceived, and thus
concept is the same as the thing conceived and understood in this way.60

This means that once a name has been intentionally given to an external thing,
it potentially signifies that external thing and not the concept whereby the
imposition was made.
On the other hand, contrary to the modists for whom the universality of a
common term depends partly on a cognitive modality and partly on an onto-
logical modality, for Bacon it depends entirely on the ontological structure of
the thing that is conceived and signified. A name is universal it can be applied
to many things because it was imposed on a universal nature that inheres in
several singular things of the external world:

Further, the species of the universal thing is truly universal just as the
species of the singular thing is singular; for, just as the universal man is
predicated of singular men, in the same way the species of the universal
man is predicated of the species of singular men, and it inheres in them,
just as the universal thing inheres in the singular things.61

60 Roger Bacon, De signis (ed. Fredborg et al., 134135): Si obiciatur per Priscianum quod
nihil aliud est esse partem orationis quam mentis conceptum significaredicendum
quod hoc quod dico conceptum mentis in illa auctoritate non sumitur secundum quod
est accusativi casus huius nominis substantivi conceptus, sed huiusmodi adiectivi sub-
stantivati conceptus, et sic conceptus idem est, quod res concepta et intellecta quantum
huiusmodi.
61 Roger Bacon, Communia naturalium c. 10 (ed. Steele, 103:2227): Ceterum secundum veri-
tatem species rei universalis est universalis sicut species rei singularis est singularis. Nam
sicut homo universalis praedicatur de singularibus hominibus, sic species hominis uni-
versalis praedicatur de speciebus hominum singularium, et est in eis, sicut res universalis
66 chapter 2

Thus, the logical properties of language are not just loosely grounded in
ontological properties of external reality, but univocally determined by the
ontological structure of the thing signified by a name.
How is it then possible to use the name homo to talk about both a common
nature as in e.g. homo est species and a singular man as in e.g. a man is run-
ning? Because, Bacon tells us, at every use of the name homo, there is a
renewed act of imposition a re-imposition that re-determines the significa-
tion intended by a particular speaker at a particular time.62 In the assertion
man is a species there is a re-imposition of man on the common nature of
man, and in a man is running there is a re-imposition of man on the singular
form of some man who is actually running. Consequently, Bacon does not
leave to the concept any role to play in the explanation of the logical features
of language, other than to provide a cognitive access to the things we intend to
talk about. It is no surprise, then, that the idea that signification follows under-
standing (significare sequitur intelligere) is entirely absent from his contribu-
tions to the debates discussed in this study. That is, not only does Bacon put
forth a highly token-oriented logic, he also totally dismisses the logic of second
intentions that we saw reaching its peak in Radulphus Brito.
Peter John Olivi, in turn, also draws heavily on Augustines semiotics with-
out going all the way along Bacons lines. In his Quaestiones logicales, in a dis-
cussion about equivocation, Olivi establishes a difference between the
potential relation of signification that follows from the imposition of a name
and the actual relation of signification that takes place when the name is used
in a context of communication:

It must be said that the signification of a name is taken in two ways: first,
dispositionally, as it were; second, actually or in exercise, as it occurs
when [the name] is actually uttered out of an intention to signify or when
it is written in some narration. [The name] has [signification] in the first
mode from its imposition; and in the second [mode] from its application
to the things to which it is now applied and had already been imposed.63

est in rebus singularis. In: Communia naturalium, ed. R. Steele, in Opera hactenus inedita
Rogeri Baconi (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 190913).
62 The same holds for the use of homo when we speak of an actual existing man and of a
man who does not exist anymore. In the next section, we shall come back to this issue and
to its relation with Bacons radical extensionalism.
63 Peter John Olivi, ql, q.7 (ed. Brown, 353): Dicendum quod significatio nominis dupliciter
accipitur: primo scilicet quasi habitualiter; secundo in actu aut exercitio, sicut fit cum ex
intentione significandi actualiter profertur aut cum in certa narratione est scriptum.
Primum modum habet ex impositione; secundum vero ex applicatione ad quae iam est et
SIGNIFICATION OF CONCEPTS AND THINGS 67

When they are actually used in contexts of communication, names are inten-
tionally given to they signify the thing that the speaker intends to talk
about. For instance, in the man runs, the intention of the speaker is to talk
about a real man and not about a thought, and hence when it is used in this
assertion, man signifies a real man and not its concept:

[Utterances] signify priorly the thing that is a man, because the intention
of men more directly and principally aims to signify the thing that is a
man than something elseIn fact, when we say a man runs, we do not
intend to say that the concept of man, or that the man as it is in our intel-
lect, runs, or that the abstract humanity runs, but rather that the thing
that is a man concretively taken runs.64

Hence, man not only potentially signifies the thing on which it has been con-
ventionally imposed, but it also signifies in a sense closer to to refer to the
thing that a speaker wants to mark out when she actually uses the name in a
context of linguistic communication.
Nevertheless, Olivi departs from Bacon when he adheres to the idea that the
thing is signified in a way that follows the mode of understanding that was
intentionally chosen by the speaker when she uses the name:

I reply that, even though the names of things were imposed in order to
signify things, they were imposed on things only insofar as they were

erat impositum. For Olivi on signification, see A.M. Mora-Mrquez, Pragmatics in Peter
John Olivis Account of Signification of Common Names, Vivarium 49 (2011), 150164; and
I. Rosier-Catach, La parole efficace. Signe, rituel, sacr (Paris: Seuil, 2004), Ch. 2.7. For Olivi
in general, see A. Boureau and S. Piron, Pierre de Jean Olivi (12481298). Pense scolastique,
dissidence spirituelle et socit (Paris: Vrin, 1999).
64 Peter John Olivi, ql, q.4 (ed. Brown, 346): <voces> prius significant res illas quas signifi-
candas sunt institutae. Et hoc modo hoc nomen homo prius significat rem quae est
homo, quia intentio hominum directius et principalius intendit per hoc nomen homo
significare rem quae est homo quam aliquid aliudCum enim dicitur homo currit non
intendimus dicere quod conceptus quam habeo de homine vel homo prout est in intel-
lecto nostro currit aut quod humanitas abstracta currit, sed potius quod res quae est
homo concretive acceptus currit. Cf. Walter Burley, Comm. m. in Perih. 1.15 (ed. Brown, 55):
Similiter si vox significaret passionem seu idolum rei haec esset vera: Sortes est idolum
Sortis vel passio Sortis, quia isti termini Sortes et idolum Sortis eandem rem signifi-
cant primo, quia uterque significat primo idolum Sortis Propter quod credo quod non
oportet quod vox primo significet passionem animae. Sed in libera potestate imponentis
est quid vox debeat primo significare, an rem an passionem.
68 chapter 2

grasped by the intellect and under the mode under which the intellect
wants to signify the things understood.65

While Bacons ontology allows him to anchor the universality of names directly
on the forms of external things, Olivi, who rejects the external existence of
universals, explains this logical feature in terms of modes of signifying and
of understanding. Also, while for the modists the modes of signifying and of
understanding are ultimately grounded in the modes of beings of things, Olivi
explicitly and radically rejects the possibility that things or their properties
affect in any way whatsoever the human soul. As a result, the logical features of
both human knowledge and human language depend to a great extent on the
intentional modalities of those who think and talk.
In fact, Olivi rejects the need to posit intelligible forms (species intelligibiles),
both as the starting point of cognitive processes (as in e.g. Thomas Aquinas)
and as their result (as in e.g. Radulphus Brito). The reason behind Olivis rejec-
tion is his radical commitment to an anthropology based on the notion of free
will, as opposed to an anthropology (e.g. Aquinas) based on the human ratio-
nal faculty. Olivis epistemological argument against intelligible forms (species
intelligibiles) is that in either case (i.e. as the starting point or as the result of
cognitive processes), they would posit an obstacle to a direct cognitive access
to the external world.66 He proposes instead that the human intellect is
directed by its will to focus its attention on certain features of things on real

65 Peter John Olivi, ql, q.1 (ed Brown, 338): Respondeo quod licet nomina rerum sint impo
sita ad significandum res, non tamen sunt imposita rebus nisi prout sunt apprehensae ab
intellectu et sub illo modo sub quo intellectus vult res se intellectas significari.
66 Peter John Olivi, De verbo (ed. Pasnau, 144): Nulla enim est necessitas aut utilitas ponere
tale verbum (i.e. the concept or the intelligible species). Quia vel res et earum reales habi-
tudines quas intellectus intelligit sunt praesentes intellectui in seipsis aut in speciebus
memorialibus, et ideo sive res earumque habitudines sint intellectui in seipsis praesentes
sive ipsae sint absentes per memoriales tamen species intellectui praesentatae, nulla est
necessitas alterius obiectivi speculi in quo res ipsi intellectui praesentatur. Immo, potius
esset ad impedimentum. For an exhaustive study of Olivis account of human cognition,
see R. Pasnau, Theories of Cognition in the Later Middle Ages (Cambridge: cup, 1997); see
also, id., Petri Iohannis Olivi Tractatus de Verbo, Franciscan Studies 53 (1993), 121153; and
J. Toivanen, Perception and the Internal Senses. Peter of John Olivi on the Cognitive Functions
of the Soul (Leiden: Brill, 2013) (Investigating Medieval Philosophy 5). For Olivis rejection
of the species intelligibilis, see L. Spruit, Species intelligibilis: From Perception to Knowledge.
t. 1: Classical Roots and Medieval Discussions (Leiden: Brill, 1994). For Olivis anthropology,
see R. Pasnau, Olivi on Human Freedom, in Boureau et al. (eds.), Pierre de Jean Olivi, pp.
1526; and F.X. Putallaz, Insolent libert. Controverses et condamnations au xiiie sicle
(Fribourg/Paris: Presses Universitaires /Le Cerf, 1995).
SIGNIFICATION OF CONCEPTS AND THINGS 69

notions (reales rationes) so that concepts are nothing but the very act of
focusing the intellects attention on those notions.
Universal knowledge results from the intentional consideration of the real
notion of common natures, without this implying that there is a bearer of uni-
versality other than the intentional act itself:

The second [position] is evident, because the first abstraction of uni

versal notions is made only as regards the act of consideration that sepa-
rates the real notion of the common or specific nature, without regarding
and considering the notion of individuation. However, through this
no real object is separated or formed that is different from the act of
consideration67

Olivi rejects both the external existence and the mental existence of common
natures. Universality is a cognitive approach whose object the real notion is
not common. Hence, he puts forth a nominalism of sorts where the real notion
of common natures can be understood as the intellectual consideration of a
likeness between individual things, without the consideration of their indi-
viduating features a likeness that is only an act of reason, which is not
grounded in something real and commonly shared by individual things:

In fact, things are not made similar with respect to a third thing, unless
you take the third thing only according to the intellect or in the mode of
the exemplar, as all the things that are thought through the same idea can
be said to be similar with respect to it. What is said thereafter that indi-
viduals are not similar as regards their proper nature is true, if the sense
is that they are not made similar with respect to it as a third thing com-
monly shared by them. In fact, the likeness does not require such third
thing, but rather the opposite.68

67 Peter John Olivi, De verbo (ed. Pasnau, 145): Ad secundam etiam patet quia prima abstrac-
tio rationum universalium fit in solo actu abstractivae considerationis realem rationem
naturae communis vel specificae absque ratione suae individuationis attendentis et con-
siderantis. Per hoc autem nihil obiectivum realiter abstrahitur vel formatur quod differat
a praefactae considerationis actu. For Olivis account of intentionality, see D. Perler,
Thories de lintentionnalit au moyen ge (Paris: Vrin, 2003), Ch. 2.
68 Peter John Olivi, In sent. ii (ed. Jansen, 248): Non enim aliqua sibi assimilantur in aliquo
tertio, nisi illud tertium accipias secundum intellectum tantum aut per modum exem-
plaris, eo modo quo omnia ideata ab eadem idea possunt dici sibi esse similia in illa. Quod
autem dicitur post, quod individua non sunt sibi similia in natura propria: si sit sensus
quod non assimilantur sibi in ea tanquam in alio tertio communiter ab eis participata,
70 chapter 2

Through the consideration of this likeness, the intellect can afterwards apply
a common name to all the things that are in a relation with it. It can also
establish further logical relations between things, such as predication and
inference:

To the fourth [argument], it must be said that, just as the intellect distin-
guishes between two notions that do not have real or essential distinc-
tion in things, and just as such two notions can be ordered as regards
priority and posteriority through a relation to the intellect that they do
not have in reality, in the same way similar predications, inferences and
relations can be formed from such mode of understanding.69

To sum up, just like Bacon, Olivi presents us with a semiotic account along
Augustinian lines, but the logical theory that it supports differs strongly both
from Bacons realism and token-oriented logic and from the modists some-
what moderate realism and logic of intentions. Olivi breaks up, indeed, the
epistemological constraint that lies behind Alberts rejection of the imposition
of common names on external things. However, he also rejects the idea that
universality as a logical feature of language is immediately dictated by real
properties of external essences, thus putting forth the only known thirteenth-
century anticipation of fourteenth-century nominalism.

The Verificational Angle

The final angle that is taken in arguments against the immediate signification
of concepts (i.e. in Scotus commentary on the Perihermeneias) regards propo-
sitional verification.
This approach to the question can also be traced back to the logical com-
mentaries from the first half of the century, namely to the dubitationes about
the different subject matters of the Categories and the Perihermeneias. Due to
Boethius claim in his commentary on the Categories that words signify things,

vera est. Sed similitudo non exigit tale tertium, immo potius contrarium. In: Quaestiones
in secundum librum Sententiarum, ed. B. Jansen (Quarachi: Collegium. S. Bonaventurae,
192226) (Biblioteca Franciscana Scholastica 46).
69 Peter John Olivi, In sent. ii (ed. Jansen, 250): Ad quartum dicendum quod sicut intellectus
distinguit inter duas rationes quae secundum rem non habent inter se diversitatem
realem seu essentialem et sicut duae tales rationes possunt habere inter se ordinem pri-
oritatis et posterioritatis per respectum ad intellectum quem non habent in re: ita et pos-
sunt ex tali modo intelligendi consimiles praedicationes, consequentiae et habitudines
formari. For Olivi on relations, see A. Boureau, Le concept de relation chez Pierre de Jean
Olivi, in Boureau et al. (eds.), Pierre de Jean Olivi, pp. 4156.
SIGNIFICATION OF CONCEPTS AND THINGS 71

authors such as Nicholas of Paris, Robert Kilwardby and Albert the Great ask
why Boethius claims in his commentary on the Categories that words signify
things, while in his commentary on the Perihermeneias his claim is that words
signify concepts.70
These authors generally accept that Boethius is right in assessing a differ-
ence between the approaches to signification in the two treatises.71 The reason
is that in the Categories Aristotle deals with simple sayables (dicibilia incom-
plexa) that are divided into the ten categories corresponding to the ten catego-
ries of being, while in the Perihermeneias he deals with simple sayables that
can be the subject that of which something is said and the predicate that
which is said of something else of an assertion. Regardless of the ontological
category of its significate, a sayable is a subject or a predicate (a name or a
verb) because of a mode of understanding this significate insofar as the sig-
nificate is understood as a subject or as a predicate:

Likewise, the Categories deals with the term insofar as it is predicable, and
thus is the thing; hence, there the analysis of the term is into utterance
and thing. But this science [i.e. the Perihermeneias] deals with the term
insofar as it is said of something else or as something else is said of it, and
thus it is something according to the intellect; for the intellect takes what-
ever is said of something else and puts it under the notion /verb/; and [it
takes] whatever about which other things are said and puts it under the
notion /name/. This is why in this science the term is analysed into utter-
ance and concept, rather than into utterance and thing. Hence, [Aristotle]
says that utterances are marks of concepts, and so of things, but in the
Categories [he says] that [utterances] are marks of things.72

70 See e.g. Nicholas of Paris, In Perih. (ed. Hansen and Mora-Mrquez, 18:1316): Item. De
diversitate dicibilis incomplexi in libro Praedicamentorum et hoc quaeritur. Dicit
Boethius quod terminatur hic de vocibus prout significant intellectus, in libro
Praedicamentorum prout significant res.
71 Cf. Nicholas of Paris, In Perih. (ed. Hansen and Mora-Mrquez, 20:28): Posset etiam susti-
neri differentia quam assignat Boethius.
72 Robert Kilwardby, Not. sup. Perih. (M46ra; P67va; V3r): Item, in Praedicamentis est sermo
de terminis ut terminus est praedicabilis, et sic est res; unde est ibi resolutio termini in
vocem et rem. Set in scientia ista est sermo de termino secundum quod dicitur de altero
sive alterum de ipso, et sic est aliquid secundum intellectum. Accipit enim intellectus quae-
cumque de altero dicuntur, et ponit sub intentione verbi; et de quo alia, et ponit sub inten-
tione nominis. Et propter hoc in scientia ista resolvitur terminus in vocem et intellectum
magis quam in vocem et rem. Unde dicit quod voces sunt notae intellectuum, et sic rerum;
in Praedicamentis quod sunt notae rerum.
72 chapter 2

However, to be understood as a subject or as a predicate is not a property of

real things, but rather a way of understanding a significate when it is com-
posed with or divided from something else in the mental acts of composition
or division. For example, Nicholas of Paris tells us that:

The Perihermeneias deals with utterances that signify concepts, i.e.

modes of understanding; for, [an utterance] is not said to be a name
because of the thing signified, but because of its mode of signifying.73

The name the subject and the verb the predicate of an assertion indi-
cate two concepts that are considered as that of which something is said and
that which is said of something else, respectively.74 Therefore, the name and
the verb can form an assertion that preserves the logical form of a mental com-
position and division insofar as they signify as subject and as predicate the
concepts that are mentally composed or divided.
Moreover, in their analyses of Aristotles Perihermeneias, Nicholas and
Kilwardby e.g. do not consider the possible reference to the external world by
names and verbs, because their purpose is to explain what are names and verbs
in the context of the treatise. They rightly notice that Aristotles names and
attributes are the linguistic counterparts of the simple thoughts that are com-
pared in a mental composition (or division) a composition (or division) that
is susceptible of truth-value precisely because of its compound form:

In fact, in the Categories utterances signify things that exist, because a

non-being is neither a category nor it falls under a category, but in this
book [i.e. the Perihermeneias] [utterances] signify thoughts (i.e. intelligi-
ble things, largely taken, or imaginable things), whether they are beings

73 E.g. Nicholas of Paris, Rat. sup. Praed. L1 (ed. Hansen, forthcoming): ...in libro
Perihermeneias de vocibus significantibus intellectum, id est modos intelligendi; non
enim dicitur nomen propter rem significatam, sed propter modum significandi.
74 Cf. AnOx, In Perih. (ed. Mora-Mrquez, 173:28): Scientia autem Praedicamentorum est de
vocibus inquantum sunt significativa intellectuum, qui intellectus sunt signa rerum
materialium (sicut substantiae et qualitates). In libro autem isto determinat <de> vocibus
secundum quod sunt signa intellectuum, qui intellectus sunt signa rei secundum ani-
mam, sicut de nomine et verbo, quia huiusmodi voces (nomen et verbum) significant res
quae sunt secundum animam. Cf. Albert the Great, In Isag. (ed. Santos Noya, 9:4145):
Complexio et incomplexio non accidunt rei, secundum quod res est, nec etiam voci,
secundum quod est vox, sed accidunt voci, secundum quod refertur ad intellectum sim-
plicem vel compositum.
SIGNIFICATION OF CONCEPTS AND THINGS 73

or non-beings, because an assertion can be formed indifferently by a

name that signifies a being and a non-being.75

Although these early authors maintain, indeed, that logic in general deals with
truth and falsity, as well as with syllogistic validity, they also separate Aristotles
correspondence between assertions and mental compositions (or divisions) in
the Perihermeneias from the problem of truth-determination (which they
would rather discuss in e.g. their commentaries on the Categories).
Nonetheless, at least from Martin of Dacia onwards there are explicit ques-
tions about propositional truth and falsity in the context of commentaries on
the Perihermeneias (e.g. where truth and falsity are as in a subject; and whether
a real composition corresponds to any true mental composition). These ques-
tions, in one way or another, amount to asking how it would be possible to
make true statements about the external world (e.g. scientific statements), if
words signified concepts.
Martin of Dacia follows his predecessors in claiming that the truth or falsity
of an assertion is immediately determined by the truth or falsity of the mental
composition or division that it signifies. For truth and falsity are primarily a
feature of mental items and only secondarily a feature of assertions through
their representation of true or false mental compositions or divisions. Martin
thereby pushes the problem of propositional verification to the mental level:

It must be said that truth is the good of the intellect, just as Aristotle takes
it in book vi of the Ethics. For truth is a disposition of the intellect accord-
ing to which it is made similar to the thing. Therefore, since truth is the
good of the intellect, nothing will be true unless it is related to the intel-
lect. But something is related to the intellect in three ways: in one way, as
the sign [is related] to what is signified, and in this way a true sentence is
related to the intellect. For the sentence insofar as it is true is a sign of the
truth in the intellect.76

75 Cf. Nicholas of Paris, In Perih. (ed. Hansen and Mora-Mrquez, 21:15): Nam in libro
Praedicamentorum voces significant res exsistentes, quoniam non ens neque est genus
neque est in genere, in hoc libro significant intellectus, id est intelligibile large, id est
imaginabile, sive sit ens sive non ens, quia ex nomine significante ens et non ens indif-
ferenter potest constitui enuntiatio. Cf. Albert the Great, In Isag. (ed. Santos Noya, 10:29
33): Adhuc dictio sive vox significativa et articulata non ex hoc quod refertur ad rem
designatam, sed ex hoc quod est in intellectu quaerentis ignotum scire per notum, habet
quod quaedam ipsius est nomen, quaedam autem verbum. Cf. above, Section1.1.
76 Martin of Dacia, Super Perih. (ed. Roos, 250:24251:5): Dicendum sicut vult Aristoteles vi.
Ethicorum, quod verum est bonum intellectus. Nam veritas est dispositio intellectus,
74 chapter 2

Most authors from the second half of the century reject this position and claim
that at least some assertions, namely the ones about external facts, are imme-
diately verified by real compositions and divisions. Accordingly, with respect
to the immediate signification of concepts they object that if words signified
concepts, assertions such as a man runs would always be false, because the
concept of a man is never running.77 Similarly, assertions such as Socrates is
would always be true, because the concept of Socrates always exists,78 and
assertions such as man is an animal or Socrates is a man would always be
false, because the concept of man and the concept of animal are always dif-
ferent.79 Consequently, only assertions about second intentions or fictional
entities would be susceptible of truth and falsity.
The Incertus sf, for instance, gives the following argument in order to
defend the immediate signification of external things: The word signifies the
thing x whose concept is provoked in the listeners mind when she hears the
word. But the listener of a word of first imposition understands an external
thing. For, if when someone uttered a man runs the listener understood the

secundum quam assimilatur rei. Cum ergo verum sit bonum intellectus, nihil erit verum
nisi in comparatione ad intellectum. Sed aliquid comparatur ad intellectum tripliciter:
uno modo si<cut> signum ad signatum, et sic oratio vera comparatur ad intellectum.
Nam oratio, in eo quod vera, signum est veritatis in intellectu. Cf. Martin of Dacia, Super
Perih. (ed. Roos, 245:25246:3): Verum complexum est dispositio intellectus sub qua
refert unum ad aliud componendo vel separat unum ab alio dividendo, et talis intellectus
sic se habet quod quando refert rem aliquam ad aliam, cum qua convenit, sicut hominem
ad animal, vel quando separat rem a re, cum qua non convenit, sic est verus. Sed quando
facit e converso, sic est falsus. Scotus bears witness to this position in his commentary
[Duns Scotus, In Perih.1 (ed. Bonaventure, 48:38)]: Item, veritas et falsitas tantum sunt in
sermone ut in signo; ergo enuntiatio prolata illud significat in quo est veritas et falsitas.
Illud est compositio et divisio intellectus, ut dicit AristotelesErgo enuntiatio composita
significat illud quod est in intellectu composito tantum. Ergo et enuntiationis partes sig-
nificant ea quae sunt in intellectu simplici, cuiusmodi sunt species. For Martins position,
see Mora-Mrquez, Martinus Dacus and Boethius Dacus.
77 See e.g. Duns Scotus, In Perih.1 (ed. Bonaventure, 50:911): Et universaliter omnes propo-
sitiones essent falsae in quibus enuntiatur actus realis de aliquo subiecto, cuiusmodi est
homo currit etc.
78 See e.g. Duns Scotus, In Perih.1 (ed. Bonaventure, 50:1820): Tum quia omnis propositio
esset vera in qua praedicatur hoc verbum est secundum adiacens, ut Socrates est,
Antichristus est, quia species cuiuslibet subiecti, de qua enuntiamus esse, est.
79 See e.g. Duns Scot, In Perih.1 (ed. Bonaventure, 50:69): Tum quia omnis propositio affir-
mativa esset falsa in qua subiectum et praedicatum cognoscuntur per diversas species, ut
illa homo est animal, cum alia species hominis per quam intelligitur, et alia animalis.
SIGNIFICATION OF CONCEPTS AND THINGS 75

concept of man, the assertion could never be true because the composition of
the concept of man and the act of running is impossible.80
However, Scotus hits the nail on the head by stressing that even if we
accepted that the immediate significate of a word of first imposition is a con-
cept, the fact that the concept is a likeness of external things would assure the
reference to them in assertoric contexts, and thus the assertions truth-makers
would be the ultimate, and not the immediate, significates of its terms:

To this [objection] it must be said that insofar as several things are signi-
fied by the same [sign], one of which [i.e. the thought] is signified insofar
as it is a sign of the other, if this [sign] is composed in a sentence with
another [sign], this composition does not concern the signs [i.e. the
thoughts] but the ultimate significates, which are not signs. And with the
uttered assertion one does not signify a composition of species, but a
composition of things, just as with the written sentence one does not
signify a composition of utterances but a composition of things.81

Scotus thereby sketches a distinction between words that, qua signs, signify
concepts and words that, qua tools for true descriptions of the world, signify
things a distinction that would likely be the reply given by Albert the Great
and Martin of Dacia, along the lines of Boethius, to the detractors of their
positions.
As to this matter, Radulphus Brito puts forth a position that, once again,
seems to relegate the notion of signification to its semiotic use. Brito claims
that names do not signify things according to their intellectual existence, as
was maintained by e.g. Albert the Great, because this would make it difficult to
explain how real predication can be verified. On the other hand, neither do
names signify things according to their external existence, because then inten-
tional predication, e.g. man is a species, also could not be verified. Therefore,
names signify things themselves regardless of their external or intellectual
existence:

80 See text quoted above, p. 56, n. 43.

81 Duns Scotus, In Perih.1 (ed. Bonaventure, 54:2024): dicendum ad illud quod, quantum-
cumque per idem multa significantur quorum unum significatur in quantum est signum
alterius, si illud in oratione componatur cum alio, non est compositio signorum sed sig-
nificatorum ultimorum, quae non sunt signa. Et per enuntiationem prolatam non signifi-
catur compositio specierum sed rerum, sicut nec per orationem scriptam significatur
compositio vocum sed rerum.
76 chapter 2

And I say that some people want to claim that [the name] signifies the
thing under its intellectual being, which I do not believe. However, I
believe that [the name] signifies the essence in its indifference to one and
the other [being], because some predicates are verified of a thing only
with respect to its intellectual being, just as genus, species and so on; but
other [predicates] are verified of a thing with respect to its being in par-
ticular instances, just as to drink, to eat and so on. If some name, e.g.
man, or every name, signified the thing with respect to its intellectual
being, then real predicates could not be verified of it Likewise, if it signi-
fied the thing only with respect to its being in particular instances, inten-
tional predicates could not be verified of it; but since both sorts of predicate
are verified, it seems that [man] signifies the thing indifferently.82

Consequently, names, qua signs, signify the ontologically neutral thing itself,
and the assertions involving them would be verified on the basis of further
conditions, whose consideration, as we shall see in Part 2, is not necessarily a
logical matter per se. In Part 2 it will become evident that Britos notion of sig-
nification operates at a semiotic level that is also neutral as regards proposi-
tional verification.

