1

ETHNIC MILITIAS AND CHALLENGES OF DEMOCRATIC

GOVERNANCE IN NIGERIA

BY
Gani Joses YOROMS PhD
Professor of International Relations,
Geopolitics/comparative Studies and Global Governance
Centre for Strategic Research and Studies
National Defence College Abuja

Paper presented at the African Berlin Conference held at the National Defence College Abuja
Febuary 2014
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ETHNIC MILITIAS AND CHALLENGES OF DEMOCRATIC

GOVERNANCE IN NIGERIA
BY
Gani Joses YOROMS PhD
Department of Defence and Security Studies
Centre for Strategic Research and Studies
National Defence College Abuja

ABSTRACT
Since the inauguration of civil rule in 1999 Nigeria has experienced turbulent political crises.
The governance process has been smeared by the rise of ethnic militias across the country.
Each aggrieved ethnic group that has been marginalised found expression in using its ethnic
militia to defend its political and economic interests. This poses serious challenge to Nigerian
democratic governance. Though capable the state security agents are rendered
inconsequential in tackling the menaces of the militias. This research work attempts to analyse
the rise of ethnic militias, its impact on various conflicts and the challenges that the
democratic governance faces with the increase of various ethnic militias.

INTRODUCTION

The rise of ethnic militias and the wars of ethnic competitions in Nigeria have been crises-
cutting around the country since the inauguration of third republican government in 1999 1
This has thrown up several postulations by citizens on how their desires for democratic
governance could be met. Nigeria has suffocated under a second period of military rule for 16
years (1979-1999) after the first period which started from 1966 to 1979. When the civil
democratic rule was opened up in 1999 it the political class were like prisoners released from
the dudgeon of hell. Indeed ethnic groups in turn saw the military withdrawal from politics as
liberation from clutches of oppression. As a result, ambitious political class began to mobilize
their ethnic groups to compete for political powers. In the process the capacity of government
to regulate these competitions was consumed by its inability to exercise its power of
legitimate use of force. This further aggravated the process of ethnic mobilisation as each
ethnic group competes to occupy the political space. The use of ethnic militias by each ethnic
group exacerbates the process.

This chapter attempts to, first, understand the concept of ethnic militia and how it evolved;
and the relationship it has in triggering or undermining democratic governance. The second
part of the chapter addressed how ethnic militias have exacerbated ethnic conflicts in Nigeria.
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In the third section, it provides empirical correlations of ethnic militia to democratic

governance. The fourth part addresses the challenges of democratic governance in a society
replete with ethnic militias.

THE CONCEPTS OF MILLITIAS AND DEMOCRATIC GOVERNANCE

The concept of Militia is historically determined by the nature of a given society. The
concept can be used either positively or negatively, depending on the historical and political
developments that evolved from a society. For instance, a society that emerges from a critical
situation in search of nationhood tends to be deeply divided on how to chart the course of the
nation that will accommodate various contending interests. The differences among the groups
may lead to conflicts in which each may raise ethnic militia to fight for their ethnic course.
Meanwhile from the positive view point, the concept is fundamentally designed by a society
where selected able-bodied citizens are set up to support regular military in the defence of the
course of the society that is held under siege of foreign occupation, emergencies or disasters.

The concept of militia is generally a military concept referring to armed men, with or
without statutory authority to maintain and defend a given interest. From a statutory point of
view, militia is an auxiliary force. It involves a recruitment of citizens for military service where
they are utilised uring warfare or peace time to assist in time of emergency to support military
professionalism in any given crises situation. As an auxiliary force militia is a non-regular
involved in some form of military discipline, organization and tactics. Its activities compliment
rather than usurp the power and authority of regular forces 2.

As a public or state sponsored unit they are involved in support professional soldiers to cope
with societal challenges like wars, disasters, emergencies and related police actions. They are
sometimes called Reserve Force, Auxiliary Force, Citizens Soldiers or National Militia. In the
view of the emerging contradictions in the global system the meaning and the uses of militias
is also changing. Therefore, there is a distinction between national and ethnic militia. Ethnic
militias emerge as result of pressure for self determination. Ethnic groups held under
suppression are raising their militia men to confront, fight and break state monopoly and
repression. Thus, with trends in globalisation where resources are getting scarcer and
governance has become exclusive to certain groups, ethnic groups are now using militias as
revolutionary pressure groups or forces to challenge their marginalisation from the political
space. This is common in political societies where politics is run like a business rather than a
service to the people. As a business there are both political and economic interests. The
political elites and their ethnic groups only look forward to the time they will grasp political
power and use it to their advantage than that of the whole society.
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The rising of ethnic militia rather than national militia is triggered by the nature and
character of the state. The collapse of the state system provides the basis for ethnic
consciousness and mobilizations. This means to actualize this consciousness it has becomes
necessary for ethnic groups to raise for themselves their own ethnic militias. And the rise of
ethnic militia in Nigeria took root under the authoritarian and repressive periods of military
rule in Nigeria especially 1985-1999. All the suppressed ethnic groups evaporated with all sorts
of agitations, given the ventilation with the military withdrew from the political space in 1999.
Never the less, democracy has rules and regulations governing processes for capturing political
power. Where conflict especially violent conflicts replace these rules and regulations, there
must be some fundamental measures taken to contain them.

