JUDICIAL ETHICS "a) failure to render judgment in Criminal Case No.
"a) failure to render judgment in Criminal Case No. RTC-1150 within the period prescribed by law (in
Joaquin vs. Javellana, AM RTJ-00-1601, November 13, 2001
In a complaint-affidavit, dated 17 September 1999, Eliezer A. Sibayan-Joaquin charged Judge Roberto S.
Javellana, acting presiding judge of the Regional Trial Court ("RTC") of San Carlos City, Branch 57, with
grave misconduct in the performance of official duties, graft and gross ignorance of the law. The
complaint was an offshoot of a case for estafa, docketed Criminal Case No. RTC 1150, entitled "People of
the Philippines vs. Romeo Tan y Salazar," filed by Sibayan-Joaquin for and in behalf of Andersons Group,
Inc., against Romeo Tan before the San Carlos City RTC. Complainant averred that there was an undue
delay in the rendition of judgment in the aforenumbered criminal case, the decision, dated 16 July 1999,
that had acquitted the accused Romeo Tan, having been rendered only on the tenth month after the
case was submitted for decision. Complainant further claimed that neither respondent judge nor his
clerk of court was present during the promulgation of the decision in contravention of Section 6, Rule
120, of the Rules of Court. Respondent judge was also cited for impropriety by complainant because he
was often seen with Attorney Vic Agravante, counsel for the accused, whose vehicle respondent judge
would even use at times.
Required to comment on the complaint, respondent judge admitted that the decision in Criminal Case
No. RTC-1150 was rendered beyond the ninety-day reglementary period but attributed the delay to his
voluminous workload. Respondent was handling two salas, his original station, RTC Branch 59,
designated as being a special court for heinous crimes, and RTC Branch 57. He explained that he was
suffering from hypertension which resulted in his frequent requests for leave. Respondent judge
maintained that the decision in Criminal Case No. RTC-1150 was validly promulgated. He denied any
irregularity in the promulgation of the decision which was duly conducted by Atty. Tarjata Ignalaga, Clerk
of Court VI, of the Regional Trial Court of San Carlos City, Negros Occidental, in the presence of accused
Romeo Tan y Salazar and his counsel, Atty. Agravante, along with Provincial Prosecutor Estefanio
Libutna, Jr., and private prosecutor Atty. Edwin Magrinto. Respondent judge denied any close
association with Atty. Agravante.
The matter was referred to the Office of the Court Administrator ("OCA") for evaluation. In its report of
09 September 2000, the OCA recommended that an investigation be conducted in order to afford the
parties the opportunity to substantiate their respective claims. In its resolution of 23 October 2000, the
Court adopted the OCA's recommendation and assigned the case to Associate Justice Bernardo Abesamis
of the Court of Appeals.
In due time, Justice Abesamis submitted his report, dated 25 May 2001, finding respondent judge to
have indeed failed to decide Criminal Case No. RTC-1150 within the ninety-day reglementary period. The
Investigating Justice found no irregularity, however, in the promulgation of the decision. He also found
no gross ignorance of the law on the part of respondent. In order to impose disciplinary action on
judges, Justice Abesamis concluded, it should be shown that the error or mistake invoked was gross or
patent, malicious, deliberate or in bad faith, and that a mere error of judgment would not be a ground
for disciplinary action. Finally, the Investigating Justice held respondent judge accountable for
impropriety for his close association with Atty. Agravante.
The Investigating Justice ended his report to the Court by recommending thusly:
"WHEREFORE, after due investigation, and in consideration of the foregoing discussions, it is most
respectfully recommended to the Honorable Supreme Court that:
"1) The charge of gross ignorance of the law against respondent judge be DISMISSED for lack of
merit.
"2) Respondent judge be held administratively liable for:
violation of 15, ARTICLE VIII OF THE PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTION, CANON 1, RULE 1.02, and CANON 3,
RULE 3.05 OF THE Code of Judicial Conduct); and
"b) engaging in activities having the appearance of impropriety which unduly raise suspicion and
distrust among the people in the administration of justice (in violation of CANON 2, RULE 2.01 AND RULE
2.03 OF THE CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT);
"3) Respondent JUDGE ROBERTO S. JAVELLANA be ADMONISHED, with a WARNING that a
repetition of similar acts will be dealt with more severely."[1]
Section 15, Article XVIII, of the Constitution provides that lower courts have three months within which
to decide cases or matters pending before them from the date of submission of such cases or matters for
decision or resolution. Canon 3 of the Code of Judicial Conduct holds similarly by mandating that the
disposition of cases must be done promptly and seasonably. Admittedly, respondent judge has taken
ten months to finally decide Criminal Case No. RTC-1150 from its submission for decision, a period clearly
beyond the ninety-day reglementary period. He could have asked for an extension of time to decide the
case and explain why, but he did not. Any undue delay in the resolution of cases often amounts to a
denial of justice and can easily undermine the people's faith and confidence in the judiciary. Aware of
the heavy caseload of judges, the Court has continued to act with great understanding on requests for
extension of time to decide cases.
The Investigating Justice has seen impropriety on the part of respondent judge in his close association
with a counsel for a litigant; thus:
"Giving respondent judge the benefit of the doubt, and presume that his close associations with lawyers
practicing within the territorial jurisdiction of his court are all normal and do not in any way unduly
influence him in the discharge of his sworn duties, the Court cannot just leave respondent judge's acts
and consider them proper.
"It is expressly provided under the CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT that:
"`CANON 2. - A JUDGE SHOULD AVOID IMPROPRIETY AND THE APPEARANCE OF IMPROPRIETY IN ALL
ACTIVITIES.
`x x x xxx xxx
`Rule 2.01. - A Judge should so behave at all times as to promote public confidence in the integrity and
impartiality of the judiciary.
`x x x xxx xxx
`Rule 2.09. - A Judge shall not allow family, social or other relationships to influence judicial conduct or
judgment. The prestige of judicial office shall not be used or lent to advance the private interests of
others to convey the impressions that they are in special position to influence the judge.'
"Hence, a judge's official conduct and his behavior in the performance of judicial duties should be free
from the appearance of impropriety and must be beyond reproach. One who occupies an exalted
position in the administration of justice must pay a high price for the honor bestowed upon him, for his
private as well as his official conduct must at all times be free from the appearance of impropriety.
Because appearance is as important as reality in the performance of judicial functions, like Caesar's wife,
a judge must not only be pure but also beyond suspicion. A judge has the duty to not only render a just
and impartial decision, but also render it in such a manner as to be free from any suspicion as to its
fairness and impartiality, and also as to the judge's integrity.
"It is obvious, therefore, that while judges should possess proficiency in law in order that they can
competently construe and enforce the law, it is more important that they should act and behave in such
a manner that the parties before them should have confidence in their impartiality."[2]
The Court shares the view and disquisition of the Honorable Justice. Judges, indeed, should be extra
prudent in associating with litigants and counsel appearing before them so as to avoid even a mere
perception of possible bias or partiality. It is not expected, of course, that judges should live in
retirement or seclusion from any social intercourse. Indeed, it may be desirable, for instance, that they
continue, time and work commitments permitting, to relate to members of the bar in worthwhile
endeavors and in such fields of interest, in general, as are in keeping with the noble aims and objectives
of the legal profession. In pending or prospective litigations before them, however, judges should be
scrupulously careful to avoid anything that may tend to awaken the suspicion that their personal, social
or sundry relations could influence their objectivity, for not only must judges possess proficiency in law
but that also they must act and behave in such manner that would assure, with great comfort, litigants
and their counsel of the judges' competence, integrity and independence.
WHEREFORE, (a) the complaint against respondent Judge Roberto S. Javellana for ignorance of the law is
DISMISSED for being without basis; (b) said respondent is found administratively liable for failing to
render judgment in Criminal Case No. RTC-1150 within the period prescribed therefor and is hereby
imposed a FINE of TWO THOUSAND PESOS, with warning that a repetition of same or similar acts will be
dealt with more severely than herein imposed; (c) the respondent, finally, is ADMONISHED to constantly
be circumspect in his conduct and dealings with lawyers who have pending cases before him.
Ramirez v.Corpuz-Macandong
Judge Antonia Corpuz-Macandog of the Regional Trial Court of Caloocan City, Branch CXX, stands
charged in six separate complaints of various forms of misconduct in the performance of her official
duties. The details are as follows:
I. Administrative Matter No. R-351-RTJ.
This originated as G.R. No. 71179, a petition for a writ of habeas corpus filed on June 29, 1985 by Deputy
Sheriff Abraham L. Ramirez of the Regional Trial Court of Caloocan City to secure his release from the
Caloocan City jail. Ramirez was ordered arrested on June 27, 1985 by respondent judge for direct
contempt of court consisting in his alleged disobedience to the writ of preliminary injunction dated
January 21, 1985 issued in Civil Case No. 8682 enjoining him from demolishing the improvements of the
intervenors in said case.
Deputy Sheriff Ramirez had previously been directed by Judge Socorro Tirona-Liwag of Branch CXXIII of
the same court in an order dated January 11, 1985, to demolish the improvements of the defendants in
Civil Cases Nos. C-7380, C-7361, C-7362, C-7363, C-7364, C-7839, C-7841 and C-7842. Said defendants
are the intervenors in Civil Case No. 8682 on whose motion respondent judge issued the preliminary
injunction.
The immediate execution of the order of arrest was effected thru a handwritten note of respondent
judge addressed to then superintendent of the Northern Police District, Brig. Gen. Alfredo Lim. Upon
orders of this Court, however, Deputy Sheriff Ramirez was released from jail on July 2, 1985. Thereafter,
the court resolved to treat the petition as an administrative case 1 and to require respondent judge to
comment thereon. 2
Respondent judge denied having acted arbitrarily or capriciously in causing the arrest of Ramirez. She
justified the arrest as a means of preserving substantial justice so that any decision rendered in Civil Case
No. 8682 may not be rendered moot and academic and as a curative measure to preserve the greater
interest of social justice. The handwritten note, on the other hand, was explained as a means to preserve
the integrity of courts of justice in the enforcement of valid and lawful orders. She added that the writ of
preliminary injunction was issued by her in the exercise of her original jurisdiction, while the Order of
January 11, 1985 was issued by Judge Liwag in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction, which the latter
should not have done as she should have remanded the case to the court of origin for execution.
II. Administrative Matter No. R-359-RTJ.
On September 28, 1984, complainant Liwayway B. Samson filed before the RTC of Caloocan City a
complaint for damages against Benecio Urgel, Roberto Exequiel, Shigiro Iwata and Remigio Pasion
docketed as Civil Case No. 11559 and assigned to respondent judge. The summonses were served on the
defendants on October 3, 1984. On October 18, 1984, defendants Urgel and Exequiel filed their answer
with cross-claim against their co-defendants Pasion and Iwata They likewise filed a motion for leave to
file a third party complaint against Imperial Insurance Co. This was granted on October 22, 1984. On
November 12, 1984, within the extension given by the court, defendant Iwata filed his answer with
compulsory counter-claim and cross-claim and answer to cross-claim against defendants Urgel, Exequiel
and Pasion. The latter did not file any answer. Thus, on November 29, 1984, complainant thru counsel
moved to declare Pasion in default and to set the case for pre-trial On January 29, 1985, counsel for
complainant filed an ex-parte motion praying for the resolution of the motion of November 29, 1984.
When no action was forthcoming, counsel filed another motion on March 26, 1985, reiterating his prayer
in the motion of November 29, 1984. For alleged failure of respondent judge to act on the motions, the
instant complaint was filed on June 6, 1985.
Required to comment, respondent judge stated that the motion of November 29, 1984 was noted for
study on December 18, 1984 and was actually resolved on March 1, 1985, "well within the period even
for the court to resolved [sic] the same and prior to the receipt ... of the letter-complaint on July 2, 1985;
" and that the case could not yet be set for pre-trial on account of the existence of the third-party
complaint. In conclusion, respondent judge said that letter-complaint "is not only malicious but was
intended to malign the undersigned Presiding Judge 3 and should therefore be dismissed.
Complainant replied to the comment for the purpose of placing in issue respondent judge's allegation
that the motion dated November 29, 1984 was resolved on March 1, 1985. She averred that if this were
true, why is it that notice thereof was received by her counsel only on June 22, 1985 after the instant
complaint had been filed; and why is it that respondent judge failed to resolve the other motions? She
concluded that the only reasonable implication is that the order was antedated to show some color of
performance of duties. She likewise cites respondent judge for failure to order the service of summons
and copy of the third-party complaint on the third-party defendant.
It appears that due to the statement found in respondent's comment that "the letter-complaint is not
only malicious but was intended to malign the undersigned Presiding Judge complainant moved for
respondent's inhibition from Civil Case No. 11559 and its re-raffling to another sala. This motion was
denied.
Eventually, as manifested by respondent in her Rejoinder, she inhibited herself from hearing Civil Case
No. 11559, which has since been assigned to another judge and has been set for pre-trial In said
rejoinder, respondent judge characterized complainant's so-called implication respecting the order of
March 1, 1985 as being founded on conjectures, assumptions and suppositions. Furthermore, she said
that after the third party complaint had been admitted, it was not her duty to order service of the
summons on the third-party defendant, but that of the counsel who espouses the cause of the client.
III. Administrative Matter No. R-621-RTJ.
In the sworn letter-complaint dated April 28, 1986, Victoria L. Torres charged respondent judge with
ignorance of the law, graft or deliberate distortion of the law for pecuniary motives. She alleged that
respondent judge had indiscriminately issued restraining orders without conducting hearings on the
applications for the issuance of preliminary injunctions and had reiterated restraining orders after the
lapse of the mandatory twenty [20] days; that she issued restraining orders against the enforcement of
the writs of execution in ejectment cases decided by other RTC branches of Caloocan City which are of
co-equal jurisdiction; that she has cited for contempt lawyers and sheriffs of other branches whom she
fancies to have offended her, as in the case of Deputy Sheriff Ramirez [cf. Adm. Matter No. R-351-RTJ]
who was merely complying with the order of Judge Liwag and that she has been issuing restraining
orders in ejectment cases involving the so- called "Maysilo Estate" for undoubtedly suspicious
considerations.
By way of compliance to the court's resolution dated June 19, 1986, respondent submitted her comment
on the letter-complaint on July 16, 1986, branding the allegations found therein as false accusations as it
failed to state specific facts on the matters complained of. She stated that she issued a temporary
restraining order in Civil Case No. 10526 entitled, "Arturo Salientes, et. al. v. Alexander Development
Corp., et al." but denied having issued an extension thereof. She claimed having issued a preliminary
prohibitory injunction after due hearing.
With respect to the second allegation, respondent explained the issuance of the restraining orders as a
method of maintaining the status quo so that the cases pending before her involving the issue of
ownership may not be rendered moot and academic by the execution of the decisions in the ejectment
cases relating to the same properties.
Respondent reiterated her explanation in Adm. Matter No. R-351-RTJ in connection with the Ramirez
arrest-incident and asserted that she has been acting on the Maysilo estate cases objectively on the basis
of the law involved and the evidence on hand.
It appears that while the instant complaint was pending evaluation by the Court, complainant Victoria
Torres, in her capacity as attorney-in-fact of Alexander Development Co. caused the implementation of
the writ of execution issued by the RTC of Caloocan, Branch CXXX in Civil Case No. 10645, entitled
"Alexander Development Co. v. Jose Chan." The writ of execution was enforced thru the demolition of a
shanty being claimed by Francisco Cruz, one of the plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 10526. Because of this,
Torres was ordered arrested for contempt of court by respondent judge in an order dated May 15, 1986.
To challenge said arrest order Torres instituted before the IAC a special civil action for certiorari and
prohibition docketed as AC-G.R. S.P. No. 09162-SP, wherein respondent judge was likewise required to
comment. On June 5, 1986, respondent judge issued an order recalling the arrest order for being moot
and academic. This was manifested in the comment submitted in AC-G.R. No. 09162-S.P.
IV. Administrative Matter No. R-684-RTJ.
The gravamen of the complaint filed before this Court on July 7, 1986 is the alleged failure of respondent
judge to decide Civil Case No. C-9831 entitled, "Federico S. Cruz v. Esperanza Lazaro," despite the case
having been submitted for decision for more than 18 months. Complainant who is the defendant in Civil
Case No. C-9831, claims that the case was submitted for decision on October 2, 1984 with the filing of
defendant's memorandum. She further alleges that as respondent judge had been drawing her salary
during the entire time that the case was pending decision, respondent judge is likewise guilty of
falsification in view of the certification required of judges before they could draw their salaries to the
effect that they have decided all cases assigned to them on or before the end of three months counted
from the time a case is submitted for decision.
On July 16, 1986, counsel for complainant Romulo T. Santos, filed a manifestation and motion to
withdraw the complaint on the ground that "certain facts and conditions which heretofore were
unknown to the complainant and undersigned counsel have come to [their] knowledge ... which affect
their resolution to prosecute the complaint. 4
Said manifestation, notwithstanding, the court by resolution dated July 24, 1986 required respondent
judge to answer the complaint.
In her answer filed on August 11, 1986, respondent judge states that nothing on the record shows that
the case has been submitted for decision; that defendant in said case [herein complainant] never
appeared in court during the hearing of the case nor during the series of conferences called by her for
the purpose of effecting an amicable settlement between the parties, as per manifestation of her
counsel, complainant and her husband were always abroad; that defendant in fact told the court
interpreter that she did not want to appear in court for the amicable settlement; that it was only after
she received a telephone call from an alleged close relative of an associate of a national official saying " If
you don't decide the case in favor of Mrs. Lazaro you will be removed, but if you decide in her favor then
you will stay," that she looked into the records of the case where she found the motion of Mrs. Lazaro,
received by the court on March 12, 1986, praying for the early resolution of the case; that because of the
telephone calls and with the point in mind that "this is a revolutionary government," she had no recourse
but to decide the case in favor of Mrs. Lazaro, which she did in a decision dated July 18, 1986; that in
view of complainant's manifestation dated July 7, 1986, the instant complaint is already moot and
academic.
V. Administrative Matter No. R-687-RTJ.
Jesus Alba charges respondent judge with gross incompetence, partiality and knowingly rendering an
unjust decision. Complainant is the offended party in Criminal Case No. C-23527 [84] entitled "People v.
Cabel" for frustrated murder assigned to respondent's court. The decision acquitting the accused was
promulgated on June 10, 1986, allegedly in the absence of complainant and his counsel, so that
complainant learned about the decision only thru a neighbor. Complainant challenged the decision as
erroneous for the reasons that the testimony of the accused on the alleged self-defense was not
convincing, respondent judge erred in her appreciation of the credibility of the witnesses for the
prosecution as well as in her pronouncement that Cabel had no motive for stabbing complainant when
lack of motive does not preclude conviction.
Upon being required to comment, respondent explained in detail the reasons why she did not give
credence to the version of the prosecution. She ended with the conclusion that the decision in said
criminal case is just and in consonance with the evidence presented by the parties. She views the
complaint as a means to harass her in the wake of the judiciary reorganization.
VI. Administrative Matter No. 86-4-9987-RTC.
Civil Case No. C-12172 entitled, "Manchie Sabile Brozo v. Spouses Esmeraldo Quijano and Adelina
Quijano," an appealed case for an unlawful detainer was pending before Branch CXXI of the RTC of
Caloocan City when presiding judge thereof, Judge Salvador J. Baylen, was transferred to the RTC of
Quezon City on November 15,1985. Said judge had previously required the parties to file their
memorandum with. in 30 days from notice of the order dated November 4, 1985, but only the plaintiff
had done so at the time of his transfer.
On January 7, 1986, therein defendants-appellees moved for either the consolidation of Civil Case No.
12172 with Civil Case No. 11724, entitled "Esmeraldo Quijano, plaintiff versus Manchie Sabile Brozo,
Defendant" pending before Branch CXXX of the same court, or the re-raffle of Civil Case No. C-12172 to
another judge to avoid delay in its disposition; or if re-raffle is not proper, to effect the transfer of said
case to the pairing judge of Branch CXXI for further proceedings. Plaintiff-appellant opposed the motion.
On January 9, 1986, Executive Judge Oscar M. Herrera referred the motion to Judge Antonia Corpuz-
Macandog of Branch CXX, the pairing judge of Branch CXXI.
On February 19, 1986, Judge Macandog denied the motion of defendants- appellees. However, on March
13, 1986, she issued another order recalling, rescinding and setting aside the order of February 19, 1986
and considering the case submitted for decision to her as pairing judge. Counsel for plaintiff-appellant,
Atty. Jose V. Marcella moved for a reconsideration of the order dated March 13, 1986 with a request
that the matter be referred to the Court Administrator for determination or ruling as to which judge-
Judge Baylen or Judge Macandog-should decide the case.
Meanwhile, on April 24, 1986, the Court En Banc designated Judge Domingo M. Angeles, RTC, Branch
CXXIX, Caloocan City as Acting Judge of Branch CXXI of the same court "in addition to his regular duties
without additional compensation, effective immediately and to continue until a regular incumbent is
appointed or until further orders from this Court." 5
On May 15, 1986, Judge Macandog rendered judgment in Civil Case No. C-12172 dismissing plaintiff's
appeal Copies of the decision and the order denying his motion for referral were received by counsel for
plaintiff on May 22, 1986. He forthwith filed a motion for reconsideration of both the decision and the
order. Pending resolution thereof, he wrote the Court Administrator a letter on June 9, 1985, requesting
for a ruling on who, among the three judges; Baylen, Macandog or Angeles, has authority to decide the
case and who, between Judges Macandog and Angeles, should resolve the pending motion for
reconsideration.
Acting on said letter, the Court En Banc resolved on July 8, 1986 to: "[a] DIRECT Judge Salvador J. Baylen
Regional Trial Court, Branch 103, Quezon City, to decide Civil Case No. C-12172, considering that before
his transfer to another court of equal jurisdiction said case was already submitted before him for
decision and as such all proceedings were totally heard and tried by him and the greater interest of
justice will be better served if he will decide the same; [b] require Judge Antonia C. Macandog to
EXPLAIN within seventy-two (72) hours from receipt of notice hereof why she should not be disciplinarily
dealt with for taking cognizance of Civil Case No. C-12172 and deciding the same against the vigorous
objection of the plaintiff and [c] SET ASIDE and declare null and void the decision rendered by Judge
Macandog for lack of authority and the pending motion for reconsideration and to set aside the decision
and the order denying plaintiff's motion to refer the case to the Supreme Court be recalled and
withdrawn." 6
In the explanation submitted on July 18, 1986, Judge Macandog stated that she took cognizance of Civil
Case No. 12172 by virtue of the note/order of Executive Judge Oscar Herrera appearing on the face of
the "Motion to Consolidate and/or to transfer case to the Pairing Judge dated January 7, 1986; which
note reads: "Refer to Pairing Judge, Br. 120" and signed, "Oscar M. Herrera 1/9/86;" that as the thirty-
day period granted to the parties within which to file their memorandum under the order dated
November 4, 1985 expired at the earliest only on December 5, 1985, at which date the case would be
deemed submitted for decision, Judge Baylen could not decide the case, the same not having been
submitted to him for decision at the time of his transfer on November 15, 1985; that she has been
authorized by this Court on September 16, 1982 to take cognizance of all kinds of cases in Branch XIV
[now Branch CXXI, RTC, Caloocan City] and that the resolution dated April 24, 1986 in A.M. No. 86-499-
87, which impliedly revoked this authority came to her knowledge only during the first week of June,
1986 when Judge Angeles started taking cognizance of and began hearing cases in Branch CXXI.
Except for the charges of gross incompetence, partiality and knowingly rendering an unjust decision in
Administrative Matter No. R-687-RTJ, which must be dismissed outright for lack of merit, the other
charges brought against respondent are indeed serious. Taken collectively, they cast a heavy shadow on
respondent's moral, intellectual and attitudinal competence to remain a member of the Bench.
The complaint in Administrative Matter No. R-687-RTJ is anchored primarily on respondent having given
credence to the exempting circumstance of self-defense offered by the accused in Criminal Case No. C-
23527. In Villa v. Llamas, 84 SCRA 277, where the complainant placed in issue the wisdom of the
respondent judge's decision in a civil case for having believed the testimony of the plaintiff, an alleged
operator and maintainer of houses of ill-repute, this Court ruled that said circumstance was not an
indubitable ground for penalizing a judge administratively. The reason, as previously stated in the case of
Dizon vs. de Borja, 37 SCRA 46, is that "to hold a judge administratively accountable for every erroneous
ruling or decision he renders, assuming that he has erred, would be nothing short of harassment and
would make his position unbearable.
Similarly, in the case of Vda. de Zabal vs. Pamaram, 39 SCRA 430, this Court had the occasion to
pronounce that 11 mere errors in the appreciation of evidence, unless so gross and patent as to produce
an influence of ignorance or bad faith or that the judge knowingly rendered an unjust decision [which
circumstances do not obtain in the case at bar], are irrelevant and immaterial in an administrative
proceeding against him. We further stated: "If in the mind of the respondent the evidence for the
defense was entitled to more weight and credence, he cannot be held to account administratively for
the result of ratiocination." 7
Neither could respondent be held administratively liable for failing to notify complainant of the
promulgation of the decision in said criminal case. While it may be the better practice to notify the
offended party of such promulgation, the Rules of Court do not require a judge to do so.
The actuations of respondent judge in Administrative Matters Nos. R-351-RTJ and R-621-RTJ are,
however, administratively censurable. In both cases, she issued preliminary injunctions to stay the
implementation of writs of execution issued by courts of coordinate and co-equal jurisdiction, and issued
arrest orders against a deputy sheriff and an attorney-in-fact of a party who proceeded to enforce the
writs of execution despite said unjunctions. To effect the immediate execution of the order of arrest
against deputy sheriff Ramirez, respondent wrote a handwritten note to Brig. Gen. Alfredo Lim
requesting his assistance on the matter.
To our mind, both orders of arrest were improvidently issued. Respondent judge should have been
aware that forcible entry and detainer cases do not interfere with a proceeding where ownership is at
issue. Thus, in Petargue v. Sorilla, 92 Phil. 5, it was held that "the determination of the respective right of
rival claimants to public land is different from the determination of who has the actual physical
possession or occupation with a view to protecting the same and preventing disorder and breaches of
the peace. A judgment of the court ordering restitution of the possession of a parcel of land to the actual
occupant, who has been deprived thereof by another through the use of force or in any illegal manner,
can never be 'prejudicial interference' with the disposition or alienation of public land." Besides, in the
case of deputy sheriff Ramirez respondent judge should have taken into consideration that his duty to
enforce court orders and processes is ministerial in character and that he has no authority to determine
the validity of the order placed in his hands to implement. Thus, whether Judge Liwag can, in the
exercise of appellate jurisdiction, legally issue the writ of execution is of no moment insofar as deputy
sheriff Ramirez is concerned, and he should not have been punished by incarceration for performing his
official duty.
Moreover, the handwritten note of respondent judge to Brig. Gen. Lim is, to say the least, highly
irregular and improper. Her over-zealousness in implementing the order of arrest creates the impression
that she has taken an interest far and beyond that ordinarily expected of judicial officers with respect to
cases pending before them; which, in turn, puts her impartiality in question.
Respondent judge is of the impression that the release of Ramirez from jail and the recall of the order of
arrest against Victoria Torres had rendered the administrative cases against her moot and academic.
Rather than exonerate her, these facts instead serve to strengthen the charges against her. For one, the
release order issued by this Court only proves the impropriety of her act, while on the other, the recall
order demonstrates the impetuosity by which the arrest order was issued in the first place.
The same attitude is observed in respondent judge in connection with Administrative Matter No. R-684-
RTC which she wants this court to consider moot and academic for the reasons that she has rendered a
decision in Civil Case No. C-9831 and that the complainant had moved for the withdrawal of said
complaint.
We said in the case of Vasquez v. Malvar, 85 SCRA 10, that a motion to withdraw and/or dismiss the
complaint by complainant, does not, by itself, warrant the dismissal of the administrative case against
respondent judge, because "to condition administrative actions upon the will of every complainant, who
may, for one reason or another, condone a detestable act, is to strip this Court of its supervisory power
to discipline erring members of the Judiciary."
And seriously blunder, respondent did.
While it appears that the complaint was filed under a misapprehension of facts, in that it was not
indubitably established that the case had been submitted for decision as alleged in the complaint, and
dismissal of the charge should have followed as a matter of course, the case had taken an unexpected
twist. In her answer, respondent judge admitted to have succumbed to pressure in deciding the case in
favor of herein complainant, Mrs. Esperanza G. Lazaro. Thus, "In order to promote peace so nobody
would call me again by telephone telling the same purpose, the respondent, then decided the case with
the point in mind that this [sic] a revolutionary government and she had nor [sic] recourse but to decide
the case in favor of Mrs. Esperanza G. Lazaro, [Decision dated July 18, 1986, see attached.]" 8
Even accepting for the nonce that there was this supposed pressure from a source twice removed from
the national official mentioned earlier, her confessed act of succumbing to this pressure on the
telephone is a patent betrayal of the public trust reposed on respondent as an arbiter of the law and a
revelation of her weak moral character. By her appointment to the office, the public has laid on
respondent their confidence that she is mentally and morally fit to pass upon the merits of their varied
contentions. For this reason, they expect her to be fearless in her pursuit to render justice, to be unafraid
to displease any person, interest or power and to be equipped with a moral fiber strong enough to resist
the temptations lurking in her office. Regrettably, respondent has dismally failed to exhibit these
qualities required of those holding such office.
In Administrative Matter No. R-359-RTJ, respondent judge failed to act with reasonable dispatch
required of judicial officers. There is reason to doubt the authenticity of the date shown on the order
resolving the motion of complainant to declare therein defendant Pasion in default. If it were true that
the motion was resolved as early as March 1, 1985, We do not think that service of the order upon
counsel for complainant at this office in Espana, Manila would take more than three [3] months, and
most conveniently after the present complaint has been filed.
Delay in the administration of justice is the most common cause of complaint and a judge should
endeavor to avoid it. It is thus incumbent upon a judge to manage his court with a view to the prompt
and convenient disposition of its business and he should not tolerate abuses, indifference or neglect by
clerks, sheriffs and other officers of the court. Hence, upon failure of her clerk to serve summons on the
third party defendant, it became incumbent upon her to remind said clerk of such failure.
The explanation given by respondent judge in Administrative Matter No. 86-4-9987-RTC is
unsatisfactory. Par. VIII, Circular No. 7, dated September 23, 1974 of this Court provides:
VIII. PAIRING SYSTEM:
A pairing system shall be established whereby every branch shall be considered as paired with another
branch. In the event of vacancy in any branch, or of the absence or disability of the judge thereof, all
incidental or interlocutory matters pertaining to it may be acted upon by that judge of the other branch
paired with it. The latter may likewise conduct trials or hearings on the merits in criminal cases with
detention prisoners assigned to the other branch, as well as in other kinds of cases, subject to the
conformity of the parties. [Emphasis supplied.]
Pursuant to the above-quoted internal procedure, the referral of Civil Case No. C-12172 to judge
Macandog was solely for the purpose of acting upon the motion to consolidate and/or transfer case to
the pairing judge. Such referral did not in any manner empower or authorize her to decide the case on
the merits, particularly in the light of the vigorous objection interposed by therein plaintiff. The power
and authority of one acting as a pairing judge are clearly defined and delineated by said paragraph and
one acting beyond its tenor certainly oversteps his authority.
Judges are required to observe due care in the performance of their official duties. 9 They are likewise
charged with the knowledge of internal rules and procedures, especially those which relate to the scope
of their authority. They are dutybound to observe and abide by these rules and procedures, designed, as
they are, primarily to ensure the orderly administration of justice. Thus, confronted with a serious
challenge to one's authority, an ordinary prudent man would perceive the reasonableness, if not the
wisdom, of the suggestion/request that the question at hand be referred to this Court. The hasty and
reckless attitude of respondent judge in taking cognizance of and deciding Civil Case No. 12172 despite
the strong objection against her authority and the reasonable request for referral of the question to this
Court, constitutes misconduct in office warranting disciplinary sanction.
Anent respondent's averment that she was granted authority by this Court on September 16, 1982 to
take cognizance of all kinds of cases in Branch CXXI, suffice it to say that the same was revoked, not by
our resolution of April 26, 1986, but much earlier, by the implementation of the Judiciary Reorganization
Act on January 17, 1983.
Respondent Judge Macandog has shown herself to be mentally and morally unfit to remain in her office.
Her removal must perforce be effected.
In view of the disclosure by respondent that the decision in Civil Case No. C-9831 was rendered under
undue pressure and influence, the party aggrieved thereby may take such remedial steps as may be
warranted.
WHEREFORE, respondent Judge Antonia Corpuz-Macandog is hereby ordered dismissed from the service,
with forfeiture of all retirement benefits and pay, and with prejudice to reinstatement in any branch of
the government or any of its agencies or instrumentalities.
This Decision is immediately executory.
Libarios v. Dabalos
This is an administrative complaint filed by Roan I. Libarios for and on behalf of his client Mariano
Corvera, Jr. against respondent Judge Rosarito F. Dabalos, for grave ignorance of the law, grave abuse of
discretion, gross misconduct and partiality, relative to Criminal Case No. 3464. The antecedent facts of
the case are as follows:
On 10 March 1988, former Mayor Mariano Corvera, Sr. was shot by Pablo Macapas inside the courtroom
of respondent Judge Dabalos, after a hearing in a frustrated murder case against said Pablo Macapas.
Corvera, Sr. was the private complainant in the aforesaid criminal case, while Mayor Tranquilino Calo, Jr.
was appearing as counsel of Macapas. As a result of the killing of Corvera Sr., a formal charge of murder
(I.S. No. 88-138) was filed with the City Fiscal's Office of Butuan City against Pablo Macapas, Mayor
Tranquilino Calo, Jr., and his driver-bodyguard Belarmino Alloco, and (2) other "John Does". Macapas
was a bodyguard of respondent Calo, Jr.
On 22 June 1988, Investigating Fiscal Macario Balansag issued a resolution, finding a prima facie case for
murder against the respondents in I.S. No. 88-138. 1
On 29 June 1988, the information was signed by the investigating Fiscal; however, a motion for
reconsideration of the resolution was filed by respondent Calo, Jr., which delayed the filing of the
Information against Calo, Jr. and his co-respondents.
On 21 July 1988, respondents in I.S. No. 88-138 filed with the RTC Butuan City a petition for prohibition
with prayer for preliminary injunction and/or temporary restraining order, to enjoin the Investigating
Fiscal from acting on their aforementioned motion for reconsideration. Then Executive Judge Vicente
Hidalgo issued a TRO, directing the Investigating Fiscal to refrain from acting on the said motion for
reconsideration and from further proceeding with the preliminary investigation of the murder charge
against respondent Calo, Jr. and his co-respondents. However the TRO expired after the lapse of twenty
(20) days, without a preliminary injunction being issued.
Before the motion for reconsideration could be resolved, Investigating Fiscal Balansag was himself
gunned down in cold blood while on his way to his office. Based on the investigation conducted by the
NBI linking the death of Fiscal Balansag to the killing of Corvera, Sr., another formal complaint for murder
was filed against Calo. Jr. and four (4) others.
On 14 September 1988, Acting City Fiscal Brocoy resolved the pending motion for reconsideration,
affirming the 22 June 1988 resolution finding a prima facie case for murder against the respondents in
I.S. No. 88-138.
On 29 September 1988, the information earlier signed by Investigating Fiscal Balansag, carrying a NO
BAIL recommendation, was filed before the Regional Trial Court of Butuan City, Branch IV, docketed as
Criminal Case No. 3464. On 14 October 1988, upon motion of the prosecution and with the approval of
the court, the information was withdrawn for being fatally defective in form, the same having been
signed by Fiscal Balansag who was already dead at the time of the filing of said information.
On 29 November 1988, a new information signed by Acting Fiscal Brocoy carrying also a NO BAIL
recommendation, was filed with the court without the necessary supporting affidavits and papers. The
case was erroneously assigned to Branch IV of the RTC of Butuan City, where the original information
prior to its withdrawal was assigned. The accused filed a Motion to Dismiss and/or Opposition to the
Issuance of a Warrant of Arrest Without Bail, and in the alternative, accused sought the fixing of bail for
their temporary release. 2 Said motion was set for hearing on 15 December 1988.
Upon motion of the prosecution, the case was scheduled for raffle on 7 December 1988. On said
scheduled date for raffle, accused Calo, Jr. and his counsel personally filed an opposition to the holding
of the raffle on the ground of lack of notice to the parties.
On 6 and 8 December 1988, Corvera, Jr. and his counsel together with their sympathizers staged a rally
demanding the immediate arrest of the accused in Criminal Case No. 3464. After their rally in the
afternoon of 8 December 1988, they personally went to see respondent judge in his chamber to reiterate
their demand.
After said meeting between Corvera, Jr., et al. and respondent-judge, the latter issued an order of 8
December 1988 3 in his capacity as Executive Judge, directing the raffle of the case with due notice to
the parties. Without conducting any prior hearing, in the same order of 8 December 1988, respondent
judge directed the issuance of a warrant of arrest against the accused, fixing at the same time the bail for
accused Calo, Jr. and Allocod at P50,000.00 each; however, no bail was recommended for the temporary
release of accused Macapas. Respondent judge fixed bail for the temporary release of accused Calo, Jr.
and Allocod on the ground that they were not charged as co-principals by cooperation or inducement,
and that the evidence of guilt against them was merely circumstantial.
On 14 December 1988, a petition for certiorari was filed by herein complainant with the Court of
Appeals, assailing the 8 December 1988 order of respondent judge, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 16383. In
response to the urgency of the petition, a resolution dated 20 December 1988 was issued by the Court of
Appeals restraining the execution and implementation of the assailed order, pending the resolution of
the petition on the merits. However, on 26 December 1988, respondent judge and Calo, Jr. informed the
Court of Appeals that accused Calo, Jr. and Allocod had already put up their respective bail bonds of
P50,000.00 as of 9 December 1988 and that both have been released, thus rendering the primary
objective of the CA temporary restraining order moot and academic.
On 31 January 1989, the Court of Appeals rendered a decision 4 setting aside the questioned 8
December 1988 order as having been issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess
of jurisdiction. The warrants of arrest as well as the bail bonds filed by the accused in said Criminal Case
No. 3464 were declared void and without force and effect; the court of origin was ordered to
immediately issue and serve new warrants of arrest upon the accused. To determine whether or not the
evidence of guilt against the accused is strong, the trial court was ordered to conduct a heating and thus
resolve the motion for fixing the bald for the temporary release of the two (2) accused, Calo, Jr. and
Allocod. The decision of the Court of Appeals became final and executory on 23 February 1989. 5
In the administrative complaint at bar, complainant claims that the act of respondent judge in granting
bail to the accused Calo, Jr. and Allocod without a hearing, is tantamount to gross ignorance and willful,
malicious and blatant disregard of the provisions of Sec. 5, Rule 114 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure,
which require a hearing before an accused charged with a capital offense can be granted bail. The
impartiality of respondent judge in issuing the questioned warrants of arrest but allowing bail is also
questioned on the ground of his "close association" with the accused Calo, Jr.
In his defense, respondent judge argues that Sec. 5 of Rule 114 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure which
requires a hearing of an application for admission to bail, filed by any person who is in custody for the
commission of a capital offense, is applicable only to cases where the accused is already in custody, but
neither of the three (3) accused in Criminal Case No. 3464 was being detained at the time their
application for bail was acted upon by respondent judge. In his capacity as Executive Judge, respondent
judge claims that he merely followed the precedents set by his predecessors, in issuing warrants of
arrest before the raffle of a case in order to avoid delay in the arrest of the accused.
In addition, respondent judge denied the allegation that he was a law partner of accused Calo, Jr.,
claiming that he was a mere employee in the business of said accused, and that he appeared with
accused Calo, Jr. as co-counsel in a case, but not as an associate. To justify his finding that the evidence
of guilt is circumstantial against accused Calo, Jr. and Allocod, respondent judge stated that
Herein respondent has some doubts whether accused Tranquilino O. Calo, Jr. could have done the acts of
giving a revolver to accused Pablo Macapas outside the courtroom and pushed Pablo Macapas into the
courtroom to shoot Mariano Corvera, Sr., which acts were allegedly done in the presence of witness (sic)
Pacifico Largonita and Fernando Casinao, who by their own admissions, are security personnel and
companions of the late Mayor Corvera. These acts being attributed to accused Calo as the brain behind
the killing do not appear to be a natural conduct of man. These are stupid acts and accused Calo does
not impress herein respondent as having that kind of mental intelligence. Respondent has known
accused Tranquilino O. Calo, Jr. as a law practitioner and as a person for about twenty years already.
Respondent finds accused Calo to be of above-average intelligence. Thus, when respondent reviewed
the findings of the investigating fiscal regarding the statements of P. Largonita and F. Casinao,
respondent entertained some serious doubts. Questions cropped up in respondent's mind. Respondent
asked himself the questions that if he were the mastermind, would he give, in the presence of some
individuals, the gun to the gunman only at the vicinity where the intended victim was to be shot
moments before the appointed time of the killing and pushed the gunman to the place where the victim
was? Respondent's answer was that he would not behave in such manner, otherwise he would appear to
be an inept mastermind and the gunman was reluctant that the latter had to be pushed to execute the
plan. 6
While it does not form part of the record of the case at bar, the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. SP. No. 16383 is quite enlightening. That decision, as already mentioned, declared as null and void
the warrants of arrest issued by respondent judge as well as the bail fixed by him for the temporary
release of the accused, all accomplished without a hearing. The Court of Appeals said:
It is conventional wisdom in legal circles that the determination as to whether or not the evidence of
guilt is strong in a capital offense rests upon the sound judgment and discretion of the court which can
only be exercised and reached after due or summary hearing. (People vs. San Diego, 26 SCRA 522;
Ocampo vs. Bernabe, 77 Phil. 55). In that hearing, the fiscal must be notified and given the opportunity
to present his evidence. If the court grants bail without affording such opportunity to the prosecution,
due process is seriously violated. (People vs. San Diego, supra; Mendoza vs. CFI of Quezon, 51 SCRA 373).
And even where the prosecutor refuses to adduce evidence in opposition to the application to grant and
fix bail, the Court may ask the prosecution "questions to ascertain the strength of the state's evidence or
judge the adequacy of the amount of bail." (Herras Teehankee vs. Director of Prisons, 76 Phil. 756, 789).

