EY Industrial Sales vs Shen Dar

Case Digest GR 184850 Oct 20 2010

Facts:

EYIS is a domestic corporation engaged in the production, distribution and sale of air compressors and
other industrial tools and equipment. On the other hand, Shen Dar is a Taiwan-based foreign
manufacturer of air compressors. From 1997 to 2004, EYIS imported air compressors from Shen Dar.
Both of them sought to register the mark VESPA for use on air compressors, but it was Shen Dar who first
filed the application on June 1997. EYIS application was first granted on 2004, so Shen Dar sought for its
cancellation on the ground of Sec 123 of the Intellectual Property Code which provides that the
registration of a similar mark is prevented with the filing of an earlier application for registration. On the
other hand, EYIS contended that Shen Dar is not entitled to register the mark VESPA on its products
because EYIS has been using it as the sole assembler and distributor of air compressors since the 1990s.
EYIS was able to prove such fact.

Issue: W/N EYIS is the true owner of the mark VESPA

Yes. EYIS is the true owner because it is the prior and continuous user of the mark VESPA.

Section 123.1 of the IPC should not be interpreted to mean that ownership is based upon an earlier filing
date. While RA 8293 removed the previous requirement of proof of actual use prior to the filing of an
application for registration of a mark, proof of prior and continuous use is necessary to
establish ownership of a mark. Ownership of a mark or trade name may be acquired not necessarily by
registration but by adoption and use in trade or commerce.

As between actual use of a mark without registration, and registration of the mark without actual use
thereof, the former prevails over the latter. Hence, EYIS is entitled to the registration of the mark in its
name.

Funa vs Villar
Case Digest GR 192791 April 24 2012

Facts:

On February 15, 2001, Pres Arroyo appointed Carague as Chairman of the COA for a term of 7 years.
Caragues term of office started on February 2, 2001 to end on February 2, 2008. On February 7, 2004,
Villar was appointed as the third member of the COA for a term of 7 years starting February 2, 2004 until
February 2, 2011.

Following the retirement of Carague on February 2, 2008 and during the fourth year of Villar as COA
Commissioner, Villar was designated as Acting Chairman of COA from February 4, 2008 to April 14, 2008.
Subsequently, on April 18, 2008, Villar was nominated and appointed as Chairman of the COA. Shortly
thereafter, the Commission on Appointments confirmed his appointment. He was to serve as Chairman
of COA, as expressly indicated in the appointment papers, until the expiration of the original term of his
office as COA Commissioner or on February 2, 2011.

Issue 1: W/N a promotional appointment from the position of Commissioner to Chairman is

constitutionally permissible and does NOT constitute reappointment as barred by the Article IX (D), Sec 1
(2) of the Constitution
Yes. A commissioner who resigns after serving in the Commission for less than seven years is eligible for
an appointment to the position of Chairman for the unexpired portion of the term of the departing
chairman. Such appointment is not covered by the ban on reappointment, provided that the aggregate
period of the length of service as commissioner and the unexpired period of the term of the predecessor
will not exceed 7 years and provided further that the vacancy in the position of Chairman resulted
from death, resignation, disability or removal by impeachment.

Reappointment found in Sec. 1(2), Art. IX(D) means a movement to one and the same office
(Commissioner to Commissioner or Chairman to Chairman). On the other hand, an appointment
involving a movement to a different position or office (Commissioner to Chairman) would constitute a
new appointment and, hence, not, in the strict legal sense, a reappointment barred under the
Constitution.

Issue 2: W/N the appointment of Villar to the position of COA Chairman which is made vacant by the
expiration of term of the predecessor is valid

No. The Constitution clearly provides that if the vacancy results from the expiration of the term of the
predecessor, the appointment of a COA member shall be for a fixed 7-year term.

Here, the vacancy in the position of COA chairman left by Carague in February 2, 2008 resulted from
the expiration of his 7-year term. Under that circumstance, there can be no unexpired portion of the
term of the predecessor to speak of. Hence, in light of the 7-year aggregate rule, Villars appointment to
a full term is not valid as he will be allowed to serve more than seven 7 years under the constitutional
ban.

Villar had already served 4 years of his 7-year term as COA Commissioner. A shorter term, however, to
comply with the 7-year aggregate rule would also be invalid as the corresponding appointment would
effectively breach the clear purpose of the Constitution of giving to every appointee so appointed
subsequent to the first set of commissioners, a fixed term of office of 7 years.

Notes:

A. One of the doctrinal guidelines outlined in Matibag vs Benipayo has been effectively abandoned by
the Courts pronouncement in this case.

