Article 39. Effects of Adoption.
- The adoption shall: HELD:
1. Give to the adopted person the same rights and duties as if he were a legitimate child
of the adopter: Provided, That an adopted child cannot acquire Philippine citizenship by
virtue of such adoption; lawphi1.net
2. Dissolve the authority vested in the natural parent or parents, except where the
adopter is the spouse of the surviving natural parent;
3. Entitle the adopted person to use the adopter's surname; and
4. Make the adopted person a legal heir of the adopter: Provided, That if the adopter is
survived by legitimate parents or ascendants and by an adopted person, the latter shall
not have more successional rights than an acknowledged natural child: Provided,
further, That any property received gratuitously by the adopted from the adopter shall
revert to the adopter should the former predecease the latter without legitimate issue
unless the adopted has, during his lifetime, alienated such property: Provided, finally,
That in the last case, should the adopted leave no property other than that received
from the adopter, and he is survived by illegitimate issue or a spouse, such illegitimate
issue collectively or the spouse shall receive one-fourth of such property; if the adopted
is survived by illegitimate issue and a spouse, then the former collectively shall receive
one-fourth and the latter also one-fourth, the rest in any case reverting to the adopter,
observing in the case of the illegitimate issue the proportion provided for in Article 895
of the Civil Code.
The adopter shall not be a legal heir of the adopted person, whose parents by nature shall inherit
from him, except that if the latter are both dead, the adopting parent or parents take the place of
the natural parents in the line of succession, whether testate or interstate.
BANAWA v MIRANO
FACTS: Mariano Mirano was taken in by spouses Doroteo Banawa and Juliana Mendoza treated
and reared her up like their own child. On July 31, 1949 Maria Mirano died of illness and left her
nearest relatives Primitiva Mirano her sister, and children of a deceased brother Martin Mirano
her nearest relatives are now the respondents. The Spouses Banawa and Mendoza both died
during the pendency of this case and Gliceria Abrenica one adoptive daughter and her spouse is
now the petitioners. The spouses Doroteo Banawa and Juliana Mendoza bought two parcels of
land, the first one Iba property was bought and named to Maria Mirano by the spouses from
Placido Punzalan in 1921 upon failure of the latter to pay the former of obligations amounting to
4,080 pesos. The second, Carsuche property was bought by the spouses in 1935 which the Court
of Appeals found out was in favor of Maria Mirano however, in 1940 the same property was sold
to the petitioners. The decision of the lower court and the Court of Appeals favors the two parcels
of land in dispute to the respondents. The petitioners contend that the there was error in the Court
of Appeals decision in relation to its interpretation of article 632 of the Old Civil Code; Section 5
Rule 100 of the Old Rules of Court. That under Section 40 of the Code of Civil Procedures the
petitioners has acquired acquisitive prescription for the Carasuche Property.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in interpreting article 632 of the Old Civil Code and
Section 5 Rule 100 of the Old Rules of Court and thus unjustly forfeited the petitioners claim to
the Iba property.
2. Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in dismissing the petitioners claim on the Carsuche
property pursuant of Section 40 of the Code of Civil Procedures.
1. No. Article 632 of the Old Code provides that: "Donations of personal property may be made
verbally or in writing. Verbal donation requires the simultaneous delivery of the gift. In the absence
of this requisite the donation shall produce no effect, unless made in writing and accepted in the
same form." The word Delivery may be actual or constructive thus the contention of the
petitioners that there was no simultaneous delivery of the credits to Maria Mirano is not
meritorious. Section 5, Rule 100 of the Old Rules of Court provides that: In case of death of the
child, his parents and relatives by nature, and not by adoption shall be his legal heirs, except as
to property received or inherited by the adopted child from either of his parents by adoption, which
shall become the property of the latter or their legitimate relatives The rule pertains to judicially
adopted child, and when the language of law is clear and unequivocal the law must be taken to
mean exactly what it says. The decision of the Court of Appeals on the Iba property is affirmed.
2. Yes. Section 40 of the Code of Civil Procedure provides Period of prescription as to real
estate- An action for recovery of title to, or possession of real property, or an interest therein, can
only be brought within ten years after the cause of action accrues. The right to ownership of the
petitioners from the time the Carsuche property was bought in 1940 has already accrued by
1950. The decision of the Court Appeal on the Carsuche property is reversed.
TEOTICO v DEL VAL
Doctrine: The relationship established by adoption is limited solely to the adopter and the adopted
does not extend to the relatives of the adopting parents or of the adopted child except only as
expressly provided for by law. Hence, no relationship is created between the adopted and the
collaterals of the adopting parents. As a consequence, the adopted is an heir of the adopter but
not of the relatives of the adopter. Thus, an adopted can neither represent nor be represented.
FACTS:
Maria Mortera died on July 1955 leaving properties worth P600,000. She executed a will written
in Spanish, affixed her signature and acknowledged before Notary Public by her and the
witnesses. Among the legacies made in the will was the P20,000 for Rene Teotico who was
married to the testatrixs niece, Josefina Mortera. The usufruct of Marias interest in the Calvo
Building were left to the said spouses and the ownership thereof was left in equal parts to her
grandchildren, the legitimate children of said spouses. Josefina was likewise instituted, as sole
and universal heir to all the remainder of her properties not otherwise disposed by will. Vicente
Teotico filed a petition for the probate of the will but was opposed by Ana del Val Chan, claiming
that she was an adopted child of Francisca (deceased sister of Maria) and an acknowledged
natural child of Jose (deceased brother of Maria), that said will was not executed as required by
law and that Maria as physically and mentally incapable to execute the will at the time of its
execution and was executed under duress, threat, or influence of fear.
ISSUE: WON defendant has right to intervene in this proceeding.
HELD:
It is a well-settled rule that in order that a person may be allowed to intervene in a probate
proceeding is that he must have an interest in the estate, will or in the property to be affected by
either as executor or as a claimant of the estate and be benefited by such as an heir or one who
has a claim against it as creditor. Under the terms of the will, defendant has no right to intervene
because she has no such interest in the estate either as heir, executor or administrator because
it did not appear therein any provision designating her as heir/ legatee in any portion of the
estate. She could have acquired such right if she was a legal heir of the deceased but she is not
under the CIVIL CODE. Even if her allegations were true, the law does not give her any right to
succeed the estate of the deceased sister of both Jose and Francisca because being an
illegitimate child she is prohibited by law from succeeding to the legitimate relatives of her natural
father and that relationship established by adoption is limited solely to the adopter and adopted
and does not extend to the relatives of the adopting parents except only as expressly provided by
law. As a consequence, she is an heir of the adopter but not of the relatives of the adopter.
Hence, defendant has no right to intervene either as testamentary or as legal heir in the probate
proceeding.
IN RE: ADOPTION OF STEPHANIE GARCIA
FACTS:
Honorato Catindig filed a petition to adopt his minor illegitimate child Stephanie Nathy Astorga
Garcia. He prayed that the child's middle name Astorga be changed to Garcia, her mother's
surname, and that her surname Garcia be changed to Catindig, his surname.
Trial court granted the petition and declared Stephanie as his legitimate child and heir, and
pursuant to Art. 189 of the Family Code, she is now known as Stephanie Nathy Catindig.
Honorato filed a motion for clarification and/or reconsideration that Stephanie should be allowed
to use the surname Garcia as her middle name.
The Republic, through the OSG, agreed with Honorato for her relationship with her natural mother
should be maintained and preserved, to prevent any confusion and hardship in the future, and
under Article 189 she remains to be an intestate heir of her mother.
ISSUE:
Whether or not an illegitimate child, upon adoption by her natural father, use the surname of her
natural mother as her middle name.
RULING:
Yes. there is no law prohibiting an illegitimate child adopted by her natural father, like Stephanie,
to use, as middle name her mothers surname, we find no reason why she should not be allowed
to do so.
Article 176 of the Family Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 9255, (An Act Allowing
Illegitimate Children To Use The Surname Of Their Father) is silent as to what middle name a
child may use. Article 365 of the CC merely provides that an adopted child shall bear the surname
of the adopter. Article 189 of the Family Code, enumerating the legal effects of adoption, is
likewise silent on the matter.
Republic Act No. 8552, (Domestic Adoption Act of 1998) an legitimate child by virtue of her
adoption, Stephanie is entitled to all the rights provided by law to a legitimate child without
discrimination of any kind, including the right to bear the surname of her father and her mother.
MORALES v OLONDRIZ
DY YIENG SEANGIO v REYES
COMPLETE DIGEST
There was a petition for the probate of an alleged holographic will which was denominated as
Kasulatan sa pag-aalis ng mana. The private respondents moved for the dismissal of the
probate proceedings primarily on the ground that the document purporting to be the
holographic will of Segundo did not contain any disposition of the estate of the deceased and
thus did not meet the definition of a will under Article 783 of the Civil Code. According to
private respondents, the will only showed an alleged act of disinheritance by the decedent of
his eldest son, Alfredo, and nothing else; that all other compulsory heirs were not named nor
instituted as heir, devisee or legatee, hence there was preterition which would result to
intestacy. Private respondents maintained that while procedurally the court is called upon to
rule only on the extrinsic validity of the will, it is not barred from delving into the intrinsic validity
of the same, and ordering the dismissal of the petition for probate when on the face of the will
it is clear that it contains no testamentary disposition of the property of the decedent.
Petitioners filed their opposition to the motion to dismiss contending that: (1) generally, the
authority of the probate court is limited only to a determination of the extrinsic validity of the
will; (2) private respondents question the intrinsic and not the extrinsic validity of the will; (3)
disinheritance constitutes a disposition of the estate of a decedent; and (4) the rule on
preterition did not apply because Segundos will did not constitute a universal heir or heirs to
the exclusion of one or more compulsory heirs.
The RTC issued an order dismissing the petition for probate proceedings, hence, a petition
for certiorari was filed by petitioners.
Issue:
Whether the document executed by Segundo can be considered as a holographic will.
Held: Petition granted. The questioned will is a holographic will. Testate proceedings for the
settlement of the estate of the decedent take precedence over intestate proceedings for the same
purpose.
A holographic will, as provided under Article 810 of the Civil Code, must be entirely written,
dated, and signed by the hand of the testator himself. It is subject to no other form, and may
be made in or out of the Philippines, and need not be witnessed.
The document, although it may initially come across as a mere disinheritance instrument,
conforms to the formalities of a holographic will prescribed by law. It is written, dated and
signed by the hand of the testator himself. An intent to dispose mortis causa (Article 783) can
be clearly deduced from the terms of the instrument, and while it does not make an affirmative
disposition of the latters property, the disinheritance of the son nonetheless, is an act of
disposition in itself. In other words, the disinheritance results in the disposition of the property
of the testator in favor of those who would succeed in the absence of the eldest son.
It is a fundamental principle that the intent or the will of the testator, expressed in the form
and within the limits prescribed by law, must be recognized as the supreme law in succession.
All rules of construction are designed to ascertain and give effect to that intention. It is only
when the intention of the testator is contrary to law, morals, or public policy that it cannot be
given effect.
Holographic wills usually prepared by one who is not learned in the law should be construed
more liberally than the ones drawn by an expert, taking into account the circumstances
surrounding the execution of the instrument and the intention of the testator. In this regard,
the document, even if captioned as Kasulatan ng Pag-alis ng Mana, was intended by the
testator to be his last testamentary act and was executed by him in accordance with law in
the form of a holographic will. Unless the will is probated, the disinheritance cannot be given
effect.
MANINANG v CA
MANINANG v. CA 19 June1982 Melencio-Herrera, J. G.R. No. 57848 TOPIC: Production and
Probate of Will [Rule 75]
SUMMARY: Clemencia Aseneta died leaving a holographic will in which she left her properties to
Soledad Maninang and mentioned her displeasure towards her nephew Bernardo. Soledad
sought the probate of the will, while Bernardo, claiming to be the decedents adopted son and
sole heir, filed an intestate case (argument: he was preterited from the will, hence intestacy should
ensue). The cases were consolidated, but Bernardo later had the testate case dismissed. SC held
that the dismissal was not proper; generally, the probate of a will is MANDATORY.
