'New Regionalism' in Central America

Author(s): Benedicte Bull

Source: Third World Quarterly, Vol. 20, No. 5, New Regionalisms in the New Millenium
(Oct., 1999), pp. 957-970
Published by: Taylor & Francis, Ltd.
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Third World Quarterly, Vol 20, No 5, pp 957-970, 1999

'New regionalism' in Central America

BENEDICTE BULL

ABSTRACT Central American regionalism is in a state of disarray after having

been surrounded by great enthusiasm in the early 1990s. This article explores
whether a 'new regionalism' framework can improve our understanding of this
turn of events. It is argued that Central American integration lacks a series of
features assumed to characterise 'new regionalism'. It has not been ac-
companied by spontaneous societal integration, its main stimulus has come from
external actors, and the goal of the process has narrowed from originally being
human welfare and security in a wide sense, to primarily being integration in the
global economy. This is reflected in the integrationist rhetoric, where globalisa-
tion has entered the centre stage and is presented as a threat to which regional
action should respond. This change has also rendered regional agreements
largely superfluous as the member states pursue policies aimed at global
integration regardless of the integration process.

The re-emergence of integration between the Central American countries' in th

early 1990s occurred within the context of a series of regional and subregional
integration projects in the Americas.2 It shared with those projects an economic
policy aimed at opening the member economies towards third parties. However,
the process had goals beyond that, related to peace, development and democracy
in the region. Taken together, these features have led to the interpretation of
Central American integration as an example of 'new regionalism', theorised to
have the following features: (1) it takes place within a multipolar world order (as
opposed to the previous bipolar order); (2) it is a spontaneous process 'from
below'; (3) it is 'open' rather than inward-looking; (4) it constitutes a compre-
hensive and multidimensional process, in which political aspects are relatively
more important than in regional projects of the 1960s and 1970s; and (5) it is
a process in which non-state actors play an important role.3
As the 1990s come to an end, the enthusiasm surrounding Central American
integration is dwindling. Progress on both economic and non-economic issues
has slowed, and the dynamism and pluralism pictured in the theories of 'new
regionalism' are hard to detect.
This article discusses how one can understand this turn of events. It is argued
that a fruitful starting point is to view Central American regional integration as
a process in which several competing regionalisms, meaning bodies of visions,
values and concrete goals, compete to direct the integration path.4 During the
decade of renewed integration attempts in Central America there have been two
regionalisms competing for dominance of the official process: one emerging
from the Esquipulas peace process-the regional initiative to end the civil wars
in three of the Central American countries-and another responding to global

Benedicte Bull is at the Centre for Development and the Environment, University of Oslo, PO Box 1116 Blindern,
Oslo N-0317, Norway.

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 BENEDICTE BULL

and hemispheric economic integration. Whereas the first has had a variety of
goals, the second has had primarily one: integration in the global market.
Liberalising regionalism became dominant after the mid-1990s but, as countries
moved forward to liberalise trade and investments on other fronts, this became
largely superfluous. Moreover, contrary to what theories of new regionalism
assume, Central American formal integration has not been followed by a more
spontaneous regionalisation, understood as 'the growth of societal integration
within a region and to the often undirected process of social and economic
interaction'.5 In consequence, as the official integration process stalled, the
regional project in Central America lost its dynamism.
The changing nature of the process is analysed here through the actions, but
also the rhetoric, of Central American regionalism. In the rhetoric, there has been
a change in discourse that can be described as a trivialisation of security on the
one hand, and a 'securitisation' of globalisation on the other. The term securiti-
sation was originally introduced in order to overcome the failure of a wide
concept of security (including various threats to human survival considered
'security issues') to distinguish between what is a security issue and what is not.6
A 'securitising move' is taken by presenting something as an existential threat
to a referent object, but the issue is 'securitised' only if and when the audience
accepts it as such. The argument here is that, during the process of Central
American integration, issues included in the originally wide-reaching security
agenda have received little attention, while integration into the global economy
is presented as an existential threat 'justifying actions outside the normal bounds
of political procedure'.7

Two perspectives on Central American regional integration

There are two predominant perspectives on Central American regional inte-

gration. One is based on an essentially liberal interpretation of two parallel
processes: the globalisation of the world economy, and the decline of US
hegemony. With respect to globalisation, regional integration has at times been
treated as a necessary 'stepping stone' enabling national economies to reap the
benefits of the new dynamics of the global economy. Elsewhere globalisation
and regional integration have been interpreted as two components of a 'double
movement', where the latter is an expression of the need for political control and
social protection in response to the ever wider reach of the market. Along these
lines, Central American integration has been described as a 'common regional
action' aimed at reducing the costs of an inevitable international openness.8
Whereas adherents of this view differ regarding the extent to which regional
alternatives to globalisation are possible and desirable, they all emphasise the
newly acquired room for action for developing countries in defining their
integration path. This is connected to the decline of US hegemony and the
transformation of the global power structure. The crumbling of cemented power
hierarchies following the end of the Cold War is assumed to have left more room
for agency regarding regional integration projects in relation to previous regional
projects. It has also allowed for the functioning of regional security dynamics.

