Religious Research Association, Inc.

Religion as National Identity in a Secular Society

Author(s): Lilly Weissbrod
Source: Review of Religious Research, Vol. 24, No. 3 (Mar., 1983), pp. 188-205
Published by: Religious Research Association, Inc.
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188
RELIGION AS NATIONAL IDENTITY
IN A SECULAR SOCIETY
LILLY WEISSBROD
Programme
Preparatory
Tel-Aviv
University
Reviewof Religious Vol. 24, No. 3 (March1983).
Research,
The articlearguesthatit is the role of religionto providevalues
that delineatenationalidentity.This role is not universal,but it
appliesto a greatvarietyof societies,includingsecularones. The case
chosenis Israel,becausesecularization was an integralpartof its ide-
ology. Nevertheless,nationalsymbolscontinuedto be secularversions
of religioussymbols,and thesecularideologycontinuedto containat
least one aspect of the Messianicidea, whichis religiousin nature.
The internalcontradiction betweenbasingnationalidentityon em-
phaticallysecularvalues thatare justifiedby religiousones caused a
crisisof identity.A new religiously-based nationalidentityis becom-
ingincreasinglywidespreadinIsrael.
Recenteventsin Poland and Iran,to mentionbut a few,have put into
questiontwo theses,one concerningmodernization and the other con-
cerning social cohesion. Firstly,according to most modernization the-
orists,the role of religionis one of the distinguishing marksbetween
traditionaland modernsocieties.In traditional societiesreligionis a major
cohesiveforce,if not the onlyone. Its value systemis acceptedunques-
tioningly by all membersof the societybecauseit is sacred. The inevita-
bilityof punishment providesa powerfuldeterrent to potentialdeviants,
and ritualsmaintainthe salienceof norms. Religiondoes not play this
role in modernsocietieswhosecohesionis based on secularvaluessuch as
democracyand equality(e.g., Eisenstadt,1978:177; Huntington, 1965).
Secondly,the veryneed forintegrative values in modemsocietyhas been
disputed(Fcnn, 1972; Vidich, 1975). The extentof differentiation in
modernsocietyhas been claimedto be such thatan encompassing value
systemhas becomeimpossible, or even unnecessary.This has been chal-
lengedby Stauffer (1973) who arguedthat some cohesivevalues were
neededevenin theUnitedStates,amongthemosthighlyadvancedmodern
societies;butthesecould well be secularand wererelevantmainlyin times
of crisis.
The above examplesof Poland and Iran representwidely different
stages of modernization.But even Iran had undergoneconsiderable
modernization beforeits revolutionof 1979, and Poland must be con-
sidereda modernindustrialsociety. Yet, in both, religionis playinga
dominantrole as recenteventshave demonstrated. In bothcases religion
provides the cohesive values thatseem indispensable in timesof social up-
heaval.
I suggestthat some integrative values are necessaryin everysociety,
irrespective of its relativestability.No matterhow pluralistica society
and how numerousthe value systemsto whichits variousgroupsadhere,
some core valuesmustexistthatdemarcatethe boundariesof thatsociety
and distinguish it fromothers.BeingAmerican,British,or Frenchcarries

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 189

a meaningbeyondlivingin a certainterritory or holdinga specificcitizen-

ship. It is associatedwithcertainvalues,as vague as thesemay be. De-
mocracyis a core value in all threeof thesesocieties,but it is interpreted
differentlyin each, and itsuniqueinterpretation provideseach societywith
its distinctidentity.Such core values are invokedmoreoftenin timesof
crisiswhen the boundariesof the societyare threatened fromwithinor
fromoutside,buttheydo existat all times.
Values are by definition nonempiricalstatements, but that does not
necessarily makethemreligious.In orderto clarifythedistinction between
religion and beliefin secularvalues, I followRotenstreich(1962:21) in
defining the secularas the assumption thateverythingmaterialor abstract
derivesfromhumanendeavor.
In thesecularsphere,thereis no concept, idea or valuewhichis vali-
datedbyreligion, i.e. bythefactthatit stemsfroma revelation
outsidethe
humansphere.Thismeansthatevenifwe ... cometo a conclusion which
puts limitsto human whichsees
capability, the humanspherelinkedor
dependent on a higherbeing,God, according to secularthoughtthiscon-
clusionis the outcomeof a consideration, analysisor enquirywithinthe
boundaries of thehuman,and,as such,theidea of a divinebeingis not
givena priori.
Core values providingsocial identitymay well be secular in some
modernsocieties,thoughtheyneed not be so in all. Religionfrequently
providedthe value systemaroundwhichgroupsin general,and nationsin
particular,coalesced,and by whichtheirmembersidentified themselves.
This role of religionin thepast is well knownand needsno further elabo-
ration. Nor can thisrole in contemporary religioussocietiesbe called in
question. Moreover,thisrole is not confinedto monoethnic creeds,such
as Judaism: Catholicismservesto identifyone part of Irishmen,as it
does mostof the Poles; in Latin America,Catholicismeven providesdif-
ferentidentiesfordifferent classesof society.
The examplesof Poland and Iran show that nationalidentitycan be
based on religionevenin modemand modernizing societies.Despiteadher-
ence to core socialistvalues,whichare per se secularin the sensedefined
above,Solidarity membersin Polandexpresstheiridentity in trulyreligious
values and reinterpretsocialistvaluesin Christianterms.In Iran,seculari-
zationwas well underway,yetthe processhas undergonea completere-
versal. In fact,doubthas been cast on the secularization of Britain,an
obviouscase of an advancedindustrial society(Martin,1973).
This paper does not disclaimthe factthatsome modemsocietieshave
indeed undergonecompletesecularization.It merelysuggeststhat this
appliesprimarily to thosecases wherenationalidentity had not been based
on exclusivelyreligiousvalues. (France is a case in point: the attempts
made to introduceGallicanismpointto the factthatCatholicism was not
interpreted in specificallyFrench termsto serve as a basis for national
identity.) But societieswhose social identitywas based on core values
derivingpredominantly fromreligiontend to have greaterdifficulty in
establishingsubstitutesecularcore values on whichto base theirnational
identity.Membersof such societiesare likelyto undergoa crisis of
identityif sucha substitution is made and to searchfora renewedreligion-

