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The Christian Parties of Western Europe

Author(s): Gabriel Almond
Source: World Politics, Vol. 1, No. 1 (Oct., 1948), pp. 30-58
Published by: Cambridge University Press
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THE CHRISTIAN PARTIES OF WESTERN
EUROPE
By GABRIEL ALMOND
IT is a clicheofCommunistpropagandato describetheoppo-
sition to the peacefuland progressivepolicy of the Soviet
Union as consistingofWall Street,fascistsand formercollabo-
rationists,the Vatican, and the right-wingSocialist "toadies."
The generalimpressiongivenis one of a monolithicand wholly
malevolentalliance of all the reactionary"minorities,"benton
drivingtheinnocentand peace-lovingmassesintoa war against
the Soviet Union and the "New Democracy." It is hardlya
betrayalof confidenceto pointout that the Communistis not
givento makingdistinctions.But it is possibleto disentangle
at least one elementof truthin thissomewhatharshjudgment
oftheworldoutside.This is, thattheunitsengagedin thepres-
ent world struggleare not solely,and perhapsnot even pri-
marily,the nation-states.There is, in a sense, an "East" in
the "West," and a subdued "West" in the "East." Ideological
and political movements,whetherregionalor world-widein
scope, have become increasinglyimportantbearersof foreign
policy.On the most significantissues of foreignpolicyin the
present crisis, the party affiliationof a Western European
makesa greaterdifference thanhis nationalaffiliation.
The "thirdpower"in WesternEuropewhichAmericanpolicy
aspiresto develop,is reallythe "thirdforce,"ifwe understand
by that termthe partiesof the moderatedemocraticcenterin
theregionas a whole.To therightofthe"thirdforce,"conserva-
tive nationalisms reject the limitationsof individual state
authority whichthe"thirdpower"implies.To thelefttheCom-
munistpartiescarryout the ordersof Moscow and the Comin-
form.
The major componentparts of the "third force" are the
Socialist and Christianparties,bothof whichare international
movements.These parties,togetherwith the smaller liberal

THE CHRISTIAN PARTIES OF EUROPE 31
and moderateconservative parties,pursuepoliticalaims similar
to but not identicalwiththoseof theUnited States.They have
a commoninterestin preventing the furtherdestructionof the
values ofpersonalfreedomand integrity bytheresolutepolitical
soldieryof communism.It is to theAmericaninterestin botha
moral and an expedientialsense so to governits foreignpolicy
as to fosterthese moderatemovementsof the center.Their
strengthis our strength,not in the sense that they can be
countedupon as henchmen,but as companionsin a common
struggleforhumanevalues and institutions.
Of thevariouspoliticalmovementswhichmake up the "third
force"in WesternEurope the "Christianparties"are boththe
largestand the least well-knownin the United States. Many
Americansfindit difficult to trusta politicalmovementwhich
is based on religiousconfession,and particularlyon Catholi-
cism,whichstillholdsin principleto its universaland exclusive
claims, and which has been, and in certaincountries,still is
identifiedwithanti-democratic movements.'In Spain and Por-
tugal the Churchand the greatmajorityof the Catholicpopu-
lations supportauthoritarianregimes.In ProtestantScandi-
navia theCatholicmovementhas no separateorganizedpolitical
existence.In the fivecountriesof greatestpopulationand eco-
nomic potential the movementhas attracted adherentsby
preachingdoctrineswhichare both democraticand anti-totali-
tarian.Exceptingonly France,the Catholicpartiesin all these
countriesare in termsof electoralsupportthe strongestof the
contendersforpower (see Table I).
In the Low Countries,France, Italy, and Austriathe Chris-
tian partieshold nine out of the nineteenkeyministries.They
havetwoout offiveprimeministries and twoforeignministries;
theyhold or share four of the internalpolicingministriesand
one of the ministriesof defense. In each of the fivecountries
theyholdfromone-thirdto one-halfoftheCabinetposts.Their
representation in the lower legislativechambersvaries from
1Distrust of political Catholicism is by no means limited to the radical left which
describesChristiandemocracyas a facade for "clerico-fascism." The Protestantdenomina-
tions attack the universalismof the Church and its claims to special status and govern-
mentalprotection,while the followersof the historicliberaltraditionare also in many cases
strongly"anti-clerical."

32 WORLD POLITICS
TableI
ThePoliticalPositionofChristian
DemocracyinFiveCountries
ofWestern
Europe
1948)
(,August,
CabinetStrength
0 ~~~~~~')04
X v > AV j, 0 >x
. .. ~ ~.. . ~~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ &
Austria.. ........................................Yes . Yes Yest :: 47% 52% 50%

Belgium. . . Yes
.............................................................................. Yes 47 46 46
France .. Yes 33 27 26
Italy.........................................
.....................................
Yes Yes 53 53 48
Netherlands . ....... Yes 43 32 31
* At mostrecentnationalelections.
t In Austriathe Ministry of Interioris sharedbetweena Socialistwiththe rankof
Ministerand a member of the CatholicPeople'sPartywiththe rankof Undersecretary
buthavingCabinetstatus.
t Thereis no defense
ministryintheAustrian Cabinet.
53 per centin Italy to 27 per centin France.Their shareof the

popularvote rangesfrom50 per centin Austriato 26 per cent
in France.2
The Christianparties of the various German Laender are
coalitionsofCatholicand Protestantelements.They are strong-
est by farin the primarilyCatholic areas such as Bavaria and
the Rhineland.In the AmericanZone theyreceivedmorethan
48 per cent of the votes,'in the FrenchZone over 57 per cent,
in the BritishZone 37 per cent (more than 40 per cent if the
leftCatholicZentrumis included),and in theSovietZone more
than 24 per cent.Their representation in thevariouslegislative
assembliesand Laender governments corresponds(withimpor-
tant exceptions) to the size of theirpopular support.In the
Bizonal Economic Council the ChristianDemocrats hold 20
out of 52 seats.
The problemof American confidencein the countriesof
WesternEurope is further complicatedby thefactthatthe gov-
2This figureis fortheNationalAssembly electionof November,1946,the last national
electionin France.The lossesoftheMRP in themunicipal of October-November,
elections
1947arediscussed at a laterpoint.
8 A recentlocal and municipal electionin the UnitedStatesZone indicatessubstantial
lossesinChristianPartystrength.

erningcoalitions are not only predominantlyCatholic, but
that the secondmost significant elementof the "center"coali-
tionsconsistsof Socialistparties.In the predominantly Protes-
tant and liberal United States stereotypedconceptionsof
Marxist and Catholic ideologystand in the way of an open-
mindedunderstanding ofWesternEuropeanpolitics.If Ameri-
can influenceis to be employedresponsibly, our policies will
have to take into considerationthe differences as well as the
similaritiesbetweenAmericanpoliticalconceptionsand those
representedby the most importantnon-Communistmove-
mentsofWesternEurope.This is a situationin whicha narrow
insistenceon Americanvalues or a misunderstanding of Euro-
pean ones may have seriousconsequencesforour securityposi-
tionin WesternEurope.
In this briefsurveyof the politicalcharacteristicsof Chris-
tian democracywe shall be concernedwiththe followingprob-
lems: (1) the politicaland social compositionof the contem-
porary Christian parties; (2) the internationalties of the
various partiesand theirrelationswiththe Churchhierarchies
and the Vatican; and (3) theirrelationswith otherpolitical
movements, and the possibleroleswhichthesemovementsmay
play in the futuredevelopmentof WesternEuropean politics.4
I
Christiandemocracy,as the dominantpoliticalorganization
oftheCatholicpopulationsofWesternEurope,is a newpolitical
phenomenon.BeforeWorld War II a verylarge proportionof
WesternEuropean Catholicswere deeplydistrustful of democ-
racy if not explicitlyanti-democratic.
They vieweddemocracy
as the "stirrup-holder"of Bolshevism; and they preferred
authoritativeregimessuch as those of Austria,Portugal,and
Spain.5The genuinelydemocraticcurrentsof politicalCatholi-
4A more carefulhistoricaland ideologicalanalysis of Christiandemocracyhas been re-
servedforlater separatepublication.
5 D. A. Binchy,Church and State in Fascist Italy, London, OxfordU. Press, 1941, pp.
85ff.;Denis Gwynn, The Catholic Reaction in France, New York, Macmillan, 1924, pp.
35ff.;CharlesMicaud, The FrenchRightand Nazi Germany,1933-39,Durham,N. C., Duke
U. Press, 1943, pp. 133ff.;Paul Vignaux, Traditionalismeet Syndicalisme,New York,
Editions de la Maison Francaise, 1943, pp. 29ff.;F. C. C. Egerton,Salazar: Rebuilderof
Portugal,London, Hodder & Stoughton,1943, pp. 199ff.;Max Stoffel,Die 5sterreichische
Stdndesordnung, Vienna, 1938, passim; Erich Voegelin,Der AutoritareStaat, Vienna, Julius

