Presentation of Evidence COMPLETE

15.
AIM AND FIRE

PRESENTATION OF EVIDENCE

EXAMINATION OF WITNESSES ( RULE 132, SECTION 1-8)

SECTION 1.Examination to be done in open court. The examination of witnesses presented in a trial or
hearing shall be done in open court, and under oath or affirmation. Unless the witness is incapacitated to
speak, or the questions calls for a different mode of answer, the answers of the witness shall be given orally.
(1a)
Sec.2.Proceedings to be recorded. The entire proceedings of a trial or hearing, including the questions
propounded to a witness and his answers thereto, the statements made by the judge or any of the parties,
counsel, or witnesses with reference to the case, shall be recorded by means of shorthand or stenotype or by
other means of recording found suitable by the court.
A transcript of the record of the proceedings made by the official stenographer, stenotypist or recorder and
certified as correct by him shall be deemed prima facie a correct statement of such proceedings. (2a)
Sec. 3.Rights and obligations of a witness. A witness must answer questions, although his answer may tend
to establish a claim against him. However, it is the right of a witness:
(1)To be protected from irrelevant, improper, or insulting questions, and from harsh or insulting demeanor;
(2)Not to be detained longer than the interests of justice require;
(3)Not to be examined except only as to matters pertinent to the issue;
(4)Not to give an answer which will tend to subject him to a penalty for an offense unless otherwise provided
by law; or
(5)Not to give an answer which will tend to degrade his reputation, unless it to be the very fact at issue or to
a fact from which the fact in issue would be presumed. But a witness must answer to the fact of his previous
final conviction for an offense. (3a, 19a)
Sec. 4.Order in the examination of an individual witness. The order in which the individual witness may be
examined is as follows;
(a)Direct examination by the proponent;
(b)Cross-examination by the opponent;
(c)Re-direct examination by the proponent;
(d)Re-cross-examination by the opponent. (4)
Sec. 5.Direct examination. Direct examination is the examination-in-chief of a witness by the party
presenting him on the facts relevant to the issue. (5a)
Sec. 6.Cross-examination; its purpose and extent. Upon the termination of the direct examination, the
witness may be cross-examined by the adverse party as to many matters stated in the direct examination, or
connected therewith, with sufficient fullness and freedom to test his accuracy and truthfulness and freedom
from interest or bias, or the reverse, and to elicit all important facts bearing upon the issue. (8a)
Evidence 2013-2014 Case Digests| PRESENTATION OF EVIDENCE 1

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Sec. 7.Re-direct examination; its purpose and extent. After the cross-examination of the witness has been
concluded, he may be re-examined by the party calling him, to explain or supplement his answers given
during the cross-examination. On re-direct-examination, questions on matters not dealt with during the
cross-examination, may be allowed by the court in its discretion. (12)
Sec. 8.Re-cross-examination. Upon the conclusion of the re-direct examination, the adverse party may re-
cross-examine the witness on matters stated in his re-direct examination, and also on such other matters as
may be allowed by the court in its discretion. (13)

ONE DAY EXAMINATION OF WITNESS RULE (PARAGRAPH 5(I), AM NO 03-1-09-SC, RULE ON GUIDELINES TO BE
OBSERVED BY TRIAL COURT JUDGES AND CLERKS OF COURT IN THE CONDUCT OF PRE-TRIAL AND USE OF
DEPOSITITION- DISCOVERY PROCEDURE)

RULE ON EXAMINATION OF A CHILD WITNESS
REE, RULE 10

EXAMINATION IN OPEN COURT

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, AMELIA K. DEL ROSARIO and DIONISIO CERBO, petitioners, vs. HON. NUMERIANO
G. ESTENZO, Judge, Court of First Instance of Iloilo, and GREGORIO OJOY, respondents.
[G.R. No. L-41166. August 25, 1976.]

Facts
In Criminal Case No. 2891, entitled "People of the Philippines, plaintiff, versus Gregorio Ojoy, accused", of the Court
of First Instance of Iloilo, Branch III, after the accused himself had testified in his defense, his counsel manifested that
for his subsequent witnesses he was filing only their affidavits subject to cross-examination by the prosecution on
matters stated in the affidavits and on all other matters pertinent and material to the case. Private prosecutor Atty.
Amelia K. del Rosario, one of the petitioners here, objected to the proposed procedure but this notwithstanding,
respondent Judge gave his conformity thereto and subsequently issued the questioned Order. Contending that
respondent Judge gravely abused his discretion because the aforesaid Orders violates Sections 1 and 2 of Rule 132 of
the Revised Rules of Court, which requires that the testimony of the witness should be given orally in open court, and
there is no appeal nor any plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, petitioners instituted
the present petition.
Ruling
Sections 1 and 2, Rule 132 and Section 1, Rule 133 of the Revised Rules of Court clearly require that the testimony of
a witness shall be given orally in open court.
The main and essential purpose of requiring a witness to appear and testify orally at a trial is to secure for the
adverse party the opportunity of cross-examination. "The opponent", according to an eminent authority, "demands
confrontation, not for the idle purpose of gazing upon the witness, or of being gazed upon by him, but for the
purpose of cross-examination which cannot be had except by the direct and personal putting of questions and
obtaining immediate answers." There is also the advantage to be obtained by the personal appearance of the witness
before the judge, and it is this - it enables the judge as the trier of facts "to obtain the elusive and incommunicable
evidence of a witness' deportment while testifying, and a certain subjective moral effect is produced upon the
witness." It is only when the witness testifies orally that the judge may have a true idea of his countenance, manner
and expression, which may confirm or detract from the weight of his testimony. 5 Certainly, the physical condition
of the witness will reveal his capacity for accurate observation and memory, and his deportment and physiognomy
will reveal clues to his character. These can only be observed by the judge if the witness testifies orally in court.
Indeed, the great weight given the findings of fact of the trial judge in the appellate court is based upon his having
had just that opportunity and the assumption that he took advantage of it to ascertain the credibility of the
witnesses.
Thus, Section 1 of Rule 133 of the Rules 7 requires that in determining the superior weight of evidence on the issues
involved, the court, aside from the other factors therein enumerated, may consider the "witness' manner of
testifying" which can only be done if the witness gives his testimony "orally in open court".
There is an additional advantage to be obtained in requiring that the direct testimony of the witness be given orally
in court. Rules governing the examination of witnesses are intended to protect the rights of litigants and to secure
orderly dispatch of the business of the courts. Under the rules, only questions directed to the eliciting of testimony
which, under the general rules of evidence, is relevant to, and competent to prove, the issue of the case, may be
propounded to the witness. A witness may testify only on those facts which he knows of his own knowledge. Thus,
on direct examination, leading questions are not allowed, except on preliminary matters, or when there is difficulty
in getting direct and intelligible answer from the witness who is ignorant, a child of tender years, or feebleminded, or
a deaf-mute. It is obvious that such purpose may be subverted, and the orderly dispatch of the business of the courts
thwarted, if trial judges are allowed, as in the case at bar, to adopt any procedure in the presentation of evidence
other than what is specifically authorized by the Rules of Court.

LAYING THE PREDICATE

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. DOMINADOR MOLO, defendant-appellant. [G.R. No. L-
44680. January 11, 1979.]

FACTS:
About 8:00 o'clock one evening, not long after Simeona Gapisa and her husband had retired, the former, heard an
indistinct sound of murmor and gnashing of teeth. She peeped through the dilapilated buri wall and saw the accused.
Trembling, she lighted a kerosene lamp and placed it on top of the trunk nearby. She tried to awaken her husband,
but the latter did not respond. Meanwhile, the accused barged into the house and finding Simeona's husband,
sleeping near the door started backing at the sleeping old man. Simeona managed to rush out of the house and
summoned her son who was at a neighbor's house some 100 meters away. Before the victim died, he named the
accused as his assailant. Charged with murder, the accused offered alibi as defense. The trial court relying on the
testimony of the eye-and-ear witness corroborated by the testimony of the victim's son and that of a neighbor who
testified on the ante-mortem statement, convicted the accused of the crime charged qualified by treachery with
aggravating circumstances of dwelling, recidivism and reiteration and a mitigating circumstance of voluntary
surrender.
Appellant contents that inconsistencies exist between Simeona's statement given to the police and her foregoing
testimony in court, relative to 1) the precise moment when Simeona recognized the accused, and 2) whether there
was a conversation between Simeona and the accused.
Ruling

Where the alleged statement of the witness given to the police was neither offered as evidence nor shown to the
witness in order to enable the latter to explain the discrepancies if any, in accordance with Section 16, Rule 132, of
the Rules of Court, so that the proper basis was not laid to impeach the testimony on the basis of alleged inconsistent
statements allegedly made by the witness before the police, said statement may not be admitted in evidence.
Inconsistencies on minor details or on matters that are not of material consequence as to affect the guilt or the
innocence of the accused do not detract from the credibility of the witnesses. The discordance in their testimonies on
collateral matters heightens their credibility and shows that their testimonies were not coached or rehearsed. Far
from being evidence of falsehood, they could justifiably be regarded as a demonstration of good faith.

