G.R. No. 205472, January 25, 2016 defense presented no witness other than Saraum.
AMADO I. SARAUM,1Petitioner, v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent. According to the prosecution, on August 17, 2006, a telephone call was received by PO3
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
This petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court (Rules) seeks
to reverse the Decision2 dated September 8, 2011 and Resolution3 dated December 19,
2012 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CEB CR No. 01199, which affirmed the
judgment of conviction against petitioner Amado I. Saraum (Saraum) rendered by the
Regional Trial Court (ATC), Branch 57, Cebu City, in Criminal Case No. CBU-77737.
Saraum was charged with violation of Section 12, Article II (Possession of Paraphernalia
for Dangerous Drugs) of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9165, or the Comprehensive Dangerous
Drugs Act of 2002. The accusatory portion of the Information reads:
That on or about the 17th day of August, 2006, at about 12:45 A.M., in the City of Cebu,
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused, with
deliberate intent, and without being authorized by law, did then and there have in his
possession the following:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
1 = One (1) lighter
2 = One (1) rolled tissue paper
3 = One (1) aluminum tin foil
which are instruments and/or equipments (sic) fit or intended for smoking, consuming,
administering, ingesting, or introducing, any dangerous drug into the body.
CONTRARY TO LAW.4ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
In his arraignment, Saraum, with the assistance of a counsel, pleaded not guilty to the
offense charged.5Trial ensued. Meantime, Saraum was released on bail.6
PO3 Jeffrey Larrobis and PO1 Romeo Jumalon testified for the prosecution while the
Larrobis regarding the illegal drug activities in Sitio Camansi, Barangay Lorega, Cebu
City. A buy-bust team was then formed composed of PO3 Larrobis, PO1 Jumalon, PO2
Nathaniel Sta. Ana, PO1 Roy Cabahug, and PO1 Julius Anion against a certain "Pata."
PO2 Sta. Ana was designated as the poseur-buyer accompanied by the informant, PO1
Jumalon as the back-up of PO2 Sta. Ana, and the rest of the team as the perimeter
security. PO1 Anion coordinated with the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency (PDEA)
regarding the operation. After preparing all the necessary documents, such as the pre-
operation report and submitting the same to the PDEA, the team proceeded to the
subject area.
During the operation, "Pata" eluded arrest as he tried to run towards his shanty. Inside
the house, which was divided with a curtain as partition, the buy-bust team also saw
Saraum and Peter Espcranza, who were holding drug paraphernalia apparently in
preparation to have a "shabu" pot session. They recovered from Saraum's possession a
lighter, rolled tissue paper, and aluminum tin foil (tooter). PO3 Larrobis confiscated the
items, placed them in the plastic pack of misua wrapper, and made initial markings ("A"
for Saraum and "P" for Esperanza). At the police station, PO3 Larrobis marked as "AIS-
08-17-2006" the paraphernalia recovered from Saraum. After the case was filed, the
subject items were turned over to the property custodian of the Office of City
Prosecutor.
By way of defense, Saraum denied the commission of the alleged offense. He testified
that on the date and time in question, he was passing by Lorega Cemetery on his way to
the house of his parents-in-law when he was held by men with firearms. They were
already with "Antik" and "Pata," both of whom were his neighbors. Believing that he had
not committed anything illegal, he resisted the arrest. He learned of the criminal charge
only when he was brought to the court.
On May 5, 2009, the RTC rendered its Decision,7 the dispositive portion of which states:
WHEREFORE, the Court finds the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime
of violation of Section 12, Article II of R.A. 9165 and he is hereby sentenced to suffer the
penalty of six (6) months and one (1) day to two (2) years and to pay a fine of
Php20,000.00 with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency.

The drug paraphernalias (sic) are ordered forfeited in favor of the government.
SO ORDERED.8ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
On appeal, the CA sustained the judgment of conviction; hence, this petition.
We deny.
Considering that Saraum failed to show any arbitrariness, palpable error, or
capriciousness on the findings of fact of the trial and appellate courts, such findings
deserve great weight and are deemed conclusive and binding.9 Besides, a review of the
records reveals that the CA did not err in affirming his conviction.
The elements of illegal possession of equipment, instrument, apparatus and other
paraphernalia for dangerous drugs under Section 12, Article II of R.A. No. 9165 are: (1)
possession or control by the accused of any equipment, apparatus or other
paraphernalia fit or intended for smoking, consuming, administering, injecting,
ingesting, or introducing any dangerous drug into the body; and (2) such possession is
not authorized by law.10 In this case, the prosecution has convincingly established that
Saraum was in possession of drug paraphernalia, particularly aluminum tin foil, rolled
tissue paper, and lighter, all of which were offered and admitted in evidence.
Saraum was arrested during the commission of a crime, which instance does not require
a warrant in accordance with Section 5 (a), Rule 113 of the Revised Rules on Criminal
Procedure.11 In arrest in flagrante delicto, the accused is apprehended at the very
moment he is committing or attempting to commit or has just committed an offense in
the presence of the arresting officer. To constitute a valid in flagrante delicto arrest, two
requisites must concur: (1) the person to be arrested must execute an overt act
indicating that he has just committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit
a crime; and (2) such overt act is done in the presence or within the view of the
arresting officer.12
Here, the Court is unconvinced with Saraum's statement that he was not committing a
crime at the time of his arrest. PO3 Larrobis described in detail how they were able to
apprehend him, who was then holding a disposable lighter in his right hand and a tin foil
and a rolled tissue paper in his left hand,13 while they were in the course of arresting
somebody. The case is clearly one of hot pursuit of "Pate," who, in eluding arrest,
entered the shanty where Saraum and Esperanza were incidentally caught in possession
of the illegal items. Saraum did not proffer any satisfactory explanation with regard to
his presence at the vicinity of the buy-bust operation and his possession of the seized
items that he claims to have "countless, lawful uses." On the contrary, the prosecution
witnesses have adequately explained the respective uses of the items to prove that they
were indeed drug paraphernalia.14 There is, thus, no necessity to make a laboratory
examination and finding as to the presence or absence of methamphetamine
hydrochloride or any illegal substances on said items since possession itself is the
punishable act.
The valid warrantless arrest gave the officers the right to search the shanty for objects
relating to the crime and seize the drug paraphernalia they found. In the course of their
lawful intrusion, they inadvertently saw the various drug paraphernalia. As these items
were plainly visible, the police officers were justified in seizing them. Considering that
Saraum's arrest was legal, the search and seizure that resulted from it were likewise
lawful. The various drug paraphernalia that the police officers found and seized in the
shanty are, therefore, admissible in evidence for having proceeded from a valid search
and seizure. Since the confiscated drug paraphernalia are the very corpus delicti of the
crime charged, the Court has no choice but to sustain the judgment of conviction.
Even if We consider the arrest as invalid, Saraum is deemed to have waived any
objection thereto when he did not raise the issue before entering his plea. "The
established rule is that an accused may be estopped from assailing the legality of his
arrest if he failed to move for the quashing of the Information against him before his
arraignment. Any objection involving the arrest or the procedure in the court's
acquisition of jurisdiction over the person of an accused must be made before he enters
his plea; otherwise the objection is deemed waived."15 In this case, counsel for Saraum
manifested its objection to the admission of the seized drug paraphernalia, invoking
illegal arrest and search, only during the formal offer of evidence by the prosecution. 16
In ascertaining the identity of the illegal drugs and/or drug paraphernalia presented in
court as the ones actually seized from the accused, the prosecution must show that: (a)
the prescribed procedure under Section 21(1), Article II of R.A. No. 9165 has been
complied with or falls within the saving clause provided in Section 21 (a), Article II of
the Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) of R.A. No. 9165;17and (b) there was an
unbroken link (not perfect link) in the chain of custody with respect to the confiscated
items.18
Although Section 21(1) of R.A. No. 9165 mandates that the apprehending team must
immediately conduct a physical inventory of the seized items and photograph them,
non-compliance therewith is not fatal as long as there is a justifiable ground and as long
as the integrity and the evidentiary value of the confiscated/seized items are properly
preserved by the apprehending team.19 While nowhere in the prosecution evidence
show the "justifiable ground" which may excuse the police operatives involved in the
buy-bust operation from making the physical inventory and taking a photograph of the
drug paraphernalia confiscated and/or seized, such omission shall not render Saraum's
arrest illegal or the items seized/confiscated from him as inadmissible in evidence. Said
"justifiable ground" will remain unknown in the light of the apparent failure of Saraum
to specifically challenge the custody and safekeeping or the issue of disposition and
preservation of the subject drug paraphernalia before the trial court. He cannot be
allowed too late in the day to question the police officers' alleged non-compliance with
Section 21 for the first time on appeal.20
The chain of custody rule requires the identification of the persons who handled the
confiscated items for the purpose of duly monitoring the authorized movements of the
illegal drugs and/or drug paraphernalia from the time they were seized from the
accused until the time they arc presented in court.21 Section 1(b) of Dangerous Drugs
Board Regulation No. 1, Series of 2002, implementing R.A. No. 9165, defines chain of
custody as follows:
Chain of Custody means the duly recorded authorized movements and custody of seized
drugs or controlled chemicals or plant sources of dangerous drugs or laboratory
equipment of each stage, from the time of seizure/confiscation to receipt in the forensic
laboratory to safekeeping to presentation in court for destruction. Such record of
movements and custody of seized item shall include the identity and signature of the
person who held temporary custody of the seized item, the date and time when such
transfer of custody were made in the course of safekeeping and use in court as evidence,
and the final disposition.
In Mallillin v. People,22 the Court discussed how the chain of custody of seized items
should be established, thus:
As a method of authenticating evidence, the chain of custody rule requires that the
admission of an exhibit be preceded by evidence sufficient to support a finding that the
matter in question is what the proponent claims it to be. It would include testimony
about every link in the chain, from the moment the item was picked up to the time it is
offered into evidence, in such a way that every person who touched the exhibit would
describe how and from whom it was received, where it was and what happened to it
while in the witness' possession, the condition in which it was received and the
condition in which it was delivered to the next link in the chain. These witnesses would
then describe the precautions taken lo ensure that there had been no change in the
condition of the item and no opportunity for someone not in the chain to have
possession of the same.23ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
While the procedure on the chain of custody should be perfect and unbroken, in reality,
it is almost always impossible to obtain an unbroken chain.24 Thus, failure to strictly
comply with Section 21(1), Article II of R.A. No. 9165 does not necessarily render an
accused person's arrest illegal or the items seized or confiscated from him
inadmissible.25
x x x Under Section 3 of Rule 128 of the Rules of Court, evidence is admissible when it is
relevant to the issue and is not excluded by the law or these rules. For evidence to be
inadmissible, there should be a law or rule which forbids its reception. If there is no
such law or rule, the evidence must be admitted subject only to the evidentiary weight
that will be accorded it by the courts. x x x
We do not find any provision or statement in said law or in any rule that will bring
about the non-admissibility of the confiscated and/or seized drugs due to non-
compliance with Section 21 of Republic Act No. 9165. The issue therefore, if there is
non-compliance with said section, is not of admissibility, but of weight - evidentiary
merit or probative value to be given the evidence. The weight to be given by the courts
on said evidence depends on the circumstances obtaining in each
case.26ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
The most important factor is the preservation of the integrity and evidentiary value of
the seized items.27In this case, the prosecution was able to demonstrate that the
integrity and evidentiary value of the confiscated drug paraphernalia had not been
compromised because it established the crucial link in the chain of custody of the seized
items from the time they were first discovered until they were brought to the court for
examination. Even though the prosecution failed to submit in evidence the physical
inventory and photograph of the drug paraphernalia, this will not render Saraum's
arrest illegal or the items seized from him inadmissible. There is substantial compliance
by the police as to the required procedure on the custody and control of the confiscated
items. The succession of events established by evidence and the overall handling of the
seized items by specified individuals all show that the evidence seized were the same SO ORDERED.ch
evidence subsequently identified and testified to in open court.