34 WORLD POLITICS
cism were minoritymovements,supportedby some of the
Catholictradeunionists,someoftheurbanmiddleclasses,and a
fewdevotedintellectualsand membersof the clergy.
The dramaticshiftin ideologyfroma primarilytraditional
and authoritarianpositionin the pre-warperiod to a demo-
craticand partlycollectivistone afterthewar,suggestsa num-
ber of hypotheses.It may not safelybe viewed as a changein
mass sentiment.What has occurredhas been a shiftin "elites"
in whichtwo factorshave been of importance.First,the "col-
laborationist"and authoritarianelementsin political Catho-
licismhave been discredited(but not destroyed)by virtueof
the militarydefeatof the Axis. At the same time the demo-
cratic leadershiphas acquired prestigebecause of its "resist-
ance" recordand its militantpro-Alliedpositionin the recent
war. Secondly,the Vatican and the national hierarchieshave
thrownthe greatweightof theirinfluencein the Catholiccom-
munitieson the side of the successfulChristiandemocratic
leadership.This stepsealed theelectoralvictoriesofthevarious
national parties.The vote receivedby these groupswas far in
excessof the mostoptimisticexpectationsof theirown leaders.
The Church,operatingthroughthe clergyand the various lay
associations,broughtthebulkofthebelievingCatholics,regard-
intotheranksoftheChristian
less oftheirpoliticalconvictions,
democratic parties.
A second hypothesisproposedhere is that while the demo-
craticpositionof the leadershipof thesepartiesis undoubtedly
based on genuineconviction,the supportgivento democratic
regimesby the Vatican and the hierarchiesis expediential.
Nothinghas happenedto suggestthat the fundamentalpolit-
ical principleof the Church has been altered in any way. It
supportsdemocraticgovernments and democraticpartieswhen
such a policywillprotector enhancethepositionof theChurch.
It will withdrawits supportwhendemocraticinstitutions seem
to be seriouslythreateningChurch interests,or when they
proveto be too weak a reed on whichto rest its fate. These
calculationsare clearlyreflectedin a recentissue of a British
Catholicjournal whichdiscussedthe Italian electionsof April,
1936,pp. 102ff.;
Springer, Gurian,Hitler and the Christians,New York,Sheed
Waldemar
andWard,1936,pp. 163ff.

1948. "Even today mostChristianDemocratsto whomI have
talkedhave onlya conditionalbeliefin the democraticprocess;
theyfranklyface the possibilitythat the most honestelection
mightmenace the Common Good. . . . The evolutionof the
Austrian Christlich-Sozialebetween 1930 and 1934 seems to
indicate such a possibility,but taking into considerationthe
recordofCatholicpartieselsewhere, such a hardeningis nottoo
likely.The conditionsof parliamentaryactivityplace a tre-
mendousethicalhandicapon Christianstatesmanship."'
This hypothesisas to the instabilityof some of the elements
of the Christianpartiesis also supportedby evidenceof their
social and politicalheterogeneity.They are the only political
partiesin continentalWesternEurope whichare similarto the
Americanmajor partiesin thattheycut acrossthe greatinter-
est groupingsof the population.The cementwhichbindsthese
divergentgroupingsis oftwo types: religiousfaith,and expedi-
ential considerationswhichmay be of a temporaryduration.
Table II gives evidenceof the occupationaldistributionof
the leadershipsof the three "mass" parties of France before
the riseoftheGaullistmovement.The mostgeneralimpression
whichone gains is that the MRP partyelite has the broadest
distributionamongthemajor economicgroupingsoftheFrench
population-agriculture, industry,commerceand banking,and
the professions. The Socialist party elite is in the majority
made up of professionalmen and governmentfunctionaries;
whilethe largestoccupationalgroupamong the leading Com-
munists are workersand employeesin industry.While the
Socialist and Communistparties have relativelyfew owners
and managersin industryand commerce(13.1 per centof the
party'scandidatesforthe June,1946 ConstituentAssemblyin
the case of the Socialists,and 6.2 per cent in the case of the
Communists),the MRP recruitedover twentyper cent of its
candidatesfromtheowningand managerialclassesin thepopu-
lation.
A thirdhypothesisproposedhere is that conservativesand
authoritarianelements,primarilyCatholicbut includingProt-
estantsin Germany,have taken refugein theseorganizations,
largelybecause of the discrediting of the historicpoliticalpar-
6 The Tablet,March20, 1948,pp. 177 ff.

36 WORLD POLITICS
Table II
Occupationsof Candidatesof the Three"Mass" Parties of France forthe ConstituentAssem-
bly ofJune1946 (in Percentages)*
MRP Communists Socialists
Agriculture...... .. 19.9% 21.6%

. 13.3%
Farmers.. . ... 19.9% 18.8%7 12.6%
Farm Labor ..............................................0. 2.8 0.7
23.6
Industry.............................................................. 37.8 16.3
Owners ..........................................................
4.2 0.6 2.9
Managers........... ......... 4.4 1.7 3.2
ManualLabor...................................
. 9.4 27.4 5.5
Employees..... ....... 4.4 5.3 3.6
Artisans ..... ........... 1.3 2.8 0.9
Commerce& Banking............. 16.6 8.1 11.0
Merchants& Bankers..................... 6.3 2.4 3.6
Managers . .... ........... 5.0 1.5 3.4
Employees.................... 5.2 4.3 3.9
Professions
. . ... 40.0 32.5 59.3
Lawyers& Notaries ..................... 9.8 0.6 7.1
Physicians..................... 7.0 1.7 5.3
Arts& Letters . ............... 4.8 3.0 6.4
Teachers& Education ................. 8.3 15.6 26.2
OtherOfficials .................... 10.0 11.5 14.3
* Adaptedfrom Raoul Husson,Elections et Referendums,
Paris,Le Monde,1946.Based
on an analysisof435 Socialist,
468 Communist, and 458 MRP candidates.
ties of the Right. This was reflectedin the large proportion

of MRP ConstituentAssemblycandidatesrecruitedfromthe
upper occupationalgroupsin France. It is also supportedby
analysisoftheregionaldistribution ofthestrengthoftheChris-
tian parties.Thus in FrancetheMRP in theelectionofNovem-
ber, 1946 receivedmore than forty-five per cent of the votes
in eightdepartments.In the pre-warperiod all eightof these
departmentsvoted forthe conservativepartiesin roughlythe
same proportion.For these voters the MRP constitutedthe
party of the moderes in the postwar political context.The
thirteenFrench departmentsin which MRP voting support
rangedbetweenthirty-five and forty-fiveper cent in the elec-
tion of November,1946 also werehistoriccentersof conserva-
tive strength in the pre-warperiod.7
7 See B. Leger, Les Opinions Politiques des Provinces Fran'aises, Paris, Librarie du
themapfacing
RecueilSirey,1936,particularly p. 266; seealsoMichelMontaquier,
"Tableau
France-Illustration,
Politiquede la FranceMetropolitaine," November3, 1945; Franqois
Goguel,"Geographie du Referendumdu 13 Octobreet des Electionsdu 10 Novembre
1946,"
Esprit,February,1947;Le Monde,November 12,1946.