JUAN YSMAEL & CO., INC., plaintiff-appellant, vs. NAGEEB T. HASHIM and AFIEE ABDO CHEYBAN GORAYEB,
defendants. AFIFE ABDO CHEYBAN GORAYEB, appellant. [G.R. No. 26247. March 18, 1927.]
Facts
The complaint in the present case sets forth two causes of action. For its first cause of action the plaintiff alleges, in
substance, that the defendant Nageeb T. Hashim on September 21, 1916, executed a chattel mortgage in favor of said
plaintiff for the sum of P13,160.87, with interest at 8 per cent per annum, the mortgage falling due on September 21,
1917; that the said defendant having failed to make payment in accordance with the terms agreed upon, the chattel
mortgage was foreclosed and the mortgage property sold by the sheriff on January 15, 1921; that the proceeds of the
sale amounted to the sum of P2,100 only, thus leaving a balance of P11,060.87, which, with the corresponding
interest at the rate of 8 per cent per annum from September 21, 1916, until January 9, 1925, now amounts to the sum
of P19,134.32, for which amount judgment is prayed.
For the second cause of action, the plaintiff alleges that the defendant Nageeb T. Hashim has been indebted in the
sum of P14,646.47 to the Hashim Commercial & Trading Company, Ltd., a limited copartnership, organized under the
laws of the Philippine Islands and that, for good and valuable consideration, the said Hashim Commercial & Trading
Company, Ltd., assigned the amount due it on said indebtedness to the plaintiff on October 3, 1921, together with its
other bills receivable, fixtures, cash on hand in banks, and its entire stock of goods; that the plaintiff has in vain
demanded payment from the defendants and now asks judgment against them for said sum of P14,060.47 . The
plaintiff also prayed for a writ of attachment of the property of the defendants, which prayer was granted.
Upon trial the Court of First Instance rendered judgment in favor of the plaintiff for the full amount demanded under
the first cause of action, but dismissed the second cause of action on the ground that the plaintiff had failed to show
that the credit upon which said cause of action is based had been legally assigned to it. Both the plaintiff and the
defendant Gorayeb appealed from this judgment.

Ruling
A debtor has the right to demand that the person who sues him for the debt shall be the real party in interest and
have a valid title to the chose in action involved; a mere equitable right to an assignment of the credit is not
sufficient. In the case at bar, the amount of P14,646.47, was assigned by the Hashim Commercial & Trading Co. Ltd.to
the Asia Banking Corporation and not to the plaintiff Juan Ysmael & Co., Inc., based on a resolution of the
stockholders of the Hashim Commercial & Trading Co., Ltd., adopted on October 3, 1921.
The court below undoubtedly erred in denying the defendant-appellant the opportunity to inquire into the sources
of the entries found in the plaintiff's books of account in relation to the indebtedness of the defendants; the fact that
such sources might have been examined in civil case No. 19569 of the Court of First Instance of Manila cannot be
regarded as a bar to a reasonable inquiry into the character of the debt in the present case. The issues in the two
cases are entirely different; the former case dealt with the validity of a chattel mortgage, while in the present case,
we are dealing with the amount of the defendant's indebtedness to the plaintiff. For much the same reasons, the
defendant-appellant should have been permitted to present evidence in support of her special defense of conspiracy.
In offering in evidence the testimony given by Mr. Hemady and the Hashims in the earlier case, the defendant-
appellant did not claim that said testimony contained admissions against interest by the parties to the action or their
agents; if such had been the case, the testimony would have been admissible without the laying of a foundation and
without the witnesses having testified in the case at bar. But the purpose of the offer of the testimony was evidently
to impeach the testimony of the same witnesses in the present case and if so, a foundation should have been laid by
calling the attention of the witnesses to the former statements so as to give them opportunity to explain before the
statements were offered in evidence.
On December 31, 1924, the plaintiff's ledger showed a balance of P12,238.02 against the defendant Hashim, and it
does not appear that he has incurred any further indebtedness to the plaintiff since that date.
Wherefore, the judgment appealed from is, therefore, modified by reducing the plaintiff's recovery to the sum of
P12,238.02, with interest at the rate of 6 per cent per annum from January 13, 1926, the date of the filing of the
complaint. In all other respects said judgment is affirmed without costs in this instance. So ordered.

LEADING QUESTIONS

IMPEACHING ONES OWN WITNESS

CROSS- EXAMINATION

IMPEACHMENT BY BIAS

IMPEACHMENT BY PRIOR INCONSISTENT STATEMENT

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS vs. ALEJO RESABAL
G.R. No. 26708, September 29, 1927
Topic: Impeachment of a Witness by Prior Inconsistent Statements

Facts:
On April 25, 1926, Primo Ordiz died at his own home in the barrio of Bogo, municipality of Maasin, Leyte, from
the effects of an internal hemorrhage caused by a sharp wound in the left lung.
As a consequence of this, an information was filed with the Court of First Instance of Leyte in Maasin. The judge
who tried the case, after having carefully analyzed the evidence, reached the conclusion that the crime committed by
the accused Alejo Resabal is that of murder with the aggravating circumstances of evident premeditation, nocturnity

and dwelling, and imposed on the accused the death penalty. He also ordered that the present case be brought to this
court for review, as provided for in section 50 of General Orders No. 58.
(Two witnesses actually testified)
Glicerio Orit testified that on the morning of April 25, 1926, the accused, armed with a revolver, invited him to
Primo Ordiz's house in order to kill the latter, and on arriving at said house, the accused went into the ground,
approached one of the windows of the house less than a meter and a half in height, opened it and looked in. At that
moment the witness left the place, and at a distance of 15 brazas heard an explosion.
Glicerio Orit's testimony as to the explosion is corroborated by the declaration of the boy Jose Ordiz, who slept
with his uncle Primo Ordiz, to the effect that early in the morning of that day he was awakened by the noise of an
explosion and saw his uncle Primon Ordiz vomiting blood and unable to speak.
Carmelo Ordizs also testified that the revolver was hidden by the accused on the land cultivated by the him, to
whom the accused revealed it, and who, through fear of the police, transferred it to the neighboring lot, burying it at
the foot of a tree called "mabago."
By following the directions of this witness, Carmelo Ordiz, the chief of police, who investigated the case, found
the revolver wrapped in two pieces of cloth Exhibits C and C-1. The revolver was loaded with two bullets and an
empty shell, and had a rusty barrel. It must be noted that Exhibit C-1 appears to be a piece of cloth from a pair of
drawers, and the chief of police who searched the house where the accused lived, found a piece of a pair of drawers
in a trunk that was in the kitchen. Upon examination of said Exhibits F and C-1 by this court, it was found that these
two pieces of cloth Exhibit F and C-1 made a complete pair of drawers, all of which shows that the accused tore the
piece of cloth Exhibits C-1 from an old pair of drawers in order to wrap up the revolver before putting it in the place
indicated by the witness Carmelo Ordiz.
Ordiz testified, furthermore, that on the night of April 24, 1926, the accused believing him to be still an
enemy of the deceased Primo Ordiz, and showing him the revolver Exhibit B, invited him to accompany him
to do away with Primo Ordiz.

Contentions of the Defense:
The defense argues that Glicerio Orit is not a credible witness, because of his having been excluded from the
information to be used as a witness for the prosecution; and, because, moreover, of the contradiction in his
testimony at the preliminary investigation and during the trial.
The defense also impeaches Carmelo Ordiz's testimony considering the invitation which the accused extended to
him as improbable, knowing that he was a cousin of the deceased Primo Ordiz.

Issues:
1. Whether or not Glicerio Orits testimony be discredited.
2. Whether or not Carmelo Ordiz's is a credible witness.

Ruling:
1. No.
We are of the opinion that the mere fact of having been excluded from the information to be used as a
witness for the Government, does not prevent this witness from telling the truth in this case, especially in the
absence of proof showing the interest he might possibly have in testifying against the accused.
Neither is the apparent contradiction which may be noted in his declarations before the court of the
justice of the peace, and before the court of first instance sufficient to discredit his testimony, for the
simple reason that this witness was not given ample opportunity, by a reading to him of his declarations
before the court of the justice of the peace, to explain the discrepancies noted by counsel for the accused.
The mere presentation of Exhibit 1, without said declaration having been read to the witness while he
testified in the Court of First Instance, is no ground for impeaching his testimony.


2. Yes.
Under ordinary circumstances, such an attitude would appear improbable, but not so if it is considered that
the accused invited the witness in the belief that the latter was still an enemy of the deceased, on account of
certain disagreements they had over some land.

In virtue whereof, we are of the opinion, and so hold, that the accused is guilty of the crime of murder, committed
with treachery, on the person of Primo Ordiz.