Certainly, the testimonies of the police officers who conducted the buy-bust operation G.R. No. 205926, July 22, 2015
arc generally accorded full faith and credit in view of the presumption of regularity in
the performance of official duties and especially so in the absence of ill-motive that ALVIN COMERCIANTE Y GONZALES, Petitioner, v. PEOPLE OF THE
could be attributed to them.28 The defense failed to show any odious intent on the part PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
of the police officers to impute such a serious crime that would put in jeopardy the life
and liberty of an innocent person.29 Saraum's mere denial cannot prevail over the DECISION
positive and categorical identification and declarations of the police officers. The
defense of denial, frame-up or extortion, like alibi, has been invariably viewed by the
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
courts with disfavor for it can easily be concocted and is a common and standard
defense ploy in most cases involving violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act.30 As evidence
Assailed in this petition for review on certiorari1 are the Decision2 dated October 20,
that is both negative and self-serving, this defense cannot attain more credibility than
the testimonies of prosecution witnesses who testily clearly, providing thereby positive 2011 and the Resolution3 dated February 19, 2013 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-
evidence on the various aspects of the crime committed.31 To merit consideration, it has G.R. CR No. 32813, which affirmed in toto the Judgment4 dated July 28, 2009 of the
to be substantiated by strong, clear and convincing evidence, which Saraum failed to do Regional Trial Court of Mandaluyong City, Branch 213 (RTC) in Crim. Case No. MC-03-
for presenting no corroborative evidence.32 7242-D convicting petitioner Alvin Comerciante y Gonzales (Comerciante) of the crime
of illegal Possession of Dangerous Drugs defined and penalized under Section 11, Article
Settled is the rule that, unless some facts or circumstances of weight and influence have II of Republic Act No. (RA) 9165,5 otherwise known as the Comprehensive Dangerous
been overlooked or the significance of which has been misinterpreted, the findings and Drugs Act of 2002.
conclusion of the trial court on the credibility of witnesses are entitled to great respect
The Facts
and will not be disturbed because it has the advantage of hearing the witnesses and
observing their deportment and manner of testifying.33 The rule finds an even more
On July 31, 2003, an Information was filed before the RTC charging Comerciante
stringent application where said findings are sustained by the CA as in this case.34 In this
ofviolation of Section 11, Article II of RA 9165, to wit:LawlibraryofCRAlaw
case, the quantum of evidence necessary to prove Saraum's guilt beyond reasonable
ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
doubt had been sufficiently met since the prosecution stood on its own strength and did
That on or about the 30th day of July 2003, in the City of Mandaluyong, Philippines, a
not rely on the weakness of the defense. The prosecution was able to overcome the
place within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, not
constitutional right of the accused to be presumed innocent until proven guilty.
having been lawfully authorized to possess any dangerous drugs, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously and knowingly have in his possession, custody and
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DENIED. The Decision dated
control Two (2) heat-sealed transparent plastic sachet (sic) each containing 0.15 gram
September 8, 2011 and Resolution dated December 19, 2012 of the Court of Appeals in
(sic) and 0.28 gram (sic) of white crystalline substance with a total of 0.43 grams which
CA-G.R. CEB CR No. 01 199, which sustained the judgment of conviction rendered by the
was found positive to the test for Methamphetamine Hydrochloride commonly known
Regional Trial Court, Branch 57, Cebu City, in Criminal Case No. CBU-77737,
as "shabu", a dangerous drug.
is AFFIRMED.

CONTRARY TO LAW.6
According to the prosecution, at around 10 o'clock in the evening of July 30, 2003, Agent
Eduardo Radan (Agent Radan) of the NARCOTICS group and PO3 Bienvy Calag II (PO3
Calag) were aboard a motorcycle, patrolling the area while on their way to visit a friend
at Private Road, Barangay Hulo, Mandaluyong City. Cruising at a speed of 30 kilometers
per hour along Private Road, they spotted, at a distance of about 10 meters, two (2) men
- later identified as Comerciante and a certain Erick Dasilla7 (Dasilla) - standing and
showing "improper and unpleasant movements," with one of them handing plastic
sachets to the other. Thinking that the sachets may contain shabu, they immediately
stopped and approached Comerciante and Dasilla. At a distance of around five (5)
meters, PO3 Calag introduced himself as a police officer, arrested Comerciante and
Dasilla, and confiscated two (2) plastic sachets containing white crystalline substance
from them. A laboratory examination later confirmed that said sachets contained
methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu.8redarclaw
After the prosecution rested its case, Dasilla filed a demurrer to evidence, which was
granted by the RTC, thus his acquittal. However, due to Comerciante's failure to file his
own demurrer to evidence, the RTC considered his right to do so waived and ordered
him to present his evidence.9redarclaw
In his defense, Comerciante averred that PO3 Calag was looking for a certain "Barok",
who was a notorious drug pusher in the area, when suddenly, he and Dasilla, who were
just standing in front of a jeepney along Private Road, were arrested and taken to a
police station. There, the police officers claimed to have confiscated illegal drugs from
them and were asked money in exchange for their release. When they failed to accede to
the demand, they were brought to another police station to undergo inquest
proceedings, and thereafter, were charged with illegal possession of dangerous
drugs.10redarclaw
The RTC Ruling
In a Judgment11 dated July 28, 2009, the RTC found Comerciante guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of violation of Section 11, Article II of RA 9165, and accordingly,
sentenced him to suffer the penalty of imprisonment for twelve (12) years and one (1)
day to twenty (20) years, and ordered him to pay a fine in the amount of
P300,000.00.12redarclaw
The RTC found that PO3 Calag conducted a valid warrantless arrest on Comerciante,
which yielded two (2) plastic sachets containing shabu. In this relation, the RTC opined
that there was probable cause to justify the warrantless arrest, considering that PO3
Calag saw, in plain view, that Comerciante was carrying the said sachets when he
decided to approach and apprehend the latter. Further, the RTC found that absent any
proof of intent that PO3 Calag was impelled by any malicious motive, he must be
presumed to have properly performed his duty when he arrested
Comerciante.13redarclaw
Aggrieved, Comerciante appealed to the CA.
The CA Ruling
In a Decision14 dated October 20, 2011 the CA affirmed Comerciante's conviction. It held
that PO3 Calag had probable cause to effect the warrantless arrest of Comerciante, given
that the latter was committing a crime in flagrante delicto; and that he personally saw
the latter exchanging plastic sachets with Dasilla. According to the CA, this was enough
to draw a reasonable suspicion that those sachets might be shabu, and thus, PO3 Calag
had every reason to inquire on the matter right then and there.15redarclaw
Dissatisfied, Comerciante moved for reconsideration16 which was, however, denied in a
Resolution17dated February 19, 2013. Hence, this petition.18redarclaw
The Issue Before the Court
The core Issue for the Court's resolution is whether or not the CA correctly affirmed
Comerciante's conviction for violation of Section 11, Article II of RA 9165.
In his petition, Comerciante essentially contends that PO3 Carag did not effect a valid
warrantless arrest on him. Consequently, the evidence gathered as a result of such
illegal warrantless arrest, i.e., the plastic sachets containing shabu should be rendered
inadmissible, necessarily resulting in his acquittal.19redarclaw
On the other hand, the Office of the Solicitor General, on behalf of respondent People of
the Philippines, maintains that Comerciante's warrantless arrest was validly made
pursuant to the "stop and frisk" rule, especially considering that he was caught in
flagrante delicto in possession of illegal drugs.20redarclaw
The Court's Ruling
The petition is meritorious.
Section 2, Article III21 of the Constitution mandates that a search and seizure must be
carried out through or on the strength of a judicial warrant predicated upon the
existence of probable cause; in the absence of such warrant, such search and seizure
becomes, as a general rule, "unreasonable" within the meaning of said constitutional
provision. To protect people from unreasonable searches and seizures, Section 3 (2),
Article III22 of the Constitution provides an exclusionary rule which instructs that
evidence obtained and confiscated on the occasion of such unreasonable searches and
seizures are deemed tainted and should be excluded for being the proverbial fruit of a
poisonous tree. In other words, evidence obtained from unreasonable searches and
seizures shall be inadmissible in evidence for any purpose in any
proceeding.23redarclaw
The exclusionary rule is not, however, an absolute and rigid proscription. One of the
recognized exceptions established by jurisprudence is a search incident to a lawful
arrest.24 In this instance, the law requires that there first be a lawful arrest before a
search can be made the process cannot be reversed.25 Section 5, Rule 113 of the Revised
Rules on Criminal Procedure lays down the rules on lawful warrantless arrests, as
follows:LawlibraryofCRAlaw
ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
SEC. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. - A peace officer or a private person may,
without a warrant, arrest a person:LawlibraryofCRAlaw
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually
committing, or is attempting to commit an offense;
(b) When an offense has just been committed and he has probable cause to believe
based on personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person to be arrested
has committed it; and
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal
establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or is temporarily confined
while his case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred from one confinement
to another.
In cases falling under paragraphs (a) and (b) above, the person arrested without a
warrant shall be forthwith delivered to the nearest police station or jail and shall be
proceeded against in accordance with Section 7 of Rule 112.
The aforementioned provision provides three (3) instances when a warrantless arrest
may be lawfully effected: (a) arrest of a suspect in flagrante delicto; (b) arrest of a
suspect where, based on personal knowledge of the arresting officer, there is probable
cause that said suspect was the perpetrator of a crime which had just been committed;
(c) arrest of a prisoner who has escaped from custody serving final judgment or
temporarily confined during the pendency of his case or has escaped while being
transferred from one confinement to another.26redarclaw
For a warrantless arrest under Section 5 (a) to operate, two (2) elements must concur,
namely: (a) the person to be arrested must execute an overt act indicating that he has
just committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit a crime; and (b) such
overt act is done in the presence or within the view of the arresting officer.27 On the
other hand, Section 5 (b) requires for its application that at the time of the arrest, an
offense had in fact just been committed and the arresting officer had personal
knowledge of facts indicating that the accused had committed it.28redarclaw
In both instances, the officer's personal knowledge of the fact of the commission of an
offense is absolutely required. Under Section 5 (a), the officer himself witnesses the
crime; while in Section 5 (b), he knows for a fact that a crime has just been
committed.29redarclaw
A judicious review of the factual milieu of the instant case reveals that there could have
been no lawful warrantless arrest made on Comerciante. PO3 Calag himself admitted
that he was aboard a motorcycle cruising at a speed of around 30 kilometers per hour
when he saw Comerciante and Dasilla standing around and showing "improper and
unpleasant movements," with one of them handing plastic sachets to the other. On the
basis of the foregoing, he decided to effect an arrest. PO3 Calag's testimony on direct
examination is revelatory:LawlibraryofCRAlaw A: They were surprised.
ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary Q: When yon say "nabigla" what was their reaction that made you say that they
Pros. Silao: were surprised?
Q: Now on July 30, 2003 around 10:00 o'clock in the evening, kindly tell the court A: They were stunned.
where were you? Q: After they were stunned, what did you do next, police officer?
A: We were then conducting our patrol on a motorbike ma'am. A: I arrested them, ma'am. I invited them.
xxxx Q: What did you say to them? How did you invite them? In short, napakasimple lang ng
Q: And who were with you while you were patrolling? tanong ko sa yo eh. Did you say anything?
A: Eduardo Radan, Ma'am. Court:
Q: And who is this Eduardo Radan? Mr. Witness, stop making unnecessary movements, just listen.