THE CHRISTIANPARTIES OF EUROPE 37
A similarelectoralshifthas occurredin the WesternZones
of Germany.Thus in Schleswig-Holstein, where in the pre-
war periodtheCatholicZentrumwas an extremely small party,
the ChristianDemocratic Union receivedmore than thirty-
seven per cent of the votes. The Nazi and Nationalistparties
togetherhad in this area a majorityin the electionof July,
1932. The Nazis alone averagedforty-four per centin the four
ReichstagelectionsbetweenSeptember1930 and March, 1933.
Since the only othernon-Leftpartyon the ballot in the post-
war period,the right-wingFree Democratic Party, received
onlysix per centof thevotes,it is difficult
to avoid the conclu-
sion thatthe bulk of theseformerNazi and nationalistvoters
in Schleswig-Holstein are now "guests"ofthe ChristianDemo-
crats. Schleswig-Holstein is ratheran extremecase; but it is
evidentthatthis shiftof formerNazis and Nationaliststo the
Christianpartieshas takenplace throughout WesternGermay.8
In Italy evidenceof the size and importanceofthe conserva-
tiveand authoritarianwingof the ChristianDemocratsis even
more striking.In the springelectionsof 1948 the greatChris-
tian Democratic victorywas largelywon at the cost of the
conservative,monarchist,and neo-fascistparties.This was a
kind of victorywhicharoused among Westernliberalsalmost
as muchapprehensionas it did satisfaction.In his electionvic-
toryaddressDe Gasperifoundit necessaryto insist,"We are
not reactionaries.Every reformwe promisedwill be made."'
The Democristianinot only includethe democratictendencies
among the old Popolari, but theirformeropponentsas well,
the right-wing Catholic industrialistsand landowners.These
elementswithdrewfromthe Popolari in the crisesof the early
and middle 1920's and, under the name of the National
Center,joined with the Fascists.' The democraticCatholics
8 Forpre-warGermanelection seeArnoldBrecht,
statistics Federalism
and Regionalismin
Germany, NewYork,Oxford U. Press,1945,pp. 31 ff.;JamesK. Pollock,"An ArealStudy
of the GermanElectorate,"American PoliticalScienceReview,XXXVIII, 89 ff.;Rudolf
Heberle,"PoliticalMovementsAmongtheRuralPeopleof Schleswig-Holstein," Journalof
Politics,February,May, 1943; SidneyL. W. Mellen,"The GermanPeopleand the Post-
War World," AmericanPolitical Science Review, Vol. 37, no. 4, pp. 601 ff.; for postwar
election returnssee OMGUS Special Report, Statistics of Elections in Germany 1946,
ChartsV andVI.
March15,1947,especially
9 New York Herald Tribune,April 22, 1948.
10Sturzo,Italy and Fascismo,London,Faber and Gwyer,1926 pp. 129 ff.;Binchey,op. cit.,
pp. 158ff.

38 WORLD POLITICS
were strongestamong the small independentfarmersand the
artisanateof NorthernItaly, while the conservativegroups
werepowerfulamongthe Catholicurbanupperclasses and the
large landholdersin the south."The conservativesouthis still
one of the most importantcentersof ChristianDemocratic
strength.
In the case of Austriait is only necessaryto pointout that
in the 1934-37 period political Catholicismwas organizedin
the "FatherlandFront,"an authoritarianpartyin a one-party
state.The contemporary AustrianPeople's Party has roughly
thesame electorateas thatwhichsupportedtheChristianSocial
Partyof Seipel and theFatherlandFrontof Dolfuss.The solid
supportof the AustrianPeople's Party lies in the conservative
ruraland agriculturalregions.
It is unnecessaryto go into furtherdetail to demonstrate
that the constituentsof the ChristianDemocratic parties of
WesternEurope are hardlyof a singlepoliticalcoloration.It is
probablethatthemajorityof thevotersof thesepartiesare not
democratsby conviction,but this is not to say that they are
convincedanti-democrats.One may distinguishat least five
elements in contemporarypolitical Catholicism: (1) the
authoritarians,(2) the conservatives,(3) the traditionalist,
non-politicalelements,(4) the "pure" Catholic democratsand
moderatecollectivists,and (5) the Catholic revolutionaries.
The specificallyauthoritarianelementsof the Christianpar-
ties have been reluctantto show theirhands in a postwarera
markedby the dominanceof anti-fascistmovements.Never-
theless,the available evidencesuggeststhattheyhave regained
confidenceand are now a forceto be reckonedwith. It is an
historicalirony that the greatestantagonistof French col-
laborationism,De Gaulle, is now supportedby many of the
survivorsof Petainism. The leadershipof the Gaullist RPF
exhibitsthree tendencies: (1) the moderate parliamentary
tendencyled by Rene Pleven which favors,at least for the
short-run,a mergerwith the "Third Force" under Gaullist
leadership; (2) themilitantactivistsof De Gaulle's immediate
entouragewho are anti-parliamentary but orientedtoward a
"A. W. Salomone, U. of Pennsylvania
Italian Democracy in the Making, Philadelphia,
Press,1945,pp.40 ff.

"left" social policy; (3) and finallythe traditionalrightists
among whom army officerspredominate,and who represent
the Catholic authoritarianpoint of view. The youngmilitant
activistsof the Gaullist movementare mainlyveteransof the
French resistance,restlessspiritswhose young manhood was
spent in undergroundactivityand war. Like the "partisan"
veteransof the lefttheyare perhapsunadaptableto the return
of the "everyday"-the bickeringsand "deals" of parliamen-
tarians,the apparentfutilityof diplomacyand negotiation,and
the generallyunheroicperspectives ofpostwarlife.'2
The armyofficers who constitutethe Gaullist leadershipin
some of the traditionalcentersof French"rightism"are asso-
ciated with and supportedby many of the clergyin the same
areas. Pierre-HenriTeitgen,MRP Minister of Defense, has
attacked the Gaullist movementas containing". . . all the
old, down-at-the-heels ghostsof pre-warradicalism. . . all of
the white-washedcollaborators. . . the renegades,the petty
traitors,and the ambitious."'3It is hardlysurprisingthat the
Gaullist movementattractedpracticallyall of the conservative
elementsof the MRP in the municipalelectionsof the fall of
1947. Ratherthan a desertion,this phenomenonmay perhaps
be moreproperlydescribedas a returnof the conservativeand
traditionalelementsto theirhistoricleadershipand point of
view.
Recentelectionsin theAmericanZone of Germanyhave also
showna right-wing trend,withthe ChristianDemocratslosing
to explicitlyconservativeformations. The significanceof these
shiftswas not lost on GeneralClay, who referred to the threat
of "totalitarianrightism"in recentpolitical developmentsin
Germany.He mentionedspecificallythe National Democratic
12
Four of eleven membersof the RPF executive committeeare in their thirties;five
in theirforties;and only two are over fifty.Men like Jacques Soustelle,Andre Malraux,
Jacques Baumel, Guillain de Benouvillecan hardlybe said to have ever lived normaladult
existences.These young activists in De Gaulle's immediateentourage are the potential
totalitariansof the RPF. See "Les Dirigeantsdu RPF," Bilans Hebdomadaires,Supplement
to No. 101,April9, 1948.
13 Bilans Hebdomadaires,No. 101, April9, 1948, p. 1; see also Jacques Fauvet, "Historical
and New Factors in Gaullism,"and "The Supportersof the RPF in the Municipal Elections,"
Documents, Ambassade de France, Service de l'Information;Paul Fraisse, "Le Nouveau
Gaullisme,"Esprit,April,1947; FrancoisGoguel, "ConjoncturePolitique du neo-Gaullisme,"
Esprit, December, 1947; Gelo and Andrea (pseud.), "Charles de Gaulle: A Political Por-
trait,"ModernReview,September,1947.