IMPEACHMENT BY OTHER MEANS

REFRESHING RECOLLECTION/REFERENCE TO MEMORANDUM

RECALLING WITNESSES

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioners, vs. HON. BAYANI S. RIVERA, Judge, Branch 129 , Regional Trial
Court of Kalookan City, and WILFREDO L. EMBRANO, respondent.
G.R. No. 98376 August 16, 1991
NICKNAME: THE CURIOUS CASE OF BENJAMIN BUTTON
TOPIC: RECALL and STRIKING OFF THE RECORD

FACTS:
1. Wilfredo Sembrano is charged of arson, it is the prosecution's theory that he wilfully caused the
fire in the early morning of May 21, 1987 which totally burned and destroyed the second and
third floors of the "I Love You Restaurant and Sauna Bath" owned by Juanita L. Tan,
2. Among the witnesses presented by the Government to demonstrate Sembrano's culpability

was Benjamin Lee, a room boy of the restaurant and bath.
3. LEE testified on DIRECT examination, that he saw Sembrano run out of the VIP room where the fire
started and refused to heed LEEs call for stop when he tried to stop him.
4. Lee took the witness stand again on April 26, 1987 during which he was cross-examined by
defense counsel, gave additional evidence on redirect examination, was again questioned on
recross-examination by the same defense counsel, and thereafter allowed to step down.
5. 2 Months after LEE s testimony before the prosecution could rest its case, the defense counsel was
substituted by a new counsel Atty. Eduardo Rodriguez.
6. The Atty. Rodriguez(new counsel) moved for the recall of Benjamin on the ground that there
seems to be many points and questions that should have been asked but were not profounded
(sic) by the other defense counsel who conducted.. (the cross-examination).
7. The Trial court granted the move for recall by Atty.Rodriguez, and ordered LEE to be put on the
witness stand again.The prosecution failed to produce Benjamin, and alleged that they already
exerted all their efforts in producing BENJAMIN LEE, These efforts met with no success; and the

trial had to be postponed several times. It appears that Lee had terminated his employment and
moved elsewhere without indicating his new address.
8. The prosecution moved for a motion to dispense with the recall of Benjamin LEE, alleging that it
already exerted all its efforts in looking for Benjamin Lee, and LEEs examination of the new
counsel would neither affect the outcome of the case.
9. By Order dated October 2, 1990, 6 the Trial Court denied the motion to dispense with the recall of
Benjamin Lee. In fact, it ordered the testimony of Benjamin Lee for the prosecution xx stricken off
the record for lack of complete cross-examination" because the witness could no longer be found,
and "the failure of counsel for the accused to further cross-examine the witness is not the fault of
the defense.
10. As a result the SOLICITOR GENERAL instituted this action for certiorari assailing the said acts of the
LOWER court:
ISSUE:
WON: The RTC gravely abused its discretion in allowing the recall of BENJAMIN LEE in the present case
WON: The RTC gravely abused its discretion in striking out the testimony of BENJAMIN LEE out of the records of the
case
RULING:
BOTH CONTROVERSY IS RESOLVED INF FAVOR OF THE PROSECUTION, to make the long story short DUMBASS ang
COURT in this CASE!!! WRONG!!! INVALID ang ILANG DECISION!!!
On the First ISSUE:
The discretion to recall a witness is not properly invoked or exercisable by an applicant's mere general
statement that there is a need to recall a witness "in the interest of justice," or "in order to afford a party full
opportunity to present his case," or that, as here, "there seems to be many points and questions that should
have been asked" in the earlier interrogation. To regard expressed generalities such as these as sufficient
ground for recall of witnesses would make the recall of witness no longer discretionary but ministerial.
Something more than the bare assertion of the need to propound additional questions is essential before the
Court's discretion may rightfully be exercised to grant or deny recall.
There must be a satisfactory showing of some concrete, substantial ground for the recall. There must be a
satisfactory showing on the movant's part, for instance, that particularly identified material points were not
covered in the cross-examination, or that particularly described vital documents were not presented to the
witness whose recall is prayed for, or that the cross-examination was conducted in so inept a manner as to
result in a virtual absence thereof. Absent such particulars, to repeat, there would be no foundation for a
trial court to authorize the recall of any witness.
In the case at bar, the respondent Trial Court granted the defendant's motion for recall on nothing more than said
movant's general claim that certain questions unspecified, it must be stressed had to be asked. In doing so, it
acted without basis, exercised power whimsically or capriciously, and gravely abused its discretion.
On the Second ISSUE:
So, too, the respondent Court acted whimsically, capriciously, and oppressively, in other words, gravely abused its
discretion, in ordering the striking out of the entire testimony of Benjamin Lee after it appeared that he could no
longer be found and produced for further examination. In the first place, the Court acted unilaterally, without
any motion to this effect by the defense and thus without according the prosecution a prior opportunity to
show why the striking out should not be decreed. More importantly, the striking out was directed without
any showing whatever by the defense of the indispensability of further cross-examination, what it was that
would have been elicited by further cross-examination rendering valueless all that the witness had
previously stated. It should be stressed that Lee was subjected both to cross-examination and recross-
examination by former counsel of the accused Sembrano. Obviously the latter was satisfied that there had
been sufficient cross-examination of the witness. Absence of cross-examination may not therefore be
invoked as ground to strike out Lee's testimony (as being hearsay). And there is no showing whatever in this
case that it was the prosecution that placed the witness beyond the reach of the Court, much less of the
expected nature or tenor of his additional testimony which, because not presented, would necessarily cause
the evidence earlier given by Lee to become hearsay or otherwise incompetent, and therefore, amenable to
being stricken from the record.
PETITION: GRANTED WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED and the respondent Court's challenged Order dated
October 2, 1990 is NULLIFIED AND SET ASIDE, with costs against private respondent.

EXCLUSION OF WITNESSES

AUTHENTICATION AND PROOF OF DOCUMENTS

RULE 132, SECTION 19- 33

E-COMMERCE ACT SECTION 5, 6-15

REE RULES 5,6,9 AND 11

RESURRECCION BARTOLOME, ET AL., petitioners, vs. THE INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT (now Court of
Appeals) and HEIRS OF SPOUSES BERNABE BARTOLOME and URSULA CID, respondents.
G.R. No. 76792 March 12, 1990

FACTS:
1. A 725-square meter portion of Lot No. 11165 located in Laoag, Ilocos Norte, was first declared as his property by
Epitacio Batara. The property was bounded on the south by the property of Doroteo Bartolome.
2. Epitacio Batara and his wife, Maria Gonzales, had two children: Catalina and Pedro. Catalina, who married
someone surnamed Bartolome, bore five children named Isabela, Tarcila, Calixto, Resurreccion and Ruperta. In 1912,
before he left Laoag to settle in Isabela, Epitacio entrusted the lot to his cousin, Doroteo Bartolome. When Maria
Gozales later followed, she allowed Doroteo Bartolome to continue taking charge of the property. 6
3. In 1916, Epitacio Batara died in Isabela. In 1921, Maria Gonzales and her grandchildren, Calixto and Resurreccion
Bartolome, returned to Laoag. They found that their house on their lot was destroyed by fire. It was also in that year
when Doroteo Bartolome migrated to Davao City where she died two years later. 8
4. The Director of Lands instituted Cadastral Case No. 53 over the land. Ursula Cid, the widow of the son of
Doroteo Bartolome (Bernabe), filed an answer claiming ownership over Lot No. 11165.
5. Resurreccion Bartolome also claimed ownership over a portion of Lot No. 11165 "by inheritance from my
grandfather and grandmother . . . Epitacio Batara and Maria Gonzales." Meanwhile, Resurreccion Bartolome verbally
entrusted the portion she had claimed to Maria Bartolome, the daughter of Doroteo Bartolome.

6. In 1939, Ursula Cid and her children also migrated to Davao City. In 1969, Maria J. Bartolome filed in Cadastral
Case No. 53 a "motion to admit answer in intervention," alleging that she is one of the children of Doroteo Bartolome
and that she and her siblings inherited the 1660-square meter lot from Doroteo Bartolome. 20
7. Ursula Cid stated that she was the absolute owner of Lot No. 11165; that she had been the possessor of Lot No.
11165 for over fifty years; that she "acquired by inheritance from Bernabe Bartolome, who together with her,
purchased the . . . lot which used to be three adjoining lots from their respective owners;" and that Lot No. 11165 had
been declared for tax purposes in the name of her late husband Bernabe Bartolome. 22
8. Ursula Cid presented at the trial three deeds of sale: [a] one dated March 1, 1917 showing that Bernabe Bartolome
and Ursula Cid bought a 374-square meter lot for fifteen pesos from the spouses Domingo Agustin and Josefa
Manrique; 23 [b] another document dated February 18, 1913 executed by Ignacia Manrique in favor of Bernabe
Bartolome evidencing the sale of another lot also for fifteen pesos; 24 and [c] still another deed executed by Maria
Gonzales y Paguyo on February 9, 1917 in favor of Bernabe Bartolome and Ursula Cid ceding to the latter 772 square
meters of land for P103.75. 25 The last-mentioned piece of land is the one being claimed by Resurreccion Bartolome.
9. In 1984, the Regional Trial Court found that the lots described in Exhibits 2 and 3 presented by Ursula Cid "are not
within Lot 11165" and that said exhibits "are defective as the vendors are not the real owner(s)" of the lots described
therein. As to Exhibit 4, the court ruled that it has "no probative value as the same is incomplete and unsigned."
10. Ursula Cid appealed to the then Intermediate Appellate Court. The appellate court held that the deeds of
sale presented by Ursula Cid are ancient documents under Section 22, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court.
ISSUE:
Whether the provisions of Rule 132 on ancient documents are applicable with respect to Exhibit 4.
RULING:
Exhibit 4 consists of three pieces of paper. The first piece is a blank sheet which apparently serves as a cover
page. The two other pages contain the handwritten document in Ilocano stating that in consideration of the
amount of P103.75, Maria Gonzales y Paguyo sold to the spouses Bernabe Bartolome and Ursula Cid 772
square meters of land bounded on the north by the property of Pedro Manuel, on the east by the Bacarra
road, on the south by the property of Doroteo Bartolome and on the west by the property of Bernabe
Bartolome. The third sheet or page 2 thereof contains a warranty against eviction and other disturbances
with the last three lines indicating the date of the execution of the instrument.
According to Dominador Bartolome, he first saw Exhibit 4 in the possession of his mother, Ursula Cid, when
he was just eleven years old. He noticed that the document had a fourth page containing the signature of
Maria Gonzales and that all four pages were sewn together. 27 However, when the document was entrusted
to him by his mother in 1947, the document's fourth page was already missing. 28 He stated that his mother
told him that the fourth page was lost during the Japanese occupation while they were evacuating from
Davao City. 29
Rule 132 of the Rules of Court provides:
Sec. 22. Evidence of execution not necessary. Where a private writing is more than thirty years old, is produced
from a custody in which it would naturally be found if genuine, and is unblemished by any alterations or
circumstances of suspicion, no other evidence of its execution and authenticity need be given.