xxx xxx xxx
In the petition at bar, private respondents argue that since they are no longer in custody of the law, the
respondent court having granted and fixed their bail which they did forthwith post, the hearing to
determine whether or not their guilt is strong is no longer necessary. The argument sounds but casuistic
because in Our judgment the respondent court acted deliberately with precipitate haste and with grave
abuse of discretion, when on December 8, 1988 it issued the order granting and fixing the bail without
any hearing at all, even as private respondents themselves had requested their motion to be heard on
December 15, 1988 yet, when respondent court in the same order directed the issuance of warrants of
arrest against private respondents, the act was nothing more than a superfluous and useless ceremony
because with the grant of bail the accused could and did effectively secure their freedom at once
without even seeing a copy of the warrant of arrest itself. As a matter of fact, there is nothing in the
records before Us to show that warrants of arrest were actually issued against private respondents. 7
Respondent judge was declared by the Court of Appeals to have acted with grave abuse of discretion in
fixing the bail of the accused without a hearing. Generally, a judge cannot be held liable to account or
answer criminally, civilly or administratively, for an erroneous judgment or decision rendered by him in
good faith. 8 However, good faith may be negated by the circumstances on record.
In the absence of fraud, dishonesty or corruption, the acts of a judge done in his judicial capacity are not
subject to disciplinary action, even though such acts may be erroneous. But, while judges should not be
disciplined for inefficiency on account merely of occasional mistakes or errors of judgment, yet, it is
highly imperative that they should be conversant with basic legal principles. 9
In every case, a judge should endeavor diligently to ascertain the facts and the applicable law unswayed
by partisan or personal interests, public opinion or fear of criticism. 10 Respondent judge should not
have allowed himself to be swayed into issuing an order fixing bail for the temporary release of the
accused charged with murder, without a hearing, which is contrary to established principles of law. A
judge owes it to the public and the administration of justice to know the law he is supposed to apply to a
given controversy. He is called upon to exhibit more than just a cursory acquaintance with the statutes
and procedural rules. There will be faith in the administration of justice only if there be a belief on the
part of litigants that the occupants of the bench cannot justly be accused of a deficiency in their grasp of
legal
principles. 11
The fact that the complainant and his sympathizers had staged a rally demanding the issuance of a
warrant of arrest against the accused is not a sufficient excuse for the unjustified haste of respondent
judge's act of fixing bail without a hearing.
It has been an established legal principle or rule that in cases where a person is accused of a capital
offense, the trial court must conduct a hearing in a summary proceeding, to allow the prosecution an
opportunity to present, within a reasonable time, all evidence it may desire to produce to prove that the
evidence of guilt against the accused is strong, before resolving the issue of bail for the temporary
release of the accused. Failure to conduct a hearing before fixing bail in the instant case amounted to a
violation of due process. 12 Irrespective of respondent judge's opinion that the evidence of guilt against
herein accused is not strong, the law and settled jurisprudence demanded that a hearing be conducted
before bail was fixed for the temporary release of accused Calo, Jr. and Allocod, if bail was at all justified.
Respondent judge's disregard of an established rule of law by depriving the prosecution of the
opportunity to prove that the evidence of guilt against the accused was strong, amounted to gross
ignorance of the law, which is subject to disciplinary action.
Furthermore, considering that respondent judge had a close association with respondent Calo, Jr. as a
former employee of the said accused, prudence and regard for his position as judge demanded that he
should have refrained from fixing the bail of said accused and from concluding that the evidence against
him was merely "circumstantial", in order to avoid any doubt as to his judicial impartiality. Respondent
judge should have waited for the raffle of the case and allowed the judge to whom the case was actually
raffled to resolve the issue of fixing the bail of said accused, if he was bailable. A judge should not only
render a just, correct and impartial decision but should do so in a manner as to be free from any
suspicion as to his fairness, impartiality and integrity. 13
ACCORDINGLY, respondent judge is hereby imposed a FINE of TWENTY THOUSAND PESOS (P20,000.00)
and WARNED to exercise more care and diligence in the performance of his duties as a judge, and that
the same or similar offense in the future will be dealt with more severally.
DIGEST:
Facts: >
Complainant, Manuel L. Lee, charged respondent, Atty. Regino B. Tambago, with violation of Notarial Law
and the Ethics of the legal profession for notarizing a will that is alleged to be spurious in nature in containing
forged signatures of his father, the decedent, Vicente Lee Sr. and two other witnesses, which were also
questioned for the unnotated Residence Certificates that are known to be a copy of their respective voter's
affidavit. >
In addition to such, the contested will was executed and acknowledged before respondent on June 30, 1965
but bears a Residence Certificate by the Testator dated January 5, 1962, which was never submitted for filing
to the Archives Division of the Records Management and Archives Office of the National Commission for
Culture and Arts (NCAA). >
Respondent, on the other hand, claimed that all allegations are falsely given because he allegedly exercised
his duties as Notary Public with due care and with due regards to the provision of existing law and had
complied with elementary formalities in the performance of his duties and that the complaint was filed simply
to harass him based on the result of a criminal case against him in the Ombudsman that did not prosper. >
However, he did not deny the contention of non-filing a copy to the Archives Division of NCAA. >
In resolution, the court referred the case to the IBP and the decision of which was affirmed with modification
against the respondent and in favor of the complainant. Issue: Did Atty. Regino B. Tambago committed a
violation in Notarial Law and the Ethics of Legal Profession for notarizing a spurious last will and testament?
Held: Yes. >
As per Supreme Court, Atty. Regino B. Tambago is guilty of professional misconduct as he violated the
Lawyer's Oath, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, Canon 1 and Rule 1.01nof the Code of Professional
Responsibility, Article 806 of the Civil Code and provision of the Notarial Law. >
Thus, Atty. Tambago is suspended from the practice of law for one year and his Notarial commission revoked.
>
In addition, because he has not lived up to the trustworthiness expected of him as a notary public and as an
officer of the court, he is perpetually disqualified from reappointments as a Notary Public.
Sabitsana Jr. v. Villamor
In an Affidavit-Complaint, dated 7 March 1990, Atty. Clemencio Sabitsana, Jr., a practicing lawyer in
Naval, Biliran Subprovince, Leyte, charged respondent, Judge Adriano R. Villamor of the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 16, Naval, Leyte, with falsification of his monthly Certificates of Service by making it
appear that he had resolved all cases submitted for decision within the ninety-day period required by the
Judiciary Act of 1948, Section 5, when actually he had fifteen (15) cases undecided from five (5) years
back or from March, 1985.
On 7 August 1990, the Court directed Deputy Court Administrator Juanita A. Bernad to make an on-the-
spot audit of the cases pending in the sala of Respondent Judge. On 2 October 1990, Deputy Court
Administrator Bernad reported that there were, indeed, eighty seven (87) cases undecided beyond the
ninety(90)-day reglementary period as of 3 July 1990, consisting of six (6) criminal cases with prisoners,
36 criminal cases without prisoners, and forty-five (45) civil cases. Worse the records of two (2) criminal
cases and twelve (12) civil cases were missing. While the records of six (6) criminal cases were not in the
Court but acknowledged by Respondent Judge to have beenin his possession.
Deputy Court Administrator Bernad also noted the dismal state of the Courthouse of the RTC, Branch 16,
which he described as "bereft of any dignity as a court of law" showing 'a lack of financial and moral
support of the local authorities," and observed that the Municipal Court was even better housed.
On 31 October 1990, Complainant further furnished the Court with an Affidavit of Judge Dulcisimo Pitao
of the Municipal Trial Court of Maripipi, Leyte, stating that Respondent had intervened for the accused in
Criminal Case No. 959 then pending with the said Municipal Court. We considered the foregoing as a
supplemental charge of undue interest in apending criminal case.
On 23 November 1990, Complainant again brought to the attention of the Court seven (7) additional
cases submitted for decision, at the earliest since April 1986, still unresolved by Respondent (p. 44,
Rollo), even though the transcripts were ready as early as 1984 in one (1) case.
In his Comment filed on 20 December 1990, Respondent claimed that the Complaint was more for
harassment and vengeance, otherwise, Complainant would not have filed a criminal case against him for
Falsification under Article 171 (4) of the Revised Penal Code before the Ombudsman, based on the same
facts alleged in his Complaint before this Court. Respondent further claimed that he had not violated the
90-day rule since 1 February 1990 when the Court required the adoption of the continuous trial system.
He did not deny, however, that before said date, there were other cases not decided within the 90-day
rule, including those listed in the Complaint allegedly because the transcripts were incomplete. He added
that he had no hand in the preparation of his monthly reports of pending cases; that after he had
ordered the person-in-charge of preparing the Certificates of Service to explain why she had made it
appear that said cases were decided within ninety (90) days from its submission when actually they were
not, she stated that he had nothing to do with the preparation of the monthly report except to sign after
she had prepared them.
On 18 April 1991, acting upon a second Report from Deputy Court Administrator Bernad, the Court
resolved: (1) to refer the supplemental charge regarding undue interest in a particular criminal case to
Associate Justice Fermin A. Martin, Jr., of the Court of Appeals for investigation, report and
recommendation; (2) to order Respondent to decide with dispatch cases still unresolved beyond the 90-
day-period; and (3) to inform the Court immediately regarding steps he had taken to retrieve lost records
and to personally put his records in order. To date, Respondent has been unheard from on those
directives.
On 12 July 1991, Complainant followed up with another letter complaint stating that the seven cases
mentioned in his letter of 23 November 1990 remained undecided, adding that five (5) cases handled by
him were unresolved since January 1987, not to speak of cases handled by other lawyers.
Judging from the Deputy Court Administrator's two Reports, there is validity to Complainant's charge
that Respondent had failed to decide cases within the 90-day reglementary period notwithstanding
"Second Ex-parte Motions to Decide Case" flied by Complainant (Annexes A to L, Complaint), and that
Respondent had falsified his Certificates of Service for 2 September 1986,3 October 1987, 3 October
1988, 3 November 1989, and 1 March 1990 (Annexes N to R, Complaint). Respondent's defense that
incomplete transcripts of stenographic notes dissuaded him from deciding those cases for fear of
"rendering an injustice" is controverted by his own stenographic reporter who stated that the transcripts
in some of those cases were ready as far back as 1984 (Comment, Annex "2").
Respondent, however, shifts the blame on his Clerk of Court, Atty. Rogelio Jocobo, who, he claims, was
inefficient in the management of Court records. Respondent forgets, however, that he sits not only to
Judge litigated cases with the least possible delay but that his responsibilities include being an effective
manager of the Court and its personnel. Canon 3, Rule 3.08, of the Code of Judicial Conduct, provides:
A judge should diligently discharge administrative responsibilities, maintain professional competence in
court management, and facilitate the performance of the administrative functions of other judges and
court personnel.
Also expected of a Judge under Rule 3.09 is that:
A judge should organize and supervise the court personnel to ensure the prompt and efficient dispatch
of business, and require at all times the observance of high standards of public service and fidelity.
As we held in Secretary of Justice vs. Legaspi (A.M. No. 997-CFI, 10 September 1981, 107 SCRA 234):
Respondent, as the incumbent judge, ought to know the cases submitted to him for decision, particularly
those pending for more than ninety days. As a matter of fact, he is supposed to keep his own record of
cases submitted for decision so that he could act on them promptly and without delay, mindful of the
mandate in Section 5 of Republic Act No. 296, also known as the Judiciary Act of 1948 ... It is expected
that he should be more diligent and more vigilant in attending to cases submitted for decision as well as
in the preparation of his monthly certificates of service by verifying every now and then whether there
are cases pending decision for more than ninety days; because he could be held accountable for any
error or falsification in his certificates. Thus, respondent cannot now escape liability for falsification of his
certificates of service with the lame excuse that he has no knowledge of those cases pending decision for
more than ninety days at the time he submitted his certificates of service. Nor could he give the excuse
that his attention was not called to the cases pending decision ninety days because he need not be
reminded of his deadlines by a subordinate court employee like the clerk of court. Court employees are
not the guardians of a judge's responsibilities.
In Nidua vs. Lazaro (A.M. No. R-465 MTJ, 29 June 1989, 174SCRA 581), we maintained:
It is incumbent upon him to devise an efficient recording and filing system in his Court so that no
disorderliness can affect the flow of cases and their speedy disposition, particularly those submitted for
decision. A judge cannot take refuge behind the inefficiency or mismanagement by Court personnel.
Proper and efficient court management is as much his responsibility. He is the one directly responsible
for the proper discharge of his official functions.
And in Cipriano vs. Judge Villamor (A.M. No. RTJ-88-207, 22 June 1989, en banc, Minute Resolution) we
ruled,
The Supreme Court cannot countenance such undue delay of a judge especially now when there is an all-
out effort to minimize, if not totally eradicate, the problems of congestion and delay long plaguing our
courts. Thus, judges are called upon to exercise the utmost diligence and dedication in the performance
of their duties. It is a measure of a judge's competence as an administrator that he is capable of
delegating to his personnel those tasks which properly pertain to them, maintaining, likewise, their trust
and confidence in him.
A member of the bench can not pay mere lip service to the 90-day requirement, but should, in fact,
persevere in its implementation. The Certificate of Service is not merely a means to one's paycheck, but
an instrument by which the Courts can fulfill the Constitutional mandate of the people's right to a speedy
disposition of cases.
The people's faith in the administration of justice, especially those who belong to the low income group,
would be greatly impaired if decisions are long in coming, more so from trial courts which unlike
collegiate tribunals where there is a need for extended deliberation, could be expected to act with
dispatch. (Magdamo vs. Pahimulin, Adm. Mat. No. 662-MJ, 30 September 1976, 73 SCRA 110).
Additionally, we have to hold respondent inexcusably negligent for failure to account for the records of
twelve (12) civil and two (2) criminal cases.
"A judge is expected to ensure that the records of the cases assigned to his sala are intact. There is no
justification for missing records save fortuitous events. The loss of not one but eight records is indicative
of gross misconduct and inexcusable negligence unbecoming of a judge. For true professionalism in the
bench to exist, judges whose acts demoralize the ethical standards of a judicial office and whose acts
demonstrate unfitness and unworthiness of the prestige and prerequisite attached to said office must be
weeded out" (Longboan vs. Polig, Adm. Mat. No. 704-RTJ, 14 June 1990, 186 SCRA 557).
We come now to the supplemental charge of undue interest in a pending criminal case, subject of the
Investigative Report submitted on 9 August 1991 by Justice Fermin A. Martin, who found the imputation
sufficiently substantiated, and has recommended the on of a fine of P10,000.00.
From that Report, we gather that on 16 July 1987, Respondent, as; Executive Judge of the Regional Trial
Court, Branch XVI, Naval, Biliran Subprovince, Leyte, designated Judge Dulcisimo Pitao, of the Municipal
Trial Court of Maripipi, Leyte, as Acting Judge of the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Biliran-Cabucgayon,
Leyte, which was then vacant, with the directive to allocate two (2) session days a week in his additional
sala.
On 19 August 1987, while Judge Pitao was at his residence at Naval, Biliran Subprovince, Leyte, he
received a note handcarried by a woman, whom he came to know later as the wife of Guillermo Lipango,
the accused in Criminal Case No. 959, which had long been pending trial in the 4th MCTC of Biliran-
Cabucgayon, Leyte.
The note (Exhibit "A"), written on Respondent's letterhead, reads:
Aug. 19, 1987
Dear Tete,
The bearer is the wife of Guillermo Lipango who has a long pending theft case. If you have jurisdiction
hear and decide. If none,remand it to RTC.
Take care because I learned Big Man Egane is taking much interest because accused is competing with
Ms fishing but only in a small scale. Okay? Thanks.
Sincerely,
Ading.
Sometime later, Judge Pitao sought respondent, as the Executive Judge, regarding his application for
leave of absence which had to be coursed through the latter. During their conversation, respondent
mentioned the case of "People vs. Lipango," asked Judge Pitao whether the latter had received the note,
and again warned the latter about a certain "Big Man Egane," who was backing the complainant therein
and that he (Judge Pitao) better acquit the accused (Tsn., 15 July 1991, pp. 13-14).
On 25 August 1988, after hearing the case, Judge Pitao rendered his decision convicting the accused,
Guillermo Lipango, of the crime of Theft (Exhibit "C") "because the evidence against the accused was
very strong" (ibid., p. 14).
On 16 November 1988, when Judge Pitao went to the boarding house of Respondent to invite the latter
to a birthday party, and while they were walking together, Judge Pitao confided to Respondent that he
had convicted Lipango "because he could not in conscience acquit him" (ibid., p. 17). Irked, Respondent
directed Judge Pitao to forward the records to the former's Court (ibid., p. 18).
On 23 November 1988, the records of Criminal Case No. 959 were elevated to the RTC, Leyte, Branch
XVI, over which Respondent presides, but the case was actually docketed thereat on 5 December 1988.
From 1 to 3 December 1988, Judge Pitao attended the National Convention of Lawyers in Cebu City.
Upon his return, he learned that Judge Meljohn de la Pena had been designated as Acting Judge of the
4th MCTC Biliran-Cabucgayon, Leyte, and that his designation had been revoked effective 30 November
1988 (ibid., pp. 18-19).
On 9 December 1988, Respondent promulgated his decision acquitting accused-appellant Guillermo
Lipango of the crime charged (Exhibit "F"). This, despite the fact that the records of the case disclosed
that no notice had been sent to the parties of the receipt of the entire record to enable them to submit
their respective memoranda.
For his part, Respondent opted to rely on his six (6)-page Comment, dated 19 December 1990 (Exh. H,
pp. 78-83, Rollo), as his testimony-in-chief As correctly observed by the Investigating Justice, said
Comment contains nothing more than a denial of the charge of falsification and an attribution of ill
motive to the Complainant. He then determined that Respondent is deemed not to have denied:
l) that he sent the handwritten note dated August 19, 1987 (Exhibit "A") to Judge Dulcisimo Pitao
through the wife of the accused Guillermo Lipango;
2) that when Judge Pitao brought his application for leave of absence to respondent as Executive Judge,
respondent took up the matter of the note he sent and the theft case against accused Guillermo Lipango
which was pending trial before Judge Pitao and even hurried the remark "better acquit him;" and,
3) that he decided the appealed criminal case and acquitted the appellant Guillermo Lipango although
the record of the case disclosed that no notice had been sent yet by the branch clerk of court to the
parties of the receipt of the entire record to enable the parties to submit memoranda pursuant to Rule
21 of the Interim Rules and Guidelines.
Accordingly, the Investigating Justice came up with the following apt observations and findings:
In sending his handwritten note (Exhibit "A") to Judge Pitao, and through the wife of the accused
Guillermo Lipango, respondent failed to exercise due care. It is true that the contents of the letter may
not have directly exhorted the addressee to decide the case in favor of one party but to have the wife of
the very accused deliver the letter to the municipal judge who will decide the case and over whom he i
respondent) exercised supervision and wielded a degree of moral ascendancy as Executive Judge was
simply a big letdown in the required circumspection and high ideals expected of a judge. It is a truism
that a judge's official conduct and his behavior in the performance of judicial duties should be free from
the appearance of impropriety (Aleza vs. Reyes, 131 SCRA 445, 453).
Moreover, respondent Judge, while cautioning Judge Pitao to watch out and exercise care in handling
the case supposedly on account of the interest of persons not parties to the case, made a side remark for
the acquittal of the accused. Such a statement, winch was not denied, was highly improper and was apt
to create the impression that he was for the exoneration of the accused Guillermo Lipango- It tended to
influence the trial judge who was going to decide the case and thus did violence to the lofty principle
that "the office of a judge exists for one solemn end: to promote justice by administering it fairly and
impartially" (Gonzales-Austria vs. Abaya, 176 SCRA 634, 646).
Cardinal is the rule that a Judge should avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in all
activities. The Canons mince no words in mandating that a Judge shall refrain from influencing in any
manner the outcome of litigation or dispute pending before another Court (Canon 2, Rule 2.04).
Interference by members of the bench in-pending suits with the end in view of influencing the course or
the result of litigation does not only subvert the independence of the judiciary but also undermines the
people's faith in its integrity and impartiality (Commentaries on the Code of Judicial Conduct). On this
point, Impao vs. Makilala (A.M. No. MTJ-88-184, 13 October 1989, 178 SCRA 541) expounds:
It is an important judicial norm that a judge's private as well as official conduct must at all times be free
from the appearance of impropriety [Lugue vs. Kayanan, G.R. No. L-26826, August 29, 1969, 29 SCRA
165; ...]. As held by the Court in the case of De la Paz vs. Inutan, Adm. Mat. No. 201 MJ, June 30, 1975, 64
SCRA 540: ... The judge is the visible representation of the law and, more importantly, of justice. From -
him, the people draw their will and awareness to obey the law. They see in him an intermediary of day rule, includingthose listed in the Complaint allegedly because the transcripts were incomplete.
justice between two conflicting interests, specially in the station of municipal judges, like respondent Issue: WON the respondent violated Sec on 3 Canon 1 of the New Code of JUdical Conduct
Judge, who have that close and direct contact with the people before nobody else in the judiciary. Thus,
for the judge to return that regard, he must be the first to abide by the law and weave an example for Ruling: Yes
the others to follow.

The Investigating Justice gave one final and pointed observation on respondent's culpability, thus: From the Inves ga ve Report of Jus ce Fermin Mar n, the imputa on that respondent
intervened inCriminal Case No. 959 is su ciently substan ated. That a le er was sent to judge Pitao
The clincher though came when respondent Judge decided the same case which was appealed to his
by the wife of heaccused and that the respondent men oned the case during their conversa on.
branch although he knew that no notice had been sent yet by the branch clerk of court to the parties of
the receipt of the entire record to enable the precaution and the defense to submit memoranda
pursuant to Rule 21 of the Interim Rules and Guidelines. Respondent's excuse was that under the rules, it Cardinal is the rule that a Judge should avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in
was (and still is) the duty of the clerk of court to notify the parties of the fact that the original record of allactivities. The Canons mince no words in mandating that a Judge shall refrain from influencing in
the case, together with the transcripts and exhibits, had been received (Rule 21, paragraph c, Interim anymanner the outcome of litigation or dispute pending before another Court (Canon 2, Rule
Rules and Guidelines). Respondent overlooked, however, that the same rule provides that the RTC judge 2.04).Interference by members of the bench in
shall decide the case on the basis of the entire record of the proceedings had in the court of origin and -
such memoranda and/or briefs, as may have been filed (paragraph D, Rule 21, Ibid). pending suits with the end in view of influencing the course or the result of litigation does not only
subvert the independence of the judiciary but also undermines thepeople's faith in its integrity and
Whether or not the accused deserved the acquittal, in point of fact, is of no moment as Respondent's impartiality (Commentaries on the Code of Judicial Conduct).
mere act of interference in a criminal case seals his fate. In administrative proceedings such as this, mere
preponderance of evidence suffices to establish the charges (The Court Administrator vs. Hermoso, et Respondent is dismissed from service.
Rivera v. Barro
al., A.M. No. R-97-RTJ, 28 May 1987, 150 SCRA 269).
Respondent Silvino Lu. Barro, City Judge of Gingoog City, is charged with malfeasance and/or
misfeasance in office by way of an affidavit dated July 10, 1978, executed by Antonio Rivera, Barangay
Upon the facts and the evidence, we can not but hold respondent guilty (1) of having made untruthful
Chairman of Barangay No. 12, Gingoog City.
statements in his Certificates of Service, of inexcusable negligence and gross inefficiency in connection
with missing records in his Sala, and of utter indifferences to the directives of this Court; and (2) of
The complaint states that in the evening of February 12, 1978, at Barrio Lunao Gingoog City, Misamis
serious misconduct for undue interest in a pending criminal case before a lower Court over which he
Oriental several persons, including one Arturo Barro, nephew of respondent Judge, were apprehended
exercised supervision, all in violation of the Code of Judicial Conduct. The dilapidated condition of the
for illegal gambling. A criminal case was thereafter filed against said persons in respondent's sala
Courthouse of the RTC, Branch 16, also betrays a lack of management capabilities desired of a Presiding
(docketed as Criminal Case No. 63-78). On March 29,1978, respondent Judge dismissed the case upon
Judge and an insensitiveness to the needs of a Court of Justice worthy of its name. All told, we find him
motion of Assistant Fiscal Cenon Alaba.
unfit to continue with his membership in the Bench.
It is contended that because one of the accused is respondentgs nephew, respondent should have
WHEREFORE, the Court RESOLVED to DISMISS respondent Judge Adriano R. Villamor, Jr. of the Regional
inhibited himself from trying the case, pursuant to the provisions of Section 1, Rule 137 of the Revised
Trial Court, Branch 16, Naval, Leyte, from the service, with forfeiture of all his accrued retirement
Rules of Court.
benefits, leave and other privileges, if any, and with prejudice to re-employment in any branch, agency
or instrumentality of the government, including government-owned or controlled corporations.
In his Comment, respondent admits that one of the accused in said criminal case in his nephew; that he
DIGEST:
did not inhibit himself therefrom, although he intended to do so, because nobody manifested any
ACTS:
objection and because he was informed that the prosecution was going to reinvestigate the case; that he
took into account the fact that if the case is assigned to another judge, it would take several months to
Atty. Clemencio Sabitsana, Jr., a practicing lawyer in Naval, Biliran Subprovince, Leyte,
dispose of, unduly clogging the docket of the court; and that the dismissal of the case was not premised
chargedrespondent, Judge Adriano R. Villamor of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 16, Naval, Leyte,
on the fact that one of the accused is his nephew.
withfalsification of his monthly Certificates of Service by making it appear that he had resolved all
casessubmitted for decision within the ninety
Deputy Court Administrator Leo D. Medialdea recommends that respondent be held administratively
-
liable without formal investigation, considering that his failure to inhibit himself at the very outset
day period required by the Judiciary Act of 1948
constituted a violation of the rule intended to free the courts from any suspicion of bias and prejudice.
Complainant further furnished the Court with an Affidavit of Judge Dulcisimo Pitao of the Municipal
We are in accord with the foregoing view. There is no excuse for respondent's failure to inhibit himself
TrialCourt of Maripipi, Leyte, stating that Respondent had intervened for the accused in Criminal Case
from participating in Criminal Case No. 63-78. As aptly noted, in Pagano Basuan v. Juan A. Baes, 1 this
No.959 then pending with the said Municipal Court.
Court said:
In his Comment filed on 20 December 1990, Respondent claimed that the Complaint was more for
The respondent admits having sat and partly acted in CAR Case No. 1438 wherein his nephew-in-law,
harassment and vengeance
Atty. Manuel M. de Baybay, was the counsel for the defendant Manuel Solomon. In his answer to the
. That
complaint the respondent does not controvert the charge that he violated Section I of Rule 137 of the
there were other cases not decided within the 90
Rules of Court which bars a judge from sitting in any case in which he is related to any counsel appearing
before him within the fourth degree, and in his Supplemental Comment he merely alleges that he
subsequently disqualified himself from sitting in the case without hearing even partially a single witness.
The respondent's subsequent inhibition does not extenuate his culpability. The rule which he violated is
intended to free courts from any suspicion of bias and prejudice. In view of the undisputed violation, a
reprimand on the is in order.
Respondent Judge has been twice held administratively liable by this Court, first in Administrative Matter
No. 179-CJ (promoted on September 28, 1973), wherein he was hold guilty of gross due to carelessness
and negligence and severely reprimanded and warned that a repetition thereof will be dealt with more
severely, and second, in Administrative Matter No. 1587-CTJ (promulgated on August 23, 1978), wherein
he was found remiss in the performance of his duties and ordered to pay a fine equivalent to his salary
for one month.
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, respondent is found guilty as charged and, taking into account
his previous administrative cases, hereby ordered to pay a fine equivalent to his salary for three (3)
months.
Tan v. Rosete
Lucila Tan filed the instant complaint against Judge Maxwel S. Rosete, former Acting Presiding Judge,
Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch 58, San Juan, Metro Manila,[1] for violation of Rule 140 of the Revised
Rules of Court and the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act (Republic Act No. 3019).
The complaint alleged that Lucila Tan was the private complainant in Criminal Case No. 59440 and
Criminal Case No. 66120, both entitled People of the Philippines vs. Alfonso Pe Sy and pending before
Branch 58, Metropolitan Trial Court of San Juan, Metro Manila, then presided by respondent judge.
Before the cases were decided, respondent judge allegedly sent a member of his staff to talk to
complainant. They met at Sangkalan Restaurant along Scout Albano, near Timog Avenue in Quezon City.
The staff member told her that respondent was asking for P150,000.00 in exchange for the non-dismissal
of the cases. She was shown copies of respondent judges Decisions in Criminal Cases Nos. 59440 and
66120, both still unsigned, dismissing the complaints against the accused. She was told that respondent
judge would reverse the disposition of the cases as soon as she remits the amount demanded. The staff
member allowed complainant to keep the copy of the draft decision in Criminal Case No. 59440.
Complainant, however, did not accede to respondents demand because she believed that she had a
very strong case, well supported by evidence. The criminal cases were eventually dismissed by
respondent judge.[2]
Respondent judge, in his Comment, denied the allegations of complainant. He instead stated that it
was complainant who attempted to bribe him in exchange for a favorable decision. She even tried to
delay and to derail the promulgation of the decisions in Criminal Cases Nos. 59440 and 66120.
Complainant also sought the intervention of then San Juan Mayor, Jinggoy Estrada, to obtain judgment
in her favor. Mayor Estrada allegedly talked to him several times to ask him to help complainant. The
former even called him over the phone when he was in New Zealand, persuading him to hold in
abeyance the promulgation of the Decisions in said cases. But he politely declined, telling him that there
was no sufficient evidence to convict the accused, and moreover, he had already turned over the
Decisions to Judge Quilatan for promulgation. Respondent further stated that complainant kept bragging
about her close relations with Mayor Estrada who was her neighbor in Greenhills, San Juan, and even
insinuated that she could help him get appointed to a higher position provided he decides the suits in
her favor. Respondent judge also claimed that complainant offered to give cash for the downpayment of
a car he was planning to buy. But he refused the offer. Finally, respondent judge denied that a member
of his staff gave complainant a copy of his draft decision in Criminal Case No. 59440. He said that he had
entrusted to Judge Quilatan his Decisions in Criminal Cases Nos. 59440 and 66120 before he left for New
Zealand on study leave. Thus, he asserted that it was impossible for him to thereafter change the
resolution of the cases and it was likewise impossible for any member of his staff to give complainant
copies of said Decisions.[3]
In a resolution dated December 2, 2002, the Court referred the complaint to the Executive Judge of
the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City for investigation, report and recommendation.[4]
First Vice Executive Judge Edwin A. Villasor conducted several hearings on the administrative case.
Only complainant Lucila Tan testified for her side. She presented as documentary evidence the copy of
the unsigned Decision in Criminal Case No. 59440 dated February 23, 2001 which was allegedly handed
to her by a member of respondent judges staff.[5] Respondent judge, on the other hand, presented
four (4) witnesses: Josefina Ramos, Rodolfo Cea (Buboy), Fernando B. Espuerta, and Joyce Trinidad
Hernandez. His documentary evidence consists of the affidavits of his witnesses,[6] copy of the Motion
for Reconsideration in Criminal Case No. 59440,[7] and various documents composed of the machine
copy of the Order of Arrest in Criminal Case No. 117219, machine copy of the letter dated December 29,
1997, machine copy of Certification dated Nov 13, 2000, front and dorsal sides of Check No. QRH-
0211804, Bank Statement dated March 31, 1998, Stop Payment Order dated April 6, 1998, Current
Account Inquiry, and Transaction Record, which documents were allegedly given by complainant to
respondents witness, Fernando B. Espuerta.[8]
The Investigating Judge summarized the testimonies of the witnesses as follows:
COMPLAINANTS VERSION:
1. LUCILA TAN
Complainant Lucila Tan testified that she knew Respondent Judge because she had a case in Branch
58, MeTC, San Juan, Metro Manila. She alleged that, in September 1998, she filed two cases involving
B.P. 22 and Other Deceits with the Prosecutors Office in Pasig. After resolution, the cases were filed in
the MeTC, San Juan. One case went to Branch 57 and the other one went to Branch 58, where
Respondent Judge Rosete was the Presiding Judge. Judge Quilatan was the Presiding Judge of Branch 57.
Upon advise of a friend, she moved for consolidation and the two cases were transferred to Judge
Quilatan in Branch 57. Subsequently, in view of the Motion for Inhibition filed by Complainants lawyer,
Judge Quilatan inhibited himself and the two cases were transferred to the sala of Respondent Judge
Rosete (TSN, pp. 9-16, Hearing of March 3, 2003). After several hearings, the Clerk of Court, named
Joyce, called up the Complainant and advised her to talk to San Juan Mayor Jinggoy Estrada to seek for
(sic) assistance. Joyce gave her the phone number of the Office of the Mayor (TSN, pages 17-18, Hearing
of March 3, 2003). Complainant then called up the Office of the Mayor but her call was intercepted by
Josie, the Mayors Secretary. When she told Josie why she called, the latter asked her if she wanted to
meet the Judge and when Complainant answered in the affirmative, Josie made arrangements for
Complainant to meet the Judge (TSN, pages 19-21, Hearing of March 3, 2003). Complainant called up
the Office of the Mayor sometime in November or late October 2000 and she met the Judge on
November 10. She, Josie and Respondent Judge met at the Cravings Restaurant in Wilson, San Juan
(TSN, page 22, Hearing of March 3, 2003). During the meeting, Complainant told the Judge regarding
this matter, how this happened and that he will convince the Accused to pay me as soon as possible
(TSN, page 23, Hearing of March 3, 2003). When she went to the restroom for a few minutes,
Respondent Judge and Josie were left alone. After she came back, they went home. On the way home,
Josie told her to give something to [the] Judge, Sabi niya magbigay tayo ng kaunti para bumilis iyong
kaso mo (TSN, page 24, Hearing of March 3, 2003). At first, Josie did not mention any amount but
when the Complainant asked her how much, the former mentioned Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00).
Complainant asked for a lesser amount, Twenty Thousand Pesos (P20,000.00) (TSN, page 25, Hearing of
March 3, 2003). When Josie agreed, she sent the amount of P20,000.00 to Josie through her driver after
two days (TSN, pages 26-27, Hearing of March 3, 2003). When Josie received the money, the Clerk of
Court, Joyce, also called her (Complainant) on that date. The Clerk of Court asked her if she sent money.
At first, Complainant denied it but the Clerk of Court said that Josie went there and there was money in
the drawer (TSN, pages 28-29, Hearing of March 3, 2003). After that, several hearings were on-going,
and before the resolution, Joyce called up the Complainant again around February 2001. Complainant
was in Baguio when Joyce called saying that she had an important thing to tell to (sic) the Complainant.
After Complainant got back to Manila, Joyce called her again and said that she will show Complainant
something. When they were in Complainants car in San Juan, Joyce showed Complainant two unsigned
Decisions of the case[s]. After reading the Decisions, Complainant saw that the cases were dismissed
and that it will be dismissed if she will not accede to Joyces request (TSN, pages 30-33, Hearing of March
3, 2003). Complainant claimed that Joyce asked for Php 150,000.00 for each case. Sabi niya it [was] for
Judge daw, kailangan daw ni Judge because he is leaving at that time (TSN, page 34, Hearing of March 3,
2003). Complainant identified the copy of the Decision in Criminal Case No. 59440 for Other Deceits,
dated 23 February 2001, which was marked as Exhibit A for the Complainant (TSN, pages 35-38,
Hearing of March 3, 2003). Complainant further alleged Sabi niya, if I will accede to that request of
P150,000.00 for each case then they will (sic) going to reverse the Decision and Si Judge daw will
reverse the Decision. Complainant met with Joyce around February 2001 (TSN, page 39, Hearing of
March 3, 2003). Complainant further claimed that Joyce told her to go to Mayor because he is a friend of
the Judge. Complainant went again to the Office of the Mayor to seek the Mayors help and she met the
Mayor at his Office in San Juan. The Mayor called up the Judge but he was not around so the Clerk of
Court, Joyce, was called. Joyce went to the Office of the Mayor and when she arrived, she said that the
Judge was out of the country (TSN, pages 40-41, Hearing of March 3, 2003). The Mayor asked for the
phone number of Respondent Judge Rosete, which Joyce gave. Mayor Estrada was able to get in touch
with the Judge. While the Mayor was talking in (sic) the phone with the Judge, Complainant was in front
of the Mayor (TSN, pages 42-43, Hearing of March 3, 2003). Complainant heard the Mayor because his
voice is very loud. He said, Judge, Saan ka? Sabi niya New Zealand. When were you coming back? I
do not know what is the answer and then he said, you help my friend naswindler siya, pabilisin mo ang
kaso niya para matapos na kasi matagal na iyan (TSN, page 43, Hearing of March 23, 2003). After that
they left the Office of the Mayor and Complainant was not able to approach Mayor Estrada again. Since
the Complainant was still carrying the Decision, and being afraid that it will be promulgated already, she
sought the advi[c]e of her friends. The Complainant showed the decision to the Prosecutor in San Juan at
that time (TSN, pages 44-45, Hearing of March 3, 2003). The Prosecutor told the Complainant that she is
going to meet with the Judge when he comes back from New Zealand. Complainant testified that,
sometime in April, in Sangkalan, Quezon City, a night life restaurant, she met Respondent Judge Rosete.
She was with two (2) Prosecutors. When she arrived at Sangkalan at about 8:30 in the evening, Judge
Rosete was already in the company of several men whom she got to know as Fernan and Buboy (TSN,
pages 46-48, Hearing of March 3, 2003). After eating and drinking, the Complainant left at around 10:30
in the evening. While they were inside, Complainant claimed that she did not say anything at all and it
was the Prosecutor who talked in her behalf. She was the one who paid all the bills which amounted to
Six Thousand Pesos (P6,000.00). When Complainant left, only they, three (3) girls, left while the Judge
and his company were still there drinking. While Complainant was waiting for her car outside, a man
came over from behind (TSN, pages 49-50, Hearing of March 3, 2003). Complainant did not know him
but she asked the Prosecutor later after the man left. The Complainant said that the man asked if he
could have an advance, which she understood as a payment, and she told the Prosecutor. Complainant
heard the Prosecutor say that she already talked to the Judge. The man left and went back inside the
restaurant (TSN, page 51, Hearing of March 3, 2003). Complainant said that when she did not give the
money she was still scared because there will already be a promulgation and she did not know whether
it will be in her behalf (sic) or not. Complainant did not give anything aside from the P20,000.00 because
her case was very strong and she had all the papers and evidence and that she promised them that she
will give them after she was (sic) able to collect all the debts. Complainant did not know the actual date
of the promulgation but somebody from the Office of Respondent Judge called her up in her house and
told her not to go to the promulgation. When Complainant asked why, Sabi niya baka mapaiyak daw
ako kasi alam na daw nila ang decision. Sabi niya ako na lang ang magdedeliver ng case ng
promulgation. She received the decision when she sent her driver to pick it up. The caller said that the
decision was unfavorable to her (TSN, pages 52-55, Hearing of March 3, 2003).
RESPONDENTS VERSION:
1. JOSEFINA RAMOS
She testified that she was the Private Secretary of Mayor Jinggoy Estrada, the former Mayor of San
Juan, Metro Manila, since he was Vice Mayor of San Juan. In 2000 and 2001, she was already the
Secretary of Mayor Jinggoy (TSN, page 7, Hearing of September 9, 2003). She met Lucila Tan when the
latter went to the Mayors Office together with Tita Pat, the sister of President Estrada, but she could no
longer remember the year. Lucila Tan went to the Office, together with Tita Pat, and they were seeking
the help of Mayor Jinggoy because they have a case. She did not know the case because they were
talking to Mayor Jinggoy. She could no longer remember how many times Lucila Tan went to the Office
of Mayor Jinggoy Estrada. She did not know what Lucila Tan wanted from Mayor Jinggoy Estrada or how
close Lucila Tan was to him (TSN, pages 8-11, Hearing of September 9, 2003). She denied that she met
Lucila Tan at the Cravings Restaurant and that she suggested to Lucila Tan to give Fifty Thousand Pesos
(P50,000.00) to Judge Rosete to speed up or facilitate her cases but that Lucila Tan agreed for only
Twenty Thousand Pesos (P20,000.00). She claimed that she did not know what Lucila Tan was talking
about regarding the money. There was no occasion that she suggested or even intimated to Lucila Tan
the idea of giving money to Judge Rosete. She denied that she met with Lucila Tan and Respondent
Judge at Cravings Restaurant along Wilson Street in San Juan, Metro Manila. She identified her Sworn
Statement, subscribed on February 5, 2003, which was marked as Exhibit 1 (TSN, pages 12-16, Hearing
of September 9, 2003). She denied that Lucila Tan gave anything to her (TSN, page 17, Hearing of
September 9, 2003).
2. RODOLFO CEA
He testified that his acquaintances usually call him Buboy and for about two years or more he
had no occupation. Two years before, he was a Clerk III at Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch 58, San Juan.
He knows Lucila Tan because, when he was still working as Clerk in San Juan, she approached me and
asked if I can introduce her to Judge Rosete and eventually asked for a favorable decision against her
case. He could not remember anymore when that was because it was a long time ago (TSN, pages 6-
7, Hearing of September 22, 2003). It was when he was still with the MeTC, Branch 58, San Juan, Metro
Manila. He met Lucila Tan at the corridor of the Metropolitan Trial Court when she approached him and
asked if he can introduce her to Judge Rosete. He agreed to introduce Lucila Tan to Judge Rosete but he
was not able to actually introduce Lucila Tan to Judge Rosete because aside from the introduction, she
wants me to ask Judge Rosete for a favorable decision against (sic) her case and I told her that Judge
Rosete dont (sic) like his staff (to) indulge on that kind of transaction (TSN, pages 8-9, Hearing of
September 22, 2003). As far as he knows, the meeting he had with Lucila Tan in the corridor of the Court
in San Juan was the first and the last time. When asked about the claim of Lucila Tan that he
approached her and demanded from her a sum of money to represent an advance payment for a
favorable decision in her cases then pending before Judge Rosete, he answered I dont know about
that, sir. (TSN, page 10, Hearing of September 22, 2003.) He identified the Sworn Statement,
subscribed on February 6, 2003, and confirmed and affirmed the truthfulness of the contents of the
Affidavit, which was marked as Exhibit 2 (TSN, pages 11-12, Hearing of September 22, 2003). He denied
that he met the Complainant at Sangkalan Restaurant around 8:30 in the evening of an unspecified date
(TSN, page 13, Hearing of September 22, 2003).
3. FERNANDO B. ESPUERTA
He testified that he is a government employee employed at the Supreme Court with the position
Budget Officer III since November 9, 1981. His first job was Casual and he became Budget Officer in 1997
(TSN, page 46, Hearing of September 22, 2003). He recalled having met Lucila Tan sometime just before
Christmas in October or November 2000. The first time he saw Lucila Tan was in a restaurant in Quezon
City where she was introduced to him by Fiscal Reyes. He went to the restaurant alone. He was invited
by Judge Rosete because they had not been together for a long time and they were long time friends.
They ate at the restaurant. When he arrived, Judge Rosete and Buboy were already there. They stayed
in the restaurant until 11:00 [eleven] oclock in the evening (TSN, pages 47-49, Hearing of September 22,
2003). He met Lucila Tan in that restaurant when Fiscal Reyes pointed him to Lucila Tan as Fernan of the
Supreme Court. When he arrived there, Buboy and Judge Rosete were already there. Later, the three
(3) girls arrived, namely: Fiscal Reyes, Lucila Tan and the sister of the Fiscal (TSN, page 50, Hearing of
September 22, 2003). They ordered and ate but they were in a separate table. He recalled that Judge
Rosete paid for their bill because he saw him get a credit card and sign something. He did not know
about Mrs. Tan but he saw Judge Rosete sign and give to the waiter. The incident where he met Lucila
Tan in the restaurant in Quezon City came before the incident when she went to his Office (TSN, pages
51-52, Hearing of September 22, 2003). He could not remember the month when Lucila Tan went to his
Office but he remembers that it was nearing Christmas in 2000. Pumunta siya sa akin parang may
ipinakiusap siya sa akin, katunayan nandito po dala ko. Lucila Tan asked him to help her in her case with
Alfonso Sy. Meron siyang inalok sa akin. Sabi bibigyan niya ako ng three hundred thousand pesos
(P300,000.00) para iabot kay Judge Rosete. Ang sagot ko nga sa kanya, hindi ganun ang aking kaibigan.
Matagal na kaming magkaibigan niyan noong nagpapractice pa yan. Iyon ang sagot ko sa kanya. He
told Judge Rosete about that and the latter got mad at him. In their second meeting, Lucila Tan gave him
papers. He presented a Motion for Reconsideration in Criminal Case No. 59440, which was marked as
Exhibit 3 (TSN, pages 53-56, Hearing of September 22, 2003). He presented the papers actually given to
him by Lucila Tan. He claimed that the xerox copy was the exact same document given to him by Lucila
Tan when she went to his Office. The other documents that Lucila Tan gave to him when she went to his
Office were marked as Exhibit 4 and submarkings (TSN, pages 57-63, Hearing of September 22, 2003).
Lucila Tan told him the contents of the documents and how the case against Alfonso Sy came about.
When Lucila Tan asked him, he answered her that his friend (Respondent Judge) was not like that and
they had been together for a long time and it is not possible. When he told Judge Rosete about that, the
latter got mad at him. Lucila Tan also mentioned to him that she knew the son of the Chief Justice (TSN,
pages 64-66, Hearing of September 22, 2003). Lucila Tan was insisting that he give Judge Rosete so that
her case will win but he answered that his friend was not like that (TSN, pages 67-68, Hearing of
September 22, 2003).
4. JOYCE TRINIDAD HERNANDEZ
She testified that she was a government employee connected with the Judiciary at the
Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch 58, San Juan, Metro Manila. She knew Complainant Lucila Tan because
in the year 2000 she had a case in their court. She first came to know Lucila Tan when the latter went to
their Office with Ellen Sorio, the Branch Clerk of Court of Branch 57, who introduced Lucila Tan to her.
Ellen Sorio said, may kaso ito sa inyo, pinapasabi ni Mayor kay Judge (TSN, pages 7-11, Hearing of
September 29, 2003). She did not say anything but Lucila Tan asked may tumawag na ba sa Mayors
Office? and she said yes, maam. After that there was a hearing and the sister of former President that he met complainant at Sangkalan Restaurant and swore that he never went out with respondent
Estrada went to their Office looking for Judge Rosete. She told her that Judge Rosete was on a hearing
and the former told her to tell Judge Rosete about the case of Lucila na pinakikiusap ni Mayor (TSN,
page 12, Hearing of September 29, 2003). She told Judge Rosete about the things that the sister of the
former President told her and that Judge Rosete said nothing. She denied the testimony of Complainant
on March 3, 2003 that, sometime in November 2000, she (Joyce Hernandez) called up Lucila Tan by
telephone and said that she saw money stuffed inside the drawer of the Respondent in his Office and
that she asked the Complainant whether the latter was the one who sent the money stuffed inside the
drawer. What she remembers is that Lucila Tan called her and asked if Josie went to their Office and she
told Lucila Tan that Josie never went to their Office. She also denied that she called up Lucila Tan
sometime in February 2001 and claimed that Lucila Tan was the one who called her up and told her that
she (Lucila Tan) was going to show her something. Lucila Tan showed her a copy of the Decision and she
was surprised when the former showed her the copy. When she asked where Lucila Tan got the copy,
the latter did not answer and said that Mayor Jinggoy wanted to talk to her (TSN, pages 13-16, Hearing
of September 29, 2003). She immediately went to the Office of the Mayor with Lucila Tan and Mayor
Jinggoy talked to her. The Mayor asked her where Judge Rosete was and she answered that he was in
New Zealand on study leave. When the Mayor asked if she knew the telephone number of the Judge,
she gave him the telephone number in New Zealand. She was present when the Mayor called up
Respondent Judge and talked to him (TSN, page 17, Hearing of September 29, 2003). He said Pare ko,
ano na itong kaso na pinakikiusap ko sa iyo? I dont know what was your answer(ed) [sic] to him, you
were talking and then he said ganun ba? then Mayor Jinggoy said o sige, okay na and then we left the
Office. She denied that she gave two advance copies of the Decisions in Complainants two cases inside
the latters parked car in San Juan, Metro Manila and claimed that Complainant was the one who
showed her the copy in their Office. She likewise denied the testimony of the Complainant that she
allegedly demanded Php150,000.00 for each of the two cases then pending before Branch 58, which
were decided by Respondent Judge, in return for a favorable decision (TSN, pages 18-21, Hearing of
September 29, 2003). She claimed that it was the Complainant who offered to her. She identified her
Sworn Statement, subscribed and sworn to on February 5, 2003, which was marked as Exhibit 5, and
confirmed and affirmed the truthfulness of all the contents thereof (TSN, pages 22-25, Hearing of
September 29, 2003).[9]
The Court is now faced with two opposing versions of the story. Complainant claims that
respondent judge, through his staff, required her to pay the amount of P150,000.00 for him to render
judgment in her favor in the two criminal cases she filed against Alfonso Pe Sy. Respondent judge, on
the other hand, asserts that it was complainant who attempted to bribe him by offering to pay for the
downpayment of the car he was planning to buy, and she even sought the intervention of then San Juan
Mayor Jinggoy Estrada to persuade him to rule for the complainant in Criminal Cases Nos. 59440 and
66120.
The issue in this administrative case thus boils down to a determination of the credibility of the
parties evidence.
After a thorough evaluation of the testimonies of all the witnesses, as well as the documentary
evidence presented by both parties, we find the complainants version more trustworthy. Not only did
she testify with clarity and in full detail, but she also presented during the investigation the unsigned
copy of the draft decision of respondent judge in Criminal Case No. 59440 given to her by a member of
his staff. Said documentary evidence supports her allegation that a member of complainants staff met
with her, showed her copies of respondent judges draft decisions in Criminal Cases Nos. 59440 and
66120, and demanded, in behalf of respondent judge, that she pays P150,000.00 for the reversal of the
disposition of said cases. It would be impossible for complainant to obtain a copy of a judges draft
decision, it being highly confidential, if not through the judge himself or from the people in his office.
And an ordinary employee in the court cannot promise a litigant the reversal of a cases disposition if not
assured by the judge who drafted the decision.
The respondents evidence did not overcome the facts proved by complainant. We note that the
testimonies of two of respondents witnesses contradict each other. Fernando Espuerta confirmed
complainants claim that she met respondent judge and his two companions, Espuerta himself and
Rodolfo Cea (Buboy), at Sangkalan Restaurant in Quezon City. Rodolfo Cea, on the other hand, denied
judge in non-office functions. The Investigating Judge observed:
Thus, there is an apparent inconsistency in the testimony of the Respondent Judges two witnesses,
Rodolfo Cea and Fernando B. Espuerta, regarding the incident at Sangkalan Restaurant in Quezon City
where Complainant claimed that she met Respondent Judge, a certain Fernan, and Buboy, while she was
with two Prosecutors. Fernando B. Espuerta testified that he was at Sangkalan Restaurant with
Respondent Judge and Buboy (Rodolfo Cea), while the latter (Rodolfo Cea) denied that he met the
Complainant at Sangkalan Restaurant.[10] (citations omitted)
Hence, we are more inclined to believe complainants version that she met with respondent judge and
his companions at Sangkalan Restaurant sometime in April 2001.
We have also observed that respondent judge has not been very candid with the Court as regards
the dates when he went to New Zealand and when he came back to the Philippines. Respondent asserts
that he was already in New Zealand at the time when complainant claims that he met with her.
However, the evidence he presented only shows his New Zealand visa and the dates when he entered
said country.[11] He did not show to the investigating body the dates when he left and returned to the
Philippines. Apparently, he entered New Zealand on two dates: March 4, 2001 and May 1, 2001. We
may therefore infer that complainant was in the Philippines before May 1, 2001, which is consistent with
complainants testimony, as well as that of Fernando Espuerta, that she met with respondent judge and
his companions, Fernando and Buboy in April 2001.
We have repeatedly admonished our judges to adhere to the highest tenets of judicial conduct.
They must be the embodiment of competence, integrity and independence. Like Caesars wife, a judge
must not only be pure but above suspicion. This is not without reason. The exacting standards of
conduct demanded from judges are designed to promote public confidence in the integrity and
impartiality of the judiciary because the peoples confidence in the judicial system is founded not only on
the magnitude of legal knowledge and the diligence of the members of the bench, but also on the
highest standard of integrity and moral uprightness they are expected to possess. When the judge
himself becomes the transgressor of any law which he is sworn to apply, he places his office in disrepute,
encourages disrespect for the law and impairs public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the
judiciary itself. It is therefore paramount that a judges personal behavior both in the performance of his
duties and his daily life, be free from any appearance of impropriety as to be beyond reproach.[12]
Respondents act of sending a member of his staff to talk with complainant and show copies of his
draft decisions, and his act of meeting with litigants outside the office premises beyond office hours
violate the standard of judicial conduct required to be observed by members of the Bench. They
constitute gross misconduct which is punishable under Rule 140 of the Revised Rules of Court.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, Respondent Judge Maxwel S. Rosete is SUSPENDED from office without salary
and other benefits for FOUR (4) MONTHS.
Salud v. Alumbres
This is an administrative case filed by Pastor Salud[1] against the Hon. Florentino M. Alumbres, then
presiding judge of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Las Pias City, Metro Manila, Branch 255, for undue
delay in the resolution of Civil Case No. LP-96-300, entitled Sps. Eduardo and Josefina Laurito v. Sps.
Pastor and Marcosa Salud.
As found by the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA),[2] the instant matter originated from the
double sale of a parcel of land. It appears that a certain Ricardo Forneza, Jr., and Cynthia S. Forneza
were the original owners of a house and lot covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. (106597) T-
5251-A. In a brief span of four (4) days, the Fornezas managed to sell the same property twice. The first
sale took place on February 8, 1990 to one Ferdinand Jimenez as evidenced by a Deed of Sale. Then on
February 12, 1990, the Fornezas executed in favor of Maria Belen Salud and Laurina Salud, a Contract to
Sell[3] over the same house and lot.
The first buyer (Jimenez) successfully caused the transfer of the title of the subject property in his name,
as a result of which TCT No. (106597) T-5251-A was cancelled and TCT No. T-14065 issued in his name.
On June 27, 1991, Jimenez sold the property to the spouses Eduardo and Josefina Laurito. The Laurito
spouses then secured a new title, TCT No. T-24778, in their names.[4]
When the Laurito spouses visited the subject property, they discovered that the spouses Pastor and
Marcosa Salud were occupying the house and lot. Notwithstanding the demand made by the Lauritos,
the Salud couple refused to vacate the property. Hence, the Lauritos filed a suit for unlawful detainer
against them before the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of Las Pias City.[5]
Despite the defense of the Salud spouses that they were buyers in good faith, the MeTC rendered a
Decision,[6] dated December 9, 1996, against them. The MeTC held that the Saluds failed to present any
document to show that they were the owners of the property.
On April 17, 1997, the Salud spouses appealed and filed a memorandum pursuant to Section 7, Rule
40[7] of the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure. The case, docketed as Civil Case No. LP-96-300, was raffled
to Branch 255 of the RTC of Las Pias City, presided over by herein respondent. Notwithstanding the
pendency of said appeal, on April 1, 1997,[8] Judge Alumbres issued an Alias Writ of Execution, stating
that judgment [is] now final and executory. [9] Thus, the Salud spouses filed a petition for certiorari
before the Court of Appeals on April 23, 1997, with a prayer to temporarily restrain the RTC from
implementing, enforcing or otherwise executing its orders dated February 17, 1997 and April 1, 1997, or
otherwise disturbing the status quo.[10]
The Laurito spouses then filed with the Court of Appeals a Motion to Declare Temporary Restraining
Order Vacated and for the early resolution of the case. On October 8, 1998, they also filed a Motion for
Issuance of an Alias Writ of Execution Pending Appeal.[11]
On October 19, 1998,[12] Pastor Salud filed a Letter Complaint[13] with the OCA praying that the
respondent judge be found administratively liable for delay in rendering judgment in Civil Case No. LP-
96-300. The Salud spouses claimed that the RTC had the period from May 1997 to August 1997 to decide
Civil Case No. LP-96-300, but had not resolved the matter. They likewise pointed to another case pending
before the respondent, where the litigants had been waiting at least six (6) months for the courts
judgment. The complainants herein asked the OCA to look closely at the docket of respondent judges
sala, as they were of the belief that several cases ripe for decision remained unacted upon.[14]
On October 19, 1998, despite Saluds opposition, the respondent judge issued an Alias Writ of Execution.
Salud questioned the issuance of the alias writ on the ground that said order was contrary to the
respondent judges earlier statement that he would not act upon or issue any writ out of respect for the
order of the Court of Appeals to maintain the status quo. The respondent judge made the statement,
according to Salud despite the prayer of the Saluds that a decision be rendered on their unlawful
detainer case.[15]
On November 20, 1998, or after more than fifteen (15) months from submission, the RTC handed down
its judgment in Civil Case No. LP-96-300. It affirmed in toto the decision of the MeTC, which found the
Saluds have failed to present a better title to the subject property.[16]
In his Comment[17] on the instant Complaint, respondent judge does not deny that there was a delay in
the rendition of judgment. However, he sought to put the blame for the delay squarely on the
complainant herein. According to respondent, after he decreed the issuance of a Writ of Execution
Pending Appeal, complainant herein filed numerous pleadings not only before the RTC but also with the
Court of Appeals, which sought to thwart the implementation of the writ issued and, obviously, to harass
him. Complainant likewise sought to inhibit him from proceeding with the hearing of Civil Case No. LP-
96-300. Respondent avers that complainant even went to the extent of charging him with contempt of
court before the Court of Appeals. As a result, respondent said his time was virtually used up by
answering baseless and unwarranted pleadings filed by the complainant.[18]
Respondent points out that despite the pendency of the administrative case against him, he was
nevertheless able to render a decision, albeit delayed by 16 months. He now submits that given this
development, he should be exempted from and relieved of any liability. In addition, Judge Alumbres
submits that more than one (1) year has lapsed since the case was decided and he no longer has any
jurisdiction over Civil Case No. LP-96-300. Hence, he should not be ordered to explain matters no longer
within his jurisdiction and competence.[19] Lastly, Judge Alumbres attributes the filing of the
administrative case against him to the unfavorable decision he rendered against complainant in the
unlawful detainer case. He cites complainant as a classic example of a disgruntled litigant.[20]
On August 29, 2000, the Court Administrator recommended that the respondent judge be suspended
without pay and benefits for a period of two (2) months[21] for delay in the disposition of a case.[22]
Said recommendation took into consideration the fact that respondent had previously been admonished
for having decided a case beyond the reglementary period.
It is not disputed that it took respondent judge over 16 months to render his decision in Civil Case No.
LP-96-300 after it was submitted for decision. The Constitution[23] mandates lower court judges to
decide a case within ninety (90) days from its submission. Likewise, the Code of Judicial Conduct[24]
mandates judges to administer justice without delay and directs every judge to dispose of the courts
business promptly within the period prescribed by the law and the rules. We have emphasized strict
observance of this duty in order to minimize, if not totally eradicate, the twin problems of congestion
and delay that have long plagued our courts. It is an oft-repeated maxim that justice delayed is often
justice denied. Thus, any delay in the administration of justice, no matter how brief, may result in
depriving the litigant of his right to a speedy disposition of his case. Delay ultimately affects the image of
the judiciary.[25] Failure to comply with the mandate of the Constitution and of the Code of Judicial
Conduct constitutes serious misconduct, which is detrimental to the honor and integrity of a judicial
office. Inability to decide a case despite the ample time prescribed is inexcusable, constitutes gross
inefficiency,[26] and warrants administrative sanction of the defaulting judge.[27]
Delay in the rendition of judgments diminishes the peoples faith in our judicial system,[28] and lowers
its standards and brings it into disrepute.[29] In the event that judges cannot comply with the deadlines
prescribed by law, they should apply for extensions of time to avoid administrative sanctions.[30] The
Court allows a certain degree of latitude to judges and grants them reasonable extensions of time to
resolve cases upon proper application by the judges concerned and on meritorious grounds.[31] At the
very least, respondent judge should have requested for an extension of time to render judgment once he
knew that he could not comply with the prescribed 90-day period to render a judgment. In so doing, he
would have been able to apprise litigants as to the status of the case and the reason for the delay, if any.
It would have shown his mindfulness of the deadlines.
Undue delay in rendering a decision constitutes a less serious charge under Section 4, Rule 140[32] of
the Rules of Court, as amended. If found guilty thereof, the judge shall be suspended from office
without salary and other benefits for not less than one (1) month or more than three (3) months; or
imposed a fine of more than P10,000, but not exceeding P20,000, pursuant to Section 10,[33] Rule 140.
In this instance, however, we also have to recognize certain contributing factors for the delay. Among
them are the observed tendencies of the litigants to resort to harassment tactics against the judge, as
well as to overburden the court with multiple but unnecessary motions and related paperwork. These
negative tactics are to be deplored. Although they do not excuse undue delay, they certainly should
mitigate the imposable penalty on the erring judge.
Except for the mitigating circumstance, we are in agreement with the OCA recommendations in this
case. The record shows that this is not the first time that respondent has been called to account by this
Court. In 1992, he was fined for gross partiality to a party. In 1996, he was admonished for delay in the
disposition of a case. In 1999, he was reprimanded. Although respondent has retired on June 3, 2001,
the recommendation of the OCA that a fine be imposed on him is still in order.
Worth stressing, even after a judge has retired from the service, he may still be held administratively
accountable for lapses and offenses committed during his incumbency. Although he may no longer be
dismissed or suspended, fines may still be meted out to be deducted from his retirement benefits.[34]
ACCORDINGLY, considering all the circumstances in this case, Hon. Florentino M. Alumbres, former
presiding judge of the Regional Trial Court of Las Pias, Branch 255, is FINED FIVE THOUSAND PESOS
(P5,000.00) for undue delay in rendering a decision in Civil Case No. LP-96-300. Said amount is hereby
ORDERED deducted from retirement benefits of respondent.
Anonymous v. Judge Rio C. Achas, (see internet)
RALLOS VS GAKO
A judge may be held administratively liable for gross ignorance of the law when it is shown that -- motivated by
bad faith, fraud, dishonesty or corruption -- he ignored, contradicted or failed to apply settled law and
jurisprudence.
The Case
Two consolidated administrative cases were filed against Judge Ireneo Lee Gako Jr. of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Cebu City, Branch 5.
The first case was filed by Joselito Rallos, Simon Rallos, Josefina Rallos Vallar and Teresita Rallos Yap. It
was an Administrative Complaint in connection with Special Proceedings Case No. 1576-R entitled Intestate
Estate of Simeon Rallos, then pending before respondent.
The second was filed by Executive Secretary Ronaldo B. Zamora, charging respondent with ignorance of the
law and grave abuse of authority. This Complaint was based on the allegation that the latter had ordered the
release of 25,000 sacks of imported rice to the claimants,[1] notwithstanding the pendency of seizure and
forfeiture proceedings before the Bureau of Customs.
After respondent had filed his Comment, the Court, in its September 1, 1999 Resolution, docketed the two
cases as administrative matters and referred them to Deputy Court Administrator Bernardo T. Ponferrada for
investigation, report and recommendation.
After conducting hearings, the investigator submitted his findings and recommendations in a Memorandum
dated January 4, 2000.
On March 17, 2000, we promulgated a Decision finding respondent guilty of the first charge and ordering him
to pay a fine of P10,000. The second charge, however, was held in abeyance, pending the judicial resolution
of the Petition questioning respondents Orders. Hence, in its earlier Decision, the Court disposed as
follows:[2]
WHEREFORE, the Court finds Judge Ireneo Lee Gako Jr. GUILTY of grave abuse of authority and partiality
aggravated by dishonesty for which he is ordered to PAY a FINE of P10,000. He is sternly warned that a
commission of similar acts in the future shall be dealt with more severely. The Complaint filed by Executive
Secretary Ronaldo Zamora is hereby held in abeyance.
Respondents Motion for Reconsideration[3] of our March 17, 2000 Decision was denied with finality by this
Court.[4]
Subsequently, in a Decision[5] dated March 30, 2000, the Court set aside respondents Orders, which were
also the bases of Secretary Zamoras Complaint.
Hence, the Court will now rule on the second case against respondent.
The Facts
For clarity, we again present the antecedent facts in the first case, which were summarized by the
investigator[6] in this wise:
On December 8, 1998, the Economic Intelligence and Investigation Bureau (EIIB) of the Bureau of Customs
(BOC), the Philippine Coast Guard, and the Philippine National Police (PNP) at the Port of Cebu withheld, for
investigation, an estimated 25,000 sacks of rice marked as Snowman on board the vessel, M/V Alberto. The
sacks of rice allegedly came from Palawan to be unloaded in Cebu. Likewise seized on the same date were
nine cargo trucks to be used for carrying the subject sacks of rice.
The EIIB then wrote to the Bureau of Customs, Cebu, stating that upon further verification, no proper voyage
clearance to sail from Palawan to Cebu was issued to the vessel, M/V Alberto. The EIIB then requested that a
warrant of seizure and detention be issued over the rice shipment.
On December 9, 1998, the Bureau of Customs issued a Warrant of Seizure and Detention against: a) the
vessel M/V Alberto used in the illegal transport of imported staple rice; b) the imported staple rice consisting of
25,000 sacks, more or less, with the Snowman brand; and c) nine (9) motor-vehicle trucks used and utilized
in the illegal transport of the rice. The warrant was also directed to the owner of the M/V Alberto, ANMA
Philippine Shipping Corporation, and the consignee of the rice shipment, Mark Montelibano.
Thereafter, the claimants Mark Montelibano and Elson Ogario, on December 10, 1998, filed a complaint for
injunction with prayer for temporary restraining order and writ of preliminary injunction. The case, entitled
Elson Ogario and Mark Montelibano vs. Bureau of Customs, EIIB, Philippine Navy, Maritime Command,
Philippine National Police, Philippine Coast Guard and All Enforcement Agencies was docketed as Civil Case
No. CEB 23077 and assigned to Branch 5, Regional Trial Court of Cebu City, which is the sala of respondent
judge. The complaint alleged that the acts of defendants in intercepting the subject sacks of rice [were]
unlawful, illegal and merely based on suspicion. Thus, plaintiffs prayed for the quashal of the warrant of
seizure and detention (dated December 9, 1998) issued by the Collector of Customs, and for the release of
the goods.
The Bureau of Customs filed a motion to dismiss on December 11, 1998, alleging that the trial court ha[d] no
jurisdiction over the complaint. x x x
xxxxxxxxx
The Bureau of Customs also pointed out that the appropriate seizure proceeding was already instituted on
December 9, 1998, by virtue of the issuance of the warrant of seizure and detention. This had the effect of
depriving the trial court of jurisdiction over the matter.
On December 28, 1998, a hearing was held by respondent judge on both the motion to dismiss of the Bureau
of Customs and the complainants application for a writ of preliminary injunction. The parties presented
evidence in support of their respective positions.
In a Resolution dated January 11, 1999, the respondent judge denied the Bureau of Customs motion to
dismiss and granted complainants prayer for writ of preliminary injunction, the dispositive portion of which
reads:
xxxxxxxxx