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190
based nationalidentity.Furthermore, the likelihoodof a crisisof identity
increaseswheresecularization has been suddenand/orcoercive.This con-
ditionis self-explanatory giventhe knownresistanceof people to change
of attitudesand beliefs.
In manyWesternsocieties,secularization has been a gradualprocess,so
thatany continuing use of religiousvalues and symbolscan be attributed
to a culturallag, remnants of a previousworldview. It could simplymean
thatsecularization has not yetbeen completed.Symbolsare indicatorsof
underlying values. Their meaning,namelythe underlying values, may
change over time,but thisis usuallya lengthyprocess. It is probablyno
coincidencethatin manyrevolutions, such as the French,the Bolshevik,
or the Nazi, symbolspertaining to nationalidentitywere replacedalto-
gether.
It seemed appropriateto test the above premiseson a case wherea
culturallag could not providean explanationfor the continueduse of
religioussymbolsand values. When secularization is an intentional act
and part of the revolutionary ideology,relianceon religionfor the new
core value systemis a betrayalof the ideal of secularization and mustbe
rejected. In such a case, one would expect the introduction of an entirely
new set of nationalsymbols,and certainlythe formulation of a new
nationalidentity, based on secularvalues,as was done in the threerevo-
lutionsmentioned above. On the otherhand,I suggestedthatsubstitution
of religiouscore values by secularones was unlikelywherethesevalues
servedto demarcate nationalidentity.
Israel providesjust such a testcase. As will be shown,Jewishnational
identityhad been demarcatedby religiousvalues,and secularization had
been an integralpart of the Zionistideologythat became dominantin
Israel. A studyof Israel may,therefore, highlightaspectsof the relation-
ship betweenreligionand the core value systemotherwiseleft obscure.
Moreover,the Israelicase is fortuitous since the outcomeof the process
can also be observedthere. That is, in its shorthistoryIsrael not only
attempted to formulatea new secularsubstitute for its religiousidentity,
but a reactionto thishas alreadyset in. The completeness of the cycle
makesthe studyof thiscase particularly interesting.
It shouldbe notedthatall statements in thisarticleregarding Judaism
referto orthodoxJudaism,which is the formpracticedin Israel, and,
therefore, the onlyformapplicablein a studyconcernedwithIsraelina-
tionalidentity.This formof Judaismis a "total"religion(in the senseof
a "totalinstitution").Unlike otherreligions, it prescribeseveryfacetof
everydaylife such as the food one eats, the cut of one's hair,the cloth
of one's dress,etc. Under theseconditions, secularization means a total
revolutionon both the individualand the communallevel, as does a re-
conversionof secularJews. Bearingthisuniquenessin mind,anygenerali-
zationfromthisstudymustbe made withtheutmostcaution.
THE CONFLICT
To understand the role of religionin contemporaryIsrael one mustfirst
analyzea basic conflictinherent in earlyZionism. Secularizationwas the

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 191
only means available to make the Zionistenterprise possible;yet, total
replacement of religiousby secularvalues would have defeatedthatvery
same enterprise, as thefollowing discussionwill show.
The Zionistmovementwas foundedand initiallyled by Herzl, a west
European,assimilated, nonorthodox Jew. But the bulk of membersand
supporters of themovement wereeast EuropeanJews: 89 percentof mem-
bershipfees came fromthemin 1903 and 72 percentin 1905 (computed
fromProtocolof the 7thZionistCongress:226). Onlya smallproportion
of easternEuropeanJewswere alreadyassimilatedat the time (Laqueur,
1974:37-39), and, even if nonpracticing, theycame predominantly from
an orthodoxJewishbackground.For orthodoxJews,Jewishreligionand
Jewishnationality were identical.This identity was establishedafterthe
secondexile and continueduntilit was deniedby the emancipation move-
mentin westernEurope (Shalom, 1975:591; Don-Yehiyaand Liebman,
1972; Shweid,1973). It is the orthodoxJews'perception of Judaismthat
will be discussed,since it was decisivein defining Zionismand, later,in
bringingabout the conflictbetweenreligiousvalues and Israeli identity:
theearlyimmigrants to Palestinecame mainlyfromeasternEurope (Eisen-
stadt,1967:8-9), and theiroutlookset thetonein Palestine,as it stilldoes
in Israelto a largeextent.
At the turnof the 19thcenturyand the beginning of the 20th,there
was a mass exodusof JewsfromeasternEurope. Of the morethan two
millionemigrants, 3.6 percentimmigrated to Palestine(Lestschinsky, 1944:
70). Those who chose Palestineas theirdestination could onlydo so by
a consciousact of defianceof the orthodoxJewishinterdiction against
rebuilding theHoly Land beforetheComingof the Messiah. Whatstarted
as discouragement graduallybecamea proscription intendedto make exile
bearable. If Jewswereto remainfaithful to theirreligionand nationality-
whichwere identicalin Judaism-whiledeprivedof theirhomeland,then
exile had to be presentedas a temporary state. On the otherhand, to
preventa constantfutileattemptto put an end to this unwantedstate,
a returnto the homelandhad to be deferredto some unspecified date in
the future.Meanwhile,one could carryon withday-to-day life sustained
by the hope of futureredemption.This way people could be reconciled
to theiroftenmiserablecondition.To justifythis,a returnto Palestine
was made conditionalon the Comingof the Messiah,and this Coming
was not to be hastenedby any positiveaction. Immigration to Palestine
was permitted only inasmuchas it was not intendedas a step towards
rebuildingPalestine,turningit into a going concern. Jews did go to
Palestinebut not to workor live an ordinarylife there. They could go
thereto prayand to die. Immigration to Palestinefor any otherpurpose
was declaredsinful,an act intendedto hastenthe Comingof the Messiah
(Weissbrod,1982). Secularizationwas thus an integralpart of Zionist
ideology.Even religiousZionistshad to disregard thisbasic tenetof ortho-
dox Judaism.ReligiousZionistsregardedthemselves as sectarian,but were
brandedhereticsby the religiousestablishment (Friedman,1978:93-97).
In view of the identityof Jewishreligionand Jewishnationality, as
perceivedby traditional Jews,a dilemmawas the inevitableconsequence