We agree with the appellate court that the first two requirements ordained by Section 22 are met by Exhibit 4. It
appearing that it was executed in 1917, Exhibit 4 was more than thirty years old when it was offered in evidence in
1983. 32 It was presented in court by the proper custodian thereof who is an heir of the person who would naturally
keep it.
Admittedly, on its face, the deed of sale appears unmarred by alteration. We hold, however, that the missing page has
nonetheless affected its authenticity. Indeed, its importance cannot be overemphasized. It allegedly bears the
signature of the vendor of the portion of Lot No. 11165 in question and therefore, it contains vital proof of
the voluntary transmission of rights over the subject of the sale. Without that signature, the document is
incomplete. Verily, an incomplete document is akin to if not worse than a document with altered contents.
Moreover, there is a circumstance which bothers the Court and makes the genuineness of the document suspect. If it
is really true that the document was executed in 1917, Ursula Cid would have had it in her possession when she filed
her answer in Cadastral Case No. 53 in 1933. Accordingly, she could have stated therein that she acquired the portion
in question by purchase from Maria Gonzales. But as it turned out, she only claimed purchase as a mode of
acquisition of Lot No. 11165 after her sister-in-law, Maria J. Bartolome and the other descendants of Doroteo
Bartolome sought intervention in the case and demanded their rightful shares over the property.
All these negate the appellate court's conclusion that Exhibit 4 is an ancient document. The signature of Maria
Gonzales on the missing fourth page of Exhibit 4 would have helped authenticate the document if it is proven
to be genuine. But as there can be no such proof arising from the signature of Maria Gonzales in the deed of
sale, the same must be excluded.
G.R. No. 76595 May 6, 1988
PACIFIC ASIA OVERSEAS SHIPPING CORPORATION, petitioner,

vs.
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION and TEODORO RANCES, respondents.

FACTS:
Private respondent Teodoro Rances was engaged by petitioner Pascor as Radio Operator of a vessel belonging to
Pascor's foreign principal, the Gulf-East Ship Management Limited. Four (4) months later, and after having been
transferred from one vessel to another four times for misbehaviour and inability to get along with officers and crew
members of each of the vessels, the foreign principal terminated the services of private respondent Rances citing the
latter's poor and incorrigible work attitude and incitement of others to insubordination. 1
Petitioner Pascor filed a complaint against private respondent with the Philippine Overseas Employment
Administration tion (POEA) for acts unbecoming a marine officer and for, character assassination," which case was
docketed as POEA Case No: M-84-09-848. Private respondent denied the charges set out in the complaint and by way
of counterclaim demanded an amount of US$ 1,500.00 which a court in Dubai had, he contended, awarded in his
favor against petitioner's foreign principal. In due course, on 4 September 1985, the POEA found private respondent
liable for inciting another officer or seaman to insubordination and challenging a superior officer to a fist fight and
imposed six (6) months suspension for each offense or a total of twelve (12) months suspension, with a warning that
commission of the same or similar offense in the future would be met with a stiffer disciplinary sanction. The POEA
decision passed over sub silentio the counterclaim of private respondent. 2
On 10 October 1985, private respondent filed a complaint against petitioner, docketed as POEA Case No: M-85-10-
0814 and entitled "Teodoro Rances v. Pacific Asia Overseas Shipping Corporation." In this complaint, he sought to
carry out and enforce the same award obtained by him in Dubai allegedly against Pascor's foreign principal which he
had pleaded as a counterclaim in POEA Case No: M-84-09-848. Private respondent claimed that be had filed an action
in the Dubai court for US$ 9,364.89, which claim was compromised by the parties for US$ 5,500.00 plus "a return
ticket to (private respondent's) country," with the proviso that "the opponent" would pay "to the claimant" US$
1,500.00 'in case the wife of the claimant Rantes doesn't agree with the amount sent to [her] Private respondent

further claimed that since his wife did not "agree with" the amount given to her as 'an allotment for the 3-month
period (of April, May and June 1984), he was entitled to recover the additional US$ 1,500.00 "as mandated under the
Compromise Agreement which was the basis of the decision of the Dubai Civil Court. 3 As evidence of this foreign
award, private respondent submitted what purports to be an "original copy (sic) of the decision" of the Dubai court
written in Arabic script and language, With a copy of an English translation by an unidentified translator and a copy
of a transmittal letter dated 23 September 1984 signed by one Mohd Bin Saleh "Honorary Consul for Philippines."
The full texts of the purported English translation of the Dubai award and of the transmittal letter are set out in the
margin. 4
In its answer, petitioner Pascor made four principal arguments: that the copy of the Dubai decision relied upon by
private respondent could not be considered as evidence, not having been properly authenticated; that Pascor was
not a party to the Dubai court proceedings; that the POEA had no jurisdiction over cases for the enforcement of
foreign judgments; and that the claim had already been resolved in POEA Case No: M-84-09-848, having been there
dismissed as a counterclaim.
The POEA held petitioner Pascor liable to pay private respondent Rances the amount of US$ 1,500.00 "at the
prevailing rate of exchange at the time of payment.
ISSUE:
WON POEA has jurisdiction to hear and decide a claim for enforcement of a foreign judgment.
RULING:
An examination of the complaint and of the Manifestation and Motion filed by respondent Rances in POEA Case No:
M-85-08-14, shows that the cause of action pleaded by respondent Rances was enforcement of the decision rendered
by c. Dubai Court which purported to award him, among other things, an additional amount of US$ 1,500.00 under
certain circumstances.
It should be noted that respondent Rances submitted to the POEA only the Dubai Court decision; he did not submit
any copy of the 'Compromise Agreement' (assuming that to have been reduced to writing) which he presumably
believed to have been absorbed and superseded by the Dubai decision.
That the cause of action set out in respondent Rances' complaint was enforcement of the Dubai decision is further,
indicated in the decision dated 14 April 1986 rendered by the POEA.
Clearly, therefore, respondent Rances' action was for enforcement of the Dubai decision to the extent that such
decision provided for payment of an additional amount of US$1,500.00 and that respondent relied upon such
decision.
The POEA has no jurisdiction to hear and decide a claim for enforcement of a foreign judgment. Such a claim must be
brought before the regular courts. The POEA is not a court; it is an administrative agency exercising, inter alia,
adjudicatory or quasi-judicial functions. Neither the rules of procedure nor the rules of evidence which are
mandatorily applicable in proceedings before courts, are observed in proceedings before the POEA.10
Even assuming (arguendo, merely) that the POEA has jurisdiction to recognize and enforce a foreign judgment, still
respondent Rances cannot rely upon the Dubai decision. The Dubai decision was not properly proved before the
POEA. The Dubai decision purports to be the written act or record of an act of an official body or tribunal of a foreign
country, and therefore a public writing under Section 20 (a) of Rule 132 of the Revised Rules of Court.
Sections 25 and 26 of Rules 132 prescribe the manner of proving a public of official record of a foreign country in the
following terms:
Sec. 25. Proof of public or official record. An official record or an entry therein, when admissible
for any purpose, may be evidenced by an official publication thereof or by a copy attested by the
officer having the legal custody of the record, or by his deputy, and accompanied. if the record is not
kept in the Philippines, with a certificate that such officer has the custody. If the office in which the
record is kept is in a foreign country, the certificate maybe be made by a secretary of embassy or
litigation, consul general, consul, vice consul, or consular agent or by any officer in the foreign service
of the Philippines stationed in the foreign country in which the record is kept, and authenticated by the
seal of his office.
Sec. 26. What attestation of copy must state. Whenever a copy of a writing is attend for the
purpose of evidence, the attestation must state, in substance, that the copy is a correct copy of the
original, or a specific part thereof, as the case may be. The attestation must be under the official seal of
the attesting officer, if there be any, or if he be the clerk of a court having a seal, under the seal of such
court. (Emphasis supplied)
In the instant case, respondent Rances failed to submit any attestation issued by the proper Dubai official having
legal custody of the original of the decision of the Dubai Court that the copy presented by said respondent is a faithful
copy of the original decision, which attestation must furthermore be authenticated by a Philippine Consular Officer
having jurisdiction in Dubai. The transmittal letter, dated 23 September 1984, signed by Mohd Bin Saleh, Honorary
Consul for Philippines' does not comply with the requirements of either the attestation under Section 26 nor the
authentication envisaged by Section 25. 11
There is another problem in respect of the admissibility in evidence of the Dubai decision. The Dubai decision is
accompanied by a document which purports to be an English translation of that decision., but that translation is
legally defective. Section 34 of Rule 132 of the Revised Rules of Court requires that documents written in a non-
official language hke Arabic) shall not be admitted as evidence unless accompanied by a translation into English or
Spanish or Filipino.
In the instant case, there is no showing of who effected the English translation of the Dubai decision which
respondent Rances submitted to the POEA. The English translation does not purport to have been made by an official
court interpreter of the Philippine Government nor of the Dubai Government. Neither the Identity of the translator
nor his competence in both the Arabic and English languages has been shown. The English translation submitted by
the respondent is not sworn to as an accurate translation of the original decision in Arabic. Neither has that
translation been agreed upon by the parties as a true and faithful one.
The foregoing does not exhaust the difficulties presented by reliance upon the Dubai decision. The Dubai Court
decision, even on the basis of the English translation submitted by respondent Rances, does not purport on its face to
have been rendered against petitioner Pascor nor against the foreign principal of petitioner. Respondent Rances simply
assumed that the decision was rendered against petitioner's foreign principal. The Dubai decision does not Identify
the parties to the litigation that was resolved by said decision. Accordingly, the Dubai decision can scarcely be
enforced against petitioner Pascor. Further, even if the Dubai decision had on its face purported to be rendered
against petitioner Pascor, we must note that petitioner Pascor has expressly denied that jurisdiction had ever been
acquired by the Dubai court over the person of Pascor in accordance with the Rules of Procedure applicable before
the Dubai Court. 17 Respondent Rances has not proved the contents of the Dubai Rules of Procedure governing
acquisition of jurisdiction over the person of a non-resident defendant.
Finally, if it be assumed (arguendo, once more) that the Dubai Court had indeed acquired jurisdiction over the person
of Pascor's foreign principal Gulf East Ship Management Ltd. it still would not follow that Pascor would
automatically be bound by the Dubai decision. The statutory agency (or suretyship) of Pascor is limited in its reach
to the contracts of employment Pascor entered into on behalf of its principal with persons like respondent
Rances. 18 Such statutory inability does not extend to liability for judgments secured against Gulf East Ship
Management Ltd., in suits brought against Gulf East outside Philippine territorial jurisdiction, even though such a
suit may involve a contract of employment with a Filipino seaman.
We conclude that the POEA acted without or in excess of jurisdiction in rendering its Decision dated 14 April 1986
and its Order dated 20 May 1986, and that public respondent NLRC similarly acted without or in excess of
jurisdiction in rendering its Orders dated 14 August 1986 and 19 November 1986 denying petitioner's appeal and
Motion for Reconsideration. This, however, is without prejudice to the right of respondent Rances to initiate another
proceeding before the POEA against petitioner Pascor, this time on the basis alone of the contract of employment