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 'NEW REGIONALISM' IN CENTRAL AMERICA

One expression of this is the inclusion of security agreements in regional

integration projects.9
Critics of this view argue that a Gramscian ideological hegemony perpetuates
the dominance of international capital and decreases the individual states' room
to manoeuvre.'0 Regional integration in this perspective is viewed as one of
several means by which states attempt to ride two tigers simultaneously-
responding to the structural power of international capital, and to national
demands, within the framework of established practices.1' It is a tool in the
process of the internationalisation of the state, in which national political
practices are adjusted to the exigencies of the global economy and the main
source of state legitimacy becomes external actors and institutions. Regionalisa-
tion of societal forces is interpreted within this framework not as constituting an
autonomous force, but as being associated either with integrationist forces or
with opposing segments. The Central American integration process has been
interpreted within this perspective as being strictly commercial, modelled exter-
nally and without any ambitions other than perfecting the free trade zone and
dismantling protection.'2
This perspective on integration also has consequences for conclusions regard-
ing the long-term viability of integration processes. Viewing it as a stepping
stone towards multilateralism and global integration, it would become largely
superfluous as soon as these have been achieved. This conclusion is avoided by
the 'new regionalism perspective' through focusing not only on the state-level
process, but also on regionalisation at the non-state level, a process assumed to
occur in various forms regardless of the success of formal integration attempts.
In the following, the degree to which Central American regionalism can be
understood as multidimensional and transnational is discussed, with the aim of
understanding the process leading to its currently gloomy prospects for continu-
ation. The discussion takes as a starting point a constructivist view on the
relation between agents and structures. This means viewing regional projects as
not only responding to, or creating, material structures, but also as arenas in
which social structures and ideology are reflected and reproduced.'3 It has been
argued convincingly that the power structures of the anarchic world are not
permanent constraints on human agency, but are rather constructed by it, through
acts that in turn constitute the agents."' The 'imperative' of globalisation is
vulnerable to the same critique. This is not to deny that it is a real and
identifiable process, but to say that it is also a process constructed at the national
and regional level, through acts which reinforce the globalising structures and in
turn constitute the agents. Consequently, not only concrete agreements and
actions, but also the integration rhetoric where ideas are presented, the external
world is constructed and identities shaped, are interesting objects for study. In
such an analysis, it is particularly interesting to look at how certain issues are
presented as existential threats requiring actions at the regional level. Securitis-
ing moves can be viewed as a technique in this endeavour, being acts in which
issues are presented as above and beyond the normal rules of politics.
But before going into this, the context of the discourse will be presented-the
regional process leading to declarations of the goal of creating a Central
American Union.

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 BENEDICTE BULL

From the Federal Republic to the Nicaragua declaration

The term 'new regionalism' in Central America usually distinguishes the pro
of the 1990s from that of the 1950s and 1960s. However, the history of Cen
American integration dates back to the Federal Republic of Central America,
unifying what is now Guatemala, Honduras, El Salvador, Costa Rica and
Nicaragua after independence from Spain in 1824. After the breakdown of the
Federal Republic in 1838, regionalist projects were endowed with little success
until the 1950s and 1960s with the establishment of the Central American
Common Market (CACM). The CACM was primarily a trade agreement, designed
to create an enlarged home market for industrial products in line with a model
of import-substitution. A common external tariff was imposed on third countries,
and intra-regional trade with industrial products was freed. Schemes of regional
industrial integration had less success, partly because of US opposition.15 The
same was true for the Organisation of Central American States (ODECA) and the
Central American Defence Council (CONDECA), established in the early 1950s to
promote political and military integration, respectively. After the overthrow of
the allegedly communist Arbenz regime in Guatemala in 1954, the political side
of the integration process became overshadowed by US interests and the
suppression of subversive communist activities. 6
The CACM faced increasing problems during the 1960s because of conflicts
between new industrial groups emerging in relation to the new export sectors
and the old agrarian elite, fiscal problems faced by states previously dependent
on income from tariffs, unequal distribution of economic benefits between the
five countries involved, and the fact that the market of the five countries
combined proved to be too small. After the 'Soccer War' between Honduras and
El Salvador in 1969, Honduras withdrew from the CACM and the countries
returned to bilateral agreements. By the early 1980s when the economic crises
hit Central America, the CACM had lost its momentum. The internal wars in three
of the member countries had rendered ODECA a mere formality, and CONDECA
descended into an anti-democratic campaign organisation.17
The revival of the Central American integration process in the 1990s has had
seven major benchmarks. The first was the summit of the Central American
presidents in Guatemala in 1990, during which the Central American Economic
Action plan was agreed upon. This is a 10-point list of economic policies to
which the signatory parties committed, including a new judicial framework for
economic integration, a programme for integration of infrastructure and trade,
coordination of opening towards third countries, and policies to allow for a
larger role of the market in the domestic economies. The second was the
Protocol of Tegucigalpa, signed in 1991, outlining the judicial basis of the
functioning of the System of Central American Integration (SICA). The third
important agreement was the Protocol of Guatemala, signed in 1993, introducing
major reforms to the Treaty of Economic Integration of 1962. The protectionist
policies pursued by CACM were abandoned in favour of a model of 'open
regionalism'. 18 The fourth benchmark was the Protocol of Guatemala, establish-
ing a timetable for the reduction of the Common External Tariff (CET) to 20%
on all goods, and in 1996, a new agreement was reached establishing a ceiling

