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LAND TITLES AND DEEDS | BUKIDNON STATE UNIVERSITY

Case digests on

Land Titles and Deeds

Prepared by:

Barroso, Danica Anthea G.


Caipang, Jacob L.
Eliseo, Tom Crystoper A.
Espartero, Dieanne Mae C.
Monte de Ramos, Jhunel Rhoss R.
Solito, Rob Jane M.
Talotalo, Elson V.
Tan, Evann Ric T.

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LAND TITLES AND DEEDS | BUKIDNON STATE UNIVERSITY

Table of Contents
IX. REGISTRATION OF JUDGMENTS, ORDERS, PARTITIONS
1. Surrender of Owners Duplicate
a. Biblia Toledo-Banaga And Jovita Tan vs Court of
Appeals and Candelario Damalerio
(G.R. No. 127941 | January 28, 1990) .................. 34

b. Spouses Leticia & Jose Ervin Abad et al. vs Fil-Homes


Realty & Development Corporation and Magdiwang
Realty Corporation
.................. 5
(G.R. No. 189239 | November 24, 2010)
XIII. DEALINGS WITH UNREGISTERED LANDS
a. Radiowealth Finance Company vs Manuelito S.
Palileo .................. 6
(G.R. No. 83432 | May 20, 1991)

XVI. THE CONDOMINIUM ACT (R.A. 4726)


1. Definition
a. Sec 2, R.A. 4726 .................. 7

2. Warranties and Representations


a. Bank of the Philippine Islands vs Als Management &
Development Corp.
(G.R. No. 151821 | April 14, 2204) .................. 78

3. Redemption of Mortgaged Amortization


a. Gregorio De Vera, Jr. Vs Court of Appeals .................. 9 11
(G.R. No. 132869 | October 18, 2001)

4. Suspension of Monthly Amortization


a. Gold Loop Properties, Inc. Vs Court of Appeals
(G.R. No. 122088 | January 26, 2001) .................. 12

5. Alteration of Plans
a. G.O.A.L., INC. Vs Court of Appeals
(G.R. No. 118822 | July 28, 1997)
.................. 13 14
XVII. SUBDIVISION AND CONDOMINIUM PROTECTIVE
BUYERS DECREE (P.D. 957)
1. Jurisdiction of HLURB .................. 15
a. Ortigas & Company, Limited Partnership vs Court of
Appeals .................. 15 16
(G.R. No. 129822 | June 20, 2012)

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LAND TITLES AND DEEDS | BUKIDNON STATE UNIVERSITY

IX. REGISTRATION OF JUDGMENTS, ORDERS, PARTITIONS


1. Surrender of Owners Duplicate
a. Biblia Toledo-Banaga And Jovita Tan vs Court of Appeals and Candelario
Damalerio
(G.R. No. 127941 | January 28, 1990)

FACTS:
Petitioner Banaga filed an action for redemption of her property which was earlier
foreclosed and later sold in a public auction to the respondent. The trial court declared petitioner
to have lost her right for redemption and ordered that certificate of title be issued to the
respondent which the petitioner caused an annotation of notice of lis pendens to the title. On
appeal, the CA reversed the decision and allowed the petitioner to redeem her property within a
certain period. Banaga tried to redeem the property by depositing to the trial court the amount of
redemption that was financed by her co-petitioner Tan. Respondent opposed in that she made the
redemption beyond the period ordered by the court. The lower court however upheld the
redemption and ordered the Register of Deeds to cancel the respondents title and issue a new
title in favor of the petitioner. In a petition for certiorari before the CA by the respondent,
another notice of lis pendens was annotated to the title. CA issued a temporary restraining order
to enjoin the execution of the court order. Meanwhile, Banaga sold the property to Tan in the
absolute deed of sale that mentions the title of the property still in the name of the respondent
which was not yet cancelled. Despite the lis pendens on the title, Tan subdivided the lot into a
subdivision plan which she made not in her own name but that of the respondent. Tan then asked
the Register of Deeds to issue a new title in her name. New titles were issued in Tans name but
carried the annotation of the two notices of lis pendens. Upon learning the new title of Tan the
respondent impleaded her in his petition. The CA later sets aside the trial courts decision and
declared the respondent as the absolute owner of the property for failure of the petitioner to
redeem the property within the period ordered by the court. The decision was final and executory
and ordered the Register of Deeds to reinstate the title in the name of the respondent. The
Register of Deeds refused alleging that Tans certificate must be surrendered first. The
respondent cited the register of deeds in contempt but the court denied contending that the
remedy should be consultation with the Land Registration Commissioner and in its other order
denied the motion of respondent for writ of possession holding that the remedy would be to a
separate action to declare Tans title as void. In its motion for certiorari and mandamus to the
CA, the court set aside the two assailed orders of the trial court and declared the title of Tan as
null and void and ordered the Register of Deeds to reinstate the title in the name of the
respondent. Petitioners now argued that Tan is a buyer in good faith and raised the issue on
ownership of the lot.

ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioner Tan is a buyer in good faith and need not to surrender the
Certificate of Title.

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LAND TITLES AND DEEDS | BUKIDNON STATE UNIVERSITY

RULING:
The court held that Tan is not a buyer in good faith because when the property was sold
to her she was aware of the interest of the respondent over the property. She even furnished the
amount used by Banaga to redeem the property. When she bought the property from Banaga she
knows that at that time the property was not registered to the sellers name. The deed of sale
mentioned the title which was named to the respondent. Moreover the title still carries 2 notices
of lis pendens. Tan therefore cannot feign ignorance on the status of the property when she
bought it. Because Tan was also impleaded as a party to the litigation, she is bound by the
decision promulgated to the subject of such litigation. It is a settled rule that the party dealing
with a registered land need not go beyond the Certificate of Title to determine the true owner
thereof so as to guard or protect her interest. She has only to look and rely on the entries in the
Certificate of Title. By looking at the title Tan would know that the certificate is in the name of
respondent. Being a buyer in bad faith, Tan does not acquire any better right over the property.
The adjudication of the ownership in favor to the respondent includes the delivery of the
possession by the defeated party to the respondent

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LAND TITLES AND DEEDS | BUKIDNON STATE UNIVERSITY

b. Spouses Leticia & Jose Ervin Abad et al. vs Fil-Homes Realty & Development
Corporation and Magdiwang Realty Corporation
(G.R. No. 189239 | November 24, 2010)

FACTS:
Fil-Homes filed a complaint for unlawful detainer against petitioners. Respondent alleged
that since 1980, they have made demands for petitioners to vacate, but they went unheeded.
Petitioners countered that there is no possession by tolerance for they have been in adverse,
continuous and uninterrupted possession of the lots for more than 30 years; and that respondents
predecessor-in-interest, Pilipinas Development Corporation, had no title to the lots. During the
pendency of the case, the city of Paranaque filed a case of expropriation. A writ of possession was
granted to the city. The respondent won in the unlawful detainer case, but the RTC reversed the
ruling upon appeal reasoning that there was no "tolerance" on the part of Respondents. On appeal
of the Respondents to the CA, it upheld the decision of the MTC. Thus, the current petition.

ISSUES:
Whether or not Petitioners should be ejected from the premises upon the judgment of the
expropriation proceedings.

HELD:
Petition is devoid of merit.
As a general rule, ejectment proceedings, due to its summary nature, are not suspended or
their resolution held in abeyance despite the pendency of a civil action regarding ownership. In
the present case, the mere issuance of a writ of possession in the expropriation proceedings did
not transfer ownership of the lots in favor of the City.Such issuance was only the first stage in
expropriation.There is even no evidence that judicial deposit had been made in favor of
respondents prior to the City's possession of the lots Respecting petitioners claim that they have
been named beneficiaries of the lots, the city ordinance authorizing the initiation of expropriation
proceedings does not state so.Petitioners cannot thus claim any right over the lots on the basis of
the ordinance. Even if the lots are eventually transferred to the City, it is nonsequitur for
petitioners to claim that they are automatically entitled to be beneficiaries thereof.For certain
requirements must be met and complied with before they can be considered to be beneficiaries.
Petition is DENIED. The decision of CA is affirmed.