which existed between said respondent and petitioner or petitioner's foreign principal; there, respondent Rances
may seek to show that he is still entitled to the allotments which he claims were not remitted by his employer to his
wife.
G.R. No. 104235 November 18, 1993
SPOUSES CESAR & SUTHIRA ZALAMEA and LIANA ZALAMEA, petitioners,

vs.
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and TRANSWORLD AIRLINES, INC., respondents.
FACTS:
Petitioners-spouses Cesar C. Zalamea and Suthira Zalamea, and their daughter, Liana Zalamea, purchased three (3)
airline tickets from the Manila agent of respondent TransWorld Airlines, Inc. for a flight to New York to Los Angeles.
The tickets of petitioners-spouses were purchased at a discount of 75% while that of their daughter was a full fare
ticket. All three tickets represented confirmed reservations.
While in New York, petitioners received notice of the reconfirmation of their reservations for said flight. On the
appointed date, however, petitioners checked in at 10:00 a.m., an hour earlier than the scheduled flight at 11:00 a.m.
but were placed on the wait-list because the number of passengers who had checked in before them had already
taken all the seats available on the flight. Liana Zalamea appeared as the No. 13 on the wait-list while the two other
Zalameas were listed as "No. 34, showing a party of two." Out of the 42 names on the wait list, the first 22 names
were eventually allowed to board the flight to Los Angeles, including petitioner Cesar Zalamea. The two others, on
the other hand, at No. 34, being ranked lower than 22, were not able to fly. As it were, those holding full-fare tickets
were given first priority among the wait-listed passengers. Mr. Zalamea, who was holding the full-fare ticket of his
daughter, was allowed to board the plane; while his wife and daughter, who presented the discounted tickets were
denied boarding. According to Mr. Zalamea, it was only later when he discovered the he was holding his daughter's
full-fare ticket.
Even in the next TWA flight to Los Angeles Mrs. Zalamea and her daughter, could not be accommodated because it
was also fully booked. Thus, they were constrained to book in another flight and purchased two tickets from
American Airlines at a cost of Nine Hundred Eighteen ($918.00) Dollars.
Upon their arrival in the Philippines, petitioners filed an action for damages based on breach of contract of air
carriage before the Regional Trial Court of Makati.
ISSUE:
WON there was fraud or bad faith on the part of respondent airline when it did not allow petitioners to board their
flight for Los Angeles in spite of confirmed tickets.
RULING:
That there was fraud or bad faith on the part of respondent airline when it did not allow petitioners to board their
flight for Los Angeles in spite of confirmed tickets cannot be disputed. The U.S. law or regulation allegedly
authorizing overbooking has never been proved. Foreign laws do not prove themselves nor can the courts take
judicial notice of them. Like any other fact, they must be alleged and proved. 6 Written law may be evidenced by an
official publication thereof or by a copy attested by the officer having the legal custody of the record, or by his
deputy, and accompanied with a certificate that such officer has custody. The certificate may be made by a secretary
of an embassy or legation, consul general, consul, vice-consul, or consular agent or by any officer in the foreign
service of the Philippines stationed in the foreign country in which the record is kept, and authenticated by the seal
of his office. 7

Respondent TWA relied solely on the statement of Ms. Gwendolyn Lather, its customer service agent, in her
deposition dated January 27, 1986 that the Code of Federal Regulations of the Civil Aeronautics Board allows
overbooking. Aside from said statement, no official publication of said code was presented as evidence. Thus,
respondent court's finding that overbooking is specifically allowed by the US Code of Federal Regulations has no
basis in fact.
Even if the claimed U.S. Code of Federal Regulations does exist, the same is not applicable to the case at bar in
accordance with the principle of lex loci contractus which require that the law of the place where the airline ticket
was issued should be applied by the court where the passengers are residents and nationals of the forum and the
ticket is issued in such State by the defendant airline. 8 Since the tickets were sold and issued in the Philippines, the
applicable law in this case would be Philippine law.
Existing jurisprudence explicitly states that overbooking amounts to bad faith, entitling the passengers concerned to
an award of moral damages.

G.R. No. 117221 April 13, 1999
IBM PHILIPPINES, INC., VIRGILIO L. PEA, and VICTOR V. REYES, petitioners,

vs.
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION and ANGEL D. ISRAEL, respondents.
FACTS:
Private respondent Angel D. Israel commenced employment with IBM as Office Products Customer Engineer. For the
next sixteen (16) years, he occupied two other positions in the company, 2 received numerous award, 3 and
represented the company in various seminars and conferences in and out of the country. 4He was assigned to the
team supervised by petitioner Reyes.
Thereafter, petitioner Reyes handed a letter to private respondent informing the latter that his employment in the
company was to be terminated effective July 31, 1991 on the ground of habitual tardiness and absenteeism.
Alleging that his dismissal was without just cause and due process, private respondent filed a complaint with the
Arbitration Branch of the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE).
In his position paper, he claimed that he was not given the opportunity to be heard and that he was summarily
dismissed from employment based on charges which had not been duly proven. 5
Petitioners denied private respondent's claims. It was alleged that several conferences were held by the
management with private respondent because of the latter's unsatisfactory performance in the company and he was
given sufficient warning and opportunity to "reform and improve his attitude toward attendance," 6 but to their
regret, he never did. It was alleged that private respondent was constantly told of his poor attendance record and
inefficiency through the company's internal electronic mail (e-mail) system. According to petitioners, this system
allows paperless or "telematic" 7 communication among IBM personnel in the company offices here and abroad. An
employee is assigned a "User ID" and the corresponding password is provided by the employee himself and,
theoretically, known only to him. Employees are then expected to turn on their computers everyday, "log in" to the
system by keying in their respective IDs and passwords in order to access and read the messages sent to and stored
in the computer system. To reply, an employee types in or encodes his message-response and sends the same to the
intended recipient, also via the computer system. The system automatically records the time and date each message
was sent and received, including the identification of the sender and receiver thereof. All messages are recorded and
stored in computer disks. 8
Attached to petitioners' position paper were copies of print-outs of alleged computer entries/messages sent by
petitioner Reyes to private respondent through IBM's internal computer system.
The labor arbiter rendered a decision finding private respondent to have been terminated for cause and accordingly
dismissing the complaint. Considering, however, the ground for termination as well as private respondent's long
record of service to the company, the arbiter ordered the award of separation pay at the rate equivalent to one-half
(1/2) month salary for every year of service.
It appears, however, that prior to the release of the labor arbiter's decision at 11:21 a.m. on March 26, 1992, private
respondent had filed a "Manifestation And Motion To Admit Attached New Evidence For The Complainant" which
was received by the Arbitration Branch at 10:58 a.m. of the same day. The evidence consisted of private respondent's
Daily Time Records (DTRs) for the period June 1, 1990 to August 31, 1990 and pay slips for the period January 1990
to June 1991 showing that private respondent did not incur any unexcused absences, that he was not late on any day
within the period and that no deduction was made from his salary on account of tardiness or absences.
Private respondent appealed to the NLRC which reversed the labor arbiter's decision and found private respondent's
dismissal illegal.
ISSUE:
WON the computer print-outs need to be identified or authenticated in order for the same to be admissible in
evidence.
RULING:
First. Petitioners argue that the computer print-outs submitted by them need not be identified or authenticated
according to the rules of procedure in regular courts in order for the same to be admissible in evidence. They
contend that technical rules of evidence do not apply to administrative/labor cases 20 and because of a relaxation of
the rules of evidence, private respondent was in fact allowed by the labor arbiter to adduce additional evidence even
after a decision had been rendered. 21
It is indeed true that administrative agencies, such as the NLRC, are not bound by the technical rules of procedure
and evidence in the adjudication of cases. 22 This was the reason private respondent was allowed to submit
additional evidence even after the case was deemed submitted for resolution by the labor arbiter. The practice of
admitting additional evidence on appeal in labor cases has been sanctioned by this Court. 23
However, the liberality of procedure in administrative actions is subject to limitations imposed by basic
requirements of due process. As this Court said in Ang Tibay v. CIR, 24 the provision for flexibility in administrative
procedure "does not go so far as to justify orders without a basis in evidence having rational probative value." More
specifically, as held in Uichico v. NLRC: 25
It is true that administrative and quasi-judicial bodies like the NLRC are not bound by the technical
rules of procedure in the adjudication of cases. However, this procedural rule should not be
construed as a license to disregard certain fundamental evidentiary rules. While the rules of
evidence prevailing in the courts of law or equity are not controlling in proceedings before the
NLRC, the evidence presented before it must at least have a modicum of admissibility for it to be given
some probative value. The Statement of Profit and Losses submitted by Crispa, Inc. to prove its
alleged losses, without the accompanying signature of a certified public accountant or audited by an
independent auditor, are nothing but self-serving documents which ought to be treated as a mere
scrap of paper devoid of any probative value.
The computer print-outs, which constitute the only evidence of petitioners, afford no assurance of their authenticity
because they are unsigned. The decisions of this Court, while adhering to a liberal view in the conduct of proceedings
before administrative agencies, have nonetheless consistently required some proof of authenticity or reliability as
condition for the admission of documents.