Democratic governance is a process which political institutions of the state set out
measures for regular conduct of state affairs, and it enables political parties (rather than ethnic
groups) to compete on how to govern the state, through constitutional provisions. Democratic
governance provides the basic rules for the observance of the rule of law, transparency and
consensus by citizens in their participation to define who governs. 3 The use of political parties
in democratic governance cuts across ethnic and social groups while the use of ethnicity in
politics is narrowed to only a group of people with similar affinity. Therefore, political parties
rather than ethnic groups are allowed to organize political process that can accommodate all
interests in the society.

Unfortunately, the failures to ensure the application of the principle of democracy do

affect the process of democratic governance. That is why when state institutions are weak
democratic process is undermined. This creates room for ethnic militias to thrive as ethnic
groups embark on other means to achieve their political ambitions. Democracy is an ideal that
espouses transparency and rule of law in governance, providing measures that encompasses
the participation of all in the determination and function of governance and governmental
operations. Election is the first indicator for determining democratic imperative but it is not
sufficient to provide stable democratic growth. 4

Democracy provides the platform for agitation, demands, opposition and cross cutting
politics. There is always a room for the aggrieved to express themselves through party politics,
parliamentary opposition and other forms of democratic channels of communications.
However, under military rules, freedom of expression was suppressed and the opposition
groups went underground. Those that were confident and stay afloat to challenge military
policies were framed up, tortured and butchered to death. Several journalists and human
rights activists like Dele Giwa and Ken Saro Wiwa among others paid the price for the fight for
democracy, human rights and grass root development in Nigeria. The military regimes did not
only destroy the military as an institution but also such social institutions like education, the
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economy and the political system, in order to create false credibility for itself. Even when a
political transition was put in place the implementation process was autocratically truncated.
Thus the transition programmes of the military regime lack moral foundation as it was not
difficult for these structures to collapse no sooner than when the process started . 5 The
political transition of General Ibrahim Babangidas government was unending. As a result, the
high hopes built into the orientation of masses to participate the political process turned to
despair6 . This made ethnic groups to begin to define their bearing within the context of
marginalisation, ethnic militias are used to achieve the purpose of ethnic competition.
Furthermore, ethnic groups begin to put pressures for power sharing, resource control and
functional (systemic or fiscal) federalism. The agitations for Sovereign National Conference
were also intended to actualize their demands even as they mobilise their ethnic militias to
carry out by violence where political negotiations have failed.

It is in the course of these developments that ethnic militias found relevance, at the time
when the Nigeria military regimes closed all channels of expressions and participation by the
citizens to exercise their rights and privileges. The bottled up channel began to burst when, in
addition, the regime of Babangida introduced the economic structural adjustment programme
which equally threatened the survival of ethnic groups and individual citizens. Individuals now
turn to those variables like ethnicity, and employing militia tendencies to survive. Therefore,
ethnicity became a means for mobilization and entrenching survival. Ethnic mobilization is
characterized by exclusiveness in inter-group competition and the consciousness of being one
in relation to others 7(Nnoli: 1978). While ethnic mobilization may serve as providing the basics
for ethnic attainment it could also establish some sort of relationship with democracy 8 . In
short when it becomes increasingly difficult for one to exercise his fundamental human rights,
ethnic violence opens up the space to do so.

ETHNIC MILITIA AND THE RISE OF CONFLICTS IN NIGERIA

The annulment of June 12 general election which most ethnic groups hoped could
open up a new dimension of political participation turned out to be sour .Ethnic groups lost
interests in anything that has to do with the Nigerian state. Hitherto, groups that had began
the fight for self determination found justification when the elections were annulled .For
instance the Movement for Survival of the Ogoni people (MOSOP) has long started the
agitations for its independence from the Nigeria state during the military regimes became. It
could be recalled how the military regime deployed armed soldiers who invaded and
bastardized Ogoniland among others, killings and destroying lives and property. The town of
Emueachem was burnt to ashes and several lives were lost alongside the village head. 9
Increasingly soldiers were continuously used to intervene in various communal conflicts. Ethnic
groups that are influential used the military to deploy troops in support of one ethnic group
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against the other. Those without influential supports in the government armed their militias to
defend themselves. With the return to democratic rule in 1999 there were sporadic
emergences of ethnic militias. Depending on how one categorise them, the former Chief of
Defence Staff General Alex Ogbumodia noted that :

However, groups like the Egbesu in the Niger Delta and the Tivs/Jukun/Kuteb
combatants in the Middle Belt may be easily classified as militia groups. While
the Odua People Congress and the Arewa Peoples Congress was originally
conceived essentially as an ethnic militia groups to advance the course of their
ethnic region. The Bakassi Boys was originally organized as an ethnically
exclusive urban vigilante group to root the towns and villages in the region of
armed bandits, criminals and ritual murderers. Each of these outfits have now
acquired a dual character and operate part as militia and part as vigilante
groups .In some cases, they are used to perpetrate illegalities and crimes
including settling of scores. Regardless of all these groups undoubtedly have
some bearing on democracy and national security in Nigeria 10