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LAND TITLES AND DEEDS | BUKIDNON STATE UNIVERSITY

XIII. DEALINGS WITH UNREGISTERED LANDS


b. Radiowealth Finance Company vs Manuelito S. Palileo (G.R. No. 83432 | May 20, 1991)
FACTS:
On April 1970, defendant spouses Enrique Castro and Herminio R. Castro (spouse
Castro) sold to herein respondent Manuelito Palileo a parcel of unregistered coconut land in
Surigao del Norte. The sale is evidenced by a notarized Deed of Absolute Sale, but the deed was
not registered in the Registry of Property for unregistered lands in the province of Surigao del
Norte. Since the execution of the deed of sale, Palileo who was then employed in Lianga,
Surigao del Sur, exercised acts of ownership over the land through his mother Rafaela Palileo, as
administratrix or overseer. Manuelito Palileo has continuously paid the real estate taxes on said
land from 1971 until the present. In November 1976, the CFI of Manila rendered a judgment
against defendant Enrique T. Castro to pay herein petitioner Radiowealth Finance Company
(Radiowealth), the sum of P22,350.35 with interest rate of 16% per annum from November 2,
1975 until fully paid, and upon the finality of the judgment, a writ of execution was issued. The
Provincial Sheriff Marietta E. Eviota, through defendant Deputy Provincial Sheriff Leopoldo
Risma, levied upon and finally sold at public auction the subject land that defendant Enrique
Castro had sold to Palileo in 1970. The said Provincial Sheriff executed a certificate of sale in
favor of Radiowealth as the only bidder, and upon expiration of the redemption period, she also
executed a deed of final sale. Both documents were registered with the Registry of Deeds.
Learning of what happened to the land, Palileo filed an action for recovery of the subject
property. The court a quo rendered a decision in favor of Palileo, which the Court of Appeals
affirmed.

ISSUE: Who is the rightful owner of the subject property?

RULING:
The Supreme Court likewise affirmed the appellate courts decision on this case. There is
no doubt that had the subject property been a registered land, this case would have been decided
in favor of Radiowealth since it was the company that had its claim first recorded in the Registry
of Deeds for it is the act of registration that operates to convey and affect registered land.
Therefore, a bonafide purchaser of a registered land at an execution sale acquires a good title as
against a prior transferee, if such transfer was unrecorded.
However, a different set of rules applies in the case at bar which deals with a parcel of
unregistered land. Under Act No. 3344, registration of instruments affecting unregistered lands is
"without prejudice to a third party with a better right." The aforequoted phrase has been held by
the Supreme Court to mean that the mere registration of a sale in one's favor does not give him
any right over the land if the vendor was not anymore the owner of the land having previously
sold the same to somebody else even if the earlier sale was unrecorded. Applying this principle,
the Court of Appeals correctly held that the execution sale of the unregistered land in favor of
petitioner is of no effect because the land no longer belonged to the judgment debtor as of the
time of the said execution sale.

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LAND TITLES AND DEEDS | BUKIDNON STATE UNIVERSITY

XVI. THE CONDOMINIUM ACT (R.A. 4726)


1. Definition
a. Sec 2, R.A. 4726

A condominium is an interest in real property consisting of separate interest in a unit in a


residential, industrial or commercial building and an undivided interest in common, directly or
indirectly, in the land on which it is located and in other common areas of the building. A
condominium may include, in addition, a separate interest in other portions of such real property.
Title to the common areas, including the land, or the appurtenant interests in such areas, may be
held by a corporation specially formed for the purpose (hereinafter known as the "condominium
corporation") in which the holders of separate interest shall automatically be members or
shareholders, to the exclusion of others, in proportion to the appurtenant interest of their respective
units in the common areas.

The real right in condominium may be ownership or any other interest in real property recognized
by law, on property in the Civil Code and other pertinent laws.