Not one of the 18 print-out copies submitted by petitioners was ever signed, either by the sender or the receiver.
There is thus no guarantee that the message sent was the same message received. As the Solicitor General pointed
out, the messages were transmitted to and received nor by private respondent himself but his computer.30
Neither were the print-outs certified or authenticated by any company official who could properly attest that these
came from IBM's computer system or that the data stored in the system were not and/or could not have been
tampered with before the same were printed out. It is noteworthy that the computer unit and system in which the
contents of the print-outs were stored were in the exclusive possession and control of petitioners since after private
respondent was served his termination letter, he had no more access to his computer. 31
Second. Even if the computer print-outs were admissible, they would not suffice to show that private respondent's
dismissal was justified.
Petitioners' contention is that private respondent was repeatedly warned through computer messages for coming in
late or not reporting at all to the office during the period May 1990 June 1991 but he never denied the
allegavtions. Therefore, he must be deemed to have admitted these allegations. 32 But the burden of proving that the
dismissal was for just cause is on petitioners. They cannot simply rely on any admission by private respondent
implied from his failure to deny the alleged computer messages to him which he denied he had ever received. On the
other hand, private respondent's additional evidence, consisting of DTRs and reporting pay slips, show that he did
not incur unexcused absences or tardiness or that he suffered deduction in pay on account of such absences or
tardiness.
Indeed, petitioners could have easily proven their allegations by presenting private respondent's DTRs. Since these
were in petitioners' possession, their non-production thereof raises the presumption that if presented they would be
adverse to petitioners. This is precisely what the best evidence rule guards against.
Private respondent's DTRs for the period June 1, 1990 August 30, 1990 34 show that while his attendance record
may not have been perfect, it was at least satisfactory. The days when private respondent did not report to the office
were credited either as vacation or as sick leaves. On days when he was away on business trips, his destination was
shown. The DTRs were signed by petitioner Victor Reyes.
Nor is there proof to support petitioners' allegation that it was private respondent's secretary and not him who often
signed the attendance sheet. 36 Indeed, petitioners did not present private respondent's secretary or, at the very
least, attach an affidavit sworn to by her to prove their allegations and thus dispute the DTRs presented by private
respondent. This, notwithstanding ample opportunity to do so. On the other hand, as already stated, the DTRs,
showing private respondent's good attendance, were signed by petitioner Victor Reyes himself, and no good reason
has been shown why they cannot be relied upon in determining private respondent's attendance.
Third. Even assuming the charges of habitual tardiness and absenteeism were true, such offenses do not warrant
private respondent's dismissal. He has not been shown to have ever committed any infraction of company rules
during his sixteen-year stint in the company. Although it is alleged that he failed to attend important client meetings
and gave false representations to a valued client to cover his tracks, there is no record finding him guilty of such
offenses. Dismissal has always been regarded as the ultimate penalty. 37 The fact that lapses in private respondent's
attendance record may have occurred only during his final year in the company, after a long period of exemplary
performance, makes petitioners' contention dubious. While it is true that long years of service is no guarantee
against dismissal for wrongdoing, 38 at least the employee's record does provide an index to his work. In case doubt
exists between the evidence presented by the employer and that presented by the employee, the scales of justice
must be tilted in favor of the latter.39
Fourth. The print-outs likewise failed to show that private respondent was allowed due process before his dismissal.
The law requires an employer to furnish the employee two written notices before termination of his employment
may be ordered. The first notice must inform him of the particular acts or omissions for which his dismissal is
sought, the second of the employer's decision to dismiss the employee after he has been given the opportunity to be
heard and defend himself. 40

These requirements were not observed in this case. As noted earlier, there is no evidence that there was an exchange
of communication between petitioners and private respondent regarding the latter's supposed substandard
performance. Private respondent has consistently denied, however, that he was ever advised of the charges hurled
against him. The so-called one-on-one consultations or "personal counsellings" mentioned in the print-outs between
petitioner Reyes and private respondent concerning the latter's work habits do not satisfy the requirements of due
process, as we had occasion to say in Pono v. NLRC. 41
Consultations or conferences may not be a substitute for the actual holding of a hearing. Every
opportunity and assistance must be accorded to the employee by the management to enable him to
prepare adequately for his defense, including legal representation. 42

EMMANUEL B. AZNAR vs. CITIBANK, N.A., (Philippines)
G.R. No. 164273; March 28, 2007