Cocofed vs Republic
Case Digest GR 177857-58 Jan 24 2012

Facts:
In 1971, RA 6260 created the Coconut Investment Company (CIC) to administer the Coconut Investment
Fund, a fund to be sourced from levy on the sale of copra. The copra seller was, or ought to be, issued
COCOFUND receipts. The fund was placed at the disposition of COCOFED, the national association of
coconut producers having the largest membership.

When martial law started in 1972, several presidential decrees were issued to improve the coconut
industry through the collection and use of the coconut levy fund:

PD 276 established the Coconut Consumers Stabilization Fund (CCSF) and declared the proceeds of the
CCSF levy as trust fund, to be utilized to subsidize the sale of coconut-based products, thus stabilizing the
price of edible oil.

PD 582 created the Coconut Industry Development Fund (CIDF) to finance the operation of a hybrid
coconut seed farm.

In 1973, PD 232 created the Philippine Coconut Authority (PCA) to accelerate the growth and
development of the coconut and palm oil industry.

Then came P.D. No. 755 in July 1975, providing under its Section 1 the policy to provide readily available
credit facilities to the coconut farmers at preferential rates. Towards achieving this, Section 2 of PD 755
authorized PCA to utilize the CCSF and the CIDF collections to acquire a commercial bank and deposit the
CCSF levy collections in said bank, interest free, the deposit withdrawable only when the bank has
attained a certain level of sufficiency in its equity capital. It also decreed that all levies PCA is authorized
to collect shall not be considered as special and/or fiduciary funds or form part of the general funds of
the government.

Both P.D. Nos. 961 and 1468 also provide that the CCSF shall not be construed by any law as a special
and/or trust fund, the stated intention being that actual ownership of the said fund shall pertain to
coconut farmers in their private capacities.

Shortly before the issuance of PD 755 however, PCA had already bought from Peping Cojuangco 72.2% of
the outstanding capital stock of FUB / UCPB. In that contract, it was also stipulated that Danding
Cojuanco shall receive equity in FUB amounting to 10%, or 7.22 % of the 72.2%, as consideration for
PCAs buy-out of what Danding Conjuanco claim as his exclusive and personal option to buy the FUB
shares.

The PCA appropriated, out of its own fund, an amount for the purchase of the said 72.2% equity. It later
reimbursed itself from the coconut levy fund.

While the 64.98% (72.2 % 7.22%) portion of the option shares ostensibly pertained to the farmers, the
corresponding stock certificates supposedly representing the farmers equity were in the name of and
delivered to PCA. There were, however, shares forming part of the 64.98% portion, which ended up in
the hands of non-farmers. The remaining 27.8% of the FUB capital stock were not covered by any of the
agreements.

Through the years, a part of the coconut levy funds went directly or indirectly to various projects and/or
was converted into different assets or investments. Of particular relevance to this was their use to
acquire the FUB / UCPB, and the acquisition by UCPB, through the CIIF and holding companies, of a large
block of San Miguel Corporation (SMC) shares.
Issue 1: W/N the mandate provided under PD 755, 961 and 1468 that the CCSF shall not be construed by
any law as a special and/or trust fund is valid

No. The coconut levy funds can only be used for the special purpose and the balance thereof should
revert back to the general fund.

Article VI, Section 29 (3) of the Constitution provides that all money collected on any tax levied for a
special purpose shall be treated as a special fund and paid out for such purpose only, and if the
purpose for which a special fund was created has been fulfilled or abandoned, the balance, if any, shall
be transferred to the general funds of the Government. Here, the CCSF were sourced from forced
exactions with the end-goal of developing the entire coconut industry. Therefore, the subsequent
reclassification of the CCSF as a private fund to be owned by private individuals in their private capacities
under P.D. Nos. 755, 961 and 1468 is unconstitutional.

Not only is it unconstitutional, but the mandate is contrary to the purpose or policy for which the coco
levy fund was created.

Issue 2:

W/N the coco levy fund may be owned by the coconut farmers in their private capacities

No. The coconut levy funds are in the nature of taxes and can only be used for public purpose. They
cannot be used to purchase shares of stocks to be given for free to private individuals. Even if the money
is allocated for a special purpose and raised by special means, it is still public in character.

Accordingly, the presidential issuances which authorized the PCA to distribute, for free, the shares of
stock of the bank it acquired to the coconut farmers under such rules and regulations the PCA may
promulgate is unconstitutional.