2. Warranties and Representations


a. Bank of the Philippine Islands vs Als Management & Development Corp.
(G.R. No. 151821 | April 14, 2204)

FACTS:
Petitioner BPI Investment Corporation filed a complaint for a Sum of Money against
respondent, alleging that on July 22, 1983, both executed at Makati, Metro Manila a Deed of
Sale for one (1) unfurnished condominium unit of the Twin Towers Condominium comprising of
271 square meters more or less, together with parking stalls identified as G022 and G-63.
Petitioner advanced the amount of P26,300.45 for the expenses in causing the issuance
and registration of the Condominium Certificate of Title. Under the penultimate paragraph of
the Deed of Sale, it is stipulated that respondent, as vendee, shall pay all the expenses for the
preparation and registration of this Deed of Sale and such other documents as may be necessary
for the issuance of the corresponding Condominium Certificate of Title. After the petitioner
complied with its obligations under the said Deed of Sale, respondent, notwithstanding demands
made by petitioner, failed and refused to pay without any valid, legal or justifiable reason.
Respondent claimed that it has just and valid reasons for refusing to pay petitioners legal claims
as petitioner jacked-up or increased the amount of its alleged advances for the issuance and
registration of the Condominium Certificate of Title, by including therein charges which should
not be collected from buyers of condominium units. Petitioner made and disseminated brochures
and other sales propaganda in and before May 1980, which made warranties as to the facilities,
improvements, infrastructures or other forms of development of the condominium units it was
offering for sale to the public. Respondent further averred that petitioner represented to the
respondent that the condominium unit would be delivered completed and ready for occupancy
not later than December 31, 1981. Respondent relied solely upon the descriptions and warranties
contained in the aforementioned brochures and other sales propaganda materials when

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LAND TITLES AND DEEDS | BUKIDNON STATE UNIVERSITY

respondent agreed to buy Unit E-4A of the Twin Tower(s) for the hefty sum of P2,048,900.00
considering that the Twin Towers was then yet to be built. In contravention of petitioners
warranties and of good engineering practices, the condominium unit purchased by respondent
suffered defects and/or deficiencies. The trial court ordered the respondent to pay the sum of
P26,300.45, with legal interest from the filing of the complaint up to full payment thereof,
representing the amount spent for the registration of the title to the condominium unit while
petitioner was ordered to repair the defects in the condominium unit. The Court of Appeals
affirmed the decision.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the decision of the Court of Appeals is based on misapprehension of facts
and/or manifestly mistaken warranting a review by this Honorable Court of the factual findings
therein.

RULING:
The brochure that was disseminated indicated features that would be provided each
condominium unit; and that, under Section 19 of PD No. 957, would form part of the sales
warranties of petitioner. Respondent relied on the brochure in its decision to purchase a unit.
Since the former failed to deliver certain items stated therein, then there was a clear violation of
its warranties and representations.The brochure says that the particulars stated as well as the
details and visuals shown are intended to give a general idea of the project to be undertaken, and
as such, are not to be relied [upon] as statements or representations of fact. This general
disclaimer should apply only to the general concept of the project that petitioner aptly
characterizes thus: Destined to reflect condominium living at its very best and its design will
make the project the only one of its kind in the Philippines. This disclaimer, however, should
not apply to the features and the amenities that the brochure promised to provide each
condominium unit. Petitioner was thus in breach when it failed to deliver a closed-circuit TV
monitor through which residents from their apartments can see their guests.
WHEREFORE, petitioner is ORDERED to pay P51,000 as temperate damages for the
termination of the lease contract because of the defects in the condominium unit.

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LAND TITLES AND DEEDS | BUKIDNON STATE UNIVERSITY

3. Redemption of Mortgaged Amortization


a. Gregorio De Vera, Jr. Vs Court of Appeals
(G.R. No. 132869 | October 18, 2001)

