ELECTRONIC WARFARE

for the
REPUBLIC OF SINGAPORE AIRFORCE
LEE Kar Heng, Ph.D
TBSS Center for Electrical and Electronics Engineering
A TBSS Group Company
 Seminar Timetable
Session Topics
0800 - 0815 (15 min) History of EW
0815 - 0845 (1/2 hour) Definitions and terms
0845 - 0900 (15 min) ES, EP & EP in modern warfare (specific to air
warfare, including GBAD)
0900 - 0930 (1/2 hour) Radar and Communications Fundamentals
(Surveillance and Fire Control Radars)
0930 - 0950 (20 min) Intermission (AM Tea Break)
0950 - 1020 (1/2 hour) Radar and Communications Vulnerabilities
1020 - 1040 (20 min) Jamming Concepts
1040 - 1100 (20 min) Active vs Passive Jamming
1100 - 1130 (1/2 hour) Denial and Deception Jamming

2
 About LEE KH
ACADEMIC
B.Tech(Hons), NUS
Deans List in 4 out of 8 Semester, B.Tech(Hons), NUS
Asia Compaq Book Prize, Top student in Year 1998, B.Tech(Hons),
NUS
M.Eng Electrical NUS
M.Sc Sheffied (UK)
Certified Teacher in Higher Education, SEDA (UK) and TP
Ph.D Engineering Management MHU (US)

3
 About LEE KH
Chief, TBSS Group, TBSS Center for Electrical and Electronics Engineering, TBSS-Truong Thuong
Vietnam Trading Services, TBSS-Scilab Singapore Center, TBSS-Smiling Star, TBSS Khai Kinh Co. Ltd., TBSS
Personalized Tour Co. Ltd.
Manager, Police Technology Department, Singapore Police Force/Ministry of
Home Affairs
Section Head/Electronics Engineer, Maritime Electronics Section, Maritime and
Port Authority of Singapore
Project Manager/Consultant, Sensor Systems Division, Defence Science &
Technology Agency
Subject Head/Lecturer, School of Engineering (Telecommuications), Temasek
Polytechnic
Engineer/Member of Technical Staff, Center for Radar Systems, DSO National
Laboratories
Lecturer/Class Form Teacher, ITE Yishun/ITE Bukit Merah, Institute of Technical
Education
Field Service Engineer/Manager, Kongsberg Norcontrol, Brown Automation &
Consulting Engineering Pte. Ltd.
Electronic Specialist/Instructor, Weapon Systems (Fire Control Radar and
Computer Systems), Republic of Singapore Navy
4
 About LEE KH
Lecturer/Subject Head, Diploma in Telecommunications, Temasek
Polytechnic (Full Time), RF Test and Measurements, Integrated Project
Lecturer, Diploma in Electronics, Temasek Polytechnic (Part Time/Full Time),
Circuits, Digital Techniques, Digital Circuits and Systems, Control Engineering
Lecturer, Specialist Diploma in Wireless Communications, Temasek
Polytechnic (Part Time), RF Techniques, Wireless Personal Communication
Lecturer/Coordinator/Developer, Basic Radar Theory and Tracking Course,
Temasek Polytechnic (Professional Short Course), Airborne Radar, 2D
Surveillance Radar, Radar Tracking Techniques and Algorithms
Lecturer, NTC-2 in Electronics Engineering, ITE (Full Time/Part Time),
Computer Technology, Electronic and Electrical Principles, Electronic and
Electrical Applications
Tutor/Project Supervisor/Course Writer, Bachelor of Science of Technology
and Bachelor of Engineering, SIM University (Part Time), Technology Project,
Info-Communication Technology, Wireless Communication Systems, Digital
Communications

5
 About LEE KH
Lecturer/Developer, Diploma in Electronics Engineering, AIT TAFE Center
(Part Time), Electrical Principles, Amplifiers, Mathematics
Lecturer, Bachelor of Engineering/IT, University of Southern Queensland,
Informatics (Part Time), Linear Systems and Control, Algebra and Calculus II,
Discrete Mathematics, Fields and Waves, Communication Systems,
Computer Systems and Communications Protocol, Engineering Problem
Solving 3
Lecturer/Tutor/Project Supervisor, Bachelor of Engineering, Northumbria
University, Informatics (Part Time), Data Communications, Electronic Circuit
Design and Manufacture, Digital Signal Processing, Engineering Project
Lecturer, Bachelor of Engineering, RMIT University, IMC Technology (Part
Time), Radio Communication Systems Design
Lecturer/Tutor/Project Supervisor, Bachelor of Engineering, The University
of Newcastle, PSB Academy (Part Time), Introduction to
Telecommunications, Digital Communications, Final Year Project, Signals
and Systems
6
 About LEE KH
Adjunct Senior Lecturer, Bachelor of Engineering, Edith Cowen University,
SMa Institute of Higher Learning (Part Time), Communication Systems 1,
Propagation and Antennas, Wireless Communications, Control Systems,
Engineering Practicum, Project Development

C SEE Lecturer/Course Developer, Customized WiMAX Course, Rhode and

Schwarz, Singapore, WiMAX Architecture and Standards, Physical Layers and
MAC Layer, Security and WiMAX Network Design
Lecturer/Course Developer, Basic Radar Theory and Tracking Course,
Ministry of Defence, Airborne Radar, 2D Surveillance Radar, Radar Tracking
Techniques and Algorithms
Lecturer/Course Developer, Basic Radar System Engineering, Ministry of
Defence, Introduction to Radar, Radar Plot Extraction and Tracking, Radar
Tracking Algorithms
Lecturer/Course Developer, Basic Phased Array Radar Systems, Ministry of
Defence, Introduction to Antennas, Phased Array Antenna, Beam Forming,
Adaptive Processing
7
 About LEE KH
Senior Adjunct Lecturer, Bachelor of Engineering, Edith Cowen
University, Responsible for the B.Eng Program in Singapore
Course Chair, Bachelor of Engineering, SIM University, Wireless
Communication Systems
Program Leader, Bachelor of Engineering, Northumbria University,
Responsible for the operations of B.Eng Program in Singapore

Member, The Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE), 1995

Present
Secretary, Education Chapter, IEEE Singapore Section, 2006 2007
Chairman, Education Chapter, IEEE Singapore Section, 2008 2009
Vice Chairman, Education Chapter, IEEE Singapore Section, 2010 2011
Treasure, Education Chapter, IEEE Singapore Section, 2015 Present

8
 About LEE KH
K. H. Lee and M. S. Leong, A Study on Coupling Effect Between Antennas Installed on a
Common Structure, IEEE Asia Pacific Microwave Conference, 1999.
K. H. Lee, Antenna Coupling, B.Tech(Hons) Project Report, NUS, 1999.
K. H. Lee, S. A. Hamilton and M. S. Leong, A Tri-Band Circular Polarized Microstrip
Antenna, IEEE APS/URSI Intl. Conf., 2002.
K. H. Lee, A Simulation of Tracking Algorithms Used in Radar Data Processing, M.Sc
Dissertation, University of Sheffield, 2001.
K. H. Lee, Design and Development of Broadband and Multiband Antennas, M.Eng
Research Thesis, NUS, 2003.
J. W. Teo and K. H. Lee, The Propagation Properties Of Electromagnetic Waves In The
Application Of Through-Wall Radar Sensors, NUS Science Research Congress, 2003.
X. Q. Tan and K. H. Lee, A Study on Data Fusion Techniques Used in Multiple Radar
Tracking, NUS Science Research Congress, 2004.
B. Moh and K. H. Lee, A Study on the use of Frequency Modulated Continuous Wave
Radar in the Detection of Swimmers, NUS Science Research Congress, 2005.

9
 About LEE KH
Mobile/Whatsapp: +65 9191 6893
Facebook: www.facebook.com/karheng
(Personal information - opinions, comments, food, )
LinkedIn: www.linkedin.com/in/karheng/en
(Business information - company, work, formal articles, )
Academia: https://edithcowan.academia.edu/KarHengLee
(Academic information - course notes, project reports,
presentation slides, technical papers, )
Slideshare: http://www.slideshare.net/karheng1
(Company Information company write up, business articles, )
URL: www.tbsskhaikinh.vn, www.tbss.com.sg
(Websites contacts, address, business description, )
10
 EW Definitions and Terms

Technical terms are widely used in EW books and

articles, it is important to understand their
definitions correctly to fully understand the content.
 Definition of EW
EW is an important capability that can advance
desired military diplomatic, and economic objectives
or, conversely, impeded undesirable ones.

In military application, EW provides the means to

counter, in all battle phases, hostile actions that
involve the electromagnetic (EM) spectrum from the
beginning when the enemy forces are mobilized for an
attack, through to the final engagement.

A E Spezio, Electronic Warfare Systems, IEEE Transactions n Microwave

Theory and Techniques, Vol. 50, No. 3, March 2002, p.633
12
 Definition of EW
EW is not strictly ELECTRONIC
electronic COUNTERMEASURES
(ECM)
EW is not carried out
using electrons but ELECTRONIC
ELECTRONIC
electromagnetic WARFARE
COUNTER-
COUNTERMEASURES
Finding, exploiting (EW)
(ECCM)
and disrupting the
ELECTRONIC
enemy's SUPPORT
communications MEASURES
(ESM)
Provides an element
of force protection EW Divisions
(Old, but they are still being referred to)

13
 Definitions and Terms
Electromagnetic Spectrum
Range of frequencies or wavelength of electric and
magnetic fields radiation
EW covers a
broader range of
frequencies, as
Typical long as there is
Radar wireless
Frequencies transmission,
there is a
possible EW
activity

14
 Definitions and Terms
Electronic Support Measure (ESM)
Actions taken to search for, intercept, locate, record
and analyses radiation EM energy, for the purpose of
exploiting such radiation to support military
operations
Replaced by the term Electronic Warfare Support (ES)
Electronic Counter Measure (ECM)
Actions taken to prevent or reduce the enemys
effective use of the EM spectrum by attacking
personnel, facilities or equipment to degrade,
neutralize or destroy
Replaced by the terms Electronic Attack (EA)
15
 Definitions and Terms
Electronic Counter-Counter Measure (ESM)
Actions taken to ensure friendly and effective use of
the EM spectrum in the presence of enemys EW
Replaced by the term Electronic Protection (EP)
Countermeasure (ESM/EA Activity)
Employment of devices and/or techniques to impair
the effectiveness of enemys operational activity
Deception (ESM/EA Activity)
Deliberate radiation, re-radiation, alternation,
suppression, absorption, denial, enhancement or
reflection of EM energy in a manner intended to
mislead the enemy
16
 Definitions and Terms
Intrusion (ESM/EA Activity)
Intentional insertion of EM energy into transmission
paths to confuse or deceive the enemy
Jamming (ESM/EA Activity)
Deliberate radiation, re-radiation, alternation,
suppression, absorption, denial, enhancement or
reflection of EM energy to prevent or reduce the
enemys use of EM spectrum effectiveness
Pulse(ESM/EA Activity)
A short duration, high power surge of damaging
current and voltage (e.g. Lightning)
17
 Definitions and Terms
Probing (ESM/EA Activity)
Intentional radiation of EM energy into devices or
systems to learn the function and operational
capabilities
Reconnaissance (ESM/ES Activity)
Detection, location, identification and evaluation of
EM radiations
Signals Intelligence (SIGINT) (ESM/ES Activity)
Generic terms used to describe communications
intelligence and electronic intelligence
18
 Definitions and Terms
Electronic Intelligence (ELINT) (ESM/ES Activity)
Technical and geolocation intelligence derived from
noncommunications (e.g. Radar) radiations but NOT from
nuclear detonations or radioactive sources
Communications Intelligence (COMINT) (ESM/ES
Activity)
Technical materials and intelligence derived from EM
communications and communications systems (e.g.
Morse, voice, wireless, mobile, )
Security (ESM/ES Activity)
Protection resulting from all measures to deny
unauthorized persons information from interception and
study of noncommunications EM radiation
19
 Definitions and Terms
Direction Finding (DF) (ESM/ES Activity)
Equipment to provide location information of target
communication emitters
Hardening (ECCM/EP Activity)
Action taken to protect personnel, facilities, and/or
equipment by filtering, attenuating, grounding, bonding,
and/or shielding against undesirable effects of EM energy
Interference (ECCM/EP Activity)
EM disturbance that interrupts, obstructs, degrades or
limits the effective performance of electronics and
electrical equipment induced intentionally (some forms
of electronic warfare) or unintentionally (spurious
emissions and responses, intermodulation products, ..)
20
 Definitions and Terms
Masking (ECCM/EP Activity)
Controlled radiation of EM energy on friendly
frequencies to protect the emissions of friendly
communications and electronic systems against
enemy ES/SIGINT, without significantly degrading the
operation of friendly systems
EW Reprogramming (ECCM/EP Activity)
Deliberate alteration, modification of EW or target
sensing systems or the tactics and procedures that
employ them, in response to validated changes in
equipment, tactics, or the EM environment
21
 Definitions and Terms
Emission Control (EMCON) (ECCM/EP Activity)
selective and controlled use of EM, acoustic, or other
emitters to optimize command and control (C2)
capabilities while minimizing transmissions for
operations security: a. detection by enemy sensors; b.
mutual interference among friendly systems; and/or c.
enemy interference with the ability to execute a military
deception plan
Spectrum Management (ECCM/EP Activity)
planning, coordinating, and managing joint use of the
EM spectrum through operational, engineering, and
administrative procedures to enable electronic systems
to perform their functions in the intended environment
without causing or suffering unacceptable interference

22
 Definitions and Terms
Electromagnetic Compatibility(EMC) (ECCM/EP
Activity)
ability of systems, equipment, and devices that utilize
the EM spectrum to operate in their intended
operational environments without suffering
unacceptable degradation or causing unintentional
degradation because of electromagnetic radiation or
response

23
 Definitions and Terms
Denial
Control of information an enemy receives via the EM
spectrum and preventing the acquisition of accurate
information about friendly forces

24
Joint Electronic Type Designation System
Military numbering system
Prefix AN/ (it used to mean Army-Navy system)
Followed by a 3-letter code which tells where
the equipment is used
Followed by a hyphen (-) and then a number
The number indicates the sequence of the
equipment, a larger number means more
modern development

AN/XXX-99 or XXX-99
25
Joint Electronic Type Designation System
First letter (Installation)
A - Piloted Aircraft
B - Underwater Mobile (submarine)
C - Cryptographic Equipment (NSA
use only) (was Air Transportable)
D - Pilotless Carrier (drone, UAV)
F - Fixed Ground
G - General Ground Use
K - Amphibious
M - Ground Mobile
P - Human Portable
S - Water (surface ship)
T - Transportable (ground)
U - General Utility (multi use)
V - Vehicle (ground)
W - Water Surface and Underwater
combined
Z - Piloted/Pilotless Airborne vehicles
combined
Second Letter (Equipment Type)
A - Invisible Light, Heat Radiation (e.g.
infrared)
B - Comsec (NSA use only) (was Pigeon)
C - Carrier (electronic wave or signal)
D - Radiac (Radioactivity Detection,
Identification, and Computation)
E - Laser (was NUPAC, Nuclear Protection
& Control)
F - Fiber Optics (was Photographic)
G - Telegraph or Teletype
I - Interphone and Public Address
J - Electromechanical or inertial wire
covered
K - Telemetering
L - Countermeasures
M - Meteorological
N - Sound in Air
P - Radar
Q - Sonar and Underwater Sound
R - Radio
S - Special or Combination
T - Telephone (Wire)
V - Visual, Visible Light
W - Armament (not otherwise covered)
X - Fax or Television
Y - Data Processing
Z - Communications (NSA use only)
Third Letter (Purpose)
A - Auxiliary Assembly
B - Bombing
C - Communications (two way)
D - Direction Finding, Reconnaissance
and Surveillance
E - Ejection and/or Release
G - Fire Control or Searchlight Directing
H - Recording and/or Reproducing
K - Computing
L - no longer used. Was Searchlight
Control, now covered by "G".
M - Maintenance or Test
N - Navigation Aid
P - no longer used. Was Reproducing,
now covered by "H"
Q - Special or Combination
R - Receiving or Passive Detecting
S - Detecting, Range and Bearing, Search
T - Transmitting
W - Automatic Flight or Remote Control
X - Identification or Recognition
Y - Surveillance (target
detecting and tracking)
and Control (fire control
and/or air control)
Z - Secure (NSA use only)
Joint Electronic Type Designation System
AN/FPS-16 or
FPS-16
F Fixed ground
installation
P radar
S detecting, range
and bearing, search

27
Joint Electronic Type Designation System

AN/ALQ-213 or ALQ-213 (EW Management

System)
A Piloted aircraft
L Countermeasure
Q Combination 28
 Abbreviations
Term Meaning Term Meaning
AAM Air to Air Missile CW Continuous Wave
AGA Air-Ground-Air Diplexer Passive device that combine
AGC Automatic Gain Control radio signals into a single
ARM Anti-Radiation Missile antenna
AAA Anti-Aircraft Artillery DEM Digital Elevation Model
ASM Air-to-Surface Missile DF Direction Finder/Finding
AOR Area of Responsibility DME Distance Measuring Equipment
APOD Air Point of Departure Downlink Down from air/base station to
BackhaulBattle area extends beyond earth/ground station
physical bounds (the battlefield) DRDF Digital Resolved DF
BSM Battle Space Management DTM Digital Terrain Model
Burn- Overcoming jamming by the DVOR Digital VHF Omni-Directional
Through robustness of target link Radio Ranging
CEW Communications EW EIRP Effective Isotropic Radiation
CIWS Close in Weapon Systems Pattern
CME Combat Net Radio ERP Effective Radiation Pattern

29
 Abbreviations
Term Meaning Term Meaning
EMP EM Pulse, a damaging RF energy MGRS Military Grid Reference System
for a nuclear weapon or EMP OP Observation Post
weapon OTHT Over the Horizon Targeting
FAA Federal Aviation Authority PD Probability of Detection
FEBA Forward Edge Battle Area POD Point of Departure
FFZ First Fresnel Zone POI Point of Interception
FH Frequency Hopping POJ Point of Jamming
GCI Ground Controlled Intercept PRF Pulse Repetitive Frequency
Hardkill Physical destruction of assets PRI Pulse Repetitive Interval
HUMINT Human Intelligence, informants PSO Probability of Success Operation
IFF Identification of Friend or Foe SAM Surface to Air Missile
IMINT Image Intelligence SAR Synthetic Aperture Radar
J/S or JSR Jamming-to-Signal Ratio SHORAD Short Range Radar
LIDAR Light Detection and Ranging SINAD Signal in Noise and Distortion
MASINT Measurement and Signature Spoofing A radiation system pretending to
Intelligence be a different system
SSM Surface to Surface Missile
30
 Abbreviations
Term Meaning Term Meaning
SSM Surface to Surface Missile MGRS Military Grid Reference System
FAA Federal Aviation Authority OP Observation Post
FEBA Forward Edge Battle Area OTHT Over the Horizon Targeting
FFZ First Fresnel Zone PD Probability of Detection
FH Frequency Hopping POD Point of Departure
GCI Ground Controlled Intercept POI Point of Interception
Hardkill Physical destruction of assets POJ Point of Jamming
HUMINT Human Intelligence, informants PRF Pulse Repetitive Frequency
IFF Identification of Friend or Foe PRI Pulse Repetitive Interval
IMINT Image Intelligence PSO Probability of Success Operation
J/S or JSR Jamming-to-Signal Ratio SAM Surface to Air Missile
LIDAR Light Detection and Ranging SAR Synthetic Aperture Radar
MASINT Measurement and Signature SHORAD Short Range Radar
Intelligence SINAD Signal in Noise and Distortion
Spoofing A radiation system pretending to
be a different system

31
 History of EW

EW is not new , it has been practiced in major

conflicts since early 90s.
It is crucial to look at the historical development of
EW to appreciate the strategic role it plays.
 Historical Development
More than 100 years
Started when 1st radio appeared on the
battlefield
Radio communication changed the information
flow of military forces
In 1901, the 1st recorded deliberate radio
jamming took place for commercial gain
It was about the use of more powerful
transmitter to jam competitors in the reporting of
a boat race
1st reported use of military EW the 1905 Russo-
Japanese War, Russian navy attempted to jam
Japanese vessels radio transmission but failed
33
 Historical Development
In 1914, Germans intercepted the
communication system of the British forces in
WW1
In early 1930s, RADAR was initially developed
During WW1, electronic deception such as
false transmissions, electronic espionage,
dummy traffic, were deployed
In 1939, Germans successfully located British
early warning radars
DF was a great success in maritime operations
during WW1
34
 Historical Development
Year Events Relating to EW through WW1
1837 S F B Morse invented telegraph
1858 US and Britain established a trans-Atlantic undersea
cable for communication
1861 Telegraph was an important target for enemy cavalry
during the US Civil War
1870 J C Maxwell establish the EM waves propagation in free
space
1888 H Hertz demonstrated electrical sparks propagation
signals into space
1895 Capt H Jackson transmitted Morse signal in England
1897 G Marconi transmitted and received signal wirelessly
over 2 km

35
 Historical Development
Year Events Relating to EW through WW1
1899 Marconi radio sets were picking signals from 140 km
st
1901 1 recorded radio jamming in US
st
1902 1 intentional radio jamming for military purpose took
place in the Mediterranean
1905 Radio jamming was used in the Russo-Japanese War
1906 US Navy installed a DF
1914 Wide use of radio jamming, chain of DF stations were
installed by the Royal Navy
1917 US Navy installed ship borne wireless DF for anti-
submarine warfare

36
 Historical Development
During WW2, British equipped their aircraft
with noise jammers and passive ECM as
countermeasure
WW2 was a competition between ECM and
ECCM
As an example, the Chain Home Radar (early
warning radar) was built by the British to fight
against the Germans
IFF capability was later built into British
aircrafts where Chain Home Radar was able to
identify them as a friendly target
37
 Historical Development
In the Japanese attack on the Pearl Harbor,
the Japanese fleet sailed across the Pacific in
total radio silence and the Simulative
Electronic Deception (SED) denied the US the
true location, intention and activities of the
fleet
After WW2, EW development became more
aggressive and sophisticated

38
 Historical Development
Significant Developments Leading to RADAR
Improved equipment performance and reliability
Transmission and reception of higher frequencies
Radio systems became smaller and lighter
Radio systems became available for short-range
communications
Better understanding of EM spectrum

39
 Historical Development
During the Korean War, B-29 were not allowed to
deploy chaff except spot jamming of fire control
radars due to potential disclosure of capability to the
Soviet
Some B-29s were lost to the North Korea
During Vietnam War in 1965, radar-guided surface-
to-air missiles (SAM) and radar-mounted anti-aircraft
artillery (AAA) were deployed to gun down the US
fighters
US realized the importance of EW capability and
strengthened the EW programs

40
 Historical Development
In 1971, the Vietnamese deployed heaviest barrages
of AAA and SAM against the EW-equipped US aircraft
during the Hanoi and Haiphong attacks
The 1973 Middle East War saw most of the SAM and
AAA systems in action where EM spectrum was
made full use of in target tracking and guidance
The war pushed EW into forefront of modern
military thinking, efficient Signal Intelligence
(SIGINT) was necessary even during peace time
If one fails to control the EM spectrum and to
gather intelligence, one may face disaster
41
 Historical Development
In the 1980-1988 Iran-Iraq War, the US made use
of effective jamming in the DESERT STORM,
ENDURANCE FREEDOM and IRAQI FREEDOM
operations
The EW-armed US aircraft successfully rendered
the enemy air defense and control and command
systems (C2S) ineffective by dominating the EM
spectrum
The deployment of Maritime Surveillance Aircraft
to map out enemy radars and C2S played an
important role in the information dominance
battlefield 42
 Historical Development
In the 1982 Lebanon War, the Israeli accounted
the use of decoys and real-time warfare
supported by accurate planning of EW actions to
their success
In the 1982 Falklands War, a British destroyer was
destroyed by a sea-skimming French-built missile,
there was no airborne early warning radar on
board
The on board missile, meant to engage aerial
platform had failed to get to the sea-skimming
missile in time
43
 Historical Development
It was the coordinated use of Airborne Early
Warning and Control System (AEWCS) and ECM
against the Lebanons Control, Control and
Communications Systems (C3S), called the C3CM
In the 1990s, Soviet threat diminished with
budgets reducing, EW operations to the Air Force
and Navy were given up
Throughout the 1990s, Information Warfare (IW)
doctrine transpired and this led to the
development of Information Operation (IO)
EW is one of the core competencies in IO
44
 Historical Development
INFORMATION OPERATIONS CORE COMPETENCIES
Electronic Warfare
Operations Security
Military Deception
Computer Network Operations
Psychological Operations
Supporting Competencies Related Competencies
Information Assurance Public Affairs
Physical Security Civil Military Operations
Physical Attack Defense Support to Public Diplomacy
Counter-Intelligence
Combat Camera

45
ES, EP and EP in Modern Warfare
(specific to Air Warfare including GBAD)
What are Electronic Warfare Support and
Electronic Project and How important are they
in Ground Based Air Defense?
 Electronic Warfare Activities
ELECTRONIC WARFARE (EW)
ELECTRONIC PROTECTION
ELECTRONIC ATTACK (EA) EW SUPPORT (ES)
(EP)
Actions tasked by, or under direct
Use of EM energy, directed Passive and active means taken control of, an operational
energy, or anti-radiation to protect personnel, facilities, commander to search for,
weapons to attack personnel, and equipment from any effects intercept, identify, and locate or
facilities, or equipment with the of friendly or enemy localize sources of radiated EM
intent of degrading, neutralizing, employment of EW that degrade, energy for immediate threat
or destroying enemy combat neutralize, or destroy friendly recognition, targeting, planning
capability and is a form of fires combat capability in support of EW operations and
other tactical actions
Non-destructive Threat warning Protect from friendly EW
Destructive Collection supporting EW Emission Control (EMCON)
EW Frequency De-confliction
Direction finding
Protect from enemy EW
Emission Control (EMCON)
EM Hardening

47
 Electronic Warfare Activities
The 3 main activities are supported by various
capabilities
Capability Description
EM Compatibility Ability of systems and devices to operate in the
(EMC) intended EM environment without causing an
unacceptable level of degradation
EM Deception Intentional radiation, re-radiation, alteration,
denial, suppression or reflection of EM energy to
provide misleading information to the enemy
EM Hardening Activities performed to protect personnel, facilities
and systems by filtering, attenuation, bonding and
grounding against unintentional EM radiations

48
 Electronic Warfare Activities
Capability Description
EM Intrusion Placing EM energy intentionally into EM
transmission paths to deceive and create
confusion
EM Interference Any intentional or unintentional EM-related
disturbance that interrupts, obstruct, degrades,
and limits the effectiveness of electronics and
electrical equipment
EM Jamming A deliberate radiation, re-radiation or reflection of
EM energy to reduce or prevent enemy from using
EM spectrum, thus degrading or neutralizing
combat capability

49
 Electronic Warfare Activities
Capability Description
EM Pulse A strong pulse that produces damaging current or
voltage to disable electronics and electrical
devices
EM Masking To protect friendly radiation against hostile ES and
SIGINT activities by controlling radiation of EM
energy of friendly frequencies
EM Probing Deliberate radiation into a potential enemys
devices and systems so that friendly forces can
learn about the functions and capabilities of
hostile devices and systems
EM Detection, location, identification, and evaluation
Reconnaissance of EM radiation

50
 Electronic Warfare Activities
Capability Description
EM Intelligence Geological and technical Information gained from
(ELINT) foreign non-communications EM radiation
EM Security Activities designed to deny unauthorized persons
access to important information from interception
or non-communication radiations
EM Purposefully made changes of EM and target
Reprogramming sensitive systems to adopt the changes in
equipment, tactics and EM environment due to
friendly or hostile activities, so as to sustain the
effectiveness of EW and target sensitive systems
Emission Control Selective and controlled use of EM, acoustic and
(EMCON) other emitters to limit detection by enemy

51
 Electronic Warfare Activities
Capability Description
Spectrum Planning, coordinating and managing the EM
Management spectrum so that friendly electronic systems can
perform their functions without interference or
confusion

52
 Electronic Attack (EA)
Targets facilities, equipment and personnel so as
to destroy, neutralize or degrade
Used to be known as Electronic Countermeasure
(ECM)
Non-destructive (soft kill) jamming, spoofing
Destructive (hard kill) anti-radiation missiles
(ARM), directed energy weapons (DEW)
EA examples are chaff, noise jamming, false
targets, angle deception and decoys
53
 Electronic Attack (EA)
ELECTRONIC ATTACK (EA) TECHNIQUES
ACTIVE PASSIVE
Noise Deceptive
Chemical Mechanical
Jamming Jamming
Spot Range Smoke Chaff
Barrage Velocity Aerosols IR Flares
Sweep Azimuth Decoys

54
 Electronic Attack (EA)
Noise jamming increases of background noise to
make target returns undetectable
Spot jamming narrowband jamming ideally
identical to the radar
Barrage jamming power output is spread over
bandwidth wider than the radar signal (amplitude)
Sweep jamming power output is swept over a
wide bandwidth (frequency)
Deception jamming masking the real signal by
injecting replicas to general false signals
55
 Electronic Attack (EA)
Range deception breaks the missile-guiding radar
locking by capturing the radar range gate with a false echo
and moving it off to a false range
Velocity deception the Doppler shift is interfered by the
jammer which produces a false Doppler shifted signal to
the radar
Angle deception introduces angle-tracking errors in the
enemys fire control radar or radar-guided missile such
that the firing is missed, cross-eye and terrain bounce
jamming are angle deception techniques
False target creates false target returns to confuse
operators so as unable to identify real target return by use
of transponders or repeaters
56
 Electronic Attack (EA)
Chemical jamming smoke or aerosol are used
against laser threat
Chaff composed of strips of metal foil, metal
coated dielectric fibers, thousands of which are
stored in a small space
Flare pyrotechnic target launched to confuse
infrared homing missiles to be decoyed away
Radar decoys confuses enemy and draws radar or
seeker of a radar-guided missile away from the
deploying aircraft
DEW high energy laser (HEL), charged particle
beam (CPB), neutral particle beams (NPB), high
power microwave (HPM)
57
 Electronic Protection (EP)
Used to be known as Electronic Counter
Countermeasure (ECCM)
Protect personnel, facilities and equipment from
any friendly or hostile employment of EW that
degrade, neutralize or destroy friendly combat
capability by active and passive means
EP is resistance to jamming
Generally, EP techniques are based on radar
transmitted energy which is governed by its pulse
shape, power, frequency, pulse duration, antenna
parameters,
58
 Electronic Protection (EP)
ELECTRONIC PROTECTION (EP) TECHNIQUES
Used in RADAR
Spectral
Spatial Temporal
(frequency- Netting
(space-based) (time-based)
based)
Low Probability
Pulse
Ultralow sidelobe of Interference Sensor Fusion
Compression
(LPI)
Sidelobe Frequency Agility
PRF Agility Radar Network
cancellation (FA)
Sidelobe blanking Doppler Filtering Dickie Fix
Monopulse CFAR
Burn-Through

59
 Electronic Protection (EP)
Ultralow sidelobe antenna with very low
sidelobe radiation pattern, it prevents jamming
from various angles and ARM becomes tougher
Sidelobe blanking (SLB) an auxiliary wide angle
antenna is used to receive target return from the
sidelobe, if there is, the return will be blanked
Sidelobe cancellation (SLC) use in surveillance
or tracking radar to prevent unwanted noise
jamming energies from the antenna sidelobe by
matching and cancelling processes
60
 Electronic Protection (EP)
Monopulse radar illuminates target in both
azimuth and elevation in a single pulse, the
modulation of noise and ECM transmission are
different and can be recognized
Burn-through radar transmits with high
effective radiated power (ERP) to illuminate
targets, so as to increase the detection range of
the targets in a jamming environment
LPI use of spread spectrum, phased array and
low sidelobe antenna to reduce enemy radars
probability of detection
61
 Electronic Protection (EP)
FA change of transmission frequency within
the allowed operating band
Doppler filtering use in tracking Doppler radar
to detect Doppler targets to defeat velocity
deception, moving target indicator (MTI) is
usually used to discriminate slowly moving chaff
from the fast moving aircraft
Pulse compression transmission of long pulse
on limited bandwidth, long pulse increases
illuminated energy on targets while short pulse
gives good resolution, gives optimal signal-to-
noise ratio 62
 Electronic Protection (EP)
PRF Agility Pulse Repetition Frequency (PRF) of
pulse radars is varied to remove false targets, it
eliminates blind speeds in MTI systems in search or
tracking pulse radar
Dicke Fix protect receiver from fast sweep
jamming, continuous wave jamming and spot-noise
jamming by using broadband IF amplifier and limiter
CFAR constant false alarm rate where receiver
adjust its sensitivity when the intensity of undesired
signal varies so that real target returns can be
detected
63
 Electronic Protection (EP)
Radar netting involves more than 1 radar to
correlate information obtained from each radar
which applies different EW techniques,
triangulation of enemy emitter
Sensor fusion allows information from different
sensors to be correlation to present the real
situation

64
 Electronic Protection (EP)
ELECTRONIC PROTECTION (EP) TECHNIQUES
Angular Resolution Compressive IF Jamming Cancellation Pulse-To-Pulse
Automatic Gain Control Amplifier Receiver Frequency Shift
(AGC) Constant False Alarm Mainlobe Cancellation (RAINDOW)
Autocorrelation Rate (CFAR) Matched Filtering Random-Pulse Blanker
Cancellation of Cross Correlation Signal Mainlobe Cancellation Range Gating
Extended Targets (ACET) Processing Monopulse Tracker Range Gate Memory
Automatic Threshold CW Jamming Canceller Multifrequency Radar Sidelobe Blanker
Variation (ATV) Dicke Fix Moving Target Indication Sidelobe Canceller
Automatic tuner Diplexing (MTI) Sidelobe Suppression
(SNIFFER) Frequency Agility Phased Array Radar (SLS)
Automatic Video Noise Frequency Diversity Polarization Diversity Staggered PRF
Leveling (AVNL) Guard Band Blanker PRF Discrimination Transmitter Power
Bistatic Radar High PRF Tracking Pulse Coding and Variable Bandwidth
Coded Waveform Instantaneous Correlation Receiver
Modulation Frequency Correlator Pulse Compression, Variable Scan Rate
Cross-Polarization Inter-Pulse Coding Stretching (CHIRP) Velocity Tracker
Jittered PRF Logarithmic Receiver Pulse Edge Tracking Video Correlator
Wide-Bandwidth Radar Zero-Crossing Counter

65
 EW Support (ES)
Previously called Electronic Support Measures (ESM)
ES - actions to search for, intercept, and identify
enemy use of the EM spectrum
It also locates and localizes intentional and
unintentional EM radiation
Primary ES purpose is immediate threat recognition,
targeting, planning, and conducting future
operations
EW provides information required for conducting
other EW operations, targeting and homing
66
 EW Support (ES)
ES OBJECTIVES
Detection of signals present
The electrical characteristics and directional bearing of the
signals present
Determination of signal with certain prescribed characteristics
Determination of signal that tracks location of intercept
receiver
Detection of new signal in the general signal environment
Identification of unusual signal
Identification of signal showing target motion characteristics
Identification of presences of CW, FM or SSB signals

67
 EW Support (ES)
EW data also produce signals intelligence (SIGINT),
measurement and signature intelligence (MASINT),
and battle damage assessment (BDA)
The derived intelligence detects, locates tracks,
identifies, and describes the unique characteristics
of fixed and dynamic target sources
Threat warning is technically derived intelligence
that detects, locates, tracks, identifies, and
describes the unique characteristics of fixed and
dynamic target

68
 EW Support (ES)
MASINT capabilities include radar, laser, optical,
infrared, acoustic, nuclear radiation, radio
frequency, spectro-radiometric, and seismic sensing
systems as well as gas, liquid, and solid materials
sampling and analysis
SIGINT is a strategic oriented activity and focus on
producing intelligence of an analytic nature
SIGINT is largely made up of Electronic Intelligence
(ELINT) and Communications Intelligence (COMINT)

69
 EW Support (ES)
ELINT measures direction and time of arrival
(DOA and TOA) and radar waveform signature
parameters (frequency, pulse width, bandwidth,
PRF, ) to update the ELINT parameters limits
(EPI) and provide electronic order of battle (EOB)
COMINT intelligence derived from potentially
hostile communications by persons other than
intended recipients via detection, collection,
classification, identification and DF of all
communications systems, data links, satellite
communications and cellular phones
70
 EW Support (ES)
Direction finding (DF) to obtain bearings of radio
frequency emitters by using a highly directional
antenna and a display unit on an intercept receiver
or ancillary equipment
Laser warning receiver (LWR) to detect laser
signal, threat warning and collection system
Radar warning receiver (RWR) intercepts radar
signals and analyses the threat in real-time, by using
threat library of enemys EOB

71
 Ground-Based Air Defense
GBAD systems
Includes air defense capabilities such as radar,
electronic warfare, weapons
Provide deterrent and protection against threats of
attack from the air
Aircraft threats air-to-air and air-to-surface
weapons such as land attack missile, UAV and
long range attacks
Rocket, Artillery and Mortar (RAM) threats
becoming smaller, more mobile and lower cost

72
 Ground-Based Air Defense
Stand-Off threats Tactical ballistic missiles (TBM)
and cruise missiles (CM) are difficult to intercept
and they are becoming more easily acquired
Countermeasures sensors, shