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Alcantara v.
Alcantara
G.R. No. 167746
August 28, 2007
Kinds of void marriages Absence of requisites
Facts: Petitioner Restituto Alcantara filed a petition for annulment of marriage against
respondent Rosita Alcantara.
A petition for annulment of marriage was filed by petitioner Restituto Alcantara against
respondent Rosita Alcantara alleging that on December 8, 1982 he and respondent, without
securing the required marriage license, went to the Manila City Hall for the purpose of looking
for a person who could arrange a marriage for them. They met a person who, for a fee, arranged
their wedding. They got married on the same day. Petitioner and respondent went through
another marriage ceremony at the San Jose de Manuguit Church in Tondo, Manila, on March 26,
1983. The marriage was likewise celebrated without the parties securing a marriage license. The
alleged marriage license, procured in Carmona, Cavite, appearing on the marriage
contract, is a sham, as neither party was a resident of Carmona, and they never went to
Carmona to apply for a license. On October 14, 1985, Rosita gave birth to their child Rose Ann
Alcantara. In 1988, the couple parted ways and lived separately.
Restituto prayed that judgment be issued declaring their marriage void.

Rosita alleges that Restituto has a mistress with whom he has three children. He only filed the
annulment of their marriage to evade prosecution for concubinage. In fact, Rosita has filed a
case for concubinage against him before the Metropolitan Trial Court of Mandaluyong City.
Rosita prays that the petition for annulment of marriage be denied for lack of merit.
The lower court and CA dismissed the petition. The CA held that the marriage license of the
parties is presumed to be regularly issued and petitioner had not presented any evidence to
overcome the presumption.
Petitioner further alleges that the certification of the Municipal Civil Registrar of Carmona,
Cavite, cannot be given weight because the certification states that Marriage License number
7054133 was issued in favor of Mr. Restituto Alcantara and Miss Rosita Almario but their
marriage contract bears the number 7054033 for their marriage license number.
Issue: Whether or not the irregularity in the marriage license renders the marriage void
Held: No. A valid marriage license is a requisite of marriage under Article 53 of the Civil Code,
the absence of which renders the marriage void ab initio pursuant to Article 80(3) in relation
to Article 58 of the same Code.
To be considered void on the ground of absence of a marriage license, the law requires that the
absence of such marriage license must be apparent on the marriage contract, or at the very
least, supported by a certification from the local civil registrar that no such marriage
license was issued to the parties.
In the present case, the marriage contract between the petitioner and respondent reflects a
marriage license number. A certification to this effect was also issued by the local civil registrar
of Carmona, Cavite. This certification enjoys the presumption that official duty has been
regularly performed and the issuance of the marriage license was done in the regular conduct of
official business.
Issuance of a marriage license in a city or municipality, not the residence of either of the
contracting parties, and issuance of a marriage license despite the absence of publication or
prior to the completion of the 10-day period for publication are considered mere
irregularities that do not affect the validity of the marriage.
The discrepancy between the marriage license number in the certification of the Municipal Civil
Registrar versus that in the marriage contract appears to be a mere a typographical error which
does not detract from the finding of validity.
So v. Valera
G.R. No. 150677
June 5, 2009
Facts: Petitioner Renato Reyes So and respondent Lorna Valera first met at a party in 1973 after
being introduced by a common friend. So was a 17-year old high school student, and Valera was
a 21-year old college student. Their meeting led to a 2-month courtship, after which they eloped
and had a 19-year common-law relationship from 1973 to 1991. Out of this relationship were
born three children, namely Jeffrey, Renelee and Lino. They exchanged marital vows at the
Caloocan City Hall on December 10.
On May 14, 1996, So with the RTC a petition for the declaration of the nullity of his
marriage with Valera, alleging the absence of the essential and formal requisites. He also
claimed that Valera was psychologically incapacitated to exercise the essential obligations of
marriage, as shown by the following circumstances: Valera failed and refused to cohabit and
make love with him; did not love and respect him; did not remain faithful to him; did not give
him emotional, spiritual, physical, and psychological help and support; failed and refused to have
a family domicile; and failed and refused to enter into a permanent union and establish conjugal
and family life with him.
So testified that after eloping, they lived at the house of his mother's friend in Bulacan, and then
transferred to his parents house in Caloocan City. They stayed there for 2 months before
transferring to Muntinlupa City.
So averred that Valera asked him to sign a blank marriage application form and marriage
contract sometime in 1986. He signed these documents on the condition that these documents
would only be used if they decide to get married.
So further alleged that Valera did not want to practice her profession after passing the dental
board exam; and that she sold the dental equipment he bought for her. He also claimed that when
he started his own communication company, her interference eventually led to many failed
transactions with prospective clients.
He often slept in the car because Valera locked him out of the house when he came home late.
Moreover, Valera went out with his employees to gamble whenever there were no clients.
Sometime in 1990, he found all his things outside their house when he came home late after
closing a deal with a client.
Aside from his testimony, So also presented certified true copies of the birth certificate of their 3
children; certified true copy of their marriage contract; and the testimony, original curriculum
vitae, and psychological report of clinical psychologist Dr. Cristina Rosello-Gates.
In her Psychological Report, Dr. Gates noted that Valera taught him how to smoke marijuana.
Within the next two months after their first meeting, Valera dropped out of school without
informing her parents; she applied for a job and was purportedly raped by her employer.
Dr. Gates concluded that respondent Valera is plagued with an Adjustment Disorder as
manifested in her impulsiveness, lack of restraint, lack of civility and a sense of decency in the
conduct of her life. Compulsive Behavior Patterns are also evident in her marijuana habit,
gambling and habitual squandering of petitioner's money. Lorna Valera's Adjustment Disorder
and Compulsive Behavior Patterns were already existing prior to their marriage. Continuing
up to the present, the same appears to be irreversible.
The RTC nullified the marriage, declaring respondent psychologically incapacitated to comply
with the essential marital obligations under Article 36 of the Family Code.
The CA reversed and set aside the RTC decision, ruling that petitioner failed to prove
respondent's psychological incapacity.
Issue: Whether or not there exists psychological incapacity as to render the marriage void
Held: No. Petitioner failed to establish respondent's psychological incapacity.
In Santos v. CA, the Court first declared that psychological incapacity must be characterized
by (a) gravity; (b) juridical antecedence; and (c) incurability. It should refer to no less than a
mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive of the basic marital
covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage." It
must be confined to the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an
utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage.
More definitive guidelines were handed down in Republic v. CA and Molina:

(1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the plaintiff. Any
doubt should be resolved in favor of the existence and continuation of the marriage.
(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be (a) medically or clinically
identified, (b) alleged in the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly
explained in the decision.
(3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at the time of the celebration of the
marriage.
(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable.
(5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to assume
the essential obligations of marriage. Thus, mild characteriological peculiarities, mood
changes, occasional emotional outbursts cannot be accepted as root causes. The illness must
be shown as downright incapacity or inability, not a refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less ill
will.
(6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of the
Family Code as regards the husband and wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same
Code in regard to parents and their children.
A later case, Marcos v. Marcos, further clarified that it is no longer necessary to introduce
expert opinion in a petition under Article 36 if the totality of evidence shows that
psychological incapacity exists and its gravity, juridical antecedence, and incurability can
be duly established.
The facts on which the psychologist based her conclusions were all derived from statements by
the petitioner whose bias in favor of his cause cannot be doubted. Moreover, the psychologist's
testimony itself glaringly failed to show that respondent's behavioral disorder was medically or
clinically permanent or incurable. Neither did the psychologist testify that the disorder was grave
enough to bring about the disability of the party to assume the essential obligations of marriage.
Such character faults and defects do not constitute psychological incapacity as a ground for
the declaration of marriage. While she appears to be less than an ideal mother to her children
and loving wife to her husband, the same are not physical manifestations of a psychological
illness as described in Molina.
Article 36 contemplates downright incapacity or inability to take cognizance of and to

assume basic marital obligations. Mere "difficulty," "refusal" or "neglect" in the
performance of marital obligations or "ill will" on the part of the spouse is different from
"incapacity" rooted on some debilitating psychological condition or illness.
Indeed, irreconcilable differences, sexual infidelity or perversion, emotional immaturity and

irresponsibility, and the like, do not by themselves warrant a finding of psychological
incapacity under Article 36, as the same may only be due to a person's refusal or
unwillingness to assume the essential obligations of marriage and not due to some
psychological illness that is contemplated by said rule.
De Castro v. De Castro
G.R. No. 160172
February 13, 2008
Facts: Petitioner Reinel De Castro and respondent Annabelle Assidao met and became
sweethearts in 1991. They applied for a marriage license in September 1994. They had their
first sexual relation sometime in October 1994, and had regularly engaged in sex thereafter.
When the couple went back to the Office of the Civil Registrar, the marriage license had already
expired. In lieu of a marriage license, they executed an affidavit stating that they had been
living together as husband and wife for at least five years. The couple got civilly married on
the same date before the MTC Judge. Nevertheless, after the ceremony, Reinel and Annabelle
went back to their respective homes and did not live together as husband and wife.
On November 13, 1995, Annabelle gave birth to their daughter Reinna. Since the birth,
Annabelle has been the one supporting her out of her own income as a government dentist and
from her private practice.
In 1998, Annabelle filed a complaint for support against her husband Reinel.
Reinel claimed that their marriage is void because the affidavit they executed was fake and
that he was merely prevailed upon to sign the marriage contract to save Annabelle from
embarrassment and possible administrative prosecution due to her pregnant state.
The trial court ruled that the marriage between Reniel and Annabelle is not valid because it
was solemnized without a marriage license. However, it declared Reniel as the natural father
of the child, and thus obliged to give her support.
The CA sustained the award for support. It applied the rule that a marriage is presumed to be
subsisting until a judicial declaration of nullity has been made, hence, the child was born
during the subsistence and validity of the parties' marriage. Nevertheless, the CA ruled that
since this case is an action for support, it was improper for the trial court to declare the marriage
of petitioner and respondent as null and void in the very same case.
Issue: Whether or not the falsity of the affidavit renders the marriage void ab initio
Held: Yes. Under the Family Code, the absence of any of the essential or formal requisites shall
render the marriage void ab initio, whereas a defect in any of the essential requisites shall render
the marriage voidable.
The falsity of the affidavit cannot be considered as a mere irregularity in the formal
requisites of marriage. The law dispenses with the marriage license requirement for a man and
a woman who have lived together and exclusively with each other as husband and wife for a
continuous and unbroken period of at least five years before the marriage. The aim of this
provision is to avoid exposing the parties to humiliation, shame and embarrassment
concomitant with the scandalous cohabitation of persons outside a valid marriage due to
the publication of every applicant's name for a marriage license.
In the instant case, there was no "scandalous cohabitation" to protect; in fact, there was no
cohabitation at all. The false affidavit which petitioner and respondent executed so they could
push through with the marriage has no value whatsoever. They were not exempt from the
marriage license requirement. Their failure to obtain and present a marriage license renders
their marriage void ab initio.
Republic v. Dayot
G.R. No. 175581
March 28, 2008
Facts: Jose Dayot and Felisa Tecson were married at the Pasay City Hall on November 24, 1986.
In lieu of a marriage license, they executed a sworn affidavit attesting that they had lived
together as husband and wife for at least five years.
On July 7, 1993, Jose filed a Complaint for Annulment/Nullity of Marriage with the RTC. He
contended that no marriage ceremony was celebrated; that he did not execute the sworn
affidavit; and that his consent to the marriage was secured through fraud.
According to Jose, in 1986, he came to live in a boarding house where Felisa was his landlady.
Some three weeks later, Felisa requested him to accompany her to the Pasay City Hall,
ostensibly so she could claim a package sent to her by her brother from Saudi Arabia. There, he
was told that he needed to sign the papers so that the package could be released to Felisa. He
initially refused to do so. However, he relented when Felisa told him that his refusal could get
both of them killed by her brother who had learned about their relationship.
In February 1987, Jose allegedly discovered a copy of his marriage contract lying on top of the
sala table in Felisa's house. Jose confronted Felisa but the latter feigned ignorance.
For her part, Felisa claimed that that while her marriage to Jose was subsisting, the latter
contracted marriage with a certain Rufina Pascual on August 31, 1990. Felisa filed an
action for bigamy against Jose.
The RTC ruled that the marriage celebrated between Jose and Felisa was valid. On the matter
of fraud, the RTC ruled that Jose's action had prescribed since under Article 87 of the New Civil
Code, the action for annulment of marriage must be commenced by the injured party within four
years after the discovery of the fraud.
The CA ruled that the marriage of Jose and Felisa was void ab initio due to the absence of a
marriage license. The CA gave credence to the assertion that the affidavit of marital
cohabitation executed by Jose and Felisa was merely fabricated. It appears that Jose and Felisa
started living together only in June 1986, or barely five months before the celebration of their
marriage.
Issue: Whether or not the marriage is void due to the absence of a marriage license
Held: Yes. Article 80(3) of the Civil Code makes it clear that a marriage performed without
the corresponding marriage license is void. An exception to the marriage license requirement
is provided under Article 76 of the Civil Code in the form of a ratification of marital
cohabitation. The reason for the law, as espoused by the Code Commission, is that the publicity
attending a marriage license may discourage such persons who have lived in a state of
cohabitation from legalizing their status.
The five-year common-law cohabitation period under Article 76 means a five-year period
computed back from the date of celebration of marriage, and refers to a period of legal union had
it not been for the absence of a marriage. It covers the years immediately preceding the day of
the marriage, characterized by exclusivity - meaning no third party was involved at any time
within the five years - and continuity that is unbroken.
For the exception in Article 76 to apply, it is a sine qua non thereto that the man and the woman
must have attained the age of majority, and that, being unmarried, they have lived together as
husband and wife for at least five years.
It is established that Jose and Felisa have not lived together for five years at the time they
executed their sworn affidavit and contracted marriage. The falsity of the allegation in the
sworn affidavit relating to the period of Jose and Felisa's cohabitation, which would have
qualified their marriage as an exception to the requirement for a marriage license, cannot be a
mere irregularity, for it refers to a quintessential fact that the law precisely required to be
deposed and attested to by the parties under oath.
Abbas v. Abbas
G.R. No. 183896
January 30, 2013
Facts: Petitioner Syed Azhar Abbas filed for the declaration of nullity of his marriage to
respondent Gloria Goo-Abbas on the ground of absence of a marriage license.
In their marriage contract, it was stated that Marriage License No. 9969967, issued at Carmona,
Cavite on January 8, 1993, was presented to the solemnizing officer.
According to petitioner, a Pakistani citizen, he met respondent, a Filipino citizen, in Taiwan and
they were married on August 9, 1992 at the Taipei Mosque in Taiwan. He arrived in the
Philippines in December of 1992. On January 9, 1993, he was at his mother-in-law's residence
in Malate, Manila, when his mother-in-law arrived with two men. He was told that he was
going to undergo some ceremony, one of the requirements for his stay in the Philippines.
During the ceremony he and Gloria signed a document. He claimed that he did not know
that the ceremony was a marriage until Gloria told him later. He further testified that he did
not go to Carmona, Cavite to apply for a marriage license, and that he had never resided in
that area.
In July 2003, he went to the Office of the Civil Registrar of Carmona, Cavite, to check on
their marriage license, and was asked to show a copy of their marriage contract wherein the
marriage license number could be found. The Municipal Civil Registrar issued a certification to
the effect that the marriage license number appearing in the marriage contract of Syed and
Gloria was the number of another marriage license issued to a certain Arlindo Getalado
and Myra Mabilangan.
Atty. Sanchez was the sponsor of the wedding. He testified that he requested a certain Qualin to
secure the marriage license for the couple, and that this Qualin secured the license and gave the
same to him on January 8, 1993. He further testified that he did not know where the marriage
license was obtained.
Felicitas Goo, mother of respondent, admitted that she sought the help of Atty. Sanchez at the
Manila City Hall in securing the marriage license. She further testified that she did not read all of
the contents of the marriage license, and that she was told that the marriage license was obtained
from Carmona.
The RTC held that given the lack of a valid marriage license, the marriage of Gloria and Syed on
January 9, 1993 was void ab initio. The CA, however, reversed the RTC. The CA held that the
certification of the Municipal Civil Registrar failed to categorically state that a diligent search for
the marriage license of Gloria and Syed was conducted, and thus held that said certification
could not be accorded probative value. The CA ruled that there was sufficient testimonial and
documentary evidence that Gloria and Syed had been validly married and that there was
compliance with all the requisites laid down by law.
Issue: Whether or not the marriage is void due to the absence of a marriage license
Held: Yes. It cannot be said that there was a simple irregularity in the marriage license
that would not affect the validity of the marriage, as no license was presented by the
respondent. No marriage license was proven to have been issued to Gloria and Syed, based on
the certification of the Municipal Civil Registrar of Carmona, Cavite and Gloria's failure to
produce a copy of the alleged marriage license.
The certification of the Local Civil Registrar that their office had no record of a marriage
license was adequate to prove the non-issuance of said license. The certification issued by the
civil registrar enjoys probative value, as it is the civil registrars duty was to maintain records of
data relative to the issuance of a marriage license.
All the evidence cited by the CA to show that a wedding ceremony was conducted and a
marriage contract was signed does not operate to cure the absence of a valid marriage
license.
Article 4 of the Family Code is clear when it says, "The absence of any of the essential or
formal requisites shall render the marriage void ab initio, except as stated in Article 35(2)."
Article 35(3) of the Family Code also provides that a marriage solemnized without a license
is void from the beginning, except those exempt from the license requirement under Articles
27 to 34, Chapter 2, Title I of the same Code. This marriage cannot be characterized as
among the exemptions, and thus, having been solemnized without a marriage license, is
void ab initio.
Wiegel v. Sempio-Diy
G.R. No. L-53703
August 19, 1986
Kinds of void marriages Bigamous and polygamous marriages
Facts: Respondent Karl Wiegel married petitioner Lilia Oliva Wiegel in July 1978 at the Holy
Catholic Apostolic Christian Church Branch in Makati.
Respondent filed a case before the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court of Caloocan asking
for the declaration of nullity of his marriage with Lilia on the ground of Lilia's previous
existing marriage to one Eduardo A. Maxion, the ceremony having been performed on June 25,
1972 at our Lady of Lourdes Church in Quezon City.
Lilia admitted the existence of said prior subsisting marriage with Eduardo. She, however,
claimed that said marriage was null and void because she and Eduardo had been allegedly
forced to enter said marital union.
Lilia asked the trial court for an opportunity to present evidence to prove that the first marriage
was vitiated by force exercised upon both her and the first husband, and that the first husband
was at the time of the marriage in 1972 already married to someone else.
Respondent judge ruled against the presentation of evidence because the existence of force
exerted on both parties of the first marriage had already been agreed upon. Hence, the present
petition.
Issue: Whether or not petitioners first marriage remained valid and subsisting
Held: Yes. There is no need for petitioner to prove that her first marriage was vitiated by force
committed against both parties because assuming this to be so, the marriage will not be void but
merely voidable, and therefore valid until annulled. Since no annulment has yet been made, it
is clear that when she married respondent she was still validly married to her first
husband. Consequently, her marriage to respondent is void.
There is likewise no need of introducing evidence about the existing prior marriage of her first
husband at the time they married each other, for then such a marriage though void still needs a
judicial declaration of such fact and for all legal intents and purposes she would still be regarded
as a married woman at the time she contracted her marriage with respondent; accordingly, the
marriage of petitioner and respondent would be regarded void under the law.
Terre v. Terre
A.C. No. 2349
July 3, 1992
Facts: In a sworn complaint filed on December 24, 1981, complainant Dorothy B. Terre charged
respondent Jordan Terre, a member of the Philippine Bar, with grossly immoral conduct,
consisting of contracting a second marriage and living with another woman, while his prior
marriage with complainant remained subsisting.
In his Answer, Atty. Terre averred that he had contracted marriage with complainant Dorothy
Terre on June 14, 1977 upon her representation that she was single; that he subsequently
learned that Dorothy was married to a certain Merlito Bercenilla sometime in 1968; that
when he confronted Dorothy about her prior marriage, Dorothy drove him out of their conjugal
residence; that Dorothy had mockingly told him of her private meetings with Merlito A.
Bercenilla and that the child she was then carrying (Jason) was the son of Bercenilla; that
believing in good faith that his marriage to complainant was null and void ab initio, he
contracted marriage with Helina Malicdem at Dasol, Pangasinan.
Dorothy explained that while she had given birth to Jason at the PAFGH registered as a
dependent of Merlito Bercenilla, she had done so out of extreme necessity and to avoid risk of
death or injury to the fetus. According to Dorothy, she had then already been abandoned by
Jordan, leaving her penniless and without means to pay for the medical and hospital bills arising
by reason of her pregnancy.
On 26 February 1990, the Office of the Solicitor General submitted its "Report and
Recommendation" to this Court. The Report summarized the testimony of the complainant in the
following manner:
Dorothy testified that she and Jordan met for the first time in 1979 as 4th year high school
classmates in Cadiz City High School. She was then married to Merlito Bercenilla, while Jordan
was single. Jordan was aware of her marital status but nevertheless started courting her. They
moved to Manila were they respectively pursued their education, Jordan as a law student at the
Lyceum University. She decided nothing would come out of the courtship since she was
married but he explained to her that their marriage was void ab initio since she and her
first husband were first cousins. Convinced by his explanation, she agreed to marry him.
In their marriage license, Jordan wrote single as her status explaining that since her
marriage was void ab initio, there was no need to go to court to declare it as such.
They were married before Judge Priscilla Mijares of the City Court of Manila on June 14, 1977.
Jason Terre was born of their union on June 25, 1981. Dorothy supported respondent up to the
time he disappeared in 1981. She found out later that he married a certain Vilma Malicdem.
She then filed a case for abandonment of minor with the City Fiscal of Pasay City, as well was
a case for bigamy against Jordan and Helina Malicdem with the office of the Provincial Fiscal of
Pangasinan.
Issue: Whether or not the second marriage is bigamous
Held: Yes. When the second marriage was entered into, respondent's prior marriage with
complainant was subsisting, no judicial action having been initiated or any judicial
declaration obtained as to the nullity of such prior marriage of respondent with
complainant.
Respondent sought to defend himself by claiming that he had believed in good faith that his prior
marriage with complainant Dorothy Terre was null and void ab initio and that no action for a
judicial declaration of nullity was necessary.
Being a lawyer, he knew or should have known that such an argument ran counter to the
prevailing case law of the Court which holds that for purposes of determining whether a
person is legally free to contract a second marriage, a judicial declaration that the first
marriage was null and void ab initio is essential.
His first marriage to complainant Dorothy Terre must be deemed valid, with the result that
his second marriage to Helina Malicdem must be regarded as bigamous and criminal in
character.
Domingo v. Court of Appeals

G.R. No. 104818
September 17, 1993
Facts: On May 29, 1991, private respondent Delia Domingo filed a petition before the RTC of
Pasig for the nullity of marriage and separation of property against petitioner Roberto
Domingo. It was alleged that they were married on November 29, 1976 at the YMCA Youth
Center Building and that unknown to Delia, Roberto had a previous marriage with one
Emerlina dela Paz on April 25, 1969, which marriage was valid and still existing. She came to
know of the prior marriage only sometime in 1983 when Emerlina sued them for bigamy.
From January 23, 1979 up to the present, Delia has been working in Saudi Arabia and she used
to come to the Philippines only when she would avail of the one-month annual vacation leave
granted by her foreign employer. Sometime in June 1989, while on her one-month vacation, she
discovered that he was cohabiting with another woman and that he had been disposing of
some of her properties without her knowledge or consent.
Petitioner filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground that the petition stated no cause of action. The
marriage being void ab initio, the petition for the declaration of its nullity is, therefore,
superfluous and unnecessary.
The trial court denied the motion to dismiss. It held that although the second marriage can be
presumed to be void ab initio as it was celebrated while the first marriage was still subsisting,
there was still the need for a judicial declaration of its nullity.
Instead of filing the required answer, petitioner filed a special civil action of certiorari and
mandamus on the ground that the lower court acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack of jurisdiction in denying the motion to dismiss. The CA dismissed the petition.
Petitioner is arguing that the judicial declaration of a void marriage was not necessary for being
superfluous and that such was only needed for the purpose of remarriage.
Issue: Whether or not a petition for judicial declaration of a void marriage same should be
filed only for purposes of remarriage
Held: No. A declaration of the absolute nullity of a marriage is now explicitly required
either as a cause of action or a ground for defense. Where the absolute nullity of a previous
marriage is sought to be invoked for purposes of contracting a second marriage, the sole basis
acceptable in law for said projected marriage to be free from legal infirmity is a final judgment
declaring the previous marriage void. (Article 39 of the Family Code)
The parties to a marriage should not be allowed to assume that their marriage is void even
if such be the fact but must first secure a judicial declaration of the nullity of their
marriage before they can be allowed to marry again. (THIS!!!)
Crucial to the proper interpretation of Article 40 is the position in the provision of the word
solely. As it is placed, the same shows that is it meant to qualify final judgment declaring
such previous marriage void. The provision in question, as it finally emerged, did not state "The
absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked solely for purposes of remarriage . . .," in
which case "solely" would clearly qualify the phrase "for purposes of remarriage."
That Article 40 as finally formulated denotes that such final judgment declaring the previous
marriage void need not be obtained ONLY for purposes of remarriage.
Undoubtedly, one can conceive of other instances where a party might well invoke the absolute
nullity of a previous marriage for purposes other than remarriage, such as in case of an action for
liquidation, partition, distribution and separation of property between the erstwhile spouses, as
well as an action for the custody and support of their common children and the delivery of the
latter's presumptive legitimes. In such cases, evidence must be adduced, testimonial or
documentary, to prove the existence of grounds rendering such a previous marriage an absolute
nullity. These need not be limited solely to an earlier final judgment of a court declaring
such previous marriage void.
In the instance where a party who has previously contracted a marriage which remains subsisting
desires to enter into another marriage which is legally unassailable, he is required by law to
prove that the previous one was an absolute nullity. But this he may do on the basis solely of a
final judgment declaring such previous marriage void.
Cario v. Cario
G.R. No. 132529
February 2, 2001
Facts: During the lifetime of the late SPO4 Santiago S. Cario, he contracted two marriages: the
first on June 20, 1969, with Susan Nicdao Cario, with whom he had two offsprings, and the
second on November 10, 1992, with Susan Yee Cario, with whom he had no children in their
near ten-year cohabitation starting in 1982.
In 1988, SPO4 Santiago S. Cario became ill and bedridden due to diabetes complicated by
pulmonary tuberculosis. He passed away on November 23, 1992, under the care of Susan Yee,
who spent for his medical and burial expenses.
Both wives filed claims for monetary benefits and financial assistance pertaining to the deceased
from various government agencies. Susan Nicdao was able to collect a total of P146,000 while
Susan Yee received a total of P21,000.
On December 14, 1993, Susan Yee filed the instant case for collection of sum of money against
Susan Nicdao praying that the latter be ordered to return to her at least half of the P146,000.
Susan Yee admitted that her marriage to the deceased took place during the subsistence of,
and without first obtaining a judicial declaration of nullity of, the marriage between Nicdao
and the deceased. However, she claimed that she had no knowledge of the previous marriage
and that she became aware of it only at the funeral of the deceased, where Nicdao introduced
herself as the wife of the deceased.
Susan Yee further contended that the marriage of Nicdao and the deceased is void ab initio
because the same was solemnized without the required marriage license. In support thereof,
respondent presented: 1) the marriage certificate of the deceased and the petitioner which bears
no marriage license number; and 2) a certification from the Local Civil Registrar of San Juan,
Metro Manila stating that there is no record of marriage license of the spouses Santiago Carino
and Susan Nicdao.
The trial court and Court Appeals ruled in favor of Susan Yee and granted her prayer for half the
benefits received by Nicdao.
Held: Yes. The first marriage between Susan Nicdao and Santiago Carino was void ab initio for
being solemnized without the required marriage license.
Nonetheless, the nullity of the first marriage does not validate the second marriage of the
deceased with Susan Yee. The fact remains that their marriage was solemnized without first
obtaining a judicial decree declaring the previous marriage void. Hence, the second marriage
of Susan Yee and the deceased is likewise void ab initio for failure to comply with Article 40
of the Family Code.
Under Article 40, the absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked for purposes of
remarriage on the basis solely of a final judgment declaring such previous marriage void. Thus,
if a party who is previously married wishes to contract a second marriage, he or she has to
obtain first a judicial decree declaring the first marriage void, before he or she could
contract said second marriage, otherwise the second marriage would be void. The same rule
applies even if the first marriage is patently void because the parties are not free to determine for
themselves the validity or invalidity or their marriage.
However, for purposes other than remarriage, no judicial action is necessary to declare a
marriage an absolute nullity. (HA?) For purposes such as the determination of heirship,
legitimacy or illegitimacy of a child, settlement of estate, dissolution of property regime, or a
criminal case for that matter, the court may pass upon the validity of marriage even after the
death of the parties thereto, and even in a suit not directly instituted to question the validity of
said marriage, so long as it is essential to the determination of the case. In such instances,
evidence must be adduced, testimonial or documentary, to prove the existence of grounds
rendering such a previous marriage an absolute nullity. These need not be limited solely to
an earlier final judgment of a court declaring such previous marriage void.
Bobis v. Bobis
G.R. No. 138509
July 31, 2000
Facts: On October 21, 1985, respondent Isagani Bobis contracted a first marriage with one
Maria Dulce Javier. Without said marriage having been terminated, Isagani contracted a second
marriage with petitioner Imelda Marbella-Bobis on January 25, 1996 and allegedly a third
marriage with a certain Julia Sally Hernandez.
Imelda filed an information for bigamy against Isagani in the RTC of Quezon City.
Sometime thereafter, Isagani initiated a civil action for the judicial declaration of absolute
nullity of his first marriage on the ground that it was celebrated without a marriage license.
Isagani then filed a motion to suspend the proceedings in the criminal case for bigamy
invoking the pending civil case for nullity of the first marriage as a prejudicial question to the
criminal case.
The trial judge granted the motion to suspend the criminal case. Imelda filed a motion for
reconsideration, but the same was denied.
Hence, this petition for review on certiorari. Imelda argues that Isagani should have first obtained
a judicial declaration of nullity of his first marriage before entering into the second marriage,
inasmuch as the alleged prejudicial question justifying suspension of the bigamy case is no
longer a legal truism pursuant to Article 40 of the Family Code.
Issue: Whether or not the subsequent filing of a civil action for declaration of nullity of a
previous marriage constitutes a prejudicial question to a criminal case for bigamy
Held: No. Any decision in the civil action for nullity would not erase the fact that
respondent entered into a second marriage during the subsistence of a first marriage. Thus,
a decision in the civil case is not essential to the determination of the criminal charge. It is,
therefore, not a prejudicial question.
Parties to a marriage should not be permitted to judge for themselves its nullity, only competent
courts having such authority. Prior to such declaration of nullity, the validity of the first
marriage is beyond question. A party who contracts a second marriage then assumes the
risk of being prosecuted for bigamy.
Whether or not the first marriage was void for lack of a license is a matter of defense
because there is still no judicial declaration of its nullity at the time the second marriage
was contracted.
The elements of bigamy are: (1) the offender has been legally married; (2) that the first marriage
has not been legally dissolved, or in case his or her spouse is absent, the absent spouse has not
been judicially declared presumptively dead; (3) that he contracts a subsequent marriage; (4) the
subsequent marriage would have been valid had it not been for the existence of the first.
Only when the nullity of the marriage is so declared can it be held as void, and so long as there is
no such declaration the presumption is that the marriage exists. No matter how obvious,
manifest or patent the absence of an element is, the intervention of the courts must always
be resorted to. That is why Article 40 of the Family Code requires a "final judgment," which
only the courts can render.
Mercado v. Tan
G.R. No. 137110
August 1, 2000
Facts: Accused Dr. Vincent Mercado and complainant Ma. Consuelo Tan got married on June
27, 1991 before Judge Ibanez of the Municipal Trial Court (MTCC) of Bacolod City, by virtue of
which a marriage contract was duly executed and signed by the parties. In said document, the
status of the accused was single. It was then found out that at the time of the celebration of the
marriage with Consuelo, Mercado was actually married to Maria Thelma Oliva in a
marriage ceremony solemnized on April 10, 1976 by Judge Canares of the CFI of Cebu City.
The matrimony was further blessed on October 10, 1976 in religious rites at the Sacred Heart
Church, Cebu City.
In the same manner, the civil marriage between accused and complainant was confirmed in a
church ceremony on June 29, 1991. Oliva bore two children, while a child, Vincent Paul, Jr. was
born by Consuelo.
On October 5, 1992, a letter-complaint for bigamy was filed by Consuelo with the City
Prosecutor of Bacolod.
On November 13, 1992, Mercado filed an action for the declaration of nullity of marriage
against Oliva and a decision was rendered declaring such marriage null and void.
Mercado posited the defense that his previous marriage had been judicially declared null and
void and that Consuelo had knowledge of the first marriage of accused.
The RTC convicted Mercado for the crime of bigamy. The CA affirmed the ruling of the lower
court. The appellate court ruled that the final judgment declaring null and void accused's
previous marriage came not before the celebration of the second marriage, but after, when
the case for bigamy against accused was already tried in court. Hence, his defense could not
prosper.
Hence, the present petition, in which Mercado argues that he should be acquitted because the
element of previous legal marriage, necessary to convict him for bigamy, was not present.
Mercado contends that he obtained a judicial declaration of nullity of his first marriage under
Article 36 of the Family Code, thereby rendering it void ab initio. Unlike voidable marriages
which are considered valid until set aside by a competent court, he argues that a void marriage is
deemed never to have taken place at all. Thus, there is no first marriage to speak of. Petitioner
also quotes the commentaries of former Justice Luis Reyes that it is now settled that if the first
marriage is void from the beginning, it is a defense in a bigamy charge.
Issue: Whether or not the element of previous legal marriage is present
Held: Yes. Petitioner was convicted of bigamy under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code,
which provides: The penalty of prision mayor shall be imposed upon any person who shall
contract a second or subsequent marriage before the former marriage has been legally dissolved,
or before the absent spouse has been declared presumptively dead by means of a judgment
rendered in the proper proceedings.
The elements of this crime are as follows:
1. That the offender has been legally married;
2. That the marriage has not been legally dissolved or, in case his or her spouse is absent, the
absent spouse could not yet be presumed dead according to the Civil Code;
3. That he contracts a second or subsequent marriage;
4. That the second or subsequent marriage has all the essential requisites for validity.
When the Information was filed, all the elements of bigamy were present. It is undisputed that
petitioner married Oliva on April 10, 1976 in Cebu City. While that marriage was still subsisting,
he contracted a second marriage, this time with Consuelo.
In Domingo v. Court of Appeals, the Court declared, A declaration of the absolute nullity of
a marriage is now explicitly required either as a cause of action or a ground for defense; in
fact, the requirement is also for the protection of the spouse who, believing that his or her
marriage is illegal and void, marries again. With the judicial declaration of the nullity of his or
her first marriage, the person who marries again cannot be charged with bigamy.
Article 40 of the Family Code expressly requires a judicial declaration of nullity of the
previous marriage. Absent the required declaration, the Court held that one may be
charged with and convicted of bigamy.
The fact that the first marriage is void from the beginning is not a defense in a bigamy
charge. The Code Commission believes that the parties to a marriage should not be allowed
to assume that their marriage is void, even if such is the fact, but must first secure a
judicial declaration of nullity of their marriage before they should be allowed to marry
again.
Te v. Court of Appeals and Choa