2.2 Whether Words Lose Their Signification with the Destruction of

Their Significate

The question whether an utterance (word/term/name) loses its signification

with the destruction of the significate is raised both as a semiotic question
regarding the significative character of words (dictiones) and as a question
concerned with the truth-value of assertions with an empty term as a subject,
namely when the question is a sub-problem of the sophisma83 Whether omnis

82 Radulphus Brito, In Met. (ed. Ebbesen, 111): Et dico quod aliqui volunt dicere quod signifi-
cat rem sub esse intellecto. Quod non credo, sed credo quod significat rem sub indifferen-
tia ad utrumque, quia quaedam sunt praedicata quae verificantur de re solum pro esse
intellecto, sicut genus et species et talia, aliqua autem verificantur de re pro esse quod
habet in suppositis, sicut bibere, comedere et talia. Si nomen aliquod sicut homo, vel
omne nomen, significaret rem pro esse intellecto, tunc de ipso non possent verificari
praedicata realiaet similiter si significaret rem solum pro esse in suppositis, de ipsa non
possent verificari praedicata intentionalia; cum ergo utraque praedicata verificentur,
videtur quod significet rem cum indifferentia.
83 A sophisma is a statement whose sense is undetermined because it involves some logical or
grammatical difficulty (e.g. the equivocation of its terms, its ambiguous syntactic construction,
SIGNIFICATION OF CONCEPTS AND THINGS 77

homo de necessitate est animal is true when no man exists (henceforth

ohnea).84 The question is also discussed from the latter perspective in

its paradoxical nature etc.), and hence needs to be solved. In the medieval scholarly environ-
ment, sophismata were solved at public disputational exercises, whose written counterparts
form what is known today as the medieval sophismatic literature. Fundamental logical issues
(e.g., the universal quantification of singletons and empty terms) were thoroughly discussed at
sophismatic disputations, so as to render the medieval sophismatic literature an unavoidable
source for historians of medieval logic. For a general account of sophismata and sophismatic
literature, see F. Pironnet and J. Spruyt, Sophismata, Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy,
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/sophismata/; for an exhaustive catalogue of medieval sophis
matic literature, see S. Ebbesen and F. Goubier, A Catalogue of 13th-Century Sophismata, 2. vols.
(Paris: Vrin, 2010).
84 For a list of the extant versions of this sophisma, see S. Ebbesen and F. Goubier, A
Catalogue, pp. 2161. This sophisma also discusses the nature of the modality of necessity,
the nature of the composition entailed by the term est, and the nature of the distribution
brought about by the universal quantifier omnis. I shall focus only on the problem of the
relation between the signification of empty terms and the truth-value of the assertions
that have them as subjects. For discussions about omnis in commentaries on Aristotles
Topics from the last quarter of the 13th century, see A.M. Mora-Mrquez, Boethius of
Dacia and Radulphus Brito on the Universal Sign Omnis, Logica Universalis (2015), doi
10.1007/s11787-014-0112-6. For 13th-century discussions about modality, quantification,
predication and empty reference, see A. de Libera, Faire de ncessit loi: Thories de la
modalit dans le sophisma Omnis homo de necessitate est animal du codex parisinus
16135, ff. 11rb12rb, ahdlma 76 (2009), 179233; id., Omnis homo de necessitate est animal.
Rfrence et modalit selon lAnonymus Erfordensis Q. 328 (Pseudo-Robert Kilwardby),
ahdlma 69 (2002), 201237; id., La rfrence vide (Paris: puf, 2002); id., Rfrence et
quantification: Sur la thorie de la distributio au xiiie sicle, in A. de Libera, A. Elamrani-
Jamal and A. Galonnier (eds.), Langages et philosophie: Hommage Jean Jolivet (Paris:
Vrin, 1997), pp. 177200; id., Csar et le phnix: Distinctiones et sophismata parisiens du
xiiie sicle (Pisa: Centro di cultura medievale della Scuola Normale Superiore, 1991); A. de
Libera and L. Gazziero, Le Sophisma Omnis homo de necessitate est animal du Parisinus
Latinus 16135, ff. 99rb103vb, ahdlma 75 (2008.1), 323368; L. Cesalli, A. de Libera and
F. Goubier, Does Loving Every Mean Loving Every Every, even Non-existent Ones?
Distribution and Universals in the Opus puerorum, in Fink et al. (eds.), Logic and
Language, pp. 305336; Cesalli, Le ralisme propositionnel; S. Ebbesen, The Present King
of France wears Hypothetical Shoes with Categorical Laces: Twelfth-century writers on
well-formedness, Medioevo 7 (1981), 91113 (repr. in Ebbesen, Collected Essays, vol. 2, pp.
1530); id., The Dead Man is Alive, Synthese 40 (1979), 4370; id., The Chimaeras Diary
edited by Sten Ebbesen, in S. Knuuttila and J. Hintikka (eds.), The Logic of Being
(Dordrecht: Reidel, 1986), pp. 115143; F. Goubier, Influences prdicatives et consquences
rfrentielles: un aspect de lapproche terministe de la premire moiti du xiiie sicle,
cimagl 71 (2000), 3770; A. Tabarroni, Omnis phoenix est: quantification and existence in
78 chapter 2

commentaries on the Posterior Analytics,85 as well as in linguistic treatises,

such as Roger Bacons De signis86 and Peter John Olivis Quaestiones logicales.87
In grammatical treatises, Ps.-Kilwardby,88 Michael of Marbais89 and John of
Dacia90 raise the question from the semiotic perspective. Finally, the question
is also raised in the commentaries on the Perihermeneias and on the
Metaphysics, by e.g. Siger of Brabant (Metaph.),91 Radulphus Brito (Perih.)92
and Duns Scotus (Perih.),93 where the semiotic question is entangled with the
problem of empty reference.
As already mentioned, when the question is a sub-problem of the sophisma
ohnea, what is at stake is the relation between signification and the truth-
value of assertions.94 It is noteworthy, though, that some dubitationes related

a new sophismata collection (ms Clm 14522), in S. Read (ed.), Sophisms in Medieval
Grammar and Logic (Dortrecht: Kluwer, 1993), pp. 185201.
85 See e.g. the commentaries on the Posterior Analytics by Simon of Faversham, q. 21 [in J.L.
Longeway, Simon of Favershams Questions on the Posterior Analytics: a Thirteenth-Century
View of Science (Ithaca: Cornell University, 1977; PhD dissertation)] and by Radulphus
Brito, In APo, q. I.38, ed. S. Ebbesen, Talking about what is no more, cimagl 55 (1987),
135168, at pp. 161168.
86 Roger Bacon, De signis iv.2 (ed. Fredborg et al., 127): Utrum de necessitate remaneat dic-
tio significativa postquam imposita est ad significandum, ita quod non poterit fieri nota
<non> significativa, ut aestimatur a vulgo insensato.
87 Peter John Olivi, ql, q. 3 (ed. Brown, 344): Post hoc quaeritur <an> ad veritatem proposi-
tionum necessariarum et affirmativarum sequatur actualis entitas subiecti et praedicati.
Utpote, an sequatur homo est animal, ergo est actu.
88 Ps.-Kilwardby, In Prisc. mai. (ed. Fredborg et al., 71): Utrum dictio, postquam significat
aliquod ens, eo corrupto amittat suam significationem.
89 Michael of Marbais, Summa (ed. Kelly, 10): Qualiter ratio significandi remanere potest
in dictione ipsa re corrupta secundum existere. In: Summa de modis significandi, ed.
L.G Kelly (Stuttgart: Frommann-Hoolzboog, 1995) (Grammatica Speculativa).
90 John of Dacia, Summa (ed. Otto, 183): Utrum scilicet vox post suam impositionem possit
destitui a sua significatione, et hoc est quaerere utrum vox significativa possit fieri non
significativa.
91 Siger of Brabant, In Metaph. (ed. Maurer, 160): Utrum nomen significet idem, re existente
et corrupta. In: Quaestiones in Metaphysicam, ed. A. Mauer (Louvain-la-neuve: Editions
de lInstitut Suprieur de Philosophie, 1983) (Philosophes Mdivaux xxv).
92 Radulphus Brito, In Perih. (ed. Venice, 144): Consequenter quaeritur utrum vox significet
idem re existente et non existente.
93 Duns Scotus, In Perih.1 (ed. Bonaventure, 61): Quaeritur utrum facta transmutatione circa
rem quae significatur, fiat transmutatio in significatione vocis.
94 This problem is also tackled in sophismata that do not explicitly raise it as a sub-problem.
The most important are: An. Liberanus, ohnea, ed. de Libera, in ahdlma 76 (2009),
179233; An. Erfordensis, ohnea, ed. de Libera, in ahdlma 69 (2002), 201237; Siger of
SIGNIFICATION OF CONCEPTS AND THINGS 79

to ohnea are found as early as the 1230s in the syncategorematic treatises

(Syncategoremata95) by Nicholas of Paris, John Pagus, Peter of Spain and
William of Sherwood.96 However, these early discussions do not revolve expli
citly around the problem of empty reference, but rather around the problem of
the composition imported by the copula est, the kind of necessity imported by
the modal operator necessario and the distribution imported by the universal
quantifier omnis.

Brabant, ohnea, ed. Bazan [in: Ecrits de logique, de morale et de physique, ed. B. Bazn
(Louvain: Publications Universitaires, 1974) (Philosophes Mdivaux xiv)], at pp. 4352;
An., ohnea, ms Wigornensi, Bibl. Cath. Q.13, sophisma 22, f. 74ra; An. Pragensis, ohnea,
MS Praha, MK M.83, f. 45ra; An., ohnea, MS Cambridge, G&C 611/341, sophisma 7, f. 58va,
ed. S. Ebbesen, in By Necessity, in V. Hirvonen, T.J. Holopainen and
M. Tuominen (eds.), Mind and Modality. Studies in the History of Philosophy in Honour of
Simo Knuuttila (Leiden: Brill, 2006), pp. 141151; An., ohnea, MS Mainz 616, distinctio 21,
f. 47va; An., ohnea, MS Brugge, sb 509, f. 106ra.
95 Syncategorematic treatises are medieval logical texts that discuss the logical features of
syncategorematic terms. A syncategorematic term, in turn, is a term that does not have
signification in itself, yet it affects the signification of the categorematic terms (i.e. the
subject-term and the predicate-term that have signification in themselves) that it deter-
mines. Cf. Peter of Spain, Sync. (ed. De Rijk, 39) [in: Peter of Spain, Syncategoremata, ed.
L.M. de Rijk (Leiden: Brill, 1992)]: Dictiones sincategorematicae significant res aliquas.
Sed non significant res subicibiles vel praedicabiles. Ergo significant res quae sunt dispo-
sitiones subicibilium vel praedicabilium Sed dispositio item, sive res quae est dispositio,
est duplex, quia est quaedam dispositio eius quod est subiectum vel eius quod est praedi-
catumsicut pater dicitur ad filium et econverso, ita subiectum ad praedicatum et econ-
verso Alia est dispositio subiecti inquantum est subiectum vel praedicati inquantum est
praedicatumet illae non subiciuntur neque praedicantur, quia sunt ipsius subiecti in
comparatione ad praedicatum et econverso. Et tales dispositiones significantur per dic-
tiones sincategorematicas; dicunt enim comparationes sive habitudines subiecti inquan-
tum subicibile et praedicati inquantum praedicabile. Among syncategorematic terms, we
find e.g. quantifiers (omnis, aliquis and so on), the copula est, conjunctions and disjunc-
tions, the markers of conditional and interrogative statements (e.g., si and utrum),
adversative terms (e.g. etsi) etc. For a comprehensive study of 13th-century theories of
syncategorematic words, see F. Goubier, Les syncatgormes au xiiie sicle, Histoire
Epistmologie Langage 25/ii (2003), 85113.
96 Nicholas of Paris, Sync., ed. H.A.G. Braakhuis, De 13de Eeuwse Tractaten over
Syncategorematische Termen, ii: Uitgave van Nicolaas van Parijs Sincategoremata, 2 vols.
(Meppel: Krips Repro, 1979); Johannes Pagus, Sync., ed. Braakhuis, De 13de Eeuwse
Tractaten, vol. 1; William of Sherwood, Sync., ed. J.R. ODonnell, The Syncategoremata of
William of Sherwood, Mediaeval Studies 3 (1941), 4693; Peter of Spain, Sync., ed. L.M. de
Rijk (Leiden: Brill, 1992).
80 chapter 2

In the present chapter, I shall focus on the discussions found in Roger

Bacons De signis iv.2, Peter John Olivis Quaestiones logicales, q. 23, Boethius
of Dacias ohnea and Anonymus Alanis ohnea. These texts present us with
four different ways of relating the question about signification to ohnea, and
therefore with four different positions regarding the relation between signifi-
cation and empty reference: (i) Terms lose their signification with the destruc-
tion of things, therefore ohnea is neither true nor false when no man exists
(Roger Bacon). (ii) Terms do not lose their signification with the destruction of
things, nevertheless ohnea is false when no man exists (Boethius of Dacia; cf.
Radulphus Brito). (iii) Terms do not lose their signification with the destruc-
tion of things, and ohnea is false in one sense and true in another, when no
man exists, because esse is equivocal to dispositional and actual being (Olivi).
Finally, (iv) terms do not lose their signification with the destruction of things,
and the assertion ohnea is always true, whether man exists or not (Anonymus
Alani). I shall use Anonymus Alani (henceforth An. Al.) as the guiding thread
of my analysis, inserting the other positions where relevant.

Anonymus Alanis Omnis Homo De Necessitate Est Animal (Paris

bnf Lat. 16135, ff. 99rb103vb)
This sophisma is of great interest for our discussion; for, just as Scotus does in
his question about the immediate signification of words, An. Al. also discusses
at length the most influential treatments of ohnea that were put forth during
the thirteenth century. Yet, contrary to Scotus, who does not introduce his own
solution to the question he presents, the anonymous author introduces his
own solution in radical opposition to the positions he presents and subse-
quently rejects.
An. Al. discusses ohnea by dividing it into three problems (problemata): (a)
whether the necessity of the composition requires the necessary existence of
the subject and the predicate; (b) whether the assertion ohnea is true or
false; and (c) whether a term loses its significate with the destruction of the
thing it signifies.97
An. Al. connects the three problems by starting his discussion with problem
(a) and by introducing problems (b) and (c) in the places where they (sort of)
naturally belong. Accordingly, he does not give a separate treatment to each prob-
lem (as e.g. Boethius of Dacia does), but rather intertwines the three discussions.

97 An. Al., ohnea (ed. de Libera and Gazziero, 332): Circa istud sophisma plura fuerunt
quaesita, sed tantum tria prosecuta. Primum est utrum necessitas compositionis requirat
necessario existentiam extremorum. Secundum est de veritate et falsitate primae propo-
sitionis. Tertium utrum terminus cadat a suo significato, quando res desinit esse.
SIGNIFICATION OF CONCEPTS AND THINGS 81

After having put forth his own solution of the sophisma, An. Al. closes his discus-
sion with short summaries of his own solutions to problems (a)(c).98
The discussion starts with the arguments proving directly that the necessity
of the linguistic composition marked with est requires the necessary exis-
tence of the subject and the predicate (in at least one individual, one should
add).99 The problem amounts then to asking if for ohnea to be true, at least
one individual man must exist. A related question, which is often discussed
separately in another group of sophismata, asks whether there have to be at
least three individuals for the quantification with omnis to make sense at all.
But since this question is not directly related to the problems around the
notion of signification, I shall leave it aside in this study.100
Several arguments support the position that indeed there has to be at least
one individual man for the assertion to be true. The most important of these
arguments goes as follows:

(a) In an assertion, the composition is to the terms as form is to matter.

(b) But a necessary form (i.e. necessary composition) cannot inform destruc-
tible matter (i.e. man and animal).
(c) Therefore the necessity of the composition marked with est entails the
necessary existence of the terms homo and animal.101

In other words, there cannot be necessary composition if it is not the case that
the existence of at least one actual compound is necessary; however, no material
compound has necessary existence. Therefore, if we hypothesise that no man
exists, which is plausible since no material compound has necessary existence,
then the modal assertion ohnea is false.102 It is worth noting that this is a meta-
physical argument, which appeals to the contingence of material compounds:

98 See An. Al., ohnea (ed. de Libera and Gazziero, 360368).

99 By existence of the subject and predicate I mean now and henceforth the existence of
the significates of the subject and the predicate.
100 This problem is mainly discussed in the sophisma Omnis phoenix est animal. For a list of
this sophisma, see Ebbesen and Goubier, A Catalogue, vol. 2, pp. 362370. For The Phoenix
Complex, see Cesalli et al., Does loving every mean loving every every?.
101 An. Al., ohnea (ed. de Libera and Gazziero, 334): Item. Compositio sic se habet ad
extrema sicut forma ad materiam; sed in materia corruptibili et non necessaria non
potest esse forma necessaria; ergo in extremis corruptibilibus non potest esse compositio
necessaria; ergo ad necessitatem compositionis requiritur necessitas extremorum. The
author puts forth 10 further arguments defending the same position; cf. An. Al., ohnea
(ed. de Libera and Gazziero, 332336).
102 As we shall see, Boethius of Dacia grants this argument.
82 chapter 2

Since the significates of the terms of an assertion about the material world can
never be involved in a necessary real composition, no assertion about the mate-
rial world is necessary.
Let us now get rid of the universal quantifier omnis and ask whether homo
est animal is true or false, when no man exists. For if it is true, then some sort
of necessity seems to be involved in essential predication (i.e. the one involved
in definitions of the sort species + est + genus + specific difference), which
may be the one grounding the necessary and universally quantified assertion
ohnea.
The equivalence between essential predication, universal quantification
and necessity of the composition is put forth explicitly by, for instance, the
Anonymus Erfordensis, who claims that whatever inheres per se inheres in
every individual and inheres by necessity:

Whatever inheres in itself (per se), inheres in every individual and by

necessity. But animal inheres in itself in man, because it is in the first
mode of saying in itself, as a part of the definition inheres in itself in
what is defined. Therefore, animal inheres in man, and by necessity.
Therefore this proposition is necessarily true. It seems then that ohnea
is true.103

This equivalence leads us to the first and second senses of per se attribution
that Aristotle puts forth in Posterior Analytics I.4: (i) When we attribute to a
subject parts of its definition, e.g. animal to man. (ii) When we attribute to a
subject a pair of opposites that contains it, e.g. even/odd to natural number.104
These two sorts of per se attribution, Aristotle claims, are universal and neces-
sary.105 In other words, if the extension of A is by definition contained in the

103 An. Er., ohnea (ed. de Libera, 222): Quod per se inest omni inest et de necessitate. Sed
animal per se inest homini, quia in primo modo dicendi per se, ut pars definitionis per se
inest definito; ergo animal inest homini et de necessitate; ergo propositio haec de neces-
sitate est vera. Videtur igitur quod haec est vera omnis homo de necessitate est animal.
104 cf. al, APo I.4 (ed. Hamesse, 314:3841): Per se primo sunt quaecumque in ratione dicente
quod quid est insuntper se secundo sunt, quaecumque insunt ipsisut propria passio
per se inest subiectoItem per se sunt, quae non dicuntur de quodam alio subiecto, ut
substantia. Item per se sunt, propter quod inest alicui aliquid, tamquam per causam. Hic
habemus, quod quattuor sunt modi dicendi per se, quorum primus et secundus tantum
ingrediuntur demonstrationem. I leave aside the question whether the last two senses
are modes of per se predication. For Aristotles theory of predication, see A. Bck,
Aristotles Theory of Predication (Leiden: Brill, 2000), Ch. 6.
105 Cf. Arist., APo I.4.
SIGNIFICATION OF CONCEPTS AND THINGS 83

extension of B (e.g. the extension of man in the extension of animal), or if A

and B have by definition exactly the same extension (e.g. the extension of even
+ odd and the extension of natural numbers), then A is B is both necessary
and universal.
Note, however, that the per se, ergo universal, ergo necessary-inference
presupposes that A and B are not empty terms; for in the context of the
Posterior Analytics the existence of the subject is presupposed in any demon-
stration of its attributes. It is also noteworthy that to presuppose the existence
of a subject is not quite the same as to require its necessary existence. Yet, we
see this requirement made in the arguments that block this inference because
of the empty subject of homo est animal (i.e. when it is hypothesised that no
man exists).
Two of the four arguments that prove homo est animal to be false when no
man exists go as follows:
Argument 1

(a) The cause of a true essential assertion is its subject (cf. Posterior Analytics,
I.4.73b1025).
(b) The cause of the truth of homo est animal is man (applying a. to homo
est animal).
(c) But no man exists (by hypothesis).
(d) Therefore homo est animal has no subject that can bear the predicate
and produce its truth.
(e) Therefore the assertion is not true (applying a.).
(f) Therefore it is false (principle of bivalence, PoB).106

Argument 2

(a) An assertion is true because it indicates a true mental composition or

division (cf. Arist., Int. 1).
(b) But the intellect composes and divides actual things, and not their con-
cepts (otherwise every mental composition would be false, because all
concepts are different from each other).
(c) But no man exists (by hypothesis).

106 An. Al., ohnea (ed. de Libera and Gazziero, 337): Item. Propositio per se vera habet
causam suae veritatis in subiecto; sed nullo homine existente haec homo est animal non
potest habere causam suae veritatis in subiecto, quia subiectum per hypothesim non est
et in eo quod non est nihil esse potest; ergo ipsa non erit per se vera nullo homine
existente.
84 chapter 2

(d) Therefore there cannot be true mental composition of man and animal
(applying b.).
(e) Therefore homo est animal is not true (applying a.).
(f) Therefore it is false (applying the PoB).
(g) Therefore omnis homo est animal and omnis homo de necessitate est ani-
mal are false (since the antecedent of the inference per se, ergo univer-
sal, ergo necessary is false).107

Note that in both arguments, the steps e. to f. entail the use of the principle of
bivalence. But in Perihermeneias 7, Aristotle explicitly says that non-universal
[assertions] about universals are not always one true, the other false; for it is
possible to claim truly and at the same time that man is white and that man is
not white.108 This is equivalent to saying that indefinite assertions (e.g. homo est
animal) do not comply with the PoB. Furthermore, it must be recalled that even
in the case of the quantified assertion omnis homo est animal, the Aristotelian
version of the principle of bivalence seems to presuppose that at least one indi-
vidual of the universal term exists.109 Thus, it is at least problematic to assume
the universal term to be empty and at the same time apply the PoB. As it seems,
then, the hypothetical assumption that homo is empty places the assertion in
question in a paradoxical situation with regard to Aristotelian logic.
On the other hand, those who grant ohnea propose that whoever denies
it, whether a man exists or not, puts forth a contradiction by claiming and
denying the same thing of the same thing. The argument (Argument 3), which

107 An. Al., ohnea (ed. de Libera and Gazziero, 337): Quia veritas est in oratione sicut in
signo. Significat enim oratio veritatem quae est circa compositionem et divisionem intel-
lectus componentis vel dividentis; intellectus autem non componit intentiones quas
habet penes se de rebus extra ita quod dicat quod haec est illa; sic enim esset omnis
compositio eius falsa; et etiam intelligens et iudicans non iudicat de ipsis intentionibus
vel speciebus sed de rebus quarum sunt; componit ergo ad invicem <res>; res autem vere
componere non potest nisi res ipsae sint; ergo ad hoc quod compositio designata per
hanc omnis homo est animal sit vera, oportet quod omnis homo sit; cum ergo hominem
esse non sit necessarium, non erit haec necessaria omnis homo est animal; ergo nec erit
haec vera omnis homo de necessitate est animal.
108 Cf. Arist., Int. 7.17b2932.
109 See Crivelli, Aristotle on Truth, p. 161. In fact, the only case where Aristotle considers an
empty term in the whole Perihermeneias is in the a fortiori argument of the goat-stag,
which he puts forth in Chapter 1, in order to show that if not even an empty term posits
the non existence of its significate, a fortiori names in general do not posit the existence
or non-existence of their significates either. Assertions, however, would seem to posit the
existence of the subject about which something (i.e. an attribute) is stated.
SIGNIFICATION OF CONCEPTS AND THINGS 85

starts by denying omnis homo est animal (ohea), can be reconstructed as

follows:

(a) In ohea, homo has personal supposition (i.e. it stands for all its particu-
lar instances).110
(b) Every assertion whose subject has personal supposition involves three
relations: (i) between the subject and the predicate, (ii) between the sub-
ject and its particular instances and (iii) between the predicate and the
particular instances of the subject.111
(c) The affirmative assertion of this kind states the three relations.
(d) Its negation denies the first and the third relation, while it states the
second.
(e) Therefore the negative assertion non ohea posits that homo stands for
all its particular instances, but it denies that est animal applies to all of
them.
(f) Therefore there is at least one particular instance of man, e.g. Plato, who
does not bear a relation with being animal.

110 Supposition is a semantic feature of categorematic terms that was famously introduced in
some 13th-century logical treatises on the properties of terms. The supposition of a cate
gorematic term is, generally speaking, that for which the term stands when it is used in an
assertoric context e.g. for the whole of its extension, for sub-sets of its extension, for
itself, for the concept with which it is associated etc. In the case at stake here, the term
homo has confused personal supposition. According to Peter of Spain [in Tractactus, ed.
L.M. de Rijk (Assen: Van Gorcum, 1972)], a common term has personal supposition when
it stands for its individuals (cf. Peter of Spain, Tractatus (ed. de Rijk, 82:1012): Personalis
suppositio est acceptio termini communis pro suis inferioribus. Ut cum dicitur homo
currit, iste terminus homo supponit pro suis inferioribus.). A common term has con-
fused personal supposition, when it stands for all its individuals, namely when it is
affected by the universal quantifier omnis (cf. Peter of Spain, Tractatus (ed. De Rijk,
82:2883:3): Confusa suppositio est acceptio termini communis pro pluribus mediante
signo universali. Ut cum dicitur omnis homo est animal, iste terminus homo mediante
signo universali tenetur pro pluribus, quia pro quolibet suo supposito.) The literature on
medieval theories of supposition is extensive. For three recent general accounts, see J.
Ashworth, Terministic Logic, in Pasnau (ed.), The Cambridge History, pp. 146158; S. Read,
Medieval Theories: Properties of Terms, Standford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, http://
plato.stanford.edu/entries/medieval-terms/; and Catarina Dutilh Novaes, Medieval
Theories of Supposition, in H. Lagerlund (ed.), Encyclopedia of Medieval Philosophy
(Berlin: Springer, 2011), pp. 12291236.
111 These three relations obtain fundamentally because of the universal quantification of a
common term that is put in relation to a predicate in an assertion. In other words, because
of the universal quantification of a common term that is the subject of an assertion.
86 chapter 2

(g) Therefore Plato non est animal is true.

(h) Therefore Plato non est homo is true (since homo is defined as animal
rationale, so that whatever is not an animal, is not a man either).
(i) But Plato est homo is true (applying d.).
(j) Therefore non ohea entails both Plato est homo and Plato est non
homo.
(k) Therefore non ohea is impossible.
(l) Therefore ohea is necessary.
(m) Therefore ohnea is true.112

Yet, also in this case the argument assumes that there are particular instances
of homo, which is what the sophisma denies by hypothesis. Thus, both the
argument proving the falsity of ohnea and the one proving its truth are put
on the spot precisely because of the assumption that no man exists.
The paradoxical nature of the sophisma ohnea very much depends on the
logical consequences both of the universal quantification of empty terms and
of the modality of necessity in compositions where they are used, because evi-
dently the logical properties of the syncategoremes omnis and necessario
depend to a great extent on the non-emptiness of the categorematic terms that
they affect. But what is it, after all, for a categorematic term (whether one calls
it utterance, word, term or name) to be empty? Is it equivalent to not having
signification? If so, the consequences for logic would be dramatic, because
without a semiotic relation on which to support the logical properties of cate
gorematic and syncategorematic terms, fundamental tenets of medieval logic
would collapse. Then, even the most radical detractors of ohnea, such as
Boethius of Dacia, accept that terms do not lose their signification with the
destruction of things. Indeed, to the best of my knowledge the only extant pro-

112 An. Al., ohnea (ed. de Libera and Gazziero, 338): Item. Quicumque negat eam, sive sit
homo sive non, idem affirmat et negat; ergo sua negativa est impossibilis. Probatio ante-
cedentis: terminus habens personalem suppositionem supponit suum significatum pro
appellato vel appellatisergo per dictum tuum qui negat eam removet esse animal ab
appellatis hominis; ergo cum ista negativa designet tres habitudines sicut et quaelibet
negativa cuius subiectum habet personalem suppositionem, unam praedicati ad subiec-
tum, aliam subiecti ad suum suppositum, tertiam praedicati ad suppositum subiecti,
prima designabitur in ea negative, secunda affirmative et tertia negative Semper in
propositione autem affirmativa designantur esse tres dictae habitudines affirmativae; tu
ergo in tua negativa qua explicite negas esse animal de homine affirmas implicite esse
hominem de eius supposito et removes animal de eodem, quod idem est implicite ac si
explicite diceres quod ipse est homo et non est animal Ergo patet quod per tuam nega-
tivam dicis quod ipse est homo et non est homo. Et sic idem affirmas et negas.
SIGNIFICATION OF CONCEPTS AND THINGS 87

ponent of something close to the opposite position is Roger Bacon, who is

always a somewhat dissident voice in thirteenth-century discussions of logical
and semantic nature.

Roger Bacons De Signis iv.2

In his De signis, Roger Bacon raises the question whether a word remains sig-
nificative after its imposition. He then goes on to introduce a difficult case,
namely the one where the thing signified ceases to exist. Other than the usual
authoritative argument taken from Boethius De divisione,113 Bacon introduces
his own argument aiming to prove that a word actually loses its signification
with the destruction of the thing it signifies. Since signification is a relation
between an utterance and a thing, and every relation is destroyed with the
destruction of one of its correlates, if the thing is destroyed the relation of sig-
nification is also destroyed:

Likewise, once one of the extremes opposed in a relation is destroyed,

even though the other one is not destroyed according to its substance,
nonetheless the relation and the disposition of one to the other is
destroyed, as when the substance of Socrates who was Platos son is
destroyed; [for] even though Plato is alive, there is no paternity in Plato
Whence, with the destruction of the thing signified, even though the sub-
stance of the utterance remains, however it does not remain with respect
to the notion of sign.114

113 Roger Bacon, De signis IV.2 (ed. Fredborg et al., 128): Item, propter defectum rei et cor-
ruptionem hoc idem ostenditur post per Boethium, qui dicit in De divisionibus, quando
vox imponitur alicui rei et illa res corrumpitur, ut non sit sive fiat non ens, iam fit vox non
significativa. Cf. Boethius, De divisione (ed. Magee, 44:2024): Oportet autem maxime
exercere hanc artem, ut ipse Aristoteles ait, contra sophisticas importunitates, si enim
nulla subiecta sit res quam significat vox, designativa esse non dicitur, sin vero una res sit
quam significat vox, dicitur simplex, quod si plures, multiplex et multa significans.
114 Roger Bacon, De signis iv.2 (ed. Fredborg et al., 128): Item, corrupto uno extremorum rela-
tive oppositorum licet non corrumpatur alterum secundum substantiam eius, corrumpi-
tur tamen relatio et habitudo unius ad aliud, ut corrupta substantia Socratis, qui fuit filius
Platonis, Plato licet vivat, tamen paternitas non manet in Platone Quare re significata
corrupta licet substantia vocis maneat non tamen ratione signi. Bacons radical exten-
sionalism entails, on one hand, the rejection of the notions of esse habitualis and esse
essentiae that are used by other authors in order to provide the words significata with
some ontological stability. It entails, on the other hand, the consideration of the copula
est as an operator that points to a relation of inherence between two real things. Bacons
extensionalism could be related to his participation in some theological debates during
the first half of the 13th century. One of these debates is concerned with the thesis
88 chapter 2

Bacon gives further support to his argument with an example that is reproduced
in An. Al.s ohnea115 the sign of wine outside a shop does not have any significa-
tion when wine is sold out, and if it can still be interpreted as the sign of some-
thing, it would be of the image of wine in the mind of those who do not know yet
that wine is sold out, namely because of a re-imposition of the sign on that image:

Furthermore, we see this in other signs; for when there is no wine in the
shop, and the buyers know this, they do not take the circular figure [that
is a sign] of the wine to be a sign anymore, just as also in the case of other
[signs]. Whence, with the destruction of the thing on which the imposi-
tion was made, the word does not continue to be significative. If someone
says: It actually happens that there is no wine in the shop, and nonethe-
less the buyers that see the circular figure ask for wine, because of the
figure, therefore the figure is still a sign for them, it must be said to this
that for the ones who know that there is no wine here, the circular figure
that was a real sign, and of real wine, loses for them, at this time, the
account of a real sign. But the ones who do not know that there is no wine
and that suppose that the shop has [it], since there is no [wine], when
they see the figure, they suppose that the circular figure signifies wine
and they renew the account of sign with respect to [the figure], so that in
their minds they make the figure be a sign of the wine that is supposed
and imagined by them, and thus the circular figure is made a new sign.
But it loses the first account of signification that it had with respect to real
wine. And it can happen in the same way in the case of utterances.116

(e.g. by Richard of Cornwall) that homo is said univocally of Jesus and of his dead body
during the three days before his resurrection. In the Compendium Bacon severely rejects
this thesis and claims that Jesus dead body can only be called homo after a reimposition
of the name, which in passing makes it an equivocal name (cf. Roger Bacon, cst (ed.
Maloney, 52:764:3) [in: Compendium of the Study of Theology (Leiden: Brill, 1988) (stgm
20)]). See also A. de Libera, Roger Bacon et la rfrence vide. Sur quelques antcdents
mdivaux du paradoxe de Meinong, in J. Jolivet et al. (eds.), Lectionum varietates.
Hommage Paul Vignaux (19041987) (Paris: Vrin, 1991), pp. 85120; and id., Roger Bacon
et le problme de lappellatio univoca, in Braakhuis et al. (eds.), English Logic and
Semantics: From the end of the twelfth century to the time of Ockham and Burleigh. Acts of
the 4th European Symposium on Medieval Logic and Semantics (Leiden/Nijmegen:
Ingenium Publishers, 1981), pp. 193221; for Bacon on equivocal words, see T.S. Maloney,
Roger Bacon on Equivocation, Vivarium 22 (1984), 85112.
115 See An. Al., ohnea (ed. de Libera and Gazziero, 350).
116 Roger Bacon, De signis iv.2 (ed. Fredborg et al., 128): Item, hoc videmus in signis aliis, cum
enim non <est> vinum in taberna et emptores vini hoc <sciunt>, iam circulus vini non
SIGNIFICATION OF CONCEPTS AND THINGS 89