FACTS:
On 23 June 1983 petitioner Gregorio de Vera Jr. and QPSDCI, through its authorized
agent Fil-Estate Realty Corporation (FIL-ESTATE), entered into a Condominium Reservation
Agreement3 where petitioner undertook to buy Unit 211-2C of the condominium for
P325,000.00 under the following agreed terms of payment: (a) an option money of P5,000.00
payable upon signing of the agreement to form part of the purchase price; (b) a full
downpayment of P175,675.00 broken down into the reservation fee of P5,000.00 and three (3)
equal monthly installments payable beginning the month after the signing of the contract; and,
(c) the remaining balance of P160,000.00 to be secured through petitioner's Pag-IBIG and Open-
Housing Loan. Pending release of the loan, petitioner was to avail of a bridge financing loan with
ASIATRUST or any accredited originating bank of the Pag-IBIG program. On 2 June 1983
petitioner paid the reservation fee of P5,000.00, and on 11 July 1983 the balance of the
downpayment of P167,000.00, thus completing the downpayment of P175,675.00 well before the
due date. As incentive, petitioner was given a full discount on cash payment by QPSDCI to bring
the total payment to P184,040.00. Pursuant to their Condominium Reservation Agreement,
petitioner submitted through FIL-ESTATE his application for the Pag-IBIG loan. On 28
December 1983 ASIATRUST as originating bank notified FIL-ESTATE that petitioner's Pag-
IBIG loan application had been approved.4 In a letter dated 18 January 1984 QPSDCI President
Quintin P. San Diego forwarded the letter to petitioner. However, the amount approved was only
P139,100.00 and not P160,000.00. Additional charges further reduced the amount to
P117,043.33.
Petitioner De Vera Jr. approached QPSDCI to have the P12,040.00 discount credited to
his additional equity. Since the resultant net loan of P117,043.33 was insufficient to cover the
balance of the purchase price, De Vera Jr. negotiated with QPSDCI to defer payment of the
P23,916.67 deficiency until the project was completed and the unit was ready for turnover.
QPSDCI agreed. On 20 May 1988 petitioner, upon discovering that the FUNDERS had already
published a notice14 of extrajudicial foreclosure of the mortgage, filed a complaint against
respondents for damages and injunction with urgent prayer for issuance of a writ of preliminary
injunction, annulment of mortgage based on fraud, with urgent prayer for the issuance of a writ
of preliminary attachment and specific performance. The complaint was docketed as Civil Case
No. Q-53737 and subsequently raffled to Branch 107 of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon
City.
On 23 May 1988 ASIATRUST extrajudicially foreclosed the mortgage on twenty-seven
(27) condominium units, including that of petitioner De Vera Jr. The units were sold at public
auction, with the FUNDERS as the highest bidder. The certificate of sale was issued and
annotated on the CCTs. On 3 March 1992 the trial court rendered judgment "directing the
defendants (herein respondents) to pay to the plaintiff (herein petitioner) jointly and severally the

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sum equivalent to the penalties and charges plus whatever amount may be necessary to redeem
Unit 211-2C from any lien and encumbrances so that the title may be released and delivered to
the plaintiff, free from any lien and encumbrances, subject only to the deduction of his unpaid
balance of P139,000.00, which the plaintiff should pay out of his own funds, plus exemplary
damages of P100,000.00 each and to pay plaintiff attorney's fees jointly and severally x x x
P50,000.00 plus the expenses of litigation." The lower court denied plaintiff's prayer for moral
damages and dismissed defendants' counterclaim against the plaintiff and cross-claims against
each other. The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court with the modification
that respondents were ordered solidarily to pay petitioner P50,000.00 as nominal damages, but
the award for actual and exemplary damages was deleted. On 8 August 1997 petitioner filed a
"Manifestation with Motion for Reconsideration," and on 6 February 1998 a "Compliance with
Motion to Resolve Manifestation with Motion for Reconsideration," with respondent court.
Reckoning the deadline of the period to file a motion for reconsideration at 19 July 1997, the
Court of Appeals denied petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration for having been filed out of
time. Hence, the instant petition for review on certiorari. The trial court found that petitioner's
failure to pay the balance of the price of Unit 211-2C was not his fault. It also found that
petitioner was a real party in interest to annul the loan agreement between QPSDCI and the
FUNDERS, and that he had priority in right to the unit over the FUNDERS.
The trial court rejected QPSDCI's counterclaim against petitioner for rentals and
sustained petitioner's claim for damages against private respondents. The Court of Appeals ruled
that the regular courts had no jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case, the proper venue
being the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB). However, respondents were
estopped from questioning jurisdiction because they filed counterclaims in the lower court.

ISSUE:
Who had a superior right over the Unit 211-2C?

