PHILIPPINE SCHOOL OF BUSINESS
ADMINISTRATION VS. COURT OF APPEALS, HON.
REGINA ORDOEZ-BENITEZ, SEGUNDA R. BAUTISTA,
and ARSENIA D. BAUTISTA,
February 4, 1992
FACTS: Carlitos Bautista was a third year student at the
Philippine School of Business Administration. Assailants,
who were not members of the schools academic
community, while in the premises of PSBA, stabbed
Bautista to death. This incident prompted his parents to file
a suit against PSBA and its corporate officers for damages
due to their alleged negligence, recklessness and lack of
security precautions, means and methods before, during
and after the attack on the victim.
The defendants filed a motion to dismiss, claiming that the
compliant states no cause of action against them based on
quasi-delicts, as the said rule does not cover academic
institutions. The trial court denied the motion to dismiss.
Their motion for reconsideration was likewise dismissed,
and was affirmed by the appellate court. Hence, the case
was forwarded to the Supreme Court.
ISSUE: Whether or not PSBA is liable for the death of the
student.
RULING: Because the circumstances of the present case
evince a contractual relation between the PSBA and
Carlitos Bautista, the rules on quasi-delict do not really
govern. A perusal of Article 2176 shows that obligations
arising from quasi-delicts or tort, also known as extra-
contractual obligations, arise only between parties not
otherwise bound by contract, whether express or implied.
However, this impression has not prevented this Court from
determining the existence of a tort even when there obtains
a contract.
Article 2180, in conjunction with Article 2176 of the Civil
Code, establishes the rule in in loco parentis. Article 2180
provides that the damage should have been caused or
inflicted by pupils or students of the educational institution
sought to be held liable for the acts of its pupils or students
while in its custody. However, this material situation does
not exist in the present case for, as earlier indicated, the
assailants of Carlitos were not students of the PSBA, for
whose acts the school could be made liable. But it does not
necessarily follow that PSBA is absolved form liability.
When an academic institution accepts students for
enrollment, there is established a contract between them,
resulting in bilateral obligations which both parties is bound
to comply with. For its part, the school undertakes to
provide the student with an education that would
presumably suffice to equip him with the necessary tools
and skills to pursue higher education or a profession. This
includes ensuring the safety of the students while in the
school premises. On the other hand, the student covenants
to abide by the school's academic requirements and
observe its rules and regulations.
Failing on its contractual and implied duty to ensure the
safety of their student, PSBA is therefore held liable for his
death.
Petition denied.
MANILA RAILROAD VS LA COMPANIA
TRANSATLANTICA
Facts:
Two locomotive boilers owned by The Manila Railroad
Company arrived at Manila via the Steamship Alicante
owned by Compaia Trasatlantica de Barcelona. The
equipment of the ship for discharging heavy cargo was not
sufficiently strong to handle these boilers, so the Steamship
Company had to procure assistance from The Atlantic, Gulf
and Pacific Company (hereafter called the Atlantic
Company). The service to be performed by the Atlantic
Company consisted in bringing its floating crane alongside
the Alicante, lifting the boilers out of the ship's hold, and
transferring them to a barge which would be placed ready
to receive them.
While the boiler was being hoisted, it was not properly done
as the rivet near the head of the boiler was caught under
the edge of the hatch. The weight on the crane was thus
increased by a strain estimated at fifteen tons with the
result that the cable of the sling parted and the boiler fell to
the bottom of the ship's hold. (natagak ang boiler unya
nakaduha pa jud xa natagak)
The boiler was badly damaged that it had to be reshipped
to England where it was rebuilt, and afterwards was
returned to Manila. The Railroad Company's damage by
reason of the cost of repairs, expenses, and loss of the use
of the boiler proved to be P22,343.29; and as to the amount
of the damage so resulting there is practically no dispute.
To recover these damages the present action was instituted
by the Railroad Company against the Steamship Company
who in turn caused the Atlantic Company to be brought in
as a codefendant, and insisted that whatever liability
existed should be fixed upon the Atlantic Company as an
independent contractor who had undertaken to discharge
the boilers and had become responsible for such damage
as had been done.
The judge of the Court of First Instance gave judgment in
favor of the plaintiff against the Atlantic Company, but
absolved the Steamship Company from the complaint.
Issue:
(1) Is the Steamship Company liable to the plaintiff by
reason of having delivered the boiler in question in a
damaged condition? (2) Is the Atlantic Company liable to be
made to respond to the steamship company for the amount
the latter may be required to pay to the plaintiff for the
damage done ? (3) Is the Atlantic Company directly liable to
the plaintiff, as the trial court held?
Ruling:
The accident is to be attributed to the failure of Leyden
(foreman) to exercise the degree of care which an ordinarily
competent and prudent person would have exhibited under
the circumstances which then confronted him. This
conclusion of fact cannot be refuted; and, indeed, no
attempt is here made by the appellant to reverse this finding
of the trial court.
It will be observed that a contractual relation existed
between the Railroad Company and the Steamship
Company; and the duties of the latter with respect to the
carrying and delivery of the boilers are to be discovered by
considering the terms and legal effect of that contract. A
contractual relation also existed between the Steamship
Company and the Atlantic Company; and the duties owing
by the latter to the former with respect to the lifting and the
transferring of the boilers are likewise to be discovered by
considering the terms and legal effect of the contract
between these parties. On the other hand, no contractual
relation existed directly between the Railroad Company and
the Atlantic Company.
Under the contract for transportation from England to
Manila, the Steamship Company is liable to the plaintiff for
the injury done to the boiler while it was being discharged
from the ship under articles 1103 and 1104 of the Civil
Code, for the consequences of the omission of the care
necessary to the proper performance of its obligation. The
contract to transport and deliver at the port of Manila a
locomotive boiler, which was received by it in proper
condition, is not complied with by delivery at the port of
destination of a mass of iron the utility of which had been
destroyed.
The Steamship Company cannot escape liability by reason
of the fact that it employed a competent independent
contractor to discharge the boilers..
Defenses of Atlantic
Atlantic contends that by the terms of the engagement in
accordance with which the Atlantic Company agreed to
render the service, all risk incident to the discharge of the
boilers was assumed by the Steamship Company; and
secondly, that the Atlantic Company should be absolved
under the last paragraph of article 1903 of the Civil Code,
inasmuch as it had used due care in the selection of the
employee whose negligent act caused the damage in
question.
At the hearing, the president of the Atlantic company said
that the agreement was that their company would not
assume responsibility for any damage.