This strange example, where we are told that signs of non-existing things are
re-imposed on an image of the thing in the mind of the interpreters, has an
unfortunate consequence: We are forced to suppose that the buyers who do
not know that there is no wine re-impose the sign without being aware of
doing so (they do not know that there is no wine, so they cannot know that
they need to re-impose the sign).117 Notwithstanding, Bacon adds that the
same happens in the case of words, so that Socrates, which was imposed to
signify a person who is now dead, lost its original signification when Socrates
died and is now used not according to its original signification but according to
a renewed signification. It is noteworthy, however, that contrary to the wine
example, most people would be aware that Socrates is dead, so that in this case
one could assume a voluntary re-imposition of Socrates by its users.
Bacon explains further the mechanisms of re-imposition by putting forth
two modes of imposition: The first occurs when an utterance is given, at its
original imposition, to a thing as its name, i.e. as in a baptism. The second,
which takes place in the mind, occurs when ordinary speakers think of some-
thing (whether existing or not) about which they want to talk and re-impose
words on it (words that according to the first mode of imposition were imposed
on something else).118 True to the Franciscan focus on human will, Bacon
explains that re-imposition is possible because the act of imposition is directed

recipitur apud eos pro signo, et ita est in aliis. Quapropter corrupta re, cui facta est impo-
sitio, non remanebit vox significativa. Si dicatur: bene accidit quod vinum non sit in
taberna, et tamen emptores videntes circulum quaerunt vinum propter circulum, ergo
circulus adhuc est eis signum, quare similiter hoc dicendum est quod scientibus, quod
non sit ibi vinum, circulus qui fuit signum verum et veri vini iam cadit apud eos et secun-
dum veritatem a ratione signi. Sed ignorantes vinum non esse et putantes esse in taberna,
cum non sit, videntes circulum aestimant circulum significare sibi vinum et renovant
rationem signi in eo, ita quod apud imaginationem suam constituunt circulum esse sig-
num vini aestimati ab eis et imaginati, et sic fit circulus signum novum. Sed cecidit a
ratione prima significandi, quam habuit respectu vini veri. Et similiter potest esse de voci-
bus. The circulus vini example most likely comes from a theological context, since it is
most often used by theologians in discussions about the nature of signs, notably in discus-
sions about the semiotic character of sacraments; see Rosier-Catach, La parole efficace.
117 I am indebted to Chris Martin for pointing out to me the problem with this example. It
seems to me, indeed, that there is a serious problem with a volontary notion of reimposi-
tion of which language-users are not aware, particularly since Bacon puts a lot of weight
on the intentional character of linguistic imposition. See above, Section2.1.
118 Roger Bacon, De signis iv.3 (ed. Fredborg et al., 130): Ad horum ergo evidentiam potest
quaeri de modo imponendi duplici an sit, ut tactum est, et dicendum quod sic. Unde unus
est modus imponendi sub forma impositionis vocaliter expressa et assignata rei sicut
imponuntur nomina infantibus et aliis rebus. <Sed alius est modus imponendi quid fit
90 chapter 2

by human will, so that a speaker can at any time have the will to re-impose a
word on the object of his thought and express this new imposition.119
This is what happens, for instance, when we talk about a dead man like
Socrates or when we call a depicted man a man. Our daily use of language
implies a long chain of re-impositions of words; chain that usually takes place
in assertoric contexts. Since there is no perceptible time between the re-impo-
sition of a word and its use in an assertion, the acts of re-imposition go
unnoticed:

If someone says that we would be aware of these impositions, but no one

is aware [of them] when imposing, it must be said that there is no aware-
ness of the notion and the time of imposition where there is no diligent
consideration, unless the imposition is utterly expressed, because this
one is first, primary and usual as regards things and languagesAnd this
is the first cause of this concealing The third cause is that there would
not be many of these impositions, unless there were at the same time
assertions about these terms, so that there is neither perceptible nor
minimal time between the imposition and the assertion120

Thus the lack of awareness of the chain of re-impositions depends on the short
interval that separates the act of re-imposition from the act of predication.121
At any rate, Bacons remark implies that whenever someone utters an asser-
tion, her act of re-imposition has already taken place, so that terms in proposi-
tional contexts are practically never empty.

apud solum intellectum considerantem ens> vel non ens, de quo vult aliquid enuntiare,
vel quod de alio vult enuntiare, et sic imponit nomen.
119 Roger Bacon, De signis iv.3 (ed. Fredborg et al., 130): Quod autem hoc sit possibile mani-
festum est, quia positio est ad placitum, ergo secundum quod placet homini, potest in
mente sua dare vocem rei vel exprimere impositionem vocaliter. Sic potest de omnibus
aliis, de quibus cogitat et quae vult.
120 Roger Bacon, De signis iv.3 (ed. Fredborg et al., 131132): Si dicatur quod tunc avertemus
impositiones istas, sed nullus quidem avertit, quando imponit, dicendum quod ubi non
diligenter consideraret non bene averteret rationem et horam imponendi <nisi fieret
impositio sub forma imponendi> vocaliter expressa quia haec est prima et principalis et
consueta in rebus et linguis Et haec est prima causa latentiae Tertia causa est quod
non fiunt multum istae impositiones, nisi simul fiant enuntiationes de illis terminis, ita
quod non est tempus sensibile nec minimum inter impositionem et enuntiationem.
121 This, of course, does not resolve the problem with the circulum vini, where there is not
even awareness of the need of re-imposing the sign on the image of wine.
SIGNIFICATION OF CONCEPTS AND THINGS 91

Bacon also tells us that any assertion that follows an act of re-imposition is
necessarily true or false, because it necessarily indicates something that either
is or is not the case about the object of re-imposition. But if the assertion did
not follow from an act of re-imposition, it would not indicate at all something
that is or is not the case, because its terms would have no signification. In other
words, when the terms of an assertion have no signification, there is no asser-
tion at all:

It must be said that, if there is imposition, it is necessary for such sen-

tence to be true or false, and when we want to signify something true or
something false, it is necessary that we formerly impose and transfer the
utterance in order to signify.122

Hence, when no man exists, if the speaker did not re-impose the terms
homo and animal on something else, the assertion ohnea is neither true
nor false there is in fact no assertion at all.123
But, as a matter of fact, the notion of re-imposition makes sure that all our
assertions indicate something that we state to be the case, because whenever
we want to predicate something, we re-impose the subject on the thing we
want to talk about. Note that this has the unfortunate consequence of us deal-
ing with a different assertion at every act of re-imposition, which in passing
seems to hinder any possible explanation of human communication
succeeding.
To the Aristotelian idea that assertions go from being true to being false
because of an accidental change within the subject, Bacon replies that this
only applies to the case of accidental predication. In the case of essential pre
dication, though, if the significates of the terms change (e.g. when they go from
existing to non-existing), the assertions at stake, before the change and after
the change, are different assertions. Then, Socrates is is one assertion, and a
true one, when Socrates is alive, but it is another assertion, and a false one,

122 Roger Bacon, De signis iv.2 (ed. Fredborg et al., 129): Et dicendum est quod si fiat imposi-
tio, necesse est quod talis oratio sit propositio et sit vera vel falsa, et quando volumus
significare verum vel falsum, necessario prius imponimus et transsumimus vocem ad
significandum.
123 Roger Bacon, De signis iv.2 (ed. Fredborg et al., 129): Sed si non fieret impositio aliqua,
certum est quod talis oratio esset propositio neque vera neque falsa immo esset non sig-
nificativa; ab una enim parte non significativa fit tota oratio non significativa, et hoc
patet.
92 chapter 2

when Socrates is dead,124 without this going against the PoB, because in these
assertions Socrates is equivocal to a living man and to a dead man.
Consequently, thanks to his idea of re-imposition, Bacon does not need
different linguistic properties in order to explain the constitution of signs,
the sense of sentences and the verification of assertions. In fact, his account
puts forth one coherent notion of signification that, thanks to the idea of re-
imposition, can operate at the semiotic, the communicational and the verifi-
cational level. Note also that, strictly speaking, for Bacon there are no empty
terms, because once a term is used in the context of an assertion it has neces-
sarily been re-imposed on something. Rather, the weakness of his account is
that this idea of re-imposition seriously compromises the very possibility of
linguistic communication.

Boethius of Dacias Sophisma ohnea

Another solution to the sophisma is to deny that a term loses its signification
with the destruction of the thing, but to reject ohnea as false. Boethius of
Dacia is perhaps the most significant extant witness to this position. Boethius
divides his treatment of the sophisma ohnea into four problems, of which
only two concern us: (i) whether ohnea is true when no man exists and
(ii) whether terms lose their significates with the destruction of things.
As to the first problem, Boethius claims that the assertion ohnea is false
because of its modality; for men and animals are destructible things suscepti-
ble of change they are essences that inform destructible matter and hence
men and animals cannot be the cause of any necessary truth.125 Recall that this

124 Roger Bacon, De signis iv.2 (ed. Fredborg et al., 129130): Si obiciatur quod Aristoteles in
Praedicamentis <dicit> quod oratio remanet vera vel falsa, et mutatur de vera vel falsa, ut
Socrates sedet, haec est vera, dum sedet, eo modo surgente haec eadem est falsa, et ita
similiter Socrates est Sed si eadem est oratio, idem est subiectum, ergo idem est signi-
ficatum per vocem subiecti Dicendum est quod ibi loquitur de praedicatis accidentali-
bus, et quae possunt separari a subiecto existente, ita quod dictio Socrates remaneat
significativa (significativum ed.) eius, quod prius significabat Sed si accipiatur praedica-
tum quod inest per se et essentialiter ut Homo est <homo>, Homo est et huiusmodi,
non est possibile quod fiat mutatio eiusdem orationis a vero in falsum, sed erit diversa et
diversa oratio, et ideo diversum subiectum et diversum significatum subiecti et accipietur
aequivoce. Ut dum Socrates est, haec est vera Socrates est et Socrates significat vivum.
Dum vero Socrates non est et dicatur haec oratio Socrates est, haec est falsa, sed non est
oratio eadem quae prius
125 Boethius of Dacia, Omnis homo etc. (ed. Ebbesen, 7): Cum ergo homo et animal sint res
transmutabiles et corruptibiles et nihil sit in eis incorruptibile nisi materia primasecun-
dum quam materiam non verificatur ista propositio homo de necessitate est animal,
SIGNIFICATION OF CONCEPTS AND THINGS 93

is the argument with which An. Al. starts his discussion of ohnea,126 an argu-
ment that, as already mentioned, is based on a metaphysical constraint: No
event in the material world is necessary, therefore no necessary statement
about the material world is true.
Boethius also puts forth the following argument, which he grants when he
gives his own solution to the problem:127

(a) There is linguistic composition, mental composition and real composition.

(b) The truth of linguistic composition depends on the truth of mental com-
position (because the truth of what is posterior is caused by the truth of
what is prior; cf. Arist., Int. 1).
(c) Likewise the cause of the true mental composition is the real composi-
tion the support and the cause of any posterior truth.
(d) Therefore, if there is no real composition, neither the mental composi-
tion nor the linguistic composition can be true (from b. and c.).
(e) But it is impossible that there is real composition of man and animal
when no man exists.
(f) Therefore, when no man exists, it is impossible for any linguistic compo-
sition involving man and animal to be true.128

sequitur quod ex hiis rebus homo et animal nulla causatur veritas intransmutabilis nec
etiam necessaria. In: Sophisma Omnis homo de necessitate est animal, mss Brugge,
Stadsbibliotheek 509, ff. 87v91v; Firenze, Biblioteca Medicea Laurenziana Pl. 12 sin. 3, ff.
63ra64rb. Unpublished edition by S. Ebbesen. I owe thanks to Sten Ebbesen for having
given me access to his unpublished edition of Boethius of Dacia sophisma.
126 See above, pp. 8182.
127 Boethius of Dacia, Omnis homo etc. (ed. Ebbesen, 8): Rationes probantes esse falsam
concedo.
128 Boethius of Dacia, Omnis homo etc. (ed. Ebbesen, 3): Triplex invenitur compositio, scilicet
compositio quae est in re ipsa, compositio quae est in intellectu, et compositio quae est
apud sermonem, ita quod in istis semper veritas quae est in posteriori compositione est
ex veritate prioris compositionis tamquam ex causa suaquomodo erit compositio vera
apud intellectum nisi consimilis sit compositio in re? Si enim sit in re divisio et apud intel-
lectum compositio, erit falsa compositio intellectus. Ex hoc arguitur sic: Sicut se habet
compositio sermonis ad compositionem intellectus, sic se habet compositio intellectus
ad compositionem rerum; sed compositio sermonis non potest esse vera nisi sit vera com-
positio intellectus ex qua ipsa est; ergo nec potest esse vera compositio intellectus nisi sit
talis compositio in re. Sed nullo homine existente animal homini non componitur; ergo
nec intellectus nec sermo componens animal homini potest esse verus, cum deficiat com-
positio quae est in re, quae est fundamentum et causa cuiuslibet veritatis posterioris,
scilicet intellectus et sermonis.
94 chapter 2

Note that Boethius rejects ohnea as false based on a general metaphysical

assumption that the material world is contingent. However, his logico-
semantic argument only shows that it cannot be true and he is careful enough
not to conclude from this to its falsity.
Some pages later, Boethius claims that the objection, according to which
after the destruction of things terms signify the same as they did before, puts
forth a less than necessary argument, because even if their signification is the
same irrespective of the existence or non-existence of the things, signification
is not the cause of truth, but the cause of truth is that things are or are not
arranged in a certain way. As regards signification, Boethius accepts that terms
do not lose their signification with the destruction of things, because their sig-
nification does not depend on the existence of their content a term signifies
the thing itself, which is indifferent to existence and non-existence.129 Boethius
argument to support this position is based on the principle that signification
follows understanding,130 i.e. since it is possible to think of Socrates when he is
dead, it is also possible to signify him:

When the things are destroyed, it is not necessary that the terms lose
their significates, because the signification of the utterance does not
depend on the existence of the thing Likewise, whatever is possible for
the intellect when it understands, is possible for utterances as regards
signification; for whatever can be understood can be signified, and in the
same mode; but when the thing is destroyed, it is possible for the concept
of the thing to be in the intellect, as it was before; for it is possible to
understand the thing after its destruction; therefore [it is] also [possible]
to signify it, just as before.131

Thus, a term is significative insofar as its content can be understood, and this
irrespective of the existence or non-existence of this content.
However, the opposite is the case regarding propositional verification,
because the use of a word in an assertion entails the presupposition of its

129 Cf. Radulphus Brito in Section 2.1.

130 For this principle, see Section2.1.
131 Boethius of Dacia, Omnis homo etc. (ed. Ebbesen, 2021): ...corruptis rebus non oportet
terminos cadere a suis significatis; et causa huius est quia significare vocis non <de>pendet
ab esse rei Item, quod est possibile apud intellectum in intelligendo, possibile est apud
voces <in> significando; nam quod potest esse intellectum potest esse vocis significatum
et illo modo; sed re corrupta possibilis est apud intellectum conceptio illius rei sicut prius;
res enim post sui corruptionem possibilis est intelligi; ergo et per vocem significari sicut
prius.
SIGNIFICATION OF CONCEPTS AND THINGS 95

contents existence it is not possible to state a real composition or division if

there is nothing real to compose with or divide from something else.
Accordingly, Boethius rejects the idea that mental existence is enough for the
verification of essential predication when things do not exist. Man only exists
when the essence of man is individuated, and the mere understanding of this
essence does not suffice for verifying essential predication:

We argue against the solution in the second argument: If the essence of

man and of animal remained after the destruction of every man and
every animal, either they remain in matter or in the soul. Not in matter,
because when the man is destroyed, the matter of man takes an opposite
form Not in the soul, because being in the soul is not sufficient for the
essences of natural things to verify sentences, but it is necessary for them
to be in matter.132

According to Boethius, then, essential assertions about material substances

have existential import, and hence homo est animal and homo est homo
amount to asserting homo qui est, est animal and homo qui est, est homo.
Consequently, the non-existence of the assertions subject prevents the possi-
bility of its verification and possibly also of its falsification regardless of
whether the assertion is essential or accidental. Note, finally, that Boethius also
shows the tendency to relegate the notion of signification to the semiotic
domain, leaving it next to no role to play in propositional verification.

Peter John Olivis Quaestiones Logicales q.3

A last solution accepts that terms do not lose their signification with the
destruction of things, but establishes a distinction because of the equivocation
of being to dispositional being (esse habituale)133 and to actual being (esse
actualis). According to actual being, ohnea is false, but according to disposi-
tional being it is true. Peter John Olivi mentions such a distinction in his reply
to the question Whether the actual existence of the subjects and the predicates

132 Boethius of Dacia, Omnis homo etc. (ed. Ebbesen, 6): Contra solutionem secundi argu-
menti arguitur. Si omni homine et omni animali corrupto maneret essentia hominis et
animalis, aut ergo in materia aut in anima. Non in materia, quia corrupto homine mate-
ria hominis est sub forma opposita Non in anima, quia ad hoc quod essentia rerum
naturalium verificet orationes non sufficit esse in anima, sed oportet quod sit in
materia.
133 Dispositional being indicates somethings tendency or capacity to be in one way or
another, regardless of the actualisation of this tendency or capacity.
96 chapter 2

follows from the truth of necessary and affirmative propositions (Quaestiones

logicales, q. 3).134 Olivi introduces us to his solution to this question by putting
forth the common and reasonable position, according to which with being we
do not always intend to express actual existence. One example is when we use
est as a third adjacent (i.e. as the copula), in which case we usually intend to
express an essential relation and coherence between subject and predicate:

I reply: Some claimed that the truth of such propositions demands the
presupposition of the actual existence of the subject [i.e. Boethius of
Dacia] But some others claim, more commonly and reasonably, that
with the verb of being [i.e. to be], when it is taken only under the notion
of the copula, we do not always intend to signify actual existence, but
rather the identity of [the subject and the predicate] or their essential
disposition or coherence.135

With homo est animal, we intend to say that the notion of animal is an essen-
tial part of the notion of man, that in some sense man and animal are the same
thing, or that man and animal are essentially related to each other, rather than
to say that the men who exist are animals.136 Note also in passing that, just as
in Bacons case, Olivis treatment of the question highlights the speakers inten-
tion as a determining factor of the content of the assertions terms.137
Thereafter, Olivi relates that the sort of being indicated by est, when it is a
third adjacent, is commonly called dispositional being or being of essence.138
However, dispositional being and actual being do not posit two different onto-
logical statuses, but only two different ways of understanding an essence; for

134 Peter John Olivi, ql (ed. Brown, 344): Post hoc quaeritur: <An> ad veritatem propositio-
num necessariarum et affirmativarum sequatur actualis entitas subiecti et praedicati?
Utpote: An sequatur Homo est animal, ergo est actu?
135 Peter John Olivi, ql (ed. Brown, 344): Respondeo: Quidam dixerunt quod ad veritatem
huiusmodi propositionum praeexigitur praesuppositio actualis exsistentiae subiecti
Alii vero communius et rationabilius dicunt quod per verbum essendi quando sumitur
sub sola ratione copulativae duorum non semper intendimus significare exsistentiam
actualem, sed potius eorum identitatem sive essentialem habitudinem et cohaerentiam.
136 Cf. Peter John Olivi, ql (ed. Brown, 344345): Unde cum dicimus Homo est animal non
intendimus dicere quod homo sit actu animal, sed solum quod animalis ratio sic cohaeret
rationi hominis quod est pars eius, et aliquo modo sunt idem.
137 See Section2.1 and Mora-Mrquez, Pragmatics in Peter John Olivi.
138 Peter John Olivi, ql (ed. Brown, 345): Et esse sic acceptum per modum solius copulae
vocatur a quibusdam esse habituale vel esse essentiae.
SIGNIFICATION OF CONCEPTS AND THINGS 97

dispositional being is attributed to the essence only insofar as it is susceptible

of being understood without its actual existence:

Regarding the third [argument], the reply is twofold: First, dispositional

being is different from actual being, however not really, as if there were
diverse real beings in things that exist, but they are different only accord-
ing to different notions or modes, because the thing has dispositional
being insofar as it can be understood without the simultaneous under-
standing of its actual existence. Hence, the first notion or the first mode
of being can be grasped by the intellect without the second one; for just
as the notion of the essence is different from the notion of its actual exis-
tence, without this entailing any real composition or difference, in the
same way dispositional being is different from actual being, because the
first concerns only the notion of the essence and of its essential [proper-
ties] as it goes together with the notion of actual existence.139

This is to say that the intellect attributes dispositional being to an essence,

when the essence is understood without its actual existence, without this
entailing that there is a real difference and a real composition between actual
being and dispositional being. The only ontological realm of essences is actual
being, the dispositional one being only a mode of understanding them.
Accordingly, since it is possible to consider the essence in this way, it is also
possible to talk about it in this way, i.e. without existential import.
Olivi goes on to introduce two modes of approaching actual existence: a
nominal or essential mode and a verbal mode. The nominal mode is when we
understand the definition of an actual being but separate that definition from
its existence. The verbal mode is when with a verb we express explicitly that an
essence has actual existence:

Second, it is said that actual being can be taken in two ways: In one way
in the nominal mode, i.e. in the mode of the quidity, just as when we

139 Peter John Olivi, ql (ed. Brown, 345): Ad tertium dupliciter respondetur: Primo, quod
esse habituale differt ab esse actuali, non quidem realiter, quasi sint diversa esse realia in
rebus exsistentia, sed solum differunt secundum diversas rationes sive modos, quia esse
habituale convenit rei prout est intelligibilis absque cointelligentia suae actualis exsisten-
tiae. Et ideo prima ratio sive primus modus essendi potest ab intellectu accipi absque
secunda. Sicut enim differt ratio essentiae a ratione suae actualis exsistentiae absque hoc
quod inter se habeant aliquam differentiam vel compositionem realem, sic differt esse
habituale ab esse actuali, quia primum esse respicit solam rationem essentiam et suorum
essentialium in quantum se tenent cum ratione exsistentiae actualis.
98 chapter 2

understand the notion of any actual being, even though it is not actual, or
even though this knowledge does not include its being actual. The dispo-
sitional being of essential terms is taken in this way, because when some-
one knows the notion of man or of animal, he truly knows the notion
of being and the notion of its essential being, but in the mode of the
quidity he knows what they express and which notions they involve
even though from this [notion] he does not know that they are actual or
does not believe that they will be. In another way, in the verbal mode
[being] is taken to be actual, insofar as [the notion] is known and said to
be actually in things.140

Even in the case that a man actually exists, the name man only indicates his
essential features but not his actual existence and the mere knowledge of the
essence that allows someone to understand the term man does not involve
the knowledge of its present or future existence. By contrast, the verb est in
the assertion homo est a man exists explicitly indicates the actual exis-
tence of an individual of man. Yet, according to the most common way in
which we understand and use the assertion man is animal, we do not intend
to express actual existence, as we do when we utter a man is an actual animal.141
Consequently, Olivi would claim that man is animal is true, because most
commonly with this assertion we intend to speak about the dispositional being
of man, unless it is somehow evident that we intend to express its actual exis-
tence, in which case it would be false.

Anonymus Alanis Solution to the Sophisma ohnea

In his discussion of the sophisma ohnea, An. Al. raises objections to several of
the claims that support the arguments above the ones that show either that

140 Peter John Olivi, ql (ed. Brown, 345346): Secundo, dicitur quod idem esse actuale potest
dupliciter accipi: Uno modo per modum nominalem et per modum quidditatis, sicut fit
cum intelligitur ratio cuiuscumque esse actualis, quamvis ipsum non sit actu, aut quam
vis non cogitetur ipsum esse in actu. Et hoc modo sumitur esse habituale terminorum
essentialium, quia cum quis cogitat rationem hominis aut animalis vere cogitat rationem
entis et rationem sui esse sibi essentialis, per modum tamen quidditatis cogitando scilicet
quod dicunt et quas rationes in se includunt, quamvis ex hac non sciantur nec fore cre-
dantur esse in actu. Alio modo sumitur esse actu per modum verbalem prout scilicet sci-
tur vel dicitur actualiter esse in rebus.
141 Peter John Olivi, ql (ed. Brown, 346): A primo autem modo sumendi non sequitur iste
secundus modus. Et ideo secundum modum intelligendi et enuntiandi non est <idem>
dicere Homo est animal quam dicere homo est actu animal. The editor supplies
<aliud>, but the sense of the passage requires <idem>.
SIGNIFICATION OF CONCEPTS AND THINGS 99

ohnea is false or that it is not true without qualification (simpliciter). An. Al.s
own solution is based on two assumptions: (i) Existence is not included in the
signification the semiotic value of a word and (ii) there is a difference
between being of essence and being of existence.142
The first assumption is supported by the first chapter of Aristotles
Perihermeneias, where Aristotle tells us that names and verbs taken in them-
selves do not state anything, and by the fourth chapter of the same treatise,
where Aristotle says that attributes outside assertions are names, because attri-
butes by themselves do not state existence or non-existence.143 The second
assumption, An. Al. tells us, is a corollary of the first one, because if words do
not signify existence, they must signify only the essence.144 Words signify
essences, because they signify the same thing that their definitions signify,145
but they do not signify existence, because when the intellect understands the
essence of a thing, it does not necessarily understand its existence.146
An. Al. appeals to these two assumptions in his rejection of several positions
that can be compared to the ones taken by Roger Bacon, Boethius of Dacia and
Peter John Olivi. It is noteworthy, though, that none of the positions he rejects
correspond exactly to the positions put forth by these authors.
To the position that terms are equivocal to being and non-being, which we
find in Bacons rejection of Socrates est homo as true without qualification,

142 An. Al., ohnea (ed. de Libera and Gazziero, 344): In his autem rationibus et in aliis
sequentibus accipiam duas suppositiones. Prima est quod nomen de vi vocis non signifi-
cat rem esse, cuius est ipsum nomen etiam si res sua sit. Secunda est quod esse existentiae
et esse essentiae non sunt idem.
143 An. Al., ohnea (ed. de Libera and Gazziero, 344): Et ne suppositiones videantur impos-
sibiles possunt confirmari. Prima sic. Dicit Aristoteles primo Peri hermeneias capitulo
primo: Nomina igitur et verba <con>similia sunt intellectui sine compositione et divi-
sione ut homo vel album, quando non additur aliquid; neque adhuc verum vel falsum
est Item. In capitulo de verbo probat quod verbum secundum se dictum aliquid
significet et subiungit sed si est vel non est nondum significat, nec enim significat est
res esse vel non esse si <hoc> ipsum est purum dixeris: ipsum quoque nihil est etc.. Cf.
above, Section1.1.
144 An. Al., ohnea (ed. de Libera and Gazziero, 345346): Secunda suppositio sequitur ex
ista directe, quia si nomen non significat esse existentiae eius cuius est nomen, ut osten-
sum est, significat autem esse essentiae, sequitur quod esse essentiae et esse existentiae
eius non sunt idem. An. Al. is silent about whether the difference between being of
essence and being of existence amounts to two different ontological statuses of things.
145 Cf. Arist., Met. vii.5.1031a1213; cf. Auctoritates Aristotelis 1, n. 163 (ed. Hamesse, 129:80).
146 An. Al., ohnea (ed. de Libera and Gazziero, 346): Quod autem significet esse essentiae
eius patet quia significat idem quod sua definitio Item. Intellectus apprehendens rei
essentiam non apprehendit necessario eius existentiam.
100 chapter 2

An. Al. opposes that this goes against Aristotle in the Categories,147 where
Aristotle allegedly claims that an assertion goes from being true to being false,
because of an alteration within the subject. Consequently, an assertion and its
contradictory (e.g. Cesar exists and Cesar does not exist) could be true simul-
taneously if for instance Cesar in each assertion happens to signify two differ-
ent things (one that exists and another that does not exist).148 Recall, however,
that for Bacon the Aristotelian tenet does not hold for assertions of the kind
X est, which he takes to be essential and involving the equivocation of the
subject when it stands for something existing at one time and non-existing at
another. The reason is that assertions with equivocal subjects do not comply
with the PoB, precisely because the subject is different in the assertion and in
its negation, and hence An. Al.s argument against Bacons position does not
seem to be conclusive. The following objection, though, is sounder:

What was said first, that the name man signifies a living man, when a
man exists, but a dead man, when no man exists [things] of which
man is said equivocally is of little or no value. In fact, [man] always
signifies a living man, because it is impossible to signify or to understand
man without life, because soul and life are the same. But when a man
does not exist or is dead, the name man does not signify this.149

Man signifies univocally the living man, whether existing or non-existing,

because humanity includes life in its definition as an essential property (since
to be animal is to have life and to be a man is to be a rational animal). In this
way, the permanence of the subject in the essential predication man is an ani-
mal is maintained, and this regardless of whether there are men or not. From
the perspective of human communication, this is certainly preferable to

147 Cf. Arist., Cat. 5.4a21b13.

148 An. Al., ohnea (ed. de Libera and Gazziero, 349): Item. ...in se falsa est. Dicit enim
Aristoteles quod oratio manens una et eadem numero mutatur a veritate in falsitatem
secundum rei mutationem. Cum ergo haec Caesar est sit vera Caesare existente, illa re
mutata manens eadem numero erit falsa. Non autem manet eadem numero nisi enuntiet
idem numero et de eo eodem numero et, si ita sit, hoc nomen Caesar univoce supponet
in una et in alia.
149 An. Al., ohnea (ed. de Libera and Gazziero, 351): Quod autem dicebatur primo quod hoc
nomen homo homine existente significat hominem vivum, nullo autem homine exis-
tente significat hominem mortuum, de quibus dicitur homo aequivoce, modicam \aut/
nullam habet proprietatem. Significat enim semper hominem vivum, quia impossibile est
hominem significari vel intelligi sine vita, quia anima et vita sunt eadem. Si autem contin-
gat hominem non esse vel mortuum esse, tamen hoc nomen non significat.
SIGNIFICATION OF CONCEPTS AND THINGS 101

Bacons cumbersome position of having a different statement at every utter-

ance of man is an animal.
We saw that the position that words lose their signification with the destruc-
tion of the things they signify cannot be fairly attributed to Bacon without
some qualifications. On the other hand, however, An. Al. rejects this position
as something similar to madness and beyond all madness, because anyone
who hears a word that signifies something non-existing, but which she none-
theless understands, will know the word has signification for her regardless of
the existence or non-existence of its content.150
The following is suggested as the cornerstone of an argument that several
authors from the second half of the thirteenth century put forth in favour of the
permanence of the words signification when things do not exist: To signify is to
provoke the formation of a thought, so that whatever can be understood can
also be signified, and this from the point of view of both the speaker (who can
speak about whatever she can understand) and the listener (for whom any word
that evokes an understanding is significative). As Michael of Marbais explains,
we can evoke the understanding of something that does not exist anymore
thanks to its image (phantasma), which remains in the intellect even when
things are not before the senses and which is the starting point of understand-
ing. Thanks to this image and to the action of the agent intellect, concepts can
be evoked as the intellect wishes, so that the relation of signification between a
word and an essence is not destroyed with the destruction of external things:

It must be known diligently that when the things are destroyed, the images
remain, as is evident from De anima ii. Hence, when sense-objects are
gone, the images (i.e. the phantasmata) remain Whence, since the rela-
tion of understanding remains in the intellect when the thing is destroyed,
thanks to the action of the agent intellect over the images, as it was said, the
relation of signification can also remain in the word after the destruction of
the thing according to its existence Whoever listens to the word Cesar,
grasps some real nature and has a real concept of the thing, as if Cesar really
existed. And thus this argument makes it evident that the word remains,
when the significate is destroyed according to its real existence.151

150 An. Al., ohnea (ed. de Libera and Gazziero, 342): sic videtur de ista positione quod sit
similis dementiae et ultra omnes dementias, quia nec laicus, nec clericus, nec demens,
nec sapiens in tantum egressus est quin nomine rei praeterita, quam cognovit, si ipsum
audiat, moveatur in anima sua.
151 Michael of Marbais, Summa (ed. Kelly, 1011): ...sciendum est diligenter quod rebus cor-
ruptis remanent phantasmata, ut patet in secundo De anima. Unde abeuntibus sensibili-
bus remanent imaginationes et phantasiae Et ideo cum ratio intelligendi re corrupta in
102 chapter 2

Radulphus Brito introduces further qualifications to this idea. On the one

hand, he agrees that the signification of a word is determined by what is under-
stood through the word, which remains the same whether the thing exists or
not, because the image (phantasma) of the thing remains the same whether
the thing exists or not.152 However, this does not amount to saying that the
essence remains the same when all its instantiations are destroyed. Instead,
this only means that the essence qua object of understanding, and hence qua
significate the essence without any consideration of its actual existence
remains the same. However, the essence qua essence is destroyed when all its
instantiations are destroyed, because its mental existence or its existence as an
object of understanding is not a proper ontological status:

The significate of the utterance is not the same when the thing exists and
when it does not exist, because the significate of the utterance is the
quidity of the thing, i.e. its essence. But [the essence] is not the same
when the thing exists or when it does not exist, because when the thing
does not exist the essence is destroyedhence, when the thing is
destroyed, the essence of the thing does not remain, as some people say;
for it does not remain in the soul, because being in the soul is[being] in
a certain respectnor it remains outside the soulnevertheless, the sig-
nificate remains the same, because when I say the utterance signifies, I
mean the significate, not according to what it is absolutely, but insofar as
it is a significate153

intellectu remaneat per recursum intellectus agentis ad ipsa phantasmata ut dictum est,
ipsa ratio significandi etiam remanere potest in dictione post corruptionem ipsius rei
secundum eius existerequicumque hanc vocem Caesar audit, aliquam veram naturam
apprehendit et habet verum conceptum rei ac si ipse Caesar realiter existeret. Et sic patet
manifeste per rationem quod dictio remanet, corrupto significato secundum eius reale
existere.
152 Radulphus Brito, In Perih. (ed. Venice, 144145): Ad istam quaestionem dico duo, primo
quod vox idem significat re existente et non existente; secundo dico quod quantum ad
significatum vocis non est idem re existente et non existente. Primum declaratur sic, quia
illud quod per vocem intelligitur per vocem significatur. Modo idem intelligitur per
vocem sive res sit sive non sit; ergo idem significatur per vocem sive res sit sive non sit.
Maior patet quia significare est intellectum constituere Minor probatur, quia ubi-
cumque manet eadem ratio intelligendi manet idem fantasma in fantasia sive sit res sive
non sit; modo ex eodem fantasmate sumitur eadem ratio intelligendi; ergo eadem ratio
manet sive res sit sive non sit.
153 Radulphus Brito, In Perih. (ed. Venice, 145): Secundum declaratur sic secundum quod
illud quod est significatum per vocem non sit idem re existente et non existente, quia
illud quod est significatum per vocem est quidditas rei et essentia illa; autem non est
SIGNIFICATION OF CONCEPTS AND THINGS 103

It is then possible to make statements about things that do not exist anymore,
but that are still known, and those statements make sense. However, this does
not entail that an essence that only exists as an object of understanding is real;
for essences are real only when they are individuated in some material
compound.
Now, as to the equivocation of being with respect to dispositional being
and actual being, An. Al. replies that est indicates either actual being (when it
is a second adjacent) or dispositional being (when it is a third adjacent), but
never both at the same time in the same assertion. Est as a third adjacent in
essential predication always indicates a necessary relation of inherence
between the terms an essential disposition to occur together:

Furthermore, some people establish a distinction concerning ohnea,

because the verb est can express dispositional being or actual being. If it
expresses dispositional being, they say that it is true, if actual being,
false I believe that est can attribute dispositional being and actual
being, but never in the same proposition. Whenever it is predicated as a
second adjacent it attributes actual being, but whenever it is predicated
as a third adjacent with an essential predicate it attributes dispositional
being Ancient [authors] said that dispositional being expresses the dis-
position or inherence of the extremes, and not their existence; but to
express actual being is to express their existence.154

Thus, while Socrates is has an implicit claim of existence, man is an animal

has none, because the latter involves essential predication and, consequently,
is here only indicates that the notions of man and of animal are necessarily

eadem re existente et non existente, quia re non existente corrumpitur rei essentiaunde
re corrupta non manet essentia rei ut quidam dicunt; non enim manet in anima quia esse
in anima estsecundum quidnec extra animam manetet tamen illud quod est signi-
ficatum manet idem, quia quando dico vox significat dico significatum non secundum
illud quod est absolute, sed ut significatum est.
154 An. Al., ohnea (ed. de Libera and Gazziero, 358359): Praeterea alii distinguunt istam
omnis homo de necessitate est animal, eo quod hoc verbum est potest dicere esse
habituale vel esse actuale. Si dicat esse habituale dicunt quod est vera, si actuale falsa
credo quod possit copulare esse habituale vel actuale, nunquam tamen in eadem propo-
sitione. Sed quandocumque praedicatur secundum adiacens copulat esse actuale, quan-
documque autem praedicatur tertio adiacens cum praedicato essentiali copulat esse
habituale Sed esse habituale appellabant antiqui dicere habitudinem vel inhaerentiam
extremorum, et non existentiam eorum. Dicere autem esse actuale est dicere eorum
existentiam.
104 chapter 2

related so as to always have the notion of animal implied by the notion of man,
whether a man exists or not.
The same distinction between is as a second adjacent and as a third adja-
cent could apply to the claim that the truth of man is animal requires the
existence of at least one man, an objection that would be more incisive than
the one An. Al. actually puts forth. As a matter of fact, An. Al. puts forth a weak
objection that is based on his supposition that names do not assert existence,
so that homo in homo est animal does not assert the existence of its
significate:

Some people who deny [ohnea] say that the name has the same signi-
fication, whether the thing exists or not; but they say that the name is
imposed only on things that are present, just as it was formerly said.
Hence, the sense of man is animal is always the man, which exists, is
animal. Hence, when no man exists, [the assertion] is false, not because
of the principal composition, but because of its implication that the man
exists, which is false.155

It is noteworthy, however, that Aristotles claim in Perihermeneias 1 and 3 that

names and attributes do not state existence indeed they do not state anything
at all only holds for names and attributes outside of an assertoric context, and
hence An. Al.s first supposition does not apply to words that are the terms of an
assertion. Boethius of Dacia, for instance, would agree that man tout court
does not assert the existence of man, even though he claims that the truth of
man is animal does assert the existence of at least one man, because the claim
of existence lies in the statement involved by the composition of the terms.156
After having raised all these objections,157 An. Al. presents his own solution
to the sophisma ohnea: ohnea is true without qualification and its proof by

155 An. Al., ohnea (ed. de Libera and Gazziero, 351): Alii autem negantes eam (i.e. ohnea)
dicunt quod nomen significat, sive res sit sive non sit, et idem. Dicunt tamen quod nomen
imponitur tantum praesentibus, sicut dixerunt priores. Unde semper est sensus huius
homo est animal iste homo, qui est, est <animal>. Unde nullo homine existente haec
erit falsa, non propter principalem compositionem, sed propter implicationem, scilicet
quia implicat hominem esse, quod falsum est.
156 I am inclined to think that Aristotle would agree with Boethius of Dacia on this point; see
Crivelli, Aristotle on Truth, Ch. 5.2, for a defense of this position. For the opposite position,
see P. Thom, On the Pervasiveness of Being, in V. Caston and D.W. Graham (eds.),
Presocratic Philosophy: Essays in Honour of Alexander Mourelatos (Aldershot: Ashgate,
2002), pp. 293301, at pp. 298300.
157 And many more that are not relevant for my purposes.
SIGNIFICATION OF CONCEPTS AND THINGS 105

means of Argument 3158 is granted.159 Recall, though, that Argument 3 presup-

poses the existence of at least one particular instance of man, which is what
the sophisma denies by hypothesis. A sounder argument would have been to
say that essential predication, e.g. in definitions, is an epistemic device that
states a coherence between notions rather than a blatant statement about an
actual event (even though a good deal of knowledge of the external world is
indeed needed in order to arrive at the formulation of a definition). However,
although An. Al. flirts here and there with this idea, he never formulates it in a
clear and open manner.

***

The medieval quaestiones we have analysed in the last two sections illustrate
well the extent to which the thirteenth-century notion of signification is used
in order to resolve a number of linguistic problems that, albeit related, are fun-
damentally different, i.e. the problem of the efficacy of human communica-
tion, the problem of instituting linguistic signs and the problem of propositional
verification. These three linguistic concerns came down to the thirteenth cen-
tury via some of the most influential authoritative texts of the period, namely
Aristotles Organon and Boethius logical corpus. In these texts, these concerns

158 See above pp. 8586.

159 When An. Al. grants Argument 3, he rejects in passing the multiplicity of forms, and
claims that, contrary to the species that adds a difference to the genus, individuals and
their species have exactly the same form. Since names are imposed thanks to the under-
standing of a form, the names of e.g. human individuals proper names are imposed
thanks to the understanding of the form of man, so that Socrates and man indicate
exactly the same essence the essence of man although in different ways. Consequently,
to predicate man of Socrates is to predicate the same thing of the same thing, so that
Socrates is a man is as necessary as homo est homo and even more necessary than
homo est animal; see An. Al., ohnea (ed. de Libera and Gazziero, 361362): Et iterum
individuum non addit formam aliquam supra speciem vel differentiam nec habet aliam
formam a forma speciei et hoc est quod scribitur quod species est totum esse individu-
orum; genus autem non est totum esse speciei, quia species addit differentiam et esse
supra genus, quae differentia non est in genere nisi potestate solum. Nomen autem impo-
nitur a forma, ergo cum individuum non habeat aliam formam a forma speciei, ut dictum
est, ab eadem forma et ad eandem <designandam> imponitur nomen speciei et individui;
idem ergo significant hoc nomen Sor et hoc nomen homo modo solum alio, qui modus
non est accidentalis ergo praedicare hominem de Sorte est praedicare idem de se, et qui
negat talem praedicationem idem affirmat et negat, sicut visum fuit prius. Haec ergo Sor
est homo non solum est necessaria, immo magis necessaria quam ista homo est animal,
et aeque necessaria ut ista homo est homo.
106 chapter 2

were already entangled with each other and closely associated with the notion
of signification. It is no surprise, then, that most authors from the thirteenth
century amalgamate these linguistic problems and jump from one to the other
in their treatment of these two quaestiones directly concerned with the signifi-
cation of words.
Notwithstanding, in dealing with the issue of whether terms lose their sig-
nificate with the destruction of things, Boethius of Dacia, like Radulphus Brito,
dares to introduce a notion of signification that accounts for the semiotic con-
tent of a word, so that other notions that are not signification but depend on it,
can explain further linguistic concerns. More precisely, in the last two sections
we have seen how Brito and Boethius of Dacia exclude the notion of significa-
tion from the problem of propositional verification.
The attempt to relegate the notion of signification to the semiotic level also
surfaces in the following and last discussion. As we shall see, towards the end
of the century masters of Arts including Boethius of Dacia and Radulphus
Brito no longer directly use the notion of signification in their deductions of
grammatical categories (partes orationis) and accounts of grammaticality, i.e.
the central tasks of the medieval commentator on Priscians Institutiones
grammaticae.
 PART 2
Signification in Logic and in
Grammar

 chapter 3

Names and Verbs in Priscian and in Aristotle

Priscianus Caesariensis Institutiones grammaticae (ca. 500 ad)1 was undoubt-

edly the main source for the study of theoretical grammar in the late Middle
Ages.2 His enquiry shares with Boethius commentaries on and translations of
Aristotles logical treatises crucial objects of analysis, such as utterance (vox),
name (nomen), verb (verbum) and sentence (oratio),3 and uses the explanatory
power of signification. Nonetheless, the role this notion plays in the grammati-
cal analyses of names, verbs and sentences differs in important respects from
the role it plays in the same analyses in the Aristotelian logical tradition. We
shall see how these divergences were also at the origin of important discus-
sions about signification in the thirteenth-century faculties of Arts.

3.1 Priscian on the Constitution of Parts of Speech and Sentences

Priscian begins his explanation of the constituent parts of speech words of a

certain grammatical category by defining the utterance (vox), i.e. the material

1 Priscian, Institutiones grammaticae (= ig), ed. M. Hertz (Leipzig: Teubner, 18551859) (gl iiiii).
For Priscians life and work, see the first three chapters of M. Baratin et al. (eds.), Priscien.
Transmission et refondation de la grammaire de lantiquit aux modernes (Turnhout: Brepols, 2009)
(Studia Artistarum 21), pp. ixxviii and 134. For a discussion of Priscians philosophical sources,
see S. Ebbesen, Priscian and the Philosophers, in Baratin et al. (eds.), Priscien, pp. 85108.
2 For the reception of Priscians grammar in the 12th and 13th centuries, see Baratin et al. (eds.),
Priscian, Ch. 6.2.
3 Priscians Institutiones was traditionally divided into two parts Priscianus maior (books i
xvi) and Priscianus minor (Books xvii and xviii). Priscianus maior deals with Latin mor-
phology and follows the traditional order of Latin grammars in that it introduces and
discusses the notions of utterance (vox), letter (littera), syllable (syllaba), part of speech (dic-
tio) and sentence (oratio) in a progressive way, it proceeds to the division of the parts of
speech into eight parts, and it gives extensive accounts of each of these parts. In contrast, in
De constructione or Priscianus minor, which is a Latin adaptation of books one to three of
Apollonius Dyscolus On Syntax, Priscian introduces the notion of grammaticality and illus-
trates in detail the possible constructions of different parts of speech that bring about a
grammatical sentence (oratio perfecta). The structure of Priscians Institutiones is basically
that of Donatus Ars Maior; see V. Law, The History of Linguistics in Europe. From Plato to 1600
(Cambridge: cup, 2003), p. 88. For a thorough description of the literary genre and the com-
position of the Institutiones, see M. de Nonno, Ars Prisciani Caesariensis: problemi di tipolo-
gia e di composizione, in Baratin et al. (eds.), Priscien, pp. 249278.

koninklijke brill nv, leiden, |doi 10.1163/9789004300132_005

110 chapter 3

part of oral expressions. Philosophers (the stoics4), Priscian explains, define an

utterance as a very subtle air that is hit or the proper sense-object of the ear, i.e.
whose proper feature is to affect the ear.5 This definition involves two aspects:
The first the substantial aspect states what an utterance is in itself (i.e. air
that is hit). The second the notional aspect states its proper feature (i.e. its
capacity to affect the organ of the sense of hearing).6 Priscians focus on the
proper feature of utterances their capacity to affect the ear can be explained
by its relevance when one is to account for the utterances place of privilege as
vehicles of linguistic communication: Utterances are of interest because they
transmit information (which depends on their ability to affect the ears) and
not because of their material constitution.
Priscian further provides us with a twofold, but not mutually exclusive, divi-
sion of utterances into articulate and inarticulate, and literate and illiterate. An
articulate utterance entails an affection in the mind of the speaker and its con-
tent is comprehensible (supposedly by a listener). A literate utterance is one
that can be written. Inarticulate and illiterate utterances are defined negatively
as not complying with these two conditions.7 Hence, an articulate and literate

4 Priscians grammar relies heavily on the Greek grammatical tradition, and most notably on
Apollonius Dyscolus On Syntax [Apollonius Dyscolus, De constructione libri quattuor, ed.
G. Uhlig (Leipzig: Teubner, 1910) (gg ii.2); for a translation, see The Syntax of Apollonius Dyscolus.
Translated, and with commentary by F.W. Householder (Amsterdam: John Benjamins, 1981)
(Studies in the History of Linguistics 23)]. Apollonius stoic-oriented grammar endowed Priscians
with a strong focus on semantic notions that is quite unique in late-ancient Latin grammar. Thus,
Priscians grammar carries stoic notions into the thirteenth-century linguistic discussions.
5 Priscian, ig i.1 (ed. Hertz, 5:12): Philosophi definiunt vocem esse aerem tenuissimum ictum
vel suum sensibile aurium, id est quod proprie auribus accidit.
6 Priscian, ig i.1 (ed. Hertz, 5:24): Et est prior definitio a substantia sumpta, altera vero
a notionehoc est ab accidentibus. Accidit enim voci auditus, quantum in ipsa est. This
twofold definition can be traced back to the stoic Diogenes of Babylon; see Diogenes
Laertius,Vitae philosophorum vii.55, 2 vols., ed. H.S. Long (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1964).
J.B. Gourinat tells us that the stoic division of definitions is related to the distinction between
a pre-notion (prolepseis) and a notion (ennoia), in that the pre-notion, just as the substantial
definition, identifies the sense-object that is the starting-point of an enquiry, whereas the
notion, just as the accidental definition, provides the proper feature with which the enquiry
in question is concerned; cf. J.B. Gourinat, La dialectique des stociens (Paris: Vrin, 2000), p. 53.
In this case, the substantial definition would provide Priscians enquiry with the sense-object
that is its starting point, and the notional (or accidental) definition, would provide it with the
proper feature that is relevant in a linguistic enquiry, namely the capacity of being heard.
7 Priscian, ig i.i.1 (ed. Hertz, 5:69): Articulata est, quae coartata, hoc est copulata cum aliquo
sensu mentis eius, qui loquitur, profertur. Inarticulata est contraria, quae a nullo affectu pro-
fiscitur mentis. Literata est, quae scribi potest, illiterata, quae scribi non potest.
Names And Verbs In Priscian And In Aristotle 111

utterance (e.g. arma virumque cano) can both be written down and under-
stood by a listener.8
A word (dictio) qua part of speech (which is an articulate and literate utter-
ance) is the minimal part of a sentence as regards its intelligible content the
minimal part that contributes to the intelligibility of the sentence as a signifi-
cative expression.9
Finally, a sentence (oratio) is defined as a grammatical arrangement
(congrua ordinatio) of parts of speech presenting us with a complete
sense.10 At this point, Priscian stresses that sentences and their parts are
presented in remarkably different ways by the dialectici (supposedly neo-
platonic and peripatetic philosophers) and the stoics, thereby introducing
the notion of signification as the distinctive criterion of his division of the
parts of speech. Different approaches to the signification of sentences and
their parts thus explain the varied treatments they receive in the different
linguistic traditions.

The Role of the Notion of Signification in the Division and Order

of the Parts of Speech
We have already observed how Aristotle regards only names and attributes as
necessary for the production of assertions susceptible of truth or falsity.11
Priscian briefly describes a similar position that he ascribes to the dialectici:

According to logicians, there are two parts of the sentence, the name and
the verb, because only the union of these [parts] produces a complete

8 There are also articulate illiterate utterances (e.g. human cries of pain), literate inarticu-
late utterances (e.g. coax) and inarticulate illiterate utterances (e.g. a rattling); cf.
Priscian, ig i.i.12 (ed. Hertz, 5:96:2). Note that, contrary to Boethius who follows a peri-
patetic tradition, in Priscians stoic background articulate utterances are not the ones that
can be written. For Priscian, for an utterance to be articulate it merely has to indicate an
affection of the soul, whereas in the peripatetic tradition to be articulate is to be made of
parts the very reason why articulate utterances can be written with letters.
9 Priscian, ig ii.iii.14 (ed. Hertz, 53:89): Dictio est pars minima orationis constructae, id
est in ordine compositae: pars autem quantum ad totum intelligendum, id est ad totius
sensus intellectum. Note that Priscian talks here of the dictio as the minimal part of a
sentence, but evidently he means that the dictio qua part of speech is the minimal part of
a sentence.
10 Priscian, ig ii.iv.15 (ed. Hertz, 53:2728): Oratio est ordinatio dictionum congrua, senten-
tiam perfectam demonstrans.
11 See above, Part 1, Section1.1.
112 chapter 3

sentence, and they called the other parts syncategoremes, i.e. consignifi-
cative items.12

Stoic logic, however, considers five parts proper name (nomen), common
noun (appellatio), verb (verbum), pronoun or article (pronomen sive articulus)
and conjunction (coniunctio).13
After noticing the discrepancies in the number of parts of speech in these
two philosophical traditions, Priscian concludes that in order to rightly deduce
the number of parts, one ought to look at the different significations of the
words that produce a complete sentence:

Whence, the parts of speech cannot be distinguished from one another,

unless we consider the proper feature of each [part]s signification.14

Signification is thus introduced as the distinctive criterion of his division of the

parts of speech. To be sure, Apollonius had already advanced this approach in
his On syntax, as his own modification of the stoic division of the parts of
speech. Let us examine this in some detail.
Stoic dialectics involves two aspects the study of significative utterances
and the study of their significates.15 However, at least in early stoic dialectics,
these two aspects depend on each other, so it is not possible to separate the
syntactic analysis from the enquiry into the content of language and its ability
to express something true or false.16

12 Priscian, ig ii.iv.15 (ed. Hertz, 54:57): Partes igitur orationis sunt secundum dialecticos
duae, nomen et verbum, quia hae solae etiam per se coniunctae plenam faciunt oratio-
nem, alias autem partes syncategoremata, hoc est consignificantia, appellabant. It is
uncertain to whom exactly Priscian refers when he talks about the dialectici, but we find
this analysis of the statement into onomata and rhmata as early as in Platos Sophist and
in Aristotles Perihermeneias.
13 Cf. Priscian, ig ii.iv.16 (ed. Hertz, 54:89).
14 Priscian, ig ii.iv.18 (ed. Hertz, 55:45): Igitur non aliter possunt discerni a se partes ora-
tionis, nisi uniuscuiusque proprietates significationum attendamus.
15 Cf. e.g. Diogenes Laertius, vp vii.4344. For introductory studies to stoic philosophy, see
J. Barnes and J.B. Gourinat, Lire les stociens (Paris: puf, 2009); Long and Sedley, The
Hellenistic Philosophers. Vol. 1 (Cambridge: cup, 1987); and J. Christensen, An Essay on the
Unity of Stoic Philosophy (Copenhagen: Museum Tusculanum Press, 2012); for an exhaus-
tive study of stoic dialectics, see Gourinat, La dialectique des stociens.
16 The detachment of grammar from dialectics seems to be at least as old as Diogenes of
Babylon; see Gourinat, La dialectique des stociens, p. 107.
Names And Verbs In Priscian And In Aristotle 113

Speech () is significative insofar as it indicates a content that can be

analysed into: (i) the incorporeal thing that is potentially indicated by a
sentence a sayable ( or 17); (ii) this very same incorporeal thing
insofar as it is actually signified by a sentence a significate () and
(iii) the corporeal thing that is the bearer of a name or of a sayable ().18
Complete sayables the ones indicated by complete sentences (e.g. assertions,
questions and commands) are compound, i.e. they have a subject and a
predicate.19 Such sayables, in turn, somehow reproduce the ontological struc-
ture of the world, which is ultimately constituted of material bodies and their
qualities, and their actions and undergoing of actions.20
The proper name, whose content indicates the proper feature of a body, and
the common name, whose content indicates a feature shared by other bodies,
usually play the role of the subject in complete sentences. On the other hand,
verbs indicate incomplete sayables predicates that are related to actions
and undergoing of actions.21 Finally, articles or relative pronouns and conjunc-
tions have, respectively, the functions of narrowing the extension of common
names and of attaching the parts of speech.22
Now, the completeness of sentences is independent of their truth or falsity,
which somehow explains how it is possible to focus only on the syntactic part of
the stoic analysis, leaving aside the semantic considerations. This detachment

17 It is called a insofar as it is a sayable and a insofar as it is a state of affairs,

although not necessarily an existing state of affairs; see Gourinat, La dialectique des
stociens, p. 117.
18 See Gourinat, La dialectique des stociens, ch. 1 and M. Baratin and F. Desbordes, Lanalyse
linguistique dans lantiquit classique. 1. Les thories (Paris: Editions Klincksieck, 1981), pp.
2634.
19 Cf. e.g. Diogenes Laertius, vp vii.64.
20 Actions and undergoing of actions are not considered corporeal things, but incorporeal
things, and hence an incomplete sayable can be considered a sort of mental counterpart
of an action or undergoing of an action, without considering its being actually performed
by any existing body; see Gourinat, La dialectique des stociens, p. 118119.
21 Note that while it is possible to have incomplete sayables that are predicates, the same does
not seem to be the case for nominal parts, which seem to occur always as parts of complete
sayables; M. Frede [in his article The Origins of Traditional Grammar, in Essays in Ancient
Philosophy (Minessota: Minessota Archive Editions, 1987), at p. 347] claims that nominal
parts are never taken as incomplete sayables. This fact would reflect the emphasis that stoic
philosophy puts on actions as opposed to the emphasis that Aristotelian philosophy puts
on substances. The question remains whether there are nominal incomplete sayables or
whether their absence results from an opposition between Aristotelian causality things
being the cause of other things and stoic causality bodies being the cause of actions.
22 Cf. Diogenes Laertius, vp vii.58.
114 chapter 3

of grammar from stoic dialectics is already fully achieved in Apollonius On

Syntax.
Apollonius passes to Priscian a stoic-oriented hierarchy of the parts of
speech that depends on the extent to which each part contributes to the com-
pleteness of a sentence. When giving his account of the constitution of sylla-
bles, parts of speech and sentences, Apollonius underscores the importance of
the order in which the different parts of speech are introduced;23 for just as
some letters are pronounced by themselves (vowels) and some need to be
attached to vowels in order to be pronounced (consonants), in the same way
some words are significative by themselves (e.g. names, verbs and pronouns)
and some are not (e.g. articles, prepositions and conjunctions). Based on this
observation, he introduces a first division of words into words significative by
themselves and consignificative words.24
Among the significative parts of speech, the name is prior to the verb
because it indicates a thing that is performing or undergoing an action and
that is thus naturally prior to this performing or undergoing.25 Pronouns follow

23 Apollonius, On syntax 13: Butits important to compare and justify the ordering of the
parts of speech. Perhaps someone, flaunting his own ignorance of such matters, may fool-
ishly urge that theres no need to bother with such investigations, suggesting that these
matters have been arranged arbitrarily and by chance. But such people can also propose
that, in general, nothing is ordered and there are no errors of ordering; but this would be
quite idiotic. (tr. Householder, 23). [
.
,
, . (ed. Uhlig, 16:48)].
24 Apollonius, On syntax 12: Furthermore, just as some phonemes are vowels, which are
complete sounds even in isolation, and other consonants, whose pronunciation is not
possible without vowels, so also one can consider words of two kinds. Some words are,
like vowels, independently speakable, e.g. verbs, nouns, pronouns, adverbs, when they
can be applied to actions in the situational context Other words resemble consonants,
and just as they require vowels, so these require the presence of some of the aforesaid
parts of the speech; this is the case with prepositions, articles and conjunctions. (tr.
Householder, 22). [ ,
, , ,
.
, , , , ,
,
, ,
, , (ed. Uhlig, 13:114:1)].
25 Apollonius, On syntax 16: The noun necessarily precedes the verb, since influencing and
being influenced are properties of physical things, and things are what nouns apply to,
Names And Verbs In Priscian And In Aristotle 115

verbs because they were invented for the purpose of accompanying verbs26
(of the first and second persons, that is); for names indicate third persons, and
therefore they can only be attached to the third person of a verb. Thereafter
follow the non-significative parts of speech in the order article, preposition
and conjunction.
On similar grounds, Priscian introduces the parts of speech in the order:
name, verb and participle, pronoun, preposition, adverb and conjunction.
This order, just as in Apollonius, takes into account the extent to which the
content of a part of speech contributes to the completeness of the sentence.
Thus, since things and their properties, and their actions and undergoing of
actions, contribute to the greatest extent to the sense of a sentence, names
and verbs are introduced in the first and second place. Thereafter come pro-
nouns that, Priscian tells us, can take the place of proper names and definite
persons.27 Finally come adverbs, prepositions and conjunctions, which are
not significative by themselves but contribute to the signification of the
parts of speech to which they are attached and, thereby, to the sense of the
whole sentence. Let us now take a look at the particular cases of the name
and the verb.

Names and Verbs and Their Construction according to Priscian

When giving the specific feature of the signification of names, Priscian claims
that:

and to things belong the special features of verbs, namely doing and experiencing. (tr.
Householder, 25). [ ,
, ,
, . (ed. Uhlig, 18:58)].
26 Apollonius, On syntax 19 (tr. Householder, 25): Someone could, I think, quite reasonably
object: why on earth shouldnt the next place after the noun be filled by the one word-
type which may replace it syntactically, i.e. the pronoun, since it, too, by substitution for
a noun, may combine with a verb to make the sentence complete? On this matter the
clearest evidence is this, that pronouns were invented for the purpose of accompanying
verbs. [ ,
, ,
.
, . (ed. Uhlig, 20:16)].
27 It is noteworthy that interrogative pronouns, e.g. who, are not considered pronouns but
names; for, even if they share the same declination with other pronouns, a word is not a
part of speech because of its declination, but because of the specific feature of its signifi-
cation; cf. Priscian, ig ii.iv.1819 (ed. Hertz, 55:1328).
116 chapter 3

It is proper to the name to signify a substance and a quality.28

Here substance and quality are not to be taken as Aristotelian categories, but
as a bearer and its essential or accidental features. Some pages later, Priscian
defines names in this way:

The name is a part of speech that assigns an individual or common qua

lity to any of the things or of the bodies that are subjects [of such a
quality].29

Although this definition follows in the footsteps of the Apollonian tradition,30

Priscian introduces a terminology that is not attested in Apollonius; for, instead
of mentioning bodies, Priscian talks about substances (substantiae), which he
then paraphrases as the things or the bodies that are subjects of qualities,
where things, as opposed to bodies, supposedly stands for incorporeal things.31
Thus, when Priscian says that names signify qualities, he means qualities
inhering in substances, reading here substance as the bearer where accidental
or essential qualities inhere.32

28 Priscian, ig ii.iv.18 (ed. Hertz, 55:67): Proprium est nominis substantiam et qualitatem
significare.
29 Priscian, ig ii.v.22 (ed. Hertz, 55:2956:1): Nomen est pars orationis, quae unicuique subi-
ectorum corporum seu rerum communem vel propriam qualitatem distribuit.
30 Apollonius definition is transmitted in scholia:

. (gg i.3, 258:2932) See A. Luhtala,
Grammar and Philosophy in Late Antiquity. A study of Priscians sources (Amsterdam: John
Benjamins, 2005), p. 89.
31 See also ig ii.v.26 (ed. Hertz, 59:1013) [where Priscian divides names into corporeal and
incorporeal]: Sunt enim quaedam corporalia in appellativis, ut homo, sunt etiam in
propriis, ut Terentius, alia incorporalia in appellativis, ut virtus, in propriis, ut
Pudicitia. Note that this paraphrase is coherent with Apollonius definition.
32 Priscians use of the terms substance and quality is not entirely coherent. In fact, in his
description of common names [Priscian, ig ii.v.24 (ed. Hertz, 58:1418): appellativum
naturaliter commune est multorum, quos eadem substantia sive qualitas vel quantitas gene-
ralis specialisve iungit: generalis, ut animal, corpus, virtus; specialis, ut homo, lapis,
grammaticus, albus, niger, grandis, brevis.], Priscian introduces a difference between
substance, quality and quantity that is supposed to account for the difference between
generic nouns and specific terms (e.g. man, white and big). But this use of substance,
quality and quantity seems to be at odds with his former description of names according
to which both man and white indicate substances with qualities. Moreover, he tells us
some paragraphs later that adjectives are a sort of common name that indicate a specific
Names And Verbs In Priscian And In Aristotle 117

The verb, in turn, is defined as a part of speech with tenses (temporibus) and
modes, without case, significant of action and undergoing of action.33 Contrary
to Aristotles attributes, which are specifically that which is said of a subject,
without any further precision of a grammatical category, Priscians verb is
already an achieved grammatical category that is the result of a very complex
development of the stoic treatment of predicates. In Priscians account, the
features (accidentia) of verbs include their genus vel significatio (active or pas-
sive depending on whether the verb indicates an action or the undergoing of
an action) as well as their tense, mode and species (depending on whether the
verb is of first imposition or derivative).34
Finally, concerning the construction of the parts of speech, Priscian gives a
place of privilege to names and verbs. This place of privilege is ensured by a
test that we also find in Apollonius: If the name or the verb is removed from a
sentence, the sentence is incomplete.35

quality or quantity, and that are attached to other names, generic, specific or proper, that
signify substances [Priscian, ig ii.v.25 (ed. Hertz, 58:1922): Haec enim quoque, quae a
qualitate vel quantitate sumuntur speciali, id est adiectiva, naturaliter communia sunt mul-
torum; adiectiva autem ideo vocantur, quod aliis appellativis, quae substantiam significant,
vel etiam propriis adici solent ad manifestandam eorum qualitatem vel quantitatem.] Thus
he separates substantive nouns (e.g. man, virtue and body), which indicate generic sub-
stances, qualities and quantities respectively, from adjectives (e.g. white and big), which
indicate specific qualities and quantities respectively. As Marc Baratin has rightly pointed
out, two senses of substance and quality are certainly at stake here. On the one hand, sub-
stance1 seems to be equivalent to the bearer of a quality in the sense of quality1, i.e. any fea-
ture by virtue of which a qualified thing x can be named by either proper or common names
(all the sub-classes of common names included). On the other hand, substance2 seems to fall
under the notion of quality1, along with quantity and quality2. Thus, general substance2, gen-
eral quality2 and general quantity are supposed to account respectively for the difference
between generic nouns such as animal, virtue and body, which are actually examples of
substance, quality and quantity in Aristotles Categories. Specific quantity and quality2, in
turn, are supposed to separate adjectives from other types of common names and to estab-
lish some sort of division inside the adjectives themselves. Thus, specific quality accounts for
the difference between adjectives such as white, grammarian and prudent, in opposition
to adjectives such as big, which indicate a specific quantity. For a similar analysis, see
M. Baratin, La naissance de la syntax Rome (Paris: Editions de minuit, 1989), pp. 387407.
33 Cf. Priscian, ig viii.i.1 (ed. Hertz, 368:12): Verbum est pars orationis cum temporibus et
modis, sine casu, agendi vel patiendi significativum.
34 For a description of the most important stages of this development, see M. Baratin,
Sources philosophiques de Priscian: classement stocien des prdicats, in Baratin et al.
(eds.), Priscien, pp. 139150.
35 Cf. Priscian, ig xvii.ii.12 (ed. Hertz, 116:511): Sicut igitur apta ordinatione perfecta redditur
oratio, sic ordinatione apta traditae sunt a doctissimis artium scriptoribus partes orationis,
118 chapter 3

Hence, just as in Aristotle, names and verbs seem to be the only necessary
parts for the production of a complete sentence. However, this would be a mis-
leading parallel because in Aristotles analysis a name and an attribute are the
elements necessary to produce an assertion susceptible of truth or falsity, and
thus Aristotles attributes involve a fundamental assertive aspect that is not
entailed by Priscians verbs. Since the possibility of producing assertions sus-
ceptible of truth or falsity is the essential role of Aristotles names and attri-
butes, Aristotles analysis focuses on the features that allow this possibility;
features of which the univocity of names and attributes and the assertiveness
of attributes are of the greatest importance. Priscians names and verbs, by
contrast, are the minimal conditions for a statement to make sense, but this
can be achieved even if the name is equivocal or if the verb is non-assertive,
e.g. when it is a subjunctive of wish.
While in Aristotles Perihermeneias the signification of concepts by names
and attributes is fundamental to explaining how they bring about assertions
that can be granted as true or rejected as false, in Priscians Institutiones the
signification of words is fundamental to the division and further definition of
the parts of speech. However, the role of this signification in his explanation of
grammaticality is far from crucial.