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 'NEW REGIONALISM' IN CENTRAL AMERICA

of 15% for capital goods and zero for consumer goods.'9 The fifth important
agreement was the Central American Alliance for Sustainable Development
(ALIDES), signed in 1994 to provide a common platform to promote social and
economic development and environmental protection. It was followed up in the
sixth important agreement, the Treaty of Central American Social Integration
(the Treaty of San Salvador) of 1995. And finally, the Treaty of Democratic
Security was signed the same year in San Pedro Sula, Honduras, launching a
new model of regional security.
In the Nicaragua Declaration of September 1997, the Central American
presidents (except the Costa Rican) expressed the political will to initiate the
gradual and progressive process of creating a Central American Union as the
ultimate state of association in a community as laid down in the Protocol of
Tegucigalpa. However, at that point it was clear that progress in integration was
occurring not between SICA countries, but between SICA members and third
parties. A series of treaties have been signed between SICA members and third
countries.20 By 1995 all SICA members had become members of the World Trade
Organization (wTo), Costa Rica had signed a bilateral treaty with Mexico, and
El Salvador, Honduras and Guatemala (The Northern Triangle) had started
negotiations for a similar agreement with Mexico. After this the initial enthusi-
asm for the Central American project started to fade. In order to understand this
turn of events, one has to look closer at the process of regionalisation and at the
regionalism promoted in the integration project.

'New regionalism' in Central America?

Explanations for the rise and fall of the 'old regionalism' in Central America
centred around structural factors. The success of the project was associated with
the ascendance of an industrial elite and an urban middle class, but the fact that
the new industrialist classes never managed to take control from national
agro-export oligarchies is also often pointed to as an explanation for the eventual
fall of the CACM.21 The integration process was also viewed as particularly
shaped by two international factors: the development of a Third World ideology
expressed through the presence of officials of the Economic Commission for
Latin America (ECLA) and the geostrategic position, expressed through the
presence of the USA.
The 'new regionalism' framework assumes more room for agency at the
regional level, expressed through the five points discussed in the introduction.
Three features of the Central American integration process lend themselves to
interpretation within such a framework: its origins in the Esquipulas peace
process, its wide-reaching agenda and the participation of a variety of actors.
The Esquipulas peace process-the regional initiative headed by the then
Costa Rican president Oscar Arias to end the three ongoing civil wars in the
region-has been pointed to as the root of the new regionalism. This process not
only contributed to removing the main obstacle to cooperation between the five
countries (the three internal conflicts), it also created new practices for negotia-
tions between the Central American countries, upon which further cooperation
could be founded.22 A concrete outcome of Esquipulas-1 of importance for the

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 BENEDICTE BULL

further integration process was the establishment of the Central American

Parliament (PARLACEN) in 1986. The Esquipulas process also underlined the
nature of Central America as a 'regional security complex,'23 expressed in the
Costa Rican doctrine during the Monge administration (1982-86): 'Costa Rica
is not a part of the Central American problem, but Central America is a part of
Costa Rica's problem'.24
The integration process emerging from the Esquipulas meetings set out a
wide-reaching agenda for integration. One of the propositions of the Tegucigalpa
Protocol was to develop a new model for regional security, based on 'strength-
ening of the civil power, a reasonable balance of forces, security for persons and
their property, the eradication of poverty and extreme poverty, promotion of
sustainable development, protection of the environment, and eradication of
violence, corruption, impunity, terrorism, drug-trade, and arms trade'. 25 This
model was formulated in the Treaty of Democratic Security emphasising
'democracy and strengthening of democratic institutions and a State of Justice'
and 'the unrestricted respect for Human Rights in the States of the Central
American region'.
The Tegucigalpa Protocol also included the establishment of a broad set of
political institutions designed to treat a variety of issues and to include a variety
of actors.26 The institutional structure was to be strengthened by a network of
civil society organisations 'committed to the integration attempts of the isth-
mus',27 represented in a Consultative Council (cc). This was preceded by the
establishment of the Federation of Private Enterprises in Central American and
Panama (FEDEPRICAP) in 1993, which brought together different social sectors
from the Central American Committee for Intersectoral Co-ordination (CACI). In
1994 the Civil Initiative for Central American Integration (ICI) was established
by a number of organisations which had participated in the CACI but an the need
for an independent voice not dominated by the business sector. In 1995 the cc
was finally established, integrating 17 regional organisations.28
A third feature leading to the view of Central American integration process as
a spontaneous process from below is the alleged existence of a process of
regionalisation at various levels, ranging from financial flows to integration of
youth gangs and organised criminal groups. Regarding the latter, Honduras'
attorney general, Edmundo Orellana, complained in April 1996 of the regional
nature of today's organised crime:

Central American integration is not happening where it should, on political and

economic levels, but rather in criminal activity ... There is a total integration of
armed bands. The bands here are the same as those in Guatemala, El Salvador and
Nicaragua.29

However, on examining the evidence, the features leading to the interpretations

of Central America as an example of new regionalism are not very clear. First,
there is little evidence of an ongoing process of regionalisation. Looking at
formal measures such as trade and investment flows, it can be concluded that,
although intra-regional trade has increased, it has increased at a much slower
pace than the overall trade flows to and from SICA between 1990 and 1996. The
total value of exports from the SICA countries increased from US$4972 million

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 'NEW REGIONALISM' IN CENTRAL AMERICA

to $12 988 million from 1992 to 1996. This means that the total value of exports
increased by 27.1 % per year on average. In contrast, intra-SICA exports increased
by 16.1% per year on average. The total value of imports increased at an even
faster pace, from $10 939 million in 1992 to $32 771 million in 1996. This
represents an average increase of 33.6% per year, whereas intra-SICA imports
increased by 15.1% per year in the same period. Investments in the region have
increased during the 1990s, but apart from a slight increase in European and
Asian investments, the pattern remain the same: the USA is overwhelmingly the
most important investor, and intra-SICA investment is negligible.30
Also with respect to less formal regionalism, integration between the Central
American countries is not clearly stronger than the integration between these and
the USA and other Latin American countries. For example youth gangs (Pandil-
las) have been shown to have connections to gangs in the USA rather than in
the other Central American countries.31
Furthermore, integration between civil society organisations at the regional
level has been shown to be a fragile process, highly dependent on external
support and marked by divisions between NGOS which spring from their differing
positions in the conflicts of the 1980s. The potential for creation of a regional
network of civil society organisations within the framework of the SICA process
has been further hampered by the bureaucratic procedures of the new regional
institutions.32
Upon closer inspection, despite the origins in the Esquipulas process, the
argument that integration is primarily a regional initiative may also be ques-
tioned. The process was given an impetus by the increasing number of hemi-
spheric and sub-hemispheric free trade and integration agreements. The NAFTA
agreement posed especially serious challenges to the Central American econom-
ies. Central Americans feared that existing and future investments in their
countries might be relocated to take advantage of Mexico's unique access to the
USA. Moreover, with respect to preferential trade agreements, Central Ameri-
cans feared that their privileged position would be threatened as a result of closer
connections between the USA and Mexico.
Support has also been given to the process by the hemispheric organisations:
the Organization of American States (OAS), the Inter-American Development
Bank (IDB) and the ECLA, now more commonly referred to as CEPAL. IDB has a
special department for regional integration and in 1995 financed the Consultative
Group on Regional Technical Co-operation for Central America. In 1998 a
general cooperation agreement was signed between CEPAL and SICA, and in 1997
CEPAL presented a diagnosis of the institutions and organisations of SICA aiming
to enforce its modernisation. The EU has also actively promoted the Central
American integration process. Since 1984 Ministerial Conferences on Political
Dialogue and Economic Co-operation have been held annually between the
countries of the European Union and the member states of SICA. They have been
used as a forum for discussion of integration issues, negotiations for support by
the EU to the SICA process and of EU preferential treatment of exports from
Central America.33 Spain is the European country that has supported the

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 BENEDICTE BULL

integration process most strongly, working bilaterally, but also influencing EU

policies.34
One may conclude that the process both has origins in the Esquipulas process
and is a response to changing economic structures and encouragement by
important actors. The important question is how these origins give rise to
different regionalisms and how these come to shape the body of ideas and the
identity of the Central American region. In the following section, light is shed
on this question through an analysis of the official integration discourse.