The Atlantic Company offered in evidence a number of
letters which had been written by it at different times,
extending over a period of years, in response to inquiries
made by other firms and persons in Manila concerning the
terms upon which the Atlantic Company would make heavy
lifts. The company recognized its duty to exercise due
supervisory care; and the exemption from liability, whatever
may have been its precise words, had reference to
disasters which might result from some inherent hidden
defect in the lifting apparatus or other unforeseen
occurrence not directly attributable to negligence of the
company in the lifting operations. Neither party could have
supposed for a moment that it was intended to absolve the
Atlantic Company from its duty to use due care in the work.
The court said that if the exemption should be understood
in the sense which counsel for the Atlantic Company now
insists it should bear, that is, as an absolute exemption from
all responsibility for negligence, it is evident that the
agreement was a most inequitable and unfair one, and
hence it is one that the Steamship Company can not be
lightly assumed to have made. Understood in that sense it
is the equivalent of licensing the Atlantic Company to
perform its tasks in any manner and fashion that it might
please, and to hold it harmless from the consequences.
There may have been in the minds of the officials of the
Atlantic Company an idea that the promise to use due care
in the lifting operations was not accompanied by a legal
obligation, such promise being intended merely for its moral
effect as an assurance to the steamship company that the
latter might rely upon the competence and diligence of the
employees of the Atlantic Company to accomplish the work
in a proper way. The contract can not be permitted to
operate in this one-sided manner. The two features of the
engagement, namely, the promise to use due care and the
exemption from liability for damage should be so construed
as to give some legal effect to both. The result is, as
already indicated, that the Atlantic Company was bound by
its undertaking to use due care and that the exemption was
intended to cover accidents due to hidden defects in the
apparatus or other unforeseeable occurrences not having
their origin in the immediate personal negligence of the
party in charge of the operations.
W/N Atlantic should be absolved
We now proceed to consider the contention that the Atlantic
Company should be absolved from liability to the Steamship
Company under the last paragraph of article 1903 of the
Civil Code, which declares that the liability there referred to
shall cease when the persons mentioned therein prove that
they employed all the diligence of a good father of a family
to avoid the damage. Even when Atlantic used proper care
in the selection of Leyden, the obligation of the Atlantic
Company was created by contract, and article 1903 is not
applicable to negligence arising in the course of the
performance of a contractual obligation. Article 1903 is
exclusively concerned with cases where the negligence
arises in the absence of agreement.
In discussing the liability of the Steamship Company to the
plaintiff Railroad Company we have already shown that a
party is bound to the full performance of his contractual
engagements under articles 1101 et seq. of the Civil Code,
and other special provisions of the Code relative to
contractual obligations; and if he falls short of complete
performance by reason of his own negligence or that of any
person to whom he may commit the work, he is liable for
the damages resulting therefrom.. It is desirable, however,
in this connection, to bring out somewhat more fully the
distinction between negligence in the performance of a
contractual obligation (culpa contractual) and negligence
considered as an independent source of obligation between
parties not previously bound (culpa aquiliana).
Justice Tracey, the author of the opinion from which we
have quoted, proceeds to observe that Manresa, in
commenting on articles 1102 and 1104, has described
these two species of negligence as contractual and extra-
contractual, the latter being the culpa aquiliana of the
Roman law. "This terminology is unreservedly accepted by
Sanchez Roman (Derecho Civil, fourth section, chapter XI,
article II, No. 12), and the principle stated is supported by
decisions of the supreme court of Spain, among them those
of November 20, 1896 (80 Jurisprudencia Civil, No. 151),
and June 27, 1894 (75 Jurisprudencia Civil, No. 182.)"
The principle that negligence in the performance of a
contract is not governed by article 1903 of the Civil Code
but rather by article 1104 of the same Code was directly
applied by this court in the case of Baer Senior & Co.'s
Successors vs. Compaia Maritima (6 Phil. Rep., 215); and
the same idea has been impliedly if not expressly
recognized in other cases (N. T. Hashim & Co. vs. Rocha &
Co., 18 Phil. Rep., 315; Tan Chiong Sian vs. Inchausti &
Co., 22 Phil. Rep., 152).
What has been said suffices in our opinion to demonstrate
that the Atlantic Company is liable to the Steamship
Company for the damages brought upon the latter by the
failure of the Atlantic Company to use due care in
discharging the boiler, regardless of the fact that the
damage was caused by the negligence of an employee who
was qualified for the work and who had been chosen by the
Atlantic Company with due care.
Can the Atlantic Company be held directly liable to the
Railroad Company?
Having regard then to the bare fact that the Atlantic
Company undertook to remove the boiler from the ship's
hold and for this purpose took the property into its power
and control, there arose a duty to the owner to use due care
in the performance of that service and to avoid damaging
the property in the course of such operation. This duty was
obviously in existence before the negligent act was done
which resulted in damage, and said negligent act may, if we
still ignore the existence of the express contract, be
considered as an act done in violation of this duty.
The duty thus to use due care is an implied obligation, of a
quasi contractual nature, since it is created by implication of
law in the absence of express agreement. The conception
of liability with which we are here confronted is somewhat
similar to that which is revealed in the case of the
depositary, or commodatary, whose legal duty with respect
to the property committed to their care is defined by law
even in the absence of express contract; and it can not be
doubted that a person who takes possession of the property
of another for the purpose of moving or conveying it from
one place to another, or for the purpose of performing any
other service in connection therewith (locatio operis
faciendi), owes to the owner a positive duty to refrain from
damaging it, to the same extent as if an agreement for the
performance of such service had been expressly made with
the owner. The obligation here is really a species of
contract le, and it has its source and explanation in the vital
fact that the active party has taken upon himself to do
something with or to the property and has taken it into his
power and control for the purpose of performing such
service. (Compare art. 1889, Civil Code.)
In the passage which we have already quoted from the
decision in the Rakes case this Court recognized the fact
that the violation of a quasi contractual duty is subject to
articles 1101, 1103, and 1104 of the Civil Code and not
within the purview of article 1903. Manresa also, in the
paragraph reproduced above, is of the opinion that
negligence, considered as a substantive and independent
source of liability, does not include cases where the parties
are previously bound by any other obligation. Again, it is
instructive in this connection to refer to the contents of
article 1103 of the Civil Code, where it is declared that the
liability proceeding from negligence is demandable in the
fulfillment of all kinds of obligations. These words evidently
comprehend both forms of positive obligations, whether
arising from express contract or from implied contract
(quasi contract).