3.2 Names and Verbs in Aristotles Perihermeneias

In Chapters 2 and 3 of the Perihermeneias, Aristotle provides further condi-

tions for a name and an attribute to bring about an assertion that can be
granted as true or rejected as false.
Aristotle defines names as follows:

A name is an utterance that is significant by convention, without [signifi-

cation of] time, of which no part is significant [if taken] separately.36

In this definition, the expressions without indication of time and of which no

part is significant if taken separately refer to the distinctive features that sepa-
rate names from attributes and sentences (), respectively.

cum primo loco nomen, secundo verbum posuerunt, quippe cum nulla oratio sine iis com-
pletur, quod licet ostendere a constructione, quae continet paene omnes partes orationis.
A qua si tollas nomen aut verbum, imperfecta fit oratio; sin autem cetera substrahas omnia,
non necesse est orationem deficere. Cf. Apollonius, On Syntax (ed. Uhlig, 16:1217:1).
36 Arist., Int. 2.16a1921: ,
.
Names And Verbs In Priscian And In Aristotle 119

The feature of which no part is significant if taken separately, i.e. a feature

that names share with attributes,37 intends to show that names and attributes,
as opposed to sentences, are semantically simple and hence not susceptible of
truth and falsity. This feature is explained by means of an a fortiori argument:
If even a compound name is semantically simple, a fortiori simple names must
also be semantically simple. Aristotle considers the case of the proper name
, in order to show that its signification is not the composition of the
signification of its parts:

In fact, in , indicates nothing by itself, as it does in the

phrase .38

This name, which would be the crasis of (fair) and (horse), is in

fact a proper name for human beings. Hence, evidently what is indicated by
does not contribute directly to the signification of the word ;
for, when someone makes an assertion about , she only has a
man in mind and nothing related to horses or to fairness. By
contrast, she would have this in mind when using and separately,
as in the sentence . Therefore, since the part of a compound name,
as , does not contribute to its signification, a fortiori the parts of
simple names do not contribute to their signification either names and attri-
butes in general are semantically simple and therefore not susceptible of truth
and falsity.39
On the other hand, the lack of indication of time in names is better under-
stood in contrast to the indication of time in attributes. In Chapter 3, Aristotle
defines attributes as follows:

An attribute is that which in addition signifies time, of which no part

signifies if it is separated; and it is the sign of things that are said about
something else.40

He goes on to explain the two features that separate attributes from names,
namely that in addition they indicate time and are signs of things said about
something else. The opposition between the lack of indication of time in

37 Cf. Arist., Int. 3.16b56.

38 Arist., Int. 2.16a2126: ,
.
39 For compound names, see Whitaker, Aristotles De interpretatione, pp. 3745.
40 Arist., Int. 3.16b67: ,
.
120 chapter 3

names and the indication of time in attributes suggests that in the context of
an assertion, the utterance of a name amounts to a timeless expression of its
content. For example, if someone says health is good, the utterance of health
() within the assertion involves no indication of the time at which health
occurs. Now, if someone says Socrates is healthy, the utterance of the attribute
is healthy () expresses not only that health is the case for Socrates but
also that health is the case for Socrates at the present time.
However, when they are uttered in a non-assertoric context, there is no dif-
ference between names and attributes.41 In other words, the non-assertoric
utterance of indicates a sort of being, just as names do, but does not
express that e.g. being healthy is the case for some bearer at a certain time,
which is exactly what an utterance qua attribute does. Here again, an a fortiori
argument supports this claim:

For neither to be nor not to be is the sign of a state of affairs (),

nor if you say being alone; for it is nothing, but it signifies in addition a
composition that cannot be understood without the things that are
composed.42

Just as in the case of goat-stag, which provided an a fortiori argument for the
fact that the mere utterance of a name does not state the existence or non-
existence of its content, the case of the word being provides the following
argument: If not even the utterance of being indicates that something is actu-
ally the case, a fortiori the utterance of other attributes does not indicate that
something is or is not the case. In other words, no simple utterance in a non-
assertoric context can properly be said to be an attribute attributes are asser-
tive, i.e. they entail a composition with a subject of attribution that produces a
statement that is susceptible of truth or falsity (i.e. an assertion).
To sum up, the attribute is a significative part of an assertion that, in addi-
tion to its indication of a way of being, expresses both that this way of being is
the case for something else and that it is so at a certain time. By contrast, the
name, within or outside the assertion, always expresses a way of being, time-
lessly and neutrally with respect to existence or the actual possession of attri-
butes. Thus, right after having put forth his definitions of names and attributes,
Aristotle defines the assertoric sentence ( ) as a sentence that

41 Cf. Arist., Int. 3.16b1926.

42 Arist., Int. 3.16b2225: ,
. , ,
.
Names And Verbs In Priscian And In Aristotle 121

is susceptible of receiving a truth-value true or false because it is composed

of a name and an attribute.43 Thereafter, he defines the affirmation as an asser-
toric sentence stating that something holds of something else (
) and the negation as an assertoric sentence stating that something is
separated from something else ( ).44

It is clear that Aristotles definitions of names and attributes greatly differ

from Priscians definitions, because the two authorities approach these
terms with fundamentally different agendas in mind: While Aristotle intends
to set forth the features that allow words to bring about assertions that are
susceptible of truth and falsity, Priscian intends to determine the features
that allow words to be divided into different grammatical categories.
Consequently, the roles that Aristotles and Priscians significare
play in their discussions of names, verbs and sentences diverge in funda-
mental aspects. This does not come as a surprise if we recall that the main
purpose of a grammatical treatise in Priscians time was to provide a tool for
the textual reconstitution and literary analysis of classical literature.45 In
this regard, poetry has a place of privilege and thus such a task quite evi-
dently demands an assessment of the grammaticality and sense of the sen-
tences that are to be analysed and reconstituted, but has little to do with
their truth and falsity.
Thirteenth-century scholars had to read and comment on Aristotles logical
works and on Priscians grammar, and they had to deal with crucial terms with
quite different senses coming from ancient traditions with different approaches
to language. The medieval task was arduous, because of the lack of access to
the Greek sources and the subsequent ahistorical approach to authorities. For
medieval scholars this approach was unavoidable given their lack of access to
the historical aspects of the development of ancient linguistic ideas. The inter-
action of these ancient sources Aristotles logic and Priscians grammar also

43 Cf. Arist., Int. 5.17a1620. Note that being the compound of a name and an attribute is a
necessary but not a sufficient condition for an assertion to be susceptible of being true or
false. Cases of assertions that are the compound of a name and an attribute without being
susceptible of receiving a truth-value are indeterminate assertions, such as man is white
or contingent statements in the future tense, such as there will be a sea-battle. Cf. Arist.,
Int. ch. 7 and 9.
44 Cf. Arist., Int. 6.17a2526.
45 See de Nonno, Ars prisciani caesariensis, pp. 260268.
122 chapter 3

yielded scholarly discussions that greatly contributed to the development of

medieval linguistics in general and of the notion of signification in particular.
In the last section of this study, we shall see the discussions concerned with
the different uses of the notion of signification in logic and grammar. These
discussions shall give further evidence of the progressive transition in thir-
teenth-century linguistic treatises from a somewhat attached and conflictive
reading of authoritative sources to a more detached reading in which the
notion of signification finds a narrower field of application that of
semiotics.
 chapter 4

The Role of the Significate (significatum)

in Grammar and in Logic

Thirteenth-century commentators on Priscians Institutiones wonder about his

remark that the logician considers only names and verbs as parts of speech,1 as
well as about the different definitions of names and verbs that we find in
Priscians treatise and in Aristotles Perihermeneias. The medieval way of tack-
ling the issue is to read the different significationes that serve to define Priscians
parts of speech as modalities of signification and not as a diversity of semiotic
contents. However, there are still substantial divergences regarding the way to
use this modal approach to signification in grammatical enquiries and regard-
ing the role that the significate of the word ought to play in grammatical and
logical accounts e.g. in the definitions of parts of speech in general, and of
names and verbs in particular.

4.1 The Pre-Modist Tradition2

The early thirteenth-century analysis of the word qua part of speech is based
on the idea that linguistic signs3 words (dictiones) are a hylomorphic

1 Note that this question is also raised by Boethius, who says [In Perih.2 (ed. Meiser, 14:915:5)]:
Exsistit hic quaedam quaestio cur duo tantum nomen et verbum se determinare promittat,
cum plures partes orationis esse videantur Quamquam duae propriae partes orationis esse
dicendae sint, nomen scilicet atque verbum. Haec enim per sese utraque significant, coniunc-
tiones autem vel praepositiones nihil omnino nisi cum aliis iunctae designant; participia verbo
cognata sunt, vel quod a gerundivo modo veniant vel quod tempus propria significatione con-
tineant; interiectiones vero atque pronomina necnon adverbia in nominis loco ponenda sunt,
idcirco quod aliquid significant definitum, ubi nulla est vel passionis significatio vel actionis.
2 The most important studies on the medieval grammatical tradition are L.G. Kelly, The Mirror of
Grammar: Theology, philosophy and the modistae (Amsterdam: John Benjamins, 2002);
C.H. Kneepkens, The Priscianic Tradition, in S. Ebbesen (ed.), Sprachteorien in Sptantiken und
Mittelalter, vol. 3 of P. Schmitter (ed.), Geschichte der Sprachtheorie (Tbingen: Gunter Narr
Verlag, 1995), pp. 239264; J. Pinborg, Die Entwicklung der Sprachtheorie im Mittelalter (Mnster:
Aschendorff, 1967); Rosier-Catach, Grammar; id., Modisme, pr-modisme, proto-modisme: vers
une dfinition modulaire, in S. Ebbesen and R. Friedmann (eds.), Medieval Analyses, pp. 4581.
3 For an exhaustive study of the development of 13th-century semiotics, see C. Marmo, La
semiotica del xiii secolo (Milano: Studi Bompiani, 2010); id., Semiotica e linguagio.

koninklijke brill nv, leiden, |doi 10.1163/9789004300132_006

124 chapter 4

composition of utterance (vox), as the material part, and significate (significa-

tum), as the formal part, a composition that follows from the imposition of the
utterance on a concept its first articulation.4 A word is a grammatical part of
speech (pars sermonis) name, verb, adverb etc. because of its second articu-
lation, i.e. its modes of signifying or its consignificates.
Already in the twelfth century, Peter Helias5 wonders why names are defined
as words that signify qualified substances, even though some names, e.g. a
walk, clearly do not signify a substance at all. His way to tackle this problem is
to claim that, although words are generally instituted on a significate with the
purpose of communicating someones own will, words qua parts of speech are
instituted with further distinct purposes, so that different parts of speech have
different causes of invention (i.e. of institution or imposition):

The common cause of the invention of every word is for a man to have a
way to make public his own will to someone else. But we shall show the

4 Ps.-Kilwardby, Sup. Prisc. mai. (ed. Fredborg et al., 8485): Dicendum quod omnes dictiones
univocantur in eo quod omnes significant ex impositione, et ex hoc quod omnes constant ex
voce pro materia et ex intellectu pro forma Ad secundum dicendum quod grammaticus
non considerat dictionem principaliter nisi propter orationem; et propter hoc definit eam
per orationem, cuius est pars. Potest tamen definiri dictio per suum significatum dicendo:
dictio est vox primo instituta ad significandum, vel dictio est vox significativa ad placitum.
For the hylomorphic composition of the dictio and its Aristotelian origin, see Pinborg,
Entwicklung; and Marmo, Semiotica e linguaggio; for the Porphyrian origin of the notion of
imposition, see C.H. Keepkens, A Note on Articulatio and University Grammar, in Fink et al.
(eds.), Logic and Language, pp. 221238; Kelly, The Mirror, ch. 1; and Rosier-Catach, La parole,
ch. 4.1. For imposition, see also above, Part 1, Section2.1.
5 Early 13th-century commentaries on Priscians Institutiones are greatly indebted, both in
structure and in content, to Peter Helias Summa super Priscianum (ca. 1139). The two main
contemporary sources of Peters Summa are an early commentary on Priscian that comes
from the school of William of Champeaux (also called the Glosule) and the commentary on
Priscian by William of Conches (also called the Glosae). Helias is also a direct source of the
early 13th-century modal interpretation of Priscians definitions of the parts of speech; see
Leo Reillys introduction to his edition of Petrus Helias Summa super Priscianum [Petrus
Helias, Summa super Priscianum. 2 Vols., ed. L. Reilly (Toronto: pims, 1993) (Studies and Texts
113)]; K.M. Fredborg, Notes on the Glosule and its reception by William of Conches and Peter
Helias, in I. Rosier-Catach (ed.), Arts du langage et thologie aux confins des xiexiie sicles.
Textes, matres, dbats (Turnhout: Brepols, 2011) (Studia artistarum 21), pp. 453484; and
R.W. Hunt, Studies on Priscian in the Eleventh and Twelfth Centuries I: Petrus Helias and his
Predecessors, Medieval and Renaissance Studies 1 (1943), 194231; for a recent collection of
essays on the 11th and 12th-centuries schools, see Rosier-Catach (ed.), Arts du langage et
thologie.
the Significate in Grammar and in Logic 125

proper cause of the invention of each part of speech and of its accidents
when dealing with each of them.6

Accordingly, the words modes of signifying make them a specific part of

speech:

Do you know why all names are said to be one and the same part of
speech? This is because this part of speech is separated from the other
[parts] by virtue of its mode of signifying.7

In addition to the significate which is given to a word to make public a

thought a word falls under a particular grammatical category because of the
way in which it indicates this significate; a way that follows from a further par-
ticular intention at the moment of the words institution. Thus, we find in Peter
Helias the suggestion of an intentional cognitive approach to the significates,
which is at the origin of the different modes of signifying that determine the
different parts of speech.
This modal approach to the parts of speech is also found in Helias interpre-
tation of Priscians claim that names signify substance with quality: Names sig-
nify something in the way of a qualified substance; for, although some names
signify something that is actually a qualified substance, not every name does so.
The signification of substance with quality is thus understood as a modality
the indication of a significate in a certain way:

Therefore, every name signifies substance and quality. Not that every
name signifies something that is a substance, but because every name
signifies either something that is a substance or something in the way of
a substance with respect to a common or proper nature We judge that,
at present, this reading of the signification of names or verbs is to be pre-
ferred, as it suits best the proper feature of grammar.8

6 Peter Helias, Summa (ed. Reilly, 177:5154): communis causa inventionis omnium dictio-
num est ut haberet homo quomodo propriam voluntatem alteri manifestaret. Propriam vero
causam inventionis cuiusque partis orationis eisque accidentium tractando de singulis
demonstrabimus.
7 Peter Helias, Summa (ed. Reilly, 181:3840): Scis quare omnia nomina dicantur esse una et
eadem pars orationis, ita quod unumquodque illorum est illa pars? Ideo quod haec pars ora-
tionis distinguitur ab aliis secundum suum modum significandi.
8 Peter Helias, Summa (ed. Reilly, 196:3646): Omne igitur nomen significat substantiam et
qualitatem, non quod omne nomen significet id quod est substantia, sed quia omne nomen
vel id quod est substantia significat vel aliquid modo substantiae in natura communi vel
126 chapter 4

According to Helias, then, in the context of Priscians definitions of parts of

speech, signification is more properly read as a modality, i.e. as a mode of
signifying (modus significandi).
Helias modal reading will be adopted by most thirteenth-century interpret-
ers of Priscians Institutiones. For e.g. Ps-Kilwardby the claim that names signify
substance with quality means that they signify a qualified substance, where
neither substance nor quality are to be understood as Aristotelian categories
but as modes of signifying something as if it were a substance or a quality:

It is evident that to signify the substance is to signify something in the way

of what is standing and permanent, finite or infinite, whether it is a being
or a non-beingand the quality that is signified by the name is not the
category, as it was opposed, but a mode of understanding the bearer with
respect to a common or proper nature, or common or proper as it were9

The grammarian deals with things insofar as they are susceptible of being signi-
fied in a certain way, and not insofar as they are of a certain sort. Thus, the actual
essential or accidental forms that make something a particular sort of thing, as
well as its existence or non-existence, are irrelevant for the grammatical analy-
sis of names. Therefore, in Priscians definition of names, substance and quality
are not categories of being or of predication, but modes of understanding and
hence of signifying a bearer (suppositum) as if it were the holder of common
or proper features. Here again, we find in the phrase mode of understanding
the suggestion of a cognitive approach to the significate that is at least concomi-
tant to, if not the cause of, the mode of signifying that makes a word a particular
part of speech.
Ps.-Kilwardby goes a step further and tells us that the modes of signifying
are not only the principles of the division of the parts of speech but also the
principles of the grammaticality of linguistic constructions:

The general mode of signifying is the first principle, while the accidental
mode of signifying is the proximate principle, from the point of view of

propria Hanc vero de significatione nominum seu verborum sentenciam ad praesens

praeferendam utpote artis gramaticae proprietati accomodatam iudicavimus.
9 Ps.-Kilwardby, Sup. Prisc. mai. (ed. Fredborg et al., 116): planum est quod significare sub-
stantiam est significare quid per modum stantis seu permanentis, finite aut infinite, sive sit
ens sive non-ens Qualitas autem quae significatur per nomen non est res praedicabilis,
sicut opponebatur, sed modus intelligendi suppositum in natura communi vel propria aut
quasi communi aut quasi propria.
the Significate in Grammar and in Logic 127

the construction. Hence, one must say that in general the unity of pro-
portion or of likeness of the general mode of signifying (or of consignify-
ing) is the precise cause of grammaticality.10

The name signifies the content on which it is conventionally imposed a

concept as if it were a qualified substance. The verb, in turn, signifies its con-
tent as if it were an action or the undergoing of an action. Finally, the name
and the verb can bring about a grammatical sentence because their modes of
signifying are compatible with each other.
By the time of Ps.-Kilwardby, then, the modes of signifying have become a
central explanatory principle in thirteenth-century theoretical grammar. This
important fact also involves a modal approach to signification, where certain
intentionality is at the origin of both a particular cognitive approach to a signifi-
cate (a mode of understanding) and the subsequent grammatical approach to it
(the mode of signifying). However, this does not happen without raising a num-
ber of problems, namely about the possibility that logic which is concerned
with truth or falsity and grammar which is concerned with grammaticality
share some of their central explanatory principles, with signification under the
spotlight.
Ps.-Kilwardby indeed raises some questions about the different approaches
to language in grammar and logic and decides on a number of aspects where
the grammarians enquiry departs from the logicians. First, grammar and logic
have different principles (or at least they should have) because neither is sub-
ordinated to nor part of the other. They are in fact mutually independent disci-
plines with mutually independent concerns and principles.
The principles of grammar are the words modes of signifying and of consig-
nifying the causes of grammaticality while those of logic are common
intentions presumably the causes of truth and falsity. Hence, modes of signi-
fying and common intentions ought to be independent from each other:

The principles of grammar are not arranged with respect to the principles
of logic, because the principles of grammar are the general or specific
modes of signifying and consignifying of words. The principles through
which logic comes forth, and that it considers, are the common intentions

10 Ps.-Kilwardby, Sup. Prisc. mai. (ed. Fredborg et al., 9394): Unde modus significandi gene-
ralis est primum principium, modus significandi accidentalis sive consignificata est
proximum principium a parte constructionis. Unde generaliter dicendum quod unitas in
modo significandi generali aut consignificandi proportionis vel similitudinis est causa
praecisa congruitatis.
128 chapter 4

grounded on things, just as the universal, the particular, the genus, the
species, the cause, the caused, and so on. Now, the modes of signifying
and consignifying things and the common intentions of things are not
arranged with respect to each other, but they are rather separated, since
they have different causes.11

On the other hand, the concerns of each discipline also bring about different
analyses of the arrangement of parts of speech. In grammar, the arrangement
of parts of speech is considered with respect to grammaticality and its cause
the general modes of signifying. In logic it is considered with respect to truth
and falsity and their cause the significates (significata specialia):

Articulate utterance is said in two ways: in itself or with respect to some-

thing else. [Articulate utterances] in the first sense are the word and the
sentence; in the second sense the letter and the syllable. [The articulate
utterance] in itself is threefold: (i) the articulation with respect to gram-
maticality, which depends on the general modes of signifying; (ii) [the
articulation] with respect to truth, and this one depends on the specific
significates; (iii) [the articulation] with respect to ornament12

Accordingly, each discipline puts forth a different number of parts of speech.

For the grammarian every word that contributes in a distinct manner to the
grammaticality of a sentence is a part of speech, whereas for the logician only

11 Ps.-Kilwardby, Sup. Prisc. mai. (ed. Fredborg et al., 2526): ...principia grammaticae non
habent ordinem ad principia logicae, quia principia grammaticae sunt modi significandi
vel consignificandi, generales vel speciales dictionum. Principia per quae procedit logica
et quae considerat sunt communes intentiones fundatae in rebus, sicut sunt universale,
particulare, genus, species, causa, causatum et sic de aliis. Modi autem significandi res aut
consignificandi et communes rerum intentiones non habent ordinem sed potius dispara-
tionem, cum a diversis causentur.
12 Ps.-Kilwardby, Sup. Prisc. mai. (ed. Fredborg et al., 39): ...vox articulata dicitur duobus
modis: uno modo in se, alio modo in altero. Primo modo dictio et oratio, secundo modo
littera et syllaba. In se tripliciter: una est articulatio respectu congrui quae est quantum ad
modos significandi generales, alia respectu veri et hoc est quantum ad significata specia-
lia, alia respectu ornatus. See also Kneepkens, A note on articulatio. Cf. e.g. Nicholas of
Paris, In Perih. (ed. Hansen and Mora-Mrquez, 35:2436:3 and 38:2539:7). For the same
position, see also AnOx, In Perih. (f. 35rb). For significatio generalis and significatio specia-
lis, see C.H. Kneepkens, Significatio generalis and significatio specialis: Notes on Nicholas
of Paris Contribution to Early Thirteenth-Century Linguistic Thought, in Ebbesen et al.
(eds.), Medieval Analyses, pp. 1743. For Nicholas incomplete commentary on Priscian
minor, see Kneepkens, A note on articulatio, p. 230.
the Significate in Grammar and in Logic 129

the subject (de quo aliquid dicitur) and the predicate (quod de alio dicitur) are
considered parts:

To the first [argument] it must be said that the grammarian says that a
word is what by virtue of its signification produces a sentence. But the
logician says that words are only that about which something is said and
that which is said about something else. Hence, [the logician] says that
there are two parts of speech13

In fact, in order to produce a sentence that is susceptible of truth or falsity, only

a subject and a predicate are required.
Consequently, the significate plays different roles in each discipline. In logic, it
is the cause of truth and falsity, insofar as the significate is the bearer of some
internal features, such as actual existence, as well as identity and diversity. In gram-
mar, it is the cause of grammaticality and ungrammaticality, insofar as the signifi-
cate is the bearer of certain external relations that determine e.g. the different
grammatical cases (nominative, accusative etc.).14 Hence, there are more than two
parts of speech according to the grammarian; for the words significates can have
external relations that determine grammatical features in more than two ways:

It must be said that there are more than two parts of speech, grammati-
cally speaking, because there are several modes of signifying and under-
standing whereby there are more than two parts of speech. To the first
[argument], it must be said that the parts of speech are not there only in
order to signify an intelligible thing, whether it is or is not an entity, but
they are there in order to signify in different ways the same or diverse
intelligible things, or in order to signify in the same way several things
that are intelligible also in different ways.15

13 Ps.-Kilwardby, Sup. Prisc. mai. (ed. Fredborg et al., 85): Ad primum dicendum quod gram-
maticus dicit illud esse dictionem quod quantum ad significationem constituit orationem.
Sed logicus dicit illud solum esse dictionem de quo aliquid dicitur vel quod de alio dicitur.
Unde dicit duas esse partes orationis. Cf. Ps.-Kilwardby, Sup. Prisc. mai. (ed. Fredborg et al.,
89): Ad secundum dicendum quod logicus considerat orationem ratione suae significatio-
nis, et quia trahit illam a suis partibus, quae sunt nomen et verbum, ideo ante definitionem
orationis ponit definitionem nominis et verbi Sed grammaticus considerat orationem
proprie in quantum est finis ordinis dictionum per constructionem et in quantum est instru-
mentum loquendi. Note that in the first passage I paraphrase significationem as sense.
14 Cf. Ps.-Kilwardby, Sup. Prisc. mai. (ed. Fredborg et al., 95).
15 Ps.-Kilwardby, Sup. Prisc. mai. (ed. Fredborg et al., 104): Dicendum quod plures sunt partes
orationis quam duae grammatice loquendo, quia plures sunt modi significandi vel
130 chapter 4

Thus, the different external features of the significate explain the different cog-
nitive approaches to it; different approaches that in turn give support to the
different modalities of signification that are explanatory in grammar.
Thereby, it is also clear why names and verbs qua parts of a grammatical
sentence and qua subject and predicate are not quite the same. For in the first
case a word is a name or a verb because its significate has a mode of signifying
allowing it to produce a grammatical sentence, whereas in the second case a
word is a name or a verb because its significate has a different set of features
allowing it to produce an assertion that can be true or false.
It is noteworthy, however, that both the modes of signifying and the logical
features, such as actual existence and identity, are features of the significate.
Thus, through two distinct sets of features, the same significate plays a role
both in the explanation of grammaticality and in the explanation of truth and
falsity two accounts that are central to grammar and logic, respectively. Let
us see this in greater detail.
Ps.-Kilwardby raises and discusses the question whether the significate
actually contributes to the grammaticality of sentences.16 The question is
interesting; for, given that there is a modal approach to signification in medi-
eval grammar, it would also be plausible to consider the different modalities of
signification (rather than the significate) as the scientific object of the gram-
matical enquiry.17
In Ps.-Kilwardbys question, the argument pro states that a name demands
an inflected name because of the quality it signifies (according to Priscians
definition of names, that is). Therefore the significate of the name, namely its
quality, determines its construction with e.g. the dative or the genitive.18 The
argument contra states that truth and grammaticality are different features

intelligendi, propter quos sunt plures partes orationis repertae quam duae. Ad primum ergo
dicendum, quod partes orationis non sunt repertae ad significandum intelligibile solum sive
sit ens sive non, sed sunt repertae ad diversimode significandum idem intelligibile aut diver-
sum aut ad eodem modo significandum diversa intelligibilia et diversimode.
16 Ps.-Kilwardby, Sup. Prisc. mai. (ed. Fredborg et al., 95): Sed tunc quaeritur, utrum ipsum
significatum faciat ad congruitatem.
17 Indeed, this position was clearly taken in the modist tradition. See below: The modist
tradition.
18 Ps.-Kilwardby, Sup. Prisc. mai. (ed. Fredborg et al., 95): Videtur quod sic, quia nomen exigit
obliquum per naturam qualitatis dependentis. Sed illa qualitas significata est. Ergo etc.
Maior patet in hiis orationibus capa Socratis, pater Verbi est ubique maritus. Note that
Latin is an inflected language, and hence some grammatical constructions demand par-
ticular inflexions of the words involved. For instance, in an expression of possession, such
as Peters dog, the possessors name Peter will always be inflected in the genitive, in
the Significate in Grammar and in Logic 131

(passiones) of sentences and consequently they have different causes, and

since the significate is the cause of truth and falsity, it cannot be the cause of
grammaticality.19
Ps.-Kilwardby goes about the problem by establishing two possible perspec-
tives on the significate of a word. On the one hand, one can focus on the sig-
nificate as something of a determinate sort of being (e.g. a man, a horse, an
apple, white or just), which has actual existence or not, and which is identical
to or different from another sort of being. In other words, one can focus on
the properties according to which something can be affirmed or denied of the
significate. According to these properties, the significate is the cause of truth
and falsity:

It must be said that the words significate can be seen from two perspec-
tives: in one way as being or non-being and further under those differ-
ences that are identity and diversity, and thus it is the principle of what is
true or false, because [something is true or false] because the thing is or
is not etc.20

On the other hand, the significate can be seen insofar as it is externally related to
other things, and according to these relations it is the cause of grammaticality:

In another way, [the significate] can be considered insofar as it depends

on something else, such as to whom it belongs, for whom it is intended,
and so on for the other relations of the cases and thus it is the principle
of what is grammatical or ungrammatical21

Consider e.g. the word apple, whose significate is the concept [apple]. One
could see this concept as having an internal composition that includes (a) the

this way: Canis Petri; and in a sentence like the flowers for Peter, Peter will be inflected
in the dative, in this way: Flores Petro.
19 Ps.-Kilwardby, Sup. Prisc. mai. (ed. Fredborg et al., 95): Contra: Verum et incongruum sunt
diversae passiones, ergo habent diversa principia. Sed veritas habet ortum a significato
dictionis, ergo congruitas vel eius oppositum non habebit ortum a significato.
20 Ps.-Kilwardby, Sup. Prisc. mai. (ed. Fredborg et al., 95): Dicendum quod significatum dic-
tionis potest dupliciter considerari: uno modo ut ens vel non-ens et ulterius sub hiis dif-
ferentiis quae sunt idem et diversum; et sic est principium veri vel falsi, quia ab eo quod
res est vel non est etc.
21 Ps.-Kilwardby, Sup. Prisc. mai. (ed. Fredborg et al., 95): Alio modo potest considerari in
quantum dependens est ad aliud, ut cuius est vel cui aliquid acquiritur, et sic de aliis habi-
tudinibus casuum; et sic est principium congrui vel incongrui.
132 chapter 4

essential or accidental features of apples themselves and (b) the external rela-
tions of apples to other things. Apple is the potential term of a true assertion
by (a), but it is a potential part of speech by (b). In other words, different fea-
tures of the significate account for the truth and falsity of assertions involving
it which belongs to the logical domain and for the grammaticality or
ungrammaticality of sentences involving it which belongs to the grammati-
cal domain. Hence, to the argument according to which the name is of a cer-
tain grammatical nature because of the quality it signifies, Ps.-Kilwardby adds:

To the first [argument] it must be said that such quality can be referred to
the bearer in two ways: In one way, as to that in which it is, and this is [the
quality] of a being or non-being and it forms a unity with that in which it
is, and in this way [the quality] is neither a principle of construction, nor
of the demand [of a case]. In another way, as to the term to which it is
related, and thus it is a principle of construction and it demands cases as
the term of its dependence.22

So, quality can be understood in two ways: First, as an inhering essential or

accidental form, i.e. the sort of quality that can be predicated of a bearer with
which it constitutes some sort of ontological unity, so as to be the principle of
true or false attribution. Second, as an external relation, i.e. the sort of quality
that determines a relation to external things, so as to be the principle of the
grammatical construction of the name with other nominal inflexions.
Consequently, the same sense of quality is not at stake in logical and in gram-
matical principles,23 to the effect that different features of the significate deter-
mine truth or falsity, on the one hand, and grammaticality, on the other.