The changing discourse of the Central American integration process

In this section the results of a study of a set of core documents are presented.
They have been chosen from three categories: 1) common declarations from
meetings of the SICA countries; 2) speeches made by state leaders in multilateral
forums; and 3) speeches made by state leaders in national forums. The aim of
the analysis is to trace various regionalisms and their relative importance during
the process.
The official goals of the process have throughout the period been stated as
developing Central America as a region of 'peace, liberty, democracy and
development'. There have been four objectives: 1) creating a Central American
Union; 2) promoting economic and social development; 3) establishing and
strengthening democracy; and 4) promoting integration of Central America in
the world economy. However, the relative emphasis on these different goals, and
the extent to which they are treated as means or goals in themselves, have
changed over time. In particular, one can observe a tension between a regional
discourse emphasising peace, development and democracy, where the 'audience'
is the Central American people, on the one hand, and a globalisation discourse
directed primarily towards other states, international organisations and other
international actors, on the other.
From the start of the integration process, the main goal was peace in the
region, and development was argued to be the key to sustained peace. The
declaration from the summit in Guatemala in 1990 (Declaration of Antigua 17
June 1990) states that:

This road to peace goes through development. We will view the future with hope
and will imprint with energy and imagination our development and economic
growth, with a better and more just distribution of the benefits. Only in this way will
it be possible to destroy the vicious circle of poverty and frustration. War and
violence is an act of human cruelty, but poverty is an act of human desertion that
we have to confront.

The Declaration of Tegucigalpa (13 December 1991) reaffirms the support for
the ongoing peace processes in El Salvador and Guatemala and the goal of
achieving democracy in the region. The presidents:

Reaffirm their conviction of the necessity to achieve a peace, strong and lasting, in
the region through the consolidation of the State of Justice, the strengthening of the
democratic institutions, the unrestricted respect for human rights, and reconciliation
of the societies through an open, straight and constructive dialogue.

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 'NEW REGIONALISM' IN CENTRAL AMERICA

Security issues are at the core of this declaration, defined in a broad sense as
mentioned above. The declaration expresses the appreciation of the work of the
Security Commission preparing an agreement on the verification, control and
limitation of weapons and militaries in the region, and support for the ongoing
peace processes in El Salvador and Guatemala. In the Declaration of Guatemala
(29 October 1993) it is established that the region has come a long way towards
achievement of peace. By this point the peace agreement in El Salvador had
been signed and it was emphasised that it was time to focus on development.
This change away from a focus on regional peace continues in the Treaty of
Social Integration (1995). Development is cited as the main goal, and globalisa-
tion and new technologies are the main challenges in achieving this. The
Declaration of San Salvador following this treaty (31 March 1995) states that:

The recent regional and global transformations, caused by the globalisation of

production, the new technologies based on the information and the new organisation
methods, have generated a series of challenges. In this context, regional integration
gains special relevance in the political, economic, social and cultural sphere.

The change of focus continues in the Declaration of Nicaragua (2 September

1997) signed two years later, by which point the armed conflict in Guatemala
had also ended. The goal of creating one Central American political unit is
reiterated, but this is not only a goal in itself, it is also a means to insert Central
America in the global economy:

We are convinced that the Central American Union should materialise with the goal
of achieving more tangible results and benefits for the population. This implies
deepening even more the compromises adopted in the framework of integration, in
particular those that permit the region to connect beneficially with the processes of
globalisation.

This change in focus is reiterated in speeches given in national forums.35 In his

speech of inauguration as president of El Salvador, Armando Calderon Sol
emphasised the need for the Central Americans to be unified in the face of
globalisation:

To our Central American brothers, we send our most sincere greetings. The great
political changes that the world has experienced in recent years, and the process of
economic globalisation show the necessity of continuing to work hard as a region,
to integrate our markets and together encounter favourable positions towards third
countries.

The change of goals is followed by a change of audience. In the early phases of

the process, the characteristics of the Central American development path were
emphasised. The Declaration of Antigua of 1990 starts with a quote from the
Popul Vuh, the main work of Mayan mythology. The audience is clearly the
Central American people, although dependence on international assistance is
recognised:

We reiterate that 'we have Central American paths to peace and development' and
we are ready to walk them, primarily by our own forces, but the task may be
facilitated by the generous help from the International Community.36

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 BENEDICTE BULL

In the declaration of Guatemala of 1993, the space given to appeals for support
from the international community for the integration process increases, as do
appeals for specific benefits:

In the economic sphere we have renewed our vision basing it on the inclusion of
Central America in the new economic global system, based on the opening of our
economies ... In this context, we request the government of the United States of
America to widen the benefits for Central American products towards that market,
in the spirit of the Caribbean Basin Initiative, to maintain the levels of competitive-
ness of our export products while the process of negotiations for introduction to the
North American Free Trade Area (NAFTA) develops.

The change of audience continues in the Declaration of Tegucigalpa following

the Alliance for Sustainable Development (24 October 1994). The main aim is
no longer to construct Central America as a meaningful unit to the population
of the region, but to convey its commitment to democracy, peace and liberal
economic policies to the international community:

Pleased with the notable presence of the International Community in this Confer-
ence, we renew our call to the friendly countries and international organisations for
them, as a concrete manifestation of their solidarity with the peace and development
of the region, to contribute to the Central American efforts to achieve our objectives
of sustainable development.