In this connection it is instructive to recall the celebrated
case of Coggs vs. Bernard (2 Ld. Raym, 909), decided in
the court of the King's Bench of England in the year 1703.
The action was brought by the owner of certain casks of
brandy to recover damages from a person who had
undertaken to transport them from one place to another. It
was alleged that in so doing the defendant so negligently
and improvidently put them down that one of the casks was
staved and the brandy lost. The complaint did not allege
that the defendant was a common carrier or that he was to
be paid for his services. It was therefore considered that the
complaint did not state facts sufficient to support an action
for breach of any express contract. This made it necessary
for the court to go back to fundamental principles and to
place liability on the ground of a violation of the legal duty
incident to the mere fact of carriage. Said Powell, J.: "An
action indeed will not lie for not doing the thing, for want of
a sufficient consideration; but yet if the bailee will take the
goods into his custody, he shall be answerable for them; for
the taking of the goods into his custody is his own act." So
Gould, J.: " . . . any man that undertakes to carry goods is
liable to an action, be he a common carrier or whatever he
is, if through his neglect they are lost or come to any
damage: . . .." Behind these expressions was an unbroken
line of ancient English precedents holding persons liable for
damage inflicted by reason of a misfeasance in carrying out
an undertaking. The principle determined by the court in the
case cited is expressed in the syllabus in these words: "If a
man undertakes to carry goods safely and securely, he is
responsible for any damage they may sustain in the
carriage through his neglect, though he was not a common
carrier and was to have nothing for the carriage." Though
not stated in so many words, this decision recognizes that
from the mere fact that a person takes the property of
another into his possession and control there arises an
obligation in the nature of an assumpsit that he will use due
care with respect thereto. This must be considered a
principle of universal jurisprudence, for it is consonant with
justice and common sense and as we have already seen
harmonizes with the doctrine above deduced from the
provisions of the Civil Code.
The conclusion must therefore be that if there had been no
contract of any sort between the Atlantic Company and the
Steamship Company, an action could have been
maintained by the Railroad Company, as owner, against the
Atlantic Company to recover the damages sustained by the
former. Such damages would have been demandable
under article 1103 of the Civil Code and the action would
not have been subject to the qualification expressed in the
last paragraph of article 1903.
The circumstance that a contract was made between the
Atlantic Company and the Steamship Company introduces,
however, an important, and in our opinion, controlling factor
into this branch of the case. It cannot be denied that the
Steamship Company had possession of this boiler in the
capacity of carrier and that, as such, it was authorized to
make a contract with the Atlantic Company to discharge the
same from the ship. Indeed, it appears in evidence that
even before the contract of affreightment was made the
Railroad Company was informed that it would be necessary
for the Steamship Company to procure the services of
some contractor in the port of Manila to effect the
discharge, as the ship's tackle was inadequate to handle
heavy cargo. It is therefore to be assumed that the Railroad
Company had in fact assented to the employment of a
contractor to perform this service.
Now, it cannot be admitted that a person who contracts to
do a service like that rendered by the Atlantic Company in
this case incurs a double responsibility upon entering upon
performance, namely, a responsibility to the party with
whom he contracted, and another entirely different
responsibility to the owner, based on an implied contract.
The two liabilities can not in our opinion coexist. It is a
general rule that an implied contract never arises where an
express contract has been made.
If double responsibility existed in such a case as this, it
would result that a person who had limited his liability by
express stipulation might find himself liable to the owner
without regard to the limitation which he had seen fit to
impose by contract. There appears to be no possibility of
reconciling the conflict that would be developed in
attempting to give effect to those inconsistent liabilities. The
contract which was in fact made, in our opinion, determines
not only the character and extent of the liability of the
Atlantic Company but also the person or entity by whom the
obligation is exigible. It is of course quite clear that if the
Atlantic Company had refused to carry out its agreement to
discharge the cargo, the plaintiff could not have enforced
specific performance and could not have recovered
damages for non-performance. (Art. 1257, Civil Code;
Donaldson, Sim & Co. vs. Smith, Bell & Co., 2 Phil. Rep.,
766; Uy Tam and Uy Yet vs. Leonard, 30 Phil. Rep., 471.)
In view of the preceding discussion it is equally obvious
that, for lack of privity with the contract, the Railroad
Company can have no right of action to recover damages
from the Atlantic Company for the wrongful act which
constituted the violation of said contract. The rights of the
plaintiff can only be made effective through the Compaia
Trasatlantica de Barcelona with whom the contract of
affreightment was made.
The judgment entered in the Court of First Instance must,
therefore, be reversed not only with respect to the judgment
entered in favor of the plaintiff directly against the Atlantic
Company but also with respect to the absolution of the
Steamship Company and the further failure of the court to
enter judgment in favor of the latter against the Atlantic
Company. The Compaia Trasatlantica de
Barcelona should be and is hereby adjudged to pay to the
Manila Railroad Company the sum of twenty two thousand
three hundred forty three pesos and twenty nine centavos
(P22,343.29), with interest from May 11, 1914, until paid;
and when this judgment is satisfied, the Compaia
Trasatlantica de Barcelona is declared to be entitled to
recover the same amount from the Atlantic Gulf & Pacific
Company, against whom judgment is to this end hereby
rendered in favor of the Compaia Trasatlantica de
Barcelona. No express adjudication of costs of either
instance will be made. So ordered.
||| (Manila Railroad Co. v. La Compa, G.R. No. 11318,
[October 26, 1918], 38 PHIL 875-901)
LRT vs. NAVIDAD
G.R. No. 145804. February 6, 2003
FACTS:
Navidad was drunk when he entered the boarding platform
of the LRT. He got into an altercation with the SG Escartin.
They had a fistfight and Navidad fell onto the tracks and
was killed when a train came and ran over him.
The Heirs of Navidad filed a complaint for damages against
Escartin, the train driver, (Roman) the LRTA, the Metro
Transit Organization and Prudent Security Agency
(Prudent). The trial court found Prudent and Escartin jointly
and severally liable for damages to the heirs. The CA
exonerated Prudent and instead held the LRTA and the
train driver Romero jointly and severally liable as well as
removing the award for compensatory damages and
replacing it with nominal damages.
The reasoning of the CA was that a contract of carriage
already existed between Navidad and LRTA (by virtue of
his havA ing purchased train tickets and the liability was
caused by the mere fact of Navidad's death after being hit
by the train being managed by the LRTA and operated by
Roman. The CA also blamed LRTA for not having
presented expert evidence showing that the emergency
brakes could not have stopped the train on time.