A: He is an agent of the Narcotics Group, ma'am. Pros. Silao:
Q: While you were along Private Road, Hulo, Mandaluyong City, what unusual incident Are you fit to testify? May sakit ka ba o wala?
that happened if any? Witness:
A: We spotted somebody who was then as if handing a plastic sachet to someone. Wala po.
xxxx Pros. Silao:
Q: Now how far were you when you saw this incident from these two male Eh, bakit di ka makapagsalita?
persons you already identified? Court:
A: About ten (10) meters away ma'am. You keep touching your eyes. Just relax. Answer the question, ano sinabi mo sa
Q: What were their positions in relation to you when you saw them in that particular kanila?
act? Pros. Silao:
A: They were quite facing me then. Are you fit to testify? Wala ka bang sakit?
Q: What was the speed of your motorcycle when you were traversing this Private Witness:
Road, Hulo, Mandaluyong City? Wala po.
A: About thirty (30) kilometers per hour, ma'am. xxxx
Q: And who was driving the motorcycle? Q: From what portion of his body, I am referring to Alvin Comerciante did you recover
A: Eduardo Radan, ma'am. the plastic sachet?
Q: When you spotted them as if handing something to each other, what did you do? A: From his hand ma'am.
A: We stopped ma'am. Q: Left or right hand?
Q: And how far were you from them when you stopped, more or less? Pros. Silao:
A: We passed by them for a short distance before we stopped ma'am. You cannot recall? Hindi mo matandaan. Sabihin mo kung hindi mo
Q: And after you passed by them and you said you stopped, what was the reaction of matandaan, no problem. Kaliwa, kanan or you cannot recall?30 (Emphases and
these two male persons? underscoring supplied)
A: They were surprised, ma'am. On the basis of such testimony, the Court finds it highly implausible that PO3 Calag, even
xxxx assuming that he has perfect vision, would be able to identify with reasonable accuracy
Q: And what was their reaction when you said you introduced yourself as police especially from a distance of around 10 meters, and while aboard a motorcycle cruising
officer? at a speed of 30 kilometers per hour miniscule amounts of white crystalline substance
inside two (2) very small plastic sachets held by Comerciante. The Court also notes that
no other overt act could be properly attributed to Comerciante as to rouse suspicion in
the mind of PO3 Calag that the former had just committed, was committing, or was
about to commit a crime. Verily, the acts of standing around with a companion and
handing over something to the latter cannot in any way be considered criminal acts. In
fact, even if Comerciante and his companion were showing "improper and unpleasant
movements" as put by PO3 Calag, the same would not have been sufficient in order to
effect a lawful warrantless arrest under Section 5 (a), Rule 113 of the Revised Rules on
Criminal Procedure.31 That his reasonable suspicion bolstered by (a) the fact that he had
seen his fellow officers arrest persons in possession of shabu; and (b) his trainings and
seminars on illegal drugs when he was still assigned in the province are insufficient to
create a conclusion that what he purportedly saw in Comerciante was
indeed shabu.32redarclaw
Neither has the prosecution established that the rigorous conditions set forth in Section
5 (b), Rule 113, have been complied with, i.e., that an offense had in fact just been
committed and the arresting officer had personal knowledge of facts indicating that the
accused had committed it. As already discussed, the factual backdrop of the instant case
failed to show that PO3 Calag had personal knowledge that a crime had been
indisputably committed by Comerciante. Verily, it is not enough that the arresting
officer had reasonable ground to believe that the accused had just committed a crime; a
crime must, in fact, have been committed first, which does not obtain in this
case.33redarclaw
In this relation, the Court finds respondent's assertion that there was a valid "stop and
frisk" search made on Comerciante untenable. In People v. Cogaed,34 the Court had an
opportunity to exhaustively explain "stop and frisk" searches:LawlibraryofCRAlaw
ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
"Stop and frisk" searches (sometimes referred to as Terry searches) are necessary for
law enforcement. That is, law enforcers should be given the legal arsenal to prevent the
commission of offenses. However, this should be balanced with the need to protect the
privacy of citizens in accordance with Article III, Section 2 of the Constitution.
The balance lies in the concept of "suspiciousness" present where the police
officer finds himself or herself in. This may be undoubtedly based on the experience
of the police officer. Experienced police officers have personal experience dealing with
criminals and criminal behavior. Hence, they should have the ability to discern - based
on facts that they themselves observe - whether an individual is acting in a suspicious
manner. Clearly, a basic criterion would be that the police officer, with his or her
personal knowledge, must observe the facts leading to the suspicion of an illicit
act.
xxxx
Normally, "stop and frisk" searches do not give the law enforcer an opportunity to
confer with a judge to determine probable cause. In Posadas v. Court of Appeals, one of
the earliest cases adopting the "stop and frisk" doctrine in Philippine jurisprudence, this
court approximated the suspicious circumstances as probable
cause:LawlibraryofCRAlaw
ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
The probable cause is that when the petitioner acted suspiciously and attempted to flee
with the buri bag there was a probable cause that he was concealing something illegal in
the bag and it was the right and duty of the police officers to inspect the same.
For warrantless searches, probable cause was defined as a reasonable ground of
suspicion supported by circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to warrant a
cautious man to believe that the person accused is guilty of the offense with which he is
charged.
Malacat v. Court of Appeals clarifies the requirement further. It does not have to be
probable cause, but it cannot be mere suspicion. It has to be a genuine reason to
serve the purposes of the "stop and frisk" exception:
ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Other notable points of Terry are that while probable cause is not required to
conduct a "stop and frisk," it nevertheless holds that mere suspicion or a hunch
will not validate a "stop and frisk." A genuine reason must exist, in light of the
police officer's experience and surrounding conditions, to warrant the belief that
the person detained has weapons concealed about him.
In his dissent for Esquillo v. People, Justice Bersamin reminds us that police officers
must not rely on a single suspicious circumstance. There should be "presence of
more than one seemingly innocent activity, which, taken together, warranted a
reasonable inference of criminal activity." The Constitution prohibits "unreasonable
searches and seizures." Certainly, reliance on only one suspicious circumstance or none RODEL LUZ y ONG, G. R. No. 197788
at all will not result in a reasonable search.35 (Emphases and underscoring supplied) Petitioner,
In this case, the Court reiterates that Comerciante's acts of standing around with a
companion and handing over something to the latter do not constitute criminal acts. Present:
These circumstances are not enough to create a reasonable inference of criminal activity
which would constitute a "genuine reason" for PO3 Calag to conduct a "stop and frisk" CARPIO, J., Chairperson,
search on the former. In this light, the "stop and frisk" search made on Comerciante - versus - BRION,
should be deemed unlawful. PEREZ,
SERENO, and
In sum, there was neither a valid warrantless arrest nor a valid "stop and frisk" search REYES, JJ.
made on Comerciante. As such, the shabu purportedly seized from him is rendered
inadmissible in evidence for being the proverbial fruit of the poisonous tree. Since the
confiscated shabu is the very corpus delicti of the crime charged, Comerciante must PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,[1] Promulgated:
necessarily be acquitted and exonerated from all criminal liability. Respondent.
February 29, 2012
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. Accordingly, the Decision dated October 20,
2011 and the Resolution dated February 19, 2013 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR x--------------------------------------------------x
No. 32813 are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Accordingly, petitioner Alvin
Comerciante y Gonzales is hereby ACQUITTED of the crime of violating Section 11,
Article II of Republic Act No. 9165. The Director of the Bureau of Corrections is ordered DECISION
to cause his immediate release, unless he is being lawfully held for any other reason.
SERENO, J.:
SO ORDERED.cra
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 seeking to set aside the
Court of Appeals (CA) Decision in CA-G.R. CR No. 32516 dated 18 February 2011[2]and
Resolution dated 8 July 2011.

Statement of the Facts and of the Case

The facts, as found by the Regional Trial Court (RTC), which sustained the
version of the prosecution, are as follows:
 PO2 Emmanuel L. Alteza, who was then assigned at the Sub-
Station 1 of the Naga City Police Station as a traffic enforcer,
substantially testified that on March 10, 2003 at around 3:00 oclock in
the morning, he saw the accused, who was coming from the direction of
Panganiban Drive and going to Diversion Road, Naga City, driving a
motorcycle without a helmet; that this prompted him to flag down the
accused for violating a municipal ordinance which requires all
motorcycle drivers to wear helmet (sic) while driving said motor
vehicle; that he invited the accused to come inside their sub-station since
the place where he flagged down the accused is almost in front of the
said sub-station; that while he and SPO1 Rayford Brillante were issuing a
citation ticket for violation of municipal ordinance, he noticed that the
accused was uneasy and kept on getting something from his jacket; that
he was alerted and so, he told the accused to take out the contents of the
pocket of his jacket as the latter may have a weapon inside it; that the
accused obliged and slowly put out the contents of the pocket of his
jacket which was a nickel-like tin or metal container about two (2) to
three (3) inches in size, including two (2) cellphones, one (1) pair of
scissors and one (1) Swiss knife; that upon seeing the said container, he
asked the accused to open it; that after the accused opened the
container, he noticed a cartoon cover and something beneath it; and that
upon his instruction, the accused spilled out the contents of the
container on the table which turned out to be four (4) plastic sachets, the
two (2) of which were empty while the other two (2) contained
suspected shabu.[3]
Arraigned on 2 July 2003, petitioner, assisted by counsel, entered a plea of Not
guilty to the charge of illegal possession of dangerous drugs. Pretrial was terminated on
24 September 2003, after which, trial ensued.
During trial, Police Officer 3 (PO3) Emmanuel Alteza and a forensic chemist
testified for the prosecution. On the other hand, petitioner testified for himself and
raised the defense of planting of evidence and extortion.
In its 19 February 2009 Decision,[4] the RTC convicted petitioner of illegal
possession of dangerous drugs[5] committed on 10 March 2003. It found the prosecution
evidence sufficient to show that he had been lawfully arrested for a traffic violation and
then subjected to a valid search, which led to the discovery on his person of two plastic
sachets later found to contain shabu. The RTC also found his defense of frame-up and
extortion to be weak, self-serving and unsubstantiated. The dispositive portion of its
Decision held:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered, finding accused
RODEL LUZ y ONG GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt for the crime of
violation of Section 11, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165 and sentencing
him to suffer the indeterminate penalty of imprisonment ranging from
twelve (12) years and (1) day, as minimum, to thirteen (13) years, as
maximum, and to pay a fine of Three Hundred Thousand Pesos
(300,000.00).
The subject shabu is hereby confiscated for turn over to the
Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency for its proper disposition and
destruction in accordance with law.
SO ORDERED.[6]
Upon review, the CA affirmed the RTCs Decision.
On 12 September 2011, petitioner filed under Rule 45 the instant Petition for
Review on Certiorari dated 1 September 2011. In a Resolution dated 12 October 2011,
this Court required respondent to file a comment on the Petition. On 4 January 2012, the
latter filed its Comment dated 3 January 2012.
Petitioner raised the following grounds in support of his Petition:
 (i) THE SEARCH AND SEIZURE OF THE ALLEGED SUBJECT
SHABU IS INVALID.
(ii) THE PRESUMPTION OF REGULARITY IN THE
PERFORMANCE OF DUTY OF THE POLICE OFFICER CANNOT
BE RELIED UPON IN THIS CASE.
(iii) THE INTEGRITY AND EVIDENTIARY VALUE OF THE
ALLEGED SUBJECT SPECIMEN HAS BEEN COMPROMISED.
(iv) THE GUILT OF THE ACCUSED-PETITIONER WAS NOT
PROVEN BEYOND THE REASONABLE DOUBT (sic).[7]
Petitioner claims that there was no lawful search and seizure, because there was no
lawful arrest. He claims that the finding that there was a lawful arrest was erroneous,
since he was not even issued a citation ticket or charged with violation of the city
ordinance. Even assuming there was a valid arrest, he claims that he had never
consented to the search conducted upon him.