In international forums, too, meeting the challenges of globalisation is presented

as the main goal of the integration process. The presidents of the member
countries of SICA were invited to the 52nd session of ordinary period of the
General Assembly of the United Nations (23 September 1997), to present the
Declaration of Nicaragua. At this point there had also been a change in the
discourse on globalisation. Increasingly it was treated not as a host of opportu-
nities, but rather as a threat in response to which Central American unity was
important. Then Honduran president, Carlos Roberto Reina, expressed it as
follows:

Honduras, as we know, forms a part of the great Central American family, united
we were in the colonial period and united we were born to independence ... [we]
do not speak of romanticism, nor of an act of maturity, but a realistic recognition
of the needs created by the internal developments and the external demands that
require, to survive with dignity, giant efforts that in our case go further than what
we can do individually as separate states.

The increasing focus on globalisation is paralleled by a decreasing focus on the

various threats to human survival outlined in the Protocol of Tegucigalpa. The
model of democratic security was elaborated in the Treaty of Democratic
Security, which emphasised the commitment of the parties to ensure civilian
control of the military forces and the urgency of action to alleviate poverty and
other threats to survival. However, against the protests of the two countries of
the region without armed forces (Costa Rica and Panama), the agreement
refrained from including concrete means to advance in this respect. The result
was that 11 of the articles of the protocol were agreed upon with reservations.37
This is reflected in the Declaration of San Pedro Sula (15 December 1995)

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 'NEW REGIONALISM' IN CENTRAL AMERICA

accompanying the Treaty of Democratic Security, in which, with one exception,

there is a complete lack of attempts to lift issues beyond the normal rules of the
game. The exception is car theft:

[We] have met to dedicate special attention to a subject of regional interest 'the
security of persons and their property', which we consider to be an indispensable
complementary to guarantee the success of the Alliance for Sustainable Develop-
ment ... We have signed the Central American Treaty of Recovery and Devolution
of Stolen, Captured, Appropriated and Illegally Retained Vehicles, which is an
instrument that facilitates and accelerates the procedures for recovery of vehicles,
in all countries of the region, and discourages this type of crime.

To sum up, there have been three major changes in the discourse. First, the
priorities changed from being peace, democracy and development in a broad
sense, to being economic development and inclusion in world markets. Second,
the audience changed from Central American citizens to the international
community. Third, the issues presented as being 'beyond and above politics'
changed from being first military threats, then a wide range of threats to human
survival and, in the end, primarily globalisation.

Concluding remarks

The Central American integration process shares a number of features with other
regional integration projects in Latin America. However, it is not paralleled by
spontaneous regionalisation. Contact between the Central American countries
has always been far-reaching, but the current increase in cross-border interaction
is more a global, hemispheric and Latin American process than a Central
American one. Furthermore, although the regional leaders took the initiative in
the integration process, it has increasingly been modelled to please external
actors. This is reflected in a discourse that is increasingly directed to an external
audience and less and less to the Central American people. The third point
highlighted here is that, although the integration process started out with a
multifaceted agenda, the focus has narrowed primarily to encompass economic
issues. This is reflected in the discourse by the increasing securitisation of
globalisation and de-securitisation of various other threats to human survival.
The main conclusion is that caution is needed when treating all new regional-
ism projects as the same type of phenomenon. Although occurring simul-
taneously and sharing some general features, they may be of a qualitatively
different character. In some cases, the 'new' before 'regionalism' is a multidi-
mensional adjective, as Hettne has argued.38 In other cases, it merely distin-
guishes the regionalism of the 1990s from that of the 1950s and 1960s. The
Central American integration process is in danger of becoming an anachronism,
a process building on historic integration experience but without the dynamics
of a new regionalism. Some have argued that the integration process had already
become superfluous by 1991 when the Barrios Chamorro government ended the
period of socialist rule in Nicaragua and thereby removed the opposition to the
currently dominant development model.39 Others have argued that the significant
date is 3 September 1995, when Nicaragua became a member of the WTO, the

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 BENEDICTE BULL

last of the Central American countries to do so." In either case it is cle

after being reduced to a stepping stone in the process of integration into the
global economy, the relevance of the integration process became dependent on
the need to ensure the member states' commitment to 'open' economic policies.
Today in Central America, this seems all but superfluous.