Some of these conflicts are communal but there are others that emerged as a result of direct
confrontation with the Nigerian state and/or among /between ethnic groups who are
championing resource controls. This again is as a result of neglect and marginalization suffered
by groups in terms of development and participation in government, jobs and employment
opportunities. There are those ethnic militias from disadvantaged state whose resources have
been extracted for the entire development of the country that felt they have been
marginalised. There are multiples of Niger Delta militia groups that have emerged agitating for
resource control such as the Movement for the Emancipation of Niger Delta (MEND), Niger
Delta Volunteer Force (NDVF), the Egbesu Boys and Ijaw Peoples Congress among others). To
be specific, the Niger Delta ethnic militias became more vibrant when the two million man
march of 1998, was organised by the Youth Earnestly ask for Abacha (YEA). Youths that
arrived Abuja to campaign for General Abachas permutation in office found Abuja much like
London in Africa. And on reflection it was realised that resources that were used to develop
Abuja were from their localities in Niger Delta through oil exploration.

The Niger Delta crises brew and grew .It expanded as civil rule was installed in 1999. With
the inauguration of a new democratic government under Obasanjo they had hoped for a
respite .However, Obasanjo, having his roots in the military; though a civil president was
behaving like a military dictator. The killing of security personnel in one of the villages of Niger
Delta, Odi, though something to vilify but the approach adopted by the government in
deploying armed soldiers to kill and destroy lives and property was contrary to the rule of law
in a democracy. The village paid for the killing of the security personnel, through extra-judicial
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killing by the Nigerian state. The drive to sustain extra-judicial killings by the democratic state
continues to provoke the rise of ethnic militias. The increase in the attacks from Boko Haram
sect was a result of the extra-judicial killing of their leader Mallam Yusuf Mohammed by the
civil regime of Umar Musa Yaardua. This has equally exacerbated the militant activities of the
sect who has now introduced acts of terrorism into its pattern of militancy.

ETHNIC MILITIA AND DEMOCRATIC GOVERNANCE IN NIGERIA

Elsewhere we have noted that democratization is coterminous with the rise of ethnic
conflict. Osaghae, defined this on the basis of situationality thesis 11 , a situation where militias
serve as ingredients of mobilization by ethnic groups for capturing political power. At the
advent of democratic rule on 29th may 1999 it is expected that political contest would be
devoid of conflict even if ethnic mobilization is the means of achieving the end. The rise and
intensity with which ethnic militias were mobilsed for political gains, by ethnic elites; rendered
useless the rules and regulations governing democratic rule. The gains from military withdraw
from politics did not actually bring about democratic governance because the democratic
institutions are weak, lacking the culture of enforcing rules and regulations for entrenching
democracy. This is not to say conflicts do not exist in a democracy. It does. Democratic
conflicts are eufunctional rather than dysfunctional. .

There are conflicts in a democracy but they are resolved by rules and regulations governing the
democratic process. Unfortunately what emerged in 1999 was indeed a civil regime without
democratic content. The absence democratic content gives it a slim mandate to govern
democratically. For a civil regime to attain an authorizing mandate there has to be a will-
leadership overridden by strong political institutions based on rule of law and defined by
irreducible minimum accepted by sizeable population. The failure to arrive at this would
always result to agitations and pressure for the equation of national question. The Obasanjo
regime was forced to organise National Political Reform Conference in 2005 when the pressure
for (sovereign) National Conference was heating up the polity. This was because of the inability
of the regime to demonstrate that the mandates given to it in 1999 and 2003 were
Authoritative Mandate. Unfortunately the political reform conference turned out to be
Obasanjos agenda for the third term in office. However, if Dr. Goodluck Jonathans national
conference which was inaugurated in early 2014 does not lead to an agenda; it could be part
of the processes of building strong political institutions. If his determination to pursue
transformation agenda is successful, he would have demonstrated the quality of a will-
leadership that should drive democratic governance, which Nigeria lack.

Obasanjos regime was a child of the military and not of the Nigeria people. The military
having destroyed the Nigeria state was held in self-suspicion and being dreaded of its status
after office, searched for someone that could land Nigeria softly 12. Thus the theory of soft
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landing was thrown up to suggest that in avoiding a tempestuous eruption there is need for
an insurmountable and towering personality or a group of individuals whose participation in
the political system would be like a standing pillars, holding a house that is about to collapse
together. The strength of the pillar would be such that the process of landing would not be
disruptive 13 (Yoroms: 2000). The onus therefore falls on locating an experienced retired
military officer whose equal knowledge of the operation of the military as an institution and
the civil society is required to take over national leadership. Such a leader may not be
acceptable to all factions in the society but must be the most preferred, of all the contenders,
because of his ability to wield the blinking swords of crises/break up from all the ethnic groups
in the country into plowshares. 14

It is unfortunate that it has been difficult because according to Omoruyi , politics in

Nigeria is seen as a business, and participating in politics is like investing in business which
should yield profits 15 (Omoruyi 1999) . Thus, As Fredrick Fasheun, President of the erstwhile
dreaded Odua Peoples Congress (OPC) noted OPC emerged as a social platform to identify
the problems of the Yorubas, to agitate against the marginalisation of the Yorubas, to defend,
to protect and promote their socio cultural aspect; and also fight for justice for all. Thats why
OPC came to be (sic) 16 . He further buttressed that as a cultural organization, OPC is to