It is unconstitutional because first, it have unduly delegated legislative power to the PCA, and second, it
allowed the use of the CCSF to benefit directly private interest by the outright and unconditional grant of
absolute ownership of the FUB/UCPB shares paid for by PCA entirely with the CCSF to the undefined
coconut farmers, which negated or circumvented the national policy or public purpose declared by P.D.
No. 755.

Hence, the so-called Farmers shares do not belong to the coconut farmers in their private capacities, but
to the Government. The coconut levy funds are special public funds and any property purchased by
means of the coconut levy funds should likewise be treated as public funds or public property, subject to
burdens and restrictions attached by law to such property.

Narra Nickel Mining vs Redmont

G.R. No. 195580, January 28, 2015

Facts:

Narra and its co-petitioner corporations Tesoro and MacArthur, filed a motion before the SC to
reconsider its April 21, 2014 Decision which upheld the denial of their MPSA applications. The SC
affirmed the CA ruling that there is a doubt to their nationality, and that in applying the Grandfather
Rule, the finding is that MBMI, a 100% Canadian-owned corporation, effectively owns 60% of the
common stocks of petitioners by owning equity interests of the petitioners other majority corporate
shareholders. Narra, Tesoro and MacArthur argued that the application of the Grandfather Rule to
determine their nationality is erroneous and allegedly without basis in the Constitution, the FIA, the
Philippine Mining Act, and the Rules issued by the SEC. These laws and rules supposedly espouse the
application of the Control Test in verifying the Philippine nationality of corporate entities for purposes of
determining compliance with Sec. 2, Art. XII of the Constitution that only corporations or associations at
least 60% of whose capital is owned by such Filipino citizens may enjoy certain rights and privileges, like
the exploration and development of natural resources.

Issue: W/N the application by the SC of the grandfather resulted to the abandonment of the control
test

Held:

No. The control test can be applied jointly with the Grandfather Rule to determine the observance of
foreign ownership restriction in nationalized economic activities. The Control Test and the Grandfather
Rule are not incompatible ownership-determinant methods that can only be applied alternative to each
other. Rather, these methods can, if appropriate, be used cumulatively in the determination of the
ownership and control of corporations engaged in fully or partly nationalized activities, as the mining
operation involved in this case or the operation of public utilities.

The Grandfather Rule, standing alone, should not be used to determine the Filipino ownership and
control in a corporation, as it could result in an otherwise foreign corporation rendered qualified to
perform nationalized or partly nationalized activities. Hence, it is only when the Control Test is first
complied with that the Grandfather Rule may be applied. Put in another manner, if the subject
corporations Filipino equity falls below the threshold 60%, the corporation is immediately considered
foreign-owned, in which case, the need to resort to the Grandfather Rule disappears.

In this case, using the control test, Narra, Tesoro and MacArthur appear to have satisfied the 60-40
equity requirement. But the nationality of these corporations and the foreign-owned common investor
that funds them was in doubt, hence, the need to apply the Grandfather Rule.

Narra Nickel Mining vs Redmont

Case Digest GR 185590, Apr 21 2014

Facts:

Redmont is a domestic corporation interested in the mining and exploration of some areas in Palawan.
Upon learning that those areas were covered by MPSA applications of other three (allegedly Filipino)
corporations Narra, Tesoro, and MacArthur, it filed a petition before the Panel of Arbitrators of DENR
seeking to deny their permits on the ground that these corporations are in reality foreign-owned. MBMI,
a 100% Canadian corporation, owns 40% of the shares of PLMC (which owns 5,997 shares of Narra), 40%
of the shares of MMC (which owns 5,997 shares of McArthur) and 40% of the shares of SLMC (which, in
turn, owns 5,997 shares of Tesoro).

Aside from the MPSA, the three corporations also applied for FTAA with the Office of the President. In
their answer, they countered that (1) the liberal Control Test must be used in determining the nationality
of a corporation as based on Sec 3 of the Foreign Investment Act which as they claimed admits of
corporate layering schemes, and that (2) the nationality question is no longer material because of their
subsequent application for FTAA.

Commercial / Political Law

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Issue 1: W/N the Grandfather Rule must be applied in this case

Yes. It is the intention of the framers of the Constitution to apply the Grandfather Rule in cases where
corporate layering is present.

First, as a rule in statutory construction, when there is conflict between the Constitution and a statute,
the Constitution will prevail. In this instance, specifically pertaining to the provisions under Art. XII of the
Constitution on National Economy and Patrimony, Sec. 3 of the FIA will have no place of application.
Corporate layering is admittedly allowed by the FIA, but if it is used to circumvent the Constitution and
other pertinent laws, then it becomes illegal.