ISSUES:
(1) Whether or not LRTA and/or Roman is liable for the
death.
(2) Whether or not Escartin and/or Prudent are liable.
(3) Whether or not nominal damages may coexist with
compensatory damages.
HELD:
(1) Yes. The foundation of LRTA's liability is the contract of
carriage and its obligation to indemnify the victim arising
from the breach of that contract by reason of its failure to
exercise the high diligence required of a common carrier.
(2) Fault was not established. Liability will be based on Tort
under Art. 2176 of the New Civil Code.
(3) No. It is an established rule that nominal damages
cannot co-exist with compensatory damages.
RATIO:
Liability of LRTA Read Arts. 1755,1756, 1759 and 1763 of
the New Civil Code
A common carrier is required by these above statutory
provisions to use utmost diligence in carrying passengers
with due regard for all circumstances. This obligation exists
not only during the course of the trip but for so long as the
passengers are within its premises where they ought to be
in pursuance to then contract of carriage.
Art. 1763 renders a common carrier liable for death of or
injury to passengers (a) through the negligence or wilful
acts of its employees or (b) on account of willful acts or
negligence of other passengers or of strangers if the
common carriers employees through theexercise of due
diligence could have prevented or stopped the act or
omission. In case of such death or injury, a carrier is
presumed to have been at fault or been negligent, and by
simple proof of injury, the passenger is relieved of the duty
to still establish the fault or negligence of the carrier or of its
employees and the burden shifts upon the carrier to prove
that the injury is due to an unforeseen event or to force
majeure.
Liability of Security Agency If Prudent is to be held liable,
it would be for a tort under Art. 2176 in conjunction with Art.
2180. Once the fault of the employee Escartin is
established, the employer, Prudent, would be held liable on
the presumption that it did not exercise the diligence of a
good father of the family in the selection and supervision of
its employees.
Relationship between contractual and non-contractual
breach How then must the liability of the common carrier,
on the one hand, and an independent contractor, on the
other hand, be described? It would be solidary. A
contractual obligation can be breached by tort and when the
same act or omission causes the injury, one resulting
in culpa contractual and the other in culpa aquiliana, Article
2194 of the Civil Code can well apply. In fine, a liability for
tort may arise even under a contract, where tort is that
which breaches the contract. Stated differently, when an act
which constitutes a breach of ontract would have itself
constituted the source of a quasi-delictual liability had no
contract existed between the parties, the contract can be
said to have been breached by tort, thereby allowing the
rules on tort to apply.
Nominal Damages - The award of nominal damages in
addition to actual damages is untenable. Nominal damages
are adjudicated in order that a right of the plaintiff, which
has been violated or invaded by the defendant, may be
vindicated or recognized, and not for the purpose of
indemnifying the plaintiff for any loss suffered by him. It is
an established rule that nominal damages cannot co-exist
with compensatory damages. The award was deleted/\.
Fausto Barredo V. Severino Garcia And Timotea
Almario (1942) G.R. No. L-48006 July 8, 1942
Lessons Applicable: Quasi-delict (Torts and Damages)
FACTS:
May 3, 1936 1:30 am: road between Malabon and Navotas,
Province of Rizal, there was a head-on collision between a
taxi of the Malate Taxicab driven by Pedro Fontanilla and a
carretela guided by Pedro Dimapalis
The carretela was overturned and its passenger Faustino
Garcia (16 years old boy) suffered injuries from which he
died two days later
Fontanilla 's negligence was the cause of the mishap
he was driving on the wrong side of the road and at high
speed
criminal action was filed against Fontanilla in the CFI
CA affirmed CFI: he was convicted and sentenced to an
indeterminate sentence of 1 year and 1 day to 2 years
of prision correccional. The court in the criminal case
granted the petition that the right to bring a separate civil
action be reserved.
March 7, 1939: parents Severino Garcia and Timotea
Almario brought an action in the CFI of Manila against
Fausto Barredo as the sole proprietor of the Malate Taxicab
and employer of Fontanilla
Barredo was careless in employing Fontanilla who had
been caught several times for violation of the Automobile
Law and speeding violation which appeared in the records
of the Bureau of Public Works available to be public and to
himself
Therefore, he must indemnify plaintiffs under the provisions
of article 1903 of the Civil Code
defense: liability of Barredo is governed by the RPC>liability
is only subsidiary (no civil action against the driver
Fontanilla Barredo cannot be held responsible in the case)
CFI awarded damages for P2,000 plus legal interest
CA: reduced the damages to P1,000 w/ legal interest
Applied Article 1903: applicable only to those (obligations)
arising from wrongful or negligent acts or commission
not punishable by law
by reason of his negligence in the selection or supervision
of his servant or employee
ISSUE: W/N the parents may bring separate civil action
against Barredo, thus making him primarily and directly,
responsible under article 1903 of the Civil Code as an
employer
HELD: YES. CA Affirmed.
quasi-delict or "culpa aquiliana " is a separate legal
institution under the Civil Code with a substantivity all its
own, and individuality that is entirely apart and independent
from delict or crime
Upon this principle and on the wording and spirit article
1903 of the Civil Code, the primary and direct responsibility
of employers may be safely anchored.
Some of the differences between crimes under the Penal
Code and the culpa aquiliana or cuasi-delito under the Civil
Code are:
1. That crimes affect the public interest, while cuasi-
delitos are only of private concern.
2. That, consequently, the Penal Code punishes or corrects
the criminal act, while the Civil Code, by means of
indemnification, merely repairs the damage.
3. That delicts are not as broad as quasi-delicts, because
the former are punished only if there is a penal law clearly
covering them, while the latter, cuasi-delitos, include all acts
in which "any king of fault or negligence intervenes."
However, it should be noted that not all violations of the
penal law produce civil responsibility, such as begging in
contravention of ordinances, violation of the game laws,
infraction of the rules of traffic when nobody is hurt.
Penal Code Civil Code
minors and
incapacitated other persons
persons
subsidiary
direct(Art.
direct (article 19) (articles 20 and
1903)
21)
same act may come under both the Penal Code and the
Civil Code interpretation of the words of article 1093 "fault
or negligence not punished by law" consequence of which
are regulated by articles 1902 and 1903 of the Civil Code
The acts to which these articles are applicable are
understood to be those not growing out of pre-existing
duties of the parties to one another.
But where relations already formed give rise to duties,
whether springing from contract or quasi contract, then
breaches of those duties are subject to articles 1101, 1103,
and 1104 of the same code.
A typical application of this distinction may be found in the
consequences of a railway accident due to defective
machinery supplied by the employer. His liability to his
employee would arise out of the contract of employment,
that to the passengers out of the contract for passage, while
that to the injured bystander would originate in the negligent
act itself.
Article 1903 of the Civil Code not only establishes liability in
cases of negligence, but also provides when the liability
shall cease. It says:
"The liability referred to in this article shall cease when the
persons mentioned therein prove that they employed all the
diligence of a good father of a family to avoid the damage."
exemption from civil liability established in article 1903 of
the Civil Code for all who have acted with the diligence of a
good father of a family, is not applicable to the subsidiary
civil liability provided in article 20 of the Penal Code
distinction between civil liability arising from criminal
negligence (governed by the Penal Code) and responsibility
for fault or negligence under articles 1902 to 1910 of the
Civil Code, and that the same negligent act may produce
either a civil liability arising from a crime under the Penal
Code, or a separate responsibility for fault or negligence
under articles 1902 to 1910 of the Civil Code
Rationales:
Revised Penal Code in article 365 punishes not only
reckless but also simple negligence. If we were to hold that
articles 1902 to 1910 of the Civil Code refer only to fault or
negligence not punished by law, according to the literal
import of article 1093 of the Civil Code, the legal institution
of culpa aquiliana would have very little scope and
application in actual life
to find the accused guilty in a criminal case, proof of guilt
beyond reasonable doubt is required, while in a civil case,
preponderance of evidence is sufficient to make the
defendant pay in damages. There are numerous cases of
criminal negligence which can not be shown beyond
reasonable doubt, but can be proved by a preponderance
of evidence. In such cases, the defendant can and should
be made responsible in a civil action under articles 1902 to
1910 of the Civil Code. Otherwise, there would be many
instances of unvindicated civil wrongs. Ubi jus ibi
remedium.
It is much more equitable and just that such responsibility
should fall upon the principal or director who could have
chosen a careful and prudent employee, and not upon the
injured person who could not exercise such selection and
who used such employee because of his confidence in the
principal or director
not depending on the issues, limitations and results of a
criminal prosecution, and entirely directed by the party
wronged or his counsel, is more likely to secure adequate
and efficacious redress
Barredo vs. Garcia and Almario
73 Phil. 607
Facts:
Torts and Damages
Civil Liability from Quasi Delicts vs Civil Liability from
Crimes
At about 1:30am on May 3, 1936, Fontanillas taxi collided
with a kalesa thereby killing the 16-year-old Faustino
Garcia. Faustinos parents filed a criminal suit against
Fontanilla and reserved their right to file a separate civil
suit. Fontanilla was eventually convicted. After the criminal
suit, Garcia filed a civil suit against Barredo the owner of
the taxi (employer of Fontanilla). The suit was based on
Article 1903 of the civil code (negligence of employers in
the selection of their employees).
Barredo assailed the suit arguing that his liability is only
subsidiary and that the separate civil suit should have been
filed against Fontanilla primarily and not him.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Barredo is just subsidiarily liable.
HELD: No. He is primarily liable under Article 1903, which is
a separate civil action against negligent employers. Garcia
is well within his rights in suing Barredo. He reserved his
right to file a separate civil action and this is more
expeditious because by the time of the SC judgment
Fontanilla is already serving his sentence and has no
property. It was also proven that Barredo is negligent in
hiring his employees because it was shown that Fontanilla
had had multiple traffic infractions already before he hired
him something he failed to overcome during hearing. Had
Garcia not reserved his right to file a separate civil action,
Barredo would have only been subsidiarily liable. Further,
Barredo is not being sued for damages arising from a
criminal act (his drivers negligence) but rather for his
own negligence in selecting his employee (Article 1903).
***
Some of the differences between crimes under the Penal
Code are:
That crimes affect the public interest, while quasi-delitos are
only of private concern.
That consequently, the Penal Code punishes or corrects
the criminal act, while the Civil Code, by means of
indemnification, merely repairs the damage.
That delicts are not as broad as quasi-delicts, because for
the former are punished only if there is a penal law clearly
covering them, while the latter, cuasi-delitos, include all acts
in which any kind of fault or negligence intervenes.
However, it should be noted that not all violations of
the penal law produce civil responsibility, such as begging
in contravention of ordinances, violation of the game laws,
infraction of the rules of traffic when nobody is hurt. x x x x x
The foregoing authorities clearly demonstrate the separate
individuality of cuasi-delitos or culpa aquiliana under the
Civil Code. Specifically they show that there is a distinction
between civil liability arising from criminal negligence
(governed by the Penal Code) and responsibility for fault or
negligence under Articles 1902 to 1910 of the Civil Code,
and that the same negligent act may produce either a civil
liability arising from a crime under the Penal Code, or a
separate responsibility for fault or negligence under Articles
1902 to 1910 of the Civil Code, and that the same negligent
act may produce either a civil liability arising from a crime
under the penal Code, or a separate responsibility for fault
or negligence under Articles 1902 to 1910 of the Civil Code.
Still more concretely the authorities above cited render it in
escapable to conclude that the employer in this case the
defendant-petitioner is primarily and directly liable under
Article 1903 of the Civil Code.
ELCANO V HILL
77 SCRA 100 May 26, 1977
Torts and Damages Civil Liability from Quasi Delicts vs
Civil Liability from Crimes
Reginald Hill, a minor, caused the death of Agapito (son of
Elcano). Elcano filed a criminal case against Reginald but
Reginald was acquitted for lack of intent coupled with
mistake. Elcano then filed a civil action against Reginald
and his dad (Marvin Hill) for damages based on Article
2180 of the Civil Code. Hill argued that the civil action is
barred by his sons acquittal in the criminal case; and that if
ever, his civil liability as a parent has been extinguished by
the fact that his son is already an emancipated minor by
reason of his marriage.
ISSUE: Whether or not Marvin Hill may be held civilly liable
under Article 2180.
HELD: Yes. The acquittal of Reginald in the criminal case
does not bar the filing of a separate civil action. A separate
civil action lies against the offender in a criminal act,
whether or not he is criminally prosecuted and found guilty
or acquitted, provided that the offended party is not allowed,
if accused is actually charged also criminally, to recover
damages on both scores, and would be entitled in such
eventuality only to the bigger award of the two, assuming
the awards made in the two cases vary. In other words, the
extinction of civil liability referred to in Par. (e) of Section 3,
Rule 111, refers exclusively to civil liability founded on
Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code, whereas the civil
liability for the same act considered as a quasi-delict only
and not as a crime is not extinguished even by a
declaration in the criminal case that the criminal act
charged has not happened or has not been committed by
the accused. Briefly stated, culpa aquiliana includes
voluntary and negligent acts which may be punishable by
law.
While it is true that parental authority is terminated upon
emancipation of the child (Article 327, Civil Code), and
under Article 397, emancipation takes place by the
marriage of the minor child, it is, however, also clear that
pursuant to Article 399, emancipation by marriage of the
minor is not really full or absolute. Thus Emancipation by
marriage or by voluntary concession shall terminate
parental authority over the childs person. It shall enable the
minor to administer his property as though he were of age,
but he cannot borrow money or alienate or encumber real
property without the consent of his father or mother, or
guardian. He can sue and be sued in court only with the
assistance of his father, mother or guardian. Therefore,
Article 2180 is applicable to Marvin Hill the SC however
ruled since at the time of the decision, Reginald is already
of age, Marvins liability should be subsidiary only as a
matter of equity.
Equitable Leasing Corporation vs. Lucita Suyom,
Marissa Enano, MyrnaTamayo and Felix Oledan
[G.R. No. 143360, 5 September 2002, 388 SCRA 445]
Facts:
A tractor driven by Raul Tutor rammed into a house-cum-
store in Tondo, Manila. Part of the house was destroyed.
Two people died and
four were injured. Tutor was convicted of reckless impruden
ce resulting in multiple homicide and multiple physical
injuries. Verification with the Land Transportation Office
revealed that the registered owner of the tractor was
Equitable Leasing Corporation who leased it to Edwin Lim.
The relatives of the victims filed a civil case
for damages. The Regional Trial Court ruled against Equita
ble and ordered it to pay damages to the victims relatives.
Upon Equitables appeal, the Court of Appeals sustained
the RTC. Equitable filed a petition for review with the
Supreme Court.
Issue:
Whether Equitable Leasing is liable for damages
Held/Ratio:
Yes, Equitable Leasing is liable. The petition is
denied and the CA decision is affirmed. As the registered
owner of the tractor, Equitable Leasing is liable for the acts
of Raul Tutor even if he was actually the employee of Equit
ables former lessee, Ecatine Corporation, who became the
actual owner of the tractor by virtue of a deed of sale not
registered with the LTO. Regardless of sales made of a
motor vehicle, the registered owner is the lawful operator
insofar as the public and third persons are concerned;
consequently, it is directly and primarily responsible for the
consequences of its operation.
In the eyes of the law, the
owner/operator of record is the employer of the driver, the a
ctual owner/operator being considered as merely the agent
of the registered owner/operator. The principle applies even
if the registered owner of any vehicle does not use it for
public service. The main aim of motor vehicle registration is
to identify the owner so that
if any accident happens, or any damage or injury is caused
by the
vehicle, responsibility can be fixed on a definite individual, t
he registered owner. Failure to register the deed of sale
should not prejudice victims, who have the right to rely on
the principle that the registered owner is liable for damages
caused by the negligence of the driver. Equitable Leasing
cant hide behind the allegation that Tutor was Ecatine
Corps employee, because it will prevent victims from
recovering their loss on the basis of Equitables inaction in
failing to register the sale. The non-registration is
Equitables fault, which should face the legal consequences
thereof.
Lily Lim v Kou Co Ping a.k.a Charlie Co
Gr. No. 175256 and Gr. No. 179160 August 23, 2012
Principle:
A single act or omission that cause damage to an offended
party may gave rise to two separate civil liabilities on the
part of the offender (1)civil liability ex delicto, that is, civil
liability arising from the criminal offense under Article 100 of
the Revised Penal Code and (2) independent civil liability,
that is civil liability that may be pursued independently of
the criminal proceedings. The independent civil liability may
be based on an obligation not arising from the act or
omission complained of as felony. It may also be based on
an act or omission that may constitute felony but,
nevertheless, treated independently from the criminal action
by specific provision of the Article 33 of the Civil Code.
Facts:
FR Cement Corporation issued several withdrawal
authorities for the account of cement dealers and traders,
Fil-Cement and Tigerbilt. Each withdrawal authority
contained provision that it is valid for six months from its
date of issuance, unless revoked by FRCC Marketing
Department.Filcement and Tigerbilt sold their withdrawal
authorities to Co. On February Co then sold these withdrwal
authorities to Lim. Using the withdrawal authorities Lim
withdrew cement bags from FRCC on a staggred basis.
Sometime in April 1999, FRCC did not allow Lim to
withdraw the remianign bags covered by the withdrwal
authorities. Lim clarified the matter with Co and
administrative manager of Fil-Cement, who explained that
the plant implemented a price increase and would only
release th goods once Lim pays the price diffrence or
agrees to receive lesser quantity of cement.Lim filed case
of Estafa through Misappropriation or Conversion against
Co. The Regional Trial Court acquitted Co.After the trial on
the civil aspect of the criminal case the court also found Co
not civilly liable.
Lim sought a reconsideration which the regional trial Court
denied. On March 14, 2005 Lim filed her notice of appeal
on the civil aspect of the criminal case.
On April 19, 2005 Lim filed a complaint for specific
performance and damages before the RTC.
Issue:
Whether or not there is no forum shopping for a private
complainant to pursue a civil complaint for specific
performance and damages while appealing the judgement
on the civil aspect of a criminal case for estafa?
Ruling:
A single act or omission that cause damage to an offended
party may gave rise to two separate civil liabilities on the
part of the offender (1)civil liability ex delicto, that is, civil
liability arising from the criminal offense under Article 100 of
the Revised Penal Code and (2) independent civil liability,
that is civil liability that may be pursued independently of
the criminal proceedings. The independent civil liability may
be based on an obligation not arising from the act or
omission complained of as felony. It may also be based on
an act or omission that may constitute felony but,
nevertheless, treated independently from the criminal action
by specific provision of the Article 33 of the Civil Code.
Because of the distinct and independent nature of the two
kinds of civil liabilities, jurisprudence holds that the offended
party may pursue two types of civil liabilities simultaneously
or cummulatively, without offending the rules on forum
shopping, litis pendentia or res judicata.
The criminal cases of estafa are based on culpa criminal
while the civil action for collection is anchored on culpa
contractual.
The first action is clearly a civil action ex delicto, it having
been insituted together with criminal action. On the other
hand, the second action, judging by the allegations
contained in the complaint, is a civil action arising from
contractual obligation and for tortious conduct.
The Civil Case involves only the obligation arising from
contratc and from tort, whereas the appeal in the stafa case
involves only the civil obligations of Co arising from the
offense charged.