On the other hand, finding that petitioner had been lawfully arrested, the RTC held thus:
It is beyond dispute that the accused was flagged down and
apprehended in this case by Police Officers Alteza and Brillante for
violation of City Ordinance No. 98-012, an ordinance requiring the use of
crash helmet by motorcycle drivers and riders thereon in the City of
Naga and prescribing penalties for violation thereof. The accused himself
admitted that he was not wearing a helmet at the time when he was
flagged down by the said police officers, albeit he had a helmet in his
possession. Obviously, there is legal basis on the part of the
apprehending officers to flag down and arrest the accused because the
latter was actually committing a crime in their presence, that is, a
violation of City Ordinance No. 98-012. In other words, the accused,
being caught in flagrante delicto violating the said Ordinance, he could
therefore be lawfully stopped or arrested by the apprehending officers. x
x x.[8]
We find the Petition to be impressed with merit, but not for the particular reasons
alleged. In criminal cases, an appeal throws the entire case wide open for review and the
reviewing tribunal can correct errors, though unassigned in the appealed judgment, or
even reverse the trial courts decision based on grounds other than those that the parties
raised as errors.[9]
First, there was no valid arrest of petitioner. When he was flagged down for
committing a traffic violation, he was not, ipso facto and solely for this reason, arrested.
Arrest is the taking of a person into custody in order that he or she may be
bound to answer for the commission of an offense.[10] It is effected by an actual restraint
of the person to be arrested or by that persons voluntary submission to the custody of
the one making the arrest. Neither the application of actual force, manual touching of
the body, or physical restraint, nor a formal declaration of arrest, is required. It is
enough that there be an intention on the part of one of the parties to arrest the other,
and that there be an intent on the part of the other to submit, under the belief and
impression that submission is necessary.[11]
Under R.A. 4136, or the Land Transportation and Traffic Code, the general
procedure for dealing with a traffic violation is not the arrest of the offender, but the
confiscation of the drivers license of the latter:
SECTION 29. Confiscation of Driver's License. Law enforcement
and peace officers of other agencies duly deputized by the Director shall,
 in apprehending a driver for any violation of this Act or any regulations
issued pursuant thereto, or of local traffic rules and regulations not
contrary to any provisions of this Act, confiscate the license of the driver
concerned and issue a receipt prescribed and issued by the
Bureau therefor which shall authorize the driver to operate a motor
vehicle for a period not exceeding seventy-two hours from the time and
date of issue of said receipt. The period so fixed in the receipt shall not
be extended, and shall become invalid thereafter. Failure of the driver to
settle his case within fifteen days from the date of apprehension will be a
ground for the suspension and/or revocation of his license.
Similarly, the Philippine National Police (PNP) Operations Manual[12] provides the
following procedure for flagging down vehicles during the conduct of checkpoints:
SECTION 7. Procedure in Flagging Down or Accosting Vehicles
While in Mobile Car. This rule is a general concept and will not apply in
hot pursuit operations. The mobile car crew shall undertake the
following, when applicable: x x x
m. If it concerns traffic violations, immediately issue a Traffic Citation
Ticket (TCT) or Traffic Violation Report (TVR). Never indulge in
prolonged, unnecessary conversation or argument with the
driver or any of the vehicles occupants;
At the time that he was waiting for PO3 Alteza to write his citation ticket,
petitioner could not be said to have been under arrest. There was no intention on the
part of PO3 Alteza to arrest him, deprive him of his liberty, or take him into custody.
Prior to the issuance of the ticket, the period during which petitioner was at the police
station may be characterized merely as waiting time. In fact, as found by the trial court,
PO3 Alteza himself testified that the only reason they went to the police sub-station was
that petitioner had been flagged down almost in front of that place. Hence, it was only
for the sake of convenience that they were waiting there. There was no intention to take
petitioner into custody.
In Berkemer v. McCarty,[13] the United States (U.S.) Supreme Court discussed at
length whether the roadside questioning of a motorist detained pursuant to a routine
traffic stop should be considered custodial interrogation. The Court held that, such
questioning does not fall under custodial interrogation, nor can it be considered a
formal arrest, by virtue of the nature of the questioning, the expectations of the motorist
and the officer, and the length of time the procedure is conducted. It ruled as follows:
It must be acknowledged at the outset that a traffic stop
significantly curtails the freedom of action of the driver and the
passengers, if any, of the detained vehicle. Under the law of most States,
it is a crime either to ignore a policemans signal to stop ones car or, once
having stopped, to drive away without permission. x x x
However, we decline to accord talismanic power to the phrase in
the Miranda opinion emphasized by respondent. Fidelity to the doctrine
announced in Miranda requires that it be enforced strictly, but only in
those types of situations in which the concerns that powered the
decision are implicated. Thus, we must decide whether a traffic stop
exerts upon a detained person pressures that sufficiently impair his free
exercise of his privilege against self-incrimination to require that he be
warned of his constitutional rights.
Two features of an ordinary traffic stop mitigate the danger that
a person questioned will be induced to speak where he would not
otherwise do so freely, Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U. S., at 467. First,
detention of a motorist pursuant to a traffic stop is presumptively
temporary and brief. The vast majority of roadside detentions last only
a few minutes. A motorists expectations, when he sees a policemans light
flashing behind him, are that he will be obliged to spend a short period
of time answering questions and waiting while the officer checks his
license and registration, that he may then be given a citation, but that in
the end he most likely will be allowed to continue on his way. In this
respect, questioning incident to an ordinary traffic stop is quite different The U.S. Court in Berkemer thus ruled that, since the motorist therein was only
from stationhouse interrogation, which frequently is prolonged, and in subjected to modest questions while still at the scene of the traffic stop, he was not at
which the detainee often is aware that questioning will continue until he
provides his interrogators the answers they seek. See id., at 451. that moment placed under custody (such that he should have been apprised of
his Miranda rights), and neither can treatment of this sort be fairly characterized as the
Second, circumstances associated with the typical traffic stop functional equivalent of a formal arrest. Similarly, neither can petitioner here be
are not such that the motorist feels completely at the mercy of the
considered under arrest at the time that his traffic citation was being made.
police. To be sure, the aura of authority surrounding an armed,
uniformed officer and the knowledge that the officer has some discretion
in deciding whether to issue a citation, in combination, exert some It also appears that, according to City Ordinance No. 98-012, which was violated by
pressure on the detainee to respond to questions. But other aspects of
petitioner, the failure to wear a crash helmet while riding a motorcycle is penalized by a
the situation substantially offset these forces. Perhaps most importantly,
the typical traffic stop is public, at least to some degree. x x x fine only. Under the Rules of Court, a warrant of arrest need not be issued if the
information or charge was filed for an offense penalized by a fine only. It may be stated
In both of these respects, the usual traffic stop is more as a corollary that neither can a warrantless arrest be made for such an offense.
analogous to a so-called Terry stop, see Terry v. Ohio, 392 U. S. 1
(1968), than to a formal arrest. x x x The comparatively
nonthreatening character of detentions of this sort explains the absence This ruling does not imply that there can be no arrest for a traffic violation. Certainly,
of any suggestion in our opinions that Terry stops are subject to the when there is an intent on the part of the police officer to deprive the motorist of liberty,
dictates of Miranda. The similarly noncoercive aspect of ordinary traffic
stops prompts us to hold that persons temporarily detained pursuant to or to take the latter into custody, the former may be deemed to have arrested the
such stops are not in custody for the purposes of Miranda. motorist. In this case, however, the officers issuance (or intent to issue) a traffic citation
ticket negates the possibility of an arrest for the same violation.
xxxxxxxxx

We are confident that the state of affairs projected by respondent Even if one were to work under the assumption that petitioner was deemed
will not come to pass. It is settled that the safeguards prescribed by arrested upon being flagged down for a traffic violation and while awaiting the
Miranda become applicable as soon as a suspects freedom of action is
issuance of his ticket, then the requirements for a valid arrest were not complied
curtailed to a degree associated with formal arrest. California v. Beheler,
463 U. S. 1121, 1125 (1983) (per curiam). If a motorist who has been with.
detained pursuant to a traffic stop thereafter is subjected to treatment
that renders him in custody for practical purposes, he will be entitled to
This Court has held that at the time a person is arrested, it shall be the duty of
the full panoply of protections prescribed by Miranda. See Oregon v.
Mathiason, 429 U. S. 492, 495 (1977) (per curiam). (Emphasis supplied.) the arresting officer to inform the latter of the reason for the arrest and must show that
person the warrant of arrest, if any. Persons shall be informed of their constitutional
rights to remain silent and to counsel, and that any statement they might make could be
used against them.[14] It may also be noted that in this case, these constitutional
requirements were complied with by the police officers only after petitioner had been
arrested for illegal possession of dangerous drugs.
In Berkemer, the U.S. Court also noted that the Miranda warnings must also be
given to a person apprehended due to a traffic violation:
The purposes of the safeguards prescribed by Miranda are to
ensure that the police do not coerce or trick captive suspects into
confessing, to relieve the inherently compelling pressures generated by
the custodial setting itself, which work to undermine the individuals will
to resist, and as much as possible to free courts from the task of
scrutinizing individual cases to try to determine, after the fact, whether
particular confessions were voluntary. Those purposes are implicated as
much by in-custody questioning of persons suspected of misdemeanors
as they are by questioning of persons suspected of felonies.
If it were true that petitioner was already deemed arrested when he was flagged down
for a traffic violation and while he waiting for his ticket, then there would have been no
need for him to be arrested for a second timeafter the police officers allegedly
discovered the drugsas he was already in their custody.
Second, there being no valid arrest, the warrantless search that resulted from it
was likewise illegal.
The following are the instances when a warrantless search is allowed: (i) a warrantless
search incidental to a lawful arrest; (ii) search of evidence in plain view; (iii) search of a
moving vehicle; (iv) consented warrantless search; (v) customs search; (vi) a stop and
frisk search; and (vii) exigent and emergency circumstances.[15] None of the above-
mentioned instances, especially a search incident to a lawful arrest, are applicable to
this case.
It must be noted that the evidence seized, although alleged to be inadvertently
discovered, was not in plain view. It was actually concealed inside a metal container
inside petitioners pocket. Clearly, the evidence was not immediately apparent.[16]
Neither was there a consented warrantless search. Consent to a search is not to be
lightly inferred, but shown by clear and convincing evidence.[17] It must be voluntary in
order to validate an otherwise illegal search; that is, the consent must be unequivocal,
specific, intelligently given and uncontaminated by any duress or coercion. While the
prosecution claims that petitioner acceded to the instruction of PO3 Alteza, this alleged
accession does not suffice to prove valid and intelligent consent. In fact, the RTC found
that petitioner was merely told to take out the contents of his pocket.[18]
Whether consent to the search was in fact voluntary is a question of fact to be
determined from the totality of all the circumstances. Relevant to this determination are
the following characteristics of the person giving consent and the environment in which
consent is given: (1) the age of the defendant; (2) whether the defendant was in a public
or a secluded location; (3) whether the defendant objected to the search or passively
looked on; (4) the education and intelligence of the defendant; (5) the presence of
coercive police procedures; (6) the defendants belief that no incriminating evidence
would be found; (7) the nature of the police questioning; (8) the environment in which
the questioning took place; and (9) the possibly vulnerable subjective state of the
person consenting. It is the State that has the burden of proving, by clear and positive
testimony, that the necessary consent was obtained, and was freely and voluntarily
given.[19] In this case, all that was alleged was that petitioner was alone at the police
station at three in the morning, accompanied by several police officers. These
circumstances weigh heavily against a finding of valid consent to a warrantless search.