In the subject resolution, the respondent judge also ruled that the Bureau of Customs ha[d] no jurisdiction
because the goods involved [were] neither imported nor smuggled and were apprehended outside the
customs zone. As further basis, it was ruled that plaintiff was able to present a certification issued by the
National Food Authority that the subject rice came from Palawan. Defendants, on the other hand, submitted
no evidence that the subject bags of rice were imported or smuggled. The issuance of the warrant of seizure
and detention being arbitrary and without probable cause, it did not divest the trial court of its jurisdiction.
The Bureau of Customs filed a motion for reconsideration, but this was subsequently denied in the trial courts
Order dated January 25, 1999. In this resolution, respondent judge ordered the defendants to release the
25,000 sacks of rice without delay, the dispositive portion of which reads:
xxxxxxxxx
The Bureau of Customs, through the Office of the Solicitor General, filed a petition for certiorari before the
Court of Appeals, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 51051, assailing the Resolutions dated January 11 and 25,
1999 of the respondent judge.
In the meantime, on April 5, 1999, the District Collector of Customs of Cebu City rendered a Decision in the
seizure proceedings (Cebu Seizure Identification Case No. 17-98) declaring the 25,000 sacks of Snowman
rice as smuggled and ordering their forfeiture.
On April 15, 1999, the Court of Appeals issued a Decision[7] denying the petition for certiorari filed by the
Bureau of Customs and affirmed the questioned Resolutions dated January 11 and 25, 1999 issued [by]
respondent judge.
In view of the Court of Appeals decision, respondent judge issued another Resolution dated April 26, 1999
reiterating the release of the 25,000 sacks of rice, the dispositive portion of which reads:
xxxxxxxxx
A petition for review was then filed by the Bureau of Customs before the Supreme Court questioning the
Decision of the Court of Appeals. Upon application, a Temporary Restraining Order was subsequently issued
by the Supreme Court on May 17, 1999, enjoining the Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court, 7th
Judicial Region, Branch 5, Cebu City or any of his representatives and the respondents from enforcing or
causing to be enforced the questioned Resolution dated 11 January 1999, the Order dated 25 January 1999,
and the Resolution dated 26 April 1999, as well as all subsequent orders issued by the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 5, Cebu City in Civil Case No. CEB-23077 entitled Elson Ogario and Mark Montelibano vs. Bureau of
Customs, et. al.
xxxxxxxxx
Respondent judge was required to comment on the administrative complaint.
1. In his Comment dated July 21, 1999 (Exh. 8), the judge in essence, sought to justify the issuance of the
questioned orders on the following propositions:
a. The Warrant of Seizure and Detention issued by the Bureau of Customs of the Port of Cebu on December
9, 1998 was based merely on a suspicion and not anchored on probable cause. Hence, the issuance of the
Warrant was not valid and, therefore, of no legal effect.
b. That the Bureau of Customs [of the Port of] Cebu x x x abused its authority or function in seizing the '25
thousand bags of rice' on the basis of a suspicion that they were smuggled goods or illegally imported. The
issuance of the Warrant of Seizure and Detention was arbitrary.
c. That the Regional Trial Court Judge in the exercise of his jurisdiction, can issue an injunction to stop or
prevent a purported enforcement of a criminal law which is not in accordance with an orderly administration of
justice, and also to stop and prevent the Bureau of Customs from using the strong arm of the law in an
oppressive and arbitrary manner.[8]
Investigators Recommendation
Deputy Court Administrator Ponferrada recommended that respondent be suspended for six months without
pay in regard to Secretary Zamoras Complaint for gross ignorance of the law. The investigator explained as
follows:
"Well-settled is the rule that the trial court has no jurisdiction over the property subject of the warrant of seizure
and detention issued by the Bureau of Customs. In the case of Mison vs. Natividad,[9] the Honorable
Supreme Court held that:
'The court a quo has no jurisdiction over the res subject of the warrant of seizure and detention. The
respondent judge, therefore, acted arbitrarily and despotically in issuing the temporary restraining order,
granting the writ of preliminary injunction and denying the motion to dismiss, thereby removing the res from
the control of the Collector of Customs and depriving him of his exclusive original jurisdiction over the
controversy. Respondent judge exercised a power he never had and encroached upon the exclusive original
jurisdiction of the Collector of Customs. By express provision of law, amply supported by well-settled
jurisprudence, the Collector of Customs has exclusive jurisdiction over seizure and forfeiture proceedings, and
regular courts cannot interfere with his exercise thereof or stifle or put it to naught.
"The Office of the Court Administrator also issued Circular 68-94 dated November 3, 1994, which reiterated
the provisions of Circular No. 13-93.
"The aforesaid circulars were again reiterated in Administrative Circular No. 07-99 dated June 25, 1999 issued
by Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide informing judges of the lower courts to exercise utmost caution, prudence,
and judiciousness in the issuance of temporary restraining orders and writs of preliminary injunctions to avoid
any suspicion that its issuance or grant was for considerations other than the strict merits of the case. x x
x[10]
The Courts Ruling
We agree with the findings of the deputy court administrator. However, we reduce the penalty to three months
suspension without pay.
Gross Ignorance of the Law
The administrative case, initiated by Secretary Zamora, is bolstered by Bureau of Customs (B0C) v.
Ogario,[11] in which the Court set aside respondents Orders. We ruled thus:
In Jao v. Court of Appeals, this Court, reiterating its ruling in a long line of cases, said:
There is no question that Regional Trial Courts are devoid of any competence to pass upon the validity or
regularity of seizure and forfeiture proceedings conducted by the Bureau of Customs and to enjoin or
otherwise interfere with these proceedings. The Collector of Customs sitting in seizure and forfeiture
proceedings has exclusive jurisdiction to hear and determine all questions touching on the seizure and
forfeiture of dutiable goods. The Regional Trial Courts are precluded from assuming cognizance over such
matters even through petitions for certiorari, prohibition or mandamus.
xxxxxxxxx
The rule that Regional Trial Courts have no review powers over such proceedings is anchored upon the policy
of placing no unnecessary hindrance on the governments drive, not only to prevent smuggling and other
frauds upon Customs, but more importantly, to render effective and efficient the collection of import and export
duties due the State, which enables the government to carry out the functions it has been instituted to perform.
Even if the seizure by the Collector of Customs were illegal, which has yet to be proven, we have said that
such act does not deprive the Bureau of Customs of jurisdiction thereon.[12] (citations omitted.)
Clearly, respondent had absolutely no jurisdiction to take cognizance of the Complaint for Injunction filed by
Ogario and Montelibano.[13] Administrative Circular No. 07-99,[14] cautioning lower court judges in their
issuance of temporary restraining orders and writs of preliminary injunctions, emphasized this lack of
jurisdiction of trial courts. It stressed, inter alia, the rule enunciated in Mison:[15] that the Collector of Customs
has exclusive jurisdiction over seizure and forfeiture proceedings.
When asked to explain why he ruled contrary to a basic and settled doctrine, respondent explained as follows:
The court believes that a Warrant of Seizure and Detention, which is a counterpart of a Warrant of Arrest,
must be issued on the basis of a probable cause. Verily, the quantum of evidence required in the issuance of
a Warrant of Seizure and Detention should also be the same as in the Warrant of Arrest. Consequently, since
the said Warrant of Seizure and Detention was merely issued on the basis of a mere suspicion and as
recommended by the EIIB and not anchored on probable cause, the same is not valid and has no legal effect.
xxxxxxxxx
In the instant case, the court believes that the defendants had abused their authority or function in seizing the
plaintiffs goods on the basis of suspicion that they are smuggled or illegally imported. The court also believes
that the issuance of the Warrant of Seizure and Detention by the defendant Bureau of Customs was attended
with arbitrariness. x x x. Consequently, the Regional Trial Court, in the exercise of its general jurisdiction, can
issue an injunction to stop or prevent a purported enforcement of the criminal law which is not in accordance
with an orderly administration of justice, and also to stop and prevent the defendants from using the strong
arm of the law in an oppressive and arbitrary manner.[16]
The reason given by respondent is unsatisfactory, having been aptly answered in Ogario,[17] from which we
quote:
[U]nder the law, the question of whether probable cause exists for the seizure of the subject sacks of rice is
not for the Regional Trial Court to determine. The customs authorities do not have to prove to the satisfaction
of the court that the articles on board a vessel were imported from abroad or are intended to be shipped
abroad before they may exercise the power to effect customs searches, seizures, or arrests provided by law
and continue with the administrative hearings. As the Court held in Ponce Enrile v. Vinuya:
The governmental agency concerned, the Bureau of Customs, is vested with exclusive authority. Even if it be
assumed that in the exercise of such exclusive competence a taint of illegality may be correctly imputed, the
most that can be said is that under certain circumstances the grave abuse of discretion conferred may oust it
of such jurisdiction. It does not mean however that correspondingly a court of first instance is vested with
competence when clearly in the light of the above decisions the law has not seen fit to do so. The proceeding
before the Collector of Customs is not final. An appeal lies to the Commissioner of Customs and thereafter to
the Court of Tax Appeals. It may even reach this Court through the appropriate petition for review. The proper
ventilation of the legal issues raised is thus indicated. Certainly a court of first instance is not therein included.
It is devoid of jurisdiction. (citations omitted; emphasis in the original)
Clearly, respondent decided against a settled doctrine. This act constitutes gross ignorance of the law.[18]
However, we have held that to be punishable as such, it must not only be contradictory to existing law and
jurisprudence, but must also be motivated by bad faith, fraud, dishonesty or corruption.[19] That there is
enough evidence here to show respondents bad faith is aptly pointed out by the Office of the Court
Administrator (OCA) in its Memorandum:[20]
The records of this case indicate that after the issuance of that questioned order of January 11, 1999, the
Bureau of Customs, et al. filed their Motions for Reconsideration and requested to set the hearing on January
21, 1999, the date scheduled by the respondent judge for the continuation of the trial on the merits in Civil
Case No. CEB-23077. But, the respondent judge set the hearing of said motions on January 19, 1999.
However, from January 18, 1999 to January 21, 1999, the respondent judge did not report to the Court. He
could not be contacted or located even by his own staff. The respondent judge also did not leave any word
regarding his whereabouts, even with the Executive Judge. Hence, the scheduled hearings could not proceed.
Obviously, the respondent judge reported back to his Office only after the Assistant Solicitor General and the
Solicitor representing the Bureau of Customs, et al. returned to Manila from Cebu City because on January
22, 1999, the same respondent judge issued instead, an order requiring the Officials of the Bureau of Customs
to comment on a Motion for Contempt filed against them.
Indeed, this actuation of respondent judge amounted to bad faith. Because he played with the court calendar,
the issuance of the questioned Orders was clearly motivated by dishonesty and fraud.
While we agree with the findings of the OCA, we believe however that the recommended penalty is too harsh.
Under the circumstances, we hold that the appropriate penalty is three months suspension without pay.
Likewise, we agree that respondents Motion to Dismiss had no legal basis either. Indeed, [t]he subject of the
x x x administrative case are the acts committed by the respondent judge in the performance of his duties.
This being the sole subject of the complaint filed by the Executive Secretary, the Court will confine itself to the
issue of whether or not the respondent judge is liable for gross ignorance of the law.[21]
WHEREFORE, the Court finds Judge Ireneo Lee Gako Jr. GUILTY of gross ignorance of the law, for which he
is hereby SUSPENDED for three months without pay. He is sternly warned that a commission of similar acts in
the future shall be dealt with more severely.
Manzon v. Judge Perello
In a First Indorsement, dated 23 June 2000, Assistant Ombudsman Abelardo L. Aportadera, Jr., forwarded to
the Office of the Court Administrator a letter-complaint of Arnel V. Manzon charging Judge Norma C. Perello
and Atty. Paul M. Resureccion, the branch Clerk of Court, both of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 276, of
Muntinlupa City, with dereliction of duty relative to Civil Case No. 9-138 (Arnel V. Manzon vs. Maria Remedios
Argana, et al.), a case for damages then pending before the sala of respondent Judge. Manzon averred in
his complaint that the case was filed on 24 July 1997 but that it had remained unacted upon for three years.
He made several follow-ups to ascertain the status of the case but his efforts proved to be in vain.
In her comment, Judge Perello explained that in an order, dated 05 November 1997, she directed the parties
to file their position papers on whether or not the court had jurisdiction over the case considering that the
subject matter would appear to have already been covered in a decision of the Metropolitan Trial Court
(MeTC), Branch 80, in Civil Case No. 2974 for unlawful detainer. The MeTC decision was later affirmed by
Branch 256[1] of the Regional Trial Court. Respondent Judge claimed that Branch Clerk of Court Paul M.
Resureccion, acting Docket Clerk of Civil Cases Section Jessie Ferreras and Receiving Clerk Jennifer Daria,
had purposely withheld the records of the case from her. Respondent judge added that complainant Manzon
had failed to prosecute the case. Respondent judge attributed the delay in deciding the case to complainants
own negligence, unfortunately abetted, she lamented, by some of her own court personnel, Resureccion and
Daria, whom she forthwith recommended to be fined in the amount equal to one month of their respective
salaries.
In his comment, respondent Paul Resureccion confirmed that the parties in Civil Case No. 9-138 were directed
to file their position papers on the issue of the courts jurisdiction over the case. Complainant, however, never
attempted to prosecute the case. Respondent Resureccion said that he, being too busy with the heavy docket
of the court, was not aware that the case was still then pending because the clerk in charge of the civil case
kept the expediente and complainant had made no follow-up thereon.
The Office of the Court Administrator (OCA), after its evaluation of the case, found both Judge Perello and
Clerk of Court Resureccion to have utterly failed in adopting a system of record management. The OCA
concluded that complainants failure to bring the matter to the courts attention was not a valid reason for the
delay complained of, and that it was incumbent upon both respondents to keep tab of all cases pending before
the sala. The OCA recommended that respondents be reprimanded for their incompetence and dereliction of
duty, be advised to be more attentive to their duties, and be warned that the same neglect or similar action in
the future would be dealt with severely.
In its 18th March 2002 resolution, the Court adopted the recommendation of the OCA. Judge Norma Perello
and Atty. Paul Resureccion were reprimanded for incompetence and/or dereliction of duty, advised to be more
attentive to their duties than had been shown, and warned that a neglect or similar inaction on their part in the
future would be dealt with severely.
Judge Perello filed a motion for reconsideration. She asserted that she was never incompetent, that the case
was not referred to her by the receiving clerk and the branch Clerk of Court, which would explain her inaction,
and that she only had learned of the pending case when complainant wrote her a letter. She informed the
Court that the case was not even reported in the monthly, quarterly or annual reports because Jessie
Ferreras, Jennifer Daria and Paul Resureccion misplaced the files and conspired against her in not bringing
the matter to her attention. She maintained that she adopted a system of case flow and management,
contrary to the findings of the OCA, which system had been in effect for almost ten years. Unfortunately, the
branch Clerk of Court did not follow the routing procedure, misplaced the case folder, and kept the matter from
respondent judge. She insisted that she could have timely acted on the matter had it been timely referred to
her. She submitted that it was unfair to reprimand her for omissions attributable to her negligent personnel.
The Court referred the motion to the OCA for evaluation, report and recommendation.
In its compliance, the OCA found no reason to reverse its previous findings and recommendation. Instead, it
found the admission of respondent Judge that the case was not reported in the monthly, quarterly and annual
reports of cases to be an aggravating circumstance. The OCA thus recommended that the penalty of
reprimand be increased to a fine of P5,000.00.
The Court shares the position taken by the OCA.
It should be the duty of Judges to see to it that clerks and other court personnel faithfully perform the functions
assigned to them. Regrettably, respondent Judge failed in this respect. Indeed, being the Executive Judge,
respondent judge had, at least should have had, first-hand information on the cases raffled to her sala.
Granting that the expediente of Civil Case No. 9-138 was, in fact, misplaced, respondent judge could have
discovered the matter had she conducted the docket inventory pursuant to Administrative Circular No. 10-
94,[2] reiterated under Administrative Circular No. 1,[3] requiring all trial judges to conduct a physical inventory
of cases at the time of their assumption of office and every semester thereafter on the 30th of June and 31st
of December of the year. In order to ensure compliance with Administrative Circular No. 10-94, the Court
issued Administrative Circular No. 17-94[4] authorizing trial judges to devote one week of each semester for
the audit and inventory during which period trials need not be scheduled.
The Statistical Reports Division, Court Management Office, of the OCA reported that the latest Docket
Inventory Report of Branch 276 presided over by respondent Judge was for the period covering July to
December 1999. The OCA informed the Court that, contrary to the clear mandate of Administrative Circular
No. 10-94, no docket inventory reports were submitted for five semesters covering January to June 2000, July
to December 2000, January to June 2001, July to December 2001 and January to June 2002.
As so aptly pointed out by the OCA, respondent Judge cannot hide behind the inefficiency of her court
personnel. In the Report on the Judicial Audit and Physical Inventory of the Cases in RTC, Branch 138,
Makati City,[5] this Court has stated:
We find unacceptable his claim that it was not his intention to deliberately mislead this Court into believing
that only one case was submitted for decision for the month of December 1993 but that the Monthly Report Of
Cases was prepared not by him but by a member of his staff. A perusal of his report however discloses that it
was noted and signed by respondent himself. It must be underscored that proper court management is one of
the primary responsibilities of a trial judge pursuant to Rule 3.09, Canon 3, of the Code of Judicial Conduct.
Upon the judge invariably rests the duty to take note of the cases submitted for decision and decide them
within the reglementary period. In his desire to exculpate himself and place the blame on his staff, Judge
Agdamag forgot that `he sits not only to judge litigated cases with the least possible delay but that his
responsibilities include being an effective manager of the Court and its personnel. Judge Agdamag is
presumed to be cognizant of his responsibilities as a worthy minister of the law. At the very least he is
expected to keep abreast with his docket.
Rule 3.09, Canon 3, of the Code of Judicial Conduct obliges a judge to properly supervise the court personnel
to ensure the prompt and efficient dispatch of business and to require at all times the observance of high
standards of fidelity to duty. Respondent judge is the master of her own domain, and she must assume the
responsibility that goes with it.
WHEREFORE, the resolution, dated 18 March 2002, of the Court is MODIFIED by imposing upon Judge
Norma C. Perello a FINE of Five Thousand Pesos. Respondent Judge is further warned that a repetition of
the same or similar conduct in the future shall be dealt with severely.
No motion for reconsideration having been filed by Atty. Paul M. Resureccion, the penalty of reprimand
imposed upon him in the resolution of 18 March 2002 stands.
SO ORDERED.
Atty. Melvin D.C. Mane v. Judge Belen
By letter-complaint dated May 19, 2006[1] which was received by the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA)
on May 26, 2006, Atty. Melvin D.C. Mane (complainant) charged Judge Medel Arnaldo B. Belen (respondent),
Presiding Judge of Branch 36, Regional Trial Court, Calamba City, of demean[ing], humiliat[ing] and
berat[ing] him during the hearing on February 27, 2006 of Civil Case No. 3514-2003-C, Rural Bank of
Cabuyao, Inc. v. Samuel Malabanan, et al in which he was counsel for the plaintiff.
To prove his claim, complainant cited the remarks made by respondent in the course of the proceedings
conducted on February 27, 2006 as transcribed by stenographer Elenita C. de Guzman, viz:
COURT:
. . . Sir, are you from the College of Law of the University of the Philippines?
ATTY. MANE:
No[,] [Y]our Honor[,] from Manuel L. Quezon University[,] [Y]our Honor.
COURT:
No, youre not from UP.
ATTY. MANE:
I am very proud of it.
COURT:
Then youre not from UP. Then you cannot equate yourself to me because there is a saying and I
know this, not all law students are created equal, not all law schools are created equal, not all
lawyers are created equal despite what the Supreme Being that we all are created equal in His form and
substance.[2] (Emphasis supplied)
Complainant further claimed that the entire proceedings were duly recorded in a tape recorder by
stenographer de Guzman, and despite his motion (filed on April 24, 2006) for respondent to direct her to
furnish him with a copy of the tape recording, the motion remained unacted as of the date he filed the present
administrative complaint on May 26, 2006. He, however, attached a copy of the transcript of stenographic
notes taken on February 27, 2006.
In his Comments[3] dated June 14, 2006 on the complaint filed in compliance with the Ist Indorsement
dated May 31, 2006[4] of the OCA, respondent alleged that complainant filed on December 15, 2005 an
Urgent Motion to Inhibit,[5] paragraph 3[6] of which was malicious and a direct assault to the integrity and
dignity of the Court and of the Presiding Judge as it succinctly implied that [he] issued the order dated 27
September 2005 for [a] consideration other than the merits of the case. He thus could not simply sit idly and
allow a direct assault on his honor and integrity.
On the unacted motion to direct the stenographer to furnish complainant with a copy of the unedited
tape recording of the proceedings, respondent quoted paragraphs 4 and 3[7] of the motion which, to him,
implied that the trial court was illegally, unethically and unlawfully engaged in editing the transcript of records
to favor a party litigant against the interest of [complainants] client.
Respondent thus claimed that it was on account of the two motions that he ordered complainant, by
separate orders dated June 5, 2006, to explain within 15 days[8] why he should not be cited for contempt.
Complainant later withdrew his complaint, by letter of September 4, 2006,[9] stating that it was a mere result
of his impulsiveness.
In its Report dated November 7, 2007,[10] the OCA came up with the following evaluation:
. . . The withdrawal or desistance of a complainant from pursuing an administrative complaint does not
divest the Court of its disciplinary authority over court officials and personnel. Thus, the complainants
withdrawal of the instant complaint will not bar the continuity of the instant administrative proceeding against
respondent judge.
The issue presented before us is simple: Whether or not the statements and actions made by the
respondent judge during the subject February 27, 2006 hearing constitute conduct unbecoming of a judge and
a violation of the Code of Judicial Conduct.
After a cursory evaluation of the complaint, the respondents comment and the documents at hand, we
find that there is no issue as to what actually transpired during the February 27th hearing as evidenced by the
stenographic notes. The happening of the incident complained of by herein complainant was never denied by
the respondent judge. If at all, respondent judge merely raised his justifications for his complained actuations.
xxxx
. . . [A] judges official conduct and his behavior in the performance of judicial duties should be free
from the appearance of impropriety and must be beyond reproach. A judge must at all times be temperate in
his language. Respondent judges insulting statements which tend to question complainants capability and
credibility stemming from the fact that the latter did not graduated [sic] from UP Law school is clearly
unwarranted and inexcusable. When a judge indulges in intemperate language, the lawyer can return the
attack on his person and character, through an administrative case against the judge, as in the instant case.
Although respondent judges use in intemperate language may be attributable to human frailty, the
noble position in the bench demands from him courteous speech in and out of the court. Judges are
demanded to be always temperate, patient and courteous both in conduct and language.
xxxx
Judge Belen should bear in mind that all judges should always observe courtesy and civility. In
addressing counsel, litigants, or witnesses, the judge should avoid a controversial tone or a tone that creates
animosity. Judges should always be aware that disrespect to lawyers generates disrespect to them. There
must be mutual concession of respect. Respect is not a one-way ticket where the judge should be respected
but free to insult lawyers and others who appear in his court. Patience is an essential part of dispensing justice
and courtesy is a mark of culture and good breeding. If a judge desires not to be insulted, he should start
using temperate language himself; he who sows the wind will reap a storm.
It is also noticeable that during the subject hearing, not only did respondent judge make insulting and
demeaning remarks but he also engaged in unnecessary lecturing and debating. . .
xxxx ATTY. MANE:
Ah, with due respect your
Respondent should have just ruled on the propriety of the motion to inhibit filed by complainant, but,
instead, he opted for a conceited display of arrogance, a conduct that falls below the standard of decorum COURT:
expected of a judge. If respondent judge felt that there is a need to admonish complainant Atty. Mane, he Tell me, what is your school?
should have called him in his chambers where he can advise him privately rather than battering him with
insulting remarks and embarrassing questions such as asking him from what school he came from publicly in
the courtroom and in the presence of his clients. Humiliating a lawyer is highly reprehensible. It betrays the ATTY. MANE:
judges lack of patience and temperance. A highly temperamental judge could hardly make decisions with
equanimity. I am proud graduate of Manuel L. Quezon University.

Thus, it is our view that respondent judge should shun from lecturing the counsels or debating with
them during court hearings to prevent suspicions as to his fairness and integrity. While judges should possess
proficiency in law in order that they can competently construe and enforce the law, it is more important that
they should act and behave in such manner that the parties before them should have confidence in their
impartiality.[11] (Italics in the original; emphasis and underscoring supplied)
The OCA thus recommended that respondent be reprimanded for violation of Canon 3 of the Code of
Judicial Conduct with a warning that a repetition of the same shall be dealt with more severely.[12]
By Resolution of January 21, 2008,[13] this Court required the parties to manifest whether they were
willing to submit the case for resolution on the basis of the pleadings already filed. Respondent complied on
February 26, 2008,[14] manifesting in the affirmative.
COURT:
Were you taught at the MLQU College of Law of the principle of Stare Decisis and the
interpretation of the Supreme Court of the rules of procedure where it states that if there is already a decision
by the Supreme Court, when that decision shall be complied with by the Trial Court otherwise non-compliance
thereof shall subject the Courts to judicial sanction, and I quote the decision. Thats why I quoted the decision
of the Supreme Court Sir, because I know the problem between the bank and the third party claimants and I
state, The fair market value is the price at which a property may be sold by a seller, who is not compelled to
sell, and bought by a buyer, who is not compelled to buy. Sir, thats very clear, that is what fair market value
and that is not assessment value. In fact even you say assessment value, the Court further state, the
assessed value is the fair market value multiplied. Not mere the basic assesses value. Sir that is the decision
of the Supreme Court, am I just reading the decision or was I inventing it?
ATTY. MANE:
May I be allowed to proceed.

COURT:

The pertinent provision of the Code of Judicial Conduct reads: Sir, you tell me. Was I inventing the Supreme Court decision which I quoted and which you should
have researched too or I was merely imagining the Supreme Court decision sir? Please answer it.

Rule 3.04. A judge should be patient, attentive, and courteous to lawyers, especially the ATTY. MANE:
inexperienced, to litigants, witnesses, and others appearing before the court. A judge should avoid
unconsciously falling into the attitude of mind that the litigants are made for the courts, instead of the courts for No your Honor.
the litigants.

An author explains the import of this rule: COURT:

Please answer it.

Rule 3.04 of the Code of Judicial Conduct mandates that a judge should be courteous to counsel,
especially to those who are young and inexperienced and also to all those others appearing or concerned in xxxx
the administration of justice in the court. He should be considerate of witnesses and others in attendance
upon his court. He should be courteous and civil, for it is unbecoming of a judge to utter intemperate language COURT:
during the hearing of a case. In his conversation with counsel in court, a judge should be studious to avoid
controversies which are apt to obscure the merits of the dispute between litigants and lead to its unjust Thats why. Sir second, and again I quote from your own pleadings, hale me to the Supreme Court
disposition. He should not interrupt counsel in their arguments except to clarify his mind as to their positions. otherwise I will hale you to the bar. Prove to me that I am grossly ignorant or corrupt.
Nor should he be tempted to an unnecessary display of learning or premature judgment.
ATTY. MANE:
A judge without being arbitrary, unreasonable or unjust may endeavor to hold counsel to a proper appreciation
of their duties to the courts, to their clients and to the adverse party and his lawyer, so as to enforce due Your Honor when this representation, your Honor . . .
diligence in the dispatch of business before the court. He may utilize his opportunities to criticize and correct
unprofessional conduct of attorneys, brought to his attention, but he may not do so in an insulting manner.[15] COURT:
(Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
No, sir.

ATTY. MANE:
The following portions of the transcript of stenographic notes, quoted verbatim, taken during the
February 27, 2006 hearing show that respondent made sarcastic and humiliating, even threatening and Yes your Honor . . .
boastful remarks to complainant who is admittedly still young, unnecessary lecturing and debating, as well
as unnecessary display of learning: COURT:

No sir unless you apologize to the Court I will hale you to the IBP Because hindi naman ako ganon. I
am not that vindictive but if this remains. You cannot take cover from the instruction of your client because
COURT: even if the instruction of a client is secret. Upon consideration, the language of the pleader must still conform
xxx with the decorum and respect to the Court. Sir, thats the rule of practice. In my twenty (20) years of practice
Sir do you know the principle or study the stare decisis? Ive never been haled by a judge to any question of integrity. Because even if I believed that the Court
committed error in judgment or decision or grave abuse of discretion, I never imputed any malicious or
unethical behavior to the judge because I know and I believe that anyone can commit errors. Because no one
is like God. Sir, I hope sir you understand that this Court, this Judge is not God but this Judge is human when
challenge on his integrity and honor is lodged. No matter how simple it is because that is the only thing I have
now.
Atty. Bantin, can you please show him my statement of assets and liabilities?
ATTY. MANE:
I think that is not necessary your Honor.
COURT:
No counsel because the imputations are there, thats why I want you to see. Show him my assets and
liabilities for the proud graduate of MLQU. Sir, look at it. Sir, I have stock holdings in the U.S. before I joined
the bench. And it was very clear to everyone, I would do everything not be tempted to accept bribe but I said I
have spent my fifteen (15) years and thats how much I have worked in fifteen (15) years excluding my wifes
assets which is more than what I have may be triple of what I have. May be even four fold of what I have.
And look at my assets. May be even your bank can consider on cash to cash basis my personal assets. That
is the reason I am telling you Atty. Mane. Please, look at it. If you want I can show you even the Income Tax
Return of my wife and you will be surprised that my salary is not even her one-half month salary. Sir, she is
the Chief Executive Officer of a Multi-National Publishing Company. Thats why I have the guts to take this job
because doon po sa salary niya umaasa na lamang po ako sa aking asawa. Atty. Mane, please you are still
young. Other judges you would already be haled to the IBP. Take that as a lesson. Now that you are saying
that I was wrong in the three-day notice rule, again the Supreme Court decision validates me, PNB vs. Court
of Appeals, you want me to cite the quotation again that any pleadings that do not conform with the three-day
notice rule is considered as useless scrap of paper and therefore not subject to any judicial cognizance. You
know sir, you would say but I was the one subject because the judge was belligerent. No sir, you can go on
my record and you will see that even prior to my rulings on your case I have already thrown out so many
motion for non-compliance of a three-day notice rule. If I will give you an exception because of this, then I
would be looked upon with suspicion. So sir again, please look again on the record and you will see how
many motions I threw out for non-compliance with the three-day notice rule. It is not only your case sir,
because sir you are a practitioner and a proud graduate of the MLQU which is also the Alma Mater of my
uncle. And I supposed you were taught in thought that the three-day notice rule is almost sacrosanct in order
to give the other party time to appear and plead. In all books, Moran, Regalado and all other commentators
state that non-compliance with the three-day notice rule makes the pleading and motion a useless scrap of
paper. If that is a useless scrap of paper, sir, what would be my ground to grant exception to your motion?
Tell me.
xxxx
COURT:
Procedural due process. See. So please sir dont confuse the Court. Despite of being away for
twenty years from the college of law, still I can remember my rules, In your motion you said . . . imputing
things to the Court. Sir please read your rules. Familiarize yourself, understand the jurisprudence before you
be the Prince Valiant or a Sir Gallahad in Quest of the Holy Grail. Sir, ako po ay mahirap na tao, karangalan
ko lang po ang aking kayang ibigay sa aking mga anak at iyan po ay hindi ko palalampasin maski kanino pa.
Sir, have you ever heard of anything about me in this Court for one year. Ask around, ask around. You know,
if you act like a duck, walk like a duck, quack like a duck, you are a duck. But have you ever heard anything
against the court. Sir in a judicial system, in a Court, one year is time enough for the practitioner to know
whether a judge is what, dishonest; 2), whether the judge is incompetent; and 3) whether the judge is just
playing loco. And I have sat hear for one year sir and please ask around before you charge into the windmill.
I am a proud product of a public school system from elementary to college. And my only, and my only, the
only way I can repay the taxpayers is a service beyond reproach without fear or favor to anyone. Not even the
executive, not even the one sitting in Malacanang, not even the Supreme Court if you are right. Sir, sana po
naman inyo ring igalang ang Hukuman kasi po kami, meron nga po, tinatanggap ko, kung inyo pong
mamarapatin, meron pong mga corrupt, maaari pong nakahanap na kayo ng corrupt na Judge pero hindi po
lahat kami ay corrupt. Maaari ko rin pong tanggapin sa inyong abang lingcod na merong mga Hukom na
tanga pero hindi po naman lahat kami ay tanga. Ako po ay 8:30 or before ay nandito po ako sa husgado ko.
Aalis po ako dito sa hapon, babasahin ko lahat ang kaso ko para ko po malaman kung any po ang kaso, para
po pagharap ko sa inyo at sa publiko hindi po ako magmumukhang tanga. Sir, please have the decency, not
the respect, not to me but to the Court. Because if you are a lawyer who cannot respect the Court then you
have no business appearing before the Court because you dont believe in the Court system. Thats why one
of my classmates never appeared before Court because he doesnt believe in that system. He would rather
stay in their airconditioned room because they say going to Court is useless. Then, to them I salute, I give
compliment because in their own ways they know the futility and they respect the Court, in that futility rather
than be a hypocrite. Atty. Mane hindi mo ako kilala, Ive never disrespect the courts and I can look into your
eyes. Kaya po dito ko gusto kasi di po ako dito nagpractice para po walang makalapit sa akin. Pero kung ako
po naman ay inyong babastusin ng ganyang handa po akong lumaban kahit saan, miski saan po. And you
can quote me, you can go there together to the Supreme Court. Because the only sir, the only treasure I have
is my name and my integrity. I could have easily let it go because it is the first time, but the second time is too
much too soon. Sir, masyado pong kwan yon, sinampal na po ninyo ako nung primero, dinuran pa po ninyo
ako ng pangalawa. Thats adding insult to the injury po. Hindi ko po sana gagawin ito pero ayan po ang dami
diyang abugado. I challenge anyone to file a case against me for graft and corruption, for incompetence.
xxxx
COURT:
I will ask the lawyer to read the statement and if they believe that you are not imputing any wrong
doing to me I will apologize to you.
Atty. Hildawa please come over. The Senior, I respect the old practitioner, whose integrity is
unchallenged.
Sir you said honest. Sir ganoon po ako. You still want to defend your position, so be it.
Atty. Hildawa I beg your indulgence, I am sorry but I know that you are an old practitioner hammered
out by years of practice and whose integrity by reputation precedes you. Please read what your younger
companero has written to this Honorable Court in pleading and see for yourself the implications he hurled to
the Court in his honest opinion. Remember he said honest. That implication is your honest opinion of an
implication sir.
Sir 1, 2 and 3. Paragraphs 1, 2 and 3. If that is your honest opinion. Remember the word you said
honest opinion.
Alam mo Atty. Mane I know when one has to be vigilant and vigorous in the pursue of pride. But if you
are vigilant and vigor, you should never crossed the line.
Sir, what is your interpretation to the first three paragraphs?
ATTY. HILDAWA:
There will be some . . .
COURT:
What sir?
ATTY. HILDAWA:
. . . indiscretion.
COURT:
Indiscretion. See, that is the most diplomatic word that an old practitioner could say to the Court
because of respect.
Sir, salamat po.
xxxx
COURT:
Kita po ninyo, iyan po ang matatandang abogado. Indiscretion na lang. Now you say that is your
honest opinion and the old practitioner hammered through years of practice could only say indiscretion
committed by this judge. Much more I who sits in this bench?
Now is that your honest opinion?[16] (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
 The Court thus finds the evaluation by the OCA well-taken.
An alumnus of a particular law school has no monopoly of knowledge of the law. By hurdling the Bar
Examinations which this Court administers, taking of the Lawyers oath, and signing of the Roll of Attorneys, a
lawyer is presumed to be competent to discharge his functions and duties as, inter alia, an officer of the court,
irrespective of where he obtained his law degree. For a judge to determine the fitness or competence of a
lawyer primarily on the basis of his alma mater is clearly an engagement in an argumentum ad hominem.
A judge must address the merits of the case and not on the person of the counsel. If respondent felt that his
integrity and dignity were being assaulted, he acted properly when he directed complainant to explain why
he should not be cited for contempt. He went out of bounds, however, when he, as the above-quoted portions
of the transcript of stenographic notes show, engaged on a supercilious legal and personal discourse.
This Court has reminded members of the bench that even on the face of boorish behavior from those
they deal with, they ought to conduct themselves in a manner befitting gentlemen and high officers of the
court.[17]
Respondent having exhibited conduct unbecoming of a judge, classified as a light charge under Section
10, Rule 140 of the Revised Rules of Court, which is penalized under Section 11(c) of the same Rule by any
of the following: (1) a fine of not less than P1,000 but not exceeding P10,000; (2) censure; (3) reprimand; and
(4) admonition with warning, the Court imposes upon him the penalty of reprimand.
WHEREFORE, respondent, Judge Medel Arnaldo B. Belen, Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 36, Calamba City, is found GUILTY of conduct unbecoming of a judge and is REPRIMANDED
therefor. He is further warned that a repetition of the same or similar act shall be dealt with more severely.
DIGEST in the internet.
SB of Taguig, MM v. Judge Santiago Estrella
At bar is a sworn letter-complaint dated October 20, 1997 filed by 10 members of the Sangguniang
Bayan of Taguig, Metro Manila charging Judge Santiago G. Estrella of Branch 68 of the Regional Trial
Court of the National Capital Judicial Region stationed in Pasig City with serious misconduct relative to
Election Protest No. 144, entitled Ricardo D. Papa, Jr. vs. Isidro B. Garcia.
The present controversy stems from an election protest filed by then mayoral candidate Ricardo D. Papa,
Jr. against Isidro B. Garcia, the candidate proclaimed mayor of Taguig, Metro Manila in the May 8, 1995
elections. In his protest, Papa impugned the results of all 713 precincts in the municipality. This was
filed with the Regional Trial Court of Pasig and eventually raffled to the sala of respondent wherein it was
docketed as Election Protest No. 144.
Garcia filed his answer with counter-protest and after the rejoinder of issues, Papa filed a Motion to
Withdraw First, Second, Fourth, and Fifth Causes of Action, thereby limiting his cause of action to only
one: the determination of the number of the plain Garcia votes which should be considered stray and
their number deducted from votes credited to protestee Garcia, there having been another candidate
surnamed Garcia.
The motion was granted and forthwith, the revision committee opened 712 questioned ballot boxes,
examined the contents, and revised the ballots.
On March 14, 1996, after the revision of ballots was completed, Papa filed a Motion for Technical
Examination, wherein he objected to more than 5,000 ballots, the same allegedly having been Written
By One (WBO) or Written By Two (WBT) persons. Respondent judge granted the motion. However,
on March 25, 1996, Papa withdrew this motion.
On April 10, 1996, a final revision report was submitted to respondent judge by Atty. Katherine A. Go,
the over-all chairperson of the Revision Committee. The report stated that Papa actually objected to a
total of 11,290 ballots for Garcia, over 5,000 of which were objected to by reason of the same having
been written by one person (WBO) or written by two (WBT). The said report also mentioned that Garcia
had 3,049 plain Garcia votes.
Thereafter, both parties offered their respective exhibits, which were all admitted by respondent judge.
On February 11, 1997, respondent issued an order directing the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) to
examine the contested ballots in the presence of a representative of both parties. The pertinent portion
of the order provided that so as to enable the court to get a complete overview of the matter, it was
better to have a handwriting expert examine the questioned ballots to settle once and for all the
questions and objections relative to the ballots.
After the NBI finished its examination of the contested ballots and upon the determination by
respondent that he had no further need of the ballot boxes, he issued an order dated May 19, 1997
directing the removal of the ballot boxes and election paraphernalia from his courtroom. On May 27,
1997, respondent ordered the immediate transfer of all the ballot boxes and election paraphernalia to
the sala of Judge Vivencio Baclig, Branch 157 of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City, so that Judge Baclig
may proceed with the trial of the vice-mayoralty election protest of the same municipality. On June 5,
1997, all the ballot boxes which contained both contested and uncontested ballots were removed from
the custody of respondent and transferred to RTC, Branch 157. On June 26, 1997, the NBI Report was
submitted to respondent.
On July 22, 1997, Garcia filed a Manifestation and Formal Motion with Formal Query, praying that an
order be issued to the Branch Clerk of Court to be furnished a copy of the NBI Reports and/or allow him
to copy or review or at least to read said reports. Respondent judge denied the motion on the same day,
proclaiming that the examination of contested ballots by the NBI was ordered, upon the instance of the
court, and not by the parties, hence, only the court was given copies of the NBI Reports.
On the same day that Garcias motion was denied, respondent also set the date of promulgation of
judgment for July 31, 1997. This prompted Garcia to file a Manifestation and Most Urgent Motion to
Defer and/or Cancel Scheduled Promulgation of Judgment premised on respondents refusal to furnish
him a copy of the NBI Reports, and Garcias physical impossibility of examining the contested ballots
because (a) the report was submitted on June 26, 1997, and (b) the contested ballots and other election
paraphernalia had been transferred to the sala of Judge Vivencio Baclig in RTC, Branch 157. Respondent
judge denied Garcias motion on July 28, 1997, explaining that:
. . . To allow parties at this stage to secure copies of the NBI report and to comment on the same before
promulgating the decision would be opening the floodgates for undue delay.
Thereafter, Garcia filed a petition for certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus, with a prayer for restraining
order and preliminary injunction with the COMELEC on July 29, 1997. The very next day or on July 30,
1997, the COMELEC issued a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) enjoining respondent judge from
proceeding with the scheduled promulgation of judgment set on July 31, 1997.
On August 21, 1997, after the expiration of the TRO, Papa filed a Motion for Immediate Promulgation of
Judgment, requesting that the same be heard on August 25, 1997. This was, however, granted by
respondent judge the very next day, three days ahead of the date set for hearing of the motion, with
respondent setting August 27, 1997 as the promulgation date. Forthwith, Garcia filed with the COMELEC
an Urgent Manifestation and Motion Reiterating Prayer for Preliminary Injunction.
One day before the scheduled promulgation of judgment, or on August 26, 1997, the COMELEC issued an
order directing respondent to allow both parties or their counsel to have access to the NBI reports and to
give the parties copies thereof before the promulgation of the decision.
On the day of the promulgation of judgment (August 27, 1997), respondent gave Garcias counsel 5
minutes to go over Questioned Documents Report No. 152-297 which consisted of 53 pages, and
Questioned Document Report No. 152-297(A), which consisted of 17 pages.
Thereafter, judgment was promulgated, disposing:
WHEREFORE, and all the forgoing considered, the Court resolves to SUSTAIN as it hereby SUSTAINS the
Protest lodged by Ricardo D. Papa, Jr., and accordingly renders judgment DECLARING the aforenamed
Protestant the duly elected mayor of the Municipality of Taguig, Metro Manila.
The Counter-Protest filed by protestee Isidro B. Garcia is ordered DISMISSED.
No pronouncement as to damages as no proof was presented by either party.
Complainants further claim that it was only after the promulgation of judgment that Garcia was able to
secure copies of the NBI Reports.
It must be noted that Papa filed an Urgent Motion for Execution Pending Appeal on August 26, 1997, a
day before the scheduled promulgation of judgment lending credibility to the claim of Garcia that Papa
had prior knowledge of respondents decision. Despite Garcias opposition, respondent granted said
motion on September 2, 1997. That same day, respondent also issued the Writ of Execution.
Complainants now allege that respondent judge, together with Papa and the NBI officials concerned,
violated Section 3(e) of Republic Act 3019 or the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, which provides
that:
Sec. 3. In addition to acts or omissions of public officers already penalized by existing law, the following
shall constitute corrupt practices of any public officers and are hereby declared to be unlawful:
(e) Causing undue injury to any party, including the government, or giving any private party any
unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in the discharge of his official administrative or judicial
functions through manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence. . . .
Complainants claim that: respondent gave unwarranted benefits to Papa and caused, on the other hand,
undue injury to Mayor Garcia as well as to the people of Taguig by depriving the latter of their duly
elected mayor, and giving Papa unwarranted benefits; the decision and reports were prepared, issued,
and executed with manifest partiality, evident bad faith, and gross inexcusable negligence; that
respondent conspired, confederated, and confabulated with the NBI officials concerned and Papa to
make the NBI Reports and the decision favorable to Papa; that respondent did not bother to check the
figures and to analyze the data contained in the reports, allegedly because a careful perusal of said
reports would have led to the discovery of flaws and mistakes; and that the hasty transfer of ballot boxes
from respondents sala to that of Judge Vivencio Baclig violated Section 255 of the Omnibus Election
Code which requires the examination and appreciation of the ballots to be done by the judge himself
rather than mere reliance on the work of the Revision Committee.
In his Comment dated December 10, 1997, respondent vehemently denied the allegations in the
complaint by addressing complainants two main issues: (1) whether it was proper for respondent to
have designated the NBI to conduct the necessary handwriting examination and to submit reports on the
results thereof to the court and not to the parties considering that said reports were the sole basis of the
decision rendered by the court, and (2) whether it was proper for respondent to have granted the
Motion for Execution Pending Appeal filed by the declared winner Ricardo D. Papa, Jr., allowing him to
take his oath notwithstanding the pendency of an appeal filed with the Commission on Elections
concerning the decision rendered by respondent.
In addressing the first issue, respondent claimed that the examination conducted by the NBI, which
included the segregation, photocopying, and photographing of the contested ballots was in fact done in
the presence of the court and the representatives of the parties. Respondent also alleged that the NBI
gave one copy each of the reports only to the court since the request therefor did not emanate from the
parties. He further claimed that the reports were made available to the parties as early as August 25,
1997, but that neither party took the time to reproduce the same.
Concerning the second issue, respondent asserted that he acted in accordance with the Rules of Civil
Procedure which provide that upon motion of the prevailing party with notice to the adverse party, the
court may, in its discretion and upon good reasons, order the execution of a judgment or final order even
before the expiration of the period to appeal. Respondent further contended that Papa, the rightful
winner of the May 1995 elections, had been deprived of his right to sit as the duly elected mayor of the
Municipality of Taguig and that his constituents had been equally deprived of his services as their duly
elected municipal head.
In the letter-reply dated August 12, 1998, complainants informed this Court that the COMELEC had
promulgated an En Banc resolution in SPR No. 42-97 entitled, Isidro B. Garcia vs. Hon. Santiago G.
Estrella, Judge, RTC, Branch 68, Pasig City and Ricardo D. Papa, Jr., nullifying the September 2, 1997
order of respondent directing execution pending appeal of his July 21, 1997 decision and the
corresponding Writ of Execution, and ordering (a) Papa to cease and desist from performing or
continuing to perform the duties and functions of Mayor of the Municipality of Taguig pending the final
resolution of the appeal, and (b) to immediately relinquish the position of Mayor of Taguig in favor
Garcia.
Both complainants and respondent were required by the Court on April 12, 2000 to manifest whether
they were willing to submit the case for resolution on the basis of the record. Respondent did manifest
that he was so willing, while complainants, despite proper service of the notice, failed to respond. They
are, therefore, deemed to be likewise willing to submit the case for resolution without further pleadings
and arguments.
In the previous report and recommendation dated February 29, 2000 submitted by Court Administrator
Alfredo L. Benipayo, it was pertinently observed that respondent gravely abused his discretion in
deciding the case and in issuing the questioned order since grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
of jurisdiction occurs when a board, tribunal or officer exercising judicial functions exercises its judgment
in a capricious, whimsical, arbitrary or despotic manner, or fails to consider the evidence adduced by the
parties. The Office of the Court Administrator echoed the COMELECs finding that respondents action
showed utter disregard of the appropriate procedure required of him, resulting in the
disenfranchisement of thousands of voters.
No less than the Code of Judicial Conduct mandates that a judge should be the embodiment of
competence, integrity, and independence (Rule 1.01, Canon 1). Indeed, in every case, a judge shall
endeavor diligently to ascertain the facts and applicable laws unswayed by partisan interests, public
opinion, or fear of criticism (Rule 3.02, Canon 3, Code of Judicial Conduct). Thus, this Court has
continually reminded members of the bench that:
The Judge should always be imbued with a high sense of duty and responsibility in the discharge of his
obligation to promptly and properly administer justice. He must view himself as a priest for the
administration of justice is akin to a religious crusade. Thus, exerting the same devotion as a priest in
the performance of the most sacred ceremonies of religious liturgy, the judge must render service with
impartiality commensurate with public trust and confidence reposed in him. (Dimatulac vs. Villon, 297
SCRA 679 [1998])
In the case at bar, respondents demeanor during the entirety of the trial is clearly wanting. From the
outset, it must be noted that Garcia obtained a total of 41,900 votes as compared to Papas 36,539.
However, respondent based his decision to proclaim Papa the winner of the 1995 elections on the basis
of the NBI reports which recommended the deduction of 12,734 votes from Garcia's total votes of
41,900 (per revision report), and 3,809 votes from Papas total votes of 36, 539 (per revision report).
Deducting 12,734 votes from Garcias votes would give him a total of 29,166; while deducting 3,809
votes from Papas votes would result in him getting a total of 32,730 votes. This will wipe out Garcias
edge of 5,361 and give Papa a judge-made plurality of 3,564 votes.
A more careful perusal of the data contained in the NBI reports would have shown a different outcome.
Upon analyzing the NBI report, it should have been apparent to respondent that the actual count of the
listed Garcia-manufactured ballots (GMB) to be deducted is 12,388 votes. This would have resulted in a
total of 29,512 votes for Garcia as compared to 32,730 for Papa. It must also be noted that there were
3,049 votes for Garcia which were not counted because these were considered stray votes, there having
been another candidate surnamed Garcia. This other candidate was, however, declared a nuisance
candidate. Upon adding these 3,049 alleged stray Garcia votes to Garcias 29,512, we get a total of
32,561 votes for Garcia as compared to 32,730 for Papa. This would have given Papa only a margin of
169 votes. This close margin between the two candidates should have given respondent reason enough
to subject the NBI Reports to closer scrutiny. It should be noted that respondent had already transferred
the questioned ballot boxes to another RTC sala on June 5, 1997, 21 days before he received the reports
and recommendation of the NBI. This fact made it impossible for him to form a proper basis for his
decision, as clearly, there was no way for him to ascertain the veracity of the NBI Reports. Section 255 of
the Omnibus Election Code requires that, where allegations in a protest or counter-protest so warrant,
or whenever in the opinion of the court the interests of justice so require, it shall immediately order the
book of voters, ballot boxes and their keys, ballots and other documents used in the election be brought
before it and that the ballots be examined and the votes recounted.
In this case, respondent was remiss in examining the questioned ballots despite the wrong figures,
computations, and typographical errors and mistakes present in the NBI Reports. Notwithstanding these
errors, respondent based his decision solely on the conclusions and findings of the NBI.
Respondents obvious partiality for Papa is further bolstered by his acts during the promulgation of
judgment on August 27, 1997. The facts show that respondent did not set the NBI Reports for hearing,
nor was Garcia allowed to confront the NBI officials concerned. He did not even allow Garcia to get
copies of the reports until after the promulgation of the decision on August 27, 1997, and this, only after
the COMELEC had ordered respondent to do so on August 26, 1997. In fact, the only time Garcias
counsel was able to study the two reports of the NBI consisting of 53 and 17 pages, respectively, was five
minutes before the promulgation of judgment. Respondents justification that he alone should have
copies of the reports since these were court-sponsored and the request did not emanate from either of
the parties, is an explanation which this Court finds hard to accept.
Judge Estrellas obvious bias became even more apparent when he granted the motion for execution
pending appeal filed by Papa on the day of promulgation of judgment, August 27, 1997. What is
disturbing is that said motion was dated August 26, 1997, a day before the scheduled promulgation,
indicating that Papa had prior knowledge of a decision favorable to him.
On this score, we find pertinent our ruling in the recent case of Evelyn Agpalasin vs. Judge Ernesto M.
Agcaoili, (A.M. No. RTJ-95-1308, April 12, 2000), that:
A judge should, in pending or prospective litigation before him, be scrupulously careful to avoid such
action as may reasonably tend to waken the suspicion that his social or business relations or friendships
constitute an element in determining his judicial course. He must not only render a just, correct and
impartial decision but should do so in such a manner as to be free from any suspicion as to his fairness,
impartiality and integrity. A decision which correctly applies the law and jurisprudence will nevertheless
be subject to questions of impropriety when rendered by a magistrate or tribunal believed to be less
than impartial and honest.
We also find credence in the COMELEC resolution promulgated on January 5, 1998 which observed that
it was physically impossible for the NBI document examiners to have examined over 16,000 ballots and
to have come out with an accurate finding. Declared thus the COMELEC:
In the case at bench, the NBI necessarily examined xerox copies of 14,664 ballots from 713 precincts and
without the guidance of objections from revisors, the NBI document examiner, on his own initiative and
determination, sorted out as written by one person 12,274 ballots in six (6) groups. This was done in a
record time of less than two (2) months, from March 31, 1997 to May 19, 1997.
As we know, standard document examination procedure requires the examination of original documents
(ballots, in this case) not photocopies. Other than this, invalidating ballots not objected to by the
revisors in the revision report, as pointed out, is not sanctioned by the rules on revision and appreciation
of ballots.
To conduct this kind of examination, involving enormous number of ballots, is almost impossible to
accomplish. One would have to spread the 14,664 ballots from 713 precincts beside each other, in a
floor or table space bigger than the size of a basketball court, and by going over those thousands of
ballots, pick at random groups of ballots six groups in all and, by examining them, reach a conclusion
that the ballots in each of these groups were written by one person. Common sense dictates that this is
simply an impossible procedure. And we are not convinced that through this method, the NBI could
correctly and with scientific precision invalidate 12,724 ballots of the protestee.
Indubitably, the foregoing have raised the suspicion of partiality on the part of respondent. Verily, a
judge must promote public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary. These stringent
standards are intended to assure parties of just and equitable decisions and of a judiciary that is capable
of dispensing impartial justice in every issue in every trial (Abundo vs. Manio, Jr., 312 SCRA 1 [1999]).
WHEREFORE, Judge Santiago G. Estrella is hereby found guilty of serious misconduct, partiality, and
inexcusable negligence, and is ordered to pay a fine in the amount of Twenty Thousand Pesos
(P20,000.00), with the stern warning that any similar misconduct on his part in the future will be dealt
with more severely.
Parayno v. Menese
Petitioner Rodolfo Parayno is the incumbent municipal mayor of Urdaneta, Pangasinan. The other
petitioners, namely, Clemartin Arboleda, Eduardo Perez, Casimiro Carancho, Diosdado Samson, Maximo
Sumera and Marcelino Dela Cruz, are members of the Sangguniang Bayan of the municipality who, along
with Parayno, are the protestees in separate election protests now still pending with the court a quo.
This petition for certiorari seeks to set aside the orders, dated 22 October 1993 1 and 16 November
1993, 2 of respondent Judge Iluminado Meneses of Branch 49, Regional Trial Court, of Urdaneta,
Pangasinan, voluntarily inhibiting himself from hearing the election cases and denying petitioners'
motion for the reconsideration thereof.
The mayoralty protest (docketed Case No. U-5346), involving Parayno, was originally raffled and assigned
to Branch 45 of the Regional Trial Court, Urdaneta, Pangasinan, presided over by Judge Manuel
Villanueva. The councilors' protest (docketed Case No. U-5347), involving the other petitioners, was
assigned to Branch 49 of the Regional Trial Court, also sitting in Urdaneta, Pangasinan, with respondent
Judge Iluminado Meneses presiding.
On 22 October 1992, a motion for the inhibition of Judge Villanueva was filed by petitioner Parayno,
which the court promptly granted. After the records of Case No. U-5346 were thus forwarded to
Executive Judge Romulo Abasolo, the latter, in an order, dated 26 October 1992, directed the assignment
of the case to Branch 46 of the court but only after its presiding Judge, Hon. Roger Domagas, agreed to
hear and try the case. Claiming impropriety in the assignment of the case, petitioner Parayno assailed
before this Court the order of the Executive Judge. The Court issued a temporary restraining order and
promptly remanded the case to the Court of Appeals for proper disposition. The appellate court set aside
the questioned order of 26 October 1992, and it directed the Executive Judge to instead include the case
in the regular raffle for re- assignment.
The case was thereupon re-raffled to Branch 49, where the councilors' protests were then pending. The
Committee on Revision in Case No. U-5346 (the mayoralty protest) terminated its work on 07 October
1993 but prior to the submission of its report, a "Motion to Use Revision Committee Report Blank Form"
was filed by protestant Lorenzo Mateo (herein private respondent). In the afternoon of 21 October 1993,
while the revision of ballots in Case No. U-5347 (councilors' protest) was in progress, private respondent
Mateo, the Revisor for the protestants-councilors in the Revision Committee, manifested: 3
. . . . I would like also to make of record that the Trial Presiding Judge of Branch 49 is the same Trial Judge
of this Electoral Protest Case U-5346, Parayno versus Mateo (sic) and therefore the Protestant look at it
that there seems to be a certain degree of greater sympathy of the Trial Presiding Judge to the
Protestee. . . . (Verceles Transcript of Stenographic Notes, Civil Case No. U-5347, revision of Ballots on
October 21, 1993, 1:45 p.m., pp. 6-7)
The following day, respondent judge issued the assailed order inhibiting himself from further hearing the
two cases. The motion for a reconsideration of the order was denied by the judge.
Hence, this petition for certiorari.
We see merit in the petition.
Section 1, Rule 137, of the Rules of Court reads:
Sec. 1. Disqualification of judges. No judge or judicial officer shall sit in any case in which he, or his
wife or child, is pecuniarily interested as heir, legatee, or creditor or otherwise, or in which he is related
to either party within the sixth degree of consanguinity or affinity, or to counsel within the fourth
degree, computed according to the rules of the civil law, or in which he has been executor,
administrator, guardian, trustee or counsel, or in which he has presided in any inferior court when his
ruling or decision is the subject of review, without the written consent of all parties in interest, signed by
them and entered upon the record.
A judge may, in the exercise of his sound discretion, disqualify himself from sitting in a case, for just or
valid reasons other than those mentioned above.
The underlying reason for the above rule is obviously to ensure that a judge, sitting in a case, will at all
times be free from inclinations or prejudices and be well capable to render a just and independent
judgment. A litigant, we often hear, is entitled to nothing less than the cold neutrality of a judge. 4 Due
process requires it. Indeed, he not only must be able to so act without bias but should even appear to so
be. 5 Impartiality is a state of mind; hence, the need for some kind of manifestation of its reality. 6
Verily, a judge may, in the exercise of his sound discretion, inhibit himself voluntarily from sitting in a
case, but it should be based on good, sound or ethical grounds, 7 or for just and valid reasons. 8 It is not
enough that a party throws some tenuous allegations of partiality at the judge. No less than imperative is
that it is the judge's sacred duty to administer justice without fear or favor. 9
We take note that the electoral protests here involved have remained unresolved for quite some time
now. Any further delay in the disposition of the cases, particularly election protests where public interest
is heavily involved, 10 cannot be countenanced.
All told and given the circumstances, we view the call for judge's inhibition, and his acceding thereto, in
this particular instance to be bereft of legal basis and improper.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Orders of the respondent Judge are SET ASIDE and
he is directed to proceed with dispatch in resolving the election protests at bar. No costs.
Martinez v. Giorenella
In Criminal Case No. 21 of the Court of First Instance of Abra, Branch II, Cresencio Martinez, as principal,
and Viernes Duclan and Arnold Bayongan, as accessories after the fact, were charged with the murder of
one Alfredo Batoon. As the first two were not apprehended, trial proceeded with respect to the third,
Arnold Bayongan. Thereafter, decision was rendered, the pertinent and dispositive portions of which are
as follows
xxx xxx xxx
It is worthy to state, however, that the offense of murder was clearly established and was committed by
Cresencio Martinez, from the evidence on record, there is no showing that Arnold Bayongan is an
accessory after the fact. The evidence as a whole, however, tends to allude Gregorio Banawa, the then
incumbent Mayor of Sallapadan to have knowledge of the perpetrator and commission of the crime but
did not take any action. It is further informed that Gregorio Banawa to date is hiding the principal
accused Cresencio Martinez.
In view of the foregoing consideration, the Court hereby dismisses the charge against Arnold Bayongan
and is therefore ordered ACQUITTED.
The Provincial Fiscal is hereby directed to investigate this case further to avoid miscarriage of justice and
the possibility of including Gregorio Banawa and for the prompt apprehension of the principal accused
Cresencio Martinez. (pp. 10-11, rollo).
xxx xxx xxx
Subsequent to the acquittal of Arnold Bayongan, Cresencio Martinez surrendered to the Philippine
Constabulary and later was arraigned before Branch II of the same Court of First instance. After having
pleaded "not guilty" to the charge, and before the prosecution started to present its evidence, counsel
for accused Cresencio Martinez moved that the trial Judge inhibit himself from hearing the case on its
merits on the grounds "(1) that the respondent had the chance to pass upon the issue and has formed an
opinion as to who committed the crime of murder; (2) that it would not be fair that he would sit, hear
and pass judgment; and (3) that the respondent is no longer impartial," and prayed that the case be
transferred to Branch I of the same Court.
Respondent denied the oral motion. Petitioner did not move for a reconsideration of the denial of the
motion so the trial proceeded. When the trial was already in the rebuttal stage for the government, this
Petition for Prohibition was filed. In his petition, Cresencio Martinez asks for a writ of prohibition
commanding respondent Judge to desist from hearing and deciding Criminal Case No. 21 of the Court of
First Instance of Abra; declaring the hearing heretofore had as a mistrial; and ordering that said criminal
case be heard anew by the presiding Judge of Branch I of the said Court or any other Court within the
Judicial District.
On being required to comment, the Solicitor General did so, and, citing the cases of Dais vs. Torres, et al.,
57 Phil. 897, 903; Luque vs. Kayanan, 29 SCRA 165; and Geotina vs. Gonzales, 41 SCRA 66, opined "that it
would be in the best interest of justice and in keeping with the clear intendment and pronouncements of
the Honorable Court that the case should be tried anew by another judge and that the respondent Judge
should desist from further taking cognizance of the case."
On the other hand, respondent Judge maintains that the trial was fair, impartial and liberal to the herein
accused-petitioner as can be gleaned from the records of Criminal Case No. 21. Respondent explains that
the statement that the "crime was committed by Cresencio Martinez" appearing in the decision
acquitting Arnold Bayongan after a separate trial "was based merely on the prosecution evidence where
petitioner was not on trial, therefore did not confront witnesses, did not submit his defense evidence
and surely will not in any way affect or apply to him. The decision to be rendered shall be based upon the
evidence adduced and submitted by both parties."
The trial of the case has already been terminated and the Case submitted for decision.
Two issues are presented before us first, whether or not to order a new trial for petitioner; and
second, whether or not respondent judge should be allowed to decide petitioner's case.
It cannot be denied that elementary due process requires that a case be heard by a tribunal that is
impartial and disinterested. And if an accused has been the victim of an unfair and partial trial, this court
will certainly not hesitate to order a new trial in the interest of justice. 1 In asking that the case be tried
by another Judge, petitioner alleges in general that respondent should not be impartial as contemplated
in the New Constitution. No specific resolution, order, or ruling of respondent is cited in particular as one
of partiality. It should be noted that after petitioner was arraigned and pleaded not guilty, and after
respondent had denied petitioner's motion for the former to inhibit himself from trying the case,
petitioner did not move for a reconsideration of the denial of the motion. Instead the trial proceeded.
Petitioner took no further action towards the disqualification of respondent until the trial was already in
the rebuttal stage for the government at which time the present Petition for Prohibition was filed. The
only conclusion we can draw from these circumstances is that the trial was fair and impartial. We are,
therefore, not inclined to order a new trial for petitioner.
As to the second issue: A Judge has the duty not only to render a just and impartial decision, but also
render it in such a manner as to be free from any suspicion as to its fairness and impartiality, and also as
to the judge's integrity. 2 While we grant respondent's capacity to render a just and impartial decision,
his statement in the decision acquitting Arnold Bayongan to the effect that the "crime was committed by
Cresencio Martinez" renders it impossible for respondent to be free from the suspicion that in deciding
petitioner's case, respondent will be biased and prejudiced. We therefore hold that under these
circumstances petitioner has the right to have his case decided by another Judge.
WHEREFORE, the petition for prohibition is granted. Respondent is ordered to transmit the records of
Criminal Case No. 21 of the Court of First Instance of Abra to Branch IV of the Court of First Instance of
Ilocos Sur, and the Judge presiding the said court will decide the same. Without pronouncement as to
cost.
SO ORDERED.
Antonio and Aquino, JJ., concur.
Separate Opinions
FERNANDO, J., concurring:
The merit, both in the main opinion by Justice Concepcion and in the concurrence of Justice Barredo, is
readily discernible even from a cursory perusal. They manifest the most careful and painstaking appraisal
of the interests that must be balanced, that of the State in pursuance of its grave responsibility to assure
that a crime does not go unpunished and to conduct a prosecution with dispatch to avoid the danger of
witnesses being unable to remember with accuracy what transpired that could ensue if the new trial
sought were granted consequent upon further delay, and that of the accused being entitled to nothing
less "than the cold neutrality of an impartial judge." 1 Moreover, as pointed out in the opinion of Justice
Barredo, this doctrine has received the imprimatur of the present Constitution. 2 The conclusion
reached, no new hearing being required but respondent Judge Leopoldo B. Gironella being precluded
from deciding the case, has then much to recommend it. My vote is thus cast with the rest of my
brethren. Candor compels the admission that at first I would have gone along with the recommendation
of the Solicitor-General to have a new trial. Further reflection persuades me that the result reached by
us manifests fealty to the constitutional commands of due process and impartiality, considering that no
unfairness tainted the proceedings. Hence my conformity with the decision. As, however, there are
certain points which to my mind possess relevance, I add these few words.
1. The difficulty this case presented could have been obviated had respondent Judge granted
the motion that he disqualify himself in view of his having previously come to the conclusion in
acquitting Arnold Bayongan that it is petitioner Cresencio Martinez who committed the offense. He was
led to do so, as he pointed out, in view of evidence presented at the previous trial, where petitioner had
no participation. Necessarily, he was unable to confront the witnesses or to submit evidence on his
behalf. Respondent Judge entertains no doubt that in the present case with petitioner as the accused,
who could thus offer proof to exculpate himself, he could decide the case fairly, uninfluenced by his
previous explicit declaration attributing the offense to him. Would that he were less certain of his
objectivity? There is, of course, that lofty conception of the men on the bench, standing aloof on chill
and distant heights, to paraphrase Cardozo, above and beyond the sweep of perturbing and deflecting
forces arising from inherited instincts, traditional beliefs, acquired convictions, and most specifically, bias
arising from circumstances as those herein disclosed. 3 It would be no reflection on respondent Judge
had he been more sympathetic to the plea for disqualification. He appeared to have been heedless of
the oft-reiterated admonition addressed to trial judges to avoid even the impression of the guilt or
innocence of an accused being dependent on prejudice or prejudgment. Only last January, in Castillo v.
Juan, 4 such an approach was restated in his manner: "In every litigation, perhaps much more so in
criminal cases, the manner and attitude of a trial judge are crucial to everyone concerned, the offended
party, less than the accused. It is not for him to indulge or even to give the appearance of catering to the
at times human failing of yielding to first impressions. He is to refrain from reaching hasty conclusions or
prejudging matters. It would be deplorable if he lays himself open to the suspicion of reacting to feelings
rather than to facts, of being imprisoned in the net of his own sympathies and predilections. It must be
obvious to the parties as well as the public that he follows the traditional mode of adjudication requiring
that he hear both sides with patience and understanding to keep the risk of reaching an unjust decision
at a minimum. It is not necessary that he should possess marked proficiency in law, but it is essential that
he is to hold the balance true. What is equally important is that he should avoid any conduct that casts
doubt on his impartiality. What has been said is not merely a matter of judicial ethics. It is impressed
with constitutional significance." 5 Nor is it a matter solely of a judge being possessed of the highly
sought-after trait of objectivity. It is equally important that such an impression finds acceptance. It does
not admit of doubt that it is not so much the confidence he feels in his impartiality but the feeling in the
heart of an accused that the one to decide his case has not as yet made up his mind as to his guilt that
the law takes into account. Not only that, the reaction of the general public cannot be ignored. That
explains why in Palang v. Zosa, 6 this Court was appreciative when respondent Judge acceded to a plea
for disqualification. Thus: "This voluntary inhibition by respondent Judge is to be commended. He has
lived up to what is expected of occupants of the bench. The public faith in the impartial administration of
justice is thus reinforced. It is not enough that they decide cases without bias and favoritism. It does not
suffice that they in fact rid themselves of prepossessions. Their actuation must inspire that belief. This is
an instance where appearance is just as important as the reality. Like Caesar's wife, a judge must not
only be pure but beyond suspicion. At least, that is an ideal worth striving for. What is more, there is
deference to the due process mandate." 7
2. To repeat, respondent Judge had less qualms about his objectivity. He turned down the
motion for inhibition and proceeded with the trial. He ought not have done so, but he indulged in
conduct that certainly could not merit approbation if deference be paid to previous controlling doctrines,
repeated time and time again. That is why, it does appear, a new trial would seem to be indicated. That
was how, as noted, I looked upon the matter on first reading the pleadings. If now I join my brethren, it
is because, as duly set forth in both opinions, respondent Judge conducted a trial free from any
procedural infirmity and marked by no evidence of unfairness. The Court is then confronted not with
what could be but with what had been. It is a reality rather than a hypothetical state of facts that
confronts us. A pragmatic approach then is not to be rejected outright. What petitioner could get in a
new trial, he had failed to show that he was deprived of in the previous prosecution. It could therefore
be a clear case of requiring the superfluous if once again both the state and the petitioner would be
called upon to go through the process of a hearing, to the complete disregard of what had gone before.
The apprehended evil is that notwithstanding the opportunity of petitioner to disprove evidence offered
at the trial where he was not a party, the conviction formed by respondent Judge that he was the
perpetrator of the offense would persist. If so, then the fairness of the trial would count for naught. With
the decision reached by us that another judge could on a careful study of the records decide the case,
such a fear is minimized, if not altogether eradicated. It is in the light of the above considerations,
reinforced by the clear and cogent reasoning found in both opinions, that I would, in this case at least,
allow a relaxation of the Gutierrez doctrine that assures a litigant that he is entitled to nothing less than
the cold neutrality of an impartial judge.
BARREDO, J., concurring:
I concur, but I feel it may not be inappropriate to add a few words to the able main opinion penned by
Mr. Justice Concepcion Jr.
In addition to the facts already stated in the main opinion, it is perhaps better to point out, as explained
by respondent judge, that the instant petition was filed by a new counsel of petitioner. The former
defense counsel was another lawyer who alone attended the trial from the very beginning until he had
to withdraw because he was suspended from the practice of law by the Supreme Court. That lawyer was
in fact the one who made the oral motion for inhibition of respondent judge before the People could
present its evidence. That motion which was never reduced to writing was denied. Apparently seeing
nothing wrong with such denial, counsel took no step to question it. Instead, the trial proceeded without
any unusual incident until the withdrawal of the former defense counsel. At that time, September 6,
1973, even the defense had already rested and the prosecution had finished presenting one rebuttal
witness. As a matter of fact, evidently because We have not issued any restraining order, after the
present petition was filed on October 17, 1973, the trial has already been completed and the case was
considered submitted for decision on December 29, 1973.
To my mind, these details I have mentioned provide additional ground to support the holding in the main
opinion that petitioner is not entitled to a new trial. From these facts, it is quite clear that petitioner had
agreed to be tried by respondent judge. It is only in the cases of disqualification specifically mentioned in
Section 1 of Rule 137 that judges are supposed to inhibit themselves motu propio without being asked to
do so by the parties in interest, considering the injunction of the rule is addressed to the judge himself.
Where the cause for inhibition is supposed bias, or prejudice or possible prejudgment deduced from
actuations of the judge in the course of the proceedings, it is but logical that the initiative to stop him
from further acting should come from the party that might be aggrieved by his continuing to act. Withal,
the challenge must be serious and persistent. In other words, such ground for disqualification is subject
to waiver and may not be invoked for the first time after the trial has already been terminated, unless, of
course, the bias or prejudice complained of has actually materialized and manifested itself and can thus
be properly demonstrated, in which event the trial may be annulled and set aside.
In the case at bar, nowhere in the record does it appear that petitioner has in any manner alleged, much
less proven, that respondent judge ever acted with partiality, bias or prejudice at any stage of his trial.
Indeed, the charge against respondent is that he has already prejudged the guilt of petitioner. That does
not necessarily mean the trial would be unfair. And there is here no pretense nor showing that it has
been so. Under these circumstances, to grant a new trial now and require the parties to begin all over
again would not only be a vain superfluity but could entail unpredictable consequences detrimental to
the interests of justice. For one thing, it would not be a simple matter for the prosecution and, for the
matter, the defense to reproduce its evidence as they were in their original form and content. There is
even the risk that the witnesses may no longer be available or willing to testify. Besides, it does not seem
fair nor proper that after submitting himself for and actually undergoing trial before respondent judge,
petitioner, thru new counsel, should be permitted to have another chance, after having studied all the
evidence and found the same to be discouraging, to say the least, to improve his position to the
prejudice of the state.
For obvious reasons, a new trial may be resorted to only as a last alternative when the paramount
interests of justice can no longer be satisfied otherwise. The records of this case do not present such a
situation as would warrant the great inconvenience of having petitioner's trial repeated. The allegations
of the petition do not furnish sufficient justification for Us to doubt the actual impartiality and fairness of
that trial. Accordingly, the petition for new trial should be denied.
All these do not mean, however, that I am in favor of allowing respondent judge to decide petitioner's
case. That is entirely a different matter. I am convinced from a scrutiny of the record that respondent
judge means well and has been trying his level best to comply with his sworn duty to do justice to
petitioner. But with his previous solemn finding in his decision acquitting the accused Arnold Bayongan
that "the offense of Murder was clearly established and was committed by Cresencio Martinez", herein
petitioner, it would be too much to expect that the new and additional evidence before him will not be
unwittingly viewed by him in the light of his previous finding that it was the petitioner who committed
the crime charged in the information. Moreover, and more importantly, even if it be a fact that
respondent judge would be so mentally equipped as to be impervious to the influence of his previous
ratiocination, nothing he can say can sufficiently dispel from petitioner and his neighbors and the public
at large the possible suspicion that the truth is otherwise. It is indeed in the peculiar circumstances of
this case that I would say, paraphrasing Justice Sanchez, that it is equally important to being truly
impartial that a judge should not give reasonable cause to any of the parties to entertain any doubt
about his impartiality. (Luque vs. Kayanan, 20 SCRA 165, 178.) This dictum is even more compelling when
it comes to criminal cases like that of petitioner, as an indispensable element not only of due process in a
general sense but of the right of the accused to have "an impartial and public trial" under Section 19 of
the Bill of Rights of the Philippine Constitution of 1973.
In this respect, therefore, my vote is to order respondent judge not to decide petitioner's case and to let
the records be submitted for decision to another judge as directed in the main opinion. And in answer to
the possible argument that the judge who will be newly assigned to decide the case will not have the
benefit of having seen the witnesses and observed their demeanor, suffice it to say that this is nothing
unusual, for it has happened and will still happen in numberless times when judges either retire, resign,
die or are transferred or removed, without being able to decide cases fully tried by them, in which
eventuality, their respective successors perform the task of making the decision without holding a new
trial. None of the decisions rendered under such circumstances has ever been questioned, much less set
aside. As a matter of fact, there are provisions in the Judiciary Act permitting implicitly that it be done,
albeit in cases of transfers, the law prefers that the decision be made by the judge who heard the case.
(Sec. 51.)
To be absolutely fair, however, I would add that if in the course of his study of the records, the new
judge should feel that there are matters which ought to be clarified or rectified, he may take such action
as he may deem suitable, including the recalling of witnesses for further questioning. This procedure
would enable the new judge to clear the record from any possible taint of partiality or prejudgment of
respondent judge that might have unwittingly crept into the proceedings before him.
Separate Opinions
FERNANDO, J., concurring:
The merit, both in the main opinion by Justice Concepcion and in the concurrence of Justice Barredo, is
readily discernible even from a cursory perusal. They manifest the most careful and painstaking appraisal
of the interests that must be balanced, that of the State in pursuance of its grave responsibility to assure
that a crime does not go unpunished and to conduct a prosecution with dispatch to avoid the danger of
witnesses being unable to remember with accuracy what transpired that could ensue if the new trial
sought were granted consequent upon further delay, and that of the accused being entitled to nothing
less "than the cold neutrality of an impartial judge." 1 Moreover, as pointed out in the opinion of Justice
Barredo, this doctrine has received the imprimatur of the present Constitution. 2 The conclusion
reached, no new hearing being required but respondent Judge Leopoldo B. Gironella being precluded
from deciding the case, has then much to recommend it. My vote is thus cast with the rest of my
brethren. Candor compels the admission that at first I would have gone along with the recommendation
of the Solicitor-General to have a new trial. Further reflection persuades me that the result reached by
us manifests fealty to the constitutional commands of due process and impartiality, considering that no
unfairness tainted the proceedings. Hence my conformity with the decision. As, however, there are
certain points which to my mind possess relevance, I add these few words.
1. The difficulty this case presented could have been obviated had respondent Judge granted
the motion that he disqualify himself in view of his having previously come to the conclusion in
acquitting Arnold Bayongan that it is petitioner Cresencio Martinez who committed the offense. He was
led to do so, as he pointed out, in view of evidence presented at the previous trial, where petitioner had
no participation. Necessarily, he was unable to confront the witnesses or to submit evidence on his
behalf. Respondent Judge entertains no doubt that in the present case with petitioner as the accused,
who could thus offer proof to exculpate himself, he could decide the case fairly, uninfluenced by his
previous explicit declaration attributing the offense to him. Would that he were less certain of his
objectivity? There is, of course, that lofty conception of the men on the bench, standing aloof on chill
and distant heights, to paraphrase Cardozo, above and beyond the sweep of perturbing and deflecting
forces arising from inherited instincts, traditional beliefs, acquired convictions, and most specifically, bias
arising from circumstances as those herein disclosed. 3 It would be no reflection on respondent Judge
had he been more sympathetic to the plea for disqualification. He appeared to have been heedless of
the oft-reiterated admonition addressed to trial judges to avoid even the impression of the guilt or
innocence of an accused being dependent on prejudice or prejudgment. Only last January, in Castillo v.
Juan, 4 such an approach was restated in his manner: "In every litigation, perhaps much more so in
criminal cases, the manner and attitude of a trial judge are crucial to everyone concerned, the offended
party, less than the accused. It is not for him to indulge or even to give the appearance of catering to the
at times human failing of yielding to first impressions. He is to refrain from reaching hasty conclusions or
prejudging matters. It would be deplorable if he lays himself open to the suspicion of reacting to feelings
rather than to facts, of being imprisoned in the net of his own sympathies and predilections. It must be
obvious to the parties as well as the public that he follows the traditional mode of adjudication requiring
that he hear both sides with patience and understanding to keep the risk of reaching an unjust decision
at a minimum. It is not necessary that he should possess marked proficiency in law, but it is essential that
he is to hold the balance true. What is equally important is that he should avoid any conduct that casts
doubt on his impartiality. What has been said is not merely a matter of judicial ethics. It is impressed
with constitutional significance." 5 Nor is it a matter solely of a judge being possessed of the highly
sought-after trait of objectivity. It is equally important that such an impression finds acceptance. It does
not admit of doubt that it is not so much the confidence he feels in his impartiality but the feeling in the
heart of an accused that the one to decide his case has not as yet made up his mind as to his guilt that
the law takes into account. Not only that, the reaction of the general public cannot be ignored. That
explains why in Palang v. Zosa, 6 this Court was appreciative when respondent Judge acceded to a plea
for disqualification. Thus: "This voluntary inhibition by respondent Judge is to be commended. He has
lived up to what is expected of occupants of the bench. The public faith in the impartial administration of
justice is thus reinforced. It is not enough that they decide cases without bias and favoritism. It does not
suffice that they in fact rid themselves of prepossessions. Their actuation must inspire that belief. This is
an instance where appearance is just as important as the reality. Like Caesar's wife, a judge must not
only be pure but beyond suspicion. At least, that is an ideal worth striving for. What is more, there is
deference to the due process mandate." 7
2. To repeat, respondent Judge had less qualms about his objectivity. He turned down the
motion for inhibition and proceeded with the trial. He ought not have done so, but he indulged in
conduct that certainly could not merit approbation if deference be paid to previous controlling doctrines,
repeated time and time again. That is why, it does appear, a new trial would seem to be indicated. That
was how, as noted, I looked upon the matter on first reading the pleadings. If now I join my brethren, it
is because, as duly set forth in both opinions, respondent Judge conducted a trial free from any
procedural infirmity and marked by no evidence of unfairness. The Court is then confronted not with
what could be but with what had been. It is a reality rather than a hypothetical state of facts that
confronts us. A pragmatic approach then is not to be rejected outright. What petitioner could get in a
new trial, he had failed to show that he was deprived of in the previous prosecution. It could therefore
be a clear case of requiring the superfluous if once again both the state and the petitioner would be
called upon to go through the process of a hearing, to the complete disregard of what had gone before.
The apprehended evil is that notwithstanding the opportunity of petitioner to disprove evidence offered
at the trial where he was not a party, the conviction formed by respondent Judge that he was the
perpetrator of the offense would persist. If so, then the fairness of the trial would count for naught. With
the decision reached by us that another judge could on a careful study of the records decide the case,
such a fear is minimized, if not altogether eradicated. It is in the light of the above considerations,
reinforced by the clear and cogent reasoning found in both opinions, that I would, in this case at least,
allow a relaxation of the Gutierrez doctrine that assures a litigant that he is entitled to nothing less than
the cold neutrality of an impartial judge.
BARREDO, J., concurring:
I concur, but I feel it may not be inappropriate to add a few words to the able main opinion penned by
Mr. Justice Concepcion Jr.
In addition to the facts already stated in the main opinion, it is perhaps better to point out, as explained
by respondent judge, that the instant petition was filed by a new counsel of petitioner. The former
defense counsel was another lawyer who alone attended the trial from the very beginning until he had
to withdraw because he was suspended from the practice of law by the Supreme Court. That lawyer was
in fact the one who made the oral motion for inhibition of respondent judge before the People could
present its evidence. That motion which was never reduced to writing was denied. Apparently seeing
nothing wrong with such denial, counsel took no step to question it. Instead, the trial proceeded without
any unusual incident until the withdrawal of the former defense counsel. At that time, September 6,
1973, even the defense had already rested and the prosecution had finished presenting one rebuttal
witness. As a matter of fact, evidently because We have not issued any restraining order, after the
present petition was filed on October 17, 1973, the trial has already been completed and the case was
considered submitted for decision on December 29, 1973.
To my mind, these details I have mentioned provide additional ground to support the holding in the main
opinion that petitioner is not entitled to a new trial. From these facts, it is quite clear that petitioner had
agreed to be tried by respondent judge. It is only in the cases of disqualification specifically mentioned in
Section 1 of Rule 137 that judges are supposed to inhibit themselves motu propio without being asked to
do so by the parties in interest, considering the injunction of the rule is addressed to the judge himself.
Where the cause for inhibition is supposed bias, or prejudice or possible prejudgment deduced from
actuations of the judge in the course of the proceedings, it is but logical that the initiative to stop him
from further acting should come from the party that might be aggrieved by his continuing to act. Withal,
the challenge must be serious and persistent. In other words, such ground for disqualification is subject
to waiver and may not be invoked for the first time after the trial has already been terminated, unless, of
course, the bias or prejudice complained of has actually materialized and manifested itself and can thus
be properly demonstrated, in which event the trial may be annulled and set aside.
In the case at bar, nowhere in the record does it appear that petitioner has in any manner alleged, much
less proven, that respondent judge ever acted with partiality, bias or prejudice at any stage of his trial.
Indeed, the charge against respondent is that he has already prejudged the guilt of petitioner. That does
not necessarily mean the trial would be unfair. And there is here no pretense nor showing that it has
been so. Under these circumstances, to grant a new trial now and require the parties to begin all over
again would not only be a vain superfluity but could entail unpredictable consequences detrimental to
the interests of justice. For one thing, it would not be a simple matter for the prosecution and, for the
matter, the defense to reproduce its evidence as they were in their original form and content. There is
even the risk that the witnesses may no longer be available or willing to testify. Besides, it does not seem
fair nor proper that after submitting himself for and actually undergoing trial before respondent judge,
petitioner, thru new counsel, should be permitted to have another chance, after having studied all the
evidence and found the same to be discouraging, to say the least, to improve his position to the
prejudice of the state.