RULING:
Court of Appeals ruled in favor of petitioner, holding that the mortgage in favor of
ASIATRUST, which was the basis for its title, did not bind petitioner inasmuch as the same was
not registered with the National Housing Authority (NHA), contrary to the mandate of Sec. 18 of
PD 957, or "The Subdivision and Condominium Buyers' Protective Decree.''19 The appellate
court further found that QPSDCI breached its warranties as seller under Art. 1547, and also
violated its obligation to deliver to petitioner a clean title as required by Sec. 4 of PD 957. It
declared that delivery of the unit to petitioner operated to transfer ownership to him from
QPSDCI. It had found that petitioner had superior right to the unit over the FUNDERS and the
mortgage in favor of the FUNDERS was contrary to Condominium laws. Therefore, the proper
remedy was to annul the mortgage foreclosure sale and the CCT issued in favor of ASIATRUST,
and not merely decree an award for damages. The trial court should have also ordered QPSDCI
to credit petitioner's payments to his outstanding balance and deliver to petitioner a clean CCT

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upon full payment of the purchase price as mandated by Sec. 25 of PD 957. We note that
petitioner, believing that he won, did not appeal the trial court's decision. Petitioner is partly to
blame for the difficult situation he is in, having filed his complaint with the regular courts instead
of the HLURB. Nevertheless, both trial court and the Court of Appeals found that petitioner had
superior rights over the condominium unit, that petitioner was not bound by the mortgage in
favor of the FUNDERS and, that QPSDCI violated its contract with petitioner by its failure to
remit the latter's payments. Such findings are uncontested before us and provide enough ground
to warrant the modification of the ruling, so that full relief may be accorded to petitioner. The
general rule that an appellate court may only pass upon errors assigned may be waived, and the
appellate court may consider matters not assigned when consideration of which is necessary in
arriving at a just decision and complete resolution of the case or serve the interests of justice or
to avoid dispensing piecemeal justice. WHEREFORE, the assailed Decision of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 37281 is MODIFIED thus (a) The mortgage over Unit 211-2C of
Lourdes I Condominium covered by CCT No. 2307 as well as its foreclosure sale is declared
NULL and VOID. The Ex-Officio Sheriff of Quezon City is ordered to cancel the certificate of
sale in favor of ASIATRUST Development Bank over the aforesaid Unit 211-2C and the
Register of Deeds of Quezon City to cancel the Annotation of the Real Estate Mortgage (Entry
No. 7714) and the Annotation of the Certificate of Sale (Entry No. 8087); and (b) Respondents
Q. P. San Diego Construction, Inc., and ASIATRUST are ordered to credit all payments made by
petitioner Gregorio de Vera Jr., to his outstanding balance, and to deliver to petitioner the
certificate of title over Unit 211-2C, Lourdes I Condominium, upon full payment of the purchase
price, free from all penalties, liens, charges, except those accruing after finality of this Decision.
The award of nominal damages in favor of petitioner in the amount of P50,000.00 is
AFFIRMED.

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LAND TITLES AND DEEDS | BUKIDNON STATE UNIVERSITY

4. Suspension of Monthly Amortization


a. Gold Loop Properties, Inc. Vs Court of Appeals
(G.R. No. 122088 | January 26, 2001)

FACTS:
On July 16, 1988, private respondents Bhavna Harilela and Ramesh Sadhwani
(hereinafter referred to as Sadhwanis) submitted through St. Martin Realty Corporation, a realtor
agent of petitioner Gold Loop Properties, Inc. (hereinafter referred to as GLPI), a signed pro
forma reservation application addressed to GLPI for the purchase of one (1) condominium unit at
Gold Loop Towers residential complex, located in Ortigas Complex, Pasig. One of the terms of
the reservation was the execution of a contract to sell once the downpayment was paid in full.
Upon submission of the reservation, the Sadhwanis issued a check for P50,000.00 to cover the
reservation fees to Josephine Flores Guina, agent of St. Martin Realty who issued a receipt to
them. On November 18, 1988, the Sadhwanis paid GLPI the amount of P819,531.25.
Subsequently, Bhavna Harilela signed a Contract To Sell[2] with GLPI, represented by its
President Emmanuel Zapanta. Ms. Guina assured them that they would be furnished with a copy
of the contract after its notarization, and that the amount, representing the balance of the
purchase price, would be included in a loan application with a bank. However, the contract to
sell was not notarized, as the private respondents were not able to supply GLPI with a copy of
their passports. On March 19 and April 25, 1989, respondent Ramesh J. Sadhwani demanded a
copy of the contract to sell, noting that his wife had no official document to show that she bought
a condominium unit from GLPI and there were conditions and/or stipulations in the contract
which she could not be expected to comply with, unless a copy of the same be given to her. By
letter dated May 22, 1989 to GLPI, respondent Sadhwanis counsel made a formal demand for the
delivery to him of a copy of the contract to sell. Spouses Sadhwanis failed to pay any of the
monthly amortizations in the payment plan.