Second, under the SEC Rule1 and DOJ Opinion2 , the Grandfather Rule must be applied when the 60-40
Filipino-foreign equity ownership is in doubt. Doubt is present in the Filipino equity ownership of Narra,
Tesoro, and MacArthur since their common investor, the 100% Canadian-owned corporation MBMI,
funded them.

Under the Grandfather Rule, it is not enough that the corporation does have the required 60% Filipino
stockholdings at face value. To determine the percentage of the ultimate Filipino ownership, it must first
be traced to the level of the investing corporation and added to the shares directly owned in the investee
corporation. Applying this rule, it turns out that the Canadian corporation owns more than 60% of the
equity interests of Narra, Tesoro and MacArthur. Hence, the latter are disqualified to participate in the
exploration, development and utilization of the Philippines natural resources.

1 DOJ Opinion No. 020 Series of 2005 (paragraph 7)

2 SEC Opinion May 13, 1990

SM Land vs BCDA
GR 203655 March 18, 2015 En Banc
GR 203655 August 13, 2014

Facts:

When BCDA opened for disposition its Bonifacio South Property pursuant to RA 7227, SMLI offered to
undertake the development of said property by submitting a succession of unsolicited proposals to
BCDA. BCDA then entered into negotiations with SMLI until the BCDA finally accepted the terms of the
final unsolicited proposal. Their agreement was thereafter reduced into writing through the issuance of
the Certification of Successful Negotiations in 2010.

It was agreed that BCDA accepted SMLIs unsolicited proposal and declared SMLI eligible to enter into
the proposed Joint Venture activity. It also agreed to subject SMLIs Original Proposal to Competitive
Challenge pursuant to NEDA Joint Venture Guidelines, which competitive challenge process shall be
immediately implemented following the Terms of Reference. Moreover, said Certification provides that
the BCDA shall commence the activities for the solicitation for comparative proposals. Years later
however, the BCDA through the issuance of Supplemental Notice No. 5 terminated the competitive
challenge for the selection of BCDAs joint venture partner for the development of a portion of Fort
Bonifacio.

SMLI, through a petition for CPM, argued that BCDAs unilateral termination of the competitive challenge
is a violation of SMLIs rights as an original proponent and constitutes abandonment of BCDAs
contractual obligations. BCDA, on the other hand, responded that it is justifiable since NEDA JV
Guidelines is a mere guideline and not a law, and that the Government has a right to terminate the
competitive challenge when the terms are disadvantageous to public interest.

Issue 1: W/N the NEDA JV Guidelines has the binding effect and force of law

Yes. Administrative issuances, such as the NEDA JV Guidelines, duly promulgated pursuant to the rule-
making power granted by statute, have the force and effect of law. Being an issuance in compliance with
an executive edict, the NEDA JV Guidelines has the same binding effect as if it were issued by the
President himself, who parenthetically is a member of NEDA. As such, no agency or instrumentality
covered by the JV Guidelines can validly deviate from the mandatory procedures set forth therein, even
if the other party acquiesced therewith or not.

Read more

Issue 2: W/N BCDA committed grave abuse of discretion in issuing Supplemental Notice No. 5

Yes. Being an instrumentality of the government, it is incumbent upon the BCDA to abide by the laws,
rules and regulations, and perform its obligations with utmost good faith. It cannot, under the guise of
protecting the public interest, disregard the clear mandate of the NEDA JV Guidelines and
unceremoniously disregard the very commitments it made to the prejudice of the SMLI that innocently
relied on such promises.

It is in instances such as thiswhere an agency, instrumentality or officer of the government evades the
performance of a positive duty enjoined by lawwherein the exercise of judicial power is warranted.
Consistent with the Courts solemn obligation to afford protection by ensuring that grave abuses of
discretion on the part of a branch or instrumentality of the government do not go unchecked, the
Petition for Certiorari must be granted and the corresponding injunctive relief be made permanent.

Issue 3: W/N the BCDA is in estoppel

Yes. Although as a general rule, the government cannot be estopped by the mistakes or errors of its
officials or agents, such will not apply if injustice is perpetrated.