NATURE: Petition to Review the CAs decision in the consolidated Petition for Probate and
Intestate Cases May 21, 1977 Clemencia Aseneta, 81, single, died at the Manila Sanitarium
Hospital. Her holographic will left her real and personal properties to Dra. Soledad Maninang, with
whose family she had lived for the last 30 years. o In the will, she said, I have found peace and
happiness with them even during the time when my sisters were still alive and especially now
when I am now being troubled by my nephew Bernardo and niece Salvacion. I am not incompetent
as Nonoy would like me to appear. I know what is right and wrong. I can decide for myself. I do
not consider Nonoy as my adopted son. He has made me do things against my will. June 1977
 Soledad filed a Petition for Probate of the Will at CFI QC (the Testate Case). July 1977
Bernardo Aseneta, claiming to be the adopted son and sole heir of Clemencia, instituted intestate
proceedings with the CFI Pasig, Rizal (the Intestate Case). Dec. 1977 - the Testate and
Intestate Cases were ordered consolidated before CFI Pasig. Bernardo filed a Motion to Dismiss
the Testate Case on the ground that the holographic will was null and void because he, as the
only compulsory heir, was preterited and, therefore, intestacy should ensue. o In her Opposition,
Soledad averred in a case for probate of a will, the Courts area of inquiry is limited to the extrinsic
validity of the will, and that Bernardo was effectively disinherited (not preterited). CFI
DISMISSED the Testate Case. It later denied Soledads MR and appointed Bernardo as
administrator of the estate. Soledad filed a petition for certiorari before the CA. CA denied it,
ruling that the order of dismissal was final in nature. Even granting that CFI committed errors,
those are errors of judgment reviewable only by appeal, not by certiorari.
W/N the Testate Case was properly dismissed NO. REMANDED to CFI for further proceedings.
3. In 1954, the petitioners filed a petition for intervention for partition alleging that they were the
nearest kin of Basilia and that the respondent had not been in fact adopted by the decedent in
accordance with law, hence the latter were strangers with no right to succeed as heirs.
4. The lower court held that the validity or invalidity is not material to the institution of heirs. It held
that the testator was possessed of testamentary capacity and her last will was executed free from
falsification, fraud, trickery or undue influence.
Issue: Whether or not the institution of the heir is valid
RULING: Yes. The general rule is that the falsity of the stated cause for the testamentary
institution does not affect the validity or efficacy of the institution. An exception to the rule is that
the falsity will set aide the institution if certain factors are present. Before the institution of the heirs
will be annulled under Art. 850 the following requisites must concur; 1) the cause must be stated

in the will, 2) the cause is shown to be false, and 3) it must appear from the face of the will that
the testator would not have made such institution if he had known the falsity. Moreover, testacy
Generally, the probate of a will is mandatory. o NCC Art. 838: "No will shall pass either real or
is favored and doubts are resolved on its side especially when the will shows a clear intention on
personal property unless it is proved and allowed in accordance with the Rules of Court." o The
the part of the testator to dispose of practically his whole estate as in this case.
law enjoins the probate of the will and public policy requires it, because unless the will is probated
and notice thereof given to the whole world, the right of a person to dispose of his property by will
VDA DE KILAYKO v TENGCO
may be rendered nugatory. Normally, the probate of a Will does not look into its intrinsic validity
Facts:
(capacity of the testator and the compliance with those requisites or solemnities which the law
prescribes for the validity of wills). o Bernardo relies on Nuguid v. Nuguid, where the Court held
The testator died without an issue leaving her last will and testament to her niece , Eustaquia
that where practical considerations demand that the intrinsic validity of the will be passed upon,
Lizarez. The will was probated and the project of partition was granted. The decree of distribution
even before it is probated, the Court should meet that issue. However, this is the exception rather
became final. However, there were errors in the distribution as alleged by Kilayko et al.
than the rule. In the cited case, the meat of the controversy was the intrinsic validity. Here, probate
is being insisted on. o In Nuguid, the will was invalid because it completely preterited the testators
parents who were her compulsory heirs. In the instant case, a crucial issue that calls for resolution Issues:
is whether under the terms of the decedent's will, Bernardo had been preterited or disinherited,
and if the latter, whether it was a valid disinheritance. Preterition and disinheritance are two Whether or not the errors in the distribution warrants the reopening of the estate of the testator.
diverse concepts. PRETERITION the omission in the testator's will of the forced heirs or
anyone of them, either because they are not mentioned therein, or, though mentioned, they are Held:
neither instituted as heirs nor are expressly disinherited. Preterition annuls the institution of heirs.