Formulated Bar Question
FRCC issued several withdrawal authorities for the account
of cement dealers and traders, F and T. Each withdrawal
authority contained provision that it is valid for six months
from its date of issuance, unless revoked by FRCC. F and T
sold their withdrawal authorities to C. On February C then
sold these withdrwal authorities to L. Using the withdrawal
authorities L withdrew cement bags from FRCC on a
staggred basis. Sometime in April 1999, FRCC did not
allow Lim to withdraw the remianign bags covered by the
withdrwal authorities. L clarified the matter with C and F,
who explained that the plant implemented a price increase
and would only release th goods once L pays the price
diffrence or agrees to receive lesser quantity of cement.L
filed case of Estafa .The Regional Trial Court acquitted C.
After the trial on the civil aspect of the criminal case the
court also found C not civilly liable.
L sought a reconsideration which the regional trial Court
denied. On March 14, 2005 L filed her notice of appeal on
the civil aspect of the criminal case.
On April 19, 2005 L filed a complaint for specific
performance and damages before the RTC.
Is there Forumshopping?Why
Answer :
No. There is no forum shopping because the criminal cases
of estafa are based on culpa criminal while the civil action
for collection is anchored on culpa contractual; because of
the distinct and independent nature of the two kinds of civil
liabilities, jurisprudence holds that the offended party may
pursue two types of civil liabilities simultaneously or
cummulatively, without offending the rules on forum
shopping, litis pendentia or res judicata.
Torts And Damages Case Digest: Amado Picart V. Frank
Smith (1918)
G.R. No. L-12219 March 15, 1918
Lessons Applicable: Negligence (Torts and Damages)
FACTS:
December 12, 1912: Amado Picart was riding on his
pony over Carlatan Bridge, at San Fernando, La
Union
 Before he had gotten half way across, the Frank
Smith driving an automobile came from the opposite
direction at the rate of about 10-12 miles/hour
As Frank Smith neared the bridge he saw a
horseman on it and blew his horn to give warning of
his approach.
He continued his course and after he had taken the
bridge he gave two more successive blasts, as it
appeared to him that the man on horseback before
him was not observing the rule of the road
Amado saw the automobile coming and heard the
warning signals
being perturbed by the novelty of the apparition or
the rapidity of the approach, he pulled the pony
closely up against the railing on the right side of the
bridge instead of going to the left because he thought
he did not have sufficient time to get over to the other
side
The pony had not as yet exhibited fright, and the
rider had made no sign for the automobile to stop
When he had gotten quite near, there being then no
possibility of the horse getting across to the other
side, Frank quickly turned his car sufficiently to the
right to escape hitting the horse alongside of the
railing but because it got close the horse became
frightened and turned its body across the bridge with
its head toward the railing
The left hind leg was hit by the flange of the car and
the limb was broken. The horse fell and its rider was
thrown off with some violence. As a result of its
injuries the horse died. Amado received contusions
which caused temporary unconsciousness and
required medical attention for several days.
ISSUE: W/N Frank was negligent in accordance to
negligence tests
HELD:
YES. lower court must be reversed, and judgment
is her rendered that the plaintiff recover of the defendant
the sum of two hundred pesos (P200), with costs of other
instances. The sum here awarded is estimated to include
the value of the horse, medical expenses of the plaintiff, the
loss or damage occasioned to articles of his apparel, and
lawful interest on the whole to the date of this recovery. The
other damages claimed by the plaintiff are remote or
otherwise of such character as not to be recoverable
Did the defendant in doing the alleged negligent
act use that person would have used in the same situation?
If not, then he is guilty of negligence
The existence of negligence in a given case is not
determined by reference to the personal judgment of the
actor in the situation before him.
The question as to what would constitute the
conduct of a prudent man in a given situation must of
course be always determined in the light of human
experience and in view of the facts involved in the particular
case
Could a prudent man, in the case under
consideration, foresee harm as a result of the course
actually pursued? If so, it was the duty of the actor to take
precautions to guard against that harm
Conduct is said to be negligent when a prudent
man in the position of the tortfeasor would have foreseen
that an effect harmful to another was sufficiently probable to
warrant his foregoing conduct or guarding against its
consequences
It will be noted that the negligent acts of the two
parties were not contemporaneous, since the negligence of
the defendant succeeded the negligence of the plaintiff
(wrong side of the road) by an appreciable interval.
Under these circumstances the law is that the
person who has the last fair chance to avoid the impending
harm and fails to do so is chargeable with the
consequences, without reference to the prior negligence of
the other party.
G.R. No. L-21291
PRECIOLITA V. CORLISS, vs. THE MANILA RAILROAD
CO.,
FACTS:
In December 1956, plaintiff, 19 years of age, married Ralph
W. Corliss Jr., 21 years of age, ...; that Corliss Jr. was an
air police of the Clark Air Force Base; that at the time of the
accident, he was driving the fatal jeep; that he was then
returning in said jeep, together with a P.C. soldier, to the
Base; and that Corliss Jr. died of serious burns at the Base
Hospital the next day, while the soldier sustained serious
physical injuries and burns.
Ronald J. Ennis, a witness of the plaintiff, declared in his
deposition, that at the time of the accident, he also awaiting
transportation at the entrance of Clark Field, which was
about 40 to 50 yards away from the tracks and that while
there he saw the jeep coming towards the Base. He said
that said jeep slowed down before reaching the crossing,
that it made a brief stop but that it did not stop dead stop.
Elaborating, he declared that while it was slowing down,
Corliss Jr. shifted into first gear and that was what he meant
by a brief stop. He also testified that he could see the train
coming from the direction of San Fernando and that he
heard a warning but that it was not sufficient enough to
avoid the accident.
Virgilio de la Paz, another witness of the plaintiff, testified
that on the night of February 21, 1957, he was at the
Balibago checkpoint and saw the train coming from Angeles
and a jeep going towards the direction of Clark Field. He
stated that he heard the whistle of the locomotive and saw
the collision. The jeep, which caught fire, was pushed
forward. He helped the P.C. soldier. He stated that he saw
the jeep running fast and heard the tooting of the horn. It
did not stop at the railroad crossing, according to him.
ISSUE: WON there was negligence?
HELD:
No negligence could be imputed to defendant-appellee, and
the action of plaintiff-appellee must necessary fail. The facts
being what they are, compel the conclusion that the liability
sought to be fastened on defendant-appellee had not
arisen.