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192

of secularizingthe Messianic message. Jews could not immigrateto

Palestinewithoutreinterpretingthe religiousaspirationof a returnto Zion
in secularpoliticalterms. Yet, if theyjustifiedtheirpoliticalaction by
purelysecularvalues,such as beinga normalnationentitledto its own
homeland,theylosttheirspecificJewishidentity.The dilemmacould only
be resolvedif theycame up withsubstitute values thatcould definefor
thema new ideationalboundary.And thistheyseemto have been unable
to do. The firstseriouspower strugglewithinthe ZionistOrganization
demonstrates thiscontention.
Herzl, the founderof the Zionistmovement, came froman assimilated
westernEuropeanfamilyand had receivedno Jewisheducationwhatever.
When he firstproposeda solutionto the Jewishproblemin 1895, the
actual destination of emigration seemedirrelevant to him (Herzl, 1922:
21-28). By the timehe convenedthe firstZionistCongressin 1897, he
had opted for Palestine(Protocol of 1st ZionistCongress: 137; Herzl,
1905:45) because of its historicmeaningfor Jews. Even then he must
have realizedthat he could not mobilizesufficient supportfor his ideas
unlesshe appealedto a symbolof historical-religious forJews.
significance
Herzl starteda roundof diplomaticnegotiations to obtaina charterfor
a Jewishhomelandin Palestinebut met withno,immediatesuccess. In
1903, pogromsbrokeout in Russia,and immediaterelieffor the perse-
cutedJewsseemedessential.Herzl agreedto a Britishproposalto settle
Jewsin Uganda (Protocolof 6th ZionistCongress:115). The proposal
was put to thevoteand won by a clearmajority of 295 to 178 (Pp. 230).
But opponentsof it organizeda protest,conveneda conferencethree
monthslater,and threatened to secede fromthe ZionistOrganization un-
less Herzl retractedfromhis stand(Heiman,1974). At thenextCongress,
the Uganda resolutionwas revoked(Protocol of 7th ZionistCongress:
45-46).
At the time,protagonists of the Uganda proposalput forwardvery
reasonablearguments in supportof theirview. Uganda was an acceptable
substitutefor Palestine,because it was availablewhilePalestinewas not.
Uganda could save the lives of Jewsin need (Protocol of 6th Zionist
Congress: 157-58). Moreover,Uganda had economic resources,while
Palestinewas undevelopedand poor (Protocol of 7th ZionistCongress:
92). Indeed,Ugandawas preferable forsettingup thenew societyaspired
to by socialistZionists:its resourcesweremoreconduciveto theeconomic
improvement of the Jewishproletarian immigrants (Pp. 135-36). Yet the
proposalwas defeated.The arguments broughtin favorof Palestineare
highlyilluminating. "Thereis no ZionismwithoutZion" (Protocolof 6th
ZionistCongress:154-55). "Even if we are shownthe lushestcountries,
fullof milkand honey,we stillpreferthebare rocksof Palestine,because
theyare in Palestine"(P. 157). "Zion is thecountrywe love, theland of
our aspiration. . .there is only one countrywhich has such an attraction
for the entirepeople and that is Zion" (P. 162).
While supportersof Uganda used the term"Palestine,"opponentsre-
ferredmainlyto Zion. Zion is not the Biblicalname of Palestine(which
is Canaan or Eretz Israel) but the place of the sanctuarybuiltby King

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 193

Solomonin Jerusalem(Buber, 1973: XVII). Zion is the religioussymbol

of the homelandclearlyassociatedwithsacredness.And this name was
appliedto Palestineto justifya choiceunreasonableby secularstandards,
and it was used by peoplewho rejectedJewishreligion.
Christians location
had separatedtheconceptof Zion fromits territorial
and appliedit in a purelyreligiousconnotationto any place wherethe
Kingdomof God was establishedon earth. Herzl had probablyreinter-
pretedit in seculartermsas any place whereJewslivedas an independent
nation. But for his easternEuropeanfollowers,raisedin the Jewishtra-
dition,thisseparationwas inconceivable:Zion was meaninglessas a pure-
ly religiousor as a purelysecular term. It was meaningful only in its
Biblicalsense as the Holy Sanctuaryand the nationalcenter. Only this
interpretationcould rallysupportby creatinga renewedbasis of national
identity.

PARTIAL SECULARIZATION
Messianism
The conflictbetweenthe need to secularizeJewishnationalaspirations
and the inabilityto defineJewishnationality in seculartermswas not re-
solved. It remaineddormantand blockedthe way to completeseculari-
zation commonin Westernsocieties.Non-observant Zionistleadersjusti-
fied immigration to Palestineby secular values, namelysocial justice,
humanitarian creatinga psychologically
principles, sane people, etc. Yet
theyjustified thesevaluesby morebasic religiousones. Syrkin,a socialist
Zionist,wrotethat"The guidelineforthenew Jewishstatemustbe justice,
rationalplanningand social solidarity. . . (so that) The hope fora Mes-
siah . . . may be convertedinto politicalfact" (Syrkin,1935:28). The
woman pioneer(the pioneerswere avowedlysecular) was describedas
"The typeof a deeplyreligiousperson,who turnsher God and herself
intoan entity, who livestheidea to whichshe payshomage"(Stein,1927:
4). A pamphletproposeda socialisteconomyfor Palestine"to prepare
the trulygreat momentof which our ProphetIsaiah speaks" (Fuchs-
Robetin,1920).
These references to theMessianicidea are no coincidence.These secular
socialistswere probablyaware of the underlying for
religiousjustification
the nationalrenaissancetheyadvocated, and of the fact that the above
conflictwas irresolvable.The Messianicidea was expressedin secular
terms,but it remainedthe Messianicidea all the same. Jewish"nation-
hood" derivesfromthe CovenantwithGod, basingnationality and terri-
torialityon religiousvalues. Messianismis a laterreassertion of theCove-
nant. Messianismcould not be discardedsince Jewishnationalitywas
meaningless withoutit. And, indeed,the very man who most strongly
advocateda territorial definitionof Israeli identity was unable to ignore
this rationale. Since Messianismhad given the impetusto the Zionist
movement, it continuedto justifythe entireenterprise.
JewishMessianismredeemsnot only the Jewishpeople but the other
nationsas well. When the Jewsreturnto Zion and set up the perfect
society,theywill convertthe restof mankindby theirexample. This is

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194

the ultimate purpose of the Coming of the Messiah. Ben Gurion, the
uncontestedleader of socialist Labor for many years and Prime Minister
of Israel, was emphatic in tryingto separate Israeli identityfrom Jewish-
ness. Yet, according to him, this aspect of Messianism justifiedZionism
and was its ultimatepurpose.

The Jewishworkingclass in this countryis not a party,but an apostle:

the emissaryof Jewishhistory.It has absorbedthe heritageof Jewishlife
and expressesall its cravingsfor redemption.It has dedicateditselfheart
and soul, with no reservations, to the great apocalypticvision of Israel's
prophets,the visionof Jewishredemption withinthe framework of the sal-
vation of humanity(Ben Gurion, 1951a:10). One cannot understand
Jewishhistory. . . withoutrealizingthe ideationaluniquenessof the Jewish
nation and the stubbornstruggle,not merelyphysical,economic,political
and military, but spiritual,ethicaland ideational,whichthe Jewishpeople
has been carryingon . . . and will be carryingon . . . untilthe prophecy
of the last days is fulfilled(Ben Gurion,1951b:IX). The prophecyof the
last days of Israel's prophetsis orientedto the futureand links national
redemptionwith redemptionof the world, Israeli independencewith the
reignof peace and justiceforall people (P. XII). The stateof Israel will be
judged not by its riches,nor by its armyor technology, but by its ethical
characterand its humanitarian values. Justto be similarto otherpeoples,
we still have to make a hard and prolongedeffort.And to be "similarto
otherpeoples,"thatis to be a normal,healthy,freeand independent people,
is no meretrifle.. .. But we may each be a 'Chauvinist'and believethat
being similarto otherpeoples is not enough. We may aspire to fulfilthe
words of the Prophet'and give thee for a covenantof the people, for a
light of the nations' (Ben Gurion 1952:VII-VIII).

ReligiousSymbols
Since the religious and national value systems could not be separated
completely,neither could religious national symbols be replaced by new
secular ones. Instead, existingreligious symbols were given a secular in-
terpretation.Religious Zionists and the firstimmigrantsto Palestine were
observantJews who simply disregardedone religiousinterdiction.But the
second and third waves of immigrantsto Palestine, who came during
1904-1923, created the political center in JewishPalestine, and formulated
the ideology that became dominant,were secular with a vengeance. They
were atheists,and many were anti-religioussince they were Marxists or
of various socialist persuasions. At best they were condescendinglytoler-
ant; at worst they were outrightcontemptuousof observant Jews and of
religiousfaith and practice (Cnaani, 1976:47-53). They made a mockery
of the religious wedding ceremony, which they had to submit since
to, and turned all Jewish
there was no civil marriage in Palestine, holidays
into days of rest withoutany religioussignificance(Pp. 99-100).
And yet, even then, these avowed atheistskept numerous religioussym-
bols intact. They kept the Jewish holidays as days of rest and did not
substituteother days of the calendar for them. They justified this by
claiming that the symbols were not religious but national and traditional
(Cnaani, 1976:99-100). They also revived the Hebrew language, and that
required a differentexplanation. Yiddish was a vernacular spoken by the
great majorityof European Jews and by Jews exclusively. It could have
served perfectlywell as a national language and was known by all and
sundry. It was also the language used by the Jewish population already

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 195

in Palestinepriorto the arrivalof the secularizingpioneers.Yet, these

Hebrewas the nationallanguageand had
pioneersinsistedon establishing
to revivea languagedead fortwo thousandyears. Theydid so laboriously
and againstthe betterjudgmentof less secular Jewsin Palestine(Pp.,
84-88). This fairlyunreasonablechoice did not lend itselfto any easy
explanation:tradition favoredYiddishover Hebrew,whichwas the Holy
Language,the languageof Scriptureand prayer.Its introduction was at
odds with emphaticsecularization.It was justifiedmainlyon historical
grounds,as the languageof the Jewishpeoplebeforetheirexile (Pp. 84-
88). But actually,Jews in Palestinehad spoken Aramaic duringthe
Second Templeperiod,so thatthisexplanationwas not quitevalid.
When Israel became independent, the Labor partyformedthe govern-
ment. Beingthe largestparty,its voice was decisivein creatingthe new
state symbols,institutions,
and laws. Despite representing the avowedly
secularsectorof the population,Israelistatesymbolsintroduced by Labor
are originally
religioussymbolsgivena secularinterpretation. The Israeli
flagconsistsof theStarof David, and King David is not merelya national
hero but symbolizesMessianism:the Messiahis to be a directdescendant
of theHouse of David. Similarly, the symbolof the stateis the Menorah,
the seven-branched candelabrumthat adorned the inner sanctuaryof
Solomon'sTemple.
Law
Similarto Islam,Judaismcomprisesa completelegal code. Due to two
thousandyearsof exile,onlythoselaws regulating relationsbetweenindi-
vidualswereupdatedand observed,whileJewishcommunities had to sub-
mit to the laws of theirrespectivecountriesof domicilein all matters
regulating relationsbetweenthemand non-Jews and withthe state.
WhenIsraelwas established, it was declareda secularstate,yetreligion
has continuedto play a significant role in Israeli jurisprudence.In the
Ottomanempire,governedby Islamiclaw, religiousminorities weregranted
legal autonomyin all internalaffairs.When the Britishreceivedthe
mandateforPalestine,theyrestricted thisautonomy to privatelaw (Rubin-
stein,1971). When Israel was established, it retaineda peculiarmixture
of civil and religiouslaw. In Israel, thereis no completeseparationof
church and state since religiousinstitutions are legally recognizedand
financedby thestate. Moreover,thereis no civilmarriagenor civilburial.
Religiouscourtshave jurisdictionovermatrimonial law, but theirsentences
can be appealedin civil courtsand enforcement is effectedby the secular
authorities.Otherreligiouslaws, such as the prohibition to sell pork,or
to operatepublic transport and places of entertainment on the Sabbath,
come underthejurisdiction of secularcourts.
Most researchers have explainedthisstrangebedfellowship of the pro-
nouncedlysecularwith the archaicallyreligiousby politicalexpedience:
the Labor partyhad untilrecentlybeen the largestsinglepartyin Israel
but had never achievedan absolutemajority.Therefore,it requireda
reliablecoalitionpartner.The religiouspartybloc was ideal since its re-
quirements were mainlyreligious:it had no formulated economicpolicy
to counteract Labor (Super, 1949:1-50) nor any well-defined line on for-