40 WORLD POLITICS
Partyin Hesse whichreceived3.4 per centof thevote although
it was onlylicensedin eightof theforty-one electiondistricts.16
In Bavaria a "Homeland and Royalist Party" was dissolved
by MilitaryGovernment in 1946. Its membership thenadhered
to the ChristianSocial Union, a movementwhichalreadycon-
tained the authoritariansurvivals of the pre-Nazi Catholic
BayerischeYolkspartei.Subsequentlya Bavarian Party,con-
sistingof formerCSU "rightists"and "particularists"made
substantialinroads on Christianparty strengthin the local
electionsof 1948.
In Italy the springelectoralcrisisand the all-out campaign
of the Churchresultedin a right-wing tide towardratherthan
away fromthe ChristianDemocrats. The extremeright-wing
Catholics desertedthe Qualunque and the Monarchists,only
to strengthen the already powerfulconservativesectorof the
Democristiani.The Vatican, CatholicAction,and the Bishops
of SouthernItaly, as well as the Christianpartyleadership
itself,have all issued statementsimplyingconsiderableappre-
hensionover the strengthof the conservativepressurewithin
theChristianDemocraticmovement.Theiroptimistic viewthat
the". . . old conservativesare finallymoving intothe dynamism
of contemporary history... ." may be wishfulthinking.17
The specificallyauthoritarianwing of politicalCatholicism
is small numerically.Its importancelies in the fact that it is
a crisis leadershipwhich will command a large followingin
the eventof a furtheraggravationof politicalconflict.Part of
thisfollowingmay come fromthe specifically conservativeand
traditionalsectorsof the Christianmovements.The conserva-
tive tendencyof political Catholicismis also small numeric-
ally,but strongin influencewithinthe Churchand in the rural
areas. The Catholiclargelandholdersand industrialists of Bel-
gium, France, Germany,Austria, and Italy constitutethe
cadresof Catholicconservatism. They are extremely influential
amongthe largestsinglecomponentof the Christianparties-
the traditionalFlemish,Bavarian, Italian, and French peas-
antry-and amongcertainsectorsoftheurbanCatholicmiddle
classes, groupswhich are deeplyimbued with religiousfaith,
16New YorkTimes,April26, 27, 30, 1948.
17 April22,
See The TabletMarch6, 1948andMarch20,1948;New YorkHeraldTribune
1948;New YorkTimes,April23,1948.

THE CHRISTIANPARTIES OF EUROPE 41
and tend to be politicallyapatheticand indifferent.The clergy
in the agrarianregionsare largelyrecruitedfromthe country-
side and are subjectto thepoliticalcontrolof theirbishopsand
the neighboringlandowners.These traditional elements of
politicalCatholicism,whileseparablefromthe specifically con-
servativeupper-classCatholics,are nevertheless especiallysus-
ceptibleto thepoliticsof conservatism. They constitutea group
in the electoratewhich,under normal circumstances,can be
"delivered"by the Churchleadership.EmmanuelMounier de-
scribesthe Italian ChristianParty as indistinguishable from
the Church and Catholic Action. The situation,in his judg-
ment,contrastssharplywiththatin France. This dependence,
he states,reflectsthe sentimentof a large part of the Italian
population". . . conservativein temperament, subjectedto the
influenceof the parishpriestand a kindof agrarianfeudalism,
deeplyreligious,apolitical.""
The agrarianand urban sectionsof conservativeand tradi-
tional politicalCatholicismalso differsomewhatin theirpolicy
tendencies.The urban Catholic middleand upperclasses tend
to follow the liberal economic position, and have adapted
themselvesto partypoliticsand parliamentarism. The agrarian
elementsare more hospitableto traditionalauthoritarianand
paternalisticideas and practices.19 Since the clergyand the
militaryprofessionsare recruitedin largemeasuresfromthese
social and regional"backwaters"of Westernculture,it is to
be expectedthat the elitesof Catholic authoritarianism would
be recruitedfromthe clergyof the countryside, the military
professions,and the latifundia.Catholic conservatism(in the
sense of "liberal economics") recruitsits leadershipmore fre-
quentlyfromtheurbanprofessional, industrial,and commercial
upperclasses.
While these three tendencies-authoritarianism, conserva-
tism,and traditionalism-aredistinguishable, seriouspolitical
criseshave the effectof subordinatingdifferences, and produc-
18 Lignes deforced'un personnalismeItalien," Esprit,No. 141, January,1948, pp. 14 ff.
"I While this generalizationis on the whole correctit should not be overlookedthat the
Communistshave been quite successfulin mobilizingdiscontentamong the distressed
agrarianelements.They have registeredremarkableelectoralsuccessesin both the Italian
and French countryside. In Italy they have mobilizedelementswhich in the pre-fascist
era had been organizedin the peasant unions of Guido Miglioli, movementswhich were
attackedas "White Bolshevism"by the Catholicconservatives.

42 WORLD POLITICS
ing unity.Under ordinaryconditionstheseright-wing Catholic
tendenciesare likelyto be sympatheticwith the views of the
non-CatholicRight.In crisesan alliance withthe resoluteand
militantauthoritariansand neo-fascistsmay be preferred. The
Vatican and the various national clergiesare of greatimpor-
tance in determining the directionofmovementof the Catholic
Right. For the conservativeand authoritariansegmentsare
small "elite" groups,whilethepotentialmass supportis largely
made up of the traditionalnon-politicalelementswhich are
directlyamenableto theinfluenceoftheChurch.
The fourthgroup consists of the democraticand social-
reformist Catholic intellectuals,the left-oriented
middle class
elements,and a largepartof the Catholictrade unionists.The
trade unionistsprovidethe largest coherentsupportfor the
"pure" Catholic democracy.These movementshave expanded
rapidlysince the end of the war. In Belgiumthereare 350,000
Catholic trade unionists as compared with 550,000 for the
Socialist-controlledtrade unions. In France the Christian
unions have almost a million members.In Italy the figures
cannotbe accuratelyestimatedsince the Catholictradeunion-
ists have onlyrecentlyseparatedfromthe generallabor organi-
zation.
Before the war the Catholic trade unions were strongpri-
marilyamongthe employeeclass, and werequite weak among
manual workers.A special efforthas since been made in Bel-
gium and France to win the manual workersto Catholicism.
The organizationof the youngChristianworkers,theJeunesse
OuvriereChretienne, was establishedfirstin Belgiumby Canon
JosephCardijn, a priestof workingclass origin.The move-
ment spread rapidlythroughoutBelgium and France and by
1945 claimed a half millionmembersin France alone. It has
greatlystrengthened the Catholic trade union movementby
providingit with a groupof youngmilitantsand by broaden-
ing its working-classbase. In general the JOC and similar
movementsamong agriculturaland studentyouthhave been
partlyresponsibleforthe powerfulsocial reformist and demo-
craticCatholiccurrentin postwarFrance and Belgium.20
20See Dominique Auvergne,Regard Catholiques sur le Monde, Bruges, DeBrauwer et
Cie, 1938, "Chanoine Cardijn"; Claire Huchet Bishop, France Alive, New York, McMullen

The social positionof this authenticallydemocraticcurrent
of politicalCatholicismis moderatelyleft.It favorsa measure
of socialization for monopolisticindustry,and for the rest
of the economyproposesa mixtureof privatelyowned smaller
enterprises, and cooperativelyowned largerenterprises. These
viewshave had considerableprominencein the postwarperiod
because the ardentand youthfulresistanceleadershipmoved
rapidlyinto leadingpartypositions.But it is doubtfulwhether
theirinfluenceextendsmuchbeyondthe Catholictradeunion-
ists and some of the professionaland intellectualelementsof
theurbanmiddleclasses.
It is impossibleto describewithany accuracythe numerical
size of the various tendenciesin WesternEuropean political
Catholicism.The three right-wing elementsso far described
probablyconstitutethe majorityof the voters in the Chris-
tian parties. The more extremerightistgroups among the
Catholicpopulationsadhereto theright-wing movementsprop-
erlyspeaking,on the orderof the Gaullist RPF of France,and
the monarchistsand Qualunquists of Italy. These extreme
rightistpartiesare "clerical" in the sense that theyappeal to
Churchinterestswithregardto educational,and similarques-
tions.
The Frenchmunicipalelectionsof the fall of 1947 resulted
of theMRP votersto theGaullistRPF.
in a loss of three-fifths
The genuinelyChristiandemocraticgrouppolled farless than
half its formerstrength.2' With variations from countryto
countrythe size of this genuinelydemocraticand moderately
collectivistcontingentmay be estimatedat anywherefrom
twenty-five per cent of the votingstrengthof the
to thirty-five
Christianparties.It is perhapsstrongestin France and Bel-
gium. The liberal Catholics,who profitfromthe supportof
theVatican and partsoftheclergy,stilltendto be influential in
theChristianpartyorganizations.They are,however,obviously
hamperedin enactingtheirprogramsby the resistanceof their
powerfulconservative wings.
Althoughthe Christian"radicals" and "revolutionaries"are
Co., 1947,ChapterIII passim; R. C. Gorman,S. J.,"The Vitalityof FrenchCatholicism,"
The Tablet,July12,1947.
21 BarbaraBarcley Carter,"The Evolutionof the MRP," The Tablet, March13, 1948,
pp. 162ff.