22 Ps.-Kilwardby, Sup. Prisc. mai. (ed. Fredborg et al., 96): Ad primum dicendum quod illa
qualitas potest dupliciter referri ad suppositum, <uno modo *** (ad id in quo est an sup-
plendum ?)> et sic est entis vel non entis et facit unum cum eo cuius est; et sic non est
principium construendi nec exigentiae. Alio modo ad terminum ad quem est; et sic est
principium construendi et exigit obliquos tamquam terminum suae dependentiae.
23 It is noteworthy that this approach is not taken directly from Priscian; for, as we already
saw, in Priscians grammar signification is only explanatory as regards the deduction of
the parts of speech, and not as regards the construction of grammatical sentences. The
sources of this approach go back to 12th-century grammar to Peter Helias and his imme-
diate sources. See Rosier-Catach, Grammar, pp. 196200; and C.H. Kneepkens, Grammar
and Semantics in the Twelfth Century: Petrus Helias and Gilbert de la Porre on the
Substantive Verb, in M. Kardaun and J. Spruyt (eds.), The Winged Chariot: Collected Essays
on Plato and Platonism in Honour of L.M. de Rijk (Leiden: Brill, 2000), pp. 237275.
the Significate in Grammar and in Logic 133

Ps.-Kilwardbys question is directly related to another question about the dif-

ferent definitions of names and verbs in logic and grammar; a question that is
mostly raised in commentaries on the Perihermeneias from the first half of the
thirteenth century and that echoes Boethius concern in his own commentary
about the different approaches to names in the two disciplines.24 We find the
question in the two recensions of the commentary on the Perihermeneias by
Nicholas of Paris, as well as in AnOxs and Robert Kilwardbys commentaries.
Like Ps.-Kilwardby, Nicholas of Paris tackles the question by saying that
logic deals with truth and falsity, whereas grammar deals with grammaticality
and ungrammaticality:

To the first [question] it must be said that regarding speech the grammar-
ian considers the grammatical and ungrammatical sentence [and] the
logician [considers] truth and falsity. Therefore, since an arrangement is
a placement of parts (in fact, order and place are placements of parts)
for a sentence is said [to be] grammatically arranged, not because it is
arranged in relation to other [sentences], but because its parts are placed
and arranged in the due manner whence the grammarian defines the
name and the verb insofar as they are parts [of speech], for insofar as
they are parts [of speech] they take an arrangement. But truth and falsity
come from the thing signified; for [they come about] because the thing
is or is not etc.. Hence the logician defines the name and the verb in com-
parison to the significate.25

Hence, grammaticality follows from a coherent arrangement of words, which

does not depend on the significates of a sentences parts. The truth or falsity of
an assertion, by contrast, depends on the significates of its parts, because its
truth or falsity comes from the truth or falsity of the compound thought it

24 Cf. Boethius, In Perih.2 (ed. Meiser, 32:1722): Vox enim quae nihil designat, ut est garalus,
licet eam grammatici figuram uocis intuentes nomen esse contendant, tamen eam
nomen philosophia non putabit, nisi sit posita ut designare animi aliquam conceptionem
eoque modo rerum aliquid possit.
25 Nicholas of Paris, In Perih. (ed. Hansen and Mora-Mrquez, 38:1524): Ad primum dicen-
dum quod grammaticus circa sermonem considerat congruam vel incongruam orationem,
logicus veritatem vel falsitatem. Quoniam ergo ordinatio est positio partium (est enim posi-
tio partium situs et ordo), dicitur enim oratio congrue ordinata non quia ipsa sit ad alia
ordinata, sed<quia>partes eius sunt debito modo ordinatae et positae, ideo grammaticus
definit nomen et verbum [et hoc est] inquantum partes, nam inquantum partes suscipiunt
ordinem. Veritas autem et falsitas est a parte rei significatae; nam in eo quod res est vel non
est etc. Ideo logicus definit nomen et verbum per comparationem ad significatum.
134 chapter 4

indicates. In other words, the grammaticality of a sentence is not determined

by comparison with another compound item from which its grammaticality is
taken, whereas the truth of an assertion is determined by its comparison with
the truth of the compound thought it indicates.
To explain this, Nicholas puts forth a double signification of words their
general signification (significatio generalis) and their significate (significatio
specialis); a distinction he applies to the case of names. A name is a grammatical
part of speech because of its general signification substance with quality ,
which is the cause of its construction in grammatical sentences. But logics
concern with names regards their significates (significata specialia); for names
contribute to the truth or falsity of assertions through their relation to the things
they signify:

To the other [question], it must be said that the signification of the name
is double: general, whereby every name is said [to be] a name because
it signifies substance with quality; and this general signification is the
principle of construction. Whence, the grammarian puts this one in the
definition of the name. There is also the specific signification, on which
the name was arbitrarily imposed, and the logician considers this one,
because truth and falsity come about thanks to this [signification]; but
[Aristotle] could not put it in the definition of the name, because it is not
unique but diverse in diverse names.26

Thus, all names, qua parts of speech, signify qualified substances, but each
name qua subject of a true or false assertion signifies a particular significate
that involves a determinate sort of being (e.g. the significate of man involves
the notion of being a man) and that is different in different names.
Along the same lines, AnOx claims that names and verbs qua parts of speech
signify substance with quality and action and undergoing of action; for these
are the principles of grammatical constructions. However, contrary to Nicholas,
AnOx is explicit about the modal reading of signification in these definitions:
The grammarian says that names signify a substance with a quality a qualified

26 Nicholas of Paris, In Perih. (ed. Hansen and Mora-Mrquez, 38:2539:7): Ad aliud dicen-
dum quod duplex est significatio nominis, scilicet generalis, qua nomen dicitur esse
nomen, scilicet quia significat substantiam cum qualitate; et haec significatio generalis
est principium construendi. Ideo hanc ponit grammaticus in definitione nominis. Est
etiam significatio specialis, ad quam impositum est nomen ad placitum, et hanc consi
derat logicus, quia penes hanc consistit veritas et falsitas. Sed hanc non potuit ponere in
definitione nominis, quia non est una sed diversa in diversis nominibus.
the Significate in Grammar and in Logic 135

substance because substances are what perform and undergo actions.

However, this does not entail that the significate of a name is necessarily a sub-
stance, but only that it is signified as a substance as something that performs
or undergoes an action:

To the other [question] that was raised, it must be said that for the gram-
marian the name signifies substance with quality, and the verb [signifies]
action or undergoing of action; but for the grammarian the name consi
dered in itself does not always signify a substance. That is, the name in
itself does not signify a substance, for instance whiteness [does not sig-
nify a substance], but a quality. However, when someone says: The white-
ness fades, whiteness is a substance as regards the arrangement.
Similarly, the verb in itself does not signify always an action or the under-
going of an action27

The anonymous master ends his discussion by putting forth the distinction
between general signification and significate that we find in Nicholas. The name
enters into a grammatical construction because of its general signification
substance with quality but it is a principle of truth or falsity because of its
significate:

The other question can be resolved by saying that the signification of the
name is double: general and specific. [The name] is the principle of the

27 AnOx, In Perih. (f. 35rb): Ad aliud quod postea quaeritur, dicendum est quod nomen apud
grammaticum significat substantiam cum qualitate, et verbum agere vel pati; sed nomen
apud grammaticum secundum se consideratum non significat substantiam universaliter.
Hoc est, nomen non significat secundum se substantiam, ut albedo, sed qualitatem:
Cum autem dicitur albedo disgregat, respectu huius praedicati disgregare<albedo>
substantia est in ordine. Similiter verbum secundum se universaliter non significat agere
vel pati. Cf. Peter Helias, Summa (ed. Reilly, 859:78860:100): Sed nota quod unaquae-
que ars habet modum suum loquendi. Aliter enim dialecticus loquitur in arte sua, et aliter
grammaticus. Dicit enim dialecticus quod non omne nomen significat substantiam quia
hoc nomen albedo non significat substantiam, sed qualitatem. Grammaticus vero dicit
quod omne nomen significat substantiam et qualitates nec est ibi contrarietas
Grammaticus vero dicit quod omne nomen significat substantiam cum qualitate, non
quod omne quod nomen significat sit substantiaet ita omne nomen dicitur significare
substantiam quia omne nomen significat modo substantiae, id est, significat rem ut de ea
aliquid dicitur et sine tempore, et ita significat substantiam. Unde Boecius in Commento
super librum Peri ermeneias: Omne nomen aut significat substantiam aut tamquam sub-
stantiam. Cf. Peter Helias, Summa (ed. Reilly, 861:22864:75).
136 chapter 4

grammatical or ungrammatical sentence with respect to the general sig-

nification, but the principle of the true or false sentence with respect to
the specific [signification].28

Robert Kilwardby, in turn, adds that logic takes names and verbs qua construct-
ible from the grammarian, but not qua subject and predicate; for the fact that
names are constructible because of their signification of substance with qual-
ity does not explain why they are subjects of predication:

It must be said that the different intentions of the authors account for the
diversity of the definitions. Therefore, in grammar [the name] is defined
through its essential parts insofar as it is constructible, because [it is con-
structible] through substance and quality; but here [i.e. in the
Perihermeneias] [it is defined] through its essential parts insofar as it is
susceptible of being subject And since in this science [i.e. the
Perihermeneias] [Aristotle] intends [to determine] about certain kinds of
sentences the assertion primarily and in itself whose parts are the sub-
ject and the predicate, and [since] all subjects fall under one difference
the name and all predicates fall under another the verb for this
reason here the division of parts concerns these two differences, but it is
not so in grammar.29

Hence, Kilwardby rightly stresses that in the context of the Perihermeneias,

name and verb are to be understood as subject and predicate the essen-
tial components of the assertion that is susceptible of truth and falsity because
it properly mirrors a compound thought that is susceptible of truth and
falsity.

28 AnOx, In Perih. (f. 35rb): Ad aliud, potest solvi dicendo quod in nomine est duplex signifi-
catio: Generalis et specialis. Et quantum ad generalem significationem est principium
orationis congruae vel incongruae, quantum ad specialem est principium verae orationis
vel falsae.
29 Robert Kilwardby, Not. sup. Perih. (P 68va; M 47rb; V 4v): Set dicendum quod diversa
intentio auctorum fecit diversitatem definitionum. Definitur ergo in grammaticis per par-
tes suae essentiae in quantum est constructibile, quia per substantiam et qualitatem; hic
autem per partes suae essentiae in quantum est subicibile Et quia in scientia ista inten-
dit de quadam specie orationis, scilicet de enuntiatione primo et per se, cuius partes sunt
subiectum et praedicatum, et omnia illa quae subiciuntur cadunt in differentiam unam,
et est nomen, et illa quae praedicantur in differentiam aliam, et est verbum, propter hoc
est hic divisio partium tantum in hiis duabus differentiis; non sic autem in grammaticis.
the Significate in Grammar and in Logic 137

In the second half of the thirteenth century, Martin of Dacia takes over this
idea and says that grammar and logic discuss names and verbs from different
perspectives: grammar insofar as they are the principles of grammatical con-
structions because of their modes of signifying; logic insofar as they are prin-
ciples of truth and falsity because they are susceptible of being subjects and
predicates.30
The same goes for Radulphus Brito, who puts forth a position not consider-
ably different from the positions of the first half of the century:

The logician is not concerned with the name insofar as it is an aggregate

of utterance, significate and mode of signifying, but as such [the name]
concerns the grammarian And for this reason the grammarian defines
the name as a part of speech, because he considers it in itself insofar as it
is constructible through its mode of signifying; mode of signifying that
makes the parts be parts. But the logician considers the same name, as it
is an extreme about which something that signifies such notion can be
verified; hence the logician says that [the name] is a significative utter-
ance. Therefore, the utterance and the notion of signification are essen-
tial parts of the name, as it concerns the logician.31

Therefore, for the logician, a word is a name if it singles out a subject of predi-
cation, and this is why Aristotle claims in the Perihermeneias that inflected
names are not names; for they fail to meet this requirement and hence cannot
produce assertions that are susceptible of being true or false. However, not
only are inflected names not names in logic, but also some words that are not
names in grammar are names in logic. For instance, in the assertion to eat

30 Martin of Dacia, In Perih. (ed. Roos, 254:2024): Ad primam quaestionem dicendum est,
quod ad logicum pertinet et cetera. Cuius ratio est: nam ad logicum pertinet determinare
de omni eo, cui applicata est ratio logica. Sed nomen et verbum sunt huiusmodi. Potest
enim eis applicari ratio subicibilis et praedicabilis. Martin of Dacia, In Perih. (ed. Roos,
254:30255:3): Nam grammaticus considerat nomen et verbum, prout habent modum
significandi, qui est principium constructionis congruae vel incongruae.
31 Radulphus Brito, In Perih. (ed. Venice, 146a147a): nomen non pertinet ad logicum ut
aggregat in se vocem, significatum et modum significandi, sed sic pertinet ad grammati-
cum Et propter hoc dicit grammaticus nomen definiendo: nomen est pars orationis,
quia ipsum per se considerat prout est constructibile (communicabile inc.) per modum
significandi, qui modus significandi facit partes esse partes. Logicus autem considerat
ipsum nomen ut est extremum de quo potest verificari aliquid talem rationem signifi-
cans, ideo logicus dicit quod est vox significativa. Tunc ergo vox est de essentia nominis ut
pertinet ad logicum et ratio significandi.
138 chapter 4

healthy food is good, the expression to eat healthy food is a name it is the
expression that singles out the subject of predication. In grammar, however, to
eat healthy food is in fact an incomplete sentence. Along these lines,
Ps.-Johannes Pagus tells us that, in logic, only names in the nominative can give
a bearer to the action that is signified by the verb, so that logic looks at names
only insofar as they indicate the bearers of actions and undergoing of actions,
because as such they can produce assertions susceptible of truth and falsity:

Third, it must be noted that the inflected name is not a name for the logi-
cian. And you must note that the inflected name, just as the name in the
nominative, is a name with respect to the general significate, because just
as the name in the nominative, also the inflected name signifies sub-
stance with quality. Similarly as regards the specific significate, because
the specific significate is the same in the inflected name and in the name
in the nominative But they differ with respect to the specific mode of
signifying Hence, the logician considers the name insofar as it renders
a bearer for the verb, because then truth or falsity are caused in the sen-
tence. Hence, since the inflected name cannot render a bearer for the
verb, and consequently cannot cause truth or falsity in the sentence, for
this reason the logician does not say that the inflected name is a name,
because the logician only considers the parts of a sentence that can cause
truth or falsity.32

Interestingly, Ps.-Pagus also claims that the significate, the general signification
and the general modes of signifying are the same in a name in the nominative
and in its inflexions, but that their specific modes of signifying are different.
Thus, the principle of truth or falsity is not the significate (significatum speci-
ale), but the specific mode of signifying that enables a name in the nominative
to single out a subject of predication. Ps.-Pagus use of a specific mode of

32 Ps.-Pagus, Scriptum super librum Perihermeneias (MS Padova Bibl. Univ. 1589 (= P), ff.
82r93r, f. 70vb): Tertio notandum quod nomen obliquum non est nomen quoad logi-
cum. Et debetis notare quod nomen obliquum est nomen sicut rectum quoad significa-
tum generale, quoniam sicut rectum significat substantiam cum qualitate, et obliquum;
similiter quantum ad significatum speciale, quoniam idem est significatum speciale in
recto et obliquo Sed differunt quantum ad modum significandi specialem Unde cum
logicus consideret nomen inquantum reddit suppositum verbo, quoniam tunc causatur
veritas vel falsitas in oratione, cum igitur obliquum non possit reddere suppositum verbo,
et per consequens non causare veritatem vel falsitatem in oratione, ideo logicus non dicit
obliquum esse nomen, quoniam logicus considerat partes orationis solum quae possunt
causare veritatem vel falsitatem in oratione.
the Significate in Grammar and in Logic 139

signifying as a logical principle of truth and falsity stands out as exceptional

with respect to comparable commentaries. For, on the one hand, it diverges
from grammars where the specific mode of signifying accounts for certain sub-
divisions within a part of speech (e.g. the internal division of names into
proper names and common names); on the other hand, it diverges from
authors such as Robert Kilwardby, Ps.-Kilwardby and AnOx, for whom the
principle of truth and falsity is the significate itself and not a mode of signify-
ing. Note, however, that Ps.-Pagus way of explaining the difference between
onomata and rhmata in Aristotles Perihermeneias and nomina and verba in
Priscians Institutiones is strikingly interesting; for quite rightly he notices that
in the Aristotelian definitions, at stake is not so much what the onomata and
rhmata signify but how they signify it.33
The interest in the different approaches to names in grammar and logic dis-
appears in the second half of the thirteenth century. Some questions in this
sense are raised in the commentaries on the Perihermeneias by Martin
of Dacia, Peter of Auvergne and Simon of Faversham, but only tackled
superficially,34 and the problem is ignored by Duns Scotus in his own com-
mentaries. However, scholars from the last quarter of the thirteenth century
will discuss, and oppose, most aspects of the positions put forth during the
first half of the century, subsequently introducing new perspectives on the
subject matter of logic and on the role the words significate plays in both
grammar and logic.

4.2 The Modist Tradition35

Modistic theoretical grammar implements the earlier idea of a correspon-

dence between modes of understanding and modes of signifying; an idea that
accounts for both the distinction of parts of speech and the grammaticality of
sentences. But it also adds a further correspondence between modes of signify-
ing and understanding, and modes of being (properties of external things), in

33 See also Kneepkens, Significatio generalis etc.

34 These authors basically limit themselves to rephrase Aristotles own argument that the
inflected name joined to a verb does not bring about an assertion. Cf. e.g. Simon of
Faversham, Quaestiones super Perihermeneias q. 8, in Opera logica i, ed. P. Mazarella
(Padova: cedam, 1957), at pp. 161163.
35 The pioneer study about modism is Jan Pinborgs Entwicklung. This study was followed by
Irne Rosiers La grammaire spculative des modistes (Lille: Presses Universitaires de
France, 1983), by C. Marmos Semiotica e linguaggio; and by L.G. Kellys The mirror.
140 chapter 4

order to provide theoretical grammar with the sufficient external ground to

make it a science concerned with reality (scientia realis). Accordingly, masters
from the second half of the thirteenth century (we shall focus on Martin of
Dacia, Boethius of Dacia and Radulphus Brito36) are called modists after their
claim of a correspondence between modes of signifying, modes of understand-
ing and modes of being, which explains the division of parts of speech and the
grammaticality of sentences. Modistic theoretical grammar, however, has a
fuzzy process of development.37
In a first stage (here represented by Martin of Dacia), a word (an utterance
imposed on a significate, i.e. on a concept or thing understood [res intellecta]38)
is a specific part of speech e.g. a noun because of its general mode of signi-
fying.39 The immediate cause of this mode of signifying is a corresponding
mode of understanding the significate. Its ultimate cause is a corresponding
mode of being that is a feature of external things because it is in external things
as in a subject.
For Martin of Dacia, the modes of signifying, understanding and being are
notionally identical but materially different because they have different bear-
ers. The mode of understanding is a property of the thing understood (res intel-
lecta) qua understood as in a subject. The mode of signifying is a property of
the thing understood qua significate as in a subject. The modes of signifying
and of understanding are thus properties of the thing understood qua signifi-
cate and qua understood, respectively, and they correspond to and have real

36 Boethius of Dacia, Modi significandi sive quaestiones super Priscianum maiorem, ed.
J. Pinborg and H. Roos (Copenhagen: gad, 1969) (CPhD iv); Radulphus Brito, Quaestiones
super Priscianum minorem. Grammatica speculativa, ed. J. Pinborg and H.W. Enders
(Stuttgart: Frommann-Holzboog, 1980) (Sprachtheorie und Logik des Mittelalters 3.12).
37 It is unclear how this development took place in the time frame between Martin of Dacia
and Radulphus Brito, due to the uncertain datation of the grammatical treatises by Martin
and Boethius of Dacia. It is certain, however, that there are substantial disagreements
between Martin of Dacia and Radulphus Brito that can only be explained as the result of
a series of ruptures that took place in the span of 30 years that separate them. See also
Rosier-Catach, Grammar and Pr-modisme.
38 Martin of Dacia, Modi significandi, (ed. Roos, 5:1012): Ulterius intellectus volens alii con-
ceptum suum significare, rei intellectae vocem imponit, ut eius conceptus scilicet res
intellecta per vocem tamquam per signum exprimatur. In: Martini de Dacia opera, ed.
H. Roos (Copenhagen: gad, 1961) (CPhD ii). For res significata, see I. Rosier-Catach, Res
significata et modus significandi: Les implications dune distinction mdivale, in
Ebbesen (ed.), Sprachtheorien, pp. 135168.
39 Martin of Dacia, Modi significandi (ed. Roos, 9:2224): omnis pars orationis est pars per
suum modum significandi essentialem generalem.
the Significate in Grammar and in Logic 141

ground in properties that are in external things as in a subject their modes of

being.40
In another stage (here represented by Boethius of Dacia), the significate of
a word is often presented as the thing itself (res ipsa), which is the content of a
concept:

Regarding this, one must understand that in his speculation about the
things themselves and the modes of being that are their properties, as
well as about the modes of understanding, the [artist] is a philosopher.
But when he joins the thing itself to an utterance, thus making it the sig-
nificate of the utterance, making the modes of being be modes of under-
standing and the modes of understanding be modes of signifying, he
starts to be a grammarian41

Boethius of Dacia, however, makes it explicit that the modes of being are not
necessarily real properties of the actual significate of a word. For, on the one

40 Martin of Dacia, Modi significandi, (ed. Roos, 4:17:12): sciendum quod modi significandi
accepti sunt a modis intelligendi sicut a causa immediata. Quidquid enim contingit intel-
ligere, contingit et significare. Et a modis essendi accepti sunt sicut a causa mediata, quia
mediantibus modis intelligendi. Modi autem essendi sunt proprietates rei secundum quod
res est extra intellectum. Modi autem intelligendi sunt eaedem proprietates rei secundum
quod res est in intellectu et ut eaedem proprietates cum re sunt intellecta. Modi autem sig-
nificandi eaedem proprietates sunt in numero secundum quod res est significata per vocem.
Et ad hoc intelligendum notandum est quod res extra intellectum multas habet proprietates.
Habet enim se per modum habitus et quietis et per modum agentis et patientis Et per istas
proprietates distinguuntur res ab invicem. Omnes autem istae proprietates rei extra intel-
lectum existentes dicuntur modi essendiet post copulationem sive impositionem vocis
ipsa res dicitur res significata, et omnes proprietates rei quae prius dicebantur modi essendi
rei extra et modi intelligendi rei intellectae, iam dicuntur modi significandimodi essendi
et modi intelligendi et modi significandi sunt idem penitus quod patet ex dictis, differunt
tamen accidentalitermodi essendi sunt in re extra sicut in subiecto; modi autem intelli-
gendi in re intellecta sicut in subiecto et per consequens in intellectu sicut cognitum in
cognoscente; modi autem significandi sunt in re significata sicut in subiecto et in voce sicut
in signo. Cf. Boethius of Dacia, Modi significandi (ed. Pinborg et al., 64:6765:84).
41 Boethius of Dacia, Modi significandi (ed. Pinborg et al., 7:5358): Circa hoc intelligendum
quod quamdiu ipse est in speculatione ipsarum rerum et modorum essendi, qui eis
appropiantur, et modorum intelligendi, ipse est philosophus. Cum autem ipsam rem voci
copulat faciendo ipsam vocis significatum, et modos essendi modos intelligendi faciendo,
et modos intelligendi modos significandi vocis, iam incipit esse grammaticus. (My ital-
ics) See also S. Ebbesen, Boethius of Dacia: science is a serious game, Theoria 66 (2000),
145158 (repr. in Ebbesen, Collected Essays, vol. 2, pp. 153162).
142 chapter 4

hand, the significate the thing itself can have a mode of being without its
word actually having the corresponding mode of signifying; on the other hand,
a word can have a mode of signifying without its significate actually having the
corresponding mode of being. Although the different grammatical modalities
are grounded in some modes of being of things in the external world, they are
not necessarily grounded in real properties of the significate of a given word.
Hence, for Boethius the modes of being, understanding and signifying are at
best similar, but not identical, as for Martin of Dacia:

To this, it must be said that the modes of being, understanding and signi-
fying are not completely the same, because then, immediately with the
mode of being of a thing, there would be the [corresponding] mode of
signifying in the word of that thing, which is false. However, the mode of
signifying is taken from the likeness with a mode of understanding, and
the mode of understanding from the likeness with a mode of being.
Hence, it is not necessary that things, one of which is taken from its like-
ness with another, are completely the same.42

Accordingly, for Boethius of Dacia the modes of signifying are properties of the
word and not of the significate (they are in the word as in a subject), because
to signify in one way or another is a property of the word as a grammatical
item. However, to be signified in one way or another is a property of the thing
insofar as it is the significate of the word, and hence to be signified in one way
or another is in the thing qua significate as in a subject:

It must be said that the modes of signifying are in the word as in a subject,
because to be signified in one way or another is to be signified with one
mode of signifying or another. To be signified with one mode of signifying
or another is in the thing signified as in a subject. But there is a thing
signified only insofar as it is in relation with some word. Whence, the
modes of signifying are in the word as in a subject.43

42 Boethius of Dacia, Modi significandi (ed. Pinborg et al., 81:2228): Dicendum ad hoc, quod
modi essendi et intelligendi et significandi non sunt idem penitus, quia tunc, statim cum
esset modus essendi rei, statim esset modus significandi in dictione illius rei, quod falsum
est. Tamen modus significandi accipitur ad similitudinem modi intelligendi et modus
intelligendi ad similitudinem modi essendi. Unde non oportet quod illa sunt idem peni-
tus, quorum unum accipitur ad similitudinem alterius.
43 Boethius of Dacia, Modi significandi (ed. Pinborg et al., 85:3542): Dicendum quod modi
significandi sunt in dictione sicut in subiecto, quia sic significari vel aliter est tali modo sig-
nificandi significari vel alio. Tali modo significandi significari vel alio est in re significata
the Significate in Grammar and in Logic 143

Consequently, from Martin to Boethius there is an important shift from the

consideration of the significate as the bearer of modes of understanding and
signifying to the consideration of the word as the bearer of modes of signifying
that result from different cognitive approaches to the thing itself. Boethius of
Dacia can thus explain how it is that different parts of speech have the same
significate without such a significate being at the same time the bearer of
opposite features:

The same concept of the mind can be the significate of any part of speech.
In fact, whatever can be conceived by the mind can be signified by any
part of speech, as long as the specific mode of signifying of the part is not
incompatible with it; and that concept of the mind, when it falls under
the specific mode of signifying of the name produces the significate of
the name; and when it falls under the specific mode of signifying of the
verb produces the significate of the verb, and so on; which is evident,
because when someone says: pain, to be in pain, the one in pain, pain-
fully and ouch, they all signify the same.44

In the last stage (here represented by Radulphus Brito), the word is analysed
into utterance, significate (the thing itself45) and relation of signification.46

tamquam in subiecto. Res autem significata non est nisi alicuius dictionis. Ideo modi signifi-
candi sunt in dictione sicut in subiecto.
44 Boethius of Dacia, Modi significandi (ed. Pinborg et al., 55:6066): idem conceptus
mentis potest esse significatum cuiuslibet partis orationis. Quicquid enim a mente con-
cipi potest, hoc potest per quamlibet partem orationis significari, dummodo modus sig-
nificandi specificus partium illi non repugnet; et ille mentis conceptus cadens sub modo
significandi specifico nominis facit significatum nominis, et cadens sub modo specifico
verbi facit significatum verbi et sic de aliis ut patet dicendo sic dolor, doleo, dolens, dol-
enter et heu, quae omnia idem significant.
45 Radulphus Brito, Sup. Prisc. min. (ed. Pinborg, 99): Sed voces imponuntur ad significan-
dum rem sub ratione propria illius rei, sicut haec vox homo significat hominem sub
ratione propria hominis et sic de aliis, et ideo quilibet artifex in sua scientia secundum
quod indigebat rebus imposuit voces ad significandum illas res.
46 A relational consideration of the significate appears already explicitly in John of Dacias
analysis of the word into utterance, significate (res significata) and relation of significa-
tion (ratio significandi). In his Summa [John of Dacia, Summa grammatica, in Johannis
Daci Opera, ed. A. Otto (Copenhagen: gad, 1955) (CPhD iii)] John defines the ratio sig-
nificandi as that whereby the word is related to its significate [John of Dacia, Summa (ed.
Otto, 195:33196:5)]: Ad hanc quaestionem dicendum est quod ratio significandi est illud
quo refertur vox significativa ad significatum. Vox autem est quod profertur. Omne autem
id quod profertur motivum est sensus auditus. Sed ratio significandi non movet auditum
144 chapter 4

The introduction of the relation of signification into the analysis of the word
leads to a more refined analysis of the part of speech that follows from the
introduction of a further distinction between active and passive modes of
signifying:

One is the active and another the passive mode of signifying. The mode
of being of the thing insofar as it is consignificated by the utterance is
called passive mode of signifying. But the relation of consignifying,
whereby the utterance consignifies that mode of being, is called active
mode of signifying. For the utterance is in itself in the category of quality,
and whence the utterance in itself is related neither to a significate nor to
a property of the thing, if it were not for some relation of signifying or
consignifying that was given to it.47

External things and their properties can be considered either as entities in

themselves or as the terms of relations of co-understanding and of consignifi-
cation. External things and their accidental properties are res extra and modi

sed intellectum. Vox autem ipsa movet auditum. Ergo ratio significandi non profertur
simul cum ipsa voce. John analyses the word into utterance, significate and relation of
signification, because the mere utterance of a word does not produce the understanding
of its significate, unless the listener establishes a link a relation of signification
between the utterance affecting her ears and the concept. The union of only utterance
and significate cannot explain the communicative aspect of words how a listener comes
to evoke the exact concept that the speaker intends to communicate to her and there-
fore the relation of signification that both speaker and listener establish in an act of com-
munication becomes an essential component of the word. Now, the relation of
signification is not something really added to the utterance, but it is rather a relation of
reason [John of Dacia, Summa (ed. Otto, 197:2136)]: Ad istam quaestionem dico quod
ratio significandi non est aliquid additum reale essentiae vocis. Ad cuius intellectum est
notandum quod vox per essentiam suam non refertur ad significatum, quia vox per essen-
tiam suam est de praedicamento qualitatis. Vox igitur per aliquod additum refertur ad
significatum, sed illud additum est ratio significandi. Haec autem ratio significandi non
profertur realiter cum ipsa voce, ut prehabitum est. Ergo illa ratio significandi solum est
aliquid additum essentiae vocis secundum rationem, unde huiusmodi additio nihil est
vocis nisi secundum quod cadit sub usu intellectus accipientis significationem vocis.
47 Radulphus Brito, Sup. Prisc. Min. (ed. Pinborg, 152): quidam est modus significandi acti-
vus et quidam passivus. Modus significandi passivus dicitur modus essendi rei ut consig-
nificatur per vocem. Sed modus significandi activus dicitur ratio consignificandi per
quam vox consignificat illum modum essendi. Nam vox de se est in genere qualitatis, et
ideo vox de se non refertur ad significatum nec ad proprietatem rei, nisi per aliquam
rationem significandi et consignificandi sibi traditam.
the Significate in Grammar and in Logic 145

essendi, respectively. As the terms of the relations of co-understanding, these

modi essendi are passive modes of understanding. Similarly, as the terms of the
relations of consignification, they are passive modes of signifying. Modes of
being and passive modes of understanding and of signifying are in this way
numerically the same but notionally different. On the other hand, the relation
of consignification between the utterance and the properties of the thing and
the relation of co-understanding between the intellect and the properties of
the thing are active modes of signifying and of understanding, respectively.
The active modes of signifying and of understanding are both notionally and
numerically different; for the former are in the utterance as in a subject and
the latter are in the intellect as in a subject.48 Finally, the passive and active
modes of signifying and the passive and active modes of understanding are
notionally identical but numerically different.49 Thus, the principles of the
division of parts of speech and of grammatical constructions the active
modes of signifying are properties of the parts of speech themselves and not
of their significates, although they are immediately grounded in properties of
things in the external world.
To sum up, the modal analysis of signification that is already suggested in
some grammatical treatises from the first half of the century (e.g.
Ps.-Kilwardbys) reaches a high level of sophistication during the second half of
the century, with the three following points of development being of particular
importance: (a) The significate of a word becomes the thing itself (instead of a
concept) without the accidental features of existence and non-existence.