To allow BCDA to renege on its statutory and contractual obligations would cause grave prejudice to
petitioner, who already invested time, effort, and resources in the study and formulation of the proposal,
in the adjustment thereof, as well as in the negotiations. To permit BCDA to suddenly cancel the
procurement process and strip SMLI of its earlier-enumerated rights as an Original Proponent at this
pointafter the former has already benefited from SMLIs proposal through the acquisition of
information and ideas for the development of the subject propertywould unjustly enrich the agency
through the efforts of petitioner. What is worse, to do so would be contrary to BCDAs representations
and assurances that it will respect SMLIs earlier acquired rights, which statements SMLI reasonably and
innocently believed. All told, the BCDAs acceptance of the unsolicited proposal and the successful in-
depth negotiation cannot be written off as mere mistake or error that respondents claim to be reversible
and not susceptible to the legal bar of estoppel. The subsequent cancellation of the Competitive
Challenge on grounds that infringe the contractual rights of SMLI and violate the NEDA JV Guidelines
cannot be shrouded with legitimacy by invoking the estoppel rule.

Hacienda Luisita vs PARC

Case Digest GR 171101 July 5 2011 Nov 22 2011

Facts:

In 1988, RA 6657 or the CARP law was passed. It is a program aimed at redistributing public and private
agricultural lands to farmers and farmworkers who are landless. One of the lands covered by this law is
the Hacienda Luisita, a 6,443-hectare mixed agricultural-industrial-residential expanse straddling several
municipalities of Tarlac. Hacienda Luisita was bought in 1958 from the Spanish owners by the Tarlac
Development Corporation (TADECO), which is owned and/or controlled by Jose Cojuanco Sr., Group. Back
in 1980, the Martial Law administration filed an expropriation suit against TADECO to surrender the
Hacienda to the then Ministry of Agrarian Reform (now DAR) so that the land can be distributed to the
farmers at cost. The RTC rendered judgment ordering TADECO to surrender Hacienda Luisita to the MAR.

In 1988, the OSG moved to dismiss the governments case against TADECO. The CA dismissed it, but the
dismissal was subject to the condition that TADECO shall obtain the approval of FWB (farm worker
beneficiaries) to the SDP (Stock Distribution Plan) and to ensure its implementation.

Sec 31 of the CARP Law allows either land transfer or stock transfer as two alternative modes in
distributing land ownership to the FWBs. Since the stock distribution scheme is the preferred option of
TADECO, it organized a spin-off corporation, the Hacienda Luisita Inc. (HLI), as vehicle to facilitate stock
acquisition by the farmers.

After conducting a follow-up referendum and revision of terms of the Stock Distribution Option
Agreement (SDOA) proposed by TADECO, the Presidential Agrarian Reform Council (PARC), led by then
DAR Secretary Miriam Santiago, approved the SDP of TADECO/HLI through Resolution 89-12-2 dated Nov
21, 1989.

From 1989 to 2005, the HLI claimed to have extended those benefits to the farmworkers. Such claim was
subsequently contested by two groups representing the interests of the farmers the HLI Supervisory
Group and the AMBALA. In 2003, each of them wrote letter petitions before the DAR asking for the
renegotiation of terms and/or revocation of the SDOA. They claimed that they havent actually received
those benefits in full, that HLI violated the terms, and that their lives havent really improved contrary to
the promise and rationale of the SDOA.
The DAR created a Special Task Force to attend to the issues and to review the terms of the SDOA and
the Resolution 89-12-2. Adopting the report and the recommendations of the Task Force, the DAR Sec
recommended to the PARC (1) the revocation of Resolution 89-12-2 and (2) the acquisition of Hacienda
Luisita through compulsory acquisition scheme. Consequently, the PARC revoked the SDP of
TADECO/HLI and subjected those lands covered by the SDP to the mandated land acquisition scheme
under the CARP law. These acts of the PARC was assailed by HLI via Rule 65.

On the other hand, FARM, an intervenor, asks for the invalidation of Sec. 31 of RA 6657, insofar as it
affords the corporation, as a mode of CARP compliance, to resort to stock transfer in lieu of outright
agricultural land transfer. For FARM, this modality of distribution is an anomaly to be annulled for being
inconsistent with the basic concept of agrarian reform ingrained in Sec. 4, Art. XIII of the Constitution.

Taiwan Kolin vs Kolin Electronics

Case Digest GR 209843 March 25 2015

Facts:

Taiwan Kolin Corp sought to register the trademark KOLIN in Class 9 on the following combination of
goods: television sets, cassette recorder, VCD Amplifiers, camcorders and other audio/video electronic
equipment, flat iron, vacuum cleaners, cordless handsets, videophones, facsimile machines, teleprinters,
cellular phones and automatic goods vending machine.

Kolin Electronics opposed the application on the ground that the trademark KOLIN is identical, if
not confusingly similar, with its registered trademark KOLIN which covers the following products under
Class 9 of the Nice Classification (NCL): automatic voltage regulator, converter, recharger, stereo booster,
AC-DC regulated power supply, step-down transformer, and PA amplified AC-DC. Kolin Electronics argued
that the products are not only closely-related because they fall under the same classification, but also
because they are inherently similar for being electronic products and are plugged into electric sockets
and perform a useful function.