Defend the right of every Yoruba person on earth. It (OPC) is an umbrella

organization of the Yoruba to articulate our stand on issues that affect our
interest. It is also arrived at helping to get the Yoruba together to speak
with one voice instead of fighting ourselves over disagreements on issues 17

Its membership cuts across Pan-Yoruba ethnic groups within and outside Nigerian, with a
profile of heavy weights from the military, politics and business class as members. It began, as
usual, as a pro-democracy activist movement to anti-crime vigilante group and transforming
into an ethnic militias and engaging in insurrectional activities 18 (Obasi: 2001). As a pro-
democracy movement it supported Chief Moshood Abiola when he declared himself a
president after the annulment of the June 12 Presidential elections. The group made protests
and carried out demonstration to defend the arrest and detention of Chief Abiola. Its
involvement in vigilante activities is based on the fact that the:

Nigeria police have been polluted. They are not sincere again (sic) if
police want to get armed robbers, it will not take them long time, instead they
will say they have published a wanted list, looking for suspects for thee years
without getting them. Why? Because the suspect is settling them. So that is
the problem we are having in the county now 19
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Under this pretence OPC has raided hideouts of alleged criminals in Lagos, Ilesa and other places
in the Southwest; the aftermath of which has led to several killings and burnings of properties.
These illegal actions undertaken by OPC were mostly not challenged by the state security
operatives. As a result they were encouraged to get involve in some insurrections. However,
intermittently whenever the police tend to react to arrest them they were attacked and some
were poured acid. In Bariga, Lagos state, a Divisional Police officer (DPO) Afolabi Amao was
kidnapped for detaining a self confessed armed robber who happened to be an OPC member.

The position of OPC has also been maintained by other militias that have emerged on the
eve of transition to civil rule. These other groups are the Ijaw Peoples Congress, the Bakkasi
Boys otherwise known as Anambra State Vigilante Service (AVS), Arewa Peoples Congress, Igbo
Peoples Congress and the Egbesu Boys of Niger Delta. Most of the Niger delta ethnic groups
have declared one charter or the other demanding the control of their resources in the area.
Notable among them are the karma Declaration of December 1998, by Ijaw youth, The Alaka
Declaration of January 1999 by Ogba people and the Oron Bill of Rights by Oron people of
Oloibiri, the first place where oil was discovered in 1956. Already the Ogoni bill of rights had
found acceptability among the international community which others have used to strengthen
their own demands.

Furthermore, in the Igbo area of South east the Movement for the Actualization of the
State of Biafra (MASSOB) has emerged, championing the course of the Igbo People. It has built
enormous sympathy among the Igbos that the possibility of it actualizing its views by violence
may not be in doubt once the federal government becomes incapable of resolving contending
national issues. Meanwhile the Bakassi boys in Anambra state have been foremost fighting
crimes but could be a source of political interests if not well managed. However, their activities
have been legislated by an edict enacted by the Anambra state government and it is known
Anambra vigilante Service (AVS). As an official state militia/vigilante group their activities have
turned sour when they visited mayhem on the police, the people of Onitsha and other parts of
the state where criminals were fished out and executed. Thus, with the legislation, AVS has
taken over the role of the police which is very dangerous for Nigerias democracy;

Legitimizing an ethnic militia is not the way out. The idea is fraught with so many
inbuilt dangers. Apart from the fact that the militia men are not trained for the job they
are suppose to perform, there are endless possibilities for miscarriage of justice, extra-
judicial execution and political victimization and proliferation of ethnic militia and
warlords. 20

It is in the midst of all these pressures and demand that the Ijaw youths kidnapped
and killed 12 police officers in Odi village. This aggravated the Obasanjos government
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who deployed soldiers to Odi to seek and arrest the armed youths who killed the officers.
This eventually led to a full scale operation that led to the destruction of the village. The
same episode happened in Zaki Biam, Benue state where Tiv militias killed some soldiers
who were on surveillance in the area following communal clashes. The killing of the
soldiers also led to a reprisal by the military and the subsequent destruction of lives and
property in Zaki Biam.

TABULATION OF SOME COMMUNAL CONFLICTS PERPETRATED BY ETHNIC MILITIAS PRIOR TO THE RISE OF
TERRORISM IN 2009

S/N DATE LOCATION PRINCIPLE ACTORS

SELECTED
1 May 31, 1999 Warri mayhem (delta) Violent clash between the Ijaw and
Itsekiri communities which has its roots in
the grievances harbored by the Olu of
Warri and his subjects over the
recognition of new kings in Warri by the
military administration.

2 July 2,1999 Sagamu crisis (ogun) A violent ethnic clash between the Yoruba
resident and the Hausa /Fulani residents.
The news attributed the crisis to the OPC.

3 July 22, 1999 Kano reprisal killing Hausa/Fulani youth took vengeance on
the killing of their kith and kin in
Sagamu. Their target was the Yoruba
community.

4 August 4, 1999 Arobo-ijaws/ilaje A violent clash between two feuding

clash (Ondo) communities, the Ijaw and Ilaje
communities in Arobo, Ondo state.