DISINHERITANCE a testamentary disposition depriving any compulsory heir of his share in No, the error will not cause the reopening of the succession.
the legitime for a cause authorized by law. By virtue of the dismissal of the Testate Case, the
determination of that controversial issue (whether Bernardo was preterited/ disinherited) has not Where the court has validly issued a decree of distribution and the same has become final, the
been thoroughly considered. SC is of the opinion that, contrary to CFIs findings, from the face of validity or invalidity of the project of partition becomes irrelevant.
the will, there can be no certainty that Bernardo was preterited. Note on procedure: Certiorari is a
proper remedy, in view of the finding that the CFI Judge acted in excess of his jurisdiction in The only instance where a party interested in a probate proceeding may have a final liquidation
dismissing the Testate Case. Even assuming appeal is available, in the broader interests of set aside is when he is left out by reason of circumstances beyond his control or through mistake
justice, a petition for certiorari may be entertained, particularly where appeal would not afford or inadvertence not imputable to negligence.
speedy and adequate relief.
The fundamental principle upon which the doctrine of res judicata rests is that parties ought not
AUSTRIA v REYES to be permitted to litigate the same issue more than once.
Doctrine: Before the institution of heirs may be annulled under article 850 of the Civil Code, the
following requisites must concur: First, the cause for the institution of heirs must be stated in the
will; second, the cause must be shown to be false; and third, it must appear from the face of the PALACIO v RAMIREZ
will that the testator would not have made such institution if he had known the falsity of the cause. Doctrine: What is meant by "one degree" from the first heir is explained by Tolentino as
follows:"Scaevola, Maura, and Traviesas construe 'degree' as designation, substitution, or
Facts: transmission. The Supreme Court of Spain has decidedly adopted this construction. From this
point of view, there can be only one transmission or substitution, and the substitute need not be
1. Basilia Austria executed a will wherein the bulk of her estate was given to the respondents, alll related to the first heir. Manresa, Morell, and Sanchez Roman, however, construe the word
have been declared by the former as her legally adopted children. 'degree' as generation, and the present Code has obviously followed this interpretation, by
providing that the substitution shall not go beyond one degree 'from the heir originally instituted.'
2. During her lifetime, Basilia filed a petition for the probate of her will. It was opposed by the The Code thus clearly indicates that the second heir must be related to and be one generation
petitioners who are the nephews and nieces. The opposition was dismissed and the will was from the first heir.
allowed.
"From this, it follows that the fideicommissary can only be either a child or a parent of the first heir.
These are the only relatives who are one generation or degree from the fiduciary."
Brief Facts: The testator instituted Wanda as first heir, and Juan and Horacio as second heirs in
a fideicommissary substitution. Juan and Horacio are strangers to Wanda.
Ratio: A fideicommissary substitution is void if first heir is not related in the first degree to the
second heir.
FACTS:
1. Jose Eugenio Ramirez, a Filipino national, died in Spain in 1964, with only his widow as
compulsory heir. His will was admitted to probate by the CFI of Manila in 1965. Maria Luisa
Palacios was appointed administratrix of the estate.
2. In 1966, Palacios submitted a project of partition. Jose Eugenios property is to be divided into
two parts.
One part shall go to Marcelle (Jose Eugenios French widow who lives in Paris) en pleno
dominio"1 in satisfaction of her legitime; the other part or "free portion" shall go to Jorge
and Roberto Ramirez "en nuda propriedad".2
Furthermore, 1/3 of the free portion is charged with the widow's usufruct and the remaining
2/3 with a usufruct in favor of Wanda de Wrobleski (Jose Eugenios Austrian companion
who lives in Spain).