48 Radulphus Brito, Sup. Prisc. min. (ed. Pinborg, 152156): modus significandi activus et
passivus sunt idem formaliter licet differant materialitermodus significandi passivus et
modus intelligendi passivus et modus essendi sint idem materialiter. Secundo quod non
sint idem formaliter. Tertio quod modus significandi et intelligendi activi non sint idem
cum modis essendimodus significandi passivus est ipsamet proprietas rei ut consignifi-
cata est per vocem. Et modus intelligendi passivus est ipsa proprietas rei ut apprehensa
est ab intellectu. Et modus essendi est ipsa proprietas rei extra absolute sumpta Ergo
modi significandi et intelligendi passivi quantum ad id quod est ibi materiale, scilicet
secundum ipsam proprietatem, sunt idem cum modo essendi Sed modus significandi
activus est relatio per quam haec vox habet rationem consignificandi respectu modi
essendi, et modus intelligendi activus est ratio cointelligendi per quam intellectus refer-
tur ad rei proprietatem. Et ergo modus significandi et intelligendi active dictus non est
idem cum modis essendi.
49 Radulphus Brito, Sup. Prisc. min. (ed. Pinborg, 157): Dicendum ad quaestionem primo
quod modi significandi et intelligendi activi differunt secundum essentiales rationes
Primum probatur: quia quorum unum est forma intellectus et aliud forma partis orationis
illa differunt, quia sunt formae diversorum Tamen credo quod modus significandi acti-
vus et passivus non differunt formaliter sed differunt materialiter.
146 chapter 4

(b) The word is analysed into utterance, significate and relation of signification
(instead of into utterance and significate). (c) The active modes of signifying
become properties of the words (instead of properties of the significate),
which explain both the grammatical division of parts of speech and the gram-
maticality of sentences.
As regards the question of the significates role in grammar and logic, the
rupture between the pre-modist tradition and modist authors from the last
quarter of the century, such as Radulphus Brito, is substantial.
Martin of Dacia already mildly opposes earlier authors with respect to the
question of the role of signification in logic and grammar. In his commentary
on the Perihermeneias,50 Martin raises the question whether the logician is
concerned with truth and falsity. He then puts forth the already familiar argu-
ment that just as the grammarian is concerned with grammaticality and
ungrammaticality, the logician is concerned with truth and falsity; for the logi-
cian analyses the subject and the predicate, which are the causes of truth and
falsity:

Just as the grammarian is concerned with grammaticality and ungram-

maticality, in the same way the logician is concerned with truth and
falsity; and the reason is evident. Likewise, whoever considers the sub-
ject and the predicate, whose composition or division is the basis of
what is true and what is false, also considers what is true and what is
false; but the logician considers the subject and the predicate; there-
fore etc.51

The argument against it states that it is possible to analyse the methods of

knowledge (literally the way of knowing modus sciendi) provided by logic
without an analysis of truth and falsity:

The logician ought to consider only the methods of knowledge. Hence,

the logician can stand without the things without which the method of
knowledge can stand. But the method of knowledge can stand without

50 Martin of Dacia, In Perih. (ed. Roos, 248:1415): Quaestio est utrum pertineat ad logicum
considerare veritatem et falsitatem.
51 Martin of Dacia, In Perih. (ed. Roos, 248:2935): sicut se habet congruum et incongruum
ad grammaticum, sic verum et falsum ad logicum. Et patet ratio. Item. Cuius est consid-
erare subiectum et praedicatum, in quorum compositione vel divisione consistit verum
et falsum, eius est considerare verum vel falsum. Sed logici est considerare subiectum et
praedicatum. Ergo et cetera.
the Significate in Grammar and in Logic 147

any truth in the specific terms. Therefore, the logician could also stand
without truth and falsity.52

Martins introduction to the question evinces an important shift as regards the

subject matter of logic between the first half of the century and the last quarter
of the century. While in the first half of the century it is common to claim that
logic deals with truth and falsity (largely taken, so as to include syllogistic
validity), most authors from the last quarter of the century maintain that logic
deals with logical methods (i.e. demonstration, definition etc.) and their prin-
ciples (i.e. logical notions or logical intentions).53 This is the position of e.g.
Radulphus Brito, who tells us that:

Logic must be divided according to the division of its main subject. The
subject of logic is the method of knowledge according to which [logic] is
an instrument of knowledgeand since the syllogism is the method of
knowledge to which every method of knowledge is subordinated, hence
logic itself is divided according to the division of this main method of
knowledge the syllogism which is said to be the subject of logic as a
whole.54

Logic is concerned with the syllogism insofar as it is the main logical instru-
ment used by other logical methods of knowledge production (i.e. definition,
division, demonstration etc.). For Brito, an analysis of the syllogism demands
an evaluation of its capacity to produce probable or certain knowledge,55

52 Martin of Dacia, In Perih. (ed. Roos, 248:2428): Item: logici tantummodo <est> consid-
erare modum sciendi. Igitur sine quo potest stare modus sciendi, sine illo potest stare
logicus. Sed modus sciendi potest stare sine omni veritate in terminis specialibus. Ergo et
logicus poterit stare sine veritate et falsitate.
53 For the different logical traditions of the thirteenth century, see J. Brumberg-Chaumont
(ed.), LOrganon.
54 Radulphus Brito, In Isag. (ed. Venice, 6): logica dividenda est secundum divisionem sui
subiecti principalis. Subiectum autem logicae est modus sciendi secundum quod est
instrumentum sciendiet quia omnis modus sciendi ad quem ordinantur omnes alii
modi sciendi est sillogismus, ideo secundum divisionem istius modi sciendi principalis
qui est sillogismus qui dicitur esse subiectum in tota logica et ipsa logica dividatur.
55 Radulphus Brito, In Isag. (ed. Venice, 67): Sillogismus autem potest considerari dupli
citer vel in se et absolute, et sic de ipso est scientia libri Priorum, vel secundum quod
habet esse in partibus subiecti<vi>s. Et hoc dicit quia partes sillogismi subiectiv<ae>sunt
per constructionem eius ad materiam specialem. Modo ista materia specialis est duplex,
quia vel materia necessaria vel materia probabilis. Et ideo duae sunt partes sillogismi
148 chapter 4

which in turn demands an analysis of the items that constitute a syllogism

capable of producing these sorts of knowledge, i.e. the premises. Since gene
rally speaking a premise is an assertion, the analysis of the assertion in the
Perihermeneias would be made from the perspective of its possibility to
become the premise of a dialectical or demonstrative syllogism, which suppo
sedly could happen without any consideration of its truth or falsity.
Britos move is indeed legitimate if one considers that an analysis of the syl-
logism could presuppose its premises to be probable or certain without being
concerned with the actual determination of their truth-value. The situation,
which is actually quite common in mathematical logic, would go like this:
Suppose that you have two premises that have a certain alethic modality
(necessary or probable), or even a determinate truth-value (true), and proceed
to determine what can validly be inferred from them. In such an analysis,
truth-determination is not, stricto sensu, part of the logicians job. This, how-
ever, does not prevent other logical analyses of the syllogism from being also
legitimately concerned with general accounts of propositional verification.
As to this matter, Martin takes a position that seems to go in the direction of
the latter possibility; for, according to him, logic is indeed concerned with how
the three terms of a syllogism contribute to the truth or falsity of its premises,
as well as to its validity:

To this question, I say three things: First, the logician ought to consider
what is true and false as regards his own terms. The proof of this is that
whoever must consider the terms, must also consider their truth and fal-
sity. But only the logician ought to consider the terms that are proper to
logic. For he is the only one concerned with the consideration of the
three terms that form the syllogism. Hence he is the only one concerned
with the truth and falsity that results from the arrangement of these
terms with each other.56

subiectivae, quia si sillogismus contrahitur ad materiam necessariam sicut sillogismus

demonstrativus de quo tanquam de subiecto accipiendo subiectum pro obiecto determi-
natur in libro Posteriorum. Si autem contrahitur ad materiam probabilem, sic est sillogis-
mus dialecticus de quo determinatur in libro Topicorum. Note that although Nicholas of
Paris tells us that logic is concerned with truth and falsity, he agrees with Brito that the
Perihermeneias deals with assertions that are to become premises of dialectical or demon-
strative syllogisms. For this, see my case study in Ebbesen et al., History of Philosophy,
pp. 131147.
56 Martin of Dacia, In Perih. (ed. Roos, 249:19): Ad istam quaestionem dico tria: primum
est, quod logicus in terminis propriis proprie habet considerare verum et falsum.
Declaratio huius est: nam cuius est considerare terminos, eius est considerare veritatem
the Significate in Grammar and in Logic 149

Moreover, logic is also concerned with what is true and what is false in general,
i.e. with the general principles of truth and falsity:

Second, I say that, other than his proper terms, the logician ought to con-
sider what is true and what is false according to the common notion of
what is true and what is false. This is evident from Aristotles Topics,
where he says that logic has the way towards the principles of all meth-
ods. But this is not through proper principles. Therefore, it is through
common principles.57

Accordingly, logic is concerned with the general causes of truth and falsity,
knowledge of which is fundamental to determining truth in other disciplines
(e.g. in physics, psychology etc.). Furthermore, these general causes are sup-
posedly related to the assertions accurate representation of the mental acts of
composition and division; for Martin replies in the affirmative to the question
whether truth and falsity come about through composition and division:

To the first [objection], I say that truth and falsity come about in every
composition and division, as long as there is affirmation or negation.58

This is to say that, generally speaking, an assertion that accurately represents a

mental act of composition or division (i.e. by being the compound of a name
and an attribute, which are not equivocal) is susceptible of truth or falsity.59
Nevertheless, logic is not concerned with the truth and falsity of assertions
within particular disciplines (e.g. physics); for the truth and falsity of such
assertions come directly from the objects that are proper to those disciplines
and that are unknown to the logician qua logician. The mathematician, the

et falsitatem in eis. Sed solius logici est considerare terminos proprios logices. Nam ad
ipsum solum spectat considerare tres terminos, ex quibus constituitur syllogismus, et
ideo ad ipsum solum spectat considerare veritatem et falsitatem, quae resultant ex col-
lectione illorum terminorum ad invicem.
57 Martin of Dacia, In Perih. (ed. Roos, 249:1318): Secundo dico quod logicus extra terminos
proprios habet considerare verum et falsum secundum communem rationem veri et falsi.
Declaratio huius patet per Aristotelem in Topicis, qui dicit quod logica ad omnia meth-
odorum principia viam habet. Sed hoc non est per principia propria. Ergo per principia
communia.
58 Martin of Dacia, In Perih. (ed. Roos, 250:2123): Dico ergo ad primam quod circa omnem
compositionem vel divisionem est veritas et falsitas, dummodo ibi fit assertio vel
deassertio.
59 Cf. above, Part 1, Section1.1.
150 chapter 4

physicist and the metaphysician, for instance, analyse mathematical, physical

and metaphysical objects, respectively, in order to determine the truth or fal-
sity of their assertions. However, this analysis does not belong to the logician
per se:

Third, I say that the logician ought not consider what is true and what is
false according to their proper notions outside his proper terms. The
proof is that truth and falsity are caused by things as their proper and
immediate principles. But the logician ought not consider the things
themselves, nor their principles Hence, it must be known that when
someone asks whether a sentence is grammatical or ungrammatical, this
concerns the grammarian; whether it is true or false, this concerns the
logician. Likewise, if someone asks whether the line has magnitude, this
regards the mathematician. And thus it is evident that any artist ought to
consider truth and falsity as regards his own terms.60

60 Martin of Dacia, In Perih. (ed. Roos, 249:1829): Tertio dico quod logicus extra proprios
terminos non habet considerare verum et falsum secundum proprias rationes eorum.
Cuius declaratio est: nam veritas et falsitas causantur ex rebus tamquam ex propriis et
immediatis principiis. Sed logici non est considerare res ipsas nec principia rerum Unde
sciendum est quod si quaeratur utrum oratio sit congrua vel incongrua, hoc pertinet ad
grammaticum; si vera vel falsa, ad logicum. Similiter si quaeratur utrum linea habeat mag-
nitudinem, spectat ad mathematicum. Et sic patet quod in propriis terminis quilibet arti-
fex proprie habet considerare veritatem et falsitatem. See also Boethius of Dacia
[Boethius of Dacia, Topica, ed. N.J. Green-Pedersen (Copenhagen: gad, 1976) (CPhD vi)],
for whom the immediate causes of logic are not things but their properties their modes
of being (cf. Boethius of Dacia, Topica (ed. Green-Pedersen, 3:144:24)). Furthermore,
things themselves are the only causes of true and false assertions (cf. Boethius of Dacia,
Topica (ed. Green-Pedersen, 6:8587:108)). And finally, dialectics the part of logic that
deals with dialectical argumention is not concerned with the truth that is involved in
composition and division, because the origin of truth is in the things themselves and
these things do not fall under the scope of the dialectician [Boethius of Dacia, Topica (ed.
Green-Pedersen, 8:135149)]: Et quia in praesenti intentio est de dialectica, ideo scire
debes primo, quod illa, per quae argumentatur dialecticus, non sunt causa conclusionis;
ideo non faciunt scientiam, sed opinionem. Licet enim de necessitate sequitur Socrates
est homo, ergo est animal, tamen habitudo speciei ad genus et intentio communis non
est causa huius necessitatis, sed identitas rerum essentialis. Similiter licet necessario
sequitur Socrates est albus, ergo non est niger, tamen communis intentio et ipsa habi-
tudo contrarii ad contrarium non est causa huius, sed ipsa incompossibilitas rerum, quae
per terminos significantur, quae multum alia est ab ipsa habitudine, quam dialecticos
considerat. Secundo debes scire quod dialecticus ipsam veritatem non considerat. Et
causa huius est, quia ipsa veritas ortum habet ex ipsis naturis rerum, quas dialecticus
the Significate in Grammar and in Logic 151

Radulphus Britos position as to the role of the significate both in logic and in gram-
mar is clearly along this line of reasoning. In his commentary on Priscian minor, he
raises the questions whether the grammarian considers the significate in itself,61
whether the mode of signifying presupposes the significate62 and whether the sig-
nificate is the cause of the construction (i.e. of sentences).63 To the first question,
Brito replies that in the case of the institution of words (in the case of grammatica
positiva), the grammarian has to consider things, not according to their real exis-
tence, but insofar as they are the object of the act of linguistic imposition:

For the solution to this question, we must distinguish three sorts of

grammar impositive grammar, practical grammar and normative
grammar. Impositive grammar is the one [dealing] with the imposition
of utterances on the specific significates and it teaches the essence of the
name, i.e. of appellations. Then, I say that with respect to impositive
grammar the grammarian ought to consider things, however not accord-
ing to their real existence, but according to their being significates
insofar as things are the significate of words.64

The part of grammar that explains how significative words are instituted by the
imposition of utterances on things impositive grammar must consider
things, not insofar as they exist in external reality, but insofar as they can be
known in themselves (without their existence or non-existence) and be,
thereby, an object of imposition and signification.

secundum quod dialecticus non considerat Sed (i.e. dialecticus) docet modum, quam
artifex specialis debet materiae speciali applicare ad inquisitionem veritatis.
61 Radulphus Brito, In Prisc. min. (ed. Pinborg, 136): Utrum grammaticus consideret signifi-
catum speciale per se.
62 Radulphus Brito, In Prisc. min. (ed. Pinborg, 138): Utrum modus significandi praesup-
ponat significatum speciale.
63 Radulphus Brito, In Prisc. min. (ed. Pinborg, 140): Utrum significatum sit causa
constructionis.
64 Radulphus Brito, In Prisc. min. (ed. Pinborg, 137): Ad solutionem istius quaestionis dis-
tinguendum est de triplici grammatica, scilicet positiva, usualis et regularis. Positiva est
quae est de impositione vocum ad significata specialia et docet quid nominis sive vocabu-
lorum Tunc dico quod quantum ad positivam grammaticam grammaticus habet con-
siderare res, non tamen secundum esse reale sed secundum esse significatum, scilicet in
quantum res sunt significatum dictionis. See Rosier-Catach, Grammar, at p. 205, for the
introduction of this distinction in Dominicus Gundissalinus De divisione philosophiae.
Recall that for Brito the words significates are the things themselves without consider-
ation of their existence or non-existence.
152 chapter 4

However, in the case of theoretical grammar, the grammarian is not con-

cerned with the things themselves:

But if one asks about theoretical grammar, which deals with causes and
principles, then I say that [the grammarian] ought to consider things, but
neither per se nor principally. And the reason is that the grammarian
ought to consider that without which there cannot be knowledge of the
modes of signifying. But the modes of signifying are not known without
the properties of things. Therefore, the grammarian ought to consider the
properties of things, and the thing, yet not principally but as a support,
just as the logician ought not consider the things per se, but insofar as he
grounds in them the second intentions.65

The grammarian has to look at the properties of things the modes of being
in which the modes of signifying are ultimately grounded, and thus things enter
into the analysis of theoretical grammar only insofar as they are the bearers of
modes of being. More importantly, and contrary to what was the case in the
first half of the century, the logician considers the things themselves only inso-
far as they give support to the principles of logic second intentions.
Accordingly, the significate is notionally presupposed by the part of speech,
because it is a part of the word that bears the modes of signifying, but the sig-
nificate is not the immediate cause of grammatical constructions:

To which it must be said that every mode of signifying presupposes the

significate, also if the significate and the mode of signifying were the
same thing. And the reason is that the significate is related to the mode
of signifying, just as the word is related to the part of speech; but the part
of speech always presupposes the word; therefore the mode of signifying
always presupposes the significate. The major [premise] is evident,
because the mode of signifying is the form of the part [of speech], just as
the significate is the form of the word; and thus the form of the word
presupposes the form of the part of speech. However, note that this

65 Radulphus Brito, In Prisc. min. (ed. Pinborg, 137): Si vero quaerat de grammatica specula-
tiva quae est per causas et principia, tunc dico quod habet considerare res quamvis non
per se nec principaliter. Et huius ratio est, quia illa habet grammaticus considerare sine
quibus cognitio modorum significandi non potest haberi; sed modi significandi sine pro-
prietatibus rerum non cognoscuntur; ergo grammaticus habet considerare proprietates
rerum et res, non tamen ex principali sed ex adiuncto, sicut nec logicus habet considerare
res per se sed prout fundat super ipsas intentiones secundas.
the Significate in Grammar and in Logic 153

anteriority is not necessarily temporal, but natural, because it must be in

art, just as it is in nature.66

The significate is notionally presupposed by the modes of signifying; for with-

out significate there is no word, and without word there is no part of speech.
However, strictly speaking, a part of speech is the conjunction of a word and a
mode of signifying, so that the significate does not enter immediately into the
analysis of the part of speech, and thus does not fall per se under the grammar-
ians consideration.
Likewise, things are notionally presupposed by second intentions, without
being their immediate cause:

But it must be understood that, just as the logician does not consider
things, unless by accident as the common intentions are grounded in
them neither does the grammarian.67

Just as in the case of grammatical enquiries, the analysis of the significate per
se no longer concerns the logical enquiry. Furthermore, while the principles of
grammar the modes of signifying are the immediate causes of grammatical
sentences, and accordingly the grammarian is directly concerned with gram-
maticality, the principles of logic second intentions are not the cause of
truth and falsity, and accordingly the logician qua logician is not concerned
with truth or falsity:

To the other [position]: Just as the logician deals with the truth of the
propositions etc., I say that it is not similar, because the cause of the truth
of some proposition is not a second intention, but the cause of the gram-
maticality of any construction is the proportion of modes of signifying.
And hence, although logic cannot judge the truth of a specific sentence

66 Radulphus Brito, In Prisc. min. (ed. Pinborg, 138139): Ad quod dicendum quod omnis
modus significandi praesupponit significatum, etiam si significatum et modus signifi-
candi fuerint idem. Et huius ratio est, quia sicut se habet dictio ad partem orationis, ita
significatum ad modum significandi. Sed pars orationis semper praesupponit dictionem,
ergo modus significandi semper praesupponit significatum. Maior patet quia sicut signi-
ficatum est forma dictionis, sic modus significandi est forma partis; et sic forma dictionis
praesupponitur formae partis. Tamen nota quod haec praecedentia non est de necessi-
tate in tempore, sed secundum naturam, quia sicut est in natura, sic debet esse in arte.
67 Radulphus Brito, In Prisc. min. (ed. Pinborg, 104): Sed est intelligendum quod sicut logicus
non considerat res nisi per accidens, ut scilicet super eas fundantur intentiones secundae,
sic etiam grammaticus.
154 chapter 4

through its second intentions, the grammarian, however, through his

modes of signifying can judge grammaticality, because the truth of spe-
cific propositions is caused by the identity of the thing, just as in man is
animal, and not because the one can be found in several things numeri-
cally different, and the other can be found in several things specifically
different.68

The truth of an assertion, such as some man is an animal, depends on a real

identity between a particular man and a particular animal in some real man.
However, the fact that man is a species or that animal is a genus, or that man
is related to animal as a species to its genus, or that animal is a universal, and
so on, plays no role in the verification of some man is an animal. Yet, these
facts do play a role in the validity of syllogisms that have some man is an ani-
mal as a premise, as in: Every animal has a soul; some man is an animal; there-
fore some man has a soul, which is valid precisely because of the relations that
man, having soul and animal have with each other insofar as they are subject
to second intentions. Second intentions are the principles of the logical meth-
ods that use the syllogism as their main instrument, and hence logic is con-
cerned with these principles and not with propositional verification.
Since according to Brito the active modes of signifying the ones that make
a word a particular grammatical item are properties of the part of speech and
not of the word qua bearer of a relation of signification, it is clear that semiotic
considerations can and should be absent from the grammatical analysis of sen-
tences. For this analysis is carried on through properties of the parts themselves
and not through properties of their semiotic value. Admittedly, the active modes
of signifying are ultimately grounded in the properties of things. However, they
are not immediately grounded in them, nor are they identical to them. More
importantly, semiotic considerations are also absent from the analysis of logical
methods, such as demonstration, because such analysis depends on the rela-
tions between second intentions. Consequently, the verification of an assertion

68 Radulphus Brito, In Prisc. min. (ed. Pinborg, 129130): Ad aliam sicut se habet logicus ad
veritatem in propositionibus etc., dico quod non est simile quia causa veritatis alicuius
propositionis non est aliqua secunda intentio, sed causa congruitatis cuiuslibet construc-
tionis est proportio modorum significandi; et ideo licet logica per suas intentiones secun-
das non possit iudicare veritatem orationis specialis, tamen grammaticus per suos modos
significandi potest iudicare congruitatem, quia veritas in propositionibus specialibus
causatur ex parte identitatis rei sicut in ista homo est animal et non ex eo quod unum
est reperibile in pluribus differentibus numero et aliud in pluribus differentibus specie.
Sed congruitas causatur ex modis significandi.
the Significate in Grammar and in Logic 155

regards the particular discipline that is concerned with the assertion and is not
as such a logical concern.
It is clear, then, that in the span of years separating Brito from Ps.-Kilwardby,
the notion of signification goes from being directly used in both the explanations
of grammaticality and truth or falsity to being used only in the part of grammar
that is concerned with the institution of words, i.e. impositive grammar a
development coherent with the one we saw taking place in the two questions
discussed in Part 1. This grammatical discussion further demonstrates the con-
siderably narrower role the notion of signification plays in explaining both the
construction of grammatical sentences and the mechanisms of propositional
verification. Indeed, the determination of truth-values is no longer considered a
logical matter per se, as the analysis of the methods of knowledge production can
be effectuated without a direct consideration of the words values.

There are important points of divergence regarding the role of signification in

grammar and logic between the grammatical and logical treatises from the
first half of the thirteenth century and those from the last quarter of the cen-
tury. In the years before the 1260s, a word results from the articulation of an
utterance and a significate. Some properties of the significate are the sources
of truth and falsity, and some others are the source of grammaticality and
ungrammaticality. Towards the end of the century, the word is analysed into
utterance, significate and relation of signification. For some authors this rela-
tion links an utterance and a thing understood, the modes of signifying being
properties of the thing understood (e.g. in Martin of Dacia). Martin of Dacia
also suggests that the significate is the general principle of truth and falsity,
and thereby he still follows in the footsteps of his predecessors. Some later
authors (e.g. Radulphus Brito and Boethius of Dacia) claim that the relation of
signification links the utterance and the thing itself, the modes of signifying
being a grammatical feature of the utterance that is ultimately grounded in
properties modes of being of the thing. Finally, for some of them (certainly
for Radulphus Brito and quite likely for Boethius of Dacia), the relation of sig-
nification and the significate are neither principles of theoretical grammar nor
principles of logic, but only the material cause of these principles, insofar as
they provide the matter the word that receives the modes of signifying and
the second intentions as forms.69 This, I submit, can be seen as yet another

69 Note, however, that this position seems to be anticipated by Ps.-Kilwardby, Sup. Prisc. mai.
(ed. Fredborg et al., 24): logica non est de sermone relato ad rem tantum, sed de sermone
156 chapter 4

attempt by these masters of Arts to move the notion of signification to a

domain that is grammatically and logically neutral, namely that of semiotics, a
domain presupposed by grammatical and logical explanations but not directly
used in their proper accounts, i.e. the accounts of grammaticality and of the
methods of knowledge production, respectively.

relato ad rem sub debitis modis significandi. Hos modos considerat grammaticus per se et
primo. Nevertheless for this author the determination of an assertions truth-value depends
on logical principles; cf. Ps. Kilwardby, Sup. Prisc. mai. (ed. Fredborg et al., 26).
Conclusion

The study of the three discussions that are directly concerned with the notion
of signification the one about the immediate significate of words, the one
about the signification of empty terms and the one about the different roles
played by the significate in logic and grammar allows us to draw conclusions
at the doctrinal, methodological and sociological levels.
From a doctrinal perspective, the thirteenth-century tendency towards a
narrower and more coherent use of the notion of signification merits empha-
sis. This development complements the intent to solidify the scientific status
of the disciplines of the trivium particularly of logic and grammar by pro-
viding them with mutually exclusive subject matters and explanatory princi-
ples based on external reality. Some masters of Arts from the last quarter of the
century show this inclination most clearly by keeping the notion of significa-
tion essential to the explanation of the institution of linguistic signs and reduc-
ing its role in purely logical and grammatical accounts.
Both Boethius of Dacia and Radulphus Brito outrank their contemporaries
by their remarkable awareness of the ambiguous use of the notion of significa-
tion (it was indeed used in linguistic problems of different nature), and their
subsequent attempt to overcome this difficulty by narrowing its use to the mere
semiotic level. Roger Bacon also shows a similar awareness, which leads him to
introduce the subsidiary notion of re-imposition. As a result, Bacon deals with
a coherent notion of signification that is instrumental at different levels.
However, as we have seen, the introduction of the notion of re-imposition by
Bacon has the unfortunate consequence of compromising the possibility of
accounting for the efficacy of human communication.
The situation we are left with at the turn of the fourteenth-century can be
summed up as follows: i) A word is instituted through the somewhat arbitrary
imposition of an utterance on the essence itself, with the purpose of human
communication, thereby acquiring its relation of signification. ii) Grammar is
mainly concerned with grammatical constructions and their fundamental
explanatory principles the modes of signifying (modi significandi). iii) Logic is
mainly concerned with the methods of knowledge production and their funda-
mental explanatory principles the second intentions (secundae intentiones).
iv) Both the modes of signifying and the second intentions presuppose the
words signification (i.e. they presuppose the word as their material part) but
are not identical to it, so that both grammar and logic presuppose a semiotic
account of the institution of linguistic signs, but are theoretically independent

koninklijke brill nv, leiden, |doi 10.1163/9789004300132_007

158 CONCLUSION

from it. Finally, v) logic is not per se concerned with the question of proposi-
tional verification.1
The development of these medieval discussions about the notion of signifi-
cation seems to outweigh, by the attempt to give the notion a more coherent
treatment, the twentieth-century discussions about the notion of meaning; for
in the latter we are still left with the impression of a reigning confusion as to
what the notion of meaning is supposed to account for and how it is to be
construed with respect to those problems. Not surprisingly, then, the Stanford
Encyclopedia of Philosophys entry on theories of meaning starts with the fol-
lowing unenthusiastic remark:

The term theory of meaning has figured, in one way or another, in a great
number of philosophical disputes over the last century. Unfortunately,
this term has also been used to mean a great number of different things.2

Nevertheless, the question remains: What was the fortune of this daring
thirteenth-century attempt in the fourteenth-century development of gram-
mar and logic?
It is already well known that the grammatical doctrine of the modi signifi-
candi was severely attacked by some fourteenth-century scholars until it gra
dually disappeared from the fourteenth-century scholarly picture. Famously,
William of Ockham rejects the modes of signifying as superfluous, in that they
unnecessarily multiply the number of notions and of beings that are needed
to account for the grammatical features of human language.3 The doctrine of
the modi significandi appears to be incompatible with the commitment to
explanatory and ontological austerity of fourteenth-century nominalism; and
with the destruction of thirteenth-century theoretical grammar, medieval
grammar also seems to fade away as a scientific discipline.4
The thirteenth-century logic of intentions was also at the centre of heated
discussions during the first quarter of the fourteenth century. One of the main
ideas put to the fore for discussion was the late thirteenth-century claim that