ISSUE:
Whether or not respondents may suspend payment of their monthly amortizations due to
failure of petitioners to furnish them copy of the contract to sell.

RULING:
The private respondents are entitled to a copy of the contract to sell, otherwise they would
not be informed of their rights and obligations under the contract. When the Sadhwanis parted
with P878,366.35 or more than one third of the purchase price for the condominium unit, the
contract to sell, or what it represents is concrete proof of the purchase and sale of the
condominium unit.

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5. Alteration of Plans
a. G.O.A.L., INC. Vs Court of Appeals
(G.R. No. 118822 | July 28, 1997)

FACTS:
G.O.A.L., INC., (GOAL), in this petition for review on certiorari, seeks to set aside part
of the decision of the Court of Appeals dated September 28, 1994 which affirmed the decision of
the Office of the President Legal Affairs (OPLA) that earlier likewise affirmed the decision of
the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB). Petitioner confines its petition to the
construction of the fifth floor of Gemin I Condominium and all works related thereto, including
the issuance of title to private respondent Teng and providing free parking spaces for the
condominium units. On 23 May 1983 GOAL and the National Housing Authority (NHA) entered
into an agreement whereby NHA extended to GOAL a loan of P4.425 million for the
construction of Gemin I Condominium at 941 Gonzales St., Ermita, Manila. Sometime in 1984 a
"Contract Agreement" was entered into between GOAL and Matson International Corporation
for the construction of the condominium within one (1) year at the cost of P4.2 million.
However, in the later part of 1984, the contractor abandoned the project with only 60% of it
finished. In 1985 GOAL offered the condominium units for sale with private respondents among
its buyers. To remedy the situation brought about by the abandonment of the project by the first
contractor, GOAL subsequently pursued the construction of the fifth floor with NHA granting
additional funding on the condition that it would hold on to the condominium certificates of title
of private respondents. In August 1989 private respondents filed with the Housing and Land Use
Regulatory Board (HLURB), Office of Appeals, Adjudication and Legal Affairs (OAALA), a
complaint against GOAL. Among the issues raised were the illegal construction of the fifth floor
of Gemin I Condominium, the failure to deliver the title of private respondent Filomeno Teng
despite his repeated demands, and the failure to provide adequate parking spaces for the unit
owners. On 31 March 1989 OAALA rendered its decision ordering GOAL, inter alia, to stop the
construction of the fifth floor, to deliver the title of private respondent Teng, and to provide
adequate parking space for the unit owners. On appeal to the Office of the President Legal
Affairs (OPLA) and subsequently to the Court of Appeals, the decision rendered by the HLURB-
OAALA was affirmed in toto. Petitioner's motion for reconsideration was denied. Hence, this
petition.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the construction of the fifth floor on the condiminium by G.O.A.L is
violative in the decree invoked.

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RULING:
Yes. The construction is violative even if it was made with the written approval of public
respondent HLURB as required by Sec. 22 of P.D. 957 which provides
Sec. 22. Alteration of Plans. No owner or developer shall change or alter the roads, open
spaces, infrastructures, facilities for public use and/or other form of subdivision development as
contained in the approved subdivision plan and/or represented in its advertisements, without the
permission of the Authority and the written conformity or consent of the duly organized
homeowners association, or in the absence of the latter, by majority of the lot buyers in the
subdivision (emphasis supplied).
The above provision is clear. We do not have to tussle with legal hermeneutics in the
interpretation of Sec. 22 of P.D. 957. The written approval of the National Housing Authority
alone is not sufficient. It must be coupled with the written conformity or consent of the duly
organized homeowners association of the majority of the lot buyers. Failing in this, the
construction of the fifth floor is violative of the decree invoked. The Court of Appeals simply
applied the law, and correctly so.