For obvious reasons, a new trial may be resorted to only as a last alternative when the paramount
interests of justice can no longer be satisfied otherwise. The records of this case do not present such a
situation as would warrant the great inconvenience of having petitioner's trial repeated. The allegations
of the petition do not furnish sufficient justification for Us to doubt the actual impartiality and fairness of
that trial. Accordingly, the petition for new trial should be denied.
All these do not mean, however, that I am in favor of allowing respondent judge to decide petitioner's
case. That is entirely a different matter. I am convinced from a scrutiny of the record that respondent
judge means well and has been trying his level best to comply with his sworn duty to do justice to
petitioner. But with his previous solemn finding in his decision acquitting the accused Arnold Bayongan
that "the offense of Murder was clearly established and was committed by Cresencio Martinez", herein
petitioner, it would be too much to expect that the new and additional evidence before him will not be
unwittingly viewed by him in the light of his previous finding that it was the petitioner who committed
the crime charged in the information. Moreover, and more importantly, even if it be a fact that
respondent judge would be so mentally equipped as to be impervious to the influence of his previous
ratiocination, nothing he can say can sufficiently dispel from petitioner and his neighbors and the public
at large the possible suspicion that the truth is otherwise. It is indeed in the peculiar circumstances of
this case that I would say, paraphrasing Justice Sanchez, that it is equally important to being truly
impartial that a judge should not give reasonable cause to any of the parties to entertain any doubt
about his impartiality. (Luque vs. Kayanan, 20 SCRA 165, 178.) This dictum is even more compelling when
it comes to criminal cases like that of petitioner, as an indispensable element not only of due process in a
general sense but of the right of the accused to have "an impartial and public trial" under Section 19 of
the Bill of Rights of the Philippine Constitution of 1973.
In this respect, therefore, my vote is to order respondent judge not to decide petitioner's case and to let
the records be submitted for decision to another judge as directed in the main opinion. And in answer to
the possible argument that the judge who will be newly assigned to decide the case will not have the
benefit of having seen the witnesses and observed their demeanor, suffice it to say that this is nothing
unusual, for it has happened and will still happen in numberless times when judges either retire, resign,
die or are transferred or removed, without being able to decide cases fully tried by them, in which
eventuality, their respective successors perform the task of making the decision without holding a new
trial. None of the decisions rendered under such circumstances has ever been questioned, much less set
aside. As a matter of fact, there are provisions in the Judiciary Act permitting implicitly that it be done,
albeit in cases of transfers, the law prefers that the decision be made by the judge who heard the case.
(Sec. 51.)
To be absolutely fair, however, I would add that if in the course of his study of the records, the new
judge should feel that there are matters which ought to be clarified or rectified, he may take such action
as he may deem suitable, including the recalling of witnesses for further questioning. This procedure
would enable the new judge to clear the record from any possible taint of partiality or prejudgment of
respondent judge that might have unwittingly crept into the proceedings before him.
Chavez v. Public Estates Authority
Doctrine: In the hands of the government agency tasked and authorized to dispose of alienable or
disposable lands of the public domain, these lands are still public, not private lands.
Facts: On November 20, 1973, the government, through the Commissioner of Public Highways, signed a
contract with the Construction and Development Corporation of the Philippines (CDCP) to reclaim
certain foreshore and offshore areas of Manila Bay. The contract also included the construction of
Phases I and II of the Manila-Cavite Coastal Road. CDCP obligated itself to carry out all the works in
consideration of fifty percent of the total reclaimed land.
On February 4, 1977, then President Ferdinand E. Marcos issued Presidential Decree No. 1084 creating
PEA. PD No. 1084 tasked PEA to reclaim land, including foreshore and submerged areas, and to
develop, improve, acquire, x x x lease and sell any and all kinds of lands. On the same date, then
President Marcos issued Presidential Decree No. 1085 transferring to PEA the lands reclaimed in the
foreshore and offshore of the Manila Bay under the Manila-Cavite Coastal Road and Reclamation
Project (MCCRRP).
On January 19, 1988, then President Corazon C. Aquino issued Special Patent No. 3517, granting and
transferring to PEA the parcels of land so reclaimed under the Manila-Cavite Coastal Road and
Reclamation Project. On April 9, 1988, the Register of Deeds issued TCT Nos. 7309, 7311, and 7312, in
the name of PEA, covering the three reclaimed islands known as the Freedom Islands located at the
southern portion of the Manila-Cavite Coastal Road, Paraaque City. On April 25, 1995, PEA entered into
a Joint Venture Agreement with AMARI, a private corporation, to develop the Freedom Islands.
Petitioner assails the sale to AMARI of lands of the public domain as a blatant violation of Section 3,
Article XII of the 1987 Constitution prohibiting the sale of alienable lands of the public domain to private
corporations.
On March 30, 1999, PEA and AMARI signed the Amended Joint Venture Agreement. On May 28, 1999,
the Office of the President under the administration of then President Joseph E. Estrada approved the
Amended JVA.
Several motions for reconsideration of the Supreme Courts July 9, 2002 decision which declared the
amended JVA null and void ab initio were filed. The conclusions of said decision were summarized by the
Court as follows:
The 157.84 hectares of reclaimed lands comprising the Freedom Islands, now covered by certificates of
title in the name of PEA, are alienable lands of the public domain. PEA may lease these lands to private
corporations but may not sell or transfer ownership of these lands to private corporations. PEA may only
sell these lands to Philippine citizens, subject to the ownership limitations in the 1987 Constitution and
existing laws.
The 592.15 hectares of submerged areas of Manila Bay remain inalienable natural resources of the public
domain until classified as alienable or disposable lands open to disposition and declared no longer
needed for public service. The government can make such classification and declaration only after PEA
has reclaimed these submerged areas. Only then can these lands qualify as agricultural lands of the
public domain, which are the only natural resources the government can alienate. In their present state,
the 592.15 hectares of submerged areas are inalienable and outside the commerce of man.
Since the Amended JVA seeks to transfer to AMARI, a private corporation, ownership of 77.34 hectares
of the Freedom Islands, such transfer is void for being contrary to Section 3, Article XII of the 1987
Constitution which prohibits private corporations from acquiring any kind of alienable land of the public
domain.
Since the Amended JVA also seeks to transfer to AMARI ownership of 290.156 hectares of still
submerged areas of Manila Bay, such transfer is void for being contrary to Section 2, Article XII of the
1987 Constitution which prohibits the alienation of natural resources other than agricultural lands of the
public domain. PEA may reclaim these submerged areas. Thereafter, the government can classify the
reclaimed lands as alienable or disposable, and further declare them no longer needed for public service.
Still, the transfer of such reclaimed alienable lands of the public domain to AMARI will be void in view of
Section 3, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution which prohibits private corporations from acquiring any
kind of alienable land of the public domain.
Issue: Whether or not the July 9, 2002 ruling of the Supreme Court should be reversed.
Held: No. Amari cannot claim good faith because even before Amari signed the Amended JVA on March
30, 1999, petitioner had already filed the instant case on April 27, 1998 questioning precisely the
qualification of Amari to acquire the Freedom Islands. Even before the filing of this petition, two Senate
Committees had already approved on September 16, 1997 Senate Committee Report No. 560 which
concluded that the Freedom Islands are inalienable lands of the public domain. Thus, Amari signed the
Amended JVA knowing and assuming all the attendant risks, including the annulment of the Amended
JVA. Amari has also not paid to PEA the full reimbursement cost incurred by PEA in reclaiming the
Freedom Islands. Moreover, Amari does not claim to have even initiated the reclamation of the 592.15
hectares of submerged areas covered in the Amended JVA, or to have started to construct any
permanent infrastructure on the Freedom Islands. In short, Amari does not claim to have introduced any
physical improvement or development on the reclamation project that is the subject of the Amended
JVA.
PEA cannot claim that it is similarly situated as the Bases Conversion Development Authority (BCDA)
which under R.A. No. 7227 is tasked to sell portions of the Metro Manila military camps and other
military reservations is incorrect. PEA took the place of DENR as the government agency charged with
leasing or selling reclaimed lands of the public domain. The reclaimed lands being leased or sold by PEA
are not private lands, in the same manner that DENR, when it disposes of other alienable lands, does not
dispose of private lands but alienable lands of the public domain. Only when qualified private parties
acquire these lands will the lands become private lands. In the hands of the government agency tasked
and authorized to dispose of alienable or disposable lands of the public domain, these lands are still
public, not private lands.
To allow vast areas of reclaimed lands of the public domain to be transferred to PEA as private lands will
sanction a gross violation of the constitutional ban on private corporations from acquiring any kind of
alienable land of the public domain. PEA will simply turn around and transfer several hundreds of
hectares of these reclaimed and still to be reclaimed lands to a single private corporation in only one
transaction. This scheme will effectively nullify the constitutional ban in Section 3, Article XII of the 1987
Constitution.
Caveat: Anyone who claims this digest as his own without proper authority shall be held liable under the
law of Karma.
OCA v. Paderanga
The administrative case before us stems from the directive issued by this Court in its Decision
promulgated on January 24, 2001 in G.R. No. 139519 entitled Conchito J. Oclarit vs. Judge Maximo G.W.
Paderanga, Judge, Regional Trial Court, Misamis Oriental,[1] requiring the Office of the Court
Administrator (OCA) of this Court to file an administrative charge against herein respondent for gross
misconduct and grave abuse of authority.
The factual antecedents as recited in this Courts Decision in G.R. No. 139519 are as follows:
Petitioner [referring to Atty. Conchito J. Oclarit] is a lawyer engaged in the private practice of law
principally in the City of Cagayan de Oro and the province of Misamis Oriental.
At times material hereto, petitioner was counsel for the plaintiffs in the case entitled, spouses Gregorio
and Pelegrina Babatido v. Elnora and Teodoro Abella, et. al., Civil Case No. 99-194, Regional Trial Court,
Misamis Oriental, Branch 38, Cagayan de Oro City. Judge Maximo G.W. Paderanga was the presiding
judge, Regional Trial Court, Misamis Oriental, Branch 38.
On June 1, 1999, the aforecited case was scheduled for continuation of pre-trial before the lower court.
The case was first heard on pre-trial on April 30, 1999. In that hearing, petitioner filed a motion to
approve compromise agreement entered into by the parties pointing out that the compromise
agreement was reached before a barangay captain. Counsel for the defendants opposed the motion
because the defendants were placed in a disadvantageous condition, arguing that the case was before
the court not before the barangay. The court ruled that the compromise agreement was not before the
barangay captain but before the court. The parties settled before the barangay captain. At this point,
petitioner informed the court that the compromise agreement was signed and was explaining further
when the court told him repeatedly to shut up. Then petitioner requested the court to stop shouting at
him. The court rhetorically asked: why should the court precisely not cite you for contempt for doing
that, that is, for settling the case before the barangay captain.
Consequently, the presiding judge cited petitioner in contempt of court and imposed on him a fine of
P1,000.00. Petitioner remarked that the presiding judge was becoming very arrogant. In reply to that,
respondent judge declared: I will put you in jail. Get a policeman. At that moment, the court issued a
verbal order holding petitioner for direct contempt of court and sentencing petitioner to serve one (1)
day in jail and to pay a fine of P1,000.00. Petitioner indicated that he would challenge the ruling. Then,
respondent judge issued a detention commitment to the Jail Warden, City Jail, Cagayan de Oro City,
committing the person of petitioner Conchito J. Oclarit for direct contempt.
The next day, with petitioner in jail, he received a copy of the written order declaring him in direct
contempt of court and sentencing him to pay a fine of P1,000.00 and also to serve one (1) day in jail. He
was released after serving one (1) day in jail. Apparently, he also paid the fine of P1,000.00.[2]
In said case, this Court held that:
respondent judge gravely abused his discretion in declaring petitioner guilty of direct contempt of
court, sentencing him to pay a fine of P1,000.00 and to serve one day in jail. It was respondent judge
who first shouted successively at petitioner to shut up. When petitioner persisted in making his
explanation, the court declared him in direct contempt, to the extent of stating that the judge had
absolute power. The lawyers remarks explaining his position in the case under consideration do not
necessarily assume the level of contumely that justifies the court to exercise the power of contempt.
Courts must be slow to punish for direct contempt. This drastic power must be used sparingly in cases of
clearly contumacious behavior in facie curiae. The salutary rule is that the power to punish for contempt
must be exercised on the preservative, not vindictive principle, and on the corrective and not retaliatory
idea of punishment. The courts must exercise the power to punish for contempt for purposes that are
impersonal, because that power is intended as a safeguard not for the judges as persons but for the
functions that they exercise.
Accordingly, this Court disposed of the case as follows:
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the Court GRANTS the petition and renders judgment declaring VOID the order
finding petitioner guilty of direct contempt of court in Civil Case No. 99-194, and sentencing him to pay a
fine of P1,000.00 and to serve one (1) day in jail. The court orders respondent judge to reimburse
petitioner the sum of P1,000.00, not out of the amount paid by petitioner to the court but from his own
funds. The Court regrets that petitioner had to serve time in jail by a despotic act of respondent judge.
The Court orders the Court Administrator, Supreme Court, to file an administrative charge against
respondent Judge Maximo G.W. Paderanga, Regional Trial Judge, Regional Trial Court, Misamis Oriental,
Branch 38, Cagayan de Oro City, for gross misconduct and grave abuse of authority, within fifteen (15)
days from notice.
This decision is immediately executory.
Costs against respondent Judge.
SO ORDERED.[3]
In compliance with the directive of the Court, the OCA, in a complaint dated October 4, 2001, charged
Judge Paderanga with gross misconduct and grave abuse of authority.[4] In the same administrative
complaint, the OCA, through Deputy Court Administrator Christopher O. Lock, prayed that respondent
be required to file his comment and that the case be submitted to an Associate Justice of the Court of
Appeals (CA) for investigation, report and recommendation.[5]
On November 21, 2001, this Court issued a resolution requiring respondent to file his Comment to the
administrative complaint filed by the OCA.[6] Respondent failed to comply.
In a Resolution dated January 12, 2004, this Court, noting respondents failure to file his comment,
directed the latter to report whether he had complied with the Decision of this Court dated January 24,
2001, and if in the affirmative, submit proof of compliance therewith; and to show cause why he should
not be disciplinarily dealt with or held in contempt for failure to file comment on the administrative
complaint filed against him, and to submit the required comment, ten (10) days from notice thereof.[7]
In his Compliance with Manifestation with Request and Clarification, respondent, through counsel,
informed the Court of his compliance with the Courts Decision of January 24, 2001. As to his failure to
file his comment to the administrative complaint filed by the OCA, respondent reasoned out that neither
he nor his counsel received or was furnished a copy of the said complaint.[8]
On May 24, 2004, this Court issued another resolution stating among others that:
The Court notes from the registry return cards for the Resolution of November 21, 2001, which required
respondent judge to comment on the administrative complaint for gross misconduct and gross abuse of
authority filed by the Office of the Court Administrator, that copies of said resolution were received by
respondent judge as well as Arcol and Musni Law Offices on an unstated date in December 2001 and
December 19, 2001, respectively. The records do not show whether copies of the administrative
complaint were attached to the copies of the resolutions received by them. However, even assuming
that copies of the complaint were inadvertently omitted, respondent judge or his counsel should have
immediately called the attention of the Court to the omission. It is only after they have received the
Courts Resolution dated January 12, 2004 that they informed the Court that they have not received a
copy of the complaint, thereby unduly delaying the proceedings and resolution of this administrative
matter.
In view thereof, the Court Resolves to:
a) NOTE the compliance of respondent judge with the directive in the Decision dated January 24, 2001
to reimburse petitioner Conchito J. Oclarit the amount of P1,000.00;
b) DECLARE the explanation for failure to file comment on the administrative complaint NOT
SATISFACTORY and to ADMONISH Judge Paderanga and Atty. Arcol to be more prudent in dealing with
the Court;
c) DIRECT the Division Clerk of Court to furnish Judge Paderanga and Arcol and Musni Law Offices with
copies of administrative complaint; and
d) REQUIRE Judge Paderanga to file COMMENT thereon within a non-extendible period of ten (10)
days from receipt hereof, with warning that upon failure to file his comment within said period, he shall
be deemed to have waived his right to comment and the complaint of the Office of the Court
Administrator shall be deemed submitted for resolution of the Court.
SO ORDERED.[9]
On July 28, 2004, respondent filed his Comment.[10]
On September 22, 2004, this Court issued a resolution referring the instant matter to Justice
Magdangal M. de Leon of the CA for investigation, report and recommendation.[11]
In conformity with the directive of this Court, Justice de Leon set the case for preliminary
conference and required the parties to submit their pre-trial briefs.[12]
Respondent and private complainant Atty. Oclarit submitted their pre-trial briefs, respectively.[13]
In his brief, respondent manifested his willingness to enter into an amicable settlement or alternative
mode of dispute resolution.
In the initial hearing conducted on January 13, 2005, respondent reiterated his willingness to enter into a
settlement with the private complainant. Accordingly, Justice de Leon reset the hearing to February 24,
2005 to give the parties opportunity and time to explore the possibility of settlement.[14]
On February 22, 2005, Atty. Oclarit submitted a Manifestation with an attached Affidavit of Desistance
explaining his desire to be permitted to desist from pursuing the complaint against respondent.[15]
]
The following day, or on February 23, 2005, respondent filed his own Manifestation with Motion
indicating that he and private complainant Oclarit have come to terms and thus, without going further
into the merits of the case, in their honest intention in good faith to have peace of mind, have expressed
their desire and decided to put an amicable closure to their controversy.[16]
Consequently, both parties did not appear during the scheduled hearing on February 24, 2005.
In his Report and Recommendation dated April 8, 2005, Justice de Leon came up with the following
evaluation of the case, pertinent portions of which read as follows:
Notwithstanding the desistance of private complainant from participating in this administrative case,
coupled with respondent Judges affirmation that they have long come to terms, a determination of the
veracity of the administrative charge against respondent Judge must still be made.
... ... ...
Indeed, respondent Judges action in forthwith declaring and punishing Atty. Oclarit in direct contempt
of court constituted misconduct and an abuse of authority. The same was all the more highlighted by his
failure to state in the written order of direct contempt the specific cause thereof. Respondent Judges
defense that his resort to such a drastic action was prompted by the manner by which Atty. Oclarit
argued as to the propriety of submitting for approval a compromise agreement reached before a
Barangay Captain is not well-taken.
... ... ...
There was nothing in the records to show that Atty. Oclarit was disrespectful to the trial court at the
inception of the hearing where respondent Judge cited Atty. Oclarit in direct contempt of court. Atty.
Oclarit was only trying to explain the propriety of obtaining a settlement before a Barangay Captain but
respondent Judge would not listen. The Supreme Court even found that it was respondent Judge who
first shouted successively at Atty. Oclarit to shut up, an act unbecoming of an impartial and a neutral
judge.
Respondent Judge should have given Atty. Oclarit the opportunity to fully present his side and only if his
explanation was found unmeritorious or his manner clearly spiteful should respondent Judge have acted
according to what was called for by the circumstances. A lawyers remarks explaining his position in a
case under consideration do not necessarily assume the level of contempt that justifies the court to
exercise the power of contempt.
Although Atty. Oclarit might have also addressed the trial court in a way not altogether tolerable,
respondent Judge was not justified in resorting to drastic action especially like in this case where the
measure taken involved a deprivation of liberty. More than anyone else in the hierarchy of court
personnel, Judges are enjoined to behave at all times to promote public confidence in the impartiality of
the judiciary.
Of course, respondent Judge, like any other normal person might have also been carried away by his
emotions. Even Atty. Oclarit, in his Affidavit of Desistance, acknowledged that fazed by the tense and
emotionally charged atmosphere of opposing counsels vigorously arguing their propositions and raising
their voices, (so that) Judge Paderanga, having been carried away by his own emotions, also got involved
by raising his voice and losing his temper. However, respondent Judges noble position in the bench
demands from him courteous speech in and out of the court. Judges are demanded to be always
temperate, patient and courteous both in conduct and in language. A judge can take comfort in the
thought that to suffer occasional outburst is a price that those who sit in judgment of other peoples
fates must at times pay.
Nonetheless, after a judicious examination of the records, the undersigned believes that the misconduct
and the abuse of authority by respondent Judge were not gross and grave as charged. What is apparent
is that respondent Judge merely adopted an erroneous measure designed to counter what he perceived
was an outright defiance of the courts authority. The same does not approximate gross misconduct or
grave abuse of authority.[17]
Accordingly, Justice de Leon recommended that respondent be reprimanded for drastically resorting to
his contempt powers with a warning that a repetition of similar acts will be dealt with more severely.[18]
This Court does not entirely agree with the findings of the investigating Justice but adopts the
recommended penalty for the infraction committed by respondent.
Respondent judge is being charged with grave abuse of authority and gross misconduct for having
unjustifiably used his contempt powers.
It must be noted that the present administrative case did not reach the stage of a full-blown
investigation owing to the manifestation by Atty. Oclarit and respondent of their willingness to put an
amicable closure to the instant case and for their failure to present evidence and attend the hearings set
by the investigating Justice. However, we agree with Justice de Leon that the withdrawal of the
complaint or the execution of an affidavit of desistance does not automatically result in the dismissal of
the instant administrative case. Thus, we have held in Pineda vs. Pinto[19] that:
an affidavit of desistance by a complainant in an administrative case against a member of the judiciary
does not divest the Supreme Court of its jurisdiction to investigate the matters alleged in the complaint
or otherwise to wield its disciplinary authority because the Court has an interest in the conduct and
behavior of its officials and employees and in ensuring the prompt delivery of justice to the people. Its
efforts in that direction cannot thus be frustrated by any private arrangement of the parties. Neither can
the disciplinary power of this Court be made to depend on a complainants whims. To rule otherwise
would undermine the discipline of court officials and personnel.[20]
Hence, we shall proceed to determine whether or not respondent is guilty of gross misconduct and grave
abuse of authority on the basis of the findings of this Court in G.R. No. 139519, the Comment of
respondent, and the Report and Recommendation of Justice de Leon.
It would be worth to reiterate this Courts pronouncement in G.R. No. 139519, to wit:
In this case, the court did not state the specific cause for declaring petitioner guilty of direct contempt
of court. Indeed, it would seem that the court cited petitioner for direct contempt of court for
submitting such compromise agreement for approval though the compromise was reached before a
barangay captain. As we said, there is nothing contumacious in such act. However, the impression of
lawyers in the courtroom at that time was that the presiding judge was irked because petitioner shouted
back and banged the table as petitioner charged the presiding judge with arrogance. This incident is not
recorded in the transcript, leaving us in doubt if it occurred. It is apparent, however, that the presiding
judge continuously ordered petitioner to shut up.
Even then, an order of direct contempt is not immediately executory or enforceable. The contemner
must be afforded a reasonable remedy to extricate or purge himself of the contempt. Thus, in the 1997
Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, the Court introduced a new provision granting a remedy to a
person adjudged in direct contempt by any court. Such person may not appeal therefrom, but may avail
himself of certiorari or prohibition. In such case, the execution of the judgment shall be suspended
pending resolution of such petition provided the contemner files a bond fixed by the court which
rendered the judgment and conditioned that he will abide by and perform the judgment should the
petition be decided against him.

In fact, petitioner asked the court presided over by respondent judge to fix a bail for his temporary
liberty pending the filing of a petition for certiorari. This written motion was filed on the first hour the
very next day. It was timely filed because the written order of contempt was issued only the next day
and given to petitioner when he was in jail. The respondent judge did not act on the motion. By such
inaction, respondent judge deprived petitioner of an effective relief from an order of direct contempt of
court. This is a violation of the Rules on contempt of court. Under Rule 65, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure,
as amended, petitioner has sixty (60) days within which to file his petition.
We find that respondent judge gravely abused his discretion in declaring petitioner guilty of direct
contempt of court, sentencing him to pay a fine of P1,000.00 and to serve one day in jail. It was
respondent judge who first shouted successively at petitioner to shut up. When petitioner persisted in
making his explanation, the court declared him in direct contempt, to the extent of stating that the judge
had absolute power. The lawyers remarks explaining his position in the case under consideration do
not necessarily assume the level of contumely that justifies the court to exercise the power of
contempt.[21]
Accordingly, we find no error in Justice de Leons finding that there is nothing on record to evidence Atty.
Oclarits contumacious behavior towards respondent or the office or court he represents. In fact,
respondent himself, in his Comment, admits that the proceedings on June 1, 1999 started rather
cordially, and went on with no discernible or perceptible recriminations.[22] Respondent further
acknowledges that [t]here were no recriminatory retorts, much less, serious diatribes thrown either
way between Atty. Oclarit and respondent, or between Atty. Oclarit and Atty. Bacal.[23] Nonetheless,
respondent claimed that his patience and forbearance were stretched to the hilt because of Atty.
Oclarits act of discourtesy towards the court which consisted of his persistent interruptions while
respondent was talking. Granting that Atty. Oclarit may indeed have committed acts of discourtesy
towards the court, we likewise agree with Justice de Leon that these acts do not justify respondent from
immediately resorting to his contempt powers, without even giving Atty. Oclarit the benefit of a warning,
considering that the penalty imposed was deprivation of liberty in addition to fine. It has time and again
been stressed that besides the basic equipment of possessing the requisite learning in the law, a
magistrate must exhibit that hallmark judicial temperament of utmost sobriety and self-restraint which
are indispensable qualities of every judge. [24] A judge anywhere should be the last person to be
perceived as a petty tyrant holding imperious sway over his domain.[25]
Indeed, Rule 3.04 of the Code of Judicial Conduct states that:
A judge should be patient, attentive and courteous to all lawyers, especially the inexperienced, to
litigants, witnesses, and others appearing before the court. A judge should avoid unconsciously falling
into the attitude of mind that the litigants are made for the courts instead of the courts for the litigants.
In Sison vs. Caoibes, Jr.,[26] this Court held that:
the power to declare a person in contempt of court and in dealing with him accordingly is an inherent
power lodged in courts of justice, to be used as a means to protect and preserve the dignity of the court,
the solemnity of the proceedings therein, and the administration of justice from callous misbehavior,
offensive personalities, and contumacious refusal to comply with court orders. Indeed, the power of
contempt is power assumed by a court or judge to coerce cooperation and punish disobedience,
disrespect or interference with the courts orderly process by exacting summary punishment. The
contempt power was given to the courts in trust for the public, by tradition and necessity, in as much as
respect for the courts, which are ordained to administer the laws which are necessary to the good order
of society, is as necessary as respect for the laws themselves. And, as in all other powers of the court, the
contempt power, however plenary it may seem, must be exercised judiciously and sparingly. A judge
should never allow himself to be moved by pride, prejudice, passion, or pettiness in the performance of
his duties.[27]
Hence, we have held that the role of a judge in relation to those who appear before his court must be
one of temperance, patience and courtesy.[28] A judge who is commanded at all times to be mindful of
his high calling and his mission as a dispassionate and impartial arbiter of justice is expected to be a
cerebral man who deliberately holds in check the tug and pull of purely personal preferences which he
shares with his fellow mortals.[29]
In the present case, respondent judges act of unceremoniously citing Atty. Oclarit in contempt while
declaring himself as having absolute power is a clear evidence of his unjustified use of the authority
vested upon him by law. He has lost sight of the fact that the power to cite persons in contempt is at his
disposal for purposes that are impersonal, because that power is intended as a safeguard not for the
judges as persons but for the functions that they exercise.[30] Respondent is guilty of grave abuse of
authority.[31]
This Court also finds respondent guilty of simple misconduct. Misconduct is defined as any unlawful
conduct on the part of a person concerned in the administration of justice prejudicial to the rights of
parties or to the right determination of the cause.[32] It generally means wrongful, improper or unlawful
conduct motivated by a premeditated, obstinate or intentional purpose.[33] Respondent may not be
held guilty of gross misconduct because the term gross connotes something out of all measure;
beyond allowance; not to be excused; flagrant; shameful.[34] In the present case, respondents
actuations, while condemnable, are not totally inexcusable as he has also been provoked by the
seemingly defiant attitude of Atty. Oclarit. Hence, this Court only finds him guilty of simple misconduct.
As to the imposable penalty, we cannot mete out the sanctions provided under Rule 140 of the Rules of
Court as amended by A.M. No. 01-8-10-SC, which took effect on October 1, 2001, because the
respondent judges infractions were committed on June 1, 1999. Nonetheless, this Court has not been
blind to the improper use by judges of the erstwhile inherent power of contempt which, in fine, amounts
to grave abuse of authority.[35]
In the present case, considering that respondent judge is not to be totally blamed for his reaction to the
apparently belligerent attitude of Atty. Oclarit, and since there is no showing that respondent has been
previously charged and found guilty of the same or similar administrative offense, we find it proper to
impose on him the penalty of reprimand, as recommended by Justice de Leon, with stern warning that
the commission of the same or similar acts in the future will be dealt with more severely.
WHEREFORE, respondent Judge Maximo G.W. Paderanga is found guilty of grave abuse of authority and
simple misconduct. He is hereby REPRIMANDED and STERNLY WARNED that repetition of the same or
similar acts shall be dealt with more severely.
J. King and Sons v. Hontanosas
acts:Complainant alleges that it is the plaintiff in a case pending before the RTC presided over
byrespondent. Respondent issued an Order granting the application for writ of preliminary attachment.
Anurgent motion to discharge and lift writ of preliminary attachment was filed by defendants before
therespondent and on the same day, respondent issued an Order lifting the writ of preliminary
attachment. aid Order was issued sans proper notice and hearing as re!uired by the Rules of Civil
"rocedure.Respondent approved defendants# counter$bond despite %nowledge that the bonding
company#s upremeCourt Clearance was not valid and the ma&imum net retention of the bonding
company had a deficiency. At a meeting in his house, respondent as%ed Rafael 'ing to match
defendants# offer to pay "()*,***.**so that the Order of +uly ), (**( will be reconsidered formally if a
motion for reconsideration is filed bycomplainant. Respondent#s favorite hang$out is the %arao%e
music lounge of etropolis -otel owned byherein complainant, and he uses said facilities
gratis et amore
. /ssue:0hether or not respondent 1udge is guilty of ignorance of the law resulting to impropriety for
usingthe facilities of the complainant free of charge2-eld:0e agree with the /nvestigating +ustice#s
finding that respondent is guilty of gross ignorance of the law for not holding a full$blown hearing on the
motion to lift attachment and for violating the three$daynotice rule. Respondent acted with indecent
haste in immediately holding a hearing on the motion to liftattachment filed only a few minutes before
said hearing, in considering the same submitted for resolution,and in issuing the order lifting the writ of
preliminary attachment and approving the counter$bond, all onthe same day without giving complainant
the opportunity to be heard on the matter./t is has been oft repeated that 1udges cannot be held to
account or answer criminally, civilly or administratively for an erroneous 1udgment of decision rendered
by him in good faith, or in the absence of fraud, dishonesty or corruption. -owever, it has also been held
that when the law violated is elementary, a 1udge is sub1ect to disciplinary action.
The principles of due notice and hearing are so basic thatrespondent#s inability to accord a litigant their
right thereto cannot be e&cused. /n this case, we believethat respondent#s actuations ree% of malice
and bad faith. Thus, we find respondent guilty of grossignorance of the law for violating the three$day
notice rule and failing to give herein complainant duenotice and the opportunity to be heard on the
matter As to the matter of the approval of the counter$bond, respondent utterly failed to e&ercise
duecare in e&amining the supporting papers. The respondent should %now the basic re!uirements
beforeapproving a surety bond or a 1udicial bond such as counter$bond./t is indeed grossly improper for
respondent to meet with a litigant at his home and to fre!uent the
karaoke
bar owned by such litigant, en1oying the use thereof for free. Respondent thereby receivedbenefits
from a litigant appearing in his court. Respondent#s defense that his wife offered to pay but
themanagement of the %arao%e bar did not allow her to do so, is feeble. The testimonies of the waiters
atsaid bar are !uite clear that respondent#s wife would sign the order slips, but no payment was ever
givenby respondent or his wife. Respondent should have insisted on paying, especially considering
thatcomplainant has a total of three cases pending before his court. 3y entertaining a litigant in his home
andreceiving benefits given by said litigant, respondent miserably failed to live up to the standards of
1udicialconduct./nsistence on personal integrity and honesty as indispensable !ualifications for 1udicial
office reflect an awareness in the legal profession of the immensity of the damage that can be done to
the legal order by 1udicial corruption.
Re: Judge Edmundo Acuna
Facts: A letter from the Concerned citizens of the lower court was received by theoffice of the Office of
the Court Administrator regarding the behavior of Judge EdmundoAcuna, RTC Caloocan City. According
to the letter, respondent judge signed orders andeven sentenced accused while on official leave from
Aug 15-Sept 15, 2001. Respondent judge also allegedly uses improper remarks in and out of open court.
In his comment,responded judge communicates that he applied for leave so that he may go abroad to
payrespects to his recently deceased brother. However, as he was waiting for his relativesvisas to be
approved, he considered deferring his leave, thus he still issued orders until Aug21, 2001, allegedly in
good faith. His improper remarks were caused by the fact that hisson had also recently passed away. He
claims that he was still in the second stage of hisrecovery exhibited by his usage of swear words. He
pleads the court that he did not render judgment out of monetary interest or other evil motive, but he
did so only because he hadan earnest intention of serving justice, as his court was overwhelmed by
various cases.Issue: W O N respondent judge should be suspended on account of his behavior?Held: No,
he should only be reprimanded. The Court agrees with the InvestigatingJustices observation that the
respondents use of such expletives is improper for theextolled office of a magistrate of the law. By
virtue of the very office he holds, the publicexpects more of the respondent as he undeniably occupies
an exalted yet delicate niche inthe administration of justice. Those who don the judicial robe and wield
the judicial gavelought to impress in their consciousness that appearance is an essential manifestation of
reality. Thus, the respondents claim that his favorite expressions were not directed atanyone in
particular is unacceptable.Judges are demanded to be always temperate, patient and courteous both in
conductand in language. Indeed, a judge should so behave at all times as to promote publicconfidence in
the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary. Propriety and the appearance of propriety are essential to
the performance of all the activities of a judge. We recognize, of course, that judges are also human
beings, with their own burdens and private affairs.However, having accepted the esteemed position of
judge, the respondent ought to haveknown that more is expected of him than an ordinary citizen. As
subjects of constant public scrutiny, personal restrictions that might be viewed as burdensome by the
ordinarycitizen should be freely and willingly accepted by a judge. In particular, he or she mustexhibit
conduct consistent with the dignity of the judicial office. Indeed, a judges personal behavior, not only
while in the performance of official duties, must be beyond reproach, being the visible personification of
law and of justice.
Manansala III v. Asdala
The following incidents spawned the filing of the present administrative case.
Before noon of February 1, 2003, Winfried Herbst, a German national, was detained at Police Station 10
in Kamuning, Quezon City for breaking a glass wall in the office of Melencio P. Manansala III
(complainant) at PM Building at 24 Matalino St., Diliman, Quezon City. By complainants account, in late
afternoon of even date, Judge Fatima G. Asdala (respondent) of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City,
Branch 87, called up by telephone the Station Commander of Station 10 Police Superintendent Atty. Joel
Napoleon Coronel, requesting for the release of Herbst to her custody. Atty. Coronel, however, did not
accede to respondents request, he informing her that complainant was adamant in filing criminal
charges against Herbst and they were just waiting for the arrival of the inquest fiscal.
Complainant further relates that on February 3, 2003, Mark Cabigao, the sheriff assigned at respondents
sala, together with two policemen, went to PM Building and requested that the Mercedes Benz car of
Herbst which he parked within the vicinity be turned over to their custody.
On February 4, 2003, complainant, together with retired Quezon City Regional Trial Court Judge
Marcelino Bautista appeared at the DIRECT CONNECT, a television show of Atty. Batas Mauricio,
wherein complainant aired respondents alleged meddling in the case against Herbst. In the same show,
respondents side was, through telephone, likewise aired.
The following day or on February 5, 2003, respondent filed before the Quezon City Prosecutors Office a
complaint for libel against complainant and Judge Bautista for allegedly defaming her in the television
show of Atty. Mauricio.
Subsequently, on February 13, 2003, complainant filed a complaint-affidavit, with a supplemental
complaint-affidavit, against respondent before the Office of the Ombudsman charging her with violation
of Section 3(a) of Republic Act 3019 (Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act) for allegedly
Persuading, inducing or influencing another public officer to perform an act constituting a violation of
rules and regulations duly promulgated by competent authority or an offense in connection with the
official duties of the latter or allowing himself to be persuaded, induced, or influenced to commit such
violation or offense.
By Memorandum[1] of February 17, 2003, the Ombudsman considered the case against respondent
closed and terminated without prejudice and referred it to the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA)
for appropriate action.
Upon receipt by the OCA of complainants complaint-affidavit and supplemental complaint-affidavit on
March 13, 2003, it directed respondent, by Indorsement[2] dated April 9, 2003, to submit her comment
thereon.
In her COMMENT[3] dated May 16, 2003, respondent claimed that the complaint at bar was intended to
harass her for the purpose of getting back at her, she having charged complainant and his lawyer
Marcelino Bautista, Jr. with libel. Respondents version of what transpired on February 1 and 3, 2003 is
quoted verbatim:
On February 1, 2003, a Saturday, at about 6:30 in the evening, as I was on my way out to treat my
children to a weekend dinner, I received an overseas call from Ed Berzosa, a first cousin working [in]
Hilton Macau asking for advi[c]e in regard [to] his benefactor, who before noon of that day, was
allegedly taken to the Kamuning Police Station for some offense. Since Ed could not accurately provide
me the information I desired to know to be able to give the proper legal advice, I instructed Ed instead to
get in touch with his benefactor Winfried Herbst and advise the latter to call me. At about 7 oclock, my
phone rang. It was Herbst on the line, saying that he was arrested upon the complaint of Manansala
after he broke some glass in the latters office on provocation; that he did so because he was fed up
with Manansalas refusal and delay in paying what he (Manansala) owes him, that he was detained at
the Kamuning Police Station at about 11:00 in the morning and that his complainant, who seems to be
very popular with the police officers thereat, would call every now and then, oftentimes, leaving
threatening words, through his cohorts at the station, for Herbst.
I could sense Herbsts agitation mainly due to the fact that he claims he has not been unable to reach his
lawyer since he was detained, neither was his side of the incident taken down by the police.
When Herbst asked if he could already be released, that was the time I decided to give the needed
advice and information, such as: that if there has been a formal complaint, for sure, he will be brought to
inquest, and that since it is Saturday, an inquest prosecutor is on duty and so, I then asked Herbst to find
out from the investigator when inquest will take place. As Herbst had a sideline conversation with
someone, I heard someone in the background ask Herbst who he was in conversation with. Before I
knew it, someone other tha[n] Herbst was on the line and he introduced himself as some police officer
whose name I cannot recall and asked what is it I wanted to know and who I am. I introduced myself as
Mrs. Asdala, a friend of Herbst and inquired if there has been a complaint filed against Herbst, for what
crime and when the case will be inquested. I gathered then that Herbst was charged with malicious
mischief for a damaged glass wall costing more or less P30,000.00, that inquest will take place at about 9
oclock in the evening.
Having been so informed, I asked to speak with Herbst again whence I advised Herbst that in an inquest
investigation, whatever he will say will be immaterial, as the inquest fiscal will focus only on what the
complaint says; he has to wait for the resolution of the fiscal whose recommendation will be for further
investigation, if he finds the complaint and evidence insufficient, in which case he will have the
opportunity to submit his counter-affidavit or the fiscal may recommend filing of the case. Either way,
the recommendation will wait for the approval of the Chief City Prosecutor or his assistant before he can
be released without necessity of bail if for further investigation; with bail, if filed. Often the inquest
fiscals recommendation stays for minor offenses like malicious mischief, UNLESS, some interested souls
INTERVENE for a reversal. I also advised Herbst of what demeanor to take during the inquest to avoid
getting the ire of the inquest investigator, then hanged up but advising to keep me posted by text of the
development, but suggested to offer [to] pay the damage caused at once, to soothe his complainant.
At about 10 oclock in the evening, Herbst sent [a] message that the inquest prosecutors
recommendation is for further investigation. I texted back saying that it is good news as he then will
have the opportunity to present his side before a final resolution is made.
xxx
On February 3, 200[3], at about 4:30 in the afternoon, I had an incidental conversation with Atty.
Bautista on the cell phone and asked why he would not want Herbsts Mercedes Benz removed from
where it was parked along Malakas Street. As related to me by Herbst, he left his Mercedes Benz
unattended on the road fronting PM apartments where Manansalas office is located when he was
forcibly hauled by the police summoned by Manansala in the morning of February 1, 2003. Herbst
called to inform that a friend reported seeing the tires of his car all flat and that the security guards of
Manansalas office were responsible for that. Fearing more vandalism, he asked for help to move out his
car.
Working hours over, I asked my sheriff to check if he can do anything. My sheriff was all too willing to
help that he immediately proceeded to where the car could be found only to be met by an irate
Manansala and his bosom lawyer Marcelino Bautista, who berated him in front of several people and
called him pakialamero at the same time telling him that no one can get Herbst car but Herbst
personally . . . which was precisely what Herbst was avoiding because Manansalas men almost roughed
him up before the police came on February 1, 2003, when the incident leading to the filing of the case,
occurred. It appears that upon seeing my sheriff in office uniform, Atty. Bautista asked what court he is
assigned. My sheriff then called up to inform what transpired and that was when I asked to speak with
Mr. Bautista ONLY for the purpose of asking him as to why he would not allow the car to be pulled out,
after all, it has nothing to do with the case filed against Herbst by Manansala. As earlier said, my only
purpose in talking with Atty. Bautista on the phone was to ask for his reason in not allowing Herbst car
moved out, knowing that the car was not even entrusted to him or to Manansala, thus, they do not have
any right to withhold it from anyone in Herbst behalf. It was never to ask for the release of the car,
precisely for the reasons already stated, and which I emphasized in my conversation with Atty. Bautista
that afternoon of February 3, 2003 when, Manansala arrogantly asked why the effort on my part. I told
him Herbst is a family friend, my cousins benefactor and he asked for help with his car. However, when
Bautista, construed the effort as meddling, I thought any further conversation with him on the phone
would not help especially when he made it clear that they will not allow anyone to get the car from
where it was, so I told myself just to forget about it. When Herbst texted that he has been released from
detention after posting bail, I instead, advised him to get his car personally but reminding him to avoid
any untoward confrontation with Manansala or his men or Bautista.
x x x[4] (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
By Resolution[5] dated February 16, 2004, this Court referred the complaint to Court of Appeals Justice
Renato C. Dacudao for investigation, report and recommendation.
In the investigation conducted by Justice Dacudao, complainant presented three witnesses, namely, Atty.
Coronel, Sheriff Mark Cabigao, and Judge Bautista, the gists of whose testimonies follow after their
names.
ATTY. CORONEL testified as follows:
On February 1, 2003, the duty desk officer, Police Chief Inspector Danilo Maceren, received a telephone
call informing him that one who introduced herself as Judge Asdala wanted to talk to him (Atty. Coronel)
by phone. He thus talked to the caller who requested him to, if possible, release Herbst from detention
and turn him to her custody, and asked about the possibility of the case being settled between
complainant and Herbst.[6]
Wanting to accommodate respondents request, he summoned complainant to his office and echoed to
him respondents request.[7]
Sheriff MARCELINO CABIGAO testified as follows:
On February 3, 2003, after office hours, napagutusan lang po ako na pumunta sa Station 10 and ask for
police assistance and go to PM Apartments to remove a vehicle because it might be damaged or lost.[8]

Upon arrival at the site where the vehicle was parked, he found out that all its 4 tires were already
deflated. And when he asked complainant and Judge Bautista for permission to get the vehicle, they
refused, prompting him to call respondent and inform her that they dont want to give it and even if
they did, I cannot take it because it has already 4 flat tires. Respondent then asked him who prevented
him from retrieving the vehicle, upon which he named Judge Bautista and complainant. Respondent
further asked him to give his phone to Judge Bautista which he did, and after respondent talked to Judge
Bautista, she told him (Cabigao) to leave the place if they do not want to release the vehicle.[9]
JUDGE BAUTISTA declared that during his phone conversation with respondent in the afternoon of
February 3, 2003, he told her to get an authorization from Herbst in order to retrieve the car as well as
make an inventory of the contents of the vehicle to avoid any misunderstanding later.[10]
Upon the other hand, RESPONDENT, at the witness stand, repeated her claim that the administrative
complaint was filed on account of her filing of the libel charges against complainant and Judge
Bautista.[11] And she reiterated the contents of her COMMENT to the complaint, she reasserting that
there was no interference on her part with regard to the investigation of Herbst took place.[12]
INVESTIGATING JUSTICE DACUDAO, by his Report and Recommendation,[13] found respondent
answerable for palpable abuse of authority or plain misconduct. The pertinent portion of his report
reads:
x x x [T]his Investigator believes that respondent judge could be held liable under Section 3(a) of Anti-
Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, to wit:
xxx
Respondent judge can be faulted for having called up that early evening of February 1, 2003, Atty. Joel
Napoleon Coronel, station commander of the Kamuning Police Station No. 10, to request for the release
to her custody of the German national Winfried Herbst, who was scheduled to undergo inquest
investigation at the Office of the City Prosecutor of Quezon City, for malicious mischief (or vandalism),
which the latter apparently committed, after he had allegedly smashed the window glass at the PM
Building at 24 Matalino Street, Diliman, Quezon City, where the complainant Melencio P. Manansala III
was living or holding office; as well as in asking for the compounding or amicable settlement of the
malicious mischief (or vandalism) case against the German national. For, it can hardly be doubted that in
making both requests respondent judge, one way or another, wittingly or unwittingly, subtly or blatantly,
brought to bear, or sought to bring to bear, upon the precinct commander, the influence of her office as
a judge, in an irregular and improper manner. Rightly or wrongly, the public identifies the abstract
precept of justice, and the administration of justice, with the persona and actuations of the visible
human judge that they see, and with whom they come in contact, or deal with. Respondent judges plea
of good faith thus becomes tenous when it is remembered that as a former fiscal or prosecutor,
respondent judge ought to know that there is no legal or statutory warrant or basis, at that time, for her
requests/ actions in seeking to obtain (temporary) custody of the still-[to] be-inquested Winfried Herbst,
or for the compounding or amicable settlement of the malicious mischief (or vandalism) case, against the
latter. However one looks at it, either course of action amounted to an unjustified, if not unlawful,
interference or meddling, (or persuading, inducing or influencing another public officer to borrow the
language of the statute) with the work of the police precinct commander at the time.
Thus conceding, for argument[s] sake, that a finding of liability under Section 3(a) of the Republic Act
No. 3019, as amended, would be improper, since a finding that respondent had violated this Section 3(a)
requires proof beyond reasonable doubt, for the reason that R.A. No. 3019, as amended, is a penal
statute, still under the facts recited, respondent judge can still be held liable, at the very least, for
palpable abuse of authority or plain misconduct, a finding whereon can rest upon substantial evidence,
as was submitted in this case. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Justice Dacudao thus found respondent judge liable at the very least, for palpable abuse or plain
misconduct, and recommended that respondent judge be fined in the amount of Ten Thousand Pesos
(P10,000.00), and warned that a repetition of the same or similar offense will merit a harsher penalty.
By Memorandum[14] of February 28, 2005, the OCA made a contrary finding and recommended the
dismissal of the complaint against respondent, to wit:
After a careful study of the records of the case, we have to withhold our concurrence with the findings of
Justice Dacudao. The report of the investigating justice solely relies on the testimony of Atty. Joel
Napoleon Coronel, the police superintendent and station commander whom Judge Asdala allegedly
called and tried to persuade to release and place the detained Mr. Herbst under her custody. It must be
pointed out that not only does Judge Asdala categorically deny having spoken to Atty. Coronel, but the
latter himself acknowledges that he did not know the respondent judge and admits that the person I
was talking over the phone may or may not be Judge Asdala.[] There is therefore the shadow of doubt
created by the possibility that somebody else could have used the name of Judge Asdala.
The testimonial evidence presented did not remove the probability that Judge Asdala might not be guilty
of the offense charged, thus failing to establish a prima facie case against the respondent judge.
The complainants allegation that Judge Asdala continues to intimidate and use her authority to
influence the outcome of the case was never substantiated by evidence, documentary or testimonial.
However, we find that sending Sheriff Cabigao to retrieve the car of Mr. Herbst was improper despite the
non-involvement of the car in the criminal case. Even if it was already after office hours, the fact that
Sheriff Cabigao, being a personnel of Judge Asdalas own court still in his office uniform and
accompanied by two policemen, would send the wrong signal, as it did.
Judges are expected to keep a watchful eye on the conduct of their employees, and not to ask them to
perform tasks outside their official functions. They are constrained to instill in the court personnel a
sense of propriety and probity in the performance of judicial functions. Given these requirements, the
respondent judge should be aware that the slightest semblance of impropriety on the part of the
employees of the court stirs ripples of public suspicion and public distrust of the judicial administrators.
The slightest breach of duty and the slightest irregularity in the conduct of court officers and employees
detract from the dignity of the courts and erode the faith of the people in the judiciary.
While we deem the respondent judge not guilty of violation of Sec 3(a) of R.A. 3019, palpable abuse of
authority or plain misconduct, we are of the view that the acts properly imputable to her, while not
warranting the imposition of any disciplinary sanction, clearly demonstrate the need for greater care,
prudence and discretion in her future actions.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, we respectfully submit for the consideration of the Honorable Court the
following recommendations:
1. That the administrative complaint against Judge Fatima G. Asdala of the Regional Trial Court
(Branch 87), Quezon City, be DISMISSED for lack of merit;
2. That such dismissal notwithstanding, Judge Asdala should be ADMONISHED to avoid acts that are
inimical to the service and which would cloud the credibility of the court; and
3. That she be STERNLY WARNED that a similar act in the future shall be strictly dealt with. (Emphasis
and underscoring supplied)
The pertinent provisions of THE CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT read:
CANON 2
 Is it not that you entertained Mr. Manansala in your office because he is an English-speaking guy and he
A JUDGE SHOULD AVOID IMPROPRIETY AND THE APPEARANCE OF IMPROPRIETY IN ALL ACTIVITIES. was decently dressed or what?