A person in control of an automobile who crosses a
railroad, even at a regular road crossing, and who does not
exercise that precaution and that control over it as to be
able to stop the same almost immediately upon the
appearance of a train, is guilty of criminal negligence,
providing a collision occurs and injury results. Considering
the purposes and the general methods adopted for the
management of railroads and railroad trains, we think it is
incumbent upon one approaching a railroad crossing to use
all of his faculties of seeing and hearing. He should
approach a railroad crossing cautiously and carefully. He
should look and listen and do everything that a reasonably
prudent man would do before he attempts to cross the
track. (Mestres Doctrine) It may be said, however, that,
where a person is nearing a street crossing toward which a
car is approaching, the duty is on the party to stop and
avoid a collision who can most readily adjust himself to the
exigencies of the case, and where such person can do so
more readily, the motorman has a right to presume that
such duty will be performed.
It is clear that Corliss Jr. was so sufficiently warned in
advance of the oncoming train that it was incumbent
upon him to avoid a possible accident and this
consisted simply in stopping his vehicle before the
crossing and allowing the train to move on. A prudent
man under similar circumstances would have acted in
this manner. This, unfortunately, Corliss, Jr. failed to
do.
DOCTRINE:
Negligence (United States v. Juanillo) - The failure to
observe for the protection of the interests of another person
that degree of care, precaution and vigilance which the
circumstance justly demand whereby such other person
suffers injury.
(Ahern v. Oregon Telephone Co.)- is want of the care
required by the circumstances. It is a relative or
comparative, not an absolute term and its application
depends upon the situation of the parties and the degree of
care and vigilance which the circumstances reasonably
require. Where the danger is great, a high degree of care is
necessary, and the failure to observe it is a want of ordinary
care under the circumstances.
NORMAN A. GAID v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 171636 April 7, 2009
TINGA, J
FACTS:
- Petitioner was driving his passenger jeepney along a two-
lane road where the Laguindingan National High School is
located toward the direction of Moog in Misamis Oriental.
- At the time several students were coming out of the school
premises. Meanwhile, a fourteen year-old student, Michael
Dayata (Dayata), was seen by eyewitness Artman Bongolto
(Bongolto) sitting near a store on the left side of the road.
From where he was at the left side of the road, Dayata
raised his left hand to flag down petitioners jeepney which
was traveling on the right lane of the road. However, neither
did petitioner nor the conductor, Dennis Mellalos (Mellalos),
saw anybody flagging down the jeepney to ride at that
point. The next thing Bongalto saw, Dayatas feet was
pinned to the rear wheel of the jeepney, after which, he laid
flat on the ground behind the jeepney.
- Another prosecution witness, Usaffe Actub (Actub), who
was also situated on the left side of the street but directly in
front of the school gate, heard a strong impact coming from
the jeep sounding as if the driver forced to accelerate in
order to hurdle an obstacle. Dayata was then seen lying on
the ground] and caught in between the rear tires. Petitioner
felt that the left rear tire of the jeepney had bounced and the
vehicle tilted to the right side.
- Dr. Tammy Uy issued an autopsy report stating cranio-
cerebral injuries as the cause of death. She testified that
the head injuries of Dayata could have been caused by
having run over by the jeepney.
Issue: WON petitioner is negligent
Held: Yes but Gaid is not liable.
-presence or absence of negligence on the part of petitioner
is determined by the operative events leading to the death
of Dayata which actually comprised of two phases or
stages. The first stage began when Dayata flagged down
the jeepney while positioned on the left side of the road and
ended when he was run over by the jeepney. The second
stage covered the span between the moment immediately
after the victim was run over and the point when petitioner
put the jeepney to a halt.
- During the first stage, petitioner was not shown to be
negligent.
-Reckless imprudence consists of voluntarily doing or failing
to do, without malice, an act from which material damage
results by reason of an inexcusable lack of precaution on
the part of the person performing or failing to perform such
act.
- Petitioner was driving slowly at the time of the accident, as
testified to by two eyewitnesses. Prosecution witness Actub
affirmed this fact on cross-examination. Petitioner stated
that he was driving at no more than 15 kilometers per hour.
-It appears from the evidence Dayata came from the left
side of the street. Petitioner, who was driving the jeepney
on the right lane, did not see the victim flag him down. He
also failed to see him go near the jeepney at the left side.
Understandably, petitioner was focused on the road ahead.
In Dayatas haste to board the jeep which was then running,
his feet somehow got pinned to the left rear tire, as narrated
by Bongolto. Actub only saw Dayata after he heard a strong
impact coming from the jeep.
-With the foregoing facts, petitioner cannot be held liable
during the first stage. Specifically, he cannot be held liable
for reckless imprudence resulting in homicide. The
proximate cause of the accident and the death of the victim
was definitely his own negligence in trying to catch up with
the moving jeepney to get a ride.
- For the second stage, petitioner is negligent for failing to
stop driving at the time when he noticed the bouncing of his
vehicle
-Negligence has been defined as the failure to observe for
the protection of the interests of another person that degree
of care, precaution, and vigilance which the circumstances
justly demand, whereby such other person suffers injury.
-The elements of simple negligence: are (1) that there is
lack of precaution on the part of the offender; and (2) that
the damage impending to be caused is not immediate or
the danger is not clearly manifest.
-The standard test in determining whether a person is
negligent in doing an act whereby injury or damage results
to the person or property of another is this: could a prudent
man, in the position of the person to whom negligence is
attributed, foresee harm to the person injured as a
reasonable consequence of the course actually pursued? If
so, the law imposes a duty on the actor to refrain from that
course or to take precautions to guard against its
mischievous results, and the failure to do so constitutes
negligence. Reasonable foresight of harm, followed by the
ignoring of the admonition born of this provision, is always
necessary before negligence can be held to exist.
-For one to be liable for negligence, It must be shown that
his negligence was the proximate cause of the
accident. Proximate cause is defined as that which, in the
natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any
efficient, intervening cause, produces the injury, and without
which the result would not have occurred. In order to
establish a motorist's liability for the negligent operation of a
vehicle, it must be shown that there was a direct causal
connection between such negligence and the injuries or
damages complained of. Thus, negligence that is not a
substantial contributing factor in the causation of the
accident is not the proximate cause of an injury.
-The head injuries sustained by Dayata at the point of
impact proved to be the immediate cause of his death,
as indicated in the post-mortem findings. His skull was
crushed as a result of the accident. Had petitioner
immediately stopped the jeepney, it would still not have
saved the life of the victim as the injuries he suffered
were fatal.

Petition Granted. Norman Gaid is acquitted.