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LAND TITLES AND DEEDS | BUKIDNON STATE UNIVERSITY

XVII. SUBDIVISION AND CONDOMINIUM PROTECTIVE


BUYERS DECREE (P.D. 957)
1. Jurisdiction of HLURB

i. Unsound real estate business practices;


ii. Claims involving refund and any other claims filed by subdivision lot or
condominium unit buyer against the project owner, developer, dealer, broker, or
salesman; and
iii. Cases involving specific performance of contractual and statutory obligations filed
by buyers of subdivision lots or condominium units against the owner, developer,
dealer, broker or salesman.

a. Ortigas & Company, Limited Partnership vs Court of Appeals


(G.R. No. 129822 | June 20, 2012)

FACTS:
In 1994 respondent City of Pasig (the City) filed a complaint against Ortigas and
Greenhills Properties, Inc. (GPI) for specific compliance before the Regional Trial Court (RTC)
of Pasig in a civil case alleging that Ortigas failed to comply with Municipal Ordinance 5, Series
of 1966 (MO 5) which required it to designate appropriate recreational and playground facilities
at its former Capitol VI Subdivision (regarded as a residential site), now the Pasig City side of
the Ortigas Center. Further, the City alleged that despite the fact that the plan was only approved
by the Municipal Council as to layout, petitioner proceeded to develop the property without
securing a final approval. In answer, Ortigas alleged that its development plan for the subject
land was for a commercial subdivision, outside the scope of MO 5 that applied only to residential
subdivisions; that the City cannot assail the validity of that development plan after its approval
25 years ago. Ortigas further alleged that only in 1984, 15 years after the approval of its plan,
that the National Housing Regulatory Commission imposed the open space requirement for
commercial subdivisions through its Rules and Regulations for Commercial Subdivision and
Commercial Subdivision Development. Ortigas filed a motion to dismiss the case on the ground
that the RTC had no jurisdiction over it, such jurisdiction being in the Housing and Land Use
Regulatory Board (HLURB) for unsound real estate business practices. On April 15, 1996 the
RTC denied the motion to dismiss. It held that HLURBs jurisdiction pertained to disputes
arising from transactions between buyers, salesmen, and subdivision and condominium
developers. Ortigas filed a petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals (CA) to challenge
the RTCs actions. On February 18, 1997 the CA rendered judgment, affirming the RTCs denial
of the motion to dismiss. The appellate court ruled that the City sought compliance with a
statutory obligation enacted to promote the general welfare (Section 16, Local Government
Code) which invariably includes the preservation of open spaces for recreational
purposes. Since the City was not a buyer or one entitled to refund for the price paid for a lot,
the dispute must fall under the jurisdiction of the RTC pursuant to Section 19 of The Judiciary
Reorganization Act of 1980.

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LAND TITLES AND DEEDS | BUKIDNON STATE UNIVERSITY

ISSUE:
W/N the jurisdiction over the case against petitioner Ortigas filed by the City regarding
non-compliance with the Municipal Ordinance 5 which required petitioner to designate
appropriate recreational and playground facilities, lies with the HLURB and not with the RTC

HELD:
No, the jurisdiction lies with the RTC. Not every case involving buyers and sellers of
subdivision lots or condominium units can be filed with the HLURB. Its jurisdiction is limited
to those cases filed by the buyer or owner of a subdivision lot or condominium unit and based on
any of the causes of action enumerated in Section 1 of P.D. 1344.
Ortigas maintains that the HLURB has jurisdiction over the complaint since a land developer's
failure to comply with its statutory obligation to provide open spaces constitutes unsound real
estate business practice that Presidential Decree (P.D.) 1344 prohibits. Executive Order 648
empowers the HLURB to hear and decide claims of unsound real estate business practices
against land developers. Ultimately, whether or not the HLURB has the authority to hear and
decide a case is determined by the nature of the cause of action, the subject matter or property
involved, and the parties. The policy of the law is to curb unscrupulous practices in real estate
trade and business that prejudice buyers. Obviously, the City had not bought a lot in the subject
area from Ortigas which would give it a right to seek HLURB intervention in enforcing a local
ordinance that regulates the use of private land within its jurisdiction in the interest of the general
welfare. It has the right to bring such kind of action but only before a court of general
jurisdiction such as the RTC.

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