Notes
'Central American countries' usually includes Guatemala, Honduras, El Salvador, Nicaragua and Costa
Rica. Central American integration is used here generally to denote integration between these countries. It
should be noted, however, that Panama is also a party to some of the agreements and that Costa Rica has
refrained from becoming a member of the Central American Parliament (PARLACEN).
2 overviews of regional integration projects in Latin America, see A Hurrell, 'Latin America in the new
world order: a regional bloc of the Americas?', International Affairs, 68 (1), 1992, pp 121-139; Hurrell,
'Regionalism in the Americas', in A Hurrell & L Fawcett, Regionalism in World Politics, New York:
Oxford University Press, 1995, pp 250-282; J Grugel, 'Latin America and the remaking of the Americas',
in A Gamble & A Payne, Regionalism and World Order, London: Macmillan, 1996, pp 131-167; and
Inter-American Development Bank, Periodic Note on Integration, July 1997.
3See B Hettne, 'Globalisation and the new regionalism: the second great transformation', In B Hettne, A
Inotai & 0 Sunkel, Globalism and the New Regionalism, The New Regionalism Series Vol 1, London:
Macmillan, 1999, pp 1-24.
4M B0as & H Hveem, 'Regionalisms compared: the African and South-East Asian experience' in B Hettne
A Inotai & 0 Sunkel Comparing Regionalisms: Implications for Global Development, The New Regional-
ism Series, Vol 5, London: Macmillan, 1999 forthcoming.
5 A Hurrell, 'Explaining the resurgence of regionalism in world politics', Review of International Studies, 21,
1995, pp 331-358.
6 Buzan, 0 Wever & J de Wilde, Security: A New Framework for Analysis, Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner,
1998.
7Ibid, pp 23-24.
8The concept of a double movement originates in the writings of Karl Polanyi, The Great Transformation:
the Political and Economic Origins of our Time, Boston, MA: Beacon Press, 1957. It is used by D Bach
& H Hveem in 'Regionalism, regionalization and globalization', paper presented at the Third General
Conference of the Standing Group on International Relations of the ECPR, Vienna, 16-20 September 1998,
to analyse the relationship between globalisation and regionalisation. 'Common regional action' is Eduardo
Lizano Fait's description of Central American integration. See E Lizano Fait 'LHacia un nuevo enfoque de
la integraci6n regional? in FUNPADEM, El nuevo orden economico internacional: temas sobre la insercion
de Centroamerica en los 90, San Jose, Costa Rica: Fundaci6n del Servicio Exterior para la Paz y la
Democracia, 1996.
9 The idea of regional security dynamics is developed in B Buzan, People, States and Fear: An Agenda f
International Security Studies in the Post-Cold War Era, Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1991. For an account
of the hemispheric initiatives in this respect see F Rojas Aravena, 'Williamsburg: LUn giro definitivo en las
relaci6nes hemisfericas de sguridad?', Revista Occidental, Estudios Latinoamericanos, 13 (1), 1996, pp
1-28. For a more critical account of the security dimensions of Latin American regionalism see A Hurrell,
'Security in Latin America', Foreign Affairs, 74 (3), 1998, pp 529-547.
10 R Cox, 'Gramsci, hegemony and international relations. An essay in method', Millennium: Journal of
International Studies, 12 (2), 1983, pp 162-175.
" A Gamble & A Payne, Regionalism and World Order, London: Macmillan, 1996.
12 A De la Ossa, El sistema de integraci6n centroamericana: critica de la vision oficial, San Jose, Costa Rica:
Fundaci6n Ebert, 1994.
13 B0as & Hveem, 'Regionalisms compared'.
14 The critique originates in the writings of Alexander Wendt, 'The agent-structure problem in international
relations theory', International Organization, 41 (3), 1987, pp 335-370; and Wendt, 'Anarchy is what states
make of it: the social construction of power politics', International Organization, 46 (2), 1992, pp 391-425.
A structure is in this sense a set of relatively unchangeable constraints on the behaviour of states. Although
these can take the form of systems of material incentives and disincentives, the idea that they are constructed
refers to the fact that actions may or may not reproduce both actor and structure. See T Hopf, 'The promise
of constructivism in international relations theory', International Security, 23 (1), 1998, pp 171-200.

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 'NEW REGIONALISM' IN CENTRAL AMERICA