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196
eign policy (Liebman,1975; Guttman,1971a; Badi, 1959:17-20). These
are certainly valid explanations forthe continuing coalitionbetweenLabor
and the religiousbloc as well as forthe enactment of religiouslaws as a
bargaining concession in return for compliance on economic and foreign
policy. But such arguments are an insufficient explanationfor the con-
tinuedvalidationby the Messianicmessage,for the continueduse of reli-
gioussymbols,or the religiousdefinition of ethnicity.
Judaismis a monoethnicreligion:religiousmembership is based on
membership in the community of the people of Israel,whichhas entered
intoa covenantwiththe God of Israel. Consequently, a convertto Juda-
ism can neverbe whollyacceptedsincehe remainsan ethnicstranger.He
is called 'Ger,' meaningbothstranger and convert.'Ger' is an ambivalent
statusof adheringto Judaicreligioustenetsbut not belonging fullyto the
community. The secular stateof Israel has not managed separatethis
to
of
unity religious and ethnicidentity.Accordingto Israelilaw, any Jew
immigrating to Israel is entitledto immediatecitizenship.For that pur-
pose, the personmustdeclarehimselfa Jewbona fide,and mustnot be
of any otherreligion(Eisenstadt,1967:259). Consequently, the rightto
citizenship restson religiousaffiliation,and thatis decidedin Israellargely
by the religiouscourts.Legally,a person'sdeclarationdetermines his reli-
gious status,but he or she cannotbe marriedunlessthe religiouscourts
are satisfiedof the couple'sJewishness.And Jewishness is determined by
religiouslaw.
The identity of Jewishnationality and Jewishreligionis clearlyadmit-
ted by the above interpretation of the "Law of Return"(the law granting
citizenship to Jewishimmigrants to Israel). This interpretation has only
been called intoquestionon rare occasions. In one case, thatof Brother
Daniel, a Jew convertedto Christianity who had become a monk,the
above interpretation was ruled invalid. BrotherDaniel arrivedin Israel
and requestedIsraelicitizenship by virtueof beingan ethnicJewaccord-
ing to religiouslaw, i.e., beingbornto a Jewishmother.In thatcase the
courtruledthattheLaw of Returnwas secularand did notapplyto some-
one holdinganotherreligion(Guttman,1971b:399-452). The rulingseems
grosslyirrelevant, since BrotherDaniel had requestedcitizenshipon ac-
countof his ethnicity and not of his religion.In a latercase, the court
avoidedrulingon the subjectof nationality (Pp. 399-452), probablynot-
ing the weaknessof the previousargument.
It seemsthatthe Israeli publicfeels as ambivalentabout the question
of secularversusreligiousethnicity as do the courtsand the government
of Israel. In past surveys,about30 percentof respondents declaredthem-
selves religious,but 43 percentof respondents supportedthe observance
of religiouslaws in publicplaces (Guttman,1971a). The Canaaniteswere
the only movementin Israel thatwas trulyconsistent in its demandto
separate religionfrom Israeli nationality.They proposed that Israelis
identifythemselvesas Canaanites,part of the indigenouspopulationof
the area. The movement neversucceededto gain any significant support.
Part of its membersunitedwith the splintersof two othermovements
opposed to religiouscoercion. They formedthe 'Haolam Haze-Koah