1 For a similar claim in 20th-century philosophy of language, see A.J. Ayer, The Criterion of
Truth, Analysis 3 (1935), 2832.
2 J. Speaks, Theories of Meaning, Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, http://plato.stanford
.edu/entries/meaning/.
3 Cf. Biard, Logique et thorie du signe, p. 239.
4 For a thorough evaluation of the fourteenth-century rejection of theoretical grammar, see
Biard, Logique et thorie du signe, pp. 238288.
Conclusion 159

logic deals with second intentions.5 Nevertheless, the details of this discussion
and its impact on the development of logic between Radulphus Brito and John
Buridan are still in need of an exhaustive study of the extant sources. After the
work of Jan Pinborg in the 1970s,6 little has been done to fill this void. Thus, it
is still difficult to assess the extent to which fourteenth-century nominalism
innovated or improved upon late thirteenth-century logic.
To be sure, there is some continuity between thirteenth-century logical
commentaries and those by John Buridan. For instance, in Buridans commen-
tary on Aristotles Perihermeneias,7 in his question whether every name signi-
fies something,8 the Parisian master engages several of the issues discussed in
the present study, namely in Part 1. In his discussion, Buridan considers two
difficult cases: i) the case of the names of fictional entities, such as chimera
and ii) the case of a name that happens to lose its extension, such as rose
when no rose exists. Regarding these two cases, Buridan commits himself to
basic tenets of thirteenth-century linguistics, e.g.: i) The significative word is
instituted through the conventional act of imposing an utterance on a deter-
minate content a concept in Buridans case with the purpose of human
communication.9 ii) A word, e.g. chimera, signifies the concept on which it
was imposed, and, moreover, through the signification of this concept, the
word also signifies the concepts content (e.g., chimera signifies whatever is
understood by its eventual listener, i.e. the mental compound of a lions head,
a bulls body and a dragons tail).10 Also, iii) even when no rose exists, rose
signifies a simple specific concept falling under the category of substance the

5 Cf. Bartholomew of Bruges sophisma on the subject matter of logic, edited in S. Ebbesen
and J. Pinborg, Bartholomew of Bruges and his Sophisma on the Nature of Logic, cimagl
39 (1981), 180.
6 See, e.g., J. Pinborg, Zum Begriff der Intentio secunda. Radulphus Brito, Hervaeus Natalis
und Petrus Aureoli in Diskussion, cimagl 13 (1974), 4959.
7 John Buridan, Questiones longe super librum Perihermeneias, ed. R. Van der Lecq
(Nijmegen: Ingenium Publishers, 1983) (Artistarium 4).
8 John Buridan, In Perih. (ed. Van der Lecq, 7:28): Utrum omne nomen significat aliquid.
9 Cf. John Buridan, In Perih. (ed. Van der Lecq, 8:219:8): Notandum est quod omnis vox est
significativa Secundo etiam dicendum est quod omnis vox literalis, vel saltem consi-
milis, est significativa ad placitum, quia non repugnat quod imponatur ad significandum
et quod significet Notandum est quod tamen de vocibus significativis ad placitum nos
vocamus consueta locutione illam vocem significativam quae communitati alicuius ydy-
omatis imposita est ad significandum, secundum aliquam certam significationem et
communiter notam illis de isto ydyomate.
10 Cf. John Buridan, In Perih. (ed. Van der Lecq, 10:38): Per hoc apparet quod haec vox chi-
maera non solum significat aliquid, immo etiam significat aliquid aliud a se, quia signifi-
cat conceptum, ut dictum est, qui est alius a voce. Item. Dico ultra quod haec vox
160 CONCLUSION

concept of a rose and, consequently, signifies roses that no longer exist but
that the listener attends to in her mind.11
Furthermore, this signification does not play a central role in the verifica-
tion of propositions involving those terms, because the propositions truth-
value depends on the supposition of its terms and not on their signification.
A chimera is understood is false, because there are no chimeras for which the
term chimera can stand. In general:

is false every affirmative proposition in which one of the terms either

the subject or the predicate does not stand for (supponit pro) one or
several things.12

For the same reason, when no rose exists, a similar proposition in the present
tense, with rose as a subject and without a term that ampliates (i.e. extends)
the supposition of rose to past roses, is also false. Hence, just as in the logic of
intentions the notion of signification does not play a role in propositional veri-
fication, in Buridans logic it does not seem to play that role either. However,
the parallel only goes so far; for, contrary to e.g. Radulphus Brito, Buridan
seems to acknowledge that the general principles of propositional verification
are a logical problem per se, the property of supposition being the subsidiary
notion thereof. It seems, then, that Buridan maintains some of the main tenets
of thirteenth-century semiotics, his notion of signification being mainly used

chimaera non solum significat conceptum animae, immo cum hoc aliquid aliud quod
isto conceptu concipitur vel aliqua alia quae illo conceptu concipiuntur.
11 Cf. John Buridan, In Perih. (ed. Van der Lecq, 12:1933): Tertia conclusio principalis
ponenda est quod rosa significatur per hoc nomen rosa quamvis etiam nulla sit rosa,
quia hoc nomen rosa impositum est ad significandum ad placitum. Ideo significat sci-
enti impositionem et non solum significat seipsam vel conceptum, sicut arguebatur de
hoc nomine chimaera. Ideo aliquid significat ultra conceptum. Et non aliud quam rosam
vel rosas. Non enim posses assignare quid aliud significaret; igitur significat rosas Sed
huic nomini rosa correspondet conceptus simplex specificus de praedicamento sub-
stantiae. Ideo non potest assignari quod significet aliquid nisi rosam, etsi concessum sit
quod hodie nulla sit rosa.
12 John Buridan, In Perih. (ed. Van der Lecq, 9:2328): Et similiter haec est falsa: chimaera
intelligiturposito (sicut nos ponimus communiter) quod impossibile sit esse chimae-
ramquia omnis propositio affirmativa est falsa in qua aliquis terminorum, scilicet subi-
ectum vel praedicatum, non supponunt pro aliquo vel pro aliquibus. Nec etiam istam
regulam intendo nunc probare, sed suppono eam. Modo constat quod iste terminus chi-
maera, qui erat subiectum in dictis propositionibus, pro nullo supponit, si impossibile sit
chimaeram esse. Ergo etc.
Conclusion 161

at this level. However, he puts forth a terministic logic (to the detriment of the
late thirteenth-century logic of intentions) that reintroduces the problem of
propositional verification into the logical domain.
At any rate, it seems important to reiterate that future research on the logi-
cal discussions that took place during the first twenty years of the fourteenth
century will be most welcome by historians of medieval logic and semantics,
the history of fourteenth-century logic from Ockham and Buridan onwards
having already been extensively and satisfactorily studied.
John Buridans use of the property of supposition brings us to the method-
ological conclusions warranted by this study; for it also justifies excluding an
analysis of thirteenth-century terministic logic. Simply put, the development
of thirteenth-century logic that took place within the framework of, at least,
the Parisian faculty of Arts is largely independent of the parallel development
of thirteenth-century terministic logic. Although masters such as Martin of
Dacia, Boethius of Dacia and Radulphus Brito are undoubtedly acquainted
with the theories of supposition put forth by thirteenth-century scholars such
as Peter of Spain and William of Sherwood, they make next to no use of them
in their logical discussions, even in the obvious cases where the notion of sup-
position would have proven to be useful, most notably in the problems of
propositional verification. Even more surprisingly, this absence is also the case
for the Franciscan theologians Roger Bacon and Peter John Olivi, who are obvi-
ously acquainted with the property of supposition but make no use of it in the
discussions with which this study was concerned. The doctrinal sources
obscure rather than proclaim whether this is due to poor interest in introduc-
ing foreign, albeit helpful, theoretical tools into the discussions, or to a rigid
system of scholarly practices that did not allow such integration. Be that as it
may, the difficulty was overcome by the time of Ockham and Buridan, both of
whom impressively articulate thirteenth-century logical tenets with the here-
tofore poorly used terministic logic.13
On the other hand, the absence of theological themes from the discussions
we have examined also explains our exclusion of theological discussions of a
linguistic nature, e.g. the one concerning divine nomination. The extent of the
interaction between theology, logic and grammar in the thirteenth-century is
indeed difficult to assess. However, while a fair number of thirteenth-century
theological treatises appear to be influenced by some of the discussions that
took place within the faculties of Arts, there is little evidence of a direct influ-
ence of the theological discussions on the logical and grammatical ones we

13 Cf. Biard, Logique et thorie du signe.

162 CONCLUSION

have entertained, Augustines otherwise highly influential De doctrina christi-

ana included.14
Let me finish with a few words of sociological nature. The chronological con-
sideration of the discussions here analysed also bears witness to the fascinating
evolution of the master of Arts role in the thirteenth-century intellectual envi-
ronment. In early masters, such as Nicholas of Paris, we can recognise com-
mentators whose main role is to clarify the content of the authoritative
literature, scarcely stirring the philosophical problems these texts raise. By con-
trast, in later masters like Radulphus Brito we see independent thinkers who
fully engage the philosophical problems earlier masters only briefly discussed,
thereby climbing considerably beyond the mere clarification of authoritative
literature.
With the emergence of European universities, the thirteenth century saw
logic rapidly acquire scientific independence. This process showed a climax in
fourteenth-century nominalism the missing link of modern research on the
history of medieval logic notwithstanding. Thus, the creation of the first
European universities in the thirteenth century represents an important point
of inflexion in the revival of somewhat independent, speculative thinkers,
with a marked interest in well-formulated philosophical problems that, even
compared with the sophistication of our modern linguistics, were impressively
given solid scientific support and treatment.

14 This would also be a breaking point of fourteenth-century logic with respect to the late
thirteenth-century; for, according to Jol Biard, fourteenth-century logic would be largely
based on Augustinian semiotics; cf. Biard, Logique et thorie du signe, pp. 920.
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Abbreviations

ahdlma Archives dhistoire doctrinale et littraire du moyen ge

al Aristoteles latinus
cimagl Cahiers de lInstitut du Moyen-ge Grec et Latin
csel Corpus scriptorum ecclesiasticorum latinorum
CPhD Corpus Philosophorum Danicorum Medii Aevi
cup Cambridge University Press
gg Grecae grammaticae
gl Grammaticae latinae
oup Oxford University Press
pims Pontifical Institute of Medieval Studies
pl Patrologia latina

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Index of Subjects
abstraction32n64, 51n34, 69
accident3, 3940, 5758, 125
action and undergoing of action14n12, 15,
63, 101, 113115, 113n2021, 114n24, 117,
127, 134135, 138
adjective65, 116n32
adverb13n10, 114n24, 115, 124
affection, of the soul1314, 13n10, 34, 52, 110,
111n8
affirmation1921, 23, 121, 149
arrangement (ordo/ordinatio)23, 25, 111, 128,
133, 135, 148
article112115, 114n24
articulation15n16, 52, 124, 128, 155
assertion (enuntiatio)2, 12, 14, 1823, 67,
7176, 78, 83, 84n109, 9092, 9496,
98100, 111, 113, 118121, 121n43, 130139,
139n34, 147n55, 148150, 150n60,
154155, 155n69
accidental56, 82, 91
essential66, 8283, 95, 100, 103104
indefinite84
modal92
quantified8485, 85n111, 154
with empty subject76, 77n84, 8081, 84, 95
attribute (rhma)14, 14n12, 15n16, 1721,
17n21, 19n25, 72, 83, 84n109, 99, 104, 111,
117121, 121n43, 149
being (esse)18, 41, 44, 51, 58n47, 5961, 64,
85, 9699, 120, 126, 131134
actual and dispositional80, 95, 95n133,
9698, 103
categories of7173, 126
imagined48n29
mental43, 48, 76, 95, 102
modes of5961, 68, 97, 139145, 150n60,
152, 155, 158
of essence and of existence9699, 99n144
bivalence, principle of19, 8384
body28, 41, 87n114, 88, 113, 113n20, 116n32, 159
case (casus)65, 117, 129, 131132
cause
efficient43, 47, 83, 113n21
final49, 124125
material155
of logic and grammar9294, 127129,
131, 134, 138, 140, 146, 149154, 150n60
chimera24n40, 159160
cognition50, 54, 68n66
communication26, 1213, 13n8, 15, 1718,
17n21, 21, 25, 30, 35, 4952, 63, 6567,
9192, 100, 105, 110, 143n46, 157, 159
composition18, 5556, 7275, 77n84, 7986,
93, 95, 97, 104, 119120, 124, 124n4, 131,
146, 149, 150n60
concept4, 17n21, 24, 2875, 83, 85n110, 94,
101, 118, 124, 127, 131, 140141, 143, 143n48,
145, 159160
conjunction79n95, 112115, 114n24
contingent94, 121n43
convention/conventional (ad placitum)
1416, 15n16, 16n18, 18, 25, 2728, 44,
4950, 67, 118, 127, 159
copula79, 79n95, 87n114, 96
corporeal/incorporeal27, 27n49, 45, 113,
113n20, 116, 116n31
consignification112, 114, 124, 127128,
144145
co-understanding144145
dialectics/dialectical12, 19, 21, 112, 114,
147n55, 148, 150n60
disposition/dispositional14n12, 66, 73, 80,
87, 9598, 95n133, 103
division1718, 22, 55, 61, 7274, 83, 95,
109n3, 110112, 110n6, 114, 116n32, 118,
126, 136, 139140, 145147, 149, 150n60
enthymeme16
equivocation/equivocal20, 4041, 66,
76n83, 80, 87n114, 92, 95, 99, 100, 103,
118, 149
essence32, 38, 49, 5160, 51n34, 58n47, 70,
76, 92, 9599, 99n144, 101103, 105n159,
151, 157
existence19, 25, 27n49, 34, 52, 5657, 6869,
75, 8081, 83, 84n109, 9499, 99n144,
101105, 120, 126, 129131, 145, 151, 151n64
expression1314, 13n10, 22, 24, 26, 33, 50n33,
110111, 118, 120, 130n18, 138
Index of Subjects
faculty
of Arts36, 53n38, 58, 109, 161
of the soul17n21, 43, 51n34, 53n38, 68
feature
accidental69, 116, 129, 132, 140, 143, 145
essential3134, 57, 63, 98, 116, 132
linguistic22, 28, 53n38, 66, 68, 70, 73, 79,
85n110, 114n25, 115, 115n27, 117119, 121,
125, 129, 130, 155, 158
proper110, 110n6, 112113, 126
figure (figura)88
form17n21, 68
essential or accidental126, 132
intelligible68
multiplicity of105n159
genus3, 3233, 40, 55, 5960, 76, 82,
105n159, 117, 128, 154
God6, 6n10, 24n40, 53n38
good19, 73, 120, 138
grammarian28, 117n32, 126129, 133137, 141,
146, 150154
grammaticality2, 4, 106, 109n3, 118, 121,
126134, 139140, 146, 153156
Idea27n49, 37, 69
identity15n15, 3435, 52, 96, 129130, 131, 154
image (imago/phantasma)11n2, 2728,
28n51, 45, 48n29, 8889, 90n121, 101102
imagination37, 47
imposition and re-imposition4170,
41n1415, 45n21, 48n29, 7475, 87,
8992, 89n117, 117, 124, 124n4, 151, 157
impression28n51, 32
inference70, 8384
inherence87n114, 103
institution of words2, 5, 4546, 45n21, 49,
61, 124125, 151, 155, 157
intellect24, 30, 37, 4650, 51n34, 5253, 56,
5860, 58n47, 62, 6771, 73, 83, 94, 97,
99, 101, 145
intention49, 136
abstract5960
common127128, 153
concrete5960
first5960
logic of70, 147, 158, 160161
second55, 57, 5961, 66, 74, 152155, 157, 159
universal61
177
intentionality69n67, 127
interlocutors12, 17n21, 21
interpretation3, 17, 2223
knowledge61, 63n55, 105, 152
certain147148
human3, 24n40, 25, 55, 68
intellectual18, 45, 50, 5859, 69, 98
methods of146147, 155157
probable147148
letter (littera)13, 22, 24, 43, 110n3, 111n8,
114, 128
likeness (similitudo)1314, 17n21, 3132,
31n63, 34, 3940, 43, 47, 5356, 6970,
75, 127, 142
listener1718, 20, 46, 5557, 74, 101, 110111,
143n46, 159160
logician7, 111, 123, 127129, 133134, 137138,
146150, 152153
mark (nota)16n18, 37, 49, 53, 71
meaning12, 12n4, 25, 158
mediation29
mind1618, 24n40, 2526, 47, 5557, 62,
63n55, 65, 74, 8889, 110, 143, 160
modality59, 65, 77n84, 86, 92, 125126, 148
mode
of being (see being)
of consignifying127128, 144
of imposition89
of signifying60, 66, 68, 72, 94, 124130,
137146, 151155, 157158
of understanding5960, 6768, 7072,
94, 97, 126127, 129, 139145
of verbs117
modistic grammar139140
name
common4142, 5052, 54, 58n45, 70,
112113, 116n32, 139
proper50, 105n159, 112113, 115, 116n32,
119, 139
compound119, 119n39, 121n43
nature14n14, 15, 24, 27, 27n49, 29, 31, 3334,
43, 48n29, 6566, 69, 101, 125126, 153
necessity77n84, 7982, 86
negation1920, 23, 85, 100, 121, 149
nomination161
178
notion (ratio)40, 55, 61, 6971, 87, 90,
9698, 103105, 110, 110n6, 134, 137, 140,
145, 147, 149150
opinion1819, 21, 50n32
participle65, 115
passion25, 28, 31, 37, 48, 53, 55, 131
phoneme114n24
physics149
predicate3, 17n21, 41n14, 56, 7172, 76,
79n95, 8081, 81n99, 83, 85, 85n111,
9596, 103, 113, 113n21, 117, 129130, 132,
136137, 146, 160
predication56, 75, 77n84, 82, 82n104, 9091,
95, 100, 103, 105, 126, 136138
premise147n55, 148, 152, 154
preposition114115, 114n24
pronoun112115, 114n24, 115n2627
proposition20, 55, 82, 96, 103, 153154, 160
propositional
context90
item26
verification4, 70, 73, 76, 9495, 105106,
148, 154155, 158, 160161
psychology25, 149
quality3, 14n12, 30, 38, 41, 116, 116n32,
125126, 130, 132, 134136, 138, 144
quantification/quantifier76n83, 77n84, 79,
8182, 85n110111, 86
reality54, 60, 66, 70, 140, 151, 157
recollection63n55
reference11, 12n4, 57, 72, 75, 77n84, 7880
relation3, 1617, 23, 29, 32, 41, 47, 49, 56, 63,
6566, 66n62, 70, 70n69, 8587, 85n111,
87n114, 96, 101, 103, 129, 131134, 142146,
143n46, 154155, 157
rhetoric16
sayable (dicible/lekton)41, 60, 60n48, 71, 113,
113n17, 113n2021
semantic(s)1, 12, 12n4, 23, 29, 85n110, 87, 94,
110n4, 113, 119, 161
semiotic(s)12, 4, 13, 21, 27, 3435, 38, 41, 50,
52, 54, 57, 61, 64, 66, 70, 7576, 78, 86,
88n116, 92, 95, 99, 106, 122123, 154,
156157, 160, 162
Index of Subjects
sense12n4, 15n16, 24, 26, 42, 47, 50, 62,
76n83, 8081, 92, 101, 103104, 110111,
115, 118, 121, 129n13
sentence (oratio)2, 14, 15n16, 1819, 2223,
73, 75, 9192, 95, 109, 109n3, 111115,
111n9, 115n26, 117121, 127130, 132134,
132n23, 136, 138140, 146, 150151,
153155
sign1314, 13n10, 16, 21, 41, 4344, 6263,
63n55, 7576, 85, 89, 89n116, 92, 119
linguistic2, 15n16, 61, 63, 105, 123, 157
given and natural6162
speaker1618, 20, 26, 4647, 55, 6467,
8991, 96, 101, 110, 143n46
s.s intention67, 96
species
praedicabilis3, 3234, 55, 55n41, 59,
6566, 76, 82, 105n159, 128, 154
intelligibilis31n63, 37n5, 38n9,
44n20, 45n23, 51n34, 56, 60, 62, 68,
74n7879, 75
speech
external23, 47, 113, 133
internal47
parts of45, 65, 109, 109n3, 111112, 111n9,
113118, 115n27, 123126, 124n5, 128129,
132134, 132n23, 137, 139140, 143146,
152154
subject
of accidents140142, 145, 154
of attribution/predication34, 41, 61,
7173, 76, 77n84, 79n95, 8083,
81n99, 82n109, 85, 85n111, 91, 9596,
100, 113, 116117, 120, 129130, 134,
136139, 146, 160
s.-matter22, 70, 147, 157, 159n5
substance3, 3334, 38, 4041, 58, 87, 95,
113n21, 116, 116n32, 124127, 134136, 138,
159
supposition85, 85n110, 160161
syllable109n3, 114, 128
syllogism16, 51, 147148, 148n55, 154
symbol (symbolum/symbolon)1316, 13n10,
15n16, 16n18, 25
syntax/syntactic1, 76n83, 112113
tense117, 121n43, 160
tertium adiacens96, 103104
theology53n38, 58, 161
Index of Subjects
thought1214, 13n10, 1619, 21, 2327, 24n40,
2930, 41n15, 6162, 101
compound17n21, 1820, 28, 133134,
136
simple17n21, 1821, 19n25, 59, 67, 72,
75, 125
object of31, 90
time18, 26, 66, 84, 88, 90, 100, 118120
token/type15, 15n15, 25, 66, 70, 115n26
translation3, 7, 13n10, 14, 14n12, 2122,
22n34, 2526, 25n42, 109
truth
and falsity4, 18, 7374, 119, 121, 127139,
146150, 153, 155
truth-determination73, 155
179
truth-value1819, 21, 72, 76, 77n84, 121,
121n43, 148, 155, 155n69
universality52, 59, 61, 65, 6870
universals5051, 51n34, 52, 5455, 61, 64, 65,
68, 84, 128, 154
univocity/univocal1112, 15, 16n18, 41, 66,
87n114, 100
verb (verbum)4, 14n12, 2223, 23n35, 26, 2831,
34, 44, 7172, 9698, 103, 109, 113118,
114n24, 121130, 133138, 139n34, 143
verification/verificational4, 12, 21, 35, 38, 41,
70, 73, 76, 92, 9495, 105106, 148,
154155, 158, 160161
Index of Modern Authors

Arens, H.28n48 Isaac, J.6n9

Ashworth, E.J.6n10, 41n15, 53n38, 85n110
Aubenque, P.11n12 Kelly, L.G.123n2, 124n4, 139n35
Ayer, A.J.158n1 Kneepkens, C.H.123n2, 128n12, 132n23,
139n33
Bck, A.83n104 Kretzmann, N.11n2, 13n910, 14n14,
Baratin M.109n12, 113n18, 117n32, 117n34 25n42, 26
Barney, R.14n14
Belardi, W.13n910 Law, V.109n3
Bermon, E.62n50, 63n55 Lewry, P.O.42n17, 43n18
Biard, J.39n10, 63n56, 158n34, 161n13, Long, A.A.112n15
162n14 Luhtala, A.116n30
Bobzien, S.12n6, 20n27
Boureau, A.70n69 Magee, J.22n31, 24n40, 26n44, 27n49
Brancacci, A.14n14 Maloney, T.S.63n56, 87n114
Brumberg-Chaumont, J.49n30, 147n53 Marenbon, J.2n2, 4n7, 6n10, 22n31,
41n15
Cameron, M.2n2, 4n7 Markus, R.A.62n50
Cesalli, L.39n10, 77n84, 81n100 Marmo, C.36n1, 44n19, 52n36, 63n56, 123n3,
Charles, D.17n21 124n4, 139n35
Chiesa, C.14n13 Martin, C.J.43n15, 89n117
Christensen, J.112n15 Montanari, E.13n9
Conti, A.39n10, 42n17 Mora-Mrquez, A.M.4n5, 5n8, 13n78,
Crivelli, P.18n24, 84n109, 104n156 39n10, 48n27, 48n29, 58n45, 66n63,
74n76, 77n84, 96n137
Da Silva, J.F.43n18
De Libera, A.32, 51n34, 77n84, 87n114 Noriega-Olmos, S.13n8, 17n21
De Nonno, M.109n3, 121n45
De Rijk, L.M.11n1 Panaccio, C.46n24
Donati, S.58n47 Pasnau, R.68n66
Dutilh Novaes, C.85n110 Ppin, J.13n910
Perler, D.36n1, 69n67
Ebbesen S.3n4, 22n30, 27n49, 39n10, Pinborg, J.48n27, 55n41, 123n2, 124n4,
55n41, 58n47, 76n8384, 92n125, 109n1, 139n35, 159, 159n56
141n41 Pini, G.36n1
Pironnet, F. and J. Spruyt76n83
Fredborg, K.M.124n5 Putallaz, F.X.68n66
Frede, M.113n21 Putnam, H.1, 11n3

Goubier, F.76n83, 77n84, 79n95 Read, S.77n84, 84n110

Gourinat, J.B.110n6, 112n1516, 113n1718, Robert, A.58n46
113n20 Rosier-Catach, I.6n10, 41n15, 53n38, 63n56,
66n63, 88n116, 123n2, 124n45, 132n23,
Hunt, R.W.124n5 139n35, 140n3738, 151n64
Index of Modern Authors 181
Tabarroni, A.77n84
Sedley, D.14n14, 112n15 Thom, P.104n156
Shields, C.12n6 Toivanen, J.68n66
Speaks, J.158n2
Spruit, L.68n66 Valente, L.6n10, 41n15
Suto, T.22n31, 2526, 25n43, 26n4445,
27n49, 29, 29n59 Wheeler, M.12n4
Whitaker, C.W.A.11n1, 13n9, 15n16, 119n39
Index of Ancient and Medieval Authors
Albert the Great37, 37n5, 4952, 49n3031,
50n3233, 51n3435, 54, 7071, 72n74,
73n75, 75
Alexander of Aphrodisias21, 27, 30, 32,
3637
Alexander of Hales53n38
Anonymus Alani8081, 80n97, 81n98,
81n101, 83n106, 84n107, 86n112, 88,
88n115, 93, 98101, 99n142144, 99n146,
100n148149, 101n150, 103105, 103n154,
104n155, 105n159
Anonymus Erfordensis77n84, 78n94, 82,
82n103
Anonymus Liberanus78n94
Anonymus Oxford5n8, 42n17, 43n18,
44n20, 46, 72n74, 128n12, 133134,
135n27, 136n28, 139
Apollonius Dyscolus109n3, 110n4, 112,
114117, 114n2325, 115n26, 116n3031,
118n36
Aristotle35, 3n3, 1121, 11n2, 12n46,
14n1112, 15n16, 16n1720, 17n2122,
18n2324, 20n2629, 23, 23n35, 2631,
28n53, 34, 3638, 38n8, 39n10, 44,
48n29, 49n31, 50n32, 53, 55, 7173,
77n84, 8284, 82n104105, 84n108109,
93, 99100, 99n145, 100n147, 104105,
104n156, 109, 111, 112n12, 116n32, 117121,
118n36, 119n3740, 120n4142,
121n4344, 123, 136137, 139, 139n34,
149, 159
Auctoritates Aristotelis99n145
Augustine6, 6n10, 25n43, 6163, 62n5054,
66, 162
Avicenna57
Boethius25, 3n3, 11, 13n10, 2134,
22n3134, 23n3537, 24n3841,
27n4749, 28n50, 28n52,
28n5456, 29n5758, 30n6061,
31n6263, 32n65, 33n6668,
34n6970, 3637, 37n2, 37n4, 38,
38n6, 41n15, 42, 42n16, 48, 48n28,
50n32, 7071, 75, 87, 87n113,
105, 109, 111n8, 123n1, 133, 133n24
Boethius of Dacia2, 6, 55n41, 80, 81n102,
86, 9296, 92n125, 93n127128,
94n131, 95n132, 99, 104, 104n156, 106,
140143, 140n3637, 141n40,
142n4243, 143n44, 150n60, 155,
157, 161
Bonaventure53n38
Cicero26, 26n46
Damascenus50n33
Diogenes Laertius110n6, 112n15, 113n19,
113n22
Diogenes of Babylon110n6, 112n16
Donatus3n4, 109n3
Henry of Ghent53n38
Incertus sf36, 5457, 55n4142, 56n43,
57n44, 74
Johannes Pagus79, 79n96
John Buridan159161, 159n710, 160n1112
John Duns Scotus4, 4n6, 3639, 36n1, 38n9,
40n1112, 53n38, 70, 73n76, 74n7779,
75, 75n81, 78, 78n93, 80, 139
John of Dacia44n19, 78, 78n90, 143n46
Lysias15n15
Martin of Dacia6, 37, 4749, 48n2729, 73,
73n76, 75, 137, 137n30, 139140,
140n3739, 141n40, 142143, 146149,
146n5051, 147n52, 148n56, 149n5758,
150n60, 155, 161
Michael of Marbais78, 78n89, 101, 101n151
Nicholas of Paris4, 6, 13n7, 41n13, 42n17,
7172, 71n7071, 72n73, 73n75, 79,
79n96, 128n12, 133135, 133n25, 134n26
Peter of Auvergne36, 5254, 52n3637,
53n39, 54n40, 55n41, 57, 139
Peter Helias5, 124126, 124n5, 125n68,
132n23, 135n27
Index of Ancient and Medieval Authors
Peter John Olivi56, 36, 61, 63, 6670,
66n63, 67n64, 68n6566, 69n6768,
70n69, 78, 78n87, 80, 9599, 96n134
138, 97n139, 98n140141, 161
Peter of Spain79, 79n9596, 85n110, 161
Plato14, 14n14, 112n12
Porphyry3, 3n3, 21, 27, 27n49, 33, 37, 50
Priscian25, 3n4, 38, 38n7, 53n38, 65, 106,
109112, 109n13, 110n47, 111n810,
112n1214, 114118, 115n27, 116n2832,
117n3335, 121, 123, 124n5, 125126, 130,
132n23, 139
Pseudo-Denys53n38
Pseudo-Johannes Pagus138139, 138n32
Pseudo-Kilwardby4447, 44n1920,
45n2123, 46n24, 47n2526, 49, 50n33,
77n84, 78, 78n88, 124n4, 126127, 126n9,
127n10, 128n1112, 129n1315, 130133,
130n16, 130n18, 131n1921, 132n22, 139,
145, 155, 155n69
Radulphus Brito2, 6, 13n7, 36, 39, 39n10,
5759, 58n45, 58n47, 60n48, 61, 61n49,
66, 68, 7576, 76n82, 78, 78n85, 78n92,
183
80, 94n129, 102, 102n152153, 106, 137,
137n31, 140, 140n3637, 143, 143n45,
144n47, 145n4849, 146148, 147n5455,
151, 151n6164, 152n65, 153n6667,
154155, 154n68, 157, 159162
Robert Kilwardby6, 42n17, 43, 43n18, 44n20,
46, 49, 7172, 71n72, 133, 136, 136n29, 139
Roger Bacon56, 3637, 37n5, 61, 6368,
63n56, 64n5759, 65n6061, 66n62, 70,
78, 78n86, 80, 8792, 87n113114, 88n116,
89n117118, 90n119120, 91n122123,
92n124, 96, 99101, 157, 161
Siger of Brabant6, 36, 58n47, 78, 78n91,
78n94
Simon of Faversham6, 36, 78n85, 139,
139n34
Thomas Aquinas6, 6n9, 41n15, 49n29,
53n38, 68
Walter Burley39, 39n10, 67n64
William of Ockham158, 161
William of Sherwood79, 161