G.R. No. 126746
November 29, 2000
Facts: Arthur Te and Liliana Choa were married in civil rites on September 14, 1988. They did
not live together after the marriage although they would meet each other regularly. Not long after
Liliana gave birth to a girl on April 21, 1989, Arthur stopped visiting her.
On May 20, 1990, while his marriage with Liliana was subsisting, Arthur contracted a second
marriage with Julieta Santella. Liliana filed an criminal action against Arthur for bigamy with
the RTC.
Earlier, on July 20, 1990, Arthur filed in the RTC an action for the annulment of his marriage to
Liliana on the ground that he was forced to marry her. He alleged that Liliana concealed her
pregnancy by another man at the time of their marriage and that she was psychologically
incapacitated to perform her essential marital obligations.
In the criminal proceedings for bigamy, Arthur filed a demurrer to evidence citing the failure of
the prosecution to present the marriage contract between him and Liliana to prove the facts of the
first marriage. The RTC denied the demurrer holding that the prosecution had sufficiently
established a prima facie case against the accused. It likewise denied the motion to inhibit for
lack of legal basis
On appeal, the CA ruled that the pendency of the civil case for annulment of marriage did not
pose a prejudicial question which would necessitate the suspension of the criminal case for
bigamy.
Having failed to obtain relief in the Court of Appeals, Arthur files this present petition.
Held: Yes. The pendency of the civil case for annulment of marriage did not pose a
prejudicial question which would necessitate that the criminal case for bigamy be
suspended until said civil case is terminated. This is because all that is required for the
charge of bigamy to prosper is that the first marriage be subsisting at the time the second
marriage is contracted.
A prejudicial question has been defined as one based on a fact distinct and separate from the
crime but so intimately connected with it that it determines the guilt or innocence of the
accused. For it to suspend the criminal action, it must appear not only that said case
involves facts intimately related to those upon which the criminal prosecution would be
based but also that in the resolution of the issue or issues raised in the civil case, the guilt or
innocence of the accused would necessarily be determined. The rationale behind the principle
of suspending a criminal case in view of a prejudicial question is to avoid two conflicting
decisions.
The argument that the nullity of the marriage had to be resolved first in the civil case before the
criminal proceedings could continue, because a declaration that the marriage was void ab initio
would necessarily absolve him from criminal liability, is untenable. The ruling in People v.
Mendoza and People v. Aragon cited by petitioner that no judicial decree is necessary to
establish the invalidity of a marriage which is void ab initio has been overturned. The prevailing
rule is found in Article 40 of the Family Code, which was already in effect at the time of
petitioner's marriage to private respondent in September 1988. Said article states that the
absolute nullity of a previous marriage may not be invoked for purposes of remarriage
unless there is a final judgment declaring such previous marriage void. Thus, under the law,
a marriage, even one which is void or voidable, shall be deemed valid until declared
otherwise in a judicial proceeding.
Tenebro v. Court of Appeals (read concurring of Justice Vitug and dissent of Justice
Carpio)
G.R. No. 150758
February 18, 2004
Facts: Petitioner Veronico Tenebro contracted marriage with Leticia Ancajas on April 10, 1990.
The two were wed by Judge Alfredo B. Perez, Jr. of the City Trial Court of Lapu-lapu City. They
lived together continuously until the latter part of 1991, when Tenebro informed Ancajas that
he had been previously married to Hilda Villareyes on November 10, 1986. Tenebro showed
Ancajas a photocopy of a marriage contract between him and Villareyes. Invoking this previous
marriage, Tenebro thereafter left the conjugal dwelling which he shared with Ancajas, stating
that he was going to cohabit with Villareyes.
On January 25, 1993, Tenebro contracted a third marriage with Nilda Villegas, before Judge
German Lee, Jr. of the RTC of Cebu City. When Ancajas learned of this third marriage, she
verified from Villareyes whether the latter was indeed married to Tenebro. In a handwritten
letter, Villareyes confirmed that Tenebro, was indeed her husband. Ancajas thereafter filed a
complaint for bigamy against Tenebro.
Tenebro admitted to co-habiting with Villareyes but he denied that he and Villareyes were
validly married to each other since no marriage ceremony took place to solemnize their
union. He alleged that he signed a marriage contract merely to enable her to get the
allotment from his office in connection with his work as a seaman. He presented
certifications issued by the NSO and the City Civil Registry of Manila attesting that the
respective issuing offices have no record of a marriage celebrated between Tenebro and
Villareyes.
The RTC convicted Tenebro for the crime of bigamy. On appeal, the CA affirmed the decision of
the trial court.
Tenebro argues that the declaration of the nullity of the second marriage to Ancajas on the
ground of psychological incapacity retroacts to the date on which the second marriage was
celebrated.
Issue: Whether or not the second marriage is bigamous notwithstanding the subsequent
declaration that it is void ab initio on the ground of psychological incapacity
Held: Yes. Since a marriage contracted during the subsistence of a valid marriage is
automatically void, the nullity of this second marriage is not per se an argument for the
avoidance of criminal liability for bigamy.
Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code penalizes the mere act of contracting a second or a
subsequent marriage during the subsistence of a valid marriage.
The subsequent judicial declaration of nullity of marriage does not retroact to the date of the
celebration of the marriage insofar as the Philippines' penal laws are concerned. As such, an
individual who contracts a second or subsequent marriage during the subsistence of a valid
marriage is criminally liable for bigamy, notwithstanding the subsequent declaration that
the second marriage is void ab initio on the ground of psychological incapacity.
Morigo v. People
G.R. No. 145226
February 6, 2004
Facts: Lucio Morigo and Lucia Barrete were boardmates at the house of Catalina Tortor at
Tagbilaran City, Province of Bohol, for a period of four years from 1974-1978.
After school year 1977-78, they lost contact with each other.
In 1984, Lucio was surprised to receive a card from Lucia from Singapore. The former replied
and after an exchange of letters, they became sweethearts.
In 1986, Lucia returned to the Philippines but left again for Canada to work there. While in
Canada, they maintained constant communication.
In 1990, Lucia came back to the Philippines and proposed to petition Lucio to join her in
Canada. Both agreed to get married, thus they were married on August 30, 1990 at the Iglesia
de Filipina Nacional at Catagdaan, Pilar, Bohol.
On September 8, 1990, Lucia reported back to her work in Canada leaving Lucio behind.
On August 19, 1991, Lucia filed with the Ontario Court petition for divorce against Lucio which
was granted by the court to take effect on February 17, 1992.
On October 4, 1992, Lucio married Maria Jececha Lumbago at the Virgen sa Barangay
Parish, Tagbilaran City, Bohol.
On September 21, 1993, Lucio filed a complaint for judicial declaration of nullity of his
marriage with Lucia on the ground that no marriage ceremony actually took place.
On October 19, 1993, Lucio was charged with bigamy in an Information filed by the City
Prosecutor of Tagbilaran.
On August 5, 1996, the RTC rendered judgment convicting Lucio of the crime of bigamy. The
trial court ruled that want of a valid marriage ceremony is not a defense in a charge of
bigamy. The parties to a marriage should not be allowed to assume that their marriage is
void even if such be the fact but must first secure a judicial declaration of the nullity of their
marriage before they can be allowed to marry again.
Lucio appealed. Meanwhile, on October 23, 1997, or while the appeal was pending before the
appellate court, the trial court of Bohol rendered a decision in the civil case declaring the
marriage void ab initio since no marriage ceremony actually took place.
The CA affirmed the RTC. The appellate court stressed that the subsequent declaration of
nullity of Lucios marriage to Lucia in the civil case could not acquit Lucio. The reason is
that what is sought to be punished by Article 349 of the RPC is the act of contracting a
second marriage before the first marriage had been dissolved. Hence, the fact that the first
marriage was void from the beginning is not a valid defense in a bigamy case.
Held: No. The elements of bigamy are:
(1) the offender has been legally married;
(2) the first marriage has not been legally dissolved, or in case his or her spouse is absent, the
absent spouse has not been judicially declared presumptively dead;
(3) he contracts a subsequent marriage; and
(4) the subsequent marriage would have been valid had it not been for the existence of the
first.
During the pendency of the appeal with the CA, the trial court rendered judgment that there
was no actual marriage ceremony performed between Lucio and Lucia. Instead, what
transpired was a mere signing of the marriage contract by the two, without the presence of
a solemnizing officer.
The first element of bigamy as a crime requires that the accused must have been legally married.
But in this case, the contract of marriage between Lucio and Lucia is void ab initio. Under the
principle of retroactivity of a marriage being declared void ab initio, the two were never
married from the beginning. Thus, for legal purposes, petitioner was not married to Lucia at
the time he contracted marriage with Maria Jececha. The existence and the validity of the first
marriage being an essential element of the crime of bigamy, it is but logical that a
conviction for said offense cannot be sustained where there is no first marriage to speak of.
The petitioner must be acquitted of the instant charge.
A judicial declaration of nullity of a previous marriage is necessary before a subsequent one can
be legally contracted. One who enters into a subsequent marriage without first obtaining such
judicial declaration is guilty of bigamy. This principle applies even if the earlier union is
characterized by statutes as void.
However, in the instant case, no marriage ceremony at all was performed by a duly authorized
solemnizing officer. The parties merely signed a marriage contract on their own. The mere
private act of signing a marriage contract bears no semblance to a valid marriage and thus,
needs no judicial declaration of nullity. (THIS!!!)
Teves v. People
G.R. No. 188775
August 24, 2011
Facts: On November 26, 1992, a marriage was solemnized between Cenon Teves and Thelma
Jaime-Teves at the Metropolitan Trial Court of Muntinlupa City.
After the marriage, Thelma left to work abroad. She would only come home to the Philippines
for vacations. While on a vacation in 2002, she was informed that her husband had
contracted marriage with a certain Edita Calderon. To verify the information, she went to the
NSO and secured a copy of the marriage certificate indicating that her husband and Edita
contracted marriage on December 10, 2001 at the Divine Trust Consulting Services, Malhacan,
Meycauayan, Bulacan.
On February 13, 2006, Danilo Bongalon, uncle of Thelma, filed before the Office of the
Provincial Prosecutor of Malolos City, Bulacan a complaint charging Cenon of bigamy.
During the pendency of the criminal case for bigamy, the RTC of Caloocan City, rendered a
decision declaring the marriage of Cenon and Thelma null and void on the ground that
Thelma is physically incapacitated to comply with her essential marital obligations pursuant to
Article 36 of the Family Code.
The trial court convicted Cenon of the crime of bigamy. The CA affirmed the RTC decision.
Hence, this petition.
Petitioner claims that since his previous marriage was declared null and void, there is in
effect no marriage at all, and thus, there is no bigamy to speak of.
Held: Yes. The crime of bigamy was committed by petitioner on December 10, 2001 when he
contracted a second marriage with Edita. The finality on June 27, 2006 of the judicial
declaration of the nullity of his previous marriage to Thelma cannot be made to retroact to
the date of the bigamous marriage.
Following petitioner's argument, even assuming that a complaint has been instituted, such as in
this case, the offender can still escape liability provided that a decision nullifying his earlier
marriage precedes the filing of the Information in court.
The elements of bigamy are:

(1) the offender has been legally married;
(2) the first marriage has not been legally dissolved, or in case his or her spouse is absent, the
absent spouse has not been judicially declared presumptively dead;
(3) he contracts a subsequent marriage; and
(4) the subsequent marriage would have been valid had it not been for the existence of the
first.
The instant case has all the elements of the crime of bigamy.
A declaration of the absolute nullity of a marriage is now explicitly required either as a

cause of action or a ground for defense. Where the absolute nullity of a previous marriage
is sought to be invoked for purposes of contracting a second marriage, the sole basis
acceptable in law for said projected marriage to be free from legal infirmity is a final
judgment declaring the previous marriage void.
Parties to a marriage should not be allowed to assume that their marriage is void even if such be
the fact but must first secure a judicial declaration of the nullity of their marriage before they can
be allowed to marry again.
Nollora v. People
G.R. No. 191425
September 7, 2011
Facts: Jesusa Pinat Nollora and accused Atilano Nollora, Jr. met in Saudi Arabia while she was
working there as a Staff Midwife in King Abdulah Naval Base Hospital. Atilano courted her and
on April 6, 1999, they got married at the IEMELIF Church in Sapang Palay, San Jose del Monte,
Bulacan. While Jesusa Pinat Nollora was still in Saudi Arabia, she heard rumors that her husband
has another wife. She returned to the Philippines and learned that indeed, Atilano contracted a
second marriage with a certain Rowena Geraldino on December 8, 2001.
Jesusa filed an instant case against Atilano and Rowena for bigamy.
Atilano admitted having contracted two marriages, however, he claimed that he was a Muslim
convert way back in 1992, even before he contracted the first marriage with Jesusa. As a Muslim
convert, he is entitled to marry 4 wives as allowed under the Muslim or Islam belief. He
presented a Certificate and Pledge of Conversion.
Atilano asserted in his marriage certificate with Rowena that his civil status is single. Both of his
marriage contracts do not state that he is a Muslim. In his marriage contract with Rowena, the
religion Catholic was indicated because he was keeping as a secret his being a Muslim. He also
indicated that he was single despite his first marriage to keep said first marriage a secret.
The trial court convicted Nollora and acquitted Geraldino. The CA affirmed the trial court.
Held: Yes. The marriage between Nollora and Rowena is bigamous. Article 13(2) of the Code
of Muslim Personal Laws states that in case of a marriage between a Muslim and a non-Muslim
solemnized not in accordance with Muslim law, the Family Code shall apply. Hence, such
bigamous marriage is considered null and void ab initio under Article 35(4) of the Family
Code.
The elements of the crime of bigamy are all present in the case: that 1) Atilano is legally married
to Jesusa; 2) that their marriage has not been legally dissolved prior to the date of the second
marriage; 3) that Atilano admitted the existence of his second marriage to Rowena; and 4) the
second marriage has all the essential requisites for validity except for the lack of capacity of
Atilano due to his prior marriage.
Granting arguendo that Atilano is indeed of Muslim faith at the time of celebration of both
marriages, he cannot deny that both marriage ceremonies were not conducted in accordance with
Articles 14, 15, 17 up to 20 of the Code of Muslim Personal Laws. His second marriage did not
comply with Article 27 of the Code of Muslim Personal Laws of the Philippines providing: No
Muslim male can have more than one wife unless he can deal with them in equal companionship
and just treatment as enjoined by Islamic Law and only in exceptional cases. Only with the
permission of the Shari'a Circuit Court can a Muslim be permitted to have a second, third
or fourth wife.
Although the truth or falsehood of the declaration of one's religion in the marriage is not an
essential requirement for marriage, his omissions are sufficient proofs of his liability for bigamy.
Montanez v. Cipriano
G.R. No. 181089
October 22, 2012
Facts:
Issue:
Held:
See: Abbas v. Abbas