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 197

Hadash' party,which never won more than two seats in the 120-seat
Knesset,the Israeliparliament.Nor did its ideologicalsuccessor,the Ratz
party.
NationalIdentity
Afterthe establishment of Israel, an attemptwas made to resolvethe
conflictand base Israelinationalidentity on purelysecularvalues. It was
done by Labor and specifically by its leader, Ben Gurion.And it was done
inadvertently, not in order to resolvethe conflictand establishsecular
boundariesforIsraelinessbut in orderto distinguish Israelisfromthe rest
of worldJewry.This processand its causeshave been discussedelsewhere
(Weissbrod,1981a), and onlyitsresultsare relevantto thesubjectat hand.
By separating theconcept'Israeli'fromtheconcept'Jew,'exclusiveempha-
sis was put on territoriality as the boundarythat delineatedIsraelis. Is-
raelisweredefinedas the peoplewho lived in the stateof Israel,and the
justificationfor claimingrightsto this territory was primarily historical.
The peopleof Israelhad inhabited thiscountry in thepast,had been exiled
fromit, and now reclaimedtheirrightto it. Religioncould have nothing
to do withthisclaim,forit wouldhave includedworldJewry, and to in-
clude themwouldhave defeatedtheverypurposeof thisterritorial formu-
lationof Israelinationalidentity.
If historyalone was the justification for the claim for the territoryof
Israel, two thousandyears of diasporaexistencehad to be ignoredand
all emphasisplaced on the periodwhenJewshad lived as an independent
nationin theirland. Otherwise, a purelyhistoricalclaim was ratherun-
convincing.Consequently, Ben Gurionadvocatedthe studyof archeology
as a substitutefor more recentJewishhistory,which was concerned
mainlywiththe diaspora. Jewishhistoryhad its importance, "but in the
state of Israel we aspire to some otherIsraeli wisdom" (Ben Gurion,
1952). The studyof the Bible was to providethe ideationaljustification
forZionistaspirations (Ben Gurion,1957).
These exhortations bore readyfruit.The Israelicult of archeologyand
of the Bible as historyare well knownand have been interpreted as a
questforidentity, a searchforroots(Sachar 1976:588-89). Evidencefor
separationof Israeli and Jewishidentity is providedby two studies.In a
study conducted in 1964/65, 90 percentof respondentpupils identified
themselves as Israelis,whileonly68 percentidentified themselvesas Jews
(Herman,1970:49). In anotherstudy,university studentswere asked a
similarquestionin 1966, 1969 and 1970. While 90 percentidentified
themselves as Israelisin 1966,96 percentin 1969, and 97 percentin 1970,
only percentidentified
56 themselves as Jewsin 1966, 66 percentin 1969,
and 67 percentin 1970 (EtzioniwithShapira,1977:165).
Basingsecularnationalidentityon the Bible provedproblematic since
the Bible is undeniablya religiousbook,indeed,the Holy Book par excel-
lence. To view it merelyas a historicaldocumentis to denyits essence.
Biblicalhistoryis exclusivelyreligiousin the sense definedabove: it is
historydirectedby God alone in which human beingsin general,and
Jewsin particular,are God's tools,the executorsof God's will. Basing

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198

secularnationalidentityon the Bible is to bringin a religiousdefinition

of nationalidentityby the back door, so to speak. Since the religious
characterof the Bible was denied,this created an equivocal national
thatculminated
identity in a crisisof legitimation.

CRISIS OF IDENTITY
A social orderand the politicalcenterthatmaintains it enjoylegitimacy
if theyrepresent and implement the core values of theirsociety(Haber-
mas, 1976). Core values are usuallyrathervague and generaland can
be interpreted in a varietyof ways. But even so, the generalspiritof a
core value systemsets limitsto the varietyof its interpretations. When
the politicalcenteroverstepstheselimits,it is likelyto be faced witha
challengeto its legitimacy.In Israel,the occupationof the remainder of
theHoly Land-the WestBankof theJordantakenin theSix Day War-
gaveriseto sucha challenge.
The Six Day War resultedin a generaleuphoriacompoundedof the
military victoryand a generalsense of havingcome home,of havingre-
gained rightfulownership.But once the euphoria subsided,questions
were raised about the ethicalrightto thisfeelingof proprietorship over
territoriesobtainedby militaryconquest. Israeli national identitywas
based on territoriality,thatis, livingwithinthe boundariesof Israel. The
occupied territorieswere plainlyoutsidethese boundaries.On the other
hand,territoriality had been justified by ethicalsuperiority-being a light
unto the nations. And this stood in obvious contradiction to retaining
territories
conqueredin war. Historicalheritageas suchwas an insufficient
justificationsince it was based on a claim to land aspiredto, but not
actuallyreclaimed,fortwo thousandyears. Onlythe Bible could function
as the titledeed to this land, and Biblicalhistorywas religious.There-
fore,logicallyconsistent Israelishad to make a choice: eitherto retain
theirsecularidentity and relinquish the occupiedterritories or to redefine
theiridentity to allow forthe linkbetweenJewishreligionand nationality
and retainthe territories. As will be shown,a large part opted for the
secondchoice.
The challengewas raisedprimarily by secularIsraeli-bornyoungpeople
whoselinkswithJudaismhad neverbeen firmly established.Olderpeople
had severedtheselinksbut could stillreestablish themwhen confronted
witha dilemma.Young Israelishad no such resourcesto fall back upon.
(For a detaileddiscussionof thecausesand outcomeof generational differ-
ences in Israel, see Weissbrod,1981a.) And the challengewas initially
formulated by youngKibbutz members,those who had been socialized
mostemphatically to secularity.The occupationof territories conquered
in war createda riftin Israelisocietythatcut acrosspartyaffiliation. Very
convincingstrategicand politicalargumentswere put forwardboth in
favorof retaining the territories
and in favorof relinquishing them. The
ethicalquestionthusgainedin importance sincean answerto it could pro-
vide the values justifying eitherchoice. Two books of interviews with
soldierswho had foughtin the war becamewidelyread and discussedin
Israel,because theywere the firstto give full expressionto the crisisof