3. Jorge and Roberto (Jose Eugenios grandnephews) opposed the project of partition on the
following grounds:
(a) The provisions for vulgar substitution in favor of Wanda with respect to the widow's
usufruct and in favor of Juan Pablo Jankowski and Horacio Ramirez, with respect to
Wanda's usufruct are invalid because the first heirs (Marcelle and Wanda) survived the
testator;
(b) The provisions for fideicommissary substitutions are invalid because the first heirs are not
related to the second heirs or substitutes within the first degree, as provided in Art. 863,
CC;
(c) The grant of a usufruct over real property in the Philippines in favor of Wanda, an alien,
violates Sec. 5, Art. III of the Philippine Constitution; and
(d) The proposed partition of the testator's interest in the Santa Cruz (Escolta) Building
between Marcelle and the appellants violates the testator's express will to give this
property to them (Jorge and Roberto).
4. Lower court approved the project of partition. Jorge and Roberto appealed.
ISSUES:
1. Whether the 1/3 usufruct over the free portion in favor of Marcelle is valid [NO]
2. Whether the fideicommissary substitution in connection with Wandas usufruct over 2/3 of the
estate in favor of Juan Pablo and Horacio is valid [NO]
3. Whether Wandas usufruct is valid [YES]
RATIO:
1. NO. It appears that the court a quo approved the usufruct in favor of Marcelle because the
testament provides for a usufruct of 1/3 of the estate in her favor. The court a quo erred for
Marcelle who is entitled to of the estate en pleno dominio as her legitime and which is
more than what she is given under the will is not entitled to have any additional share in the
estate. To give Marcelle more than her legitime will run counter to the testators intention,
seeing as the latters dispositions even impaired Marcelles legitime and tended to favor
Wanda.
1 Freehold.
Appellants here also questioned the legality of the vulgar substitution in favor of Wanda
with respect to Marcelles usufruct. However, since Marcelle is not entitled to any usufruct,
the question has become moot.
2. NO, the said fideicommissary substitution is void.
Appellants: The substitution in its vulgar aspect is void because Wanda survived the
testator.
SC: Dying before the testator is not the only case for vulgar substitution for it also
includes refusal or incapacity to accept the inheritance as provided in Art. 859, CC.
Hence, the vulgar substitution is valid.
Appellants: The substitution in its fideicommissary aspect is void.
SC: The appellants are correct for the following reasons:
(a) The substitutes (Juan Pablo and Horacio) are not related to Wanda, the heir
originally instituted. Art. 863, CC validates a fideicommissary substitution
"provided such substitution does not go beyond one degree from the heir originally
instituted." The fideicommissary can only be either a child or a parent of the first
heir. These are the only relatives who are one generation or degree from the
fiduciary.
(b) There is no absolute duty imposed on Wanda to transmit the usufruct to the
substitutes as required by Arts. 865 and 867 of the Civil Code. In fact, the appellee
admits "that the testator contradicts the establishment of a fideicommissary
substitution when he permits the properties subject of the usufruct to be sold upon
mutual agreement of the usufructuaries and the naked owners."
3. YES, Wandas usufruct is valid.
Sec. 5, Art. XIII, 1935 Constitution: Save in cases of hereditary succession, no private
agricultural land shall be transferred or assigned except to individuals, corporations, or
associations qualified to acquire or hold lands of the public domain in the Philippines.
The Court is of the opinion that the Constitutional provision which enables aliens to acquire
private lands does not extend to testamentary succession for otherwise the prohibition will
be for naught and meaningless. Any alien would be able to circumvent the prohibition by
paying money to a Philippine landowner in exchange for a devise of a piece of land.
This opinion notwithstanding, the Court upheld the usufruct in favor of Wanda because a
usufruct, albeit a real right, does not vest title to the land in the usufructuary and it is the
vesting of title to land in favor of aliens which is proscribed by the Constitution.
DISPOSITION: The estate of Jose Eugenio Ramirez is hereby ordered distributed as follows:
1/2 thereof to his widow as her legitime;
1/2 thereof which is the free portion to Roberto and Jorge Ramirez in naked ownership and
the usufruct to Wanda de Wrobleski with a simple substitution in favor of Juan Pablo
Jankowski and Horace V. Ramirez.
CRISOLOGO v SINGSON
2 In bare ownership.