44 WORLD POLITICS
numericallyand politicallyof lesserimportance, theyrepresent
a phenomenonof considerableinterest-believingCatholics
who findit possibleto reconciletheirfaithwithMarxistideas.
Such groups had existed beforethe war, notablyin France.
They were strengthened duringthe resistanceby virtueof the
comradeshipof the Catholic resistancewith Communistand
Socialist undergroundmovements.
In 1935 a group of revolutionaryFrench Catholics had
joined a Protestantgroupto found a reviewand a Christian
revolutionarymovement.The reviewwas called Terre Nou-
velle and carriedthe symbolof the hammerand the sickleon
a backgroundof a scarletcross. The group took the position
thatMarxismfulfilled thedoctrineoftheGospel.This spiritwas
reflectedin its declarationthat"The Christianoughtto be ...
a revolutionaryand the more revolutionaryhe is, the more
Christian."22A yearafterits establishment thePope condemned
the movement,and placed Terre Nouvelle on the Index. A
pontificalletterappearingin OsservatoreRomano explained
the condemnationby the assertionthat Christianityand Bol-
shevismwereirreconcilable and no collaborationbetweenCom-
munistsand Catholicswas possible.
In the postwarperiodthisCatholic revolutionary movement
emergedwith greaterstrengthin both France and Italy. A
recentManifestedes Chre'tiens Progressistes describestheCom-
munistpartyof France as the ". . . sole means of defendingthe
workingclass today, and the hope of popular democracy."23
In Italy the SinistraCristianawas foundedduringthe resist-
ance period. It accepted Marxism as a methodof historical
analysis and of revolutionary action but rejectedit as a phil-
osophyof life.At the time of the liberationthe Sinistrawas
attackedin OsservatoreRomano and the groupwas dissolved.
Many of its foundersenteredthe Italian CommunistParty,
the membership statutesof whichconveniently statethatparty
affiliationdoes not signifyadherenceto any particularsystem
ofphilosophy.24 The significanceof thissymptomand the effec-
tiveness of Communisttactics was reflectedin the extraor-
dinaryactionsof the Vatican and the Italian hierarchyin the
22
Spire,op. cit. p. 46.
1948,pp. 133 ff.
Mounier,"DelivrezVous,"Esprit,January,
23 Citedin Emmanuel
1948,loc. cit.pp. 14 ff.
Esprit,January
24 Mounier,

springelectionof 1948. Cardinal Schusterof Milan orderedhis
clergyto refusethe sacramentsto Catholic adherentsof the
"Popular Front." The Pope himselfintervenedand leftlittle
doubt in the minds of his flockthat votingfor the Popular
Frontwas a grievouserror,althoughhe did not go so faras to
declareit a sin.25
A moresignificant leftCatholictendencyis that represented
by the Esprit group in France and the Cronache Sociali in
Italy. These Catholic elementsare the convincedsocialists,
stronglyinfluencedby Marxism,but opposed to Communist
totalitarianism. They had been strongsupportersof the Com-
munist-Socialist"Left-Catholic"alliance in the era of "tripar-
tism." Afterthe dissolutionof the coalitionsin France and
Italy theyattackedthe anti-Communism of the Socialist and
Christianparties. French Catholic intellectualssuch as Em-
manuelMounier and Paul Fraisse apparentlyfavorthe forma-
tion of a new majoritybased on the "revolutionaryworking
class." Mounierattacksthe existing"Third Force" government
as a parliamentaryinstrumentof conservatismand social de-
fense.In its place he calls forwhat would in effectbe a new
popularfront,". . . a new socialismwitha strongand conquer-
ing faith. . . a proletarianand popularforcewhichis the basis
ofthe orderof thetwentieth century;a renovationpreparatory
to a futurerallyingof all the revolutionary forcesin a climate
of libertyand a reciprocalrespect.""This Catholic grouphas
ties witha movementhavingsimilarviews withinthe Socialist
party, the Rassemblement Democratique Revolutionnaire.
There is some speculationthatthe RDR may attemptto over-
turnthepresentleadershipoftheSocialistpartyand reestablish
a Communist-Socialist coalition.The Espritgroupand thepro-
Communist"ChristianProgressives"amongthe Catholics,the
RDR among the Socialists, and a group of pro-Communist,
formerRadical Socialists (among them Pierre Cot) offerto
the French Communiststhe prospectof establishinga Union
des Gauches in whichthe Communistswould be the dominant
partner."
25 The Tablet,March20, 1948.
26 Mounier,
Esprit,January,1948,pp. 139ff.;see alsoPaul Fraisse,"Apres e'chec"Esprit,
January,1948,pp. 1 ff.
27 "Dissidence Socialistes,"
Supplement No. 96, Bilans Hebdomadaires,
March5, 1948;
No. 100,April2, 1948,p. 2; No. 101,April9,1948,p. 1.

46 WORLD POLITICS
While political Catholicismis characterizedby these five
policytendencies,the mostsignificant groupswithinthe Chris-
tian partiesproperare the conservatives, the traditional,non-
political elements,and the democratic,moderateleftgroups.
The questionof whetherthe Christianpartiesare movements
of the "right"or of the "center"is impossibleto answerwith
confidence.The answerlies in part with the Vatican and the
national hierarchieswhichare in a positionto swingmany of
the non-politicalCatholic votersin the directionwhich they
desire.The Churchleadersin turnare limitedin theirdiscre-
tion by the heterogeneity of the supportfor these parties.If
theyshouldpresspartypolicyto the "right"theymay effecta
splintering ofCatholicpoliticalstrength.
On the basis of the principleof maximizationof polical
strength theChurchis constrainedto encouragea centerpolicy.
But theChurchis limitedin its capacityto enforceconformity.
At themomentit has provenitselfcapableofmaintainingunity
and encouraging"centrism"in Italy. But in both France and
Germanythereare considerablepoliticaldifferences withinthe
nationalclergiesand theCatholicpopulations,and theinfluence
to establishand maintainpolit-
of the Vatican is not sufficient
ical unity.
II
Popular prejudice attributesto the Vatican a monolithic
controlover the politicsof the Catholic populations.It is, of
course,quite clear that the Vatican intervenesfrequentlyand
aggressivelyin politicaldevelopments, but it would be an ex-
aggerationto view the Christianpartiesas the mere long arm
of the Church. It would also be an exaggerationto view the
various national clergiesas a unifiedand disciplinedpolitical
forceunder the direct controlof the Holy See. Catholicism
cannot comparewith the Communistmovementin regardto
disciplineand centralizedcontrol.
Any sound analysis of the relationof the Vatican to the
Christianpartieshas to distinguishbetweentheoryand prac-
tice. In a formalsensethe Vatican and the hierarchiesare con-
cernedwithmattersof faithand morals.28 Only wherepolitics
Rommen,
28 Heinrich St. Louis,HerderBookCo., 1945,
The Statein CatholicThought,
pp.580ff.