G.R. No. 183896
January 30, 2013
Facts: In January 1993, Syed Azhar Abbas was invited to the house of Felicitas Goo, mother of
Gloria Goo. He said he was asked to participate in a ceremony which was meant to welcome him
to the Philippines (Abbas is a Pakistani). He said he did not know that the ceremony was actually
his marriage with Gloria Goo.
Later, Gloria filed a bigamy case against Abbas. Abbas allegedly married a certain Maria
Corazon Buenaventura.
To avoid the bigamy case, Abbas filed a petition for the declaration of nullity of his marriage to
Gloria Goo.
To prove the validity of their marriage, Gloria presented a marriage contract signed by Abbas as
well as the solemnizing officer who celebrated their marriage. The marriage contract contained
the alleged marriage license issued to Abbas.
Abbas presented a certification issued by the Local Civil Registrar which states that the marriage
license, based on its number, indicated in the marriage contract was never issued to Abbas but to
someone else.
The RTC ruled in favor of Abbas. However, the Court of Appeals reversed the RTC on the
ground that there was no diligence to search for the real source of the marriage license issued to
Abbas (for it could be that the marriage license was issued in another municipality).
Issue: Whether or not the marriage between Abbas and Goo is void ab initio
Held: Yes. Their marriage lacked one of the essential requisites of marriage which is the
issuance of a valid marriage license.
The Court of Appeals is wrong in reversing the RTC. The Local Civil registrars certification
enjoyed probative value as her duty was to maintain records of data relative to the issuance of a
marriage license. There is a presumption of regularity of official acts in favor of the local civil
registrar. Gloria was not able to overcome this presumption hence it stands to favor Abbas.
The fact that Abbas did sign the marriage contract does not make it conclusive that there was in
fact a valid marriage license issued to him nor does it cure the fact that no marriage license was
issued to Abbas. Article 4 of the Family Code is clear when it says, The absence of any of the
essential or formal requisites shall render the marriage void ab initio. Article 35(3) of the
Family Code also provides that a marriage solemnized without a license is void from the
beginning.
Capili v. People
G.R. No. 183805
July 3, 2013
Facts: On June 28, 2004, petitioner James Walter P. Capili was charged with the crime of
bigamy before the RTC of Pasig City for contract a second marriage with private respondent
Shirley G. Tismo without the previous marriage with Karla Y. Medina-Capili having been
legally dissolved or annulled.
James filed a Motion to Suspend Proceedings alleging that: (1) there is a pending civil case for
declaration of nullity of the second marriage before the RTC of Antipolo City filed by Karla
Y. Medina-Capili; (2) in the event that the marriage is declared null and void, it would
exculpate him from the charge of bigamy; and (3) the pendency of the civil case for the
declaration of nullity of the second marriage serves as a prejudicial question in the instant
criminal case.
The RTC of Antipolo City rendered a decision declaring the voidness or incipient invalidity of
the second marriage between James and Shirley on the ground that a subsequent marriage
contracted by the husband during the lifetime of the legal wife is void from the beginning.
James prayed for the dismissal of the criminal case for bigamy filed against him on the
ground that the second marriage had already been declared void.
The RTC granted petitioners Manifestation and Motion to Dismiss and ruled that there is no
more bigamy to speak of. The CA reversed and set aside the RTCs decision, remanding the case
to the trial court for further proceedings.
Issue: Whether or not the subsequent declaration of nullity of the second marriage is a
ground for dismissal of the criminal case for bigamy
Held: No. Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code provides: The penalty of prision mayor shall
be imposed upon any person who shall contract a second or subsequent marriage before the
former marriage has been legally dissolved, or before the absent spouse has been declared
presumptively dead by means of a judgment rendered in the proper proceedings.
The elements of this crime are as follows:
In the present case, it appears that all the elements of the crime of bigamy were present when the
Information was filed on June 28, 2004.
It is undisputed that a second marriage between petitioner and private respondent (Shirley
Tismo) was contracted on December 8, 1999 during the subsistence of a valid first marriage
between petitioner and Karla Y. Medina-Capili contracted on September 3, 1999. Thus, the
subsequent judicial declaration of the second marriage for being bigamous in nature does
not bar the prosecution of petitioner for the crime of bigamy.
The subsequent judicial declaration of the nullity of the first marriage was immaterial
because prior to the declaration of nullity, the crime had already been consummated.
Moreover, petitioners assertion would only delay the prosecution of bigamy cases considering
that an accused could simply file a petition to declare his previous marriage void and invoke the
pendency of that action as a prejudicial question in the criminal case.
The outcome of the civil case for annulment of petitioners marriage to [private complainant] had
no bearing upon the determination of petitioners innocence or guilt in the criminal case for
bigamy, because all that is required for the charge of bigamy to prosper is that the first
marriage be subsisting at the time the second marriage is contracted.
Fujiki v. Marinay
G.R. No. 196049
June 26, 2013
Facts: Petitioner Minoru Fujiki is a Japanese national who married respondent Maria Paz Galela
Marinay in the Philippines on January 23, 2004. Fujikis parents did not approve of the marriage,
hence, he could not bring his wife to Japan where he resides. Eventually, they lost contact with
each other.
In 2008, Marinay met another Japanese, Shinichi Maekara. Without the first marriage being
dissolved, Marinay and Maekara were married on May 15, 2008 in Quezon City. Maekara
brought Marinay to Japan. However, Marinay allegedly suffered physical abuse from
Maekara. She left Maekara and started to contact Fujiki.
Fujiki and Marinay met in Japan and they were able to reestablish their relationship. In 2010,
Fujiki helped Marinay obtain a judgment from a family court in Japan which declared the
marriage between Marinay and Maekara void on the ground of bigamy.
On January 14, 2011, Fujiki filed a petition in the RTC entitled Judicial Recognition of Foreign
Judgment (or Decree of Absolute Nullity of Marriage). Fujiki prayed that (1) the Japanese
Family Court judgment be recognized; (2) that the bigamous marriage between Marinay and
Maekara be declared void ab initio under Articles 35(4) and 41 of the Family Code; and (3) for
the RTC to direct the Local Civil Registrar of Quezon City to annotate the Japanese Family
Court judgment on the Certificate of Marriage between Marinay and Maekara and to endorse
such annotation to the Office of the Administrator and Civil Registrar General in the NSO.
The RTC dismissed the petition, ruling that the petition was in gross violation of Sections 2 and
4 of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC (Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and
Annulment of Voidable Marriages) which provides that A petition for declaration of
absolute nullity of void marriage may be filed solely by the husband or the wife. The RTC
took the view that only the husband or the wife can file the petition to declare their marriage
void, and not Fujiki.
Sec. 2. Petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriages. (a) Who may file. A
petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage may be filed solely by the husband or
the wife. x x x
Sec. 4. Venue. The petition shall be filed in the Family Court of the province or city where the
petitioner or the respondent has been residing for at least six months prior to the date of filing, or
in the case of a nonresident respondent, where he may be found in the Philippines, at the election
of the petitioner. x x x
Fujiki argued that A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC contemplated ordinary civil actions for declaration of
nullity and annulment of marriage, while a petition for recognition of foreign judgment is a
special proceeding. It was also Fujikis view that A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC applied only to void
marriages under Article 36 of the Family Code on the ground of psychological incapacity.
Fujiki argued that Rule 108 (Cancellation or Correction of Entries in the Civil Registry) of the
Rules of Court is applicable. Rule 108 is the procedural implementation of the Civil Register
Law (Act No. 3753) in relation to Article 413 of the Civil Code. The Civil Register Law imposes
a duty on the successful petitioner for divorce or annulment of marriage to send a copy of the
final decree of the court to the local registrar of the municipality where the dissolved or annulled
marriage was solemnized. Section 2 of Rule 108 provides that entries in the civil registry
relating to marriages, judgments of annulments of marriage and judgments declaring
marriages void from the beginning are subject to cancellation or correction. The petition in the
RTC sought (among others) to annotate the judgment of the Japanese Family Court on the
certificate of marriage between Marinay and Maekara.
Issue: Whether or not A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC is applicable
Held: No. A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC is not applicable here. Whats applicable is Rule 108 of the
Rules of Court.
Rule 108 of the Rules of Court is the procedure to record acts, events and judicial decrees
concerning the civil status of persons in the civil registry as required by Article 407 of the Civil
Code. In other words, the law requires the entry in the civil registry of judicial decrees that
produce legal consequences upon a persons legal capacity and status x x x. The Japanese
Family Court judgment directly bears on the civil status of a Filipino citizen and should
therefore be proven as a fact in a Rule 108 proceeding.
A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC does not apply in a petition to recognize a foreign judgment relating
to the status of a marriage where one of the parties is a citizen of a foreign country.
Moreover, the rule in A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC that only the husband or wife can file a declaration
of nullity or annulment of marriage does not apply if the reason behind the petition is bigamy.
While the Philippines does not have a divorce law, Philippine courts may, however, recognize a
foreign divorce decree under the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, to
capacitate a Filipino citizen to remarry when his or her foreign spouse obtained a divorce decree
abroad. Since the recognition of a foreign judgment only requires proof of fact of the
judgment, it may be made in a special proceeding for cancellation or correction of entries
in the civil registry under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court since a special proceeding is a
remedy by which a party seeks to establish a status, a right, or a particular fact.
Section 2(a) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC does not preclude a spouse of a subsisting marriage to
question the validity of a subsequent marriage on the ground of bigamy. Under Article 35(4)
of the Family Code, bigamous marriages are void from the beginning. Thus, the parties in a
bigamous marriage are neither the husband nor the wife under the law. The husband or the wife
of the PRIOR SUBSISTING MARRIAGE is the one who has the personality to file a
petition for declaration of absolute nullity under Section 2(a) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC.
In this case, Fujiki has the personality to file a petition to recognize the Japanese Family Court
judgment nullifying the marriage between Marinay and Maekara on the ground of bigamy
because the judgment concerns his civil status as married to Marinay. For the same reason, he
has the personality to file a petition under Rule 108 to cancel the entry of marriage between
Marinay and Maekara in the civil registry on the basis of the decree of the Japanese Family
Court.
A petition for correction or cancellation of an entry in the civil registry cannot substitute for an
action to invalidate a marriage. However, this does not apply in a petition for correction or
cancellation of a civil registry entry based on the recognition of a foreign judgment annulling a
marriage where one of the parties is a citizen of the foreign country. A recognition of a foreign
judgment is not an action to nullify a marriage. It is an action for Philippine courts to
recognize the effectivity of a foreign judgment, which presupposes a case which was already
tried and decided under foreign law.
The recognition of a foreign judgment nullifying a bigamous marriage is without prejudice