Neither does the search qualify under the stop and frisk rule. While the rule normally
applies when a police officer observes suspicious or unusual conduct, which may lead
him to believe that a criminal act may be afoot, the stop and frisk is merely a limited
protective search of outer clothing for weapons.[20]
In Knowles v. Iowa,[21] the U.S. Supreme Court held that when a police officer stops a
person for speeding and correspondingly issues a citation instead of arresting the latter,
this procedure does not authorize the officer to conduct a full search of the car. The
Court therein held that there was no justification for a full-blown search when the
officer does not arrest the motorist. Instead, police officers may only conduct minimal
intrusions, such as ordering the motorist to alight from the car or doing a patdown:
In Robinson, supra, we noted the two historical rationales for the
search incident to arrest exception: (1) the need to disarm the suspect in
order to take him into custody, and (2) the need to preserve evidence for
later use at trial. x x x But neither of these underlying rationales for the
search incident to arrest exception is sufficient to justify the search in
the present case.
We have recognized that the first rationaleofficer safetyis both
legitimate and weighty, x x x The threat to officer safety from issuing a
traffic citation, however, is a good deal less than in the case of a custodial
arrest. In Robinson, we stated that a custodial arrest involves danger to
an officer because of the extended exposure which follows the taking of a
suspect into custody and transporting him to the police station. 414 U. S.,
at 234-235. We recognized that [t]he danger to the police officer flows
from the fact of the arrest, and its attendant proximity, stress, and
uncertainty, and not from the grounds for arrest. Id., at 234, n. 5. A
routine traffic stop, on the other hand, is a relatively brief
encounter and is more analogous to a so-called Terry stop . . . than
to a formal arrest. Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U. S. 420, 439 (1984). See
also Cupp v. Murphy, 412 U. S. 291, 296 (1973) (Where there is no
formal arrest . . . a person might well be less hostile to the police and less
likely to take conspicuous, immediate steps to destroy incriminating
evidence).
This is not to say that the concern for officer safety is absent
in the case of a routine traffic stop. It plainly is not. See Mimms, supra,
at 110; Wilson, supra, at 413-414. But while the concern for officer
safety in this context may justify the minimal additional intrusion
of ordering a driver and passengers out of the car, it does not by
itself justify the often considerably greater intrusion attending a
full fieldtype search. Even without the search authority Iowa urges,
officers have other, independent bases to search for weapons and
protect themselves from danger. For example, they may order out of a
vehicle both the driver, Mimms, supra, at 111, and any passengers,
Wilson, supra, at 414; perform a patdown of a driver and any passengers
upon reasonable suspicion that they may be armed and dangerous,
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U. S. 1 (1968); conduct a Terry patdown of the
passenger compartment of a vehicle upon reasonable suspicion that an
occupant is dangerous and may gain immediate control of a weapon,
Michigan v. Long, 463 U. S. 1032, 1049 (1983); and even conduct a full
search of the passenger compartment, including any containers therein,
pursuant to a custodial arrest, New York v. Belton, 453 U. S. 454, 460
(1981).
Nor has Iowa shown the second justification for the authority to search
incident to arrestthe need to discover and preserve evidence. Once
Knowles was stopped for speeding and issued a citation, all the evidence
necessary to prosecute that offense had been obtained. No further
evidence of excessive speed was going to be found either on the person
 of the offender or in the passenger compartment of the car. (Emphasis
supplied.)
The foregoing considered, petitioner must be acquitted. While he may have failed to
object to the illegality of his arrest at the earliest opportunity, a waiver of an illegal
warrantless arrest does not, however, mean a waiver of the inadmissibility of evidence
seized during the illegal warrantless arrest.[22]
The Constitution guarantees the right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures.[23] Any evidence
obtained in violation of said right shall be inadmissible for any purpose in any
proceeding. While the power to search and seize may at times be necessary to the public
welfare, still it must be exercised and the law implemented without contravening the
constitutional rights of citizens, for the enforcement of no statute is of sufficient
importance to justify indifference to the basic principles of government.[24]
The subject items seized during the illegal arrest are inadmissible.[25] The drugs
are the very corpus delicti of the crime of illegal possession of dangerous drugs. Thus,
their inadmissibility precludes conviction and calls for the acquittal of the accused.[26]
WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED. The 18 February 2011 Decision of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 32516 affirming the judgment of conviction dated 19
February 2009 of the Regional Trial Court, 5th Judicial Region, Naga City, Branch 21, in
Criminal Case No. RTC 2003-0087, is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Petitioner
Rodel Luz y Ong is hereby ACQUITTED and ordered immediately released from
detention, unless his continued confinement is warranted by some other cause or
ground.
G.R. No. 180661 December 11, 2013
GEORGE ANTIQUERA y CODES, Petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
DECISION
ABAD, J.:
This case is about a supposed warrantless arrest and a subsequent search prompted by
the police officers' chance sighting through an ajar door of the accused engaged in pot
session.
The Facts and the Case
On January 13, 2004 the second Assistant City Prosecutor of Pasay City charged the
accused George Codes Antiquera* and Corazon Olivenza Cruz with illegal possession of
paraphernalia for dangerous drugs 1 before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasay City
in Criminal Case 04-0100-CFM. 2 Since the accused Cruz jumped bail, the court tried
her in absentia. 3
The prosecution evidence shows that at around 4:45 a.m. of February 11, 2004, PO1
Gregorio Recio, PO1 Laurence Cabutihan, P/Insp. Eric Ibon, PO1 Rodelio Rania, and two
civilian operatives on board a patrol car and a tricycle were conducting a police
visibility patrol on David Street, Pasay City, when they saw two unidentified men rush
out of house number 107-C and immediately boarded a jeep.
Suspecting that a crime had been committed, the police officers approached the house
from where the men came and peeked through the partially opened door. PO1 Recio
and PO1 Cabutihan saw accused Antiquera holding an improvised tooter and a pink
lighter. Beside him was his live-in partner, Cruz, who was holding an aluminum foil and
an improvised burner. They sat facing each other at the living room. This prompted the
police officers to enter the house, introduce themselves, and arrest Antiquera and Cruz.4
While inspecting the immediate surroundings, PO1 Cabutihan saw a wooden jewelry
box atop a table. It contained an improvised burner, wok, scissors, 10 small transparent
plastic sachets with traces of white crystalline substance, improvised scoop, and seven
unused strips of aluminum foil. The police officers confiscated all these and brought
Antiquera and Cruz to the Drug Enforcement Unit of the Philippine National Police in
Pasay City for further investigation and testing.5
A forensic chemical officer examined the confiscated drug paraphernalia and found
them positive for traces of methamphetamine hydrochloride or "shabu."6
Accused Antiquera gave a different story. He said that on the date and time in question,
he and Cruz were asleep in their house when he was roused by knocking on the door.
When he went to open it, three armed police officers forced themselves into the house.
One of them shoved him and said, "Dyan ka lang, pusher ka." He was handcuffed and
someone instructed two of the officers to go to his room. The police later brought
accused Antiquera and Cruz to the police station and there informed them of the
charges against them. They were shown a box that the police said had been recovered
from his house.7
On July 30, 2004 the RTC rendered a Decision8 that found accused Antiquera and Cruz
guilty of the crime charged and sentenced them to a prison term ranging from six
months and one day to two years and four months, and to pay a fine of 10,000.00 each
and the costs of the suit.
The RTC said that the prosecution proved beyond reasonable doubt that the police
caught accused Antiquera and Cruz in the act of using shabu and having drug
paraphernalia in their possession. Since no ill motive could be attributed to PO1 Recio
and PO1 Cabutihan, the court accorded full faith and credit to their testimony and
rejected the self-serving claim of Antiquera.
The trial court gave no weight to accused Antiqueras claim of illegal arrest, given PO1
Recio and PO1 Cabutihans credible testimony that, prior to their arrest, they saw
Antiquera and Cruz in a pot session at their living room and in possession of drug
paraphernalia. The police officers were thus justified in arresting the two without a
warrant pursuant to Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure.9
On appeal, the Court of Appeals (CA) rendered a Decision10 on September 21, 2007
affirming in full the decision of the trial court. The accused moved for reconsideration
but the CA denied it.11 The accused is now before this Court seeking acquittal.
The Issue Presented
The issue in this case is whether or not the CA erred in finding accused Antiquera guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of illegal possession of drug paraphernalia based on the
evidence of the police officers that they saw him and Cruz in the act of possessing drug
paraphernalia.
Ruling of the Court
The prosecutions theory, upheld by both the RTC and the CA, is that it was a case of
valid warrantless arrest in that the police officers saw accused Antiquera and Cruz
through the door of their house, in the act of having a pot session. That valid warrantless
arrest gave the officers the right as well to search the living room for objects relating to
the crime and thus seize the paraphernalia they found there.
The prosecution contends that, since the seized paraphernalia tested positive for shabu,
they were no doubt used for smoking, consuming, administering, injecting, ingesting, or
introducing dangerous drug into the body in violation of Section 12 of Republic Act
9165. That the accused tested negative for shabu, said the prosecution, had no bearing
on the crime charged which was for illegal possession of drug paraphernalia, not for
illegal use of dangerous drugs. The prosecution added that even assuming that the
arrest of the accused was irregular, he is already considered to have waived his right to
question the validity of his arrest when he voluntarily submitted himself to the courts
jurisdiction by entering a plea of not guilty.12
Section 5(a), Rule 113 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure provides that a "peace officer
or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person when, in his presence, the
person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit
an offense." This is an arrest in flagrante delicto.13 The overt act constituting the crime is
done in the presence or within the view of the arresting officer.14
But the circumstances here do not make out a case of arrest made in flagrante delicto.
1. The police officers claim that they were alerted when they saw two unidentified men
suddenly rush out of 107 David Street, Pasay City. Since they suspected that a crime had
been committed, the natural thing for them to do was to give chase to the jeep that the
two fleeing men boarded, given that the officers were in a patrol car and a tricycle.
Running after the fleeing suspects was the more urgent task but the officers instead
gave priority to the house even when they heard no cry for help from it.
2. Admittedly, the police officers did not notice anything amiss going on in the house
from the street where they stood. Indeed, even as they peeked through its partially
opened door, they saw no activity that warranted their entering it. Thus, PO1 Cabutihan
testified:
THE COURT:
Q By the way, Mr. Cabutihan, when you followed your companion towards the open
door, how was the door open? Was it totally open, or was it partially open?
A It was partially open Your Honor.
Q By how much, 1/3, 1/2? Only by less than one (1) foot?
A More or less 4 to 6 inches, Your Honor.
Q So how were you able to know, to see the interior of the house if the door was
only open by 6 inches? Or did you have to push the door?
A We pushed the door, Your Honor.
xxxx
Q Were you allowed to just go towards the door of the house, push its door and
peeped inside it, as a police officer?
A Kasi po naghinala po kami baka may
Q Are you not allowed to Are you not required to get a search warrant before you
can search the interior of the house?
A Yes, Your Honor.
Q What do you mean by yes? Would you first obtain a search warrant before searching
the interior of the house?
A Yes, Your Honor.
Q So why did you not a [sic] secure a search warrant first before you tried to
investigate the house, considering your admission that you suspected that there was
something wrong inside the house?
A Because we saw them that they were engaged in pot session, Your Honor.
Q But before you saw them, you just had to push the door wide open to peep
through its opening because you did not know what was happening inside?