RULE 2.01. A Judge should so behave at all times as to promote public confidence in the integrity and ATTY. CORONEL:
impartiality of the judiciary.
I asked Mr. Manansala to my office because I received a call from a person who introduced herself as
xxx Judge Asdala and that is the reason why I asked Mr. Manansala to my office and asked him if he is willing
to settle the case amicably with Mr. Herbst.
RULE 2.04. A Judge shall refrain from influencing in any manner the outcome of litigation or dispute
pending before another court or administrative agency. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied) JUDGE ASDALA:

Above-quoted Rule 2.04 is reproduced as CANON 2, Sec. 3 in the NEW CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT FOR When you called Mr. Manansala in your office, you informed him that a certain Judge Ma. Fatima
THE PHILIPPINE JUDICIARY which took effect on June 1, 2004. Asdala called in order to ask for a favor, is that it?

In administrative cases, the quantum of proof necessary to hold a respondent liable for the charge is
substantial evidence or such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind may accept as adequate to support
a conclusion.[15]
In the case at bar, respondent denies having talked to Atty. Coronel. She admits though that she talked
to one Maceren who, by her claim, butted in during her phone conversation with Herbst. She proffers,
however, that when she conversed with Maceren, she identified herself as Mrs. Asdala and merely asked
him if a complaint had been filed against Herbst, for what offense, and when the case would be
inquested.
ATTY. CORONEL:
I informed him that Judge Asdala called me and ask me to help the person under investigation, Mr.
Herbst, if possible to have the person released from detention and I told Mr. Manansala the only way
that I can do this is to have the case settled amicably so that . . . no case will be filed against Mr. Herbst.
xxx
JUDGE ASDALA:

Respondents plain denial of the charge of influencing does not suffice to discredit the straightforward Why did you take interest, Mr. Coronel, when the case should have been handled by the investigator
claim of Atty. Coronel, however. of the case?

MR. MANANSALA: ATTY. CORONEL:

Did you inform me of, for lack of a better term at this point in time, inquiries from a certain judge Because I believe in my mind at that time that it was Judge Asdala who called me and asked for my
regarding the Winfried Herbst complaint? assistance regarding Mr. Herbst who she claimed to be a family friend and asked me if possible to
release Mr. Herbst to her custody. That is why I asked Mr. Manansala to come to my office and if there
ATTY. CORONEL: could be a possible amicable settlement between Mr. Manansala and Mr. Herbst so that no criminal
complaint could be filed against Mr. Herbst.
I called you to my office because I received a phone call from a person who introduced herself as
Judge Asdala of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City concerning the investigation of a criminal JUSTICE DACUDAO:
complaint being conducted by our office against Mr. Herbst.
In other words, you were attempting to forge some kind of an amicable settlement?
xxx
ATTY. CORONEL:
JUDGE ASDALA:
Yes, Your Honor, I was trying to arrange an amicable settlement between Mr. Manansala and Mr.
What particular words that the person you were talking with on [the] phone tell you that is now being Herbst at that time.
considered by Mr. Manansala as pakikialam?
JUSTICE DACUDAO:
ATTY. CORONEL:
Why did you do that? What is your purpose?
The person who introduced herself as Judge Asdala asked me if I can possibly help a certain Mr. Herbst
who was brought in to our station for investigation and that he would not be detained and be released ATTY. CORONEL:
to the custody of the person who introduced herself as Judge Asdala.
I believed I spoke to Judge Asdala over the phone and then I would like to accommodate her request
xxx that her friend will not be detained any longer if the case will be settled between Mr. Manansala and Mr.
Herbst at that time.
JUDGE ASDALA:
xxx
 JUSTICE DACUDAO:
JUDGE ASDALA:
Where is he now?
Because actually, the reason why the complainant would file this is because of the damage, he would
want that rectified, correct? ATTY. CORONEL:

ATTY. CORONEL: Major Maceren is now in Cosovo, Yugoslavia. He is part of the U.N. Peace Visiting Mission.

Yes, mam. x x x (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)[16]

JUDGE ASDALA: Moreover, respondents vacillating version regarding the phone conversation with the police officer
flaws her credibility. In her COMMENT to the complaint at bar, she stated that during her phone
That is the main reason why you were trying to forge a settlement between Mr. Manansala and Mr. conversation with Herbst, she heard someone in the background ask Herbst who he was in
Herbst and not particularly because somebody called you? conversation with and [b]efore she knew it, someone other tha[n] Herbst was on the line and he
introduced himself as some police officer whose name [she] cannot recall and asked what is it [she]
ATTY. CORONEL: wanted to know and who [she was] xxx.[17] And during her interview on air by Atty. Mauricio, she
likewise admitted having talked to a police officer in Station 10, to wit:
I took interest in the case because of the call I received that afternoon that is why I asked Mr.
Manansala to come to my office and asked him if an amicable settlement can be arranged between him ATTY. BATAS MAURICIO (BMM): Welcome po kayo dito sa ating Direct Connect at kasama po natin dito si
and Mr. Herbst. Judge Marcelino Bautista at Ginoong Melencio Manansala, at nirereklamo na nakikialam daw po kayo
dito sa hinuling suspect na nakaditine sa station ng Quezon City police. Ano po ang inyong panig Judge
JUDGE ASDALA: Asdala?

So it is not for the reason that the case is actually the subject of a usual settlement that you took JUDGE FATIMA ASDALA (JFA): Ah well . . . dun sa salitang pikikialam, I think thats an incorrect adaptation
interest in but because of the call of a certain person who represented herself as Judge Asdala. Is that of, ah . . . kung ano man, ang naging ginawa ko.
what you are trying to say?
BMM: Ok?
ATTY. CORONEL:
JFA: Hindi ako nakialam. I only helped a friend who is a family friend, (pause) ah more than even a family
Yes. friend because he is like a member of the family.

xxx BMM: Totoo po bang . . judge

JUSTICE DACUDAO: xxx

What was the gist of the conversation?
ATTY. CORONEL:
Your Honor, I was informed by my desk officer at that time that a call from Judge Asdala was
received by them and asked me if I will be willing to talk with Judge Asdala. I received that call and I
spoke to a woman who introduced herself as Judge Asdala of RTC Quezon City. And then the person
over the phone asked me if I can possibly help a Mr. Herbst, a German national, who was brought in to
Station 10 for investigation considering that the person is a friend of hers and if possible, Mr. Herbst
would not be detained at our station.
JUSTICE DACUDAO:
JFA: Now, ang sinasabi siguro niyang pakikialam when I requested no, I requested, ah, ahhh, I think I
was talking with one Major Mazaren(?) . . . (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)[18]
During the investigation conducted by Justice Dacudao, however, while Atty. Coronel was on cross-
examination by respondent, respondent, in reply to the question of the Justice if she denied being the
Judge Asdala who made a telephone call to the police station, evasively answered the Justice and stated
that she did not speak with anybody.
JUDGE ASDALA:
So there is a possibility that it was not Judge Asdala and that her name was only being used in order for
you to hear her over the phone?

You mentioned of a desk officer, what is the name of that desk officer? ATTY. CORONEL:

ATTY. CORONEL: Yes.

At that time, the person who approached me was Police Chief Inspector Danilo Maceren, Your JUSTICE DACUDAO:
Honor.
By the way, Judge Asdala, are you denying that you were the person?

JUDGE ASDALA:
Precisely, that is my statement. Those are the essence of my Answer and Comment to the Complaint
filed by Mr. Manansala with the office of the City Prosecutor.
JUSTICE DACUDAO:
You mean to say you are not that person?
JUDGE ASDALA:
Not, Your Honor. I did not speak. Even in the interview, Your Honor, I said I did not speak with
anybody, I did not request anybody to release the accused to my custody because I wouldnt possibly do
that, Your Honor, because I am aware of the procedure when a case is supposed to be heard for inquest,
it is only the Fiscal who can order the release of the accused and not any police officer.[19] (Emphasis
and underscoring supplied)
As for respondents act of ordering her sheriff to engage the assistance of policemen and retrieve
Herbsts car, this Court finds that respondent should also be faulted therefor. For by such act, she
availed of the services of a government employee inutusan niya for private concerns. In any event,
that her sheriff was even ordered to engage the services of policemen could not have been intended
other than to demonstrate her perceived might as a judge in order to hopefully secure an unimpeded
release of the car. Her claim that the sheriff was all too willing to help does not, even if true, albeit the
sheriffs testimony does not reflect such claim, extenuate her or mitigate her liability.
In fine, this Court finds well-taken the investigating Justices evaluation of complainants allegations.
Instead, however, of palpable abuse of authority or plain misconduct, respondent is found liable for
gross misconduct constituting violation of the earlier quoted provisions of the Code of Judicial Conduct, a
serious charge under Rule 140 of the Rules of Court, as amended.[20] Section 11 of said rule reads:
SECTION 11. Sanctions
A. If the respondent is guilty of a serious charge, any of the following sanctions may be imposed:
1. Dismissal from the service, forfeiture of all or part of the benefits as the Court may determine, and
disqualification from reinstatement or appointment to any public office, including government-owned
and controlled corporations, Provided, however, that the forfeiture of benefits shall in no case include
accrued leave credits;
2. Suspension from office without salary and other benefits for more than three (3) but not exceeding
six (6) months; or
3. A fine of more than P20,000.00 but not exceeding P40,000.00
WHEREFORE, respondent Judge Fatima G. Asdala, having been found GUILTY of GROSS MISCONDUCT, is
hereby FINED in the amount of P40,000.00 with a STERN WARNING that a repetition of the same or
similar offense will be dealt with more severely.
IN RE: DESIGNATION OF JUDGE RODOLFO U. MANZANO AS MEMBER OF THE ILOCOS NORTE PROVINCIAL
COMMITTEE ON JUSTICE.
On 4 July 1988, Judge Rodolfo U. Manzano, Executive Judge, RTC, Bangui, Ilocos Norte, Branch 19, sent
this Court a letter which reads:
Hon. Marcelo Fernan
Chief Justice of the Supreme Court
of the Philippines
Manila
Thru channels: Hon. Leo Medialdea
Court Administrator
Supreme Court of the Philippines
Sir:
By Executive Order RF6-04 issued on June 21, 1988 by the Honorable Provincial Governor of Ilocos Norte,
Hon. Rodolfo C. Farinas, I was designated as a member of the Ilocos Norte Provincial Committee on
Justice created pursuant to Presidential Executive Order No. 856 of 12 December 1986, as amended by
Executive Order No. 326 of June 1, 1988. In consonance with Executive Order RF6-04, the Honorable
Provincial Governor of Ilocos Norte issued my appointment as a member of the Committee. For your
ready reference, I am enclosing herewith machine copies of Executive Order RF6-04 and the
appointment.
Before I may accept the appointment and enter in the discharge of the powers and duties of the position
as member of the Ilocos (Norte) Provincial Committee on Justice, may I have the honor to request for the
issuance by the Honorable Supreme Court of a Resolution, as follows:
(1) Authorizing me to accept the appointment and to as assume and discharge the powers and
duties attached to the said position;
(2) Considering my membership in the Committee as neither violative of the Independence of
the Judiciary nor a violation of Section 12, Article VIII, or of the second paragraph of Section .7, Article IX
(B), both of the Constitution, and will not in any way amount to an abandonment of my present position
as Executive Judge of Branch XIX, Regional Trial Court, First Judicial Region, and as a member of the
Judiciary; and
(3) Consider my membership in the said Committee as part of the primary functions of an
Executive Judge.
May I please be favored soon by your action on this request.
Very respectfully yours,
(Sgd) RODOLFO U. MANZANO
Judge
An examination of Executive Order No. 856, as amended, reveals that Provincial/City Committees on
Justice are created to insure the speedy disposition of cases of detainees, particularly those involving the
poor and indigent ones, thus alleviating jail congestion and improving local jail conditions. Among the
functions of the Committee are
3.3 Receive complaints against any apprehending officer, jail warden, final or judge who may be
found to have committed abuses in the discharge of his duties and refer the same to proper authority for
appropriate action;
3.5 Recommend revision of any law or regulation which is believed prejudicial to the proper
administration of criminal justice.
It is evident that such Provincial/City Committees on Justice perform administrative functions.
Administrative functions are those which involve the regulation and control over the conduct and affairs
of individuals for; their own welfare and the promulgation of rules and regulations to better carry out
the policy of the legislature or such as are devolved upon the administrative agency by the organic law of
its existence (Nasipit Integrated Arrastre and Stevedoring Services Inc., vs. Tapucar, SP-07599-R, 29
September 1978, Blacks Law Dictionary).
Furthermore, under Executive Order No. 326 amending Executive Order No. 856, it is provided that
Section 6. Supervision.The Provincial/City Committees on Justice shall be under the supervision of the
Secretary of justice Quarterly accomplishment reports shall be submitted to the Office of the Secretary
of Justice.
Under the Constitution, the members of the Supreme Court and other courts established by law shag not
be designated to any agency performing quasi- judicial or administrative functions (Section 12, Art. VIII,
Constitution).
Considering that membership of Judge Manzano in the Ilocos Norte Provincial Committee on Justice,
which discharges a administrative functions, will be in violation of the Constitution, the Court is
constrained to deny his request.
Former Chief Justice Enrique M. Fernando in his concurring opinion in the case of Garcia vs. Macaraig (39
SCRA 106) ably sets forth:
2. While the doctrine of separation of powers is a relative theory not to be enforced with
pedantic rigor, the practical demands of government precluding its doctrinaire application, it cannot
justify a member of the judiciary being required to assume a position or perform a duty non-judicial in
character. That is implicit in the principle. Otherwise there is a plain departure from its command. The
essence of the trust reposed in him is to decide. Only a higher court, as was emphasized by Justice
Barredo, can pass on his actuation. He is not a subordinate of an executive or legislative official, however
eminent. It is indispensable that there be no exception to the rigidity of such a norm if he is, as expected,
to be confined to the task of adjudication. Fidelity to his sworn responsibility no less than the
maintenance of respect for the judiciary can be satisfied with nothing less.
This declaration does not mean that RTC Judges should adopt an attitude of monastic insensibility or
unbecoming indifference to Province/City Committee on Justice. As incumbent RTC Judges, they form
part of the structure of government. Their integrity and performance in the adjudication of cases
contribute to the solidity of such structure. As public officials, they are trustees of an orderly society.
Even as non-members of Provincial/City Committees on Justice, RTC judges should render assistance to
said Committees to help promote the laudable purposes for which they exist, but only when such
assistance may be reasonably incidental to the fulfillment of their judicial duties.
ACCORDINGLY, the aforesaid request of Judge Rodolfo U. Manzano is DENIED.
SO ORDERED.
Cruz, Paras, Feliciano, Gancayco, Bidin, Sarmiento, Cortes, Medialdea and Regalado, JJ., concur.
Separate Opinions
GUTIERREZ, JR., J., dissenting:
The Constitution prohibits the designation of members of the judiciary to any agency performing quasi-
judicial or administrative functions (Section 12, Article VIII, Constitution.).
Insofar as the term "quasi-judicial" is concerned, it has a fairly clear meaning and Judges can confidently
refrain from participating in the work of any administrative agency which adjudicates disputes and
controversies involving the rights of parties within its jurisdiction. The issue involved in this case is where
to draw the line insofar as administrative functions are concerned.
"Administrative functions" as used in Section 12 refers to the executive machinery of government and
the performance by that machinery of governmental acts. It refers to the management actions,
determinations, and orders of executive officials as they administer the laws and try to make
government effective. There is an element of positive action, of supervision or control.
Applying the definition given in the opinion of the majority which reads:
Administrative functions are those which involve the regulation and control over the conduct and affairs
of individuals for their own welfare and the promulgation of rules and regulations to better carry out the
policy of the legislature or such as are devolved upon the administrative agency by the organic law of its
existence (Nasipit Integrated Arrastre and Stevedoring Services Inc. v. Tapucar, S.P-07599-R, 29
September 1978, Black's Law Dictionary. )
we can readily see that membership in the Provincial or City Committee on Justice would not involve any
regulation or control over the conduct and affairs of individuals. Neither will the Committee on Justice
promulgate rules and regulations nor exercise any quasi-legislative functions. Its work is purely advisory.
I do not see anything wrong in a member of the judiciary joining any study group which concentrates on
the administration of justice as long as the group merely deliberates on problems involving the speedy
disposition of cases particularly those involving the poor and needy litigants or detainees, pools the
expertise and experiences of the members, and limits itself to recommendations which may be adopted
or rejected by those who have the power to legislate or administer the particular function involved in
their implementation.
We who are Judges cannot operate in a vacuum or in a tight little world of our own. The administration
of justice cannot be pigeonholed into neat compartments with Judges, Fiscals, Police, Wardens, and
various other officials concerned erecting water-tight barriers against one another and limiting our
interaction to timidly peeping over these unnecessary and impractical barriers into one another's work,
all the while blaming the Constitution for such a quixotic and unreal interpretation. As intimated in the
majority opinion, we should not be monastically insensible or indifferent to projects or movements
cogitating on possible solutions to our common problems of justice and afterwards forwarding their
findings to the people, public or private, where these findings would do the most good.
The majority opinion suggests the giving of assistance by Judges to the work of the Committees on
Justice. Assistance is a vague term. Can Judges be designated as observers? Advisers? Consultants? Is it
the act of being "designated" which is proscribed by the Constitution or is it participation in the
prohibited functions? If judges cannot become members, why should they be allowed or even
encouraged to assist these Committees The line drawn by the majority is vague and unrealistic.
The constitutional provision is intended to shield Judges from participating in activities which may
compromise their independence or hamper their work. Studying problems involving the administration
of justice and arriving at purely recommendatory solutions do not in any way involve the encroachment
of. the judiciary into executive or legislative functions or into matters which are none of its concerns.
Much less is it an encroachment of the other departments into judicial affairs.
As the visible representation of the law and of justice in his community, the Judge should not shy away
from public activities which do not interfere with the prompt and proper performance of his office, but
which, in fact, enhance his effectiveness as a Judge. He cannot stop mingling in civic intercourse or shut
himself into solitary seclusion. The Committees on Justice will also be immensely benefited by the
presence of Judges in the study groups. The work of the Committees is quite important. Let it not be said
that the Judges the officials most concerned with justice have hesitated to join in such a worthy
undertaking because of a strained interpretation of their functions.
It is well for this Court to be generally cautious, conservative or restrictive when it interprets provisions
of the Constitution or statutes vesting us with powers or delimit the exercise of our jurisdiction and
functions. However, we should not overdo it. The basic principles of constitutional interpretation apply
as well to the provisions which define or circumscribe our powers and functions as they do to the
provisions governing the other dependents of government. The Court should not adopt a strained
construction which impairs its own efficiency to meet the responsibilities brought about by the changing
times and conditions of society. The familiar quotation is apt in this caseconstitutional provisions are
interpreted by the spirit which vivifies and not by the letter which killeth.
I, therefore, dissent from the majority opinion and vote to allow Judge Rodolfo U.
Fernan C.J., Narvasa and Grio-Aquino, JJ., join in Gutierrez dissent.
MELENCIO-HERRERA, J., dissenting:
I hesitate to give such a restrictive and impractical interpretation to Section 12, Article VIII of the 1987
Constitution, and thus join the dissent of Justice Gutierrez, Jr.
What I believe is contemplated by the Constitutional prohibition is designation, for example, to such
quasi-judicial bodies as the SEC, or administrative agencies like the BIR. Those are full-time positions
involving running the affairs of government, which will interfere with the discharge of judicial functions
or totally remove a Judge/Justice from the performance of his regular functions.
The Committee on Justice cannot be likened to such an administrative agency of government. It is a
study group with recommendatory functions. In fact, membership by members of the Bench in said
committee is called for by reason of the primary functions of their position.
The matter of supervision by the Secretary of Justice provided for under E.O. No. 326 amending E.O. No.
856, need not be a cause for concern. That supervision is confined to Committee work and will by no
means extend to the performance of judicial functions per se.
Manzano to become a member of the Ilocos Norte Provincial Committee on Justice.
Separate Opinions
GUTIERREZ, JR., J., dissenting:
The Constitution prohibits the designation of members of the judiciary to any agency performing quasi-
judicial or administrative functions (Section 12, Article VIII, Constitution.).
Insofar as the term "quasi-judicial" is concerned, it has a fairly clear meaning and Judges can confidently
refrain from participating in the work of any administrative agency which adjudicates disputes and
controversies involving the rights of parties within its jurisdiction. The issue involved in this case is where
to draw the line insofar as administrative functions are concerned.
"Administrative functions" as used in Section 12 refers to the executive machinery of government and
the performance by that machinery of governmental acts. It refers to the management actions,
determinations, and orders of executive officials as they administer the laws and try to make
government effective. There is an element of positive action, of supervision or control.
Applying the definition given in the opinion of the majority which reads:
Administrative functions are those which involve the regulation and control over the conduct and affairs
of individuals for their own welfare and the promulgation of rules and regulations to better carry out the
policy of the legislature or such as are devolved upon the administrative agency by the organic law of its
existence (Nasipit Integrated Arrastre and Stevedoring Services Inc. v. Tapucar, S.P-07599-R, 29
September 1978, Black's Law Dictionary. )
we can readily see that membership in the Provincial or City Committee on Justice would not involve any
regulation or control over the conduct and affairs of individuals. Neither will the Committee on Justice
promulgate rules and regulations nor exercise any quasi-legislative functions. Its work is purely advisory.
I do not see anything wrong in a member of the judiciary joining any study group which concentrates on
the administration of justice as long as the group merely deliberates on problems involving the speedy
disposition of cases particularly those involving the poor and needy litigants or detainees, pools the
expertise and experiences of the members, and limits itself to recommendations which may be adopted
or rejected by those who have the power to legislate or administer the particular function involved in
their implementation.
We who are Judges cannot operate in a vacuum or in a tight little world of our own. The administration
of justice cannot be pigeonholed into neat compartments with Judges, Fiscals, Police, Wardens, and
various other officials concerned erecting water-tight barriers against one another and limiting our
interaction to timidly peeping over these unnecessary and impractical barriers into one another's work,
all the while blaming the Constitution for such a quixotic and unreal interpretation. As intimated in the
majority opinion, we should not be monastically insensible or indifferent to projects or movements
cogitating on possible solutions to our common problems of justice and afterwards forwarding their
findings to the people, public or private, where these findings would do the most good.
The majority opinion suggests the giving of assistance by Judges to the work of the Committees on
Justice. Assistance is a vague term. Can Judges be designated as observers? Advisers? Consultants? Is it
the act of being "designated" which is proscribed by the Constitution or is it participation in the
prohibited functions? If judges cannot become members, why should they be allowed or even
encouraged to assist these Committees The line drawn by the majority is vague and unrealistic.
The constitutional provision is intended to shield Judges from participating in activities which may
compromise their independence or hamper their work. Studying problems involving the administration
of justice and arriving at purely recommendatory solutions do not in any way involve the encroachment
of. the judiciary into executive or legislative functions or into matters which are none of its concerns.
Much less is it an encroachment of the other departments into judicial affairs.
As the visible representation of the law and of justice in his community, the Judge should not shy away
from public activities which do not interfere with the prompt and proper performance of his office, but
which, in fact, enhance his effectiveness as a Judge. He cannot stop mingling in civic intercourse or shut
himself into solitary seclusion. The Committees on Justice will also be immensely benefited by the
presence of Judges in the study groups. The work of the Committees is quite important. Let it not be said
that the Judges the officials most concerned with justice have hesitated to join in such a worthy
undertaking because of a strained interpretation of their functions.
It is well for this Court to be generally cautious, conservative or restrictive when it interprets provisions
of the Constitution or statutes vesting us with powers or delimit the exercise of our jurisdiction and
functions. However, we should not overdo it. The basic principles of constitutional interpretation apply
as well to the provisions which define or circumscribe our powers and functions as they do to the
provisions governing the other dependents of government. The Court should not adopt a strained
construction which impairs its own efficiency to meet the responsibilities brought about by the changing 4. When our principal counsel, Atty. Zamora, arrived and took over from Atty. Loria, she inquired
times and conditions of society. The familiar quotation is apt in this caseconstitutional provisions are regarding the personality of Judge Malanyaon, being seated at the lawyers bench beside Atty.
interpreted by the spirit which vivifies and not by the letter which killeth. Malanyaon, Judge Malanyaon then proudly introduced himself and manifested that he was the counsel
of the respondents counsel. Atty. Zamora proceeded to raise the propriety of Judge Malanyaons sitting
I, therefore, dissent from the majority opinion and vote to allow Judge Rodolfo U. Manzano to become a with and assisting his daughter in that hearing, being a member of the judiciary, to which Judge
member of the Ilocos Norte Provincial Committee on Justice. Malanyaon loudly retorted that he be shown any particular rule that prohibits him from sitting with his
daughter at the lawyers bench. He insisted that he was merely assisting her daughter, who just
Fernan C.J., Narvasa and Grio-Aquino, JJ., join in Gutierrez dissent. passed the bar, defend the respondent, and was likewise helping the latter defend herself. Pertinent
portion of the records of the proceedings are as follows:
MELENCIO-HERRERA, J., dissenting: xxxx
Atty. Nieves
I hesitate to give such a restrictive and impractical interpretation to Section 12, Article VIII of the 1987 :
Constitution, and thus join the dissent of Justice Gutierrez, Jr. First, she has to enter her appearance. Okay?
Atty. Zamora
What I believe is contemplated by the Constitutional prohibition is designation, for example, to such :
quasi-judicial bodies as the SEC, or administrative agencies like the BIR. Those are full-time positions Anyway, I dont think, I do not memorize my PTR number, I dont remember my PTR number, but aside
involving running the affairs of government, which will interfere with the discharge of judicial functions from that Your Honor, I think this Honorable Hearing Officer could take judicial notice that Atty. Ed Loria
or totally remove a Judge/Justice from the performance of his regular functions. is indeed a lawyer in good standing in IBP. And moreover, Your Honor, I would like to inquire as to the
personality of the gentleman next to the lawyer of the defendant or respondent, Your Honor?
The Committee on Justice cannot be likened to such an administrative agency of government. It is a Judge Malanyaon
study group with recommendatory functions. In fact, membership by members of the Bench in said :
committee is called for by reason of the primary functions of their position. I am the counsel of the complainant, ah, of the respondents counsel, I am Judge Malanyaon. I am
assisting her. And so what?!!
The matter of supervision by the Secretary of Justice provided for under E.O. No. 326 amending E.O. No. Atty. Zamora
856, need not be a cause for concern. That supervision is confined to Committee work and will by no :
means extend to the performance of judicial functions per se. Ah, you are the counsel of the (interrupted)
Decena ,et al. v. Judge Malanyaon Atty. Nieves
A judge may not involve himself in any activity that is an aspect of the private practice of law. His :
acceptance of an appointment to the Bench inhibits him from engaging in the private practice of law, Theres no need to be belligerent lets calm down
regardless of the beneficiary of the activity being a member of his immediate family. He is guilty of Atty. Zamora
conduct unbecoming of a judge otherwise. :
Your Honor, Your Honor, we all do not know each other, and with due respect to the judge, there is also
Antecedents a hearing officer here Your Honor, and I think Your Honor the Hearing Officer here deserves due respect.
I mean, the word So what?!, I dont think that would be proper Your Honor in this Court.
The complainants have lodged an administrative complaint for conduct unbecoming a judge against Hon. Judge Malanyaon
Nilo A. Malanyaon, the Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 32, in Pili, Camarines :
Sur.1crared I am sorry your Honor, because the is out of turn, out of turn.
Atty. Nieves
In their joint complaint-affidavit dated April 10, 2007,2 the complainants averred that complainant Rey :
C. Decena had brought an administrative case in Regional Office No. V of the Civil Service Commission in This is not necessary, actually, this is not necessary. So we might as well proceed with our hearing today.
Legaspi City, Albay against Judge Malanyaons wife, Dr. Amelita C. Malanyaon (Dr. Amelita), then the Ive already made a ruling regarding the, the query regarding PTR. Okay, at this stage it is not proper
Assistant Provincial Health Officer of the Province of Camarines Sur; that during the hearing of the considering that Atty. Loria only entered his appearance during the start of the hearing. Okay. So, we
administrative case on May 4, 2006, Judge Malanyaon sat beside his daughter, Atty. Ma. Kristina C. have to proceed now.
Malanyaon, the counsel of Dr. Amelita in the case; and that the events that then transpired were as Atty. Zamora
recounted in the joint complaint-affidavit, to wit:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary :
I am accepting Your Honor the delegation again of Atty. Loria. I am entering my appearance as the lead
3. During the early stage of the hearing when the hearing officer, Atty. Dennis Masinas Nieves, brought counsel for this case, Your Honor, as counsel for the complainant.
up the matter regarding Dr. Malanyaons manifestation or motion (to dismiss the case for lack of Atty. Nieves
jurisdiction), Judge Malanyaon coached her daughter in making manifestations/motions before the :
hearing officer, by scribbling on some piece of paper and giving the same to the former, thus prompting Okay.
her daughter to rise from her seat and/or ask permission from the officer to speak, and then make some Atty. Zamora
manifestations while reading or glancing on the paper given by Judge Malanyaon. At one point, Judge :
Malanyaon even prompted her daughter to demand that Atty. Eduardo Loria, the collaborating counsel And may I be clear that the judge will be the collaborating counsel for the respondent or the counsel of
of our principal counsel, Atty. Mary Ailyne Zamora, be required to produce his PTR number. record of the respondent?
Atty. Nieves
: It is true I snapped at Atty. Zamora, when she asked about my personality but she was speaking out of
of the judge is Im sorry? turn as all I was doing was sitting beside my daughter when she came as the transcript will show, I
Atty. Zamora apologized to the hearing officer, who graciously let the matter pass;cralawlibrary
:
He manifested Your Honor that he is the counsel of the respondent. My daughter is a new practitioner; her law partner and lead counsel could not make it on time, and as
Atty. Malanyaon her consultant, I did not speak, nor enter my appearance for my wife to lend a helping hand to a
: neophyte lawyer, defending her mother in an administrative case, is not unethical, nor does it constitute
No, the counsel of the counsel of the respondent. the proscribed practice of law;cralawlibrary
Atty. Nieves
: It is petty for my sister-in-law and for my nephew to complain of my presence during the hearing; it is my
He has not, he has not entered his appearance in this case. filial duty to lend my wife and daughter, moral and legal support in their time of need; indeed, it is
Atty. Zamora strange for complainants to take offense at my presence and accuse me of practicing law during my stint
: as a judge when before the bad blood between my wife and her sibling and nephew erupted, I helped
Would that be proper for him Your Honor, considering that he is a judge Your Honor? Would that, ah, them out with their legal problems gratis et amore and they did not complain of my practicing law on
there will be undue influence, or whatever, Your Honor? We are just trying to avoid any bias or undue their behalf, indeed, one of the crosses a judge must carry is the cross of base ingratitude.4
influence in this court, Your Honor.
Atty. Nieves On March 27, 2008, then Court Administrator Zenaida N. Elepao recommended to the Court that: (a)
: the complaint be re-docketed as a regular administrative matter; (b) Judge Malanyaon be found guilty of
Okay, it will not, considering the fact that he has not entered his appearance for the respondent. gross misconduct; and (c) Judge Malanyaon be fined P50,000.00.5cralawvllred
Judge Malanyaon
: On September 16, 2009, the Court required the parties to manifest within 10 days from notice if they
If Your Honor, please, the respondent is my wife. Counsel for the respondent is my daughter. She just were willing to submit the case for resolution on the basis of the records or pleadings filed.6cralawvllred
passed the bar! Im assisting her. Is it not my right, my duty to assist my daughter? And to assist my wife
defend herself? I am only sitting with my daughter! Im not acting for the respondent! The complainants complied on November 13, 2009, stating their willingness to submit the case for
resolution after a formal investigation or hearing was conducted, and after they were given time to file
Atty. Zamora their respective position papers or memoranda.7cralawvllred
:
I dont think Your Honor under the rule, the counsel needs a counsel. Only the one charged or the one On January 11, 2010, the Court resolved: (a) to re-docket the administrative case as a regular
being charged needs a counsel. administrative matter; (b) to await Judge Malanyaons compliance with the September 16, 2009
Atty. Nieves resolution; and (c) to refer the administrative matter to the OCA for evaluation, report and
: recommendation.8cralawvllred
Okay, lets settle this now. Judge Malanyaon has not entered his appearance. It will not in any way
xxxx After Judge Malanyaon did not submit any compliance with the September 16, 2009 resolution, the
Court ordered him on February 10, 2010 to show cause why he should not be disciplinarily dealt with or
The complainants averred that the actuations of Judge Malanyaon during the hearing of his wifes held in contempt for such failure, and further directed him to still comply with the
administrative case in the Civil Service Commission constituted violations of the New Code of Judicial resolution.9cralawvllred
Conduct for the Philippines Judiciary.
On February 15, 2010, Judge Malanyaons counsel informed the Court that Judge Malanyaon had
On June 21, 2007, then Court Administrator Christopher O. Lock required Judge Malanyaon to comment meanwhile suffered a massive stroke on September 2, 2009 that had affected his mental faculties and
on the complaint.3cralawvllred made him unfit to defend himself here; and prayed for the suspension of the proceedings until Judge
Malanyaon would have been found competent to comprehend and stand the rigors of the
On July 15, 2007, Judge Malanyaon filed his comment, refuting the allegations of the complaint investigation.10cralawvllred
thusly:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
On April 12, 2010, the Court deferred action on the case, and required Judge Malanyaon to submit a
Complainants are the sister and nephew of my wife, Amelita C. Malanyaon, there is bad blood between medical certificate.11cralawvllred
them arising from divergent political loyalties and family differences;cralawlibrary
Judge Malanyaon submitted a medical certificate dated May 27, 2010, issued by the Philippine General
There is no reason for complainants to take offense at my sitting beside my daughter Ma. Kristina, when Hospital, certifying that he had been confined thereaft from September 2, 2009 to October 19, 2009 for
she appeared for my wife in the first hearing of the administrative case Rey C. Decena filed against my the following reason, to wit:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
wife; the hearing officer himself could cite no rule disallowing me from sitting beside my daughter, in the
counsels table, and he did not ask me to vacate where I sat beside my daughter; the transcript does not Cerebro Vascular disease, Hypertension Intra Cerebral Hematoma
support complainants claim;cralawlibrary Left Thalamus with obstructive Hydrocephalus; DM type II, Chronic
Obstructive Pulmonary disease; Pneumonia; lleus (resolved); Neurogenic bladder, Benign Prostatic
Hypertrophy; Graves disease;
Arthritis.