5 October 5, 1999 Eleme/ okirika Violent clash between the Eleme and
(rivers) Okirika communities over traditional and
legal titles to the stretch of land where
port Harcourt refinery is located.
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6 October 19, 1999 Ijaw/ OPC (Ajegunle, It reported to be an extension of the

Lagos) Arobo-Ijaw/Ilaje crisis which started with
kidnap of an Ijaw man.

7 October 1999 Aguleri-umeleri A violent communal clash between two

(Anambra) neighboring communities of Aguleri and
Umulari. It is linked to the April 4 clash
which resulted from an orgy of hatred
and vengeance.

8 Nov. 8, 1999 Odi killing (bayelsa) Youth group associated with Egbesu
youth kidnapped and killed police men in
revenge of the killing of their members.
The Ajegunle Ijaw/ OPC community. The
town received a shelling and
bombardment with artillery from
soldiers.

9 Nov. 16, 1999 Oleh-olomuro (isoko- A bloody communal clash between Oleh
delta) and Olomuro over sharing of used pipes
from Oleh-Olomuro flow station.

10 Nov.26, 1999 Eleme/okirika (rivers) An extension of hostility between the two

neighboring communities of Eleme and
okirika.

11 Feb. 28, 200 Kaduna mayhem Kaduna city exploded in violence as

(Kaduna) Muslim and Christian extremists and
other hoodlums clashed over the proposal
to introduce Sharia.

12 Feb.28, 2000 Aba reprisal riot The riot which began in Aba, Abia state
as a reprisal to that of Kaduna. Later
spread to other eastern state. It was
reported that the Aba riot was a fall-out
of Kaduna violence.

13 March 10, 2000 Ife-modakeke crisis Communal killings between Ife and
(osun) Modakeke communities of Ijesha. This
was a fresh hostility after a long truce. It
is believed to have a history of ancestral
rivalry which became heightened by local
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govt. creation and the tussle over the

location of the head quarters of the new
LGC.

14 March 18,2000 Okirika-eleme crisis A communal hostility between the Eleme

(rivers) and the Okirika communities which
degenerated claiming several lives.

15 April 2000 Gokana communal A bloody encounter involving sic

crisis (rivers) communities in Gokana LG of River state.

16 April 14, 2000 Agyragu crisis Communal clash that started with a
(Nasarawa) protest against the location of local govt.
headquarters. The militant youth group
started the riot and later took to the
streets killing and destroying.

17 May 4, 2000 Ife-modakeke 11 Another round of hospitality between the

(Osun) two warring communities.

18 May 16, 2000 Akaasa-igwama A bloody ethnic encounter between the

(Bayelsa) Akaasa and Igwama communities.

19 June 5, 2000 Olowo stool crisis A violent clash between supporters of two
(Ondo) linage groups over the succession of the
Owo stool. The tomb of pa Ajasin was
destroyed in the conflict.

20 July 2000 Tsagari crisis (Kwara) Clash between Tsagari and share
communities of Kwara state which
claimed several lives.

21 Sept. 8, 2000 Kaltungo religious A religious violence that was sparked off
crisis (Gombe) by the presence of the states sharia
implementation committee.

22 Oct. 17, 2000 OPC-Hausa/Fulani A faceoff between the militant members

(Lagos) of OPC and Hausa/Fulani community
over supremacy of emirate system in the
state.

23 Oct.18, 2000 OPC-Hausa/Fulani Violent clashes between the militant OPC

(lagos) and Hausa resident in Ajegunle which
escalated and spread to other arts of the
city recording heavy causalities. It was
gathered that the clash might have been a
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spillover of Ilorin crisis.

24 Oct. 21, 2000 Minna reprisal Violent ethnic crisis erupted after the
(Niger) OPC assaults in kwara and Lagos state.

25 Oct. 22, 2000 Owaale-Olukare crisis Hostility between owaale and olukare of
(ondo) ikare (Ondo state) over obaship.

26 Dec. 2, 2000 Hadejia crisis (jigawa) A sectarian disturbance that was caused
by a debate between muslim and christens
in hadejia (jigawa). There was wanton
destruction of workshop places.

27 June 28, 2001 Azara crisis (jigawa) An ethnic conflict between the Tiv and the
Azara indigenes. It started with gruesome
killing of an Azara traditional leader. And
later spread to the Tiv village. With the
Tiv community on the defense.

28 Sept. 7, 2001 Jos crisis A violent ethnic religious crisis between

the Muslim/Hausa and Fulani Christian
indigenes. The subject of discord between
the Jasawa development association and
plateau youth council was political over
political appointment in Jos north.

29 Sept. 15, 2001 Onitsha reprisal A reprisal killing of northern. In Onitsha

after the Jos crisis in which several Igbos
fell victim.

30 Oct. 2001 Okirika crisis A chieftaincy crisis which now bled into
(clan) violence encounter that claimed
several lives and destruction of properties.

31 Oct. 12, 2001 Kano riot A peaceful anti-American protest over the
bombing of Afghanistan turned violent.
Taking ethnic and religious tone. It
degenerated into uncontrollable violence
which claimed lives and damaged
properties and places of worship.
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32 Oct. 29, 2001 Tiv-jukun/Fulani An ethnic clash between Tivs and

conflict Jukun/Fulani which was extension of the
may 2001 clash and could be linked with
the protracted dispute between both sides.
Newswatch reported that 16 soldiers were
killed which later lead to the gruesome
revenge on the Tivs, by the Nigerian
army.