A Yes, Your Honor.15 (Emphasis supplied)
Clearly, no crime was plainly exposed to the view of the arresting officers that
authorized the arrest of accused Antiquera without warrant under the above-mentioned
rule. Considering that his arrest was illegal, the search and seizure that resulted from it
was likewise illegal.16 Consequently, the various drug paraphernalia that the police
officers allegedly found in the house and seized are inadmissible, having proceeded
from an invalid search and seizure. Since the confiscated drug paraphernalia is the
very corpus delicti of the crime charged, the Court has no choice but to acquit the
accused.17
One final note. The failure of the accused to object to the irregularity of his arrest by
itself is not enough to sustain his conviction. A waiver of an illegal warrantless arrest
does not carry with it a waiver of the inadmissibility of evidence seized during the
illegal warrantless arrest.18
WHEREFORE, the Court REVERSES and SETS ASIDE the Decision dated September 21,
2007 and Resolution dated November 16, 2007 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR
28937 and ACQUITS the accused George Antiquera y Codes of the crime of which he is
charged for lack of evidence sufficient to establish his guilt beyond reasonable
doubt.1wphi1 The Court further ORDERS the cancellation and release of the bail bond
he posted for his provisional liberty.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 200304 January 15, 2014
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
DONALD VASQUEZ y SANDIGAN @ "DON," Accused-Appellant,
DECISION
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:
The case before this Court is an appeal from the Decision1 dated May 31, 2011 of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR.-H.C. No. 04201. Said decision affirmed with modification
the Joint Decision2 dated August 6 2009 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila,
Branch 41, in Criminal Case Nos. 98-164174 and 98-164175, which convicted the
appellant Donald Vasquez y Sandigan of the crimes of illegal sale and illegal possession
of regulated drugs under Sections 15 and 16 Article III of Republic Act No. 6425, as
amended, otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972.
Criminal Case No. 98-164174 stemmed from a charge of violation of Section 15 Article
III of Republic Act No. 6425, as amended,3 which was allegedly committed as follows:
That on or about April 3, 1998 in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused not
having been authorized by law to sell, dispense, deliver, transport or distribute any
regulated drug, did then and there [willfully], unlawfully and knowingly sell or offer for
sale, dispense, deliver, transport or distribute 45.46 grams, 44.27 grams, 45.34 grams,
51.45 grams, 41.32 grams and 20.14 grams or with a total weight of TWO HUNDRED
FORTY-SEVEN POINT NINETY-EIGHT (247.98) grams contained in six (6) transparent
plastic sachets of white crystalline substance known as "Shabu" containing
methamphetamine hydrochloride, which is a regulated drug.4
Criminal Case No. 98-164175, on the other hand, arose from an alleged violation of
Section 16, Article III of Republic Act No. 6425, as amended,5 which was said to be
committed in this manner:
That on or about April 3, 1998 in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused
without being authorized by law to possess or use any regulated drug, did then and
there [willfully], unlawfully and knowingly have in his possession and under his custody
and control 1.61 grams, 0.58 grams, 0.29 grams, 0.09 [grams], 0.10 grams, 0.17 grams,
0.21 grams, 0.24 grams, 0.12 grams, 0.06 grams, 0.04 grams, [0].51 grams or all with a
total weight of four point zero three grams of white crystalline substance contained in
twelve (12) transparent plastic sachets known as "SHABU" containing
methamphetamine hydrochloride, a regulated drug, without the corresponding license
or prescription thereof.6
Initially, Criminal Case No. 98-164175 was raffled to the RTC of Manila, Branch 23. Upon
motion7 of the appellant, however, said case was allowed to be consolidated with
Criminal Case No. 98-164174 in the RTC of Manila, Branch 41.8 On arraignment, the
appellant pleaded not guilty to both charges.9 The pre-trial conference of the cases was
held on July 27, 1998, but the same was terminated without the parties entering into
any stipulation of facts.10
During the trial of the cases, the prosecution presented the testimonies of the following
witnesses: (1) Police Inspector (P/Insp.) Jean Fajardo,11 (2) P/Insp. Marilyn
Dequito,12 and (3) Police Officer (PO) 2 Christian Trambulo.13Thereafter, the defense
presented in court the testimonies of: (1) the appellant Donald Vasquez y
Sandigan,14 (2) Angelina Arejado,15 and (3) Anatolia Caredo.16
The Prosecutions Case
The prosecutions version of the events was primarily drawn from the testimonies of
P/Insp. Fajardo and PO2 Trambulo.
P/Insp. Fajardo testified that in the morning of April 1, 1998, a confidential informant
went to their office and reported that a certain Donald Vasquez was engaged in illegal
drug activity. This alias Don supposedly claimed that he was an employee of the
National Bureau of Investigation (NBI). According to the informant, alias Don promised
him a good commission if he (the informant) would present a potential buyer of drugs.
P/Insp. Fajardo relayed the information to Police Superintendent (P/Supt.) Pepito
Domantay, the commanding officer of their office. P/Insp. Fajardo was then instructed
to form a team and conduct a possible buy-bust against alias Don. She formed a team on
the same day, which consisted of herself, PO2 Trambulo, PO1 Agravante, PO1 Pedrosa,
PO1 Sisteno, and PO1 De la Rosa. P/Insp. Fajardo was the team leader. With the help of
the informant, she was able to set up a meeting with alias Don. The meeting was to be
held at around 9:00 p.m. on that day at Cindys Restaurant located in Welcome Rotonda.
She was only supposed to meet alias Don that night but she decided to bring the team
along for security reasons.17
At about 9:00 p.m. on even date, P/Insp. Fajardo and her team went to the meeting place
with the informant. The members of her team positioned themselves strategically inside
the restaurant. The informant introduced P/Insp. Fajardo to alias Don as the buyer of
shabu. She asked alias Don if he was indeed an employee of the NBI and he replied in the
affirmative. They agreed to close the deal wherein she would buy 250 grams of shabu
for 250,000.00. They also agreed to meet the following day at Cindys Restaurant
around 10:00 to 11:00 p.m.18
In the evening of April 2, 1998, P/Insp. Fajardo and her team went back to Cindys
Restaurant. Alias Don was already waiting for her outside the establishment when she
arrived. He asked for the money and she replied that she had the money with her. She
brought five genuine 500.00 bills, which were inserted on top of five bundles of play
money to make it appear that she had 250,000.00 with her. After she showed the
money to alias Don, he suggested that they go to a more secure place. They agreed for
the sale to take place at around 1:30 to 2:00 a.m. on April 3, 1998 in front of alias Dons
apartment at 765 Valdez St., Sampaloc, Manila. The team proceeded to the Western
Police District (WPD) Station along U.N. Avenue for coordination. Afterwards, the team
held their final briefing before they proceeded to the target area. They agreed that the
pre-arranged signal was for P/Insp. Fajardo to scratch her hair, which would signify that
the deal had been consummated and the rest of the team would rush up to the scene.
The team then travelled to the address given by alias Don.19
When the team arrived at the target area around 1:15 a.m. on April 3, 1998, the two
vehicles they used were parked along the corner of the street. P/Insp. Fajardo and the
informant walked towards the apartment of alias Don and stood in front of the
apartment gate. Around 1:45 a.m., alias Don came out of the apartment with a male
companion. Alias Don demanded to see the money, but P/Insp. Fajardo told him that she
wanted to see the drugs first. Alias Don gave her the big brown envelope he was
carrying and she checked the contents thereof. Inside she found a plastic sachet, about
10x8 inches in size, which contained white crystalline substance. After checking the
contents of the envelope, she assumed that the same was indeed shabu. She then gave
the buy-bust money to alias Don and scratched her hair to signal the rest of the team to
rush to the scene. P/Insp. Fajardo identified herself as a narcotics agent. The two
suspects tried to flee but PO2 Trambulo was able to stop them from doing so. P/Insp.
Fajardo took custody of the shabu. When she asked alias Don if the latter had authority
to possess or sell shabu, he replied in the negative. P/Insp. Fajardo put her initials "JSF"
on the genuine 500.00 bills below the name of Benigno Aquino. After the arrest of the
two suspects, the buy-bust team brought them to the police station. The suspects rights
were read to them and they were subsequently booked.20
P/Insp. Fajardo said that she found out that alias Don was in fact the appellant Donald
Vasquez. She learned of his name when he brought out his NBI ID while he was being
booked. P/Insp. Fajardo also learned that the name of the appellants companion was
Reynaldo Siscar, who was also arrested and brought to the police station. P/Insp.
Fajardo explained that after she gave the buy-bust money to the appellant, the latter
handed the same to Siscar who was present the entire time the sale was being
consummated. Upon receiving the buy-bust money placed inside a green plastic bag,
Siscar looked at the contents thereof and uttered "okey na to." P/Insp. Fajardo marked
the drug specimen and brought the same to the Crime Laboratory. She was
accompanied there by PO2 Trambulo and PO1 Agravante. She handed over the drug
specimen to PO1 Agravante who then turned it over to P/Insp. Taduran, the forensic
chemist on duty. The police officers previously weighed the drug specimen. Thereafter,
the personnel at the crime laboratory weighed the specimen again. P/Insp. Fajardo and
her team waited for the results of the laboratory examination.21
P/Insp. Fajardo further testified that the six plastic bags of shabu seized during the buy-
bust operation were actually contained in a self-sealing plastic envelope placed inside a
brown envelope. When the brown envelope was confiscated from the appellant, she put
her initials "JSF" therein and signed it. She noticed that there were markings on the
envelope that read "DD-93-1303 re Antonio Roxas y Sunga" but she did not bother to
check out what they were for or who made them. When she interrogated the appellant
about the brown envelope, she found out that the same was submitted as evidence to
the NBI Crime Laboratory. She also learned that the appellant worked as a Laboratory
Aide at the NBI Crime Laboratory. She identified in court the six plastic sachets of drugs
that her team recovered, which sachets she also initialed and signed. P/Insp. Fajardo
also stated that after the appellant was arrested, PO2 Trambulo conducted a body
search on the two suspects. The search yielded 12 more plastic sachets of drugs from
the appellant. The 12 sachets were varied in sizes and were contained in a white
envelope. P/Insp. Fajardo placed her initials and signature on the envelope. As to the 12
sachets, the same were initialed by P/Insp. Fajardo and signed by PO2 Trambulo.22
The testimony of PO2 Trambulo corroborated that of P/Insp. Fajardos. PO2 Trambulo
testified that in the morning of April 1, 1998, a confidential informant reported to them
about the illegal drug activities of alias Don. P/Supt. Domantay then tasked P/Insp.
Fajardo to form a buy-bust team. P/Insp. Fajardo was able to set up a meeting with alias
Don at Cindys Restaurant in Welcome Rotonda, Quezon City. At that meeting, PO2
Trambulo saw P/Insp. Fajardo talk to alias Don. P/Insp. Fajardo later told the members
of the team that she convinced alias Don that she was a good buyer of shabu and the
latter demanded a second meeting to see the money. After the initial meeting, P/Insp.
Fajardo briefed P/Supt. Domantay about what happened. PO2 Trambulo stated that on
April 2, 1998, P/Insp. Fajardo was furnished with five genuine 500.00 bills together
with the boodle play money. P/Insp. Fajardo placed her initials in the genuine bills
below the name "Benigno Aquino, Jr." Afterwards, the team left the office. When they
arrived at Cindys Restaurant past 10:00 p.m., alias Don was waiting outside. P/Insp.
Fajardo showed the boodle money to alias Don and after some time, they parted ways.
P/Insp. Fajardo later told the team that alias Don decided that the drug deal would take
place in front of alias Dons rented apartment on Valdez St., Sampaloc, Manila. After an
hour, the team went to Valdez St. to familiarize themselves with the area. They then
proceeded to the WPD station to coordinate their operation. Thereafter, P/Insp. Fajardo
conducted a final briefing wherein PO2 Trambulo was designated as the immediate
back-up arresting officer. The agreed pre-arranged signal was for P/Insp. Fajardo to
scratch her hair to indicate the consummation of the deal. PO2 Trambulo was to signal
the same to the other members of the team.23
The buy-bust team went to the target area at around 1:30 to 2:00 a.m. on April 3, 1998.