Issue: W/N the products are closely-related

Held:

No, the products are not related and the use of the trademark KOLIN on them would not likely cause
confusion. To confer exclusive use of a trademark, emphasis should be on the similarity or relatedness of
the goods and/or services involved and not on the arbitrary classification or general description of their
properties or characteristics.

First, products classified under Class 9 can be further classified into five categories. Accordingly, the
goods covered by the competing marks between Taiwan Kolin and Kolin Electronics fall under different
categories. Taiwan Kolins goods are categorized as audio visual equipments, while Kolin Electronics
goods fall under devices for controlling the distribution and use of electricity. Thus, it is erroneous to
assume that all electronic products are closely related and that the coverage of one electronic product
necessarily precludes the registration of a similar mark over another.

Second, the ordinarily intelligent buyer is not likely to be confused. The distinct visual and aural
differences between the two trademarks KOLIN, although appear to be minimal, are sufficient to
distinguish between one brand or another. The casual buyer is predisposed to be more cautious,
discriminating, and would prefer to mull over his purchase because the products involved are various
kind of electronic products which are relatively luxury items and not considered affordable. They are not
ordinarily consumable items such as soy sauce, ketsup or soap which are of minimal cost. Hence,
confusion is less likely.

Fonterra Brand Phils, Inc. vs Largado and Estrellado

Case Digest GR 205300 March 18 2015

Facts:

Fonterra contracted the services of Zytron to provide for trade merchandising representatives (TMRs) in
the marketing and promotion of its milk and dairy products. Among those TMRs whose services were
engaged are Largado and Estrellado, who are the respondents in this case. After 4 years, Fonterra
terminated its contract with Zytron and entered into an agreement for manpower supply with AC Sicat.
Desirous of continuing their work as TMRs in Fonterra, Largado and Estrellado submitted their job
application with AC Sicat, a legitimate job contracting company. AC Sicat hired their services as TMRs for
a term of 5 months.

When their 5-month contract with AC Sicat were about to expire, they allegedly sought renewal thereof,
which was allegedly refused. This prompted them to file for complaints of illegal dismissal,
regularization, nonpayment of service incentive leave, 13 thmonth pay, and actual and moral damages
against Fonterra, Zytron and AC Sicat.

Issue 1: W/N Largado and Estrellado were illegally terminated by Zytron

No. When Largado and Estrella refused to renew their contract with Zytron by applying with AC Sicat,
they effectively resigned from Zytron. Hence, they were not illegally dismissed because they voluntary
terminated their employment with the latter.

Issue 2: W/N Largado and Estrellado were illegally terminated by AC Sicat

No. There is no illegal dismissal to speak of since AC Sicat is a legitimate job contractor and their
termination is merely brought about by the expiration of their employment contracts with AC Sicat.

First, Largado and Estrellado were hired as fixed-term or project employees of AC Sicat. The determining
factor of such employment is not the duty of the employee but the day certain agreed upon by the
parties for the commencement and termination of the employment relationship. Second, the non-
renewal of their contracts by AC Sicat is a management prerogative, and failure of respondents to prove
that such was done in bad faith militates against their contention that they were illegally dismissed.

Hence, the expiration of their contract with AC Sicat simply caused the natural cessation of their fixed-
term employment thereat.

Kyle Zabala vs People

Case Digest GR 210670 Jan 26 2015

Facts:
Alas accused Zabala of theft. During the trial, Alas testified that he and Zabala were not only neighbors,
but kumpares as well, and would often invite the latter to drinking sessions inside his house. At times, he
would also call Zabala to repair his vehicle and allow Zabala to follow him to his bedroom to get cash
whenever spare parts are to be bought for the repair of his vehicle. One day when he returned from
work, he found that his P68k which he kept in an envelope inside his closet was missing. There were only
five persons living in the house that time, he together with his parents, his 9-year old son, and his aunt.

Witness Pinon also testified that, being Zabalas girlfriend, she were with him at the store which was
near Alas house at that time. She saw Zabala climb the fence, scale and enter Alas house, and noticed
that when he returned, he had a bulge in his pocket. Day after that, they went to Greenhills, where
Zabala bought two Nokia phones worth about P8,500.

Issue 1: W/N the corpus delicti of the crime was established in this case

No. In theft, corpus delicti has two elements, namely: (1) that the property was lost by the owner, and
(2) that it was lost by felonious taking.