impingeson these questionsdo the Vatican and the national
hierarchiesassume the rightto intervene.The Catholic defini-
tion of faithand morals makes fora ratherflexiblestandard.
On the basis of logical developmentof Church doctrine,as
well as historicalexample,"faithand morals" can be made to
includea verygreatdeal indeed.Thus the attackof theChurch
in the nineteenthcenturyon liberaland socialistpoliticalphil-
osophywas justifiedon the groundthatthesemovementswere
atheisticand threatenedthe properfunctionof the Churchas
guardianof faithand morals.The Vatican throughthe Non-
expeditattemptedto enforcea boycottof the Italian govern-
mentwhichhad deprivedthe Churchof its politicalauthority
over the formerPapal states.At the presenttime the Church
has prohibitedCatholics frombecomingaffiliatedwith Com-
munist movementsand has warned against the dangers of
affiliationwiththenon-Catholicpartiesand tradeunions.
faithand moralsmuchdepends
In politicalmattersaffecting
on the severityof the sanction employed.The Church may
proscribean action as a "sin" of a particulardegree,or as an
"error"; or it may merelycounsel against a particularpolicy.
Interdictionof movementsor excommunication of individuals
are sanctionsrarelyemployed.Perhaps the Churchhas found
that the authorityof the Pope and the bishopsis best fostered
by an infrequentresortto "compulsive"means. The action of
Cardinal Schusterof Milan in the recentItalian electionsin
orderinghis clergyto refusethesacramentsto thosewho voted
for the "Popular Front," was an extraordinary step even in
thatbittercampaign.Earlier,duringtheNazi occupationmem-
bersoftheDutch clergyhad deniedthesacramentsto members
of the Dutch Nazi movement.The interventionof the Pope
was somewhatmore moderatein the Italian campaign.In his
allocutionas Bishop of Rome to the parishpriestsand Lenten
preachers,Pius XII drew the attentionof the clergyto the
extraordinary importanceof the electionand to the moral re-
sponsibilityof the voters."Withoutdoubt the Churchintends
to remain outside and above the political parties,but how
could it be possible to remain indifferentto the composition
of a parliamentto whichthe constitutiongives the powerto
legislate in matters which concern so directlythe highest

48 WORLD POLITICS
religiousinterests.. . . He who abstains,particularlythrough
indolenceor fromcowardice,commitstherebya grave sin, a
mortal offense."Voting instructionsin the papal allocution
took the followingform: "Everyonehas to vote accordingto
the dictatesof his own conscience.Now it is evidentthat the
voice ofconscienceimposeson everysincereCatholictheneces-
sityof givinghis vote to those candidates,or to those lists of
candidates,whichoffertrulyadequate guaranteesforthe pro-
tectionof the rightsof God and of souls, forthe true good of
individuals,of families,and of society,accordingto the laws of
God and to Christianmoralteaching."'
Typicallythe politicalinfluenceof the Vatican and the hier-
archiestakes the formof suggestionsand recommendations, a
formof pressurewhichis effective with the greatbulk of the
faithful.An example of this type of influencewas the letter
ofthePope to theSemaineSociale of 1946in whichhe suggested
thatFrance had gonefarenoughin its programof nationaliza-
tion,and thatit was advisableto pause and digestthesereforms.
In a letterto the Semaine Sociale of 1947 the Pope answered
thosewho had criticizedhim forenteringpoliticsby asserting
that he had been speakingon the moral and not the political
level, and that he had been expoundingthe moral doctrine
of the Church as it mighteffectthe balance betweennation-
alized enterprisesand small and medium-sizedenterprises.In
thesame letterthePope warnedagainstgivingtoo muchpower
over the state to the workers,a step as grave". . . in thiscase
as in thatwherethegovernment ofthestateis givenoverto the
pressureof capital."30 The Pope was exercisingin thisinstance
a prerogativeto interpret thedivineand naturallaw as it affects
"secular" affairs,a righton which the Church has always
insisted.This "interpretative" power . . . "does not mean a
power over political and secular mattersinasmuch as they
are of a politicalnature,but inasmuchas theyare subject to
the rule of naturaland divinelaw, of whichthe Churchis the
teacherand authoritative interpreter.""
There are, indeed,many historicalexamplesof Vatican in-
29The Tablet,March6, 1948.
30The Tablet,August2, 1947.
31 Rommen,op. cit. p. 576.

tervention whichhave had littleeffect.The effort of Leo XIII
to reconcileFrench Catholicismwiththe Republic duringthe
1890's was futile,just as the later interdictionof the Action
Franfaise failedto dispel right-wing Catholic supportforthis
movement.Catholic democracyin the nineteenthcenturycon-
tinuedits tenuous existencedespitethe generallyhostileatti-
tude of the Vatican duringa greatpart of the period.
Political interventionon the part of the individualnational
hierarchiesin WesternEurope has been occasionedin themain
by two factors,the educationalquestionand the susceptibility
of some Catholicsto Communistpropaganda.The questionof
the status of Churchschoolshas aroused seriouspoliticalcon-
troversyin Belgium,France,and Germany.The Petain regime
had grantedsubsidiesto Catholicinstitutions oflearning.These
were terminatedby the ProvisionalGovernmentin the post-
war period. An assemblyof the Cardinals and Archbishops
of France held in June, 1945 issued an appeal that the sub-
sidiesbe continued.The argumentwas advancedthatthewith-
drawal of subsidies would place Catholic parents at a dis-
advantageand deprivethemof theirfreedomof choicein edu-
cation.32More recentlya local problemof "freedomof edu-
cation" arose in connectionwith the nationalizedcoal mines.
The schools connectedwith the mines had been run by the
Church.The decisionoftheAssemblyto "laicize" theseschools
aroused a stormof dissentand forthe firsttime produceda
parliamentarysplit on historicprewarlines. The MRP voted
withthe Right,and the Communists,Socialists,and Radicals
voted togethera la Front Populaire. More than one hundred
fiftytownmayorsof the Vendee called an eight-dayadminis-
trativestrikein protestagainst this attack on the Catholic
schools.
With regard to mattersonly remotelyrelated to Church
interestsinterventiontendsto take on a privateand informal
character.Thus, duringthe constitutionalcontroversies in the
32
TimoignageChritien,July6, 1945; La Fie Intellectuelle,August-September,December,
1945,February,1946.
83"Le D6bat surla Nationalisationdes 1Rcolesdes Houilleres,"Bilans Hebdomadaires,May
21, 1948. In GreaterHesse in the U. S. Zone of Germanythe Bishops of Mainz, Fulda, and
Limburgcriticizedthe draftof the Hesse constitution,particularlythe educational article.
See DarmstddterEcho, November28, 1946; Fuldaer Yolkszeitung,November26, 1946.

50 WORLD POLITICS
post-warperiod the clergyhas generallyrefrainedfromovert
intervention. At the same time theirinfluencehas been sub-
stantial. In the matterof the dispositionof the Italian mon-
archy a large part of the clergyused its influenceover the
faithfulin favorof the maintenanceof the dynasty;and this
at a timewhenthe Democristianipubliclyfavoreda republic.
In France the MRP leadershipwas only able to swinga small
part of its normal voting strengthin supportof the second
versionofthe Frenchconstitution. De Gaulle and theconserva-
tiveclergypressedthevast majorityofMRP votersintoabsten-
tion,or opposition.The projectedBelgian referendum on the
returnofLeopold may soon provideus withanotherillustration
ofthistypeofinformalintervention.
The effectiveness of these interventionsis enhancedby the
special place of the clergyin some of the main centersof
Christian democratic strength.To the apolitical believing
Catholic a wordfromthe parishpriestalways has the backing
of supernaturalsanction,even thoughthismay not be invoked
in regard to political questions. In the rural areas of Italy,
France, Belgium, Germanyand Austria the Christianparty
organizationis oftenindistinguishable fromthe Churchappa-
ratus.One may pass fromChurchto CatholicActionto Chris-
tian party and still be under the same roof and surrounded
by the same faces.
Nevertheless,it would be an unfortunatemistaketo view
the Catholic Church as a monolithicpolitical force.In this
complexcommunitythe Vatican perhapsshould be regarded
as an arbiteramong conflicting politicalcurrents.The vague-
ness and generalityof the Vatican's officialcommunications
grow out of its efforts,first,to avoid the impressionof too
directintervention in politics,and second,to hold withinthe
foldof the Churchall of the heterogeneous politicaltendencies
which animateworld Catholicism.There is, of course,a con-
stant strugglebetweenthesepoliticalfactionsto gain the sup-
port of the Vatican in theirinterests.There can also be little
questionthat at any giventime the particularpoliticalbiases
of thePope, theVatican bureaucracy,and thePapal entourage
will influencethe directionof Vatican pressure. At the same
time,withinthe body of the Churchthe traditionsand social