P/Insp. Fajardo and the informant walked towards the direction of alias Dons
apartment, while PO2 Trambulo positioned himself near a parked jeepney about 15 to
20 meters from the apartment gate. The rest of the team parked their vehicles at the
street perpendicular to Valdez St. Later, alias Don went out of the gate with another
person. PO2 Trambulo saw alias Don gesturing to P/Insp. Fajardo as if asking for
something but P/Insp. Fajardo gestured that she wanted to see something first. Alias
Don handed P/Insp. Fajardo a big brown envelope, which the latter opened. P/Insp.
Fajardo then handed to alias Don a green plastic bag containing the buy-bust money and
gave the pre-arranged signal. When PO2 Trambulo saw this, he immediately summoned
the rest of the team and rushed to the suspects. He was able to recover the buy-bust
money from alias Dons male companion. Upon frisking alias Don, PO2 Trambulo
retrieved 12 pieces of plastic sachets of suspected drugs. The same were placed inside a
white envelope that was tucked inside alias Dons waist. PO2 Trambulo marked each of
the 12 sachets with his initials "CVT" and the date. The police officers then informed the
suspects of their rights and they proceeded to the police headquarters in Fort
Bonifacio.24
As regards the brown envelope that alias Don handed to P/Insp. Fajardo, the latter
retained possession thereof. The envelope contained six pieces of plastic bags of white
crystalline substance. When they got back to their office, the team reported the progress
of their operation to P/Supt. Domantay. The arrested suspects were booked and the
required documentations were prepared. Among such documents was the Request for
Laboratory Examination of the drug specimens seized. PO2 Trambulo said that he was
the one who brought the said request to the PNP Crime Laboratory, along with the drug
specimens.25
P/Insp. Marilyn Dequito, the forensic chemist, testified on the results of her examination
of the drug specimens seized in this case. She explained that P/Insp. Macario Taduran,
Jr. initially examined the drug specimens but the latter was already assigned to another
office. The results of the examination of P/Insp. Taduran were laid down in Physical
Science Report No. D-1071-98. P/Insp. Dequito first studied the data contained in
Physical Science Report No. D-1071-98 and retrieved the same from their office. She
entered that fact in their logbook RD-17-98. She then weighed the drug specimens and
examined the white crystalline substance from each of the plastic sachets. She examined
first the specimens marked as "A-1," "A-2," "A-3," "A-4," "A-5" and "A-6." P/Insp.
Dequitos examination revealed that the white crystalline substances were positive for
methamphetamine hydrochloride.26 She also examined the contents of 12 heat-sealed
transparent plastic sachets that also contained crystalline substances. The 12 plastic
sachets were marked "B-1" to "B-12." The white crystalline powder inside the 12 plastic
sachets also tested positive for methamphetamine hydrochloride. P/Insp. Dequitos
findings were contained in Physical Science Report No. RD-17-98.27
The prosecution, thereafter, adduced the following object and documentary evidence:
(1) photocopies of the five original 500.00 bills28 used as buy-bust money (Exhibits A-
E); (2) Request for Laboratory Examination29 dated April 3, 1998 (Exhibit F); (3) Initial
Laboratory Report30 dated April 3, 1998, stating that the specimen submitted for
examination tested positive for methylamphetamine hydrochloride (Exhibit G); (4)
Court Order31 dated September 2, 1998 (Exhibit H); (5) Physical Sciences Report No. D-
1071-9832 dated April 3, 1998 (Exhibit I); (6) Drug specimens A-1 to A-6 (Exhibits J-O);
(7) Big brown envelope (Exhibit P); (8) Small white envelope (Exhibit Q); (9) Drug
specimens B-1 to B-12 (Exhibits R-CC); (10) Physical Sciences Report No. RD-17-
9833 (Exhibit DD); (11) Joint Affidavit of Arrest34 (Exhibit EE); (12) Play money (Exhibit
FF); (13) Booking Sheet and Arrest Report35 (Exhibit GG); (14) Request for Medical
Examination36 (Exhibit HH); (15) Medico Legal Slip37 of Donald Vasquez (Exhibit II); and
(16) Medico Legal Slip38 of Reynaldo Siscar (Exhibit JJ).
The Defenses Case
As expected, the defense belied the prosecutions version of events. The appellants
brief39 before the Court of Appeals provides a concise summary of the defenses
counter-statement of facts. According to the defense:
Donald Vasquez was a regular employee of the NBI, working as a Laboratory Aide II at
the NBI Forensics Chemistry Division. His duties at the time included being a subpoena
clerk, receiving chemistry cases as well as requests from different police agencies to
have their specimens examined by the chemist. He also rendered day and night duties,
and during regular office hours and in the absence of the laboratory technician, he
would weigh the specimens. As subpoena clerk, he would receive subpoenas from the
trial courts. When there is no chemist, he would get a Special Order to testify, or bring
the drug specimens, to the courts.
On 1 April 1998, Donald Vasquez took his examination in Managerial Statistics between
6:00 to 9:00 oclock p.m. Thereafter, he took a jeepney and alighted at Stop and Shop at
Quiapo. From there, he took a tricycle to his house, arriving at 9:45 oclock that evening,
where he saw Reynaldo Siscar and Sonny San Diego, the latter a confidential informant
of the narcotics agents.
On 3 April 1998, at 1:45 oclock in the morning, Donalds household help, Anatolia
Caredo, who had just arrived from Antipolo that time, was eating while Donald was
asleep. She heard a knock on the door. Reynaldo Siscar opened the door and thereafter
two (2) men entered, poking guns at Reynaldo. They were followed by three (3) others.
The door to Donalds room was kicked down and they entered his room. Donald,
hearing noise, woke up to see P./Insp. Fajardo pointing a gun at him. He saw that there
were six (6) policemen searching his room, picking up what they could get. One of them
opened a cabinet and got drug specimens in [Donalds] possession in relation to his
work as a laboratory aide. The drugs came from two (2) cases and marked as DD-93-
1303 owned by Antonio Roxas, and DD-96-5392 owned by SPO4 Emiliano Anonas. The
drug specimen contained in the envelope marked as DD-93-1303 was intended for
presentation on 3 April 1998. Aside from the drug specimens, the policemen also took
his jewelry, a VHS player, and his wallet containing 2,530.00.
Angelina Arejado, Donalds neighbor, witnessed the policemen entering the apartment
and apprehending Donald and Reynaldo from the apartment terrace.40 (Citations
omitted.)
The defense then offered the following evidence: (1) NBI Disposition Form 41 dated April
3, 1998 (Exhibit 1); (2) Sworn Statement of Idabel Bernabe Pagulayan42 (Exhibit 2); (3)
Photocopy of the buy-bust money43 (Exhibit 3); (4) List of Hearings44 attended by
Donald Vasquez (Exhibit 4); (5) Authorization Letter45 prepared by Acting Deputy
Director Arturo A. Figueras dated March 27, 1998 (Exhibit 5); and (6) List of
Evidence46 taken by Donald Vasquez from 1996-1998 (Exhibit 6).
The Decision of the RTC
On August 6, 2009, the RTC convicted the appellant of the crimes charged. The RTC gave
more credence to the prosecutions evidence given that the presumption of regularity in
the performance of official duty on the part of the police officers was not overcome. The
trial court held that the appellant did not present any evidence that would show that the
police officers in this case were impelled by an evil motive to charge him of very serious
crimes and falsely testify against him. Also, the trial court noted that the volume of the
shabu involved in this case was considerable, i.e., 247.98 grams and 4.03 grams for
illegal sale and illegal possession, respectively. To the mind of the trial court, such fact
helped to dispel the possibility that the drug specimens seized were merely planted by
the police officers. Furthermore, the RTC ruled that the positive testimonies of the
police officers regarding the illegal drug peddling activities of the appellant prevailed
over the latters bare denials.
Assuming for the sake of argument that the appellant was merely framed up by the
police, the trial court pointed out that:
[T]he accused should have reported the said incident to the proper authorities, or asked
help from his Acting Chief [Idabel] Pagulayan from the NBI to testify and identify in
Court the xerox copy of the Disposition Form which she issued to the accused and the
Affidavit dated April 17, 1998 (xerox copy) executed by her or from Mr. Arturo A.
Figueras, Acting Deputy Director, Technical Services of the NBI to testify and identify
the Letter issued by the said Acting Deputy Director in order to corroborate and
strengthen his testimony that he was indeed authorized to keep in his custody the said
shabu to be presented or turned over to the Court as evidence, and he should have filed
the proper charges against those police officers who were responsible for such act. But
the accused did not even bother to do the same. Further, the pieces of evidence
(Disposition Form, Affidavit of [Idabel] Pagulayan and Letter dated March 27, 1998
issued by Acting Deputy Director) presented by the accused in Court could not be given
weight and credence considering that the said persons were not presented in Court to
identify the said documents and that the prosecution has no opportunity to cross-
examine the same, thus, it has no probative value.47
The trial court, thus, decreed:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered as follows:
1. In Crim. Case No. 98-164174, finding accused, DONALD VASQUEZ y
SANDIGAN @ "DON" guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Violation of
Sec. 15, Art. III in Relation to Sec.
2 (e), (f), (m), (o), Art. I of R.A. No. 6425 and hereby sentences him to suffer the
penalty of reclusion perpetua and a fine of 5,000,000.00; and 2. In Crim. Case
No. 98-164175, judgment is hereby rendered finding the accused, DONALD
VASQUEZ y SANDIGAN @ "DON" guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
Violation of Sec. 16, Art. III in Relation to Sec. 2 (e-2) Art. I of R.A. 6425 as
Amended by Batas Pambansa Bilang 179 and hereby sentences him to suffer the
penalty of SIX (6) MONTHS and ONE (1) DAY to FOUR (4) YEARS and a fine of
FOUR THOUSAND (4,000.00) PESOS.
The subject shabu (247.98 grams and 4.03 grams, respectively) are hereby forfeited in
favor of the government and the Branch Clerk of Court is hereby directed to deliver
and/or cause the delivery of the said shabu to the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency
(PDEA), upon the finality of this Decision.48
The Judgment of the Court of Appeals
On appeal,49 the Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction of the appellant. The appellate
court ruled that the prosecution sufficiently proved the elements of the crimes of illegal
sale and illegal possession of shabu. The testimony of P/Insp. Fajardo on the conduct of
the buy-bust operation was found to be clear and categorical. As the appellant failed to
adduce any evidence that tended to prove any ill motive on the part of the police officers
to falsely charge the appellant, the Court of Appeals held that the presumption of
regularity in the performance of official duties on the part of the police officers had not
been controverted in this case.
The dispositive portion of the Court of Appeals decision stated:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant appeal is hereby DENIED. The August 6,
2009 Decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 41 of the City of Manila in Criminal
Cases No. 98-164174-75, finding appellant Donald Vasquez y Sandigan guilty beyond
reasonable doubt for the crimes of Violation of Section 15 and Section 16, Article III of
Republic Act No. 6425 is AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that in Criminal Case No.