First, nobody saw Zabala entered the room of Alas where the money was hidden. Pinon merely saw that
Zabala scaled the fence of Alas house and entered it. Second, all that Pinon saw was the bulge in Zabalas
pocket; her testimony does not show that the bulge was the P68k which was supposedly stolen. These
testimonies failed to prove the fact that the P68k was lost and that Zabala unlawfully took it. Hence, the
evidence presented was not sufficient to prove the fact of the crime of theft.

Issue 2: W/N the circumstantial evidence presented is sufficient to prove Zabalas guilt beyond
reasonable doubt

No. The rule in circumstantial evidence cases is that the evidence must exclude the possibility that some
other person committed the crime.

In this case, the prosecution failed to adduce evidence that at the time the theft was committed, there
was no other person inside the house of Alas, or that no other person could have taken the money from
the closet of Alas. They failed to prove that culpability could only belong to Zabala, and not to some
other person. Hence, Zabala must be acquitted in the absence of proof beyond reasonable doubt.

Republic vs Heirs of Donato Sanchez

Case Digest GR 212388 Dec 10 2014

Facts:

When Spouses Sanchez died intestate, their Heirs executed a deed of extrajudicial partition over a lot of
which owners copy of the OCT is missing. Since they cannot register the Deed without the OCT, they
sought for the reconstitution, pursuant to RA 26, of the said OCT. They alleged in their petition that OCT
45361 covers a lot that was issued in the name of their predecessors-in-interest Spouses Sanchez
pursuant to Decree 418121 which was in relation to a court decision in 1930. Among the evidences
presented are: (1) a certification from the RD that the copies of the OCT and the decree which issued it
cannot be found among its records, (2) the court decision in 1930 adjudicating the lot in the name of
spouses Sanchez, and (3) certified true copy of the Registrars Index Card containing the notation that
the OTC was listed under the name of one of the spouse Sanchez. Since there is no copy of the OCT in
the RD records, there was no certification from the RD that the OCT was either lost or destroyed.

Issue 1: W/N reconstitution of OCT 45361 should be granted

No. Under RA 26, a petition for reconstitution of lost or destroyed title requires, as a condition
precedent, that a certificate of title has indeed been issued. Here, the court decision and the Registrars
Index Card containing the notation on OCT No. 45361 do not cite nor mention that Decree No. 418121
was issued to support the issuance of the said OCT. Since there was no clear and convincing evidence
adduced to prove the existence of the OTC, RA 26 cannot apply.

For obvious reasons, reconstitution cannot be made on a title that never existed in the first place.

Issue 2: W/N reconstitution of OCT is proper when the only evidences presented to support its existence
are derivative titles

No. Assuming that there was sufficient evidence to prove the existence of the OCT considering the
totality of evidence presented, still, reconstitution of the OCT is not warranted. Under Sec 15 of RA 26,
before a certificate of title which has been lost or destroyed may be reconstituted, it must first be proved
by the claimants that the certificate of title was still in force at the time it was lost or destroyed, among
others.

First, the mere existence of the derivative titles which contain the notations that the name of the
registered owner of OCT 45361 is not available as per certification of the RD clearly shows that the OCT
which the Heirs seek to be reconstituted is no longer in force, rendering the procedure, if granted, a
mere superfluity

Second, the necessary certification from the RD that said OCT was in force at the time it was lost or
destroyed is lacking. The presentation of alleged derivative titles will not suffice to replace this
certification because the titles do not authenticate the issuance of OCT No. 45361 having been issued by
the RD without any basis from its official records. Hence, the OCT cannot be reconstituted because
clearly it was no longer in force.

Notes:

The proper procedure when seeking the reconstitution of an Original Certificate of Title is to file a
petition for the cancellation of the decree, re-issuance of the decree and issuance of OCT pursuant to
the re-issued decree.

Conrado Nicart, as Gov of Eastern Samar vs Titong and Abrugar

Case Digest GR 207682 Dec 10 2014

Facts:

Titong and Abrugar, together with 93 others, were appointed as department heads by the then Governor
Evardone of Samar a few days before the end of his term.Their appointments were disapproved by the
CSC Regional Office for violation of CSC rules and for not having met the requirements laid down
in Nazareno vs City of Dumaguete case. Titong and Abrugar filed a petition for review before the CSC
Main, which granted and declared their appointments as valid. The new Governor Nicart sought for
reconsideration, but it was denied. Before the CA, he appealed arguing that their appointments cannot
be valid since there was no need to fill up the positions and that their appointments were en masse.