to prosecution for bigamy under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code. The recognition of a
foreign judgment nullifying a bigamous marriage is not a ground for extinction of criminal
liability under Articles 89 and 94 of the Revised Penal Code.
Fujiki may prove the Japanese Family Court judgment through:
(1) an official publication or
(2) a certification or copy attested by the officer who has custody of the judgment. If the office
which has custody is in a foreign country such as Japan, the certification may be made by the
proper diplomatic or consular officer of the Philippine foreign service in Japan and authenticated
by the seal of office.
Go-Bangayan v. Bangayan
G.R. No. 201061
July 3, 2013
Facts: On March 15, 2004, Benjamin Bangayan, Jr. filed a petition for declaration of nullity of
marriage before the RTC of Manila. On September 10, 1973, he married Azucena Alegre in
Caloocan City. They had three children, namely, Rizalyn, Emmamylin, and Benjamin III.
In 1979, Benjamin developed a romantic relationship with Sally Go-Bangayan who was a
customer in the autoparts and supplies business owned by Benjamins family. In December
1981, Azucena left for the U.S. In February 1982, Benjamin and Sally lived together as
husband and wife. Sallys father was against the relationship. On March 7, 1982, in order to
appease her father, Sally brought Benjamin to an office in Santolan, Pasig City where they
signed a purported marriage contract. Sally, knowing Benjamins marital status, assured him
that the marriage contract would not be registered.
Benjamin and Sallys cohabitation produced two children, Bernice and Bentley.
Their relationship ended in 1994 when Sally and their children left for Canada. She then filed
criminal actions for bigamy and falsification of public documents against Benjamin, using
their simulated marriage contract as evidence. Benjamin, in turn, filed a petition for
declaration of nullity of marriage before the trial court on the ground that his marriage to Sally
was bigamous and that it lacked the formal requisites to a valid marriage.
The trial court ruled that the second marriage was void not because of the existence of the
first marriage but because of other causes, particularly, the lack of a marriage license.
Hence, bigamy was not committed in this case.
The Court of Appeals partly granted the appeal. The CA ruled that Benjamins action for
declaration of nullity of marriage was based on his prior marriage to Azucena and there was no
evidence that the marriage was annulled or dissolved before Benjamin contracted the second
marriage with Sally. Thus, the trial court committed no error in declaring Benjamins marriage to
Sally null and void.
Held: No. The marriage is not bigamous. If the second marriage was void not because of the
existence of the first marriage but FOR OTHER CAUSES SUCH AS LACK OF
LICENSE, the crime of bigamy was not committed.
What was committed was contracting marriage against the provisions of laws not under Article
349 but Article 350 of the Revised Penal Code. Assuming that Sallys marriage to Benjamin has
the marriage license, the same would be bigamous as it would be invalidated by a prior existing
valid marriage of petitioner and Azucena.
For bigamy to exist, the second or subsequent marriage must have all the essential
requisites for validity except for the existence of a prior marriage. In this case, there was
really no subsequent marriage. Benjamin and Sally just signed a purported marriage
contract without a marriage license. The supposed marriage was not recorded with the local
civil registrar and the National Statistics Office. In short, the marriage between Benjamin and
Sally did not exist. They lived together and represented themselves as husband and wife
without the benefit of marriage.
People v. Odtuhan
G.R. No. 191566
July 17, 2013
Facts: On July 2, 1980, respondent Edgardo V. Odtuhan married Jasmin Modina. On October
28, 1993, he married Eleanor A. Alagon. Sometime in August 1994, he filed a petition for
annulment of his marriage with Modina. The RTC of Pasig City granted the petition and
declared his marriage with Modina void ab initio for lack of a valid marriage license. On
November 10, 2003, Alagon died. In the meantime, in June 2003, private complainant Evelyn
Abesamis Alagon learned of respondents previous marriage with Modina. She thus filed a
complaint charging respondent with bigamy.
Respondent moved for the quashal of the information on two grounds: (1) that the facts do not
charge the offense of bigamy; and (2) that the criminal liability has been extinguished.
The RTC denied respondents motion and held that the facts alleged in the information constitute
the crime of bigamy. The trial court further held that neither can the information be quashed on
the ground that criminal liability has been extinguished, because the declaration of nullity of
the first marriage is not one of the modes of extinguishing criminal liability.
Respondent appealed to the CA, assailing the denial of his motion despite the fact that his first
marriage with Modina was declared null and void ab initio prior to the filing of the bigamy case.
The CA granted the petition and held that there is cogent basis in looking into the motion to
quash filed by respondent, for if the evidence would establish that his first marriage was indeed
void ab initio, one essential element of the crime of bigamy would be lacking.

Held: Yes. An examination of the information filed against respondent, however, shows the
sufficiency of the allegations therein to constitute the crime of bigamy as it contained all the
elements of the crime as provided for in Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code, to wit:
Respondents motion to quash was founded on the trial courts declaration that his
marriage with Modina is null and void ab initio. He claims that with such declaration, one
of the elements of the crime is wanting. Thus, the allegations in the information do not
charge the offense of bigamy, or at the very least, such court decree extinguished his
criminal liability.
Respondent heavily relied on the Courts pronouncement in Morigo v. People. In said case, the
first marriage was declared null and void, because the parties only signed the marriage contract
without the presence of a solemnizing officer. Considering that the declaration of nullity
retroacts to the date of the first marriage, the Court held that there was no marriage to speak of
when the accused contracted the second marriage. The accused was acquitted.
However, the Family Code has settled once and for all the conflicting jurisprudence on the
matter. A declaration of the absolute nullity of a marriage is now explicitly required either
as a cause of action or a ground for defense. A judicial declaration of nullity is required before
a valid subsequent marriage can be contracted; or else, what transpires is a bigamous marriage.
What makes a person criminally liable for bigamy is when he contracts a second or subsequent
marriage during the subsistence of a valid marriage. Parties to the marriage should not be
permitted to judge for themselves its nullity, for the same must be submitted to the judgment of
competent courts and only when the nullity of the marriage is so declared can it be held as
void, and so long as there is no such declaration, the presumption is that the marriage
exists.
If we allow respondents line of defense, a person who commits bigamy can simply evade
prosecution by immediately filing a petition for the declaration of nullity of his earlier marriage
and hope that a favorable decision is rendered therein before anyone institutes a complaint
against him.
Settled is the rule that criminal culpability attaches to the offender upon the commission of the
offense and from that instant, liability appends to him until extinguished as provided by law and
that the time of filing of the criminal complaint or information is material only for determining
prescription.
The RTC did not commit grave abuse of discretion in denying his motion to quash.
Iwasawa v. Gangan
G.R. No. 204169
September 11, 2013
Facts: Petitioner Yasuo Iwasawa, a Japanese national, met private respondent Felisa Custodio
Gangan sometime in 2002 in one of his visits to the Philippines. Gangan introduced herself as
single and has never married before. The two became close to each other. Later that year,
Iwasawa came back to the Philippines and married Gangan on November 28, 2002 in Pasay City.
After the wedding, the couple resided in Japan.
In July 2009, Iwasawa noticed his wife become depressed. He confronted his wife about it. To
his shock, Gangan confessed to him that she received news that her previous husband
passed away.
Iwasawa discovered that indeed, she was married to one Raymond Maglonzo Arambulo and
that their marriage took place on June 20, 1994. This prompted Iwasawa to file a petition for
the declaration of nullity of his marriage to Gangan on the ground that their marriage is a
bigamous one, based on Article 35(4) in relation to Article 41 of the Family Code.
The RTC denied the petition due to insufficieny of evidence to prove Gangans prior existing
valid marriage to another man. It held that while petitioner offered the certificate of marriage
between Gangan and Arambulo, it was only Iwasawa who testified about said marriage.
Petitioners testimony is unreliable because he has no personal knowledge of private
respondents prior marriage nor of Arambulos death which makes him a complete stranger to
the marriage certificate between private respondent and Arambulo and the latters death
certificate.
In her letter dated March 19, 2013 to the Court, Gangan admitted that it was due to poverty and
joblessness that she married Iwasawa.
Held: Yes. A judicial declaration of nullity is required before a valid subsequent marriage
can be contracted; or else, what transpires is a bigamous marriage, which is void from the
beginning as provided in Article 35(4) of the Family Code of the Philippines. This is what
transpired in the instant case.
The documentary exhibits taken together concretely establish the nullity of the marriage of
petitioner to private respondent on the ground that their marriage is bigamous. The exhibits
directly prove the following facts: (1) that private respondent married Arambulo on June 20,
1994 in the City of Manila; (2) that private respondent contracted a second marriage this time
with petitioner on November 28, 2002 in Pasay City; (3) that there was no judicial declaration of
nullity of the marriage of private respondent with Arambulo at the time she married petitioner;
(3) that Arambulo died on July 14, 2009 and that it was only on said date that private
respondents marriage with Arambulo was deemed to have been dissolved; and (4) that the
second marriage of private respondent to petitioner is bigamous, hence null and void, since the
first marriage was still valid and subsisting when the second marriage was contracted.
SSS v. Azote
G.R. No. 209741
April 15, 2015
Facts: On June 19, 1992, respondent Edna A. Azote married Edgardo Azote, a member of the
SSS, in civil rites at the RTC of Legazpi City, Albay. Their union produced six children. On
April 27, 1994, Edgardo submitted Form E-4 to the SSS with Edna and their three older
children as designated beneficiaries. On September 7, 2001, Edgardo submitted another Form
E-4 to the SSS designating his three younger children as additional beneficiaries.
On January 13, 2005, Edgardo passed away. Shortly thereafter, Edna filed her claim for death
benefits with the SSS as the wife of a deceased-member. It appeared, however, that Edgardo
had earlier submitted another Form E-4 on November 5, 1982 with a different set of
beneficiaries, namely: Rosemarie Azote, as his spouse; and Elmer Azote, as dependent, born
on October 9, 1982. Consequently, Ednas claim was denied. Her children were adjudged as
beneficiaries and she was considered as the legal guardian of her minor children. The benefits,
however, would be stopped once a child would attain the age of 21.
On March 13, 2007, Edna filed a petition with the Social Security Commission to claim the death
benefits, lump sum and monthly pension of Edgardo. She insisted that she was the legitimate
wife of Edgardo. In its answer, the SSS averred that there was a conflicting information in the
forms submitted by the deceased. Summons was published in a newspaper of general
circulation directing Rosemarie to file her answer. No answer was filed and Rosemarie was
declared in default.
In the Resolution dated December 8, 2010, the SSC dismissed Ednas petition for lack of
merit. Citing Section 24(c) of the SS Law, it explained that although Edgardo filed the Form
E-4 designating Edna and their six children as beneficiaries, he did not revoke the
designation of Rosemarie as his wife-beneficiary, and Rosemarie was still presumed to be
his legal wife.
The SSC further wrote that the NSO records revealed that the marriage of Edgardo to one
Rosemarie Teodora Sino was registered on July 28, 1982. Consequently, it opined that
Edgardos marriage to Edna was not valid as there was no showing that his first marriage
had been annulled or dissolved.
The SSC opined that Rosemarie could not be merely presumed dead.
The CA reversed and set aside the resolution and the order of the SSC. It held that the SSC
could not make a determination of the validity or invalidity of the marriage of Edna to
Edgardo considering that no contest came from either Rosemarie or Elmer.
The CA ruled that Edgardo made a deliberate change of his wife-beneficiary in his 1994 E-4
form, manifesting his intention to revoke his former declaration in the 1982 E-4 form. The 1994
E-4 form submitted by Edgardo, designating Edna as his wife, superseded his former
declaration in his 1982 E-4 form.
The CA was of the view that Rosemaries non-appearance despite notice could be deemed a
waiver to claim death benefits from the SSS, thereby losing whatever standing she might have
had to dispute Ednas claim.
The SSC contends that Edna was not the legitimate spouse of deceased member Edgardo as the
CA failed to consider the NSO certification showing that Edgardo was previously married to
Rosemarie. With the death certificate of Rosemarie showing that she died only on
November 6, 2004, it proved that she was alive at the time Edna and Edgardo were
married, and, therefore, there existed a legal impediment to his second marriage, rendering
it void. Edna is, therefore, not a legitimate spouse who is entitled to the death benefits of
Edgardo.
The SSC claims that the right to designate a beneficiary is subject to the SS Law. The
designation of a wife-beneficiary merely creates a disputable presumption that they are
legally married and may be overthrown by evidence to the contrary. Ednas designation
became invalid with the determination of the subsistence of a previous marriage, since only
a legitimate spouse could qualify as a primary beneficiary.
Issue:
Held: The petition is meritorious.
Applying Section 8(e) and (k) of R.A. No. 8282 or the Social Security Law, it is clear that only
the legal spouse of the deceased-member is qualified to be the beneficiary of the latters SS
benefits. In this case, there is a concrete proof that Edgardo contracted an earlier marriage with
another individual as evidenced by their marriage contract.
Article 41 of the Family Code expressly states:
A marriage contracted by any person during subsistence of a previous marriage shall be null
and void, unless before the celebration of the subsequent marriage, the prior spouse had been
absent for four consecutive years and the spouse present has a well-founded belief that the absent
spouse was already dead. In case of disappearance where there is danger under the circumstances
set forth in the provisions of Article 391 of the Civil Code, an absence of only two years shall be
sufficient.
For the purpose of contracting a subsequent marriage under the preceding paragraph, the spouse
present must institute a summary proceeding as provided in this Code for the declaration of
presumptive death of the absentee, without prejudice to the effect of reappearance of the absent
spouse.
Edna could not adduce evidence to prove that the earlier marriage of Edgardo was either
annulled or dissolved or whether there was a declaration of Rosemaries presumptive death
before her marriage to Edgardo. What is apparent is that Edna was the second wife of Edgardo.
Considering that Edna was not able to show that she was the legal spouse of a deceased-
member, she would not qualify under the law to be the beneficiary of the death benefits of
Edgardo.
Jones v. Hortiguela
G.R. No. L-43701
March 6, 1937
Kinds of void marriages Subsequent marriage, upon reappearance of absent spouse
Facts: In December 1914, Marciana Escao married Arthur W. Jones in the suburban catholic
church of San Nicolas, Province of Cebu. On January 10, 1918, Athur Jones secured a
passport to go abroad and thereafter nothing was ever heard of him. In October 1919,
proceedings were instituted in the CFI of Maasin, Leyte, at the instance of Marciana Escao, to
have her husband judicially declared an absentee. On October 25, 1919, the court issued an
order declaring Arthur W. Jones an absentee from the Philippine Islands pursuant to the
provisions of Article 186 of the Civil Code, which provides that said judicial declaration of
absence would not take effect until six months after its publication in the official newspapers.
Pursuant thereto, said order was published in the Official Gazette from December 1919 to June
1920. On April 23, 1921, the court issued another order for the taking effect of the
declaration of absence, publication thereof having been made in the Official Gazette and "El
Ideal." On May 6, 1927, Felix Hortiguela and Marciana Escao were married before the
justice of the peace of Malitbog, Leyte, and they signed the certificate of marriage.
As Marciana Escao had died intestate, her widower Felix Hortiguela was appointed judicial
administrator of her entire estate. In an order issued on May 9, 1932, Angelita Jones, her
daughter by her first marriage, and Felix Hortiguela, her widower by her second marriage, were
declared her only heirs. In a motion, Felix Hortiguela, as administrator, prayed that his fees, as
such, be fixed at P10,000 which was granted by the court. The latter, who was a minor, was
represented in the proceedings by her guardian Paz Escao de Corominas.
On May 3, 1934, the heiress Angelita Jones, then married to Ernesto Lardizabal, filed a motion
alleging that she was the only heir of her mother and that there never was a valid marriage
between her mother and Felix Hortiguela or that had such marriage been celebrated, it was
null and void. She prayed: (a) for the reopening of the proceedings; (b) that her husband be
appointed special administrator without bond; (c) that her mother's alleged marriage to Felix
Hortiguela be declared null and void; (d) that the partition of the properties made by
administrator Hortiguela be declared null and void and that the petitioner be declared the only
universal heir of her deceased mother; and (e) that in case there was a valid marriage Felix
Hortiguela and Marciana Escao, Hortiguela be declared not entitled to the widower's usufruct;
the errors in the administrator's account be corrected; the latter be granted a remuneration of only
P4 a day, and a new partition of the properties be made.
The CFI of Cebu denied the petition.
Angelita Jones contends that the declaration of absence must be understood to have been made
not in the order of October 25, 1919, but in that of April 23, 1921, and that from the latter date to
May 26, 1927, the date of the celebration of the marriage, only 6 years and 14 days elapsed; and
in accordance with section III, paragraph 2, of General Orders, No. 68, the marriage so
contracted by Felix Hortiguela and Marciana Escao is null and void.
Issue: Whether or not Felix Hortiguela's to Marciana Escao was valid
Held: Yes. For the purposes of the civil marriage law, it is not necessary to have the former
spouse judicially declared an absentee. The declaration of absence made in accordance with
the provisions of the Civil Code has for its sole purpose to enable the taking of the
necessary precautions for the administration of the estate of the absentee.
For the celebration of civil marriage, however, the law only requires that the former spouse
has been absent for seven consecutive years at the time of the second marriage, that the
spouse present does not know his or her former spouse to be living, that such former spouse
is generally reputed to be dead and the spouse present so believes at the time of the
celebration of the marriage (section 3, paragraph 2, General Orders, No. 68).
In accordance with the foregoing legal provision, the absence of Arthur Jones should be
counted from January 10, 1918, the date on which the last news concerning Arthur W.
Jones was received, and from said date to May 6, 1927, more than nine years elapsed. Said
marriage is, therefore, valid and lawful.
Furthermore, Marciana Escao believed Arthur W. Jones to be dead when she contracted her
second marriage. Her daughter Angelita Jones herself was of the same belief, since she lived
with her mother after the latter had married Hortiguela and treated Hortiguela as her true
stepfather
Still furthermore, according to section 334, No. 24, of the Code of Civil Procedure, a person not
heard from in seven years is presumed to be dead.
Republic v. Nolasco
G.R. No. 94053
March 17, 1993
Facts: On August 5, 1988, respondent Gregorio Nolasco filed before the RTC of Antique a
petition for the declaration of presumptive death of his wife Janet Monica Parker under
Article 41 of the Family Code. The petition prayed that respondent's wife be declared
presumptively dead or, in the alternative, the marriage be declared null and void.
The Republic of the Philippines opposed the petition and argued that Nolasco did not possess a
well-founded belief that the absent spouse was already dead and that his attempt to have his
marriage annulled in the same proceeding was a cunning attempt to circumvent the law on
marriage.
During trial, Nolasco testified that he was a seaman, and that he had first met Janet Monica
Parker, a British subject, in a bar at 38 Ravena Road, Allerton, Liverpool, England. After that,
she lived with him on his ship for 6 months. After his seaman's contract has expired, he brought
her to his hometown in Antique and they married on January 15, 1982 in Catholic rites in the
Cathedral of San Jose, Antique.
After the marriage celebration, Nolasco obtained another employment contract and left his wife
with his parents in San Jose, Antique. Sometime in January 1983, Nolasco received a letter from
his mother that 15 days after Janet gave birth to their son Gerry on December 7, 1982, she left.
Nolasco asked permission to leave his ship to return home in San Jose. He entered in a new
contract in London to search for her. He wrote several letters to the bar where he and Janet first
met, but all were returned to him. He claimed that he inquired from his friends but they too had
no news about Janet.
Nolasco stated that he had lived with and later married Janet despite his lack of knowledge as to
her family background. He insisted that his wife continued to refuse to give him such
information even after they were married. He also testified that he did not report the matter of
Janet's disappearance to the Philippine government authorities.
Nolasco presented his mother, Alicia Nolasco, as his witness. She testified that her daughter-in-
law Janet had expressed a desire to return to England even before she had given birth. When
asked why her daughter-in-law might have wished to leave Antique, Alicia replied that
Janet never got used to the rural way of life in San Jose, Antique. She tried to dissuade Janet
from leaving, but when she failed to do so, she gave Janet Monica P22,000 for her expenses
before she left on December 22, 1982 for England.
The RTC granted Nolascos petition and declared as presumptively dead Janet Monica
Parker Nolasco, without prejudice to her reappearance. The CA affirmed the trial court's
decision.
Issue: Whether or not Nolasco has a well-founded belief that his wife is already dead
Held: No. Nolasco failed to conduct a search for his missing wife with such diligence as to
give rise to a well-founded belief that she is dead.
The four requisites for the declaration of presumptive death are:

(1) That the absent spouse has been missing for four consecutive years, or two consecutive
years if the disappearance occurred where there is danger of death under the circumstances
laid down in Article 391, Civil Code;
(2) That the present spouse wishes to remarry;
(3) That the present spouse has a well-founded belief that the absentee is dead; and
(4) That the present spouse files a summary proceeding for the declaration of presumptive
death of the absentee.
The circumstances of Janets departure and respondent's subsequent behavior make it

very difficult to regard the claimed belief that Janet Monica was dead a well-founded one.
Nolasco did not explain the delay of 9 months from January 1983, when he allegedly asked leave
from his captain, to November 1983 when he finally reached San Jose.
Also, when he arrived in San Jose after learning of Janets departure, instead of seeking the
help of local authorities or of the British Embassy, he secured another seaman's contract
and went to London, a vast city of many millions of inhabitants, to look for her there.
Respondent's testimony showed that he confused London for Liverpool and this casts doubt on
his supposed efforts to locate his wife in England. Walking into a major city like Liverpool or
London with a simple hope of somehow bumping into one particular person there cannot
be regarded as a reasonably diligent search.
Nolasco asserted that he had inquired from their friends of her whereabouts, however, he did not
identify those friends in his testimony. Even if admitted as evidence, said testimony merely
tended to show that the missing spouse had chosen not to communicate with their common
acquaintances, and not that she was dead.
The spouses should not be allowed, by the simple expedient of agreeing that one of them leave
the conjugal abode and never to return again, to circumvent the policy of the laws on marriage.
Respondent even tried to have his marriage annulled before the trial court in the same
proceeding.
Since respondent failed to establish that he had the well-founded belief required by law
that his absent wife was already dead, his petition for a judicial declaration or presumptive
death must be denied.
Bienvenido v. Court of Appeals

G.R. No. 111717
October 24, 1994
Facts: Aurelio P. Camacho married Consejo Velasco in Manila on October 3, 1942. On