Facts:
Emmanuel B. Aznar is a holder of a Preferred Master Credit Card (Mastercard) issued by Citibank. As he and his wife
planned to take their two grandchildren on an Asian tour, Aznar made a total advance deposit with the intention of
increasing his credit limit. With the use of his Mastercard, Aznar purchased plane tickets to Kuala Lumpur for his
group. He claims that when he presented his Mastercard in some establishments in Malaysia, Singapore and
Indonesia, the same was not honored. When he tried to use the same in Ingtan Agency in Indonesia to purchase
plane ticket, it was again dishonored for the reason that his card was blacklisted by Citibank. He further
claims that his humiliation caused by the denial of his card was aggravated when Ingtan Agency spoke of
swindlers trying to use blacklisted cards.
Aznar filed a complaint for damages against Citibank claiming that Citibank fraudulently or with gross negligence
blacklisted his Mastercard which forced him, his wife and grandchildren to abort important tour destinations and
prevented them from buying certain items. He further claimed that he suffered mental anguish, serious anxiety,
wounded feelings, besmirched reputation and social humiliation due to the wrongful blacklisting of his card. To
prove that Citibank blacklisted his Mastercard, Aznar presented a computer print-out, denominated as ON-LINE
AUTHORIZATIONS FOREIGN ACCOUNT ACTIVITY REPORT, issued to him by Ingtan Agency (Exh. "G") with the
signature of one Victrina Elnado Nubi (Nubi) which shows that his card in question was "DECL OVERLIMIT" or
declared over the limit.
Citibank denied the allegation and contended that under the terms and conditions governing the issuance and use of
its credit cards, Citibank is exempt from any liability for the dishonor of its cards by any merchant affiliate. To prove
this, Department Head, Dennis Flores, presented Warning Cancellation Bulletins which contained the list of its
canceled cards covering the period of Aznars trip.
In May 29, 1998, RTC Branch 20, dismissed Aznars complaint for lack of merit. Aznar filed a motion for
reconsideration with motion to re-raffle the case saying that Judge Marcos could not be impartial as he himself is a
holder of a Citibank credit card. The case was re-raffled and the RTC issued an Order granting Aznars motion for
reconsideration. Citibank filed an appeal with the CA and its counsel filed an administrative case against Judge De la
Pea. The CA rendered its Decision granting Citibanks appeal
Contentions:
Aznar alleges that: the RTC found that Aznars Mastercard was dishonored for the reason that it was declared over
the credit limit; this factual finding is supported by Exh. "G" and by his (Aznars) testimony; Exh. "G" cannot be
excluded as it qualifies as an electronic evidence following the Rules on Electronic Evidence which provides that
print-outs are also originals for purposes of the Best Evidence Rule; Exh. "G" has remained complete and unaltered,
apart from the signature of Nubi, thus the same is reliable for the purpose for which it was generated; the RTC judge
correctly credited the testimony of Aznar on the issuance of the computer print-out as Aznar saw that it was signed
by Nubi; said testimony constitutes the "other evidence showing the integrity and reliability of the print-out to the
satisfaction of the judge" which is required under the Rules on Electronic Evidence;
Citibank contends that: Aznar never had personal knowledge that his credit card was blacklisted as he only
presumed such fact; Aznars self-serving testimony is not sufficient to prove the integrity and reliability of Exh. "G";
Aznar did not declare that it was Nubi who printed the document and that said document was printed in his
presence as he merely said that the print-out was provided him; there is also no annotation on Exh. "G" to establish
that it was Nubi who printed the same; assuming further that Exh. "G" is admissible and Aznars credit card was
dishonored, Citibank still cannot be held liable for damages as it only shows that Aznars credit card was dishonored
for having been declared over the limit; Aznars cause of action against Citibank hinged on the alleged blacklisting of
his card which purportedly caused its dishonor;
Issue:
Whether Aznar has established his claim against Citibank.
Ruling:
The answer is no.
It is basic that in civil cases, the burden of proof rests on the plaintiff to establish his case based on a preponderance
of evidence. The party that alleges a fact also has the burden of proving it.
X X X
As correctly found by the RTC in its May 29, 1998 Decision, Aznar failed to prove with a preponderance of
evidence that Citibank blacklisted his Mastercard or placed the same on the "hot list."
Aznar in his testimony admitted that he had no personal knowledge that his Mastercard was blacklisted by Citibank
and only presumed such fact from the dishonor of his card.
X X X
The dishonor of Aznars Mastercard is not sufficient to support a conclusion that said credit card was blacklisted by
Citibank, especially in view of Aznars own admission that in other merchant establishments in Kuala Lumpur and
Singapore, his Mastercard was accepted and honored.
Aznar puts much weight on the ON-LINE AUTHORIZATION FOREIGN ACCOUNT ACTIVITY REPORT, a computer
print-out handed to Aznar by Ingtan Agency, marked as Exh. "G", to prove that his Mastercard was dishonored for
being blacklisted. On said print-out appears the words "DECL OVERLIMIT" opposite Account No. 5423-3920-0786-
7012.
As correctly pointed out by the RTC and the CA, however, such exhibit cannot be considered admissible as its
authenticity and due execution were not sufficiently established by petitioner.
The prevailing rule at the time of the promulgation of the RTC Decision is Section 20 of Rule 132 of the Rules of
Court. It provides that whenever any private document offered as authentic is received in evidence, its due execution
and authenticity must be proved either by (a) anyone who saw the document executed or written; or (b) by evidence
of the genuineness of the signature or handwriting of the maker.
Aznar, who testified on the authenticity of Exh. "G," did not actually see the document executed or written, neither
was he able to provide evidence on the genuineness of the signature or handwriting of Nubi, who handed to him said
computer print-out.
X X X
Even if examined under the Rules on Electronic Evidence, which took effect on August 1, 2001, and which is being
invoked by Aznar in this case, the authentication of Exh. "G" would still be found wanting.
Pertinent sections of Rule 5 read:
Section 2. Manner of authentication. Before any private electronic document offered as authentic is received in
evidence, its authenticity must be proved by any of the following means:
xxx
(c) by other evidence showing its integrity and reliability to the satisfaction of the judge.
Aznar claims that his testimony complies with par. (c), i.e., it constitutes the "other evidence showing integrity and
reliability of Exh. "G" to the satisfaction of the judge." The Court is not convinced. Aznars testimony that the person
from Ingtan Agency merely handed him the computer print-out and that he thereafter asked said person to sign the
same cannot be considered as sufficient to show said print-outs integrity and reliability. As correctly pointed out by
Judge Marcos in his May 29, 1998 Decision, Exh. "G" does not show on its face that it was issued by Ingtan Agency as

Aznar merely mentioned in passing how he was able to secure the print-out from the agency; Aznar also failed to
show the specific business address of the source of the computer print-out because while the name of Ingtan Agency
was mentioned by Aznar, its business address was not reflected in the print-out.
Indeed, Aznar failed to demonstrate how the information reflected on the print-out was generated and how the said
information could be relied upon as true.
X X X
And even if Exh. "G" is admitted as evidence, it only shows that the use of the credit card of petitioner was denied
because it was already over the limit. There is no allegation in the Complaint or evidence to show that there was
gross negligence on the part of Citibank in declaring that the credit card has been used over the limit.
The Court is also perplexed that stated on Exh. "G" is the amount of "6,289,195.10" opposite petitioner's account
number, which data, petitioner did not clarify. As plaintiff in this case, it was incumbent on him to prove that he did
not actually incur the said amount which is above his credit limit. As it is, the Court cannot see how Exh. "G" could
help petitioner's claim for damages.
The claim of petitioner that Citibank blacklisted his card through fraud or gross negligence is likewise effectively
negated by the evidence of Citibank which was correctly upheld by the RTC and the CA, to wit:
xxx Mr. Dennis Flores, the Head of the Credit Card Department of defendant Bank, presented documents known as
Warning Cancellation Bulletin(WCB) xxx which show that plaintiffs Citibank preferred mastercard was not placed in
a hot list or was not blacklisted. Xxx The WCB xxx which covered the period xxx when plaintiff traveled in the
aforementioned Asian countries showed that said Citibank preferred mastercard had never been placed in a hot list
or the same was blacklisted, let alone the fact that all the credit cards which had been cancelled by the defendant
bank were all contained, reported and listed in said Warning Cancellation Bulletin which were issued and released
on a regular basis.
These 300 WCB pieces of documentary proofs, all in all, adduced by defendant pointed to the fact that said plaintiffs
credit car (sic) was not among those found in said bulletins as having been cancelled for the period for which the
said bulletins had been issued.
Between said computer print out (Exhibit G) and the WCB (Exhibits 3 to 8 and their submarkings) the latter
documents adduced by defendant are entitled to greater weight than that said computer print out presented by
plaintiff that bears on the issue of whether the plaintiffs preferred master card was actually placed in the hot list or
blacklisted for the following reasons:
The first reason is that the due execution and authentication of these WCB have been duly established and identified
by defendants own witness, Dennis Flores, one of the banks officers, who is the head of its credit card department,
and, therefore, competent to testify on the said bulletins as having been issued by the defendant bank showing that
plaintiffs preferred master credit card was never blacklisted or placed in the Banks hot list. But on the other hand,
plaintiffs computer print out (Exhibit G) was never authenticated or its due execution had never been duly
established. Thus, between a set of duly authenticated commercial documents, the WCB, presented by defendants
(sic) and an unauthenticated private document, plaintiffs computer print out (Exhibit G), the former deserves
greater evidentiary weight supporting the findings of this Court that plaintiffs preferred master card (Exhibit 1)
had never been blacklisted at all or placed in a so-called hot list by defendant.
X X X
WHEREFORE, the petition is denied for lack of merit
HEIRS OF VICENTE ARCILLA v. LOURDES TEODORO

G.R. No.162886, 11 August 2008
Topic: Authentication of Documents

FACTS:
Respondent, Ma. Lourdes A. Teodoro filed an application for land registration of two parcels of land. This
action was opposed to by the Heirs of Vicente claiming absolute ownership and seeking the dismissal for the
registration over the parcels of land and the commercial building thereon and improvements.
Respondent alleged that, with the exception of the commercial building constructed thereon, she purchased the
subject lots from her father, Pacifico Arcilla (Pacifico), as shown by a Deed of Sale dated December 9, 1966, and that,
prior thereto, Pacifico acquired the said lots by virtue of the partition of the estate of his father, Jose Arcilla
evidenced by a document entitled Extrajudicial Settlement of Estate. She also presented as evidence an Affidavit of
Quit-Claim in favor of Pacifico, executed by herein petitioners as Heirs of Vicente Arcilla (Vicente), brother of
Pacifico.
Petitioners claim on the one hand that the lots in question were owned by their father, Vicente, having
purchased the same from a certain Manuel Sarmiento sometime in 1917; Vicente's ownership is evidenced
by several tax declarations attached to the record; petitioners and their predecessors-in-interest had been
in possession of the subject lots since 1906.
MTC: Dismissed. Teodoro won.
RTC: Affirmed in toto.
CA: Dismissed. had the Court intended to include notarial documents as one of the public documents contemplated
by the provisions of Section 24, it should not have specified only the documents referred to under paragraph (a) of
Section 19
ISSUE:
WON the certification of non-forum shopping executed in a foreign country is covered by Section 24, Rule 132 of the
Rules of Courtcertification by the consul, v-consul etc.
RULING:
The certification of non-forum shopping executed in a foreign country is not covered by Section 24, Rule 132
of the Rules of Court. (SC agreed with CA)
PETITIONERS assailed that the verification and certification of non-forum shopping were notarized in the USA, the
same may not be deemed admissible for any purpose in the Philippines for failure to comply with the
requirement of Section 24, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court that the notarized document must be accompanied
by a certificate issued by an officer in the foreign service of the Philippines who is stationed in the country in
which a record of the subject document is kept, proving or authenticating that the person who notarized the
document is indeed authorized to do so and has custody of the same.