98-164175, appellant is hereby sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of six
months of arresto mayor, as minimum, to two years, four months and one day of prision
correccional in its medium period, as maximum.50
The Ruling of the Court
The appellant appealed his case to this Court to once again impugn his conviction on
two grounds: (1) the purported illegality of the search and the ensuing arrest done by
the police officers and (2) his supposed authority to possess the illegal drugs seized
from him.51 He argues that the police officers did not have a search warrant or a warrant
of arrest at the time he was arrested. This occurred despite the fact that the police
officers allegedly had ample time to secure a warrant of arrest against him. Inasmuch as
his arrest was illegal, the appellant avers that the evidence obtained as a result thereof
was inadmissible in court. As the corpus delicti of the crime was rendered inadmissible,
the appellant posits that his guilt was not proven beyond reasonable doubt. Appellant
further insists that he was able to prove that he was authorized to keep the drug
specimens in his custody, given that he was an employee of the NBI Forensic Chemistry
Laboratory who was tasked with the duty to bring drug specimens in court.
After an assiduous review of the evidence adduced by both parties to this case, we
resolve to deny this appeal.
At the outset, the Court rules that the appellant can no longer assail the validity of his
arrest. We reiterated in People v. Tampis52 that "[a]ny objection, defect or irregularity
attending an arrest must be made before the accused enters his plea on arraignment.
Having failed to move for the quashing of the information against them before their
arraignment, appellants are now estopped from questioning the legality of their arrest.
Any irregularity was cured upon their voluntary submission to the trial courts
jurisdiction."53 Be that as it may, the fact of the matter is that the appellant was caught in
flagrante delicto of selling illegal drugs to an undercover police officer in a buy-bust
operation. His arrest, thus, falls within the ambit of Section 5(a), Rule 11354 of the
Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure when an arrest made without warrant is deemed
lawful. Having established the validity of the warrantless arrest in this case, the Court
holds that the warrantless seizure of the illegal drugs from the appellant is likewise
valid. We held in People v. Cabugatan55 that:
This interdiction against warrantless searches and seizures, however, is not absolute
and such warrantless searches and seizures have long been deemed permissible by
jurisprudence in instances of (1) search of moving vehicles, (2) seizure in plain view, (3)
customs searches, (4) waiver or consented searches, (5) stop and frisk situations (Terry
search), and search incidental to a lawful arrest. The last includes a valid warrantless
arrest, for, while as a rule, an arrest is considered legitimate [if] effected with a valid
warrant of arrest, the Rules of Court recognize permissible warrantless arrest, to wit:
(1) arrest in flagrante delicto, (2) arrest effected in hot pursuit, and (3) arrest of escaped
prisoners. (Citation omitted.)
Thus, the appellant cannot seek exculpation by invoking belatedly the invalidity of his
arrest and the subsequent search upon his person.
We now rule on the substantive matters.
To secure a conviction for the crime of illegal sale of regulated or prohibited drugs, the
following elements should be satisfactorily proven: (1) the identity of the buyer and
seller, the object, and the consideration; and (2) the delivery of the thing sold and the
payment therefor.56 As held in People v. Chua Tan Lee,57 in a prosecution of illegal sale
of drugs, "what is material is proof that the accused peddled illicit drugs, coupled with
the presentation in court of the corpus delicti." On the other hand, the elements of illegal
possession of drugs are: (1) the accused is in possession of an item or object which is
identified to be a prohibited drug; (2) such possession is not authorized by law; and (3)
the accused freely and consciously possessed the said drug.58
In the case at bar, the testimonies of P/Insp. Fajardo and PO2 Trambulo established that
a buy-bust operation was legitimately carried out in the wee hours of April 3, 1998 to
entrap the appellant. P/Insp. Fajardo, the poseur-buyer, positively identified the
appellant as the one who sold to her six plastic bags of shabu that were contained in a
big brown envelope for the price of 250,000.00. She likewise identified the six plastic
bags of shabu, which contained the markings she placed thereon after the same were
seized from the appellant. When subjected to laboratory examination, the white
crystalline powder contained in the plastic bags tested positive for shabu. We find that
P/Insp. Fajardos testimony on the events that transpired during the conduct of the buy-
bust operation was detailed and straightforward. She was also consistent and
unwavering in her narration even in the face of the opposing counsels cross-
examination.
Apart from her description of the events that led to the exchange of the drug specimens
seized and the buy-bust money, P/Insp. Fajardo further testified as to the recovery from
the appellant of another 12 pieces of plastic sachets of shabu. After the latter was
arrested, P/Insp. Fajardo stated that PO2 Trambulo conducted a body search on the
appellant. This search resulted to the confiscation of 12 more plastic sachets, the
contents of which also tested positive for shabu. The testimony of P/Insp. Fajardo was
amply corroborated by PO2 Trambulo, whose own account dovetailed the formers
narration of events. Both police officers also identified in court the twelve plastic
sachets of shabu that were confiscated from the appellant.
In People v. Ting Uy,59 the Court explains that "credence shall be given to the narration
of the incident by prosecution witnesses especially so when they are police officers who
are presumed to have performed their duties in a regular manner, unless there be
evidence to the contrary." In the instant case, the appellant failed to ascribe, much less
satisfactorily prove, any improper motive on the part of the prosecution witnesses as to
why they would falsely incriminate him. The appellant himself even testified that, not
only did he not have any misunderstanding with P/Insp. Fajardo and PO2 Trambulo
prior to his arrest, he in fact did not know them at all.60 In the absence of evidence of
such ill motive, none is presumed to exist.61
The records of this case are also silent as to any measures undertaken by the appellant
to criminally or administratively charge the police officers herein for falsely framing
him up for selling and possessing illegal drugs. Such a move would not have been a
daunting task for the appellant under the circumstances. Being a regular employee of
the NBI, the appellant could have easily sought the help of his immediate supervisors
and/or the chief of his office to extricate him from his predicament. Instead, what the
appellant offered in evidence were mere photocopies of documents that supposedly
showed that he was authorized to keep drug specimens in his custody. That the original
documents and the testimonies of the signatories thereof were not at all presented in
court did nothing to help the appellants case. To the mind of the Court, the evidence
offered by the appellant failed to persuade amid the positive and categorical testimonies
of the arresting officers that the appellant was caught red-handed selling and possessing
a considerable amount of prohibited drugs on the night of the buy-bust operation.
It is apropos to reiterate here that where there is no showing that the trial court
overlooked or misinterpreted some material facts or that it gravely abused its
discretion, the Court will not disturb the trial courts assessment of the facts and the
credibility of the witnesses since the RTC was in a better position to assess and weigh
the evidence presented during trial. Settled too is the rule that the factual findings of the
appellate court sustaining those of the trial court are binding on this Court, unless there
is a clear showing that such findings are tainted with arbitrariness, capriciousness or
palpable error.62
On the basis of the foregoing, the Court is convinced that the prosecution was able to
establish the guilt of the appellant of the crimes charged.
The Penalties
Anent the proper imposable penalties, Section 15 and Section 16, Article III, in relation
to Section 20(3) of Republic Act No. 6425, as amended by Republic Act No. 7659, state:
SEC. 15. Sale, Administration, Dispensation, Delivery, Transportation and Distribution of
Regulated Drugs. - The penalty of reclusion perpetua to death and a fine ranging from
five hundred thousand pesos to ten million pesos shall be imposed upon any person
who, unless authorized by law, shall sell, dispense, deliver, transport or distribute any
regulated drug. Notwithstanding the provisions of Section 20 of this Act to the contrary,
if the victim of the offense is a minor, or should a regulated drug involved in any offense
under this Section be the proximate cause of the death of a victim thereof, the maximum
penalty herein provided shall be imposed. SEC. 16. Possession or Use of Regulated
Drugs. - The penalty of reclusion perpetua to death and a fine ranging from five hundred
thousand pesos to ten million pesos shall be imposed upon any person who shall
possess or use any regulated drug without the corresponding license or prescription,
subject to the provisions of Section 20 hereof.
SEC. 20. Application of Penalties, Confiscation and Forfeiture of the Proceeds or
Instruments of the Crime. - The penalties for offenses under Sections 3, 4, 7, 8 and 9 of
Article II and Sections 14, 14-A, 15 and 16 of Article III of this Act shall be applied if the
dangerous drugs involved is in any of the following quantities:
1. 40 grams or more of opium;
2. 40 grams or more of morphine;
3. 200 grams or more of shabu or methylamphetamine hydrochloride;
4. 40 grams or more of heroin;
5. 750 grams or more of Indian hemp or marijuana;
6. 50 grams or more of marijuana resin or marijuana resin oil;
7. 40 grams or more of cocaine or cocaine hydrocholoride; or
8. In the case of other dangerous drugs, the quantity of which is far beyond
therapeutic requirements, as determined and promulgated by the Dangerous
Drugs Board, after public consultations/hearings conducted for the purpose.
Otherwise, if the quantity involved is less than the foregoing quantities, the penalty shall
range from prision correccional to reclusion perpetua depending upon the quantity.
(Emphases supplied.)
In Criminal Case No. 98-164174 involving the crime of illegal sale of regulated drugs, the
appellant was found to have sold to the poseur-buyer in this case a total of 247.98
grams of shabu, which amount is more than the minimum of 200 grams required by the
law for the imposition of either reclusion perpetua or, if there be aggravating
circumstances, the death penalty.
Pertinently, Article 6363 of the Revised Penal Code mandates that when the law
prescribes a penalty composed of two indivisible penalties and there are neither
mitigating nor aggravating circumstances in the commission of the crime, the lesser
penalty shall be applied.1wphi1 Thus, in this case, considering that no mitigating or
aggravating circumstances attended the appellants violation of Section 15, Article III of
Republic Act No. 6425, as amended, the Court of Appeals correctly affirmed the trial
courts imposition of reclusion perpetua. The 5,000,000.00 fine imposed by the RTC on
the appellant is also in accord with Section 15, Article III of Republic Act No. 6425, as
amended.
As to the charge of illegal possession of regulated drugs in Criminal Case No. 98-164175,
the Court of Appeals properly invoked our ruling in People v. Tira 64 in determining the
proper imposable penalty. Indeed, we held in Tira that:
Under Section 16, Article III of Rep. Act No. 6425, as amended, the imposable penalty of
possession of a regulated drug, less than 200 grams, in this case, shabu, is prision
correccional to reclusion perpetua. Based on the quantity of the regulated drug subject
of the offense, the imposable penalty shall be as follows:
QUANTITY IMPOSABLE PENALTY
Less than one (1) gram to 49.25 grams prision correccional
49.26 grams to 98.50 grams prision mayor
98.51 grams to 147.75 grams reclusion temporal
 147.76 grams to 199 grams reclusion perpetua
(Emphases ours.)

Given that the additional 12 plastic sachets of shabu found in the possession of the
appellant amounted to 4.03 grams, the imposable penalty for the crime is prision
correccional. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, there being no aggravating or
mitigating circumstance in this case, the imposable penalty on the appellant should be
the indeterminate sentence of six months of arresto mayor, as minimum, to four years
and two months of prision correccional, as maximum. The penalty imposed by the Court
of Appeals, thus, falls within the range of the proper imposable penalty. In Criminal Case
No. 98-164175, no fine is imposable considering that in Republic Act No. 6425, as
amended, a fine can be imposed as a conjunctive penalty only if the penalty is reclusion
perpetua to death.65

Incidentally, the Court notes that both parties in this case admitted that the appellant
was a regular employee of the NBI Forensics Chemistry Division. Such fact, however,
cannot be taken into consideration to increase the penalties in this case to the
maximum, in accordance with Section 24 of Republic Act No. 6425, as amended.66 Such a
special aggravating circumstance, i.e., one that which arises under special conditions to
increase the penalty for the offense to its maximum period,67 was not alleged and
charged in the informations. Thus, the same was properly disregarded by the lower
courts.

All told, the Court finds no reason to overturn the conviction of the appellant.

WHEREFORE, the Court of Appeals Decision dated May 31, 2011 in CA-G.R. CR.-H.C. No.
04201 is AFFIRMED. No costs.

SO ORDERED.