33 Nov. 2, 2001 Gwantu crisis A clash that started on a political ground

(over the relocation of LG headquarters)
later took on ethno-religious dimensions
which in places of worship were destroyed.

34 Dec. 30, 2001 Vwang crisis A violent communal conflict in Vwang

district between the indigenes and non-
indigene exploded in the backdrop of
sept.7 Jos crisis. It started when an illegal
group of 40 men attacked the district head
of Vwang. It also had religious colouring.

35 Jan. 18, 2002 Awe crisis A renewed communal clash between two
indigenous communities in awe LG of
Nasarawa state. The cause was not certain
but two people was killed and several
others injured.

36 Feb. 12, 2002 Idi araba mayhem An inter-ethnic violent between the Hausa
resident community and the Yoruba
resident in Idi Araba (Lagos). It started on
the trivial accusation of the Yoruba man
being man handled nut later escalated and
took on ethnic line.

37 March 25, 2002 Ikom crisis A fresh hostility erupted at Ikom, cross
rivers, when Ofara natives launched a
revenge attack against their Nselle
neighbors, killing ten (10) people in the
process.

38 March 2002 Ika community clash An inter-communal war in Ika local govt.
of Akwa-Ibom state hundreds of lives were
said to be perished.
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39 May 2. 2002 Jos mayem Another mayhem that followed PDP

congress but later took an ethno-religious
colour.

40 May 13, 2002 Bori crisis A communal clash in Ogoni land over the
ownership of Bori town between the Yeghe
people and the Zappa community.

41 May 27, 2002 Fulani-irigwe crisis An ethnic clash between the Hausa Fulani
and the Irigwe indigenes in Bassa. Plateau.
Which was said to be a reprisal attack.

42 June 2002 Isoko crisis A clash between youth of Ozoro and

Okpaile communities in Isoko, delta state.
The punch reported that five (5) people
were found dead and more injured.

43 June 2002 Yelwa-shendam A religious-cum-ethnic fracas between the

mayhem (plateau) native people (predominantly Christians)
and Hausa settlers (predominantly
Muslims). This violence extended to about
14 LGCs in southern plateau.

44 July 2002 Wase (plateau) The Yelwa-Shendam riots spilled over to

wase.

45 September 2010 Bauchi The group freed 721 prisoners, including

105 suspected sect members, from a
Bauchi jail in northern Nigeria in run-up
to the presidential elections.
46 December 2010 Jos, Abuja the sect regrouped under a new leader,
Abubakar Shekau, bombed Jos, killing 80
people. There was also a New Year Eve
attack on Abuja barracks.

47 June 2011 Abuja Police headquarters in Abuja was bombed,

killing six people. United Nations
headquarters in the capital were targeted
just two months later, destroying the lower
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floor of the building. Eighteen people

killed and dozens injured
48 November 2011 Yobe State, The motorcade of the Borno state
Maiduguri governor, Kashim Shettima, came under
bomb attack in Maiduguri as he returned
from a foreign trip. About 150 died in co-
ordinated attacks on police facilities in
Damaturu and Potiskum in Yobe State. In
a botched attack, two suicide bombers
blew up themselves outside military
headquarters in Maiduguri.
49 December 2011 Madalla,Jos,Yobe, Multiple bomb attacks on Christmas Day
Damaturu, Gadaka. killed dozens, including 35 at St Theresas
Catholic Church in Madalla, near the
Federal Capital Territory, Abuja. A
second explosion shortly afterwards hit a
church in the central city of Jos, where a
police officer was killed by gunfire. Three
attacks in northern Yobe state kill four
people. Two further attacks hit the town of
Damaturu, and a third struck Gadaka.

50 January 2012 Kano Bombing killed at least 180 people in

Kano, the deadliest attack to date
51 June 2012 Kaduna Offices of ThisDay newspaper are
bombed. Later in the month, more than
100 people died in attacks on three
churches in Kaduna, a city on the border
of the Muslim north and the
predominantly Christian south. Channels
Reporter was also killed
52 July 2012 Northern,Nigerian July 2012 massacre: Attacks on multiple
northern Nigerian villages killed 100
villages
people

53 the Boko Haram sect attacked Deeper Life

August 2012 Okene Church Okene and killed 19 people
 17

54 September 2012 telecommunications The group attacks mobile phone masts

companies belonging to nine telecommunications
companies. The army announces it has
killed at least 35 suspected members of
Boko Haram.

55 Maiduguri and Potiskum were attacked

December 2012 Maiduguri, Potiskum leaving 27 Nigerians dead.

56
April 2013 Baga, Borno Baga, Borno massacre snuffed life out of
228 people

57 July 2013 Yobe State Yobe State School shooting at Mamudo

government Secondary School killed 30.