Section 24, Rule 132, Rules of Court, does not include documents acknowledged before [a] notary public abroad. For,
Sec. 24, Rule 132 of the 1997 Rules of Court basically pertains to written official acts, or records of the official
of the sovereign authority, official bodies and tribunals, and public officers, whether of the Philippines, or of
a foreign country. This is so, as Sec. 24, Rule 132 explicitly refers only to paragraph (a) of Sec. 19.
If the rule comprehends to cover notarial documents, the rule could have included the same. What is important is the
fact that the respondent-applicant certified before a commissioned officer clothed with powers to administer oath
that [s]he has not and will not commit forum shopping.[33]
Petitioners relied on the Lopes case invalidating an uncertified notarial document. The rule applied in Lopez,
which was decided prior to the effectivity of the amended Rules of Evidence,[35] was Section 25, Rule 132, to
wit:
Sec. 25. Proof of public or official record - An official record or an entry therein, when admissible for
any purpose, may be evidenced by an official publication thereof or by a copy attested by the officer
having the legal custody of the record, xxx the foreign country in which the record is kept, and
authenticated by the seal of his office.
When the Rules of Evidence were amended in 1989, Section 25, Rule 132 became Section 24, Rule 132; and the
amendment consisted in the deletion of the introductory phrase "An official record or an entry therein," which was
substituted by the phrase "The record of public documents referred to in paragraph (a) of Section 19."
Section 19(a) of the same Rule provides:
Sec. 19. Classes of documents. - For the purpose of their presentation in evidence, documents are either
public or private.

Public documents are:

(a) The written official acts or records of the official acts of the sovereign authority, official bodies
and tribunals, and public officers, whether of the Philippines or of a foreign country;

(b) Documents acknowledged before a notary public except last wills and testaments; and

(c) Public records, kept in the Philippines, of private documents required by law to be entered therein.

All other writings are private.

In Lopez, the requirements of then Section 25, Rule 132 were made applicable to all public or official records
without any distinction because the old rule did not distinguish. However, in the present rule, it is clear
under Section 24, Rule 132 that its provisions shall be made applicable only to the documents referred to
under paragraph (a), Section 19, Rule 132.
Petitioners question the validity of the above-mentioned documents. However, as the CA, RTC and MTC found, these
documents are all notarized. It is settled that a notarized document is executed to lend truth to the statements
contained therein and to the authenticity of the signatures. Notarized documents enjoy the presumption of regularity
which can be overturned only by clear and convincing evidence.
Petitioners' bare denials of the contents of the subject documents will not suffice to overcome the presumption of
their regularity considering that they are all notarized. To overthrow such presumption of regularity, the
countervailing evidence must be clear, convincing and more than merely preponderant, which petitioners failed to
present.
ON LATE FILING OF CERTIFICATE OF NON FORUM SHOPPING ISSUE: (this is not under evidence na topic na but may
be of help J )
SC: The CA ruled correctly when it held that the belated filing of a sworn certification of non-forum shopping was
substantial compliance with SC Administrative Circular No. 04-94. There was no showing of intention to violate the
rules with impunity. Justice over mere technicalities.
ON PHYSICAL OCCUPATION OF THE PROPERTY:
SC: physical occupation of the commercial building which they erected on the disputed property does not necessarily
prove their ownership of the subject lots.
SC AFFIRMED CA.

ANCIENT DOCUMENT RULE

Heirs of Lacsa vs. Court of Appeals, Aurelio Songco, et al.
197 SCRA 234 (1991)

Facts:
Heirs of Lacsa seek to recover a parcel of land allegedly taken fraudulently by the Songcos. The Songcos, on
the other hand, claim that the property in question had long been transferred to their predecessor-in-interest,
Inocencio Songco, by a certain Juan Limpin and Alberta Guevarra, via a document called ESCRITURA DE VENTA
ABSOLUTA. Limpin and Guevarra, the Songcos allege, in turn earlier acquired the same from Lacsas heirs
themselves, through a document called TRADUCCION AL CASTELLANO DE LA ESCRITURA DE PARTICION EXTRA-
JUDICIAL.
The lower court recognized the above-named documents as ancient documents, and utilized the same as
its basis in ruling in favor of the Songcos. It was much to the agony of the heirs of Lacsa, who now comes before the
Court to question, among others, the status of the documents as ancient. They contend that since the first pages
of said documents do not bear the signatures of the alleged parties thereto, this constitutes an indelible
blemish that can beget unlimited alterations, which is thus a violation of the third (3rd) requisite for
recognizing ancient documents (unblemished by any alteration or circumstances of suspicion).
Ruling:
The Court decided against the petitioners.
(The) first document, Exhibit "3", entitled 'Traduccion Al Castellano de la Escritura de
Particion Extrajudicial" was executed on 7 April 1923 whereas the second document, exhibit "7",
entitled "Escritura de Venta Absoluta" was executed on 20 January 1924. These documents are,
therefore, more than thirty (30) years old. Both copies of the aforementioned documents were certified
as exact copies of the original on file with the Office of the Register of Deeds of Pampanga, by the
Deputy Register of Deeds. There is a further certification with regard to the Pampango translation of
the document of extrajudicial partition which was issued by the Archives division, Bureau of Records
Management of the Department of General Services.
Documents which affect real property, in order that they may bind third parties, must be
recorded with the appropriate Register of Deeds. The documents in question, being certified as copies
of originals on file with the Register of Deeds of Pampanga, can be said to be found in the proper
custody. Clearly, therefore, the first two (2) requirements of the "ancient document rule" were met.

As to the last requirement that the document must on its face appear to be genuine,
petitioners did not present any conclusive evidence to support their allegation of falsification of the
said documents. They merely alluded to the fact that the lack of signatures on the first two (2) pages
could have easily led to their substitution. We cannot uphold this surmise absent any proof
whatsoever. As held in one case, a contract apparently honest and lawful on its face must be treated as
such and one who assails the genuineness of such contract must present conclusive evidence of
falsification.
Moreover, the last requirement of the "ancient document rule" that a document must be
unblemished by any alteration or circumstances of suspicion refers to the EXTRINSIC quality of the
document itself. The lack of signatures on the first pages, therefore, absent any alterations or
circumstances of suspicion cannot be held to detract from the fact that the documents in question,
which were certified as copied of the originals on file with the Register of Deeds of Pampanga, are
genuine and free from any blemish or circumstances of suspicion.
The documents in question are "ancient documents" as envisioned in Sec. 22 of Rule 132 of the
Rules of Court. Further proof of their due execution and authenticity is no longer required. Having held
that the documents in question are private writings which are more than thirty (30) years old, come from
the proper repository thereof, and are unblemished by any alteration or circumstances of suspicion, there is
no further need for these documents to fulfill the requirements of the 1903 Notarial Law. Hence, the
other contentions of the petitioners that the documents do not fulfill the mandatory requirements of
the Notarial Law and that the proper person or public official was not presented to testify on his
certification of the documents in question, need not be resolved as they would no longer serve any
purpose.



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15.

AIM AND FIRE

(2)Not to be detained longer than the interests of justice require;

(3)Not to be examined except only as to matters pertinent to the issue;

(a)Direct examination by the proponent;

(b)Cross-examination by the opponent;

(c)Re-direct examination by the proponent;

(d)Re-cross-examination by the opponent. (4)

Evidence 2013-2014 Case Digests| PRESENTATION OF EVIDENCE 1

Evidence 2013-2014 Case Digests| PRESENTATION OF EVIDENCE 4

Evidence 2013-2014 Case Digests| PRESENTATION OF EVIDENCE 5

2. Among the witnesses presented by the Government to demonstrate Sembrano's culpability

Evidence 2013-2014 Case Digests| PRESENTATION OF EVIDENCE 6

On the First ISSUE:

On the Second ISSUE:

Evidence 2013-2014 Case Digests| PRESENTATION OF EVIDENCE 8

Rule 132 of the Rules of Court provides:

Evidence 2013-2014 Case Digests| PRESENTATION OF EVIDENCE 9

G.R. No. 76595 May 6, 1988

PACIFIC ASIA OVERSEAS SHIPPING CORPORATION, petitioner,

Evidence 2013-2014 Case Digests| PRESENTATION OF EVIDENCE 10

Evidence 2013-2014 Case Digests| PRESENTATION OF EVIDENCE 12

G.R. No. 104235 November 18, 1993

SPOUSES CESAR & SUTHIRA ZALAMEA and LIANA ZALAMEA, petitioners,

Evidence 2013-2014 Case Digests| PRESENTATION OF EVIDENCE 13

G.R. No. 117221 April 13, 1999

IBM PHILIPPINES, INC., VIRGILIO L. PEA, and VICTOR V. REYES, petitioners,

Evidence 2013-2014 Case Digests| PRESENTATION OF EVIDENCE 15

Evidence 2013-2014 Case Digests| PRESENTATION OF EVIDENCE 16

Evidence 2013-2014 Case Digests| PRESENTATION OF EVIDENCE 18

HEIRS OF VICENTE ARCILLA v. LOURDES TEODORO

Evidence 2013-2014 Case Digests| PRESENTATION OF EVIDENCE 21

Evidence 2013-2014 Case Digests| PRESENTATION OF EVIDENCE 22

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