Meanwhile, the CSC Main issued a writ of execution ordering Gov Nicart and the provincial government
to pay the salaries and emoluments of Titong and Abrugar. Gov Nicart refused, so they filed a petition for
mandamus before the RTC even while the case before the CA was still pending.

The RTC decided the petition on the basis of the CSC memo circular 82 which states that the non-
issuance of a restraining order or injunction would make the CSC resolution executory pending appeal.
Since there was no TRO or injunction, and its opinion that the CA decision would not constitute res
judicata or in any way affect the petition for mandamus, the RTC issued a writ of mandamus and went
even further in deciding that the appointments were valid.

Issue: W/N it is proper for the RTC to take cognizance of the petition for mandamus even while the issues
involved is still pending resolution before the CA

Held:

No. First, it is erroneous for the RTC to opine that the CA decision would not affect the petition before it
because clearly, the mandamus petition heavily relies on the validity or invalidity of the appointments
which issue is yet to be resolved by the CA. Second, even while there is no preliminary injunction or TRO
issued by the higher court, ordinarily it would be proper for a lower court or a court of origin to suspend
the proceedings on the precept of judicial courtesy. Hence, the RTC erred when it decided on the
mandamus petition for disregarding such principle.

Curata vs Philippine Ports Authority

Case Digest GR 154211-12 June 22 2009
Facts:

EO 385 and EO 431 Series of 1990 delineated the Batangas Port Zone and placed it under the Philippine
Ports Authority for administrative jurisdiction of its proper zoning, planning, development, and
utilization. Pursuant thereto, the PPA instituted a complaint for expropriation of 185 lots before the RTC.
Owned by some 231 individuals or entities, the 185 lots, with a total area of about 1,298,340 sqm, were
intended for the development of Phase II of the BPZ. The PPA alleged that, per evaluation of the Land
Acquisition Committee for Phase II of the BPZ project, the lots had a fair market value of P 336.83 per
sqm. Prior to the filing of the complaint, PPA offered PhP 336.40 per sqm as just compensation, but the
lot owners rejected the offer. PPA prayed to be placed in possession upon its deposit of the amount
equivalent to the assessed value for real estate taxation of the lots in question.

After proceedings, the RTC issued a compensation order directing PPA to pay the lot owners the amount
of P 5,500 per sqm as just compensation. Upon motion, the RTC granted the issuance of a writ of
execution pending appeal and issued the writ of execution thereafter. Subsequently, the sheriff served
the Notice of Garnishment to the LBP Batangas City Branch.

Issue 1: W/N execution pending appeal is applicable to expropriation proceedings

No. Discretionary execution of judgments pending appeal under Sec. 2(a) of Rule 39 simply does not
apply to eminent domain proceedings. Since PPAs monies, facilities and assets are government
properties, they are exempt from execution whether by virtue of a final judgment or pending appeal.

It is a universal rule that where the State gives its consent to be sued by private parties either by general
or special law, it may limit the claimants action only up to the completion of proceedings anterior to the
stage of execution and that the power of the Courts ends when the judgment is rendered, since
government funds and properties may not be seized under writs of execution or garnishment to satisfy
such judgments. This is based on obvious considerations of public policy. Disbursements of public funds
must be covered by the corresponding appropriation as required by law. The functions and public
services rendered by the State cannot be allowed to be paralyzed or disrupted by the diversion of public
funds from their legitimate and specific objects, as appropriated by law. (Commissioner of Public
Highways vs San Diego, 1970)

Issue 2: W/N RA 8974 is a substantial law that cannot be reapplied retroactively

Yes. The appropriate standard of just compensation inclusive of the manner of payment thereof and the
initial compensation to the lot owners is a substantive, not merely a procedural, matter. This is because
the right of the owner to receive just compensation prior to acquisition of possession by the State of the
property is a proprietary right. RA 8974, which specifically prescribes the new standards in determining
the amount of just compensation in expropriation cases relating to national government infrastructure
projects, as well as the payment of the provisional value as a prerequisite to the issuance of a writ of
possession, is a substantive law.

Further, there is nothing in RA No. 8974 which expressly provides that it should have retroactive effect.
Neither is retroactivity necessarily implied from RA No. 8974 or in any of its provisions. Hence, it cannot
be applied retroactively in relation to this case.

Note:

RA 8974 amended Rule 67 effective November 26, 2000, but only with regard to the expropriation
of right-of-way sites and locations for national government infrastructure projects. On the other hand, in
all other expropriation cases outside of right-of-way sites or locations for national government
infrastructure projects, the provisions of Rule 67 of the Rules of Court shall still govern. #