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 199

identityresulting fromthis ethicaldilemma. One soldierwas quoted as

sayingthatthe fighting "has made us thinkmore about Zionismand our
rightto Eretz Israel" (Talk of Warriors,1967:13). Anotherstatedthat
Zionism,the ideologyof immigration linked
to EretzIsrael,was intricately
to the problemof the conflict withthe Arabs; the entireconflict was un-
ethical,as was the settlement of Palestinein the past and in the future,
unlessit was effected by Jewsreclaiming theirheritage("Do We Have a
SpiritualWorld?" 1969). An articlein Shdemot,a periodicalof young
Kibbutzmembers, statedthat"Preachingabouta commonZionistinterest,
the aspiredfatherland, 'It is good to die formy country'and 'We are all
pioneers'. . . createsnon-confidence in sloganswhichis totallyjustified.
This educationto values,whichattempts to identifyyouthwiththe exis-
tenceof Israel,withoutconsidering thecharacterof the state,is education
to falsegeneralities"
(Kafkafi1975).
Questioning the veryexistenceof a social orderin its territorialboun-
dariesis the mostseriouschallengeto the legitimacy of thatorderand to
the politicalcenterthatmaintainsit. As partof thatorder,the challenger
also rendershimselfvulnerableand is likelyto seek the cause of his pre-
dicament.As thecarriersof secularLabor Zionism,Kibbutzmembershad
been an elite in JewishPalestine. Though theirelite positionhas de-
clined, they still carry considerableinfluence.The second generation
amongthemfelt very ambivalentabout theiridentity.In the Kibbutz,
Jewishreligionand traditionhad been rejectedmore completely than in
the restof Israel,so thatyoungKibbutzmemberswere more aware than
otheryoungIsraelis of the contradiction inherentin secular patriotism
by
justified a historical
right derivedfrom Holy Scripture.
Secularitywas frequently blamedfor this crisis,definedby some as a
crisisof identityand by othersas a crisisof ideology.Accordingto one
author,theKibbutzhad been themajorcarrierof the revolutionary aspect
of Messianism,and it was therefore also the firstto seek ways to free
itselffromsecularization thathad caused the crisis(Meron, 1970). The
same themewas takenup by otherIsraelis. The Ministerof Education,
AharonYadlin, blamed the crisison the fact that nationalidentitywas
secular. To resolvethe crisis"Our policy. . . is based on acquainting the
youngergeneration with every facet of this tradition-withthe Bible,
createdwhen the people was young,and the Talmud,the productof a
maturenation."(Yadlin, 1970:44). Anotherauthorbelievedsecularna-
tionalidentity to be a false Messianism,a delusionthathad perpetrated
the crisis(Zur, 1968). An eminentscholarof Judaismwas of the same
opinion.
I alwaysthought via secularity
thattransition was essential,
unavoidable.
But I do not thinkthatthe secularvisionof Zionismis final(Shalom,
1975:40). I thinkwe cannotexpressconceptually
thechaosthathas come
about;we ourselveswantedit. . . . We regardedsecularity as the raw
a situation
material, fromwhichsomething new wouldevolve(p. 48).
Young Kibbutzmembers,who feltthe crisismost,were also the first
to seek a renewedidentityby way of Jewishreligionand Jewishhistory.
in articlesin Shdemot,the Kibbutzperiodical,
This can be seen repeatedly

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200

as well as in the above citedbooks of interviews withKibbutzmembers

who had foughtin the Six Day War. Followingare some examples.Na-
tionalidentity was equatedwithJewishidentity, and the remedyproposed
forthe crisiswas the reintroduction Jewish
intoKibbutzlife of traditional
holidays and symbols(Ayali, 1969; "What Is the ConnectingLink?"
1969). Since originalZionismhad lost its abilityto providean unequivo-
cal nationalidentity,a newlydefinedidentitywas needed,linkedwith
Judaismand a reidentification withworld Jewry(Amishai,1970). The
Six Day War had broughtthe diasporacloserand had initiateda search
forJewishidentity overand above Israeliness("Cast Anchorin Life Once
More,"1969).
Indeed,the reintroduction of orthodoxreligiouscelebrationsof Jewish
holidaysin numerousKibbutzimhas alreadybeen noted (Deshen, 1978).
More generally, thewell-known scenesof hardened,secularIsraelisoldiers
kissingtheWesternWall was regardedby one authoras a questfora re-
newedidentity(Sachar, 1976:598-614). The WesternWall is a religious
symbol,beingpartof the wall thatonce surrounded theTemple,theHoly
Shrine. It is not a symbolof empirenor of nationalindependence (such
as Masada) but ratherthe boundaryof theholiestJewishshrine.As such
it had been veneratedoverthe ages, and as such it touchedthe emotions
of youngsecularIsraelis. The resultsof a recentsurveyare therefore not
surprising.Accordingto surveysconductedin 1963, 1969, and 1973, an
average30 percentof the Israelipublicdefinedthemselves as religiousor
traditional,thatis, mildlyobservant(EtzioniwithShapira,1977:173). In
the mostrecentsurvey,56.5 percentof respondents definedthemselves as
religiousor traditional(Pori Public OpinionPoll, Haaretz, 3.1.82). It
seemsthatwhatstartedas a questby youngKibbutzmembershas mean-
whilebecomea moregeneraltrendamongthe Israelipublicat large.

RENEWED RELIGIOUS NATIONAL IDENTITY

It was not a simplematterof readoptingorthodoxJudaism,though.
OrthodoxJudaismcould not providethe new national identitysought
after.To thisday,the stateof Israel is a subjectof controversy in ortho-
dox circlesin Israel. Some denythe identity betweenZion and Israel,and
refuseto regardthe stateof Israel as the restorationof the ancientHoly
Land. It is a commandment to servethe Holy Land, but thisappliesto
Israel only if the two conceptsare synonymous(Liebman 1975). If
orthodoxJudaismcould not do the job a new brandof Jewishreligiosity
could. The religiousNew Zionismof Gush Emunimhas been analyzed
elsewhere(Weissbrod,1982), and onlythoseaspectsrelevantto our dis-
cussionwill be pointedout here. New Zionismholdsthattherightto the
Holy Land, includingbothIsrael and the occupiedterritories on the West
Bank, derivesfromthe covenantbetweenGod and God's People, Israel.
Being an inalienableright,it is the dutyof everyJewto claim it. This
argumentis totallyreligioussince it makes God the wielderof human
destiny.Man is but an instrument for realizingGod's will. Nor can the
dicta of religiousdoctrinebe questionedby human logical or ethical
standards.Therefore,the potentialpoliticalconsequencesof actionsdic-