15 S Jonas, 'La ayuda externa no ayuda a la integrac6n Centroamericana', in Integracion y Depe

Centroamerica, INEP, 1973.
16 As evident in, for example, the Declaration of Central America of 1963. For a collection of the political
declarations see F Fernandez-Shaw La Integraci6n de Centroamerica, Madrid: Edici6nes de Cultura
Hispanica, 1963. For an account of the military integration process see Aguilera Peralta, G Aguilera Peralta,
La Integraci6n Militar en Centro America, undated.
7 R Cerdas, 'Las instituciones de integraci6n en Centroamerica', in V Bulmer Thomas (ed), Integraci6n
Regional en Centroam6rica, San Jose, Costa Rica: FLAcso-Sede Costa Rica, 1998, pp 245-278.
18 CEPAL, Open Regionalism in Latin America and the Caribbean, Santiago: United Nations, 1994.
19 V Bulmer-Thomas, 'The Central American Common Market: from closed to open regionalism', World
Development, 26 (2), 1998, pp 313-322.
20 Among the most significant of the agreements with third parties is the free trade agreement signed with
Dominican Republic in 1997. For an overview of treaties and conventions see the website: sIcA-Tratados
21 y Convenios, http://www.sicanet.org.sv.
See, for example, S Stone The Heritage of the Conquistadors. Ruling Classes in Central America from the
Conquest to the Sandinistas, Lincoln, NB: University of Nebraska Press, 1990, pp 30-34; and V
Bulmer-Thomas, The Economic History of Latin America Since Independence, Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1994, pp 303-322.
22 C Sojo, 'Negociaci6nes internacionales en Centroamerica', Polemica (Costa Rica), 1991, No 14-15, pp
35-52.
23 The expression is taken from Buzan and is defined as 'a group of states whose primary security concerns
link together sufficiently closely that their national securities cannot realistically be considered apart from
one another'. Buzan, People, States and Fear, p 190.
24 Fernando Zumbado, speech to the UN General Assembly. Quoted in F Rojas Aravena, Costa Rica: Politica
Exterior y Crisis Centroamericana, Heredia, Costa Rica: Universidad Nacional, Escuela de Relaci6nes
Internacionales, 1990, p 141.
25 Protocolo de Tegucigalpa a la Carta de la Organizacion de Estados Centroamericanos (ODECA), Art 3b.
26 A Diaz Cordova, 'La integraci6n desde el punto de vista institucional', Estudios Internactionales
(Guatemala) 5 (10), 1994, pp 114-127.
27 Protocol of Tegucigalpa.
28 J E Vargas Roldan, 'Los actores de la sociedad civil en el processo de integraci6n Centroameric
Estudios Internacionales, 7 (13), 1996, pp 176-183.
29 Reuters, 19 April 1996. Quoted in A Isacson, Altered States. Security and Demilitarization in Central
America, Washington, DC: Center for International Policy and San Jose, Costa Rica: The Arias Foundation
for Peace and Human Progress, 1996, p 111.
30 Institute for European-Latin American Relations (IRELA), DATARELA, Latin American Data Bank, http://
www.irela.org, 1998. The main increase in imports came from Japan and the Asian NICS, but imports from
the USA and the EU also increased significantly. The increase in exports is more varied, but it is accounted
for by a modest increase in exports to the USA, the rest of Latin America and the Asian NICS. Bilateral
treaties signed between individual SICA countries and third parties have also had greater impact on
commercial flows than have the SICA agreements. For example, Costa Rica's trade with Mexico increased
150% after the bilateral treaty between the two was signed in 1994.
31 See for example J M Cruz & N P Pefia, Solidaridad y Violencia en las Pandillas del Gran San Salvador.
Mas alld de la Vida Loca, San Salvador: UCA Editores, 1998.
32 G A Morales & M I Cranshaw, Regionalismo Emergente: Redes de la Sociedad Civil e Integracion
Centroamericana, San Jose, Costa Rica: FLACSO, 1997. For an account of the dividing lines between
different NGOs and how they relate to the conflict of the 1980s, see L Macdonald, 'Globalising civil society:
intepreting international NGOS in Central America', Millenium, 22 (2), 1994, pp 267-285.
33 The 1998 meeting was used in that respect to request that an arrangement be applied to industrial products
similar to that granted to the countries of the Andean Community. Council press release: 02/10/98 (1) San
Jose XIVth Ministerial Conference, 10 February 1998, San Jose, Costa Rica, Joint Communique.
34 The European Parliament has given substantial assistance to IRELA, located in Madrid, an institution
established to further relations within and between the two regions. The European Commission has also
formalised working relationships with such regional bodies as the Sistema Economico Latinoamericano
(SELA) and Asociaci6n Latinoamericana de Integraci6n (ALADI). See E N Baklanoff, 'Spain's economic
strategy toward the "Nations of Its Historical Community": the "reconquest" of Latin America', Journal of
Interamerican Studies and World Affairs, 38 (1), 1996, pp 105-127.
35 Of speeches in national forums, the inauguration speeches given by presidents when resuming power have
been chosen. In general, the most striking aspect is that Central American integration is mentioned very
rarely.
36 Declaration of Antigua, 17 June 1990.
37 Panorama Centroamericano/Reporte Politico, No 111, January 1996.

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 BENEDICTE BULL

38 Hettne, 'Globalisation and the new regionalism'.

39 Sojo, 'Negociaci6nes internacionales en Centroamerica', pp 14-15, 35-52.
40 Edelberto Torres-Rivas, speech at II Seminario de Relaciones Econ6micas Mexico-Centroamerica, referred
to in La Prensa de Honduras, 16 April 1999.

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