compositionof particularnationalclergiesresultin quite effec-
tive resistance to Vatican intervention.Similarly,vigorous
Catholic lay movements,Catholic orders,and groupswithin
the clergyhave been able to maintaintheirpoliciesin the face
of pressurefromtheVatican and fromtheirown hierarchies.
Perhaps the most importantdevice of the Catholic Church
in maintainingpolitical control over the laity is "Catholic
Action." This movement,whichis quite powerfulin Western
Europe,is definedas a "lay apostolate"and is presumedto have
a purelyreligiousand moral functoin.In actual fact Catholic
Actionprovidesa meetinggroundoutsideof the Churchwhere
politicalmovementsmay be developed,politicalpoliciespropa-
gated, and where election instructionsmay be given to the
faithful.Since the clergyparticipateactivelywith the laity,
theChurchgains the advantageof a moreor less docile instru-
mentwithoutbeingcontinuallyand overtlyinvolvedin politics.
Church influenceon the political behaviorof Catholics is
thus exercisedby overt interventionon the groundsthat a
questionof faithand moralsis involved,by formalexhortation
of thefaithfulon politicalquestions,and by informalinfluence
in ways indicated. Apart from Church directives,political
Catholicismachievescoordinationon threelevels.Firstone may
considerformaland regularcontactsbetweenChristianparty
leadersof differentcountries.In February,1947 theSwiss Con-
servativePopular Party called a congressof Christianparties
at Lucerne.At this meetingthe Swiss,Austrians,and Italians
favoredthe formationof a ChristianParty International,but
the MRP vetoedthis proposal.In its place the congressestab-
lished a Nouvelles Equipes Internationales,an unofficial asso-
ciation of partyleaders,but not of the partiesin the formal
sense.The executivecommitteeofthe neworganizationis com-
posed primarilyof partyvice-chairmen or secretaries.The first
formalmeeting,held at Liege in May, 1947,discussedtheprob-
lem of the "integrationof the workerin his economiclife."34
To the Second Congress,held in LuxembourgbetweenJanu-
ary 30 and February1, 1948,boththe CDU and the Zentrum
wereinvited-an act symbolizingthe reintegration of German
Catholicismin the European Catholic community. Amongthe
84 The Tablet,February14, 1948.

52 WORLD POLITICS
problemsdiscussedwerethe Germanquestion,and theproblem
ofCatholicworkersin theunifiedtradeunionsofGermanyand
Italy. Althoughthe Nouvelles Equipes Internationalesis a
voluntary,consultativeorganization,and cannot committhe
national parties to particularpolicies, it provides a regular
channelforcommunicationand voluntarycoordinationto sup-
plementthe many informalinternationalcontacts of Chris-
tian Partyleadership.
The Christiantradeunion "International"has been reestab-
lished in the postwarperiod and attemptsto coordinatethe
policiesof the Catholic trade unions of WesternEurope. It is
engagedin a campaignat the momentto encourageseparate
Christianunions in Italy and Germanyin orderto break the
Communisthold overthe unionmovementsin thosecountries.
The recentformationof a separate Catholic trade union in
Italy may in partbe a consequenceofthiscampaign.
A second means of coordinationin politicalCatholicismis
the constant flow of communicationthroughChurch and
Church-influenced channels. Bishops and archbishopsand
membersof the clergyfromall areas meetfrequently in Rome,
receiveCatholic literaturefromthe Vatican and othercoun-
triesand engagein the exchangeofperiodicalsand correspond-
ence withone another.Catholic associations,such as Catholic
Action,send delegatesto each other'sconferences and exchange
publications.There is, therefore,a continualpoliticalcommu-
nicationwithinthe body of Catholicism(includingspecialized
Catholic news services)whicheffectscoordinationbetweenthe
Vatican and thenationalchurches,on theone hand,and thelay
social and politicalmovementson the other.
A third coordinatingfactoris the body of basic Catholic
doctrinerelatingto political,economic,and social policy,as
authoritativelyinterpreted by theVatican and thehigherclergy
In
of particularcountries. relationto the politicalproblemsof
today two Papal Encyclicals have assumed the characterof
basic documentsofmodernpoliticalCatholicism.These are the
EncyclicalsRerum Novarum of Leo XIII, and Quadragesimo
Zinnoof Pius XI. As guidesto politicalactiontheyare lacking
in clarityand specificity.
Spanish and Portugueseauthoritarian
Catholicismand the liberalCatholic movementsalike referto

thesedocumentsas the sourcesoftheirpoliticalinspirationand
moral authority.Despite theirambiguitytheseencyclicalspro-
vide pointsof departureforthepoliticalprogramsof theChris-
tian parties.
III
The persistentEuropean ideologicalantagonistsforthe past
centuryhave been Marxism,liberalism,and the varioustradi-
tional and authoritariantendenciesof whichCatholicismwas
perhapsthe mostimportantcontingentin WesternEurope. In
the postwarperiod,each of thesethreetraditionshas soughtto
findcommongroundwiththe othersand has soughtto do so
more earnestlyand more persistently than at any timebefore
the Second WorldWar. This has in partbeen a tacticalaccom-
modationto pressuresfromleftto right,but it would be unfor-
tunateif the accommodationsof principlewere overlooked.In
Socialist-humanism, Marxism has approachedliberal democ-
racy and has become a democraticcollectivism.In Christian
democracy,Catholicismidentifiesitselfwith popular govern-
ment and, in part, with moderatecollectivistideals. At the
same time,in the liberalmovementstendencieshave developed
which accept a limiteddegreeof collectivisation,or are tol-
erantof such experimentation ifconductedwithina democratic
framework.
These ideologicalaccommodationsare reflected in the polit-
ical alliancesof the presentFrench,Italian, Austrian,Belgian,
and Dutch governments and in some of the governments ofthe
German Laender. Leon Blum, in his futileeffortto forma
government afterthefalloftheRamadiercabinetgavethename
of the "Third Force" to this politicalalliance. The sloganwas
intended to consolidate the moderate democraticelements
againstthe threatof Stalinismon the leftand Gaullismon the
right.The sloganwas takenup in England and othercountries
and was one of the impulsesin the directionof a politicaland
economicunification and invigoration
ofWesternEurope.How-
ever, these internationalthirdforcetendenciesdo not mean
the same thingto theirvariousproponents.Amongthe Social-
ists thereis a tendencyto organizethe struggleagainsttotali-
tarianismon socialistideologicallines.Such a policyif pressed

54 WORLD POLITICS
by the socialist parties would in all likelihood alienate the
moderaterightgroups.
There are serious conflictsof policy and tactics between
the threesectorsof the "Third Force." The main conflictsin
the presentperiod concern (1) economicpolicy, (2) the reli-
gious question,and (3) problemsof nationalism.The conflict
over economic policy involvesthe various programsof eco-
nomic stabilization and nationalization of industries.The
Socialists and left-Catholicshave grownincreasinglyuneasy
over the directionof stabilization policies in France and
Italy. These problemsbecome acute wheneverproposals for
the extension of the free market and the eliminationof
governmentcontrols are pressed by the liberals and right-
wing Catholics of the governingcoalitions.Thus in France
the "Mayer Plan," the Reynaud fiscalprogram,and the anti-
inflationary measuresof the short-livedsecond Schumancabi-
net collapsed in the face of Socialist and trade union intran-
sigence.In Italy the moderateSocialists have been distrustful
of the liberal economicpolicies supportedby theirChristian
Democraticand Liberal allies.
A longer-run basis ofinternalthirdforceconflictis the ques-
tion of nationalizationand economicplanning.The Socialists
and some Catholic elementsfavorextensionof the programof
nationalizationand the maintenanceof economic planning,
whilethe conservativeCatholics and the liberalsoppose it. As
a sourceof internaldissensionthisproblemis now of immense-
significance,resultingas it has in the fall of threeFrenchcabi-
netswithinthe space of littlemorethan a month.Ultimately
eventheleftCatholicsand Socialistsmay haveto facetheissues
presentedby the differences in theirapproachto economicre-
form.
The questionof lay versus religiouseducationhas not lost
its power to embitterand divide political movementsin the
postwarperiod. The controversyover the withdrawalof the
Vichy subsidiesto the Catholic schools has alreadybeen dis-
cussed. In this matterthe MRP followeda moderatecourse,
votingfor the maintenanceof the subsidiesbut not carrying
the conflictfurtherin inter-partyrelations. The Catholic
bishopsofGreaterHesse wereso disturbedbytheallegedinade-