February 6, 1962, without his marriage to Consejo Velasco being dissolved, Camacho
contracted another marriage with respondent Luisita C. Camacho with whom he had been
living since 1953 and by whom he begot a child, respondent Aurelio Luis Faustino C. Camacho
(Chito), born on May 22, 1961. The marriage was solemnized in Tokyo, Japan where Aurelio
and Luisita had been living since 1958.
There were instances during Luisita and Aurelio's marriage when, because of their quarrels, one
or the other left the dwelling place for long periods of time. In her case, Luisita stayed at various
times in Davao City, Hong Kong or Japan.
In 1967, Aurelio met petitioner Nenita T. Bienvenido, who had been estranged from her
husband, Luis Rivera. Aurelio courted her and from June 1968 until Aurelio's death on May 28,
1988, he lived with her, the last time in a duplex apartment on 84 Scout Delgado Street, Quezon
City. Nenita's daughter, Nanette, stayed with them.
On April 30, 1982, Aurelio bought a house and lot on 84 Scout Delgado Street, Quezon City.
On November 26, 1984, Aurelio executed a deed of sale of the property in favor of Nenita in
consideration of the sum of P250,000.
On May 28, 1988, Aurelio died. Nenita, using her Loyola Life Plan and Aurelio's account in the
PCI Bank, took care of the funeral arrangements. Luisita was then in the United States with
Chito, having gone there to look for a house in San Francisco so that Aurelio could follow and
rejoin them. Upon learning of the death of Aurelio she and her son Chito came home on May 31,
1988. She had the remains of Aurelio transferred from the Loyola Memorial Chapels, first to the
St. Ignatius Church and later to the Arlington Memorial Chapels. Luisita paid for the funeral
services.
Luisita was granted death benefits by the AFP as the surviving spouse of Aurelio. Soon she also
claimed ownership of the house and lot on Scout Delgado Street in which Nenita had been
living. The two met at a barangay conciliation meeting but efforts to settle their dispute failed.
On September 7, 1988, Luisita and her son Chito brought the case to the RTC of Quezon City,
seeking the annulment of the sale of the property to Nenita. Luisita alleged that the deed of sale
was a forgery and that it was executed in fraud of her as the legitimate wife of Aurelio.
The trial court rendered a decision upholding the sale of the property and dismissing the
complaint of Luisita.
The CA reversed the trial court decision and declared respondents to be the owners of the house
and lot in dispute. The CA ruled that in the absence of proof to the contrary, Aurelio's first wife
must be presumed to have been absent for seven years without Aurelio having news of her
being alive when Aurelio contracted a second marriage. On this premise, it held (1) that the
property in dispute belonged to the conjugal partnership of Aurelio and Luisita and (2) that
the sale of the property to Nenita was void for the same reason that donations between persons
who are guilty of concubinage or adultery are declared void under Article 739 of the Civil Code.
Issue: Whether or not the absence of Aurelios first wife for at least 7 years was sufficiently
proved
Held: No. Petitioner had shown that on February 6, 1962, when Aurelio married Luisita,
Aurelio's previous marriage to Consejo Velasco was still subsisting and, therefore, his second
marriage was bigamous. It was the burden of respondents to prove that, at the time of his second
marriage to Luisita, Aurelio's first wife, Consejo Velasco, had been absent for at least seven
years and that Aurelio had no news that she was alive.
Article 83 of the Civil Code provides: Any marriage subsequently contracted by any person
during the lifetime of the first spouse of such person with any person other than such first spouse
shall be illegal and void from its performance, unless:
(1) the first marriage was annulled or dissolved; or
(2) the first spouse had been absent for seven consecutive years at the time of the second
marriage without the spouse present having news of the absentee being alive, or if the
absentee, though he has been absent for less than seven years, is generally considered as dead
and believed to be so by the spouse present at the time of contracting such subsequent marriage,
or if the absentee is presumed to be dead after four years from the occurrence of any of the
events enumerated in Article 391. The marriage so contracted shall be valid in any of the three
cases until declared null and void by a competent court.
In the case at bar, the burden of proof was on respondents to show that Luisita and Aurelio's
marriage falls under any of these exceptions in order to be considered valid. They failed to
discharge this burden.
It has been held that the first exception refers to the subsequent marriage of the abandoned
spouse and not the remarriage of the deserting spouse, after the period of seven years has lapsed.
This exception cannot be invoked in this case in order to sustain the validity of Aurelio's
marriage to Luisita because apparently it was Aurelio who had left his first wife. At the time of
his second marriage to Luisita, he and Luisita had already been living together as husband and
wife for five years.
What applies in this case, therefore, is the general rule, i.e., since Aurelio had a valid,
subsisting marriage to Consejo Velasco, his subsequent marriage to respondent Luisita was
void for being bigamous.
Thus, the deed of sale to petitioner Nenita is valid.
SSS v. Jarque
G.R. No. 165545
March 24, 2006
Facts: On April 25, 1955, Clemente Bailon married Alice Diaz in Barcelona, Sorsogon. More
than 15 years later or on October 9, 1970, Bailon filed a petition to declare Alice
presumptively dead. The CFI of Sorsogon granted the petition.
In 1983, Bailon married respondent Teresita Jarque.
In 1998, Bailon, who was a member of the SSS since 1960, died.
Jarque filed a claim for funeral benefits, and was granted P12,000 by the SSS. Jarque filed an
additional claim for death benefits which was also granted by the SSS.
Cecilia Bailon-Yap, who claimed to be a daughter of Bailon and one Elisa Jayona contested
before the SSS the release to Jarque of the death and funeral benefits. She claimed that Bailon
contracted three marriages in his lifetime, the first with Alice, the second with her mother Elisa,
and the third with Jarque, all of whom are still alive. She further claimed that she, together with
her siblings, paid for Bailon's medical and funeral expenses; and all the documents submitted by
respondent to the SSS in support of her claims are spurious.
In support of her claim, Cecilia and her sister Norma Bailon Chavez submitted an Affidavit
averring that they are two of nine children of Bailon and Elisa who cohabited as husband and
wife as early as 1958, and they have personal knowledge that Alice is still alive.
The SSS Legal Unit cancelled the death pension benefits issued to Jarque and ordered her to
refund the benefits she has collected. Jardin was also required to turn over the P12,000 to Cecilia
and Norma as they were the ones who who defrayed Bailon's funeral expenses.
Alicia filed an Affidavit dated August 14, 2002 with the SSS Naga Branch attesting that she is
the widow of Bailon; she had only recently come to know of the petition filed by Bailon to
declare her presumptively dead; it is not true that she disappeared as Bailon could have easily
located her, she having stayed at her parents' residence in Barcelona, Sorsogon after she found
out that Bailon was having an extramarital affair; and Bailon used to visit her even after their
separation.
By Resolution of April 2, 2003, the SSC found that the marriage of Jarque to Bailon was void
and, therefore, she was just a common-law-wife. It declared that the marriage of Bailon to
Jarque was void for being bigamous as the first marriage to Alice Diaz was never annulled
or dissolved.
However, the CA reversed the SSC and declared that the second marriage contracted by a person
endures until annulled. SSS may not validly declare the second marriage null and void on the
basis alone of its own investigation for it is only the competent court, that can nullify the
second marriage.
Issue: Whether or not the second marriage is valid despite reappearance of the first spouse
Held: Yes. Under Article 83 of the Civil Code, a subsequent marriage contracted during the
lifetime of the first spouse is illegal and void ab initio unless the prior marriage is first annulled
or dissolved or contracted under any of the three exceptional circumstances. The marriage under
any of these exceptional cases is deemed valid until declared null and void by a competent court.
Alice had been absent for 15 consecutive years when Bailon sought the declaration of her
presumptive death, which judicial declaration was not even a requirement then for purposes of
remarriage.
Under the Civil Code, a subsequent marriage being voidable, it is terminated by final judgment
of annulment in a case instituted by the absent spouse who reappears or by either of the spouses
in the subsequent marriage.
Under the Family Code, no judicial proceeding to annul a subsequent marriage is

necessary. Under Article 42 thereof, the subsequent marriage shall be automatically
terminated by the recording of the affidavit of reappearance of the absent spouse.
(THIS!!!) This does not preclude the filing of an action in court to prove the reappearance of the
absentee and obtain a declaration of dissolution or termination of the subsequent marriage
If the absentee reappears, but no step is taken to terminate the subsequent marriage, either
by affidavit or by court action, such absentee's mere reappearance, even if made known to the
spouses in the subsequent marriage, will not terminate such marriage.
Since the second marriage has been contracted because of a presumption that the former spouse
is dead, such presumption continues in spite of the spouse's physical reappearance, and by
fiction of law, he or she must still be regarded as legally an absentee until the subsequent
marriage is terminated as provided by law. (Note: The second marriage to Jarque remains
valid notwithstanding proof that the first wife is still alive at the time of the second marriage.)
If the subsequent marriage is not terminated by registration of an affidavit of reappearance or by

judicial declaration but by death of either spouse as in the case at bar, the effects of dissolution
of valid marriages shall arise. The good or bad faith of either spouse can no longer be
raised, because, as in annullable or voidable marriages, the marriage cannot be questioned
except in a direct action for annulment.
In the case at bar, as no step was taken to nullify Bailon and Jarques marriage prior to the
former's death in 1998, Jarque is rightfully the dependent spouse-beneficiary of Bailon.
Republic v. Granada
G.R. No. 187512
June 13, 2012
Kinds of void marriages Procedure
Facts: In May 1991, respondent Yolanda Cadacio Granada met Cyrus Granada at Sumida
Electric Philippines, an electronics company in Paranaque where both were then working. The
two eventually got married at the Manila City Hall on March 3, 1993. Their marriage resulted in
the birth of their son, Cyborg Dean Cadacio Granada.
Sometime in May 1994, when Sumida Electric Philippines closed down, Cyrus went to Taiwan
to seek employment. Yolanda claimed that from that time, she had not received any
communication from her husband, notwithstanding efforts to locate him.
After 9 years of waiting, Yolanda filed a Petition to have Cyrus declared presumptively
dead.
On February 7, 2005, the RTC rendered a Decision declaring Cyrus as presumptively dead.
On March 10, 2005, petitioner Republic of the Philippines argued that Yolanda had failed to
exert earnest efforts to locate Cyrus and thus failed to prove her well-founded belief that he
was already dead, as expressly required by Article 41 of the Family Code. The RTC denied the
motion. The CA affirmed the RTC decision.
Issue: Whether or not respondent has a well-founded belief that her husband is already dead
Held: No. However, the RTC ruling on the issue of whether respondent was able to prove
her well-founded belief that her absent spouse was already dead is already final and can
no longer be modified or reversed.
In evaluating whether the present spouse has been able to prove the existence of a well-founded
belief that the absent spouse is already dead, the Court cited United States v. Biasbas, which it
found to be instructive as to the diligence required in searching for a missing spouse.
In Biasbas, the Court held that defendant Biasbas failed to exercise due diligence in ascertaining
the whereabouts of his first wife, considering that he only had a suspicion that she was dead,
and that the only basis of that suspicion was the fact of her absence.
For the purpose of contracting the subsequent marriage, the spouse present must institute
a summary proceeding for the declaration of presumptive death of the absentee, without
prejudice to the effect of reappearance of the absent spouse.
The spouse present is, thus, burdened to prove that his spouse has been absent and that he
has a well-founded belief that the absent spouse is already dead before the present spouse
may contract a subsequent marriage.
Belief is a state of the mind or condition prompting the doing of an overt act. It may be proved
by direct evidence or circumstantial evidence which may tend, even in a slight degree, to
elucidate the inquiry or assist to a determination probably founded in truth. Any fact or
circumstance relating to the character, habits, conditions, attachments, prosperity and objects of
life which usually control the conduct of men, and are the motives of their actions, was, so far as
it tends to explain or characterize their disappearance or throw light on their intentions,
competence evidence on the ultimate question of his death.
The belief of the present spouse must be the result of proper and honest to goodness
inquiries and efforts to ascertain the whereabouts of the absent spouse and whether the
absent spouse is still alive or is already dead.
Applying the foregoing standards to the present case, petitioner points out that respondent
Yolanda did not initiate a diligent search to locate her absent husband. While her brother
Diosdado Cadacio testified to having inquired about the whereabouts of Cyrus from the latters
relatives, these relatives were not presented to corroborate Diosdados testimony. If Yolanda was
diligent, she would have sought information from the Taiwanese Consular Office or assistance
from other government agencies in Taiwan or the Philippines. She could have also utilized mass
media.

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Alcantara v.

Restituto prayed that judgment be issued declaring their marriage void.

Held: No. Petitioner failed to establish respondent's psychological incapacity.

More definitive guidelines were handed down in Republic v. CA and Molina:

Article 36 contemplates downright incapacity or inability to take cognizance of and to

Indeed, irreconcilable differences, sexual infidelity or perversion, emotional immaturity and

Issue: Whether or not the second marriage is bigamous

Domingo v. Court of Appeals

Issue: Whether or not the second marriage is bigamous

Issue: Whether or not the element of previous legal marriage is present

1. That the offender has been legally married;

3. That he contracts a second or subsequent marriage;

Te v. Court of Appeals and Choa

Issue: Whether or not the second marriage is bigamous

Issue: Whether or not the second marriage is bigamous

Held: No. The elements of bigamy are:

(1) the offender has been legally married;

(3) he contracts a subsequent marriage; and

Issue: Whether or not the second marriage is bigamous

The elements of bigamy are:

(3) he contracts a subsequent marriage; and

A declaration of the absolute nullity of a marriage is now explicitly required either as a

Issue: Whether or not the second marriage is bigamous

See: Abbas v. Abbas

The elements of this crime are as follows:

1. That the offender has been legally married;

3. That he contracts a second or subsequent marriage;

Issue: Whether or not A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC is applicable

The recognition of a foreign judgment nullifying a bigamous marriage is without prejudice

Fujiki may prove the Japanese Family Court judgment through:

(1) an official publication or

Issue: Whether or not the second marriage is bigamous

Issue: Whether or not the second marriage is bigamous

1. That the offender has been legally married;

3. That he contracts a second or subsequent marriage;

Issue: Whether or not the second marriage is bigamous

Held: The petition is meritorious.

Article 41 of the Family Code expressly states:

The CFI of Cebu denied the petition.

Issue: Whether or not Felix Hortiguela's to Marciana Escao was valid

The four requisites for the declaration of presumptive death are:

The circumstances of Janets departure and respondent's subsequent behavior make it

Bienvenido v. Court of Appeals

Facts: Aurelio P. Camacho married Consejo Velasco in Manila on October 3, 1942. On

(1) the first marriage was annulled or dissolved; or

Thus, the deed of sale to petitioner Nenita is valid.

In 1983, Bailon married respondent Teresita Jarque.

Under the Family Code, no judicial proceeding to annul a subsequent marriage is

If the subsequent marriage is not terminated by registration of an affidavit of reappearance or by

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