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 201

tatedby religiouscommandment can be ignored(Goldmann,1977; Lamm,

1974).
Young religiousIsraelishad not experienced thesame ambivalenceabout
theirJewishidentity as had secularones. In the previously citedstudyon
Jewishand Israeli identification of pupils,68 percentof the respondents
identifiedthemselvesas Jews. But when brokendown by orthodoxy, 98
percent of the religiouspupils and 78 percent of the traditionalones did
so, as againstonly 46 percentof secularpupils (Herman, 1970:49,51).
In the same study,pupilswere also askedto markthe relativeimportance
of Israeliness,as againstJewishness, on a 7-score semanticdifferential
scale runningfrom1 (Israeliness)to 7 (Jewishness).The averagewas
3.5 for the total,brokendown to 5.1 for religiouspupils,3.6 for tradi-
tionalones, and 2.6 for secularones (quoted in Liebmann,1977). The
beginning of the trendtoward,a renewedJewishidentity can be detected
in a follow-upto the above study,conductedin 1974. By then, the
averagefor religiouspupilshad risenonlyslightly to 5.4, but it had risen
to 4.4 fortraditionalpupilsand to 3.1 forsecular ones (Liebmann,1977).
On the otherhand,the Israelinessof orthodoxIsraeliswas regardedas
questionableby secular Israelis. Since observantIsraelis have remained
largelyaloof fromIsraelisociety,due to geographicsegregation and a dis-
tinctlifestyle(Deshen, 1978), their attitudescould not be established
directlyby thesecularpopulationof Israel. Instead,theyhave beenlargely
inferred frompoliciesof the religiousparties.This mightseem an unfair
inference sincethe religiouspartiesnevergainedmorethan 10 percentof
the votes,whilean average30 percentof the publicdeclaredthemselves
religious.The religiouspartiesclearlydid not represent the bulk of the
religiouspublic; yet theirpoliciescreatedthe image that secularIsraelis
had of the orthodox.The religiousparties,and notablythe NationalReli-
gious Party,whichis by far the largestamongthem,were untilrecently
expresslynonmilitant and nonnationalistic (Deshen, 1977; Nave, 1977).
The NationalReligiousPartyadoptedthatname so as to stressits recog-
nitionof the state of Israel as the divinelypromisedhomelandof the
Jewishpeople to which Jewsshould return.This distinguishes it from
otherorthodoxcircleswho denythatlink and have opposedsettlement in
Palestineand Israel (Tirosh, 1975). But the name does not implyna-
tionalism.Thoughthis partyrunsTalmudiccolleges,whose studentsdo
part-time militaryservice,it insistson an exemption, on principle, of Tal-
mudicscholarsfromconscription and of girlsdeclaringthemselves to be
religious.In a countrylivingunderconstantthreatof war,thisin itselfis
sufficientgroundsformakingsuspecta nationalidentity based on religious
Zionism.
In contrast,the formulators of religiousNew Zionism,Gush Emunim,
preached and practiced a new ideologythatwas bothmilitantly national-
istic and religious.They had servedin the armyand had foughtin the
Six Day War. Theirinsistence on settlingthenewly"liberated"Holy Land
was furtherproof of theiractive patriotism.Their ideologycould thus
providea renewednationalidentity thatwas specifically Israeliyet based
on Jewishreligion.

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202

There are strongindications thatNew Zionismhas indeedsucceededin

doing so. The increasingdominance of Gush Emunimideologyhas been
discussedat lengthelsewhere(Weissbrod,1981b) and has been frequently
lamentedin the Israeli press (e.g., Rubinstein,1982; Shapiro,1982) as
well as by Israelischolarssuch as ProfessorShalom (1975:50) and Pro-
fessorLeibowitz(Zakai, 1978). There is also extensiveevidenceof the
consequencesof this dominance. The Israeli government's supportfor
Gush Emunimsettlements on the West Bank, despiteinternational dis-
approval,has becomecommonknowledge.Public supportfor themruns
at 48.8 percent(Haaretz, 13.8.81). The law declaringJerusalem the capi-
tal of Israelwas initiated
by Tehia,a new partyclaimingto representGush
Emunim. But the law won an overwhelming majority in the Knesset.
Supportfortheextensionof Israelilaw to the Golan Heightsrunsat 66.4
percent(JerusalemPost, 25.2.82). Religiosity as such has also increased
substantiallyin Israel,as shownearlier,whichmeans thatreligiosity has
becomerespectablein Israel whencombinedwithpatriotism.Duringthe
Yom KippurWar, the media repeatedlystressedthe participation in the
fighting of Talmudiccollegestudents(Liebman,1975).

CONCLUSION
The Israeli case demonstrated the difficulty in secularizinga national
identityoriginallybased on religiousvalues. JewishMessianismwas the
value systemon whichJewishidentity rested. People broughtup to ad-
here to thesecore values were unableto rejectthemtotally,thoughthis
rejectionwas dictatedby theirideologicalcommitment. Consequently, any
redefinitionof nationalidentityin secular termswas self-contradictory.
Even if originallybased on religion,a secularidentity may crystallize if
secularizationis gradual,thoughthat need not always succeed as the
Polishcase demonstrates. But wheneffected suddenly, it is likelyto create
an ideationalvoid. In that case, the reinterpreted originalreligiouscore
valuesare likelyto fillthisvoid. Israelis not uniquein thatrespect.The
religiousrevivalin Iran, the Sinhaleserevolution in Ceylon,the ascentof
LiberationTheologyin Latin America,and the beginning of religiousdis-
sentin the SovietUnion are some further examplesthatseem to support
thisconclusion.
Since secularizationof the value systemremainedincomplete,so did
that of the symbolicsystem.The overtmeaningsof religioussymbols
were transformed into secularones, but the intrinsicmeaningremained
significantfor thosewho had willfullybrokenaway fromJewishortho-
doxy. Theirsons,though,had been raisedon secularstatismalone. This
made themmuch more aware of the ambivalenceof a pseudo-secular
identitywhen confronted withthe dilemmaposed by the Six Day War.
They weretherefore the firstto challengethe entiresocial orderthatwas
justifiedby thisambivalent bodyof ideas. This crisisof identity led them
to adopt a new religiousdefinition of nationalidentitydevoid of any
ambiguity, whichseemsto be spreadingto the publicat large.
Providinga nationalidentity maynotbe a universalfunction of religion
in contemporary societies,but it is stilla fairlycommonone. Even in an

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 203

apparentlysecular society such as England, God has not really ceased to

be an Englishman. In many secular societies, the religious motifs consti-
tute an underpinning-values so much taken for granted that their reli-
gious origin is not consciously perceived. But in times of crisis,when the
legitimacyof the social order is called in question, the religious aspect of
core national values is again invoked and made obvious. It would seem
that the sacral nature of patriotic concepts is ill-suited to secularization,
for, after all, the sacred is the domain of religion.
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