58 September 2013 Gujba College Gujba College Massacre killed 50

59 February 2014 Borno Borno Massacre: 39 victims

60 February 25, 2014 Buni Yadi Federal Government College Buni Yadi
attack claimed 59 lives

Culled from J.Isawa Elaigwu(2002) Ethnic Militias and Democracy in Nigeria

Meanwhile the OPC killing of the Hausa in Sagamu, Ogun state was reverberated in
the north, especially kano where the Hausa youth equally attacked Yoruba community. And in
counter confrontations several lives and properties were lost respectively. The OPC reacted
and inflicted serious injuries and death on the Hausas in Lagos around October 2000. The
northern group made up of Arewa Consultative Forum and Arewa Peoples Congress through
Sharia advocates called for compensation for every death of a northern Hausa killed elsewhere
in the country. Though Arewa People Congress and Arewa consultative Forum were initially
harmless, nevertheless, their activities are carried out by youths known as yandaba Almajiri
and social miscreants who are out to intimidate and enforce sharia law on non Muslims. 21 The
Kano and Kaduna crises and the subsequent ones that occurred in Sokoto and Gombe were all
in the name of Sharia overtly promoted by the Arewa Peoples Congress and the Arewa
 18

Consultative Forum. Here, because they hide under religious claw, it has been difficult to
assess the level of conflict they have been engaged. Most members of Arewa Peoples
Congress, including political class in the north believed that as Muslims they cannot oppose
the introduction of Sharia. This means that all its activities and implementations are
sanctioned by them whether it is by political Sharia or religious Sharia.

The initial inability to check the increasing strength of the militias gradually led to the
politicisation process. At the aftermath of the death of President Yaardua and his subsequent
replacement by Dr. Goodluck Jonathan tend to heat up the political space .The attempt made by
Dr. Jonathan to contest the 2011 presidential election infuriated the north who felt he was
taking up the slot of the North which President Yaardua was not able to complete because of
his death. The northern youth saw Yaarduas replacement in the person of General
Mohammadu Buhari which the northern elders found too radical to accept. Meanwhile the Boko
Haram sect whose leader was executed in an extra judicial killing on the order of President
Yaardua in 2009 abandoned their initial demand for justice for the killing of their leader. They
insisted that a northerner or a Muslim must rule Nigeria to fulfill their quest for Nigeria to
become an Islamic state. Or at best Dr Jonathan should be converted to Islam and become
Muslim. Oversighting that Jonathan Presidency will not actualize their dream of Islamizing
Nigeria as a Sharia country they began to attack government institutions including banks in the
Northeast axis. Since 2010 Boko Haram has retreated to the North east where they have caused
a lot of havoc in Yobe, Borno and Adamawa states. Efforts by the military to confront the sect
following the critical attacks in Bama and Baga areas were berated by human rights
organisations as human rights abuse. As a result, the relaxation by the onslaught by the military
strengthened the sect to ride on the back of human rights to perpetuate their nefarious acts
which include killings, destruction of property and kidnapping of children including over the 200
Chibok village girls whom they are using as a ransom.

The rising profile of ethnic militias shows that there is something wrong fundamentally with
the civilian rule for the past 15 years. It means the best intention of government is not best
enough to channel energies towards sustaining the goals of democracy. In fact some have gone
underground waiting to explode. If this happens it will add to the present dangerous
predicaments of containing the threats of Boko Haram sect.
 19

CHALLENGES FOR DEMOCRATIC GOVERNANCE

There several challenges that the Nigeria democratic governance faces with the rise of
ethnic militias. First, as the political class continues to see politics as business and the basis for
making profits from their investment in politics they will always rely on militias as collateral for
maintaining their political interests. Some of them recruited the militias of other ethnic groups
as their political thugs. The Odua Peoples Congress was always ready to defend the interest of
any Yoruba politician while the Boko Haram got its strength when the former governor of
Zamfara state Malam Sani Yerima decided to introduce Sharia Law in the state. The Boko Haram
sect saw this as meeting their religions obligations and subsequently became political thugs of
any northern governor that was challenged for pandering to Sharia or whatever could cause the
political differences between political stalwarts.

Secondly, Nigerian political elites and their ethnic groups are self-converted. They hardly
accept any genuine national political reconciliatory measures without an ethnic caveat. Because
of this it has been often difficult to reach a consensus on any national issue. In this case it ethnic
relies on their ethnic interests and the strength of their militias to define their position on
national issue.

Thirdly, in view of the foregoing corruption become endemic and difficult to tackle. This is
because the country operates on Professor Peter Ekehs concept of Two Publics: The Public
realm and Private Realm 23. Resources stolen from the public realm is not seen as crime as long
as they are sued to service the private realm where ethnic groups are the beneficiaries.
However, anyone that steals from the community purse (private realm) suffers the consequence
of doing so. In short money stolen from government fund is not seen as a crime against the
ethnic groups. In this case the rise in corruption means the rise in ethnic consciousness and the
basis for sustaining ethnic militias.

Fourthly, with the spread of corruption and dwindling economic resources the tendency for the
rise in youth unemployment is critical. These youth tend to become ethnic recruits as either
political thug for the politicians or as ethnic militias. This increases the circle of crisis and
sustenance of the wheel of ethnic militias.