quacy of the constitutionalprovisionsrelatingto religiousin-
struction,that they stopped just short of counsellingthe
Catholicvotersto rejectthe proposeddraftin whichthe Chris-
tionDemocraticPartyleadershad concurred.
More recentlyin Belgiumand France governments have tot-
teredoverthe educationalquestion. In Belgium, in early May,
1948, PremierSpaak submittedhis resignationover a crisis
of thissort.The Socialist-Christian Social Partycoalitiongov-
ernmenthad agreedto increasethe subsidyforCatholic tech-
nical high schools by fifteenper cent. The militantlyanti-
clericalsocialistsattackedSpaak on thisissue and insistedthat
the amountbe reducedand that the Catholics abandon their
plans fortheconstruction of twohundredand fifty new schools.
The socialist attack resultedin provocativedemands on the
partof the Catholicextremists. Had the issue cometo a vote it
is possiblethatSpaak wouldhave failedto geta majority.Spaak
tenderedhis resignationbefore such a vote was taken and
therebyput pressureon the socialist and Catholic partymili-
tantsto composetheirdifferences.
Later in May, 1948 a similarcrisisarose in France in con-
nectionwith the twenty-sixprimaryschools acquired by the
state whenthe government nationalizedthe coal mines.These
schools had previouslybeen under Church control,and the
clergywere anxious to maintaintheirformerprivileges.The
controversy arrayedthe Socialists,Communists,and some of
the Radicals against the MRP, PRL and other right-wing
groups.FormerPremierSchuman'sversionof the bill was de-
feated,but he had not put thequestionof confidence. A similar
issue involvingsubsidiesfor tuitionto poor familieswishing
to send theirchildrento Catholic privateschools almost de-
stroyedSchuman'smajorityduringthecrucialAssemblydebate
on the questionof WesternGermany.
As one moves to the rightin the political spectrumthe
strengthand rigidityof nationalistsentimentincreases.Ques-
tions pertainingto militarybudgetsand national security,the
cessionof sovereignty in theinterestofinternational consolida-
tion,the reduction of metropolitan controlover colonies,and
national prestigeand predominance,have typicallydivided
radicals fromconservatives.Issues of this kind are constant

56 WORLD POLITICS
sourcesofconflictwithinthe Socialist-Catholic-Liberal govern-
ments of WesternEurope. The stronglynationalistviews of
General De Gaulle exert a powerfulattractionon the right-
wingCatholics.In hisviewtheconsolidationofWesternEurope
should take place under French leadership,and the Western
German states should adhere as individualunits to the new
politicalcommunity. WhiletheSchumanand theMarie govern-
mentshad been able to maintaintheirnarrowmajoritieson
some of these questions,right-wing nationalismand socialist
anti-militarismand "anti-imperialism"continuallythreaten
the stabilityof the administration and undermineFrenchpar-
ticipationin the variousWesternEuropean arrangements.
The demands forthe returnof colonies and the full moral
and political rehabilitationof Italy are strongestamong the
rightistparties,includingthe rightwingof the Democristiani.
If and whenthe questionofthe adherenceof Italy to theWest-
ern European programarises, serious internal and interna-
tional conflictmay be anticipated.The conservativesectorof
Italian opinionmay pressthe presentmoderatecoalitioninto
presentingdemandsforthe reestablishment of the Italian colo-
nial positionwhich will be unacceptableto the British.The
Italian rightwill exploit any national resentmentresulting
fromthe frustration of theseand similardemandsin efforts to
weakenthe existinggovernment.
In Germanythe most powerfulresistance(exclusiveof that
oftheCommunist)to limitationson Germansovereignty comes
fromtheconservativeChristiandemocratsand theincreasingly
articulateright-wing nationalistmovements.The reluctanceof
the moderategroupsto accept such measuresas the interna-
tionalizationof the controlover the Ruhr turnsin greatpart
on theirfearthattheappealsoftheright(and theCommunists)
to nationalistresentmentwill underminetheirown electoral
position.
On the left of the third force,anti-nationalismand anti-
militarismplay a significantrole in weakeningthe present
coalitions.Socialist ideologicalstereotypesrenderthese move-
mentsvulnerableto Communistpropagandaattackingmilitary
budgets,conscriptionprograms,and alliances directedagainst
Soviet infiltration and pressure.

Thus nationalist and anti-nationaliststereotypesproduce
seriousambivalenceson the rightand leftflanksof the center
governments. Issues ofthistype,combinedwithbasic disagree-
ments on economic policy and fundamentaldifferencesin
Weltanschauung,renderthe thirdforcean uneasy coalition.
Expectationsthat the movementsparticipating in thesecenter
regimesmay actually consolidateinto unifiedpartiesare un-
realistic.The thirdforceis not to be viewed as the germof a
single political movement,but as the currentlyhard-pressed
potentialof a democraticpartysystem.Agreementis largely
confinedto an adherenceto democraticmethodsand to humani-
tarianwelfarepolicies.Even iftherewere a prospectof a more
substantialunification,its effect
would probablyweakenrather
than strengthen the moderatedemocraticforces.A combined
Socialist-Catholic-liberal
partywould alienate the doctrinaire
electorsin each movement.The various elementsin the third
forceare perhapsreadyforfriendship but not forbrotherhood.
In the developingcontextof WesternEuropean politicsthe
Christianpartieswill provemost sensitiveto the tacticsof the
Communistparties.In France the aggressiveness of the Com-
munistParty and the attractionof the resoluteanti-Commu-
nism of De Gaulle resultedin a desertionof the MRP by its
conservativevoters. A renewal of Communistaggressionin
France may well signal the collapse of moderategovernment,
and the movementof the greatbulk of Catholic votersto the
Gaullist RPF. Recent local by-electionsin France show con-
clusivelythatMRP voters(and manySocialistvotersas well)
will rally around RPF candidates to preventthe electionof
Communists.
The threatto the survivalof the Christianpartiesas mass
movementsof the centeris obviouslygreatestin France,where
right-wing nationalismhas an importantasset in the prestige
of France's "firstresister."Developmentsin Germany are
ominous,but still largelybelow the surface.In Italy, Austria,
Belgium,and Holland the Christianparties,and themoderate
coalitionsofwhichtheyare a part,demonstrate bothvigorand
stability.At the same timeit would be unwiseto overlookthe
danger to Christiandemocracyas a whole arisingfromthe
threatin France. Perhaps the movementis only as strongas

58 WORLD POLITICS
its weakestlink.A collapse of Christiandemocracyin France,
and the rise of an authoritarianGauflistmovementmightex-
acerbatenationalistconflictsin the whole of WesternEurope
and underminetheprogramofeconomic,political,and military
consolidation.Were thisto occur the opportunitiesforsuccess-
ful Communistpropaganda and agitationwould greatlyim-
prove.In such an atmosphereas thistheVatican and theclergy
mightturnto an authoritarianpositionand mobilizethe bulk
of the Christian party voters around more resolute action
against such a threatto Churchinterests.Such changesin the
internationalsituationmay resultin a splitin politicalCatho-
licism.The greatmajorityof believingCatholicsmightadhere
to authoritariananti-Communist movements, whilethesmaller
groupof convinceddemocratsand moderatecollectivists might
findthemselves isolatedand powerlessto stemthetrend toward
extremist solutions.


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The Christian Parties of Western Europe

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Austria.. ........................................Yes . Yes Yest :: 47% 52% 50%

53 per centin Italy to 27 per centin France.Their shareof the

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MRP Communists Socialists

Agriculture...... .. 19.9% 21.6%

ties of the Right. This was reflectedin the large proportion

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