OPERATION PERFORMED:
Bilateral tube ventriculostomy12
Judge Malanyaon submitted two more medical certificates, the first dated October 5, 2010,13 certifying
that, among others, he was undergoing regular check-up, and the other, dated January 24, 2011,14
certifying that his functional and mental status had been assessed as follows:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
The severity and location of the hemorrage in the brain resulted in residual epoliptogenic focus (Post-
gliotic seizures) and significant impairment of cognition, memory judgment behavior (Vascular
Dementia). He has problems with memory recall, analysis of information, events and situations which
may make defending himself difficult, if necessary. Although he is independent on ambulation, he
requires assistance even in basic activities of daily living.15
The Court required the complainants to comment on Judge Malanyaons medical certification dated
October 5, 2010.
On July 18, 2011, however, Dr. Amelita submitted a manifestation and urgent motion to dismiss, seeking
the dismissal of the administrative case against Judge Malanyaon upon the following grounds, to
wit:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
xxxx
2. Unfortunately, in a Medical Certification dated June 15, 2011 the original of which is attached
hereto as Annex 1, the attending neurologist of my husband has pronounced him permanently
mentally impaired. x x x.
xxxx
3. As a consequence, my husband has permanently lost the capacity to understand the nature and object
of the administrative proceedings against him. He cannot intelligently appoint his counsel or
communicate coherently with him. He cannot testify in his own behalf, and confront and cross-examine
opposing witnesses. Indeed, he cannot properly avail himself of his rights in an adversarial administrative
investigation;cralawlibrary
4. Given the progressive mental impairment afflicting my husband, he has permanently lost the capacity
to defend himself. Thus, to continue the administrative investigation against my husband who is no
longer in any position to defend himself would constitute a denial of his right to be heard (Baikong Akang
Camsa vs. Judge Aurelio Rendon, A.M. No. MTJ-02-1395 dated 19 February 2002).16
Even so, on September 26, 2011, we required the complainants to comment on the manifestation and
motion of Dr. Amelita.17cralawvllred
Subsequently, Dr. Amelita submitted another motion dated January 23, 2012,18 praying for the dismissal
of the case against Judge Malanyaon.
On February 6, 2012, Court Administrator Jose Midas P. Marquez reiterated the recommendation made
on March 27, 2008 by then Court Administrator Elepao by recommending that: (a) the administrative
case be re-docketed as a regular administrative matter; and (b) Judge Malanyaon be found guilty of gross
misconduct and fined P50,000.00.19cralawvllred
On May 3, 2012, the Court received the complainants compliance dated February 1, 2012,20 as their
response to the show cause order issued in relation to their failure to submit the comment the Court had
required on September 26, 2011.21cralawvllred
On September 4, 2012, the Court received from Dr. Amelita an urgent ex parte motion for immediate
resolution, praying that the motion to dismiss dated July 18, 2011 be already resolved.22cralawvllred
Issues
For consideration and resolution are the following issues, namely: (a) whether or not Judge Malanyaon
would be denied due process if the administrative case was not dismissed; (b) whether the actuations of
Judge Malanyaon complained of constituted conduct unbecoming of a judge; and (c) if Judge Malanyaon
was guilty of conduct unbecoming of a judge, what should be the correct sanction.
Ruling
We now discuss and resolve the issues accordingly.
1.
Respondents right to due process
is not violated by resolution of the case
In her manifestation with urgent motion to dismiss,23 Dr. Amelita stressed that proceeding against Judge
Malanyaon despite his present medical state would violate his right to due process. She
stated:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
3. As a consequence, my husband has permanently lost the capacity to understand the nature and object
of the administrative proceedings against him. He cannot intelligently appoint his counsel or
communicate coherently with him. He cannot testify in his own behalf, and confront and cross-examine
opposing witnesses. Indeed, he cannot properly avail himself of his rights in an adversarial administrative
investigation.24
Opposing, the complainants argued that Dr. Amelitas concern was unfounded considering that Judge
Malanyaon had not only been given the opportunity to be heard, but had been actually heard on their
complaint.
The complainants argument is well taken.
On August 3, 2007, or prior to his suffering the massive stroke that impaired his mental faculty, Judge
Malanyaon already submitted his comment containing his explanations and refutations of the charge
against him. His comment asserted that during the hearing of the administrative case of his wife in the
Regional Office of the Civil Service Commission, the hearing officer did not even cite any rule that
prohibited him from sitting beside his daughter who was then acting as the counsel of Dr. Amelita
therein, or that inhibited him from assisting his daughter in the defense of his wife. He pointed out that
although he had then lost his temper after the opposing counsel had inquired about his personality in
that hearing, he had ultimately apologized to the hearing officer, who had in turn graciously let the
matter pass.
Under the circumstances, Judge Malanyaon was accorded due process. In administrative cases, the
requirement of due process is satisfied whenever the parties are afforded the fair and reasonable
opportunity to explain their side of the controversy,25 either through oral arguments or through
pleadings.26 That is what happened herein. Accordingly, Dr. Amelitas motion was bereft of basis, and
should be denied.
2.
Actuations of Judge Malanyaon
rendered him guilty of
conduct unbecoming of a judge
The following actuations of Judge Malanyaon constituted conduct unbecoming of a judge upon the
reasons set forth below.
First was Judge Malanyaons occupying a seat beside his daughter that was reserved for the lawyers
during the hearing. Such act displayed his presumptuousness, and probably even his clear intention to
thereby exert his influence as a judge of the Regional Trial Court on the hearing officer in order for the
latter to favor his wifes cause. That impression was definitely adverse against the Judiciary, whose every
judicial officer was presumed to be a subject of strict scrutiny by the public. Being an incumbent RTC
Judge, he always represented the Judiciary, and should have acted with greater circumspection and self-
restraint, simply because the administrative hearing was unavoidably one in which he could not but be
partisan. Simple prudence should have counselled him to avoid any form of suspicion of his motives, or
to suppress any impression of impropriety on his part as an RTC judge by not going to the hearing
himself.
Second was Judge Malanyaons admission that his presence in that hearing was to advise his daughter on
what to do and say during the hearing, to the point of coaching his daughter. In the process, he
unabashedly introduced himself as the counsel of the respondents counsel upon his presence being
challenged by the adverse counsel, stating that his daughter was still inexperienced for having just
passed her Bar Examinations. Such excuse, seemingly grounded on a filial duty towards his wife and his
daughter, did not furnish enough reason for him to forsake the ethical conduct expected of him as a
sitting judge. He ought to have restrained himself from sitting at that hearing, being all too aware that
his sitting would have him cross the line beyond which was the private practice of law.
Section 3527 of Rule 138 of the Rules of Court expressly prohibits sitting judges like Judge Malanyaon
from engaging in the private practice of law or giving professional advice to clients. Section 11,28 Canon
4 (Propriety),29 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct and Rule 5.0730 of the Code of Judicial Conduct
reiterate the prohibition from engaging in the private practice of law or giving professional advice to
clients. The prohibition is based on sound reasons of public policy, considering that the rights, duties,
privileges and functions of the office of an attorney are inherently incompatible with the high official
functions, duties, powers, discretion and privileges of a sitting judge. It also aims to ensure that judges
give their full time and attention to their judicial duties, prevent them from extending favors to their
own private interests, and assure the public of their impartiality in the performance of their functions.
These objectives are dictated by a sense of moral decency and desire to promote the public
interest.31cralawvllred
Thus, an attorney who accepts an appointment to the Bench must accept that his right to practice law as
a member of the Philippine Bar is thereby suspended, and it shall continue to be so suspended for the
entire period of his incumbency as a judge. The term practice of law is not limited to the conduct of
cases in court or to participation in court proceedings, but extends to the preparation of pleadings or
papers in anticipation of a litigation, the giving of legal advice to clients or persons needing the same, the
preparation of legal instruments and contracts by which legal rights are secured, and the preparation of
papers incident to actions and special proceedings.32 To the Court, then, Judge Malanyaon engaged in
the private practice of law by assisting his daughter at his wifes administrative case, coaching his
daughter in making manifestations or posing motions to the hearing officer, and preparing the questions
that he prompted to his daughter in order to demand that Atty. Eduardo Loria, collaborating counsel of
the complainants principal counsel, should produce his privilege tax receipt. Judge Malanyaon did so
voluntarily and knowingly, in light of his unhesitating announcement during the hearing that he was the
counsel for Atty. Katrina Malanyaon, the counsel of the respondent, as his response to the query by the
opposing counsel why he was seated next to Atty. Malanyaon thereat.
Third was Judge Malanyaons admission that he had already engaged in the private practice of law even
before the incident now the subject of this case by his statement in his comment that it is strange for
complainants to take offense at my presence and accuse me of practicing law during my stint as a judge
when before the bad blood between my wife and her sibling and nephew erupted, I helped them out
with their legal problems gratis et amore and they did not complain of my practicing law on their
behalf.33 He thereby manifested his tendencies to disregard the prohibition against the private practice
of law during his incumbency on the Bench.
Any propensity on the part of a magistrate to ignore the ethical injunction to conduct himself in a
manner that would give no ground for reproach is always worthy of condemnation.34 We should abhor
any impropriety on the part of judges, whether committed in or out of their courthouses, for they are
not judges only occasionally. The Court has fittingly emphasized in Castillo v. Calanog, Jr.: 35cralawvllred
The Code of Judicial Ethics mandates that the conduct of a judge must be free of a whiff of impropriety
not only with respect to his performance of his judicial duties, but also to his behavior outside his sala
and as a private individual. There is no dichotomy of morality; a public official is also judged by his
private morals. The Code dictates that a judge, in order to promote public confidence in the integrity and
impartiality of the judiciary, must behave with propriety at all times. As we have very recently explained,
a judges official life cannot simply be detached or separated from his personal existence. Thus:cralaw
Being a subject of constant public scrutiny, a judge should freely and willingly accept restrictions on
conduct that might be viewed as burdensome by the ordinary citizen.
A judge should personify judicial integrity and exemplify honest public service. The personal behavior of
a judge, both in the performance of official duties and in private life should be above suspicion.
Fourth was Judge Malanyaons display of arrogance during the hearing, as reflected by his reaction to
the opposing counsels query on his personality to sit at the counsel table at the hearing, to
wit:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
I am the counsel of the complainant, ah, of the respondents counsel, I am Judge Malanyaon. I am
assisting her. And so what?!!
Judge Malanyaons uttering And so what? towards the opposing counsel evinced his instant
resentment towards the adverse parties counsel for rightly challenging his right to be sitting on a place
reserved for counsel of the parties. The utterance, for being made in an arrogant tone just after he had
introduced himself as a judge, was unbecoming of the judge that he was, and tainted the good image of
the Judiciary that he should uphold at all times.36 It is true that the challenge of the opposing counsel
might have slighted him, but that was not enough to cause him to forget that he was still a judge
expected to act with utmost sobriety and to speak with self-restraint. He thereby ignored the presence
of the hearing officer, appearing to project that he could forsake the decorum that the time and the
occasion rightly called for from him and the others just because he was a judge and the other side was
not. He should not forget that a judge like himself should be the last person to be perceived by others as
a petty and sharp-tongued tyrant.
Judge Malanyaon has insisted that his actuations were excused by his filial obligation to assist his
daughter, then only a neophyte in the Legal Profession. We would easily understand his insistence in the
light of our culture to be always solicitous of the wellbeing of our family members and other close kin,
even risking our own safety and lives in their defense. But the situation of Judge Malanyaon was
different, for he was a judicial officer who came under the stricture that uniformly applied to all judges
of all levels of the judicial hierarchy, forbidding him from engaging in the private practice of law during
his incumbency, regardless of whether the beneficiary was his wife or daughter or other members of his
own family.
3.
What is the proper penalty?
Judge Malanyaon had been previously sanctioned by the Court on the following three occasions, namely:
(a) A.M. No. RTJ-93-1090, with admonition for gross ignorance of the law and unreasonable delay in
resolving motions;37 (b) A.M. No. RTJ-99-1444, with reprimand for failure to resolve motions;38 and (c)
A.M. No. RTJ-02-1669, with a fine of P20,000.00 (coupled with a stern warning that a repetition of the
same or similar act would be dealt with more severely) for conduct unbecoming of a judge.39 He had
other administrative cases that were dismissed.40 Of the three administrative cases that merited
sanctions, however, only the third should be considered as aggravating herein because it involved the
similar offense of conduct unbecoming of a judge for which he had been given the stern warning of a
more severe penalty upon a repetition.
However, our uniform treatment of administrative sanctions as having the nature of liabilities akin to
those in criminal cases now brings us to offset such aggravating circumstance with the apparent fact that
the actuations of Judge Malanyaon complained of had not been motivated by bad faith, or by any malice
towards another. Indeed, he did not intend to thereby cause any prejudice to another, having so acted
from a sincere, albeit misplaced, desire to go to the help of his wife and daughter.
Accordingly, the Court deems it condign and proper to mitigate the fine of P50,000.00 recommended by
the Court Administrator by imposing on Judge Malanyaon a fine of P40,000.00. With his disability
retirement from the Judiciary having been earlier granted by the Court, the fine shall be deducted from
his remaining retirement benefits.
WHEREFORE, the Court finds and pronounces JUDGE NILO A. MALANYAON, Presiding Judge of Branch 32
of the Regional Trial Court in Pili, Camarines Sur, administratively liable for conduct unbecoming of a
Judge, and penalizes him with a fine of P40,000.00.
Dulay v. Lelina
Respondent Elias O. Lelina, Jr., presiding judge of the Regional Trial Court of Cabarroguis, Quirino, Branch
31, stands administratively charged for gross misconduct in two separate administrative complaints filed
by the Mga Umaasang Mamamayan ng Quirino, docketed as A.M. OCA IPI No. 99-860-RTJ, and Onofre G.
Dulay, docketed as A.M. OCA IPI No. 99-588-RTJ.
An anonymous letter was sent by the Mga Umaasang Mamamayan ng Quirino to the National Bureau of
Investigation (NBI) on February 25, 1998[1] requesting for an investigation on the alleged violation of the
Anti-Graft Law and other illegal activities committed by respondent judge in the province of Quirino. On
June 1, 1998, through an Indorsement Letter from the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA), the
matter was referred to the NBI for discreet investigation. The NBI submitted its Investigation Report on
July 27, 1999 to the OCA for information and disposition.[2]
The report stated that respondent judge usually asked for money or parcels of land in exchange for
favorable decision. There were incidents when respondent judge would carry his .45 caliber pistol while
inside the courtroom, tucked in his waist, for the purpose of intimidating others. According to the NBI,
respondent judge was guilty of serious misconduct as a judge and committed the following acts:
1) Extorting money from a party litigant who has a case before his court;
2) Using intemperate language unbecoming of a judge;
3) Failure to pay debt;
4) Oppression or unwarranted display of authority;
5) Acting as counsel for all the parties with opposing interest on a parcel of land in pursuance of his
personal self-interest.
The NBI recommended disbarment and the filing of administrative charges for serious misconduct and
inefficiency.
The second case stems from the letter-complaint filed by Onofre G. Dulay with the OCA dated July 11,
1998.[3] Onofres charges against respondent judge can be summed up as follows:
1) Respondent judge arbitrarily cited him, his mother Victoria Gacote Dulay, and his aunt, Marita G.
Rosal, for indirect contempt in a civil case no longer pending in respondent judges sala;
2) Corollary to the first charge, Onofres mother and aunt were each meted fines of P15,000.00 and
imprisonment of 3 months while Onofre was meted a fine of P30,000.00 and imprisonment of 6 months;
3) In Criminal Case No. 1395 filed against Onofre for Grave Threats, respondent judge arbitrarily
increased his bail from P50,000.00 to P200,000.00 and immediately issued a warrant for his arrest;
4) Respondent judge showed bias in resolving the matters submitted to him in Civil Case No. 445;
5) Respondent judge ordered Onofre to give him 160 square meters of a home lot in Cabarroguis,
Quirino which respondent directed to be registered in the name of one Agnes Mariano; and
6) Respondent judge prepared the pleadings filed in court by Onofres opponents in behalf of the latters
counsel, Atty. Beltejar.
In his comment[4] dated February 12, 1999, respondent judge denied the allegations and insisted that
Onofre initiated the complaint in retaliation for an unfavorable judgment removing him as administrator
of the estate of former Governor Dulay. Respondent judges comment on each accusation are as
follows:
1) The subject civil case was transferred to his sala through the directive of the Presiding Judge without
any objections from Onofres party.
2) Onofre, his mother and aunt were cited for contempt and fined accordingly for their refusal to receive
the processes from the court and to answer the contempt charge filed against them.
3) The bail set was reasonable considering that the charge was for Grave Threats to Kidnap and Kill,
which under the Bail Bond Guide of 1997 is a non-bailable offense. Nonetheless, respondent judge
wanted to be fair and followed the recommendation of the Provincial Prosecutor for the amount of the
bail.
4) Respondent judge proceeded with Civil Case No. 445 in accordance with law.
5) The home lot being referred to does not even belong to the late Governor Dulay or to his son Onofre.
Likewise, neither is respondent judge the registered owner of said lot.
6) Atty. Beltejar is a seasoned lawyer with a reputable practice throughout the country. It is in fact
Onofre who has attempted to offer him money for a favorable judgment in his case.
In a resolution dated December 15, 1999, the cases were docketed as A.M. No. RTJ-99-1516 and were
referred to then Court of Appeals Associate Justice Romeo Callejo, Sr. for report and recommendation.
Investigative proceedings were conducted. However, upon the appointment of Justice Callejo, Sr. to the
Supreme Court, the case was re-assigned to Court of Appeals Justice Conrado M. Vasquez, Jr. per
resolution of this Court dated November 13, 2002.[5]
On the complaint filed by Mga Umaasang Mamamayan ng Quirino, Justice Vasquez reported that the
alleged complainants never came forward nor did they execute any affidavit or sworn statement to
substantiate their claims. The only evidence submitted to support the complaint was the
uncorroborated sworn statement of Editha Dumlao, who was not presented as a witness during the
investigation, and the report of the NBI, which was based on second-hand information. Thus, he
recommended the dismissal of the complaint.
Anent the complaint filed by Onofre Dulay, Justice Vasquez reported that Onofres statement of facts
were not accurate; that Onofre failed to prove that he was ordered to give 160 square meters of home
lot to respondent judge. On the contrary, evidence shows that Agnes Mariano is the registered owner of
the lot after Onofre gave her the property as payment for his debts. Neither was Onofre able to prove
that respondent judge prepared the pleadings filed by his opponents.
However, the investigating justice found adequate evidence showing that respondent judge committed
improprieties in dealing with Onofre which warrants disciplinary sanctions.
Based on his findings, the investigating justice recommended:
IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, it is respectfully recommended that the complaint of the Mga
Umaasang Mamamayan ng Quirino be dismissed for lack of merit. As for the complaint of Onofre G.
Dulay, it is further recommended that, for violation of the Code of Judicial Conduct, Judge Elias O. Lelina,
Jr. be dismissed from service with forfeiture of all of the benefits as the High Court may determine, and
be disqualified from reinstatement or appointment to any public office, including government-owned or
controlled corporations.[6]
We sustain the findings of the investigating justice.
In administrative proceedings, the complainant has the burden of proving the allegations in the
complaint with substantial evidence, i.e., that amount of relevant evidence which a reasonable mind
might accept as adequate to justify a conclusion.[7] It must be remembered that while this Court has the
duty to ensure that judges and other court personnel perform their duties with utmost efficiency,
propriety and fidelity, it is also our obligation to see to it that they are protected from unfounded suits
that serve to disrupt rather than promote the orderly administration of justice.[8] Thus, administrative
complaints that are clearly motivated by intentions other than the advocacy of judicial competence are
promptly written off.
As held in Pangan v. Ganay, et al.:[9]
Furthermore, even in an administrative case, the Rules of Court require that if the respondent Judge
should be disciplined for grave misconduct or any graver offense, the evidence against him should be
competent and should be derived from direct knowledge. The judiciary to which the respondent belongs
demands no less. Before any of its members could be faulted, competent evidence should be presented,
especially since the charge is penal in character.
Indeed, while it is our duty to investigate and determine the truth behind every matter in complaints
against Judges and other court personnel, it is also our duty to see to it that they are protected and
exonerated from baseless administrative charges. The Court will not shirk from its responsibility of
imposing discipline upon its magistrates, but neither will it hesitate to shield them from unfounded suits
that only serve to disrupt rather than promote the orderly administration of justice.
However, as to the complaint filed by Onofre Dulay against respondent judge, although the investigation
revealed that most of the allegations were based on misrepresentation of facts by Onofre, sufficient
evidence however exists which shows that respondent judge was guilty of gross misconduct.
Although every office in the government is a public trust, no position exacts greater demand on moral
righteousness and uprightness of an individual than a seat in the judiciary. A magistrate of law must
comport himself at all times in such manner that his conduct, official or otherwise, can bear the most
searching scrutiny of the public.[10] The New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary[11]
prescribes that judges shall ensure that not only is their conduct above reproach, but that it is perceived
to be so in the view of a reasonable observer.[12] Thus, judges are to avoid impropriety and the
appearance of impropriety in all their activities.[13] Likewise, they are mandated not to allow family,
social or other relationships to influence judicial conduct or judgment, nor convey or permit others to
convey the impression that they are in a special position to influence the judge.[14] The Code clearly
prohibits judges or members of their families from asking for or accepting, any gift, bequest, loan or
favor in relation to anything done or to be done or omitted to be done by him or her in connection with
the performance of judicial duties.[15]
Respondent judge failed to live up to these standards. Despite knowledge of Onofre and Marianos
intentions in offering the business to his daughters, respondent judge allowed his daughters to accept
the offer of business partnership with persons who have pending cases in his court.
Respondent judge is guilty of gross misconduct constituting violations of the Code of Judicial Conduct for
which he is administratively liable. Under Section 11, Rule 140 of the Revised Rules of Court, gross
misconduct is a serious charge punishable by: 1) dismissal from service; 2) suspension from office
without salary and other benefits for more than three (3) but not exceeding six (6) months; or 3) a fine of
more than P20,000.00 but not exceeding P40,000.00. We find that suspension from office for six (6)
months without salary and other benefits is commensurate penalty.[16]
WHEREFORE, respondent Judge Elias O. Lelina, Jr., Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court of Cabarroguis,
Quirino, Branch 31, is found GUILTY of gross misconduct and is hereby SUSPENDED from office for six (6)
months without salary and other benefits. He is WARNED that the commission of the same or similar
infractions in the future will merit a more severe penalty.
Judge Dojillo, Jr. v. Ching,
By letter-complaint[1] of January 18, 2006, Judge Jaime L. Dojillo, Jr., (Judge Dojillo), presiding judge of
the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Manaoag, Pangasinan, charged Concepcion Z.[2] Ching (Concepcion),
MTC Clerk of Court, with gross misconduct, gross incompetence and inefficiency, violation of the
Supreme Court Circular which prohibits smoking inside the office, violation of the Code of Ethics, conduct
unbecoming of a public official, conduct prejudicial to the interest of public service, and gross
dishonesty.
By 1st Indorsement[3] of February 2, 2006, the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) directed
Concepcion to comment on the letter-complaint within 10 days from notice, with which she complied by
Comment[4] of March 13, 2006 with a prayer to consider it as a counter complaint/charge against
Judge Dojillo.
Both complaints were referred to Executive Judge Rodrigo Nabor of the Regional Trial Court of
Urdaneta City, Pangasinan, for investigation, report and recommendation. Instead of submitting their
respective Comments pursuant to Judge Nabors November 6, 2006 Order,[5] Judge Dojillo and
Concepcion filed a joint Manifestation and Motion[6] of June 5, 2007 stating that the charges and
counter-charges involved were filed out of pure misunderstanding and should thus be dismissed.
By Resolution of October 1, 2007,[7] the Court referred the complaints to the OCA for evaluation,
report and recommendation.
By Memorandum of June 25, 2008,[8] the OCA synthesized Judge Dojillos complaint as follows:
A. GROSS MISCONDUCT
Complainant judge alleged that respondent Ching is a lesbian who is a well-known gossiper and
troublemaker in the town of Manaoag,
Pangasinan. Even her officemates were not spared of her daily food of venomous gossiping.
Sometime in the year 1999, respondent gossiped that Ramon Paster, Court Stenographer, has an
illicit relationship with Mrs. Erlinda L. Marmolejo, the Court Interpreter. Subsequently, respondent
allegedly passed malicious information that the complainant judge and Mrs. Marmolejo had an ongoing
illicit affair.
On December 20, 2005, while complainant was having lunch together with some of his staff,
respondent banged the main door of the office, showing lack of civility, disrespect, discourtesy, insult
and belligerent attitude towards the complainant as the presiding judge and towards respondents
officemates. Further, it was also alleged that respondent threatened with death the complainant via
typewritten death threats purportedly using the typewriter belonging to respondents brother.
B. GROSS INCOMPETENCE AND INEFFICIENCY
Complainant judge averred that respondent was not personally doing most of her assigned tasks.
She always passed the job to other members of the staff even if she was not doing anything. Further, she
was always out of the office. She also refused to learn to type well and to use the computer issued to the
court. These resulted in the delay in the preparation and issuance of writs of execution ordered by the
court.
C. VIOLATION OF THE SUPREME COURT CIRCULAR BANNING SMOKING INSIDE THE OFFICE.
Respondent Ching, according to the complainant, is a well known chain smoker. She smoked
inside the office to the detriment of the health of her officemates.
D. CONDUCT UNBECOMING OF A PUBLIC OFFICIAL AND CONDUCT PREJUDICIAL TO THE
INTEREST OF THE SERVICE.
Aside from being a well known gossiper and troublemaker, it was also alleged that respondent
was a bad-tempered, impatient, disrespectful and discourteous public employee. Instead of devoting the
office hours for work, she was frequently seen loitering, wasting time and parading downstairs as if she is
the boss, creating an impression to the public that she could do whatever she wants and pleases and
thereby eroding the trust and confidence of the people in the judiciary.
E. VIOLATION OF THE CODE OF ETHICAL STANDARDS
With her malicious motive in mind, she intimidated and harassed Mrs. Erlinda Marmolejo by
uttering unsavory and uncalled remarks in order to force the latter to transfer or to resign from work.
Certification of
entries of incidents in the police blotter were attached to the complaint to prove that respondent indeed
annoyed and harassed Marmolejo.
F. GROSS DISHONESTY
Respondent Ching was also charged for falsifying her Daily Time Record for the month of
November 2003 to make it appear that she was present in the office on November 11, 2003 when in
truth and in fact, she was not as she went to Manila on that day as evidenced by her application for
leave. She also allegedly falsified her Daily Time Record for the month of December 2005 by making it
appear that December 12, 2005 was a local holiday in Manaoag, Pangasinan, to make her absence on the
aforesaid date excusable.[9]
The OCA summarized Concepcions Comment with counter-complaint as follows:
x x x She denied the accusations hurled against her. She averred that it has been a long time time
[sic] since she heard feedbacks relative to the unusual closeness of Judge Dojillo and Mrs. Marmolejo.
She, herself, has witnessed their closeness. She stated that sometime on May 27, 2005, she saw Mrs.
Marmolejo came out of the chambers of the complainant looking like she just woke up from sleep. To
her shock, Judge Dojillo was also inside the chambers. Thus, she talked to Marmolejo in order to silence
the increasing discomfort of the people around them. Marmolejo, however, denied her suspicions.
Instead of distancing from one another, Judge Dojillo and Marmolejo were oftentimes seen arriving and
leaving the office together. She further advised Marmolejo that if the latter could not stop what was
going on between her and the judge, Marmolejo should save herself from destruction by going abroad.
She further averred that sometime in December of 2005, at around 8 in the morning, she went
early in the office. She thought that she was all alone but to her surprise, she saw Marmolejo come out
of the chambers of the complainant. When she peeked inside the chambers, Judge Dojillo was also
there. She thus sternly warned Marmolejo to avoid incidents that would make their colleagues
uncomfortable otherwise she will be forced to make the necessary action against her and the judge.
As to the charge of gross misconduct, she argued that she was a very warm person with strong
convictions for propriety and decorum in office. She averred that she made the court accessible to
people by immediately entertaining their concerns and advising them of the procedures in court. She
also denied being a rumor monger and claimed that all the accusations of the witnesses for the
complainant were fabrications in order to malign her person. She, moreover, denied having banged the
door on December 20, 2005 claiming that she had to forcefully close the same since the door was bigger
than the jamb.
Anent the charge of gross incompetence and inefficiency, she stated that as a clerk of court, her
duties were administrative and supervisory. She made sure that all the cases were on file and calendared
and that all the pleadings were referred to the complainant for proper action. These delicate tasks were
performed by her and it was only the typing job that she delegates. She justified this by saying that it was
necessary for her to delegate the typing to others who are faster than her.
As to the allegation that she was always out of the office, her defense was that the nature of her
job requires her to leave the office. These include the monthly submission of reports to RTC and to the
Prosecutors Office in Urdaneta City, depositing in bank of the Judiciary Development Fund and Special
Allowance for the Judiciary and withdrawing of bonds from the bank whenever necessary. She handles
these tasks herself as these are delicate tasks which could not be delegated to others. As to the alleged
delay in the issuance of writs of execution, she attributes the delay to Judge Dojillo who fails to
immediately release signed orders.
With respect to her alleged violation of the circular regarding smoking ban, she claimed that she is
not a chain smoker and she was not the only one smoking among the court employees. She thus could
not fathom why she was singled out by complainant. As to the charge of dishonesty, she stood by her
claim as to the truthfulness of her Daily Time Record. The reason why her application for leave on
November 11, 2003 was not submitted for approval was because she decided not to proceed to Manila
and instead choose to stay at the office. As to her DTR for the month of December 2005, she argued that
December 12, 2005 was a rest day and in fact the Municipal Hall was closed on that day. Further,
according to respondent, the court employees agreed to just state in their DTRs that such was a local
holiday due to Galicayo Festival. Moreover, her DTRs were with the approval of the presiding judge. She
thus prayed that the complaint against her be dismissed and that her comment be considered as a
counter complaint against Judge Dojillo.[10]
The OCA, passing on the Manifestation and Motion of the parties for the dismissal of their respective
charges, states that the withdrawal of an administrative complaint or subsequent desistance of the
complainant does not free the respondent from liability as the purpose of an administrative proceeding
is to protect the public service, based on the time-honored principle that a public office i[s] a public
trust.
The OCA goes on to state:
The withdrawal of the complaint or the execution of an affidavit of desistance does not automatically
result in the dismissal of the administrative case. x x x It will not divest the Supreme Court of its
jurisdiction to investigate the matters alleged in the complaint. Thus, the manifestation and motion filed
by the parties praying that the charges and counter-charges be dismissed should be denied.
Evaluating the charges and counter charges, the OCA reports as follows:
Anent the complaint against Judge Dojillo, it bears stressing that in administrative cases, the
burden devolves upon the complainant for him to prove by substantial evidence the allegations in the
complaint. In the instant case, records are bereft of any evidence which would render Judge Dojillo guilty
of immorality. Complainant Ching miserably failed to present any substantial evidence which will prove
that Judge Dojillo is having an illicit affair with Ms. Marmolejo. It was also revealed that it was not only
Ms. Marmolejo who enters the chambers of the judge. Even granting that it was only Ms. Marmolejo
who enters the chambers of the judge, the same is purely due to work-related reasons since the
computer is inside his chambers. It would thus be hasty to conclude that they were having an illicit affair.
Moreover, the allegation that Ms. Marmolejo and Judge Dojillo were unusually early in the office
deserves scant consideration. It was complainant Ching, herself, who admitted that she saw Marmolejo
and Judge Dojillo at around 8 oclock in the morning. It bears stressing that eight in the morning is no
longer unusually early. In fact[,] it is already the start of the official office hours for all the personnel of
the court. This Office also sees nothing wrong and unsuitable in the actuation of the judge in giving
Marmolejo and her family a free ride in his car since the residence of Marmolejo is on the way to the
judges own residence. We find nothing immoral with that. Time and again, the Court will not hesitate to
impose penalty to those who are guilty of any wrongdoing but it will likewise not hesitate to exonerate
those charged of baseless and unfounded complaints.
Anent the complaint against Ching, the latter should be penalized for her acts. Misconduct is
defined as any unlawful conduct on the part of a person concerned in the administration of justice
prejudicial to the rights of the parties or to the right determination of the cause. It generally means
wrongful, improper or unlawful conduct motivated by a premeditated, obstinate or intentional purpose.
Her actuations in maliciously accusing her officemate of having an illicit affair with Judge Dojillo should
not be countenanced especially in the instant case where it appears that the accusations made by her
are baseless and unfounded. What is more alarming is the fact that she falsified the entries in her DTR in
making it appear that December 12, 2005 was a local holiday when in fact it was not. Her claim that the
aforesaid date was a local holiday was not corroborated by any other evidence. In fact, her co-employees
attested to the fact that such day was a regular working day. In making it appear in her DTR that such
day was a holiday only highlights her dishonesty x x x.
xxxx
There is no denying that respondent Ching committed misrepresentation when she made it
appear in her DTR that she was present in the office while in fact she was not. Falsification of DTR is
patent dishonesty. Dishonesty, being a grave offense, carries the extreme penalty of dismissal from the
service with forfeiture of retirement benefits except accrued leave credits, and with perpetual
disqualification from re-employment in government service. Indeed, dishonesty is a malevolent act that
has no place in the Judiciary. x x x
xxxx
Rule IV, Section 52 of the Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service Commission
provides that dishonesty and falsification are grave offenses which carries with it the penalty of dismissal
even on the first offense. However, such an extreme penalty is not hastily inflicted upon an erring
employee especially in cases where there exist mitigating circumstances that could alleviate the
culpability. Inasmuch as this is respondent Chings first offense, it is considered a mitigating circumstance
in h[er] favor. Even if the law specifically states that the appreciation of the mitigating circumstance must
first be invoked or pleaded by the proper party, the same may be considered even if not raised by the
respondent in the interest of substantial justice.
In Re: Failure of Jose Dante E. Guerrero to Register His Time In and Out in Chronolog Time
Recorder Machine on Several Dates, the Court imposed the penalty of six months suspension to an
employee found guilty of dishonesty for falsifying his time records.[11] (Italics in the original;
underscoring supplied)
Thus, the OCA recommends that
x x x respondent Concepcion Ching, Clerk of Court, MTC, Manaoag, Pangasinan, be found guilty of
falsification and dishonesty and be SUSPENDED for six (6) months with a STERN WARNING that a
repetition of the same or similar acts x x x shall be dealt with more severely; [and]
x x x the counter-charge against Judge Jaime L. Dojillo, Jr., MTC, Manaoag, Pangasinan x x x be
DISMISSED for being barren of merit.[12] (Capitalization and emphasis in the original; underscoring
supplied)
By Resolution of August 13, 2008,[13] the Court required the parties to manifest whether they
were willing to submit the cases for resolution based on the pleadings filed, within 10 days from notice.
By Joint Manifestation of September 29, 2008,[14] the parties answered in the affirmative and prayed
that the cases be resolved soonest.
In her Affidavit, Jenelyn Sernadilla (Jenelyn) of the Office of the Human Resource Management of
Manaoag, Pangasinan stated that December 12, 2005 was a regular working day.[15] On the other hand,
in his Affidavit, Municipal Consultant Sofronio L. Mangonon (Mangonon)[16] stated that on December
12, 2005, a Monday, the municipal hall where the court holds office was closed, for it was a rest day
after the Galicayo Festival which ended on the preceding Sunday.
Between the two affidavits, that of Jenelyns appears to be more credible, she being the officer in
charge of the attendance of the employees. As Judge Dojillo pointed out, Mangonon, being a consultant,
was not required to report to office daily as he, in fact, only reports during paydays. Parenthetically,
Concepcion could have submitted the affidavits of employees or the photocopies of their Daily Time
Record (DTR) to support her claim that December 12, 2005 was a local holiday.
Dishonesty is a serious offense which has no place in the judiciary.[17] Each false entry in the DTR
constitutes falsification and dishonesty.[18] The falsification of a DTR constitutes fraud involving
government funds. It bears stressing that the DTR is used to determine the salary and leave credits
accruable for the period covered thereby. Falsifying ones DTR to cover up absences or tardiness
automatically results in financial losses to the government because it enables an employee to receive
salary and earn leave credits for services which were never rendered.[19]
Under the Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service, dishonesty and falsification of
official document are punishable with dismissal even for the first offense.[20] However, the Court, in
certain instances, has not imposed the penalty of dismissal due to the presence of mitigating factors
such as the length of service, acknowledgment of the infractions, and remorse by the respondent.[21]
 Considering that this is the first administrative charge against Concepcion since she entered the
government service in 1996 as a court interpreter, the recommended penalty of suspension for a period
of six months is in order.
In the case of Judge Dojillo, he should be admonished to be more circumspect in his choice of
words and use of gender-fair language.[22] There was no reason for him to emphatically describe
Concepcion as a lesbian[23] because the complained acts could be committed by anyone regardless of
gender orientation. His statements like I am a true man not a gay to challenge a girl and a lesbian like
her,[24] the handiwork and satanic belief of dirty gossiper,[25] and the product of the dirty and
earthly imagination of a lesbian and gossiper[26] were uncalled for.
Being called to dispense justice, Judge Dojillo must demonstrate finesse in his choice of words as
normally expected of men of his stature.[27] His language, both written and spoken, must be guarded
and measured lest the best of intentions be misconstrued.[28]
WHEREFORE, Concepcion Ching, Clerk of Court of the Municipal Trial Court of Manaoag,
Pangasinan, is found GUILTY of dishonesty and falsification of official document, and is SUSPENDED for
six months without salary and other benefits, with a STERN WARNING that a repetition of the same or
similar acts shall be dealt with more severely.
The complaint against Judge Jaime L. Dojillo, Jr. is DISMISSED, but he is ADMONISHED to be more
circumspect in his choice of words and use of gender-fair language.
Panes, Jr. v. Judge Dinopol (in internet)
Atty. Gloria Lastimosa-Dalawampu v. Judge Yrastorza,
The administration of justice is primarily the joint responsibility of the judge and the lawyer. The judge
expects the lawyer to properly perform his role in this task, in the same manner that the lawyer expects
the judge to do his part. The people expect of them a sense of shared responsibility which is a crucial
factor in the administration of justice.[1] Their relation should be based on mutual respect and on a
deep appreciation by one of the duties of the other. Only in this manner can each minimize occasions
for delinquency and help attain effectively the ends of justice.[2]
Atty. Gloria Lastimosa-Dalawampu filed a complaint for serious misconduct[3] against respondent Judge
Raphael Yrastorza, Sr., the incumbent presiding judge of Branch 14 of the Regional Trial Court of Cebu
City, with the Office of the Court Administrator.
The complaint alleged that on January 14, 2002, Atty. Lastimosa-Dalawampu appeared as counsel for the
accused before the respondent judge in Criminal Case No. CBU-58947 entitled, People of the Philippines
versus Gina and Bob Villaver. After her client, Bob Villaver, was arraigned, Atty. Lastimosa-Dalawampu
moved for the re-setting of the pre-trial conference in view of absence of the trial prosecutor assigned to
Branch 14. However, before she could finish her statement, respondent judge purportedly cut her off by
saying, If you cannot handle this case, Atty. Dalawampu, you better give this case to another lawyer.
When complainant answered that she can handle the case, respondent again cut her off saying, Do not
give me so many excuses, Atty. Dalawampu! I dont care who you are! When complainant was about to
leave the courtroom, she heard respondent say, I dont care who you are. You can file one thousand
administrative cases against me. I dont care.
According to the complainant, the foregoing incident was not the first time that she was berated by the
respondent judge. On October 11, 2000, when she appeared as private prosecutor in Criminal Case CBU-
49515, she was scolded by respondent judge for failure to file the pre-trial brief even if a pre-trial brief is
not compulsory in criminal cases.
Complainant was unable to attend the pre-trial conference on October 12, 2000, but she prepared and
filed the pre-trial brief and informed the public prosecutor, Rustico Paderanga, that she had to attend a
hearing before the Sandiganbayan in Manila. Complainants client, Consuelo Aznar, was present during
the pre-trial. Complainant did not advise her client to bring the original documents to be presented in
the case because she stated in the pre-trial brief that the marking of exhibits will be done as the trial
progresses and that photocopies of these documents already formed part of the record. This
notwithstanding, respondent judge ordered Consuelo Aznar to produce the original documents in five
minutes, or the case would be dismissed. Consuelo Aznar frantically got the documents from her house,
but the travel time from the court house to the house of Consuelo Aznar and back required at least 30
minutes.[4] Respondent judges action towards Consuelo Aznar is oppressive.
In his Comment,[5] respondent judge claimed that complainants allegations are pure exaggerations. His
remark that complainant should let another lawyer handle her case if she was busy with her other cases
was occasioned by complainants failure to submit a pre-trial brief, and his other remark that he was not
deterred by administrative cases against him was not necessarily to the complainant but to the public.
Respondent explained that he did not mean to insult complainant or her clients as he only wanted to
expedite the proceedings.[6]
In a Resolution[7] dated August 6, 2003, the Court referred the case to Associate Justice Marina Buzon of
the Court of Appeals for investigation, report and recommendation.
Prior to the date of first hearing before the Investigating Justice, complainant filed a motion[8] to
withdraw complaint, alleging that sometime in September 2003, she and the respondent judge have
ironed out their differences in a Bench and Bar dialogue, and the pendency of her complaint against
respondent judge poses a block to a harmonious relation between them.
Thereafter, complainant failed to appear during the investigation of the case. At the hearing on October
21, 2003, respondent judge filed a motion to dismiss[9] on the ground of lack of interest and failure to
prosecute.
On November 6, 2003, Justice Buzon submitted her report to the Office of the Court Administrator
recommending the dismissal of the administrative case against respondent judge due to the failure of
the complainant to prove the allegations in her complaint.
Prefatorily, the Court must reiterate the rule that mere desistance on the part of the complainant does
not warrant the dismissal of an administrative complaint against any member of the bench and the
judiciary.[10] The Courts interest in the affairs of the judiciary is a paramount concern that knows no
bounds.[11] Hence, instead of dismissing the charge as recommended, the Court, in the exercise of its
power of administrative supervision,[12] resolves to reprimand respondent judge for his failure to
exercise greater circumspection in dealing with the complainant.
Upon his assumption to office, a judge ceases to be an ordinary mortal. He becomes the visible
representation of the law and, more importantly, of justice. He must be the embodiment of competence,
integrity and independence.[13] A magistrate of the law must comport himself at all times in such
manner that his conduct, official or otherwise, can bear the most searching scrutiny of the public that
looks up to him as the epitome of integrity and justice.[14]
It appears that as Atty. Lastimosa-Dalawampu, the complainant in this case, was about to leave the sala
of the respondent judge, the latter, after berating her in public, uttered, I dont care who you are. You
can file one thousand administrative complaints against me. I dont care! Respondent, in his comment,
admitted that he indeed made such an utterance although the same was not directed at the complainant
but to the public. This notwithstanding, the utterance was definitely uncalled for.
The tenor of respondents statement can easily instill in the minds of those who heard them that as a
judge he is above the law. Such a remark creates an impression on the public that whatever
administrative case they will file against respondent or against any judge will only be a futile exercise.
Statements such as those made by respondent judge erode the publics confidence in the integrity of the
judiciary. Respondents unwarranted statement is a clear derogation of his duty to be faithful to the
law[15] which he swore to uphold as a member of the judiciary.

Furthermore, respondents unfounded act of insulting the complainant in open court and cutting her off
in mid-sentence while she was still explaining her side exhibited a manifest disregard by respondent of
his duty[16] to be patient, attentive, and courteous to lawyers. A judge should conduct proceedings in
court with fitting dignity and decorum.[17] Respondent cannot justify his action by a desire to hasten the
proceedings before him. In Ruiz v. Bringas,[18] it was ruled:
The duty to maintain respect for the dignity of the court applies to members of the bar and bench alike.
A judge should be courteous both in his conduct and in his language especially to those appearing before
him. He can hold counsels to a proper appreciation of their duties to the court, their clients and the
public without being petty, arbitrary, overbearing, or tyrannical. He should refrain from conduct that
demeans his office and remember that courtesy begets courtesy. Above all he must conduct himself in
such a manner that he gives no reason for reproach.
A judges duty to observe courtesy to those who appear before him is not limited to lawyers. The said
duty also includes being courteous to litigants and witnesses. Respondents conduct towards Consuelo
Aznar leaves a lot to be desired. As stated in the complaint, respondent ordered Consuelo Aznar to go
back to her house to get the original documents in five minutes or he would dismiss the case.[19]
Respondent did not offer any explanation to this charge against him. Respondents act in this instance
smacks of judicial tyranny. A judge anywhere should be the last person to be perceived as a petty tyrant
holding imperious sway over his domain. Thus, the role of a judge in relation to those who appear before
his court must be one of temperance, patience and courtesy.[20]
Judges are strictly mandated to abide by the law, the Code of Judicial Conduct and existing
administrative policies in order to maintain the faith of our people in the administration of justice.[21]
Any act which falls short of the exacting standard for public office, especially on the part of those
expected to preserve the image of the judiciary, shall not be countenanced.[22]
WHEREFORE, respondent Judge Raphael B. Yrastorza is hereby REPRIMANDED for discourtesy against
complainant. He is further warned that a repetition of this or similar acts will be dealt with more
severely.
Navarro v. Tormis
Complainant Judge Donato Sotero A. Navarro of MTCC, Cebu City, Branch 6, sent a letter dated September
15, 2000 to the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA), requesting for an opinion on the propriety of the
alleged conduct of respondent Executive Judge Rosabella M. Tormis, MTCC of Cebu City in the following
instances:
1. Finding Criminal Case No. 106436-R, entitled, People vs. Comparativo, to be covered by the Rule on
Summary Procedure, Judge Tormis removed the Order of Commitment issued by Judge Navarro[1] from the
records of the case and substituted it with her own order directing the release of the accused;
2. Judge Tormis uttered derogatory remarks against Judge Navarro and his court, to wit: for me, Branch 6
does not exist;
3. Judge Tormis rendered an opinion in a case pending before Judge Grace Orma E. Ypil, MTCC of Cebu
City, Branch 8, in violation of Rule 2.04 of Canon 2 of the Code of Judicial Ethics.
Upon recommendation of the OCA, the Court, in a Resolution dated December 13, 2000,[2] resolved to treat
the letter as an administrative complaint against Judge Tormis, directing Judge Navarro to have his letter
verified and Judge Tormis to comment thereon.
Meanwhile, in a Motion dated 24 April 2001, Judge Navarro informed the Court that Judge Tormis personally
posted on the door of her courtroom, a copy of the Courts Resolution dated 14 February 2001 which reads:
Administrative Matter No. MTJ-00-1337 (Judge Donato Sotero A. Navarro vs. Executive Judge Rosabella M.
Tormis) The manifestation of compliance with the resolution of December 13, 2000 filed by Judge Donato
Sotero A. Navarro is NOTED.
Very truly yours,
VIRGINIA ANCHETA-SORIANO
Clerk of Court
First Division
By: ENRIQUETA ESGUERRA-VIDAL
Asst. Clerk of Court
First Division[3]
with a handwritten note Please Read, to call the attention of the lawyers and the public. A similar notice was
also posted at the door of the office of MTCC, Branch 8, which some court personnel removed, but another
copy was again posted. For this reason, he asked the Acting Clerk of Court Evelyn Bacalla to explain the
matter but instead, the latter handed to him another copy of the Resolution.
In a Resolution dated July 2001,[4] the Court directed Evelyn Bacalla to desist from committing further acts
which may tend to unduly publicize the instant case, to immediately remove copies of the notices posted on
the doors, and to explain within ten days how these notices came to be posted thereat. In a Resolution dated
September 10, 2001, the Court noted the compliance/explanation of Evelyn Bacalla saying that she had no
hand in or knowledge about the posting of the papers.
In her Comment,[5] respondent explains that:
1. Anent Criminal Case No. 106436-R (People vs. Comparativo) -
a) she never removed nor substituted any order of Judge Navarro from the records since the latter had
not issued any order at all. What was in the records was an order issued by his Clerk of Court, Prospero M.
Sincero;
b) the said criminal case was referred to her for raffle when the accused had already been in jail for two
days. She admitted having ordered the release of the accused considering the value of the article stolen was
even less than P52.45, and as such, fell within the coverage of the Rule on Summary Procedure.
2. If ever she made the statement that MTCC, Branch 6, did not exist, this should not be taken seriously as
this can only be interpreted in the context of light banter and did not at all place Branch 6 in disrepute.
3. As to the issue that she rendered an opinion on a criminal case raffled to another sala -
a) as the Executive Judge, she immediately conducted an investigation on Evelyn Bacalla. In the
process, she discovered grave injustice committed against an urban poor family charged with illegal
squatting in Criminal Case No. 99796-12-R (People vs. Garduque), so she called the attention of Presiding
Judge Ypil, in a letter dated January 5, 2000, regarding the legal and factual circumstances of the case which
she believed justified a dismissal of the case since the act complained of had already been decriminalized by
virtue of R.A. No. 7276.
b) Complainants intervention in said case is not only unethical but oppressively unjust, he being the
former private prosecutor of the case together with his mother, retired Judge Exaltacion Navarro and that
according to some of his staff, complainant was angry at those whom he perceived thwarted his entitlement to
attorneys fees of not less that P100,000.00 should he successfully eject the accused from the premises.
c) this administrative complaint is part of complainants obsession to compel her to relinquish her position
as Executive Judge and to fulfill his ambition to replace her as such.
In his Reply, complainant reiterated that respondent had been making derogatory remarks about him both in
print and on television which were not only damaging to him and his family but also to the entire Judiciary.
Complainant asserts that the fact that the order of commitment removed by respondent from the records of the
case was signed by the Clerk of Court is of no significance since it is likewise her practice that her
commitment orders are signed by her Clerk of Court Reynaldo S. Teves; that he has not intervened in the
case because his letter to Evelyn Bacalla was dated 25 November 1999 when he was not yet a judge; and
thereafter, he refrained from pursuing the case to its conclusion.
As the matter involves members of the bench accusing each other and finding that it cannot be resolved
satisfactorily on the basis alone of the documents submitted, the Court, upon recommendation of the OCA,
issued a Resolution dated December 9, 2002, referring the instant administrative matter to Executive Judge
Galicano C. Arriesgado, RTC, Cebu City for investigation, report and recommendation. Upon retirement of
Judge Arriesgado, the case was inherited by Executive Judge Pampio A. Abarintos who formed a panel,
composed of three members, namely: himself, First Vice Executive Judge Isaias P. Dicdican and Second Vice
Executive Judge Simeon K. Dumdum, Jr., to continue with the investigation.
In their Report dated August 25, 2003, the Investigating Panel submitted the following findings, portions of
which are reproduced hereunder:
FINDINGS:
The rift between the two judges started sometime immediately after January 5, 2000 when then Acting
Executive Judge Tormis issued a letter to Judge Ypil (Annex I) in reply to the 1st Endorsement (Annex H) first time as Executive Judge; that she even interviewed the representative of the complainant who said that it
of Judge Ypil (judge designate of MTCC 8 Cebu) on the letter-complaint of Atty. Donato Navarro (now Judge
Navarro) against Legal Researcher (then acting Branch Clerk of Court MTCC 8 Cebu City) Evelyn Bacalla
(now Branch Clerk of Court MTCC 8 Cebu City).
On (sic) November 1999, while Judge Donato Navarro was still a practicing lawyer, he was the private
prosecutor in the criminal case entitled Pp vs. Garduque, et al. CBU-99796-R pending at MTCC Branch 8
Cebu City, involving the issue on professional squatters. Atty. Navarro wrote a letter addressed to the Branch
Clerk of Court, MTCC Branch 8 Cebu City, asking for a written explanation from Evelyn Bacalla why she set
the Motion to Quash for hearing without the authority of the Judge and when the accused had not yet been
arrested. Acting on the letter-complaint of Atty. Navarro, Judge Ypil endorsed the same to the Office of the
Executive Judge. The controversy now starts on the letter reply of Executive Judge Tormis, copy furnished to
Judge Navarro, as the latter was already appointed as Judge sometime on (sic) December, 2000.
Executive Judge Tormis, in reply to the 1st Endorsement, stated that while there might have been a
transgression committed by Evelyn Bacalla with respect to some procedural matter, the motion to quash for
hearing without order from the judge, the same is not of such grave nature as would necessitate such a drastic
action. In addition, however, Executive Judge Tormis made a comment that the case ought to be dismissed
as the act complained of had already been decriminalized under R.A. No. 8368.
This additional comment irked Judge Navarro. As a result, he came barging into the office of Judge Tormis,
bringing along certain books on the matter, splashing the same to the latters staff, saying: Tell your Judge,
she does not know her law!. Naturally, upon learning of said incident, Judge Tormis flared up especially
because it was only a month or two that Judge Navarro was appointed as judge.
Judge Navarro complains that Judge Tormis had been downgrading him and his Court, stating the words:
For me, Branch 6 does not exist! Instead of patching things up with the Executive Judge, who is supposed
to be his superior, on September 15, 2000, he sent a letter to then Hon. Court Administrator Alfredo L.
Benipayo entitled Request for an Opinion about the Propriety of Certain Acts of the Executive Judge. In turn,
Executive Judge Tormis filed a Complaint against Judge Sotero Navarro docketed as Adm. Matter No. 01-6-
188 MTCC accusing him of his alleged failure to timely dispose of the cases pending before his court and of
his wifes interference with the judicial functions of her husband and with the duties of the court personnel.
Judge Navarro then accused Judge Tormis to have expressed derogatory remarks against him both in
television and in print.
On the first issue:
Acting in her capacity as Executive Judge, she carefully reviewed the case involving theft of an Eskinol. After
careful scrutiny, she discovered that the amount involved was less then P50.00. Since the case falls under
the Rules on Summary Procedure, Executive Judge Tormis ordered for the release of the accused and had
the case raffled. . . .
On the second issue:
As testified by Executive Judge Tormis, she may have uttered those words but the same were never meant to
downgrade Branch 6, they were only made in a light banter or in jest. The panel believes that while Executive
Judge Tormis might have uttered the words, FOR ME, BRANCH 6 DOES NOT EXIST! against Judge
Navarros Court, the same was only a result of the arrogance and demeaning words which Judge Navarro
uttered against her: TELL YOUR JUDGE, SHE DOES NOT KNOW HER LAW! The panel finds it
understandable to have uttered those words especially because of the words previously uttered by
complainant.
On the third issue:
Judge Navarro insists that Executive Judge Tormis may have committed acts of impropriety. The panel finds
that Judge Tormis was just acting within her duties as Executive Judge when she made a letter reply to the 1st
Endorsement issued by Judge Ypil.
Based on the foregoing, the Investigating Panel recommends the dismissal of the administrative complaint
against Judge Tormis. Court Administrator Presbitero J. Velasco, Jr., in his Memorandum dated January 20,
2004, agrees with the findings and recommendation of the Investigating Panel.
The Court does not fully agree.
As to the first issue Respondent reviewed Criminal Case No. 106436-R when it was referred to her by the
Clerk of Court of Branch 4, MTCC, Cebu City. She testified that when the record was forwarded to her, there
was no previous order that was attached to it so she had the impression she was acting on the case for the
only involves the amount of less than P52.45; and that in the exercise of her discretion, the case should be
covered by the Rules of Summary Procedure.[6] When asked further by the Investigating Panel if it is true that
she replaced the commitment order which is attached to the record with her order, she answered that she was
not aware of it[7] which is consistent with her assertion that she saw no previous order attached to the
records. Complainant failed to demonstrate that respondent had acted on this matter in bad faith or with
malice.
Anent the second issue Indeed, the Court agrees with the Investigating Panel and Court Administrator that
the alleged derogatory remarks uttered by respondent against Branch 6, MTCC, Cebu City could have been
uttered in a sudden burst of emotion when complainant uttered demeaning words against her and that her
action was not intentional and in bad faith.
As to the third issue The act of respondent in giving an opinion in a criminal case raffled to Judge Ypil was in
response to an indorsement made by the latter. Respondent claims that she rendered an opinion because the
case was referred to her in her capacity as executive judge. However, a perusal of the said indorsement
shows that Judge Ypil merely referred to respondent the letter of complainant, filed when he was still a
practicing lawyer, seeking explanation why legal researcher Evelyn Bacalla set the Motion to Quash for
hearing despite the fact that the accused had not been arrested and Judge Ypil had not issued a verbal or
written order to set the motion for hearing.[8] Clearly, Judge Ypil did not seek the opinion of respondent about
the merits of the case, but the latter delved thereon and advised Judge Ypil, as follows:
All the foregoing considered, the undersigned believes that it would be a better part of your discretion if you
order the dismissal of the case, as the act complained of has been decriminalized under RA 8368.[9]
Respondent may not have any ulterior motive nor was there any showing that she was after monetary
consideration still it is beyond her authority to render such an opinion. Wittingly or unwittingly, respondent
violated Rule 2.04, Canon 2 of the Code of Judicial Conduct, which provides:
Rule 2.04 A judge shall refrain from influencing in any manner the outcome of litigation or dispute pending
before another court or administrative agency.
In the absence of any showing that respondents interference was in bad faith or with malice and considering
that this is the first time on record that he committed such infraction of the Code of Judicial Conduct, a mere
reprimand is just and reasonable.
It is imperative that we call the attention of both complainant and respondent judges regarding their
unbecoming conduct. It is very apparent that the rift between them transcended the professional level to a
personal one. Worse, their fight was picked up by the local media and for a while they were an item in the
local newspapers.[10] This is very unfortunate for it puts the judiciary in a bad light. Certainly, when judges of
the same court in the same place fight, the image of the judiciary is impaired rather than enhanced.[11] Their
positions as judges demand utmost caution and circumspection to avoid poor public impression on the
Judiciary.[12] Magistracy is after all about character.[13] It is incumbent upon them to so behave at all times
as to promote public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary. Being the dispensers of
justice, judges should not act in a way that would cast suspicion in order to preserve faith in the administration
of justice. They should avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in all activities.[14]
Judge Navarro and Judge Tormis should bear in mind that no position is more demanding than a seat in the
Bench. Occupying as they do, an exalted position in the administration of justice, as judges, they must pay a
high price for the honor bestowed upon them.[15] A judge must comport himself at all times in such a manner
that his conduct, can bear the most searching scrutiny of the public that looks up to him as the epitome of
integrity and justice.[16] Public confidence in the judiciary is eroded by irresponsible or improper conduct of
judges.[17] As the visible representation of law and justice, judges are expected to conduct themselves in a
manner that would enhance the respect and confidence of our people in the judicial system.[18]
WHEREFORE, Judge Rosabelle M. Tormis is found guilty of improper conduct for trying to influence the
course of litigation in Criminal Case No. 99796-12. Accordingly, Judge Tormis is hereby REPRIMANDED with
a stern warning that a repetition of the same will be dealt with more severely.
Both Judge Rosabelle M. Tormis and Judge Donato Sotero A. Navarro are ADMONISHED for their
unbecoming conduct as dispensers of justice with a stern warning that a repetition of the same shall be dealt
with more severely.
Mataga v. Rosete
The imperative and sacred duty of each and everyone in the court is to maintain its good name and standing
as a temple of justice.[1] The Court condemns and would never countenance any conduct, act or omission on
the part of all those involved in the administration of justice which would violate the norm of public
accountability or tend to diminish the faith of the people in the judiciary.[2]
In a verified complaint dated June 12, 2002, Adarlina G. Mataga, a retired Court Stenographer 1 of the
Municipal Trial Court of Santiago City, Isabela, charged Judge Maxwel S. Rosete and Process Server Gasat
M. Payoyo with Dishonesty and Misconduct in connection with the encashing of the check representing her
terminal pay.[3]
Complainant alleged that she applied for disability retirement because she was suffering from Organic Brain
Syndrome Moderate to Severe Secondary to Cerebro-Vascular Accident (Thrombosis). Complainants
application was approved on January 30, 1996,[4] and consequently, Disbursement Voucher No. 101-96-03-
8924[5] for One Hundred Sixty Five Thousand Five Hundred Thirty and 8/100 Pesos (P165,530.08) and the
corresponding Land Bank Check No. 37021[6] were prepared in the name of complainant. The check was
released to respondent Payoyo who turned it over to Judge Rosete.[7]
Sometime in March 1996, respondent Payoyo brought complainant to the house of respondent Judge Rosete,
where she was given the amount of P44,000.00 as her terminal pay. It was only subsequently that
complainant came to know that the disability retirement benefit granted to her was in the amount of
P165,530.08, which respondents did not deliver to her.
When asked to comment,[8] respondent judge denied the complainants allegations. He stated that
complainant has not been to his house in Quezon City, nor has he given the complainant the sum of
P44,000.00 as her terminal pay. Respondent judge, however, admitted that the check representing the
retirement benefits of the complainant was indeed turned over to him by the Supreme Court security guard
after it was misplaced by his co-respondent, Payoyo. Upon his receipt of complainants check, respondent
judge immediately handed the same to Payoyo because he knew that complainant had requested the latter to
follow up her check.
For his part, respondent process server Payoyo denied the accusations against him. He claimed that he did
not know complainant personally. Respondent judge instructed him to claim complainants disability check,
which he did. Respondent judge then told him to encash the check at the Land Bank of the Philippines, Taft
Avenue Branch and to proceed to the formers house to meet complainant and her son. There, he turned over
the full amount of complainants disability benefit.
The case was referred to Judge Fe Albano Madrid, the Executive Judge of the Regional Trial Court of
Santiago City, Isabela, for investigation, report and recommendation.[9] On July 9, 2003, Judge Madrid
submitted her report,[10] wherein she recommended that the complaint be dismissed in view of the admission
of the complainant that she has received the full amount of her benefits as early as March 17, 1996, as
evidenced by a receipt which bore her signature.[11]
After noting the report of Judge Albano Madrid, we resolved to refer the case to the Office of the Court
Administrator (OCA) for evaluation, report and recommendation.[12] The OCA recommended that, in view of
the failure to thresh out the material contradictions between the allegations of the complainant and the
assertions of the respondent, the case be returned to the investigating judge for further investigation, report
and recommendation.[13] On December 10, 2003, we resolved to return the case to Judge Albano Madrid.[14]
After conducting another investigation of the case, Judge Albano Madrid submitted her report, stating that
during the second investigation, complainant made it clear that she had no more complaint against respondent
judge provided that the latter will give her the money. Rather, the complaint was directed at the dishonesty of
respondent Payoyo in his dealings with the complainant.
After reviewing the records of this case, we hold that the complaint against respondent judge should be
dismissed.
Any administrative complaint leveled against a judge must always be examined with a discriminating eye, for
its consequential effect are by their nature highly penal, such that the respondent judge stands to face the
sanction of dismissal or disbarment.[15] Mere imputation of judicial misconduct in the absence of sufficient
proof to sustain the same will never be countenanced. If a judge should be disciplined for misconduct, the
evidence against him should be competent.
When an administrative charge against a judge is determined to have no basis whatsoever, we will not
hesitate to protect him against any groundless accusation that trifles with judicial process. We will not shirk
from our responsibility of imposing discipline upon employees of the Judiciary but neither shall we hesitate to
shield the same employees from unfounded suits that only serve to disrupt rather than promote the orderly
administration of justice.[16]
On the other hand, respondent Payoyo should be held administratively liable. As correctly pointed out by the
investigating judge:
xxx xxx xxx
From the conduct and actuations of Mr. Gasat Payoyo, together with his confusing testimony, it is clear that he
was not honest enough when he gave the proceeds of the terminal leave benefits of the complainant. He was
able to collect P165,530.00. He lost the check. It was found and given to the security guard of the Supreme
Court who in turn gave it to Judge Rosete who gave it back to Gasat Payoyo who he knew was the one
authorized by Ms. Mataga to release it from the Supreme Court. By virtue of his special power-of-attorney Mr.
Payoyo encashed the check but he did not give all of it to the complainant. But the complainant must have
accepted the amount given to her pursuant to an agreement she had with Mr. Payoyo. It is hard to imagine
that Ms. Mataga authorized Mr. Payoyo to follow-up her retirement benefits without any consideration
whatsoever.
Six years later the complainants daughter complained why her mother accepted a lesser amount than what
was indicated in the check. She urged her mother to file a complaint with the Supreme Court against both
Gasat Payoyo and Judge Rosete. The daughter must have suspected that Judge Rosete had something to
do with the lesser amount delivered to her mother because she found out that the lost check had been given
to Judge Rosete and yet the latter did not give the check to her mother but instead returned it to Payoyo for
encashment.
When Gasat Payoyo was apprised that the complaint was scheduled for investigation, he got scared. Before
the scheduled date of hearing on June 11, 2003 he went to talk to the complainant and agreed to give her
P100,000.00 provided she will sign a receipt antedated March 17, 1996 to show that he actually delivered the
full amount of the check to her. He presented this as evidence during the investigation. Because of their
agreement about the receipt, the complainant gave a vague and confusing testimony regarding it.
It is clear that the complainant did not receive the full amount of her terminal leave benefits. As to how much
she received, the complainant said she only received P40,000.00. But Gasat Payoyo said he gave it all.
Nevertheless there was an agreement between the complainant and Payoyo regarding the amount received
by the complainant which was satisfactory to both of them. Thus Ms. Mataga should not have any cause to
complain. But her daughter believed that her mother was taken advantage of because of her illness.
Judge Maxwell Rosete denied any participation in the follow-up and encashment of the check representing the
terminal leave benefits of the complainant. There is no reason to doubt this inspite of the statements given by
Gasat Payoyo in his supplemental affidavit which he admitted were not true. To absolve himself, the
respondent Payoyo by himself or upon the advice of others, tried to put the blame on Judge Rosete. x x x
Subsequently M. Payoyo became more worried and became more scared of what he did. He could not face
Judge Rosete. So he refused to appear in the scheduled investigation. But finally he appeared and admitted
that the contents of his supplemental affidavit are not true.
The Investigating Judge believes that it was the initial dishonesty of the respondent Mr. Gasat Payoyo in not
delivering to the complainant the full amount of her terminal leave benefits minus only a reasonable amount
for his efforts in following it up, that led to the filing of the complaint. His efforts to cover up what he did by
paying the complainant and falsifying the date of a receipt compounded his fault. He aggravated it more when
he attempted to maliciously implicate his co-respondent in the commission of his dishonesty. x x x.[17]
The behavior of everyone connected with an office charged with the dispensation of justice, from the presiding
judge to the clerk of lowest rank, should be circumscribed with a high degree of responsibility.[18] The image
of a court, as a true temple of justice, is mirrored in the conduct, official or otherwise, of the men and women
who work thereat. Judicial personnel are expected to be living examples of uprightness in the performance of
official duties to preserve at all times the good name and standing of the courts in the community.[19]
The acts of the respondent Payoyo in not giving to the complainant the full amount of her terminal leave
benefits minus reasonable expenses that he incurred in making a follow-up of its release; his efforts at
covering the same by paying the complainant and by falsifying the date of the receipt for such payment and
his aborted attempt to maliciously implicate his co-respondent judge, all fall short of the measure of
uprightness expected of judicial personnel. For respondent Payoyos dishonesty, he should be suspended for
a period of six months.
WHEREFORE, the complaint filed against respondent Judge Maxwell S. Rosete is DISMISSED for lack of
merit. Respondent Process Server, Gasat M. Payoyo, is found GUILTY of Dishonesty and is SUSPENDED
for a period of SIX MONTHS. Respondent Payoyo is WARNED that a repetition of this or any similar act will
be dealt with more severely.
The Officers and Members of the IBP Baguio-Benguet Chapter, et al v. Pamintuan, AM RTJ-02-1691
On January 16, 2004, we rendered a Decision suspending for a period of one (1) year Judge Fernando Vil
Pamintuan, Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 3, Baguio City, herein respondent. He
was charged by the above-named complainants with (1) gross ignorance of the law; (2) violation of the
constitutional rights of the accused; (3) arrogance, oppressive conduct, and violations of the Code of Judicial
Conduct; and (4) impropriety.
For our resolution is complainants motion for reconsideration of our Decision praying that the penalty of one
(1) year suspension we imposed upon respondent judge be modified. Instead, we should dismiss him from
the service with forfeiture of all benefits and with prejudice to any re-employment in any branch, agency or
instrumentality of the government, including government-owned or controlled corporations.
The instant motion for reconsideration lacks merit.
Firstly, the assailed Decision was a product of our extensive and serious deliberation. We carefully evaluated
respondents infractions before imposing upon him the penalty of one (1) year suspension from the service.
To reconsider our Decision sans new and compelling reason is plain flip-flopping which will result in serious
injustice to respondent. Even complainants motion for reconsideration provides no sufficient justification. It
does not raise new matters or issues demanding new judicial determination. In other words, it is but a
reiteration of reasons and arguments previously set forth in complainants pleadings which we already
determined and resolved before we rendered the Decision sought to be reconsidered. The facts, the issues,
and the law contained in our Decision having remained unchanged, we find no reason why we should
reconsider it.
Secondly, the cases relied upon by complainants in pointing out that the penalty imposed upon respondent is
not commensurate to his offenses are based on entirely different factual settings. Complainants cited the
following cases:
(1) Re: Release by Judge Manuel T. Muro, RTC, Br. 54, Manila, of an Accused in a Non-Bailable
Offense,[1]
(2) Dizon vs. Calimag,[2]
(3) Guray vs. Bautista,[3]
(4) Office of the Court Administrator vs. Sanchez,[4]
malice, wrongful motives, corrupt intentions or moral depravity. Apparently, of the thirteen (13) cases cited,
eight (8) were either for gross misconduct, serious misconduct or corruption. Five (5) cases were for gross
ignorance of the law. In two (2) of these cases, only reprimand and fine were imposed upon respondents. In
the remaining three (3), respondents were penalized with dismissal from the service because of facts peculiar
to said cases, definitely not similar to the facts in the instant case. In Castaos vs. Escao,[15] in addition to
gross ignorance of the law, respondent was also found guilty of grave abuse of authority for using contempt as
a retaliatory measure. In Lantaco, Sr. vs. Judge Llamas,[16] respondent judge repeatedly ignored our
directive for him to file comment. And in State Prosecutors vs. Muro,[17] though respondent judge was initially
dismissed, he was reinstated upon his filing of a motion for reconsideration. It bears reiterating that in all
these cases, malice, fraud, dishonesty, corruption or wrongful intention are present. Here, respondents
questioned actuations are not tainted by any of these incidents. Hence, we can not consider the above cited
cases as precedents applicable to his case.
Thirdly, it is not true that respondent has not shown remorse or repentance. In his motion for reconsideration,
he manifested his immediate compliance with our Decision dated January 16, 2004 on the premise that the
Supreme Court has spoken. A truth, commonly accepted in civilized institutions, is that acceptance of
punishment often mitigates the gravity of a violation of a duty. The ultimate commitment of ones fate to legal
process means that under an obligation of consent or a duty to support just institutions, ones breach is also
substantially lessened.[18] Although respondent judge moved for the reduction of his penalty, the same was
premised on his length of service in the judiciary. His motion merely appealed to our compassion and
understanding, thus, showing humility in his moral judgment.
And fourthly, a more thorough review of the facts as well as the applicable jurisprudence shows that the
penalty of dismissal from the service is disproportionate to respondent judges infractions.
I
The first charge of gross ignorance of the law must fail.
First, there exists a judicial remedy sufficient to correct respondent judges alleged mistakes in the imposition
of the Indeterminate Sentence Law. And second, there is no evidence to show that he was moved by bad
faith, malice, dishonesty or corruption in imposing the penalties.
Settled is the rule that the filing of an administrative complaint is not the proper remedy for the correction of
actions of a judge perceived to have gone beyond the norms of propriety, where a sufficient judicial remedy
exists.[19] The law provides ample judicial remedies against errors or irregularities committed by the trial court
in the exercise of its jurisdiction. The ordinary remedies against errors or irregularities which may be regarded
as normal in nature (i.e., error in application of procedural or substantive law or in appreciation or admission of
evidence) include a motion for reconsideration, a motion for new trial, and appeal. On the other hand, the
extraordinary remedies against error or irregularities which may be deemed extraordinary in character (i.e.,
whimsical, capricious, despotic exercise of power or neglect of duty, etc.) are the special civil actions of
certiorari, prohibition or mandamus, or a motion for inhibition, or a petition for change of venue, as the case
may be.[20]

(5) Mamba vs. Garcia,[5] Today, the established policy is that disciplinary proceedings against judges are not complementary or
suppletory of, nor a substitute for these judicial remedies. Resort to and exhaustion of these judicial remedies,
(6) In Re: An Undated Letter with the Heading Expose of a Concerned Mediaman on the Alleged as well as the entry of judgment in the corresponding action or proceeding, are pre-requisites for the taking of
Illegal Acts of Judge Julian C. Ocampo III,[6] other measures against the judges concerned, whether of civil, administrative, or criminal nature. It is only
after the available judicial remedies have been exhausted and the appellate tribunals have spoken with
(7) Agpalasin vs. Agcaoili,[7] finality, that the door to an inquiry into his criminal, civil or administrative liability may be said to have opened,
or closed.[21]
(8) Magarang vs. Jardin, Sr.,[8]
In the present administrative case, respondent judge is found to have repeatedly misapplied the Indeterminate
(9) Castaos vs. Escao, Jr.,[9] Sentence Law in seventeen (17) cases.[22]

(10) State Prosecutors vs. Muro,[10] The records, however, show that of these seventeen (17) cases, twelve (12)[23] are pending appeal in the
Appellate Court. One (1)[24] is subject of a motion for reconsideration before respondent judge. Two (2)[25]
(11) Chin vs. Gustilo,[11] were decided by him on the basis of a plea of guilty to a lesser offense by both accused. And in one (1)
case,[26] we affirmed his Decision in our Resolution dated October 9, 2000.
(12) Francisco vs. Springael,[12]
With the foregoing circumstances, it is therefore both improper and premature to hold respondent judge guilty
(13) Lantaco, Sr. vs. Judge Llamas,[13] and of gross ignorance of the law. Following established doctrine, the pendency of the appeals is sufficient cause
for the dismissal of the administrative complaint against respondent judge.[27] The rationale is that if
(14) Carreon vs. Flores.[14] subsequent developments prove respondent judges challenged act to be correct, there would be no occasion
to proceed against him after all. In Flores vs. Abesamis,[28] we held:
The common thread in the above cases, which justifies the imposition of the supreme penalty of dismissal
from the service upon the erring judges, is the fact that the acts committed by respondents therein involve
Indeed, since judges must be free to judge, without pressure or influence from external forces or factors, they
should not be subject to intimidation, the fear of civil, criminal or administrative sanctions for acts they may do
and disposition they may make in the performance of their duties and functions; and it is sound rule, which
must be recognized independently of statute, that judges are not generally liable for acts done within the
scope of their jurisdiction and in good faith; and that exceptionally, prosecution of a judge can be had only if
there be a final declaration by a competent court in some appropriate proceeding of the manifestly unjust
character of the challenged judgment or order, and also evidence of malice or bad faith, ignorance of
inexcusable negligence, on the part of the judge in rendering said judgment or order or under the stringent
circumstances set out in Article 32 of the Civil Code. . . . (Underscoring supplied)
To declare that respondent judge misapplied the Indeterminate Sentence Law to criminal cases on appeal will
only result to undesirable consequences, foremost of which is the existence of conflicting decisions. The
danger is heightened by the fact that the complainants in this administrative case are not the counsel of the
accused in most of the cases mentioned but mere members of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines who only
sorted out respondent judges Decisions and on the basis thereof, concluded that he erred in the application of
the Indeterminate Sentence Law.[29] They neither looked at the records of the cases nor consulted the parties
concerned. As a matter of fact, during cross-examination, they admitted that they do not know personally the
facts of the cases.
It bears reiterating that to constitute gross ignorance of the law, it is not enough that the subject decision,
order or actuation of the judge in the performance of his official duties is contrary to existing law and
jurisprudence but, most importantly, he must be moved by bad faith, fraud, dishonesty or corruption.[30] Here,
the administrative complaint does not even assert that in imposing the penalties, respondent judge was so
motivated. In fact, complainants failed to present positive evidence to show that he was prompted by malice
or corrupt motive in imposing the assailed penalties. Even the records, specifically the transcript of
stenographic notes, reveal nothing of that sort.
In Guillermo vs. Judge Reyes, Jr.,[31] we ruled that good faith and absence of malice, corrupt motives or
improper considerations are sufficient defenses in which a judge charged with ignorance of the law can find
refuge. In this case, reprimand was considered an appropriate penalty. In People vs. Serrano, Sr.,[32]
respondent Judge Pepe P. Domael allowed an appeal from a judgment of acquittal. Although the accused did
not object to the appeal interposed by the prosecution, we held that respondent Judge Domael should have
known that granting such appeal would constitute double jeopardy. However, since the acts in question were
not shown to be tainted with bad faith, fraud, or malice, they were not considered as so gross to warrant the
dismissal of respondent judge from the service.
Indeed, the fact that herein respondent judge misapplied the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the same merely
constitutes an error of judgment. To reiterate, a judicial determination or mistake based merely on errors of
judgment, and without corrupt or improper motives, will not supply a ground for removal, and this is true
although such errors are numerous.[33]
II
Anent the second charge of violation of the Constitutional rights of the accused, complainants mentioned two
cases, i.e., People vs. Baniqued[34] and Surla vs. Dimla,[35] wherein respondent judge failed to decide
pending motions within the prescribed period.
In People vs. Baniqued,[36] respondent judge, according to complainants, took more than one (1) year to
decide the prosecutions motion for the preventive suspension of Ceferino Baniqued. At first glance, the delay
seems to be unreasonable and attributable to respondent judge. However, a more probing inquiry on the
matter shows that the delay was due to the maneuverings of Atty. Lauro C. Gacayan, Baniqueds own counsel
and one of the complainants herein.
The records show that as early as December 2, 1997, former Presiding Judge Ruben Costales had deemed
submitted for resolution the prosecutions motion for preventive suspension. Notwithstanding so, Atty.
Gacayan filed several pleadings[37] insisting that it was still premature to consider the incident submitted for
resolution because the mandatory pre-suspension hearing has not yet been terminated. On August 18,
1998, the motion for preventive suspension was again considered submitted for resolution, this time by
respondent judge. Pending resolution, Atty. Gacayan filed a demurrer to evidence praying that the case of
People vs. Baniqued[38] be dismissed for lack of evidence to support the conviction of the accused.[39] This
was followed by a supplement to the demurrer to evidence.[40]
Obviously, the delay in the resolution of the prosecutions motion was, in the main, due to Atty. Gacayans
persistence that a pre-suspension hearing be conducted. Not only did he file one pleading after another, he
also filed a demurrer to evidence. This only complicated the matters before respondent judge. Naturally, if
the demurrer to evidence is found to be meritorious, then the necessary consequence is the dismissal of the
motion for preventive suspension on the ground that it has become moot and academic.
Under the principle that he who comes to court must come with clean hands, complainant Atty. Gacayan
cannot now pretend that he was not responsible for the delay and that respondent judge deserves all the
blame. As counsel of accused Baniqued, he had resorted to all possible legal maneuverings just to prevent
the suspension of his client. He cannot now extricate himself from the result of his legal strategies and adopt
a different stance just to crucify respondent judge. Certainly, we cannot countenance such effrontery. In
Gaspar vs. Bayhon,[41] we ruled that a judge should not be blamed for the delay in the disposition of a case
when the delay is beyond his control, especially in the absence of any showing that it was done in bad faith
and intended to prejudice a party to the case or it was motivated by some ulterior end.
Indeed, it is extremely ironic that Atty. Gacayan is so vigorous in invoking his clients right to speedy trial when
what was delayed is the resolution of the prosecutions motion. If there is someone who has been prejudiced
by the delay, it is the prosecution, not the accused. He has no reason to complain.
In Surla vs. Dimla,[42] allegedly it took respondent judge four (4) months to resolve an unopposed motion for
reconsideration. This appears to be Atty. Gacayans last-ditch attempt to revive a dead case. As pointed out
by respondent judge, the case was initially dismissed for failure to prosecute. Upon plaintiffs motion for
reconsideration, the case was reinstated. Due to several subsequent unjustified absences on the part of
plaintiff, the case was again dismissed on the same ground. No motion for reconsideration was filed until the
order of dismissal became final.[43]
III
The third charge imputes to respondent arrogance, oppressive conduct and violations of the Code of Judicial
Conduct. These offenses are not so grave as to warrant the penalty of dismissal from the service.
Complainants claim that respondent judges displayed arrogance when he imposed time constraint on Atty.
Federico Mandapats cross-examination of the witness in People vs. Andrada. We believe otherwise. The
transcript of stenographic notes shows that respondent judge required Atty. Mandapat to approach the bench
before advising him to ask only relevant questions and not to be repetitious. That he was required to
approach the bench only proves that respondent judge did not intend to embarrass him. And while it is true
that respondent judge limited the cross-examination to only ten (10) minutes, it was because he (Atty.
Mandapat) had already spent a considerable time cross-examining the witness. However, his cross-
examination was extended the next day. In fact, respondent judge allowed him to cross-examine the witness
without limitation.[44]
At this juncture, it must be stressed that it is both the right and duty of a trial judge to control the cross-
examination of witnesses, both for the purpose of conserving the time of the court and of protecting the
witnesses from prolonged and needless examination.[45] In People vs. Gorospe,[46] we ruled that while
cross-examination is a right available to the adverse party, it is not absolute in the sense that a cross-
examiner could determine for himself the length and scope of his cross-examination of a witness. The court
has always the discretion to limit the cross-examination and to consider it terminated if it would serve the ends
of justice.
Anent respondent judges statement to the client of Atty. Joris Karl Dacawi not to pay the latters attorneys
fees because he did nothing but merely to seek the postponement of the case, the same does not constitute
oppression, though, I must say, it was really uncalled for. Oppression is a misdemeanor committed by a
public officer, who under color of his office, wrongfully inflicts upon any person any bodily harm, imprisonment
or other injury. It is an act of cruelty, severity, or excessive use of authority.[47] Respondent judges
utterance can hardly qualify as an act of cruelty or severity or excessive use of authority. Obviously, the
statement was uttered to discourage lawyers from seeking postponement of trials. A strict judge that he is, it
is understandable that he was irritated by Atty. Dacawis request to postpone the case on the ground that his
client was not feeling well when actually, the latter was in court. Of course, there is a limit to a judges
patience and leniency. Though it is required that respondent judge maintains a firm resolve in the face of
provocations by untoward defense tactics, and display such resolve with the appearance of dispassionate
equanimity, however, any showing of impatience or gratuitous observations left unsaid may be tolerated to
some extent. After all, as a judge, he has the obligation to remind lawyers of their duties to the public, to their
client, and to the adverse party and his counsel, so as to enforce due diligence in the dispatch of business
before the court.[48]
Complainants, particularly Atty. Reynaldo Agranzamendez, lament respondent judges conduct of ordering
him to stand during the promulgation of the Decision in People vs. Cruz[49] in which he was the counsel de
oficio, thus, making him appear to be the accused. While respondent judges actuation is irregular, however,
we believe that such offense does not justify his dismissal from the service.
With regard to respondent judges delay in the release of the copies of the Decisions in People vs. Cas[50]
and People vs. Malapit,[51] there is no showing of malice or bad faith on his part.

In People vs. Cas,[52] complainant Atty. Jurgenson Lagdao filed a Notice of Appeal which states:
ACCUSED, with the assistance of counsel, hereby gives notice that he is appealing to the Court of Appeals
the decision of the Honorable Court promulgated on June 22, 1999, a copy of which the Honorable Court has
yet to release, for being patently contrary to law and the attending facts and circumstances. x x x
Respondent judge directed Atty. Lagdao to modify the wording of such Notice of Appeal on the ground that the
phrase a copy of which the Honorable Court has yet to release is inaccurate considering that copies of the
Decision were already released to the parties. This is evident from the Manifestation and Explanation filed by
Atty. Lagdao quoted as follows:
THE UNDERSIGNED COUNSEL FOR THE ACCUSED,
unto this Honorable Court, most respectfully states:
1. That a notice of appeal from the judgment promulgated on 22 June 1999 was filed on July 5, 1999;
2. That in said notice, it was alleged that a copy of the decision has yet to be released by the Honorable
Court;
3. That between 10:00 and 11:00 o clock in the morning of 5 July 1999, the mother of the accused came to
the office and she was assisted by Atty. Henry Patrick Villanueva in inquiring about the decision and it was
then that Atty. Villanueva was furnished copy thereof;
4. That the notice of appeal was actually prepared and handed to one of the clerks in the office for filing at
about 8:25 in the morning of the same day. However, unknown to undersigned counsel, the notice was filed
only at about 1:30 in the afternoon for the reason that the clerk attended to several clients and prepared
reports such that it was only after taking lunch that he realized not having filed the notice earlier;
5. That had the undersigned counsel been aware that it was only in the afternoon that the notice was filed,
then he should have corrected or changed the notice prepared earlier to indicate receipt of the decision;
6. That to rectify the notice of appeal, undersigned counsel hereby states for the record that a copy of the
decision was received on 5 July 1999;
7. That the undersigned apologizes for what had happened and begs for the understanding of the Honorable
Court.
Clearly, respondent judge was justified in requiring Atty. Lagdao to change the tenor of his Notice of Appeal to
conform to the truth that copies of the Decision were indeed previously released to the parties.
In People vs. Malapit,[53] respondent judge failed to release to the parties copies of the Decision on the same
day it was promulgated. There were typographical errors in the Decision that have to be corrected by the
stenographers. Atty. Itliong-Rivera positively testified on this matter. Significantly, the delay did not prejudice
the accuseds right to appeal. In a number of cases wherein the respondent judge committed delay in the
release of decisions to the parties, the penalty meted upon him is only reprimand. Our rulings in Dizon vs.
Judge Lopez,[54] Mangulabnan vs. Tecson[55] and Castro vs. Judge Malazo[56] are relevant.
IV
Finally, on the appointment of Eufemio Gula as Driver I, suffice it to say that it was the Sangguniang
Panlungsod of the City of Baguio which appointed him to such position through Resolution No. 230, Series of
1999. His item was later on changed to Utility Worker II, through Resolution No. 298, Series of 1999,[57]
upon the request of Clerk of Court Delilah Gonzales-Munoz. The assailed appointment was therefore beyond
the control of respondent judge.
As a final word, let it be stressed that the administration of justice is primarily a joint responsibility of the judge
and the lawyer. The judge expects a lawyer to properly perform his role in this task in the same manner that
the lawyer expects a judge to do his part.[58] Their relation should be based on mutual respect and on a deep
appreciation by one of the duties of the other. Only in this manner can each minimize occasions for
delinquency and help attain effectively the ends of justice.[59]
The conflict between the herein parties could have been avoided if only they heeded the foregoing call.
Indeed, in the last analysis, the quality of justice meted out by the courts cannot be higher than the quality of
the lawyers practicing in the courts and of the judges who have been selected from among them.
While respondent judge indeed committed infractions, the absence of malice, bad faith, fraud, or dishonesty
on his part, does not warrant his removal from office. Significantly, eleven (11) witnesses[60] who are also
members of the IBP, Baguio City Chapter contradicted complainants charges. They testified that respondent
judges integrity is above board and that he administers justice effectively.
ACCORDINGLY, complainants motion for reconsideration is DENIED. The penalty of one (1) year suspension
from office imposed upon respondent judge is retained.
OCA v. Judge Villegas, AM RTJ-00-1526
Before this Court is an administrative complaint initiated by Dr. Fe Yabut against Judge Franklin A.
Villegas of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pagadian City, Branch 19.
In an undated letter received by the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) on January 5, 1999, Dr.
Yabut complained of the delay in the disposition of Civil Case No. 1576 pending before Judge Villegas of
the RTC-Pagadian City. The case was filed in 1976 by Romeo Alcantara against spouses Norberto and Fe
Yabut for reconveyance of agricultural properties situated in Pagadian City. It was originally assigned to
the then Court of First Instance of Zamboanga del Sur and Pagadian City presided by Judge Asaali S.
Isnani. On August 22, 1984, respondent judge took over the case after Judge Isnanis demise. But after
almost 15 years, Judge Villegas had yet to finish the trial of the case and render his decision thereon.
This prompted Dr. Yabut to bring the matter to this Courts attention.
Acting on the letter of Dr. Yabut, then Court Administrator Alfredo L. Benipayo twice required Judge
Villegas to comment on the allegations against him, first on February 9, 1999 and then on August 13,
1999. However, Judge Villegas failed to file his comment. Thus, on January 18, 2000, the Court en banc
ordered Judge Villegas to answer the complaint and show cause why no disciplinary action should be
taken against him for not complying with the directives of the OCA. Still he filed no answer.
On August 8, 2000, respondent judge was fined by this Court in the amount of P1,000 for his continued
failure to comply with its resolution. This fine was increased to P2,000 in a resolution dated January 16,
2001.
On March 29, 2001, the Court received a letter from respondent judge seeking its indulgence for his
failure to comply with the resolution dated January 18, 2000. He stressed that he had no intention of
disregarding the Courts directive. He explained that his vision in both eyes started deteriorating since
the late 1980s and, despite the treatments and laser operations, his vision did not improve. As a result,
he encountered much difficulty reading without the assistance of his clerks. He also enclosed postal
money orders in the amount of P2,000 as payment of the fine previously imposed upon him. He further
requested an extension of ten days from April 2, 2001 within which to file his comment on the
complaint.
However, it was only on December 12, 2003 that respondent judge filed his comment. He reasoned that
the delay in the disposition of Civil Case No. 1576 was brought about by postponements initiated by both
parties, failure to transcribe the testimonies of vital witnesses due to the court stenographers[1] death,
and negotiations between the parties for an amicable settlement. Likewise, he implored the Courts
mercy for the long delay in filing his comment.
In compliance with the resolution of the Court en banc dated January 27, 2004, the Office of the Court
Administrator filed its reply on March 11, 2004.
The noble office of a judge is to render justice not only impartially but expeditiously as well, for delay in
the disposition of cases erodes the faith and confidence of our people in the judiciary, lowers its
standards and brings it into disrepute.[2] Thus, Canon 3, Rule 3.05 of the Code of Judicial Conduct
requires judges to dispose of the courts business promptly and decide cases within the period specified
in Section 15 (1) (2), Article VIII of the Constitution, that is, three months from the filing of the last
pleading, brief or memorandum. We have consistently held that the failure of a judge to decide a case
within the said prescribed period is inexcusable and constitutes gross inefficiency.[3]
We find the explanation of Judge Villegas to be completely unsatisfactory. It deserves scant
consideration. Incidents such as the numerous postponements of hearings, non-submission of the
transcript of stenographic notes (TSN) and the possibility of an amicable settlement between the parties
are not reasonable justifications for failing to dispose of a case and render a decision within the
prescribed period.
Worse, respondent judge defied two directives of the OCA and six resolutions of this Court requiring him
either to file his comment or to show cause. Assuming his visual difficulty to be true, respondent judge
admitted that he was in fact being assisted by his clerks in attending to his paperwork. We thus find it
improbable that such serious orders of this Court and the OCA could have escaped his or his clerks
notice. No sufficient justification therefore existed for his failure to comply with the directives of this
Court. As the Court Administrator stated:
Respondent judge ought to be reminded that a resolution of this Court requiring comment on an
administrative complaint against officials and employees of the Judiciary is not to be construed as a mere
request from this Court. On the contrary, respondents in administrative cases are to take such
resolutions seriously by commenting on all accusations or allegations against them as it is their duty to
preserve the integrity of the judiciary. The Supreme Court can hardly discharge its constitutional
mandate of overseeing judges and court personnel and taking proper administrative sanction against
them if the judge or personnel concerned does not even recognize its administrative authority.[4]
Clearly, Judge Villegas contumacious conduct and blatant disregard of the Courts mandate for more
than three years amounted to studied defiance and downright insubordination.
A magistrates (1) delay in rendering a decision or order and (2) failure to comply with this Courts rules,
directives and circulars constitute less serious offenses under Rule 140, Section 9 of the Rules of Court:
SEC. 9. Less Serious Charges. Less serious charges include:
1. Undue delay in rendering a decision or order, or in transmitting the records of a case;
xxx xxx xxx
4. Violation of Supreme Court rules, directives and circulars;
xxx xxx xxx.
Section 11 (B) of said Rule 140 provides the following sanctions for less serious offenses:
SEC. 11. Sanctions. xxx xxx xxx
B. If the respondent is guilty of a less serious charge, any of the following sanctions shall be
imposed:
1. Suspension from office without salary and other benefits for not less than one (1) month nor more
than three (3) months; or
2. A fine of more than P10,000.00 but not exceeding P20,000.00.
We note that, in another administrative case, docketed as A.M. No. RTJ-03-1812 (promulgated
November 19, 2003) the Court en banc found respondent judge guilty of serious misconduct, and
ordered his dismissal from the service and the forfeiture of his retirement benefits. Respondents motion
for reconsideration of his dismissal was denied with finality on May 25, 2004.
WHEREFORE, Judge Franklin Villegas is hereby found guilty of two less serious offenses: (1) undue delay
in rendering a decision and (2) violation of Supreme Court directives. He is hereby FINED in the amount
of P20,000.
Beso v. Daguman, 323 SCRA 566
In this administrative complaint, respondent Judge stands charged with Neglect of Duty and Abuse of
Authority. In a Complaint-Affidavit dated December 12, 1997, Zenaida S. Beso charged Judge Juan J.
Daguman, Jr. with solemnizing marriage outside of his jurisdiction and of negligence in not retaining a
copy and not registering the marriage contract with the office of the Local Civil Registrar alleging
"a. That on August 28, 1997, I and my fiancee (sic) BERNARDITO A. YMAN got married and our marriage
was solemnized by judge (sic) Juan Daguman in his residence in J.P.R. Subdivision in Calbayog City,
Samar; xxxalex
b. That the ceremony was attended by PACIFICO MAGHACOT who acted as our principal sponsor and
spouses RAMON DEAN and TERESITA DEAN; xxx
c. That after our wedding, my husband BERNARDITO YMAN abandoned me without any reason at all;
d. That I smell something fishy; so what I did was I went to Calbayog City and wrote the City Civil
Registrar to inquire regarding my Marriage Contract;
e. That to my surprise, I was informed by the Local Civil Registrar of Calbayog City that my marriage was
not registered; xxxSc lex
f. That upon advisement of the Local Civil Registrar, I wrote Judge Juan Daguman, to inquire;
g. That to my second surprise, I was informed by Judge Daguman that all the copies of the Marriage
Contract were taken by Oloy (Bernardito A. Yman);
h. That no copy was retained by Judge Daguman;
i. That I believe that the respondent judge committed acts prejudicial to my interest such as: x law
1. Solemnizing our marriage outside his jurisdiction;
2. Negligence in not retaining a copy and not registering our marriage before the office of the Local Civil
Registrar."
The Affidavit-Complaint was thereafter referred to respondent Judge for comment.
In his Comment, respondent Judge averred that:
1. The civil marriage of complainant Zenaida Beso and Bernardito Yman had to be solemnized by
respondent in Calbayog City though outside his territory as municipal Judge of Sta. Margarita, Samar due
to the following and pressing circumstances: Sc
1.1. On August 28, 1997 respondent was physically indisposed and unable to report to his station in Sta.
Margarita. In the forenoon of that date, without prior appointment, complainant Beso and Mr. Yman
unexpectedly came to the residence of respondent in said City, urgently requesting the celebration of
their marriage right then and there, first, because complainants said she must leave that same day to be
able to fly from Manila for abroad as scheduled; second, that for the parties to go to another town for
the marriage would be expensive and would entail serious problems of finding a solemnizing officer and
another pair of witnesses or sponsors, while in fact former Undersecretary Pacifico Maghacot,
Sangguniang Panglunsod [member] Ramon Dean were already with them as sponsors; third, if they failed
to get married on August 28, 1997, complainant would be out of the country for a long period and their
marriage license would lapse and necessitate another publication of notice; fourth, if the parties go
beyond their plans for the scheduled marriage, complainant feared it would complicate her employment
abroad; and, last, all other alternatives as to date and venue of marriage were considered impracticable
by the parties;
1.2. The contracting parties were ready with the desired cocuments (sic) for a valid marriage, which
respondent found all in order. Spped
1.3. Complainant bride is an accredited Filipino overseas worker, who, respondent realized, deserved
more than ordinary official attention under present Government policy.
2. At the time respondent solemnized the marriage in question, he believed in good faith that by so
doing he was leaning on the side of liberality of the law so that it may be not be too expensive and
complicated for citizens to get married.
3. Another point brought up in the complaint was the failure of registration of the duplicate and
triplicate copies of the marriage certificate, which failure was also occasioned by the following
circumstances beyond the control of respondent: Scmis
3.1. After handing to the husband the first copy of the marriage certificate, respondent left the three
remaining copies on top of the desk in his private office where the marriage ceremonies were held,
intending later to register the duplicate and triplicate copies and to keep the forth (sic) in his office.
3.2. After a few days following the wedding, respondent gathered all the papers relating to the said
marriage but notwithstanding diligent search in the premises and private files, all the three last copies of
the certificate were missing. Promptly, respondent invited by subpoena xxx Mr. Yman to shed light on
the missing documents and he said he saw complainant Beso put the copies of the marriage certificate in
her bag during the wedding party. Unfortunately, it was too late to contact complainant for a
confirmation of Mr. Ymans claim. Mis sc
3.3. Considering the futility of contracting complainant now that she is out of the country, a reasonable
conclusion can be drawn on the basis of the established facts so far in this dispute. If we believe the
claim of complainant that after August 28, 1997 marriage her husband, Mr. Yman, abandoned her
without any reason xxx but that said husband admitted "he had another girl by the name of LITA
DANGUYAN" xxx it seems reasonably clear who of the two marriage contracting parties probably
absconded with the missing copies of the marriage certificate. Jo spped
3.4. Under the facts above stated, respondent has no other recourse but to protect the public interest by
trying all possible means to recover custody of the missing documents in some amicable way during the
expected hearing of the above mentioned civil case in the City of Marikina, failing to do which said
respondent would confer with the Civil Registrar General for possible registration of reconstituted copies
of said documents.
The Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) in an evaluation report dated August 11, 1998 found that
respondent Judge " committed non-feasance in office" and recommended that he be fined Five
Thousand Pesos (P5,000.00) with a warning that the commission of the same or future acts will be dealt
with more severely pointing out that:
"As presiding judge of the MCTC Sta. Margarita Tarangnan-Pagsanjan, Samar, the authority to solemnize
marriage is only limited to those municipalities under his jurisdiction. Clearly, Calbayog City is no longer
within his area of jurisdiction. Miso
Additionally, there are only three instances, as provided by Article 8 of the Family Code, wherein a
marriage may be solemnized by a judge outside his chamber[s] or at a place other than his sala, to wit:
(1) when either or both of the contracting parties is at the point of death;
(2) when the residence of either party is located in a remote place; Nex old
(3) where both of the parties request the solemnizing officer in writing in which case the marriage may
be solemnized at a house or place designated by them in a sworn statement to that effect.
The foregoing circumstances are unavailing in the instant case.
Moreover, as solemnizing officer, respondent Judge neglected his duty when he failed to register the
marriage of complainant to Bernardito Yman.
Such duty is entrusted upon him pursuant to Article 23 of the Family Code which provides: Ncm
"It shall be the duty of the person solemnizing the marriage to furnish either of the contracting parties
the original of the marriage certificate referred to in Article 6 and to send the duplicate and triplicate
copies of the certificates not later than fifteen days after the marriage, to the local civil registrar of the
place where the marriage was solemnized. xxx" (underscoring ours)
It is clearly evident from the foregoing that not only has the respondent Judge committed non-feasance
in office, he also undermined the very foundation of marriage which is the basic social institution in our
society whose nature, consequences and incidents are governed by law. Granting that respondent Judge
indeed failed to locate the duplicate and triplicate copies of the marriage certificate, he should have
exerted more effort to locate or reconstitute the same. As a holder of such a sensitive position, he is
expected to be conscientious in handling official documents. His imputation that the missing copies of
the marriage certificate were taken by Bernardito Yman is based merely on conjectures and does not
deserve consideration for being devoid of proof."
After a careful and thorough examination of the evidence, the Court finds the evaluation report of the
OCA well-taken. Mani kx
Jimenez v. Republic[1] underscores the importance of marriage as a social institution thus: "[M]arriage in
this country is an institution in which the community is deeply interested. The state has surrounded it
with safeguards to maintain its purity, continuity and permanence. The security and stability of the state
are largely dependent upon it. It is the interest and duty of each and every member of the community to
prevent the bringing about of a condition that would shake its foundation and ultimately lead to its
destruction."
With regard to the solemnization of marriage, Article 7 of the Family Code provides, among others, that
"ART. 7. Marriage may be solemnized by: Maniks
(1) Any incumbent member of the judiciary within the courts jurisdiction; xxx" (Italics ours)
In relation thereto, Article 8 of the same statute mandates that:
ART. 8. The marriage shall be solemnized publicly in the chambers of the judge or in open court, in the
church, chapel or temple, or in the office of the consul-general, consul or vice-consul, as the case may
be, and not elsewhere, except in cases of marriages contracted at the point of death or in remote places
in accordance with Article 29 of this Code, or where both parties request the solemnizing officer in
writing in which case the marriage may be solemnized at a house or place designated by them in a sworn
statement to that effect." (Italics ours) Spped jo
As the above-quoted provision clearly states, a marriage can be held outside the judges chambers or
courtroom only in the following instances: 1.] at the point of death; 2.] in remote places in accordance
with Article 29, or 3.] upon the request of both parties in writing in a sworn statement to this effect.
In this case, there is no pretense that either complainant Beso or her fiance Yman was at the point of
death or in a remote place. Neither was there a sworn written request made by the contracting parties
to respondent Judge that the marriage be solemnized outside his chambers or at a place other than his
sala. What, in fact, appears on record is that respondent Judge was prompted more by urgency to
solemnize the marriage of Beso and Yman because complainant was "[a]n overseas worker, who,
respondent realized deserved more than ordinary official attention under present Government policy."
Respondent Judge further avers that in solemnizing the marriage in question, "[h]e believed in good faith
that by doing so he was leaning on the side of liberality of the law so that it may not be too expensive
and complicated for citizens to get married." Manikan
A person presiding over a court of law must not only apply the law but must also live and abide by it and
render justice at all times without resorting to shortcuts clearly uncalled for.[2] A judge is not only bound
by oath to apply the law;[3] he must also be conscientious and thorough in doing so.[4] Certainly, judges,
by the very delicate nature of their office should be more circumspect in the performance of their
duties.[5]
registrar to the solemnizing officer transmitting copies of the marriage certificate. The solemnizing
officer shall retain in his file the quadruplicate copy of the marriage certificate, the original of the
marriage license and, in proper cases, the affidavit of the contracting party regarding the solemnization
of the marriage in a place other than those mentioned in Article 8. (Italics supplied) Sdaad
In view of the foregoing, we agree with the evaluation of the OCA that respondent Judge was less than
conscientious in handling official documents. A judge is charged with exercising extra care in ensuring
that the records of the cases and official documents in his custody are intact. There is no justification for
missing records save fortuitous events.[9] However, the records show that the loss was occasioned by
carelessness on respondent Judges part. This Court reiterates that judges must adopt a system of record
management and organize their dockets in order to bolster the prompt and efficient dispatch of
business.[10] It is, in fact, incumbent upon him to devise an efficient recording and filing system in his
court because he is after all the one directly responsible for the proper discharge of his official
functions.[11]
In the evaluation report, the OCA recommended that respondent Judge be fined Five Thousand Pesos
(P5,000.00) and warned that a repetition of the same or similar acts will be dealt with more severely.
This Court adopts the recommendation of the OCA. Juris

If at all, the reasons proffered by respondent Judge to justify his hurried solemnization of the marriage in WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, respondent Judge is hereby FINED Five Thousand Pesos
this case only tends to degrade the revered position enjoyed by marriage in the hierarchy of social (P5,000.00) and STERNLY WARNED that a repetition of the same or similar infractions will be dealt with
institutions in the country. They also betray respondents cavalier proclivity on its significance in our more severely.
culture which is more disposed towards an extended period of engagement prior to marriage and frowns
upon hasty, ill-advised and ill-timed marital unions.Ncmmis
LINKS:
An elementary regard for the sacredness of laws let alone that enacted in order to preserve so Anonymous vs Achas-
sacrosanct an inviolable social institution as marriage and the stability of judicial doctrines laid down by https://www.scribd.com/doc/257143459/Anonymous-v-Achas
superior authority should have given respondent judge pause and made him more vigilant in the exercise
of his authority and the performance of his duties as a solemnizing officer. A judge is, furthermore, Mane vs Belen
presumed to know the constitutional limits of the authority or jurisdiction of his court.[6] Thus http://ustlawreview.com/pdf/vol.LIII/cases/Atty_Mane_v._Judge_Belen.pdf
respondent Judge should be reminded that
Dinopol Case
A priest who is commissioned and allowed by his ordinary to marry the faithful, is authorized to do so https://docs.google.com/viewer?url=http%3A//sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2013/february2013/07
only within the area of the diocese or place allowed by his Bishop. An appellate court justice or a Justice -2618-RTJ.pdf
of this Court has jurisdiction over the entire Philippines to solemnize marriages, regardless of the venue,
as long as the requisites of the law are complied with. However, Judges who are appointed to specific Beso vs Daguman
jurisdictions may officiate in weddings only within said areas and not beyond. Where a judge solemnizes http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2000/jan2000/mtj_99_1211.html
a marriage outside his courts jurisdiction, there is a resultant irregularity in the formal requisite laid
down in Article 3, which while it may not affect the validity of the marriage, may subject the officiating
official to administrative liability.[7] Scnc m

Considering that respondent Judges jurisdiction covers the municipality of Sta. Margarita-Tarangan-
Pagsanjan, Samar only, he was not clothed with authority to solemnize a marriage in the City of
Calbayog.[8]

Furthermore, from the nature of marriage, aside from the mandate that a judge should exercise extra
care in the exercise of his authority and the performance of his duties in its solemnization, he is likewise
commanded to observe extra precautions to ensure that the event is properly documented in
accordance with Article 23 of the Family Code which states in no uncertain terms that

ART. 23. - It shall be the duty of the person solemnizing the marriage to furnish either of the contracting
parties, the original of the marriage contract referred to in Article 6 and to send the duplicate and
triplicate copies of the certificate not later than fifteen days after the marriage, to the local civil registrar
of the place where the marriage was solemnized. Proper receipts shall be issued by the local civil