Lastly, in view of the foregoing the state security apparatus though may not be weak but they
become too inconsequential in tackling ethnic conflicts that have been populated by ethnic
militias and political thugs. It is important to note that personnel of national security agencies
are from ethnic groups; and in a deeply divided plural society their loyalties lies first with their
ethnic security before national security. Evidence of most troops confronted Boko Haram have
been compromised is critical to Nigerian national security interests.
 20

CONCLUSION

Several panaceas have been provided in the literature for the resolutions of these conflicts
and at the same time ending the rule of ethnic militia. Government has begun on a good note by
reworking the 1999 constitution through debates and discussion. This may help to establish
confidence in the future of democratic governance. In other to legitimize this slim mandate, it
must acquire an authorizing mandate which only the people can give. And the best option to
achieve this is by organizing a (sovereign) national conference which the presidency of Dr
Jonathan has started. . Hence as argued Obansanjo is just a pillar for soft landing. There fore
care must be taken so that by the year 2015 Nigeria is not crash landed. One mistake why
sovereign national conference is required, is the fact that while the federal government is
struggling to control resources and even went as far as taking oil producing states to the to the
supreme court, it failed to do the same thing with those who have declared some states as a
sharia state. Let the people determine what they want. Both resource control and the desire for
a sharia environment are relevant in a democratic federal system. If there is no acceptable
panacea for ethnic demands certainly the possibility of ethnic militias maturing to revolutionary
pressures in defence of aggrieved ethnic groups will continue to increase.

Endnotes

1. I plead disagree with other scholars that categorised the return to civil rule in 1999 as
Nigerias Fourth Republic .My argument is that a republican regime is defined by the
existence of complete structure of civil rule with constitutionally authorized mandate. As
long as the military (either General Babangida or General Abacha were still presiding
over the state affairs, though with most of the governors and members of parliaments
elected it was not yet a republican governance regime. Under such a situation there
exists what can be called minimal democratic/civil authority in a military guided
 21

democracy. And a minimal authority cannot be assumed to be a democracy .Thus under

the Babangida and Abacha regime Nigeria was still under a military interregnum. The
Shonekan interval was not even a democracy because he was not elected, even though
there was an elected national and state parliament. Therefore, the 1999 handing over by
General Abdulsalami Abubakar to Chief Olusegun Obasanjo was the only period that
Nigerias Third Republic took off.
2. Yoroms Gani ,2005 Militia as Social a Phenomenon :Towards a Theoretical Construction
in David J Francis (ed) Civil Militia: Africas Intractable Security Menace Ashagate
publishing Company UK
3. Economic Commission for Africa;2009, African Governance Report 11, Oxford University
Press UK )
4. Gani Yoroms 2007 Elections and Election Rigging in Nigeria: Implication for Democratic
Growth in Kenneth Omeje (ed) State-Society Relations in Nigeria:Democractic
Consolidation . Conflicts and Reform Adonis and Abbey Publishers London
5. Agbese Pita (1992): The Autocratic Foundation of Nigerians Forthcoming Third
Republic The Journal of International Studies N0 28 January.
6. Oyediran, O. 1998 Transition Without End: From Hope To Despair-Reflections Of A
Participant-Observer In Paul A. Beckett And Crawford Young (Eds) Dilemma In Nigeria,
Rochester, URP. P175
7. (Nnoli: O.1978, Ethnic Politics in Nigeria, Enugu, Fourth Dimensions; Egwu Sam 1998
Democracy at Bay: Ethnicity and Nigerias Democratic Eclipse 1986-1995 AFRIGOV
Monograph Series No 5.
8. Osaghae O. 1994 Ethnicity and Its Management in Africa: The Demonstration Link,
CASS Monograph No.2.
9. Obese N. (2001) Odua Peoples Congress, Memo; Briggs, D.A. (2000) Youths Restiveness
And The Jesse Tragedy In The Niger-Delta, Paper For A Conference On The Niger Delta As
A Matter Of Fact December 6-9.

10. AO Ogbemudia, 2002 Ethnic Militia and Internal Security Operations in Nigeria
Defence Headquarters Abuja, July 2002 p. 4
11. Osaghae Opcit p.3
12. Yoroms Gani, 2000, Obasanjo and the Theory of Soft- landing Community. Vol.5 No.1
September ; see also Yoroms, Gani Joses, 1999 Transition To Democratic Rule In Africa:
The Case Of Nigeria And South Africa In Comparative Perspectives, And Area
Scandinavian Journal Of Development Alternatives Studies Vol. 18 No. 23, June
13. Yoroms 2000, Ibid.
14. Ibid.
 22

15. Omo Omoruyi , Democratisation Process in Nigeria Centre for Democratic Studies Abuja
1995
16. Africa today February 2000:24-25.
17. Newswatch November 6, 2000:19
18. Obasi: 2001 ibid.
19. Tell 31 January 2000:25
20. This Day May 15, 2001:15
21. Yoroms Joses Gani 2002 The Phenomenon of Ethnic Militias in North West Nigeria;The
case of Yan Daba , Hisba Committee and Yan Dauka Amarya Report of National
Workshop on Ethnic Militias and National Security in Nigeria Vol.11 Workshop
Proceedings July
22. Peter Ekeh, 1975 Colonialism and Two Publics in Africa Comparative Studies in Society
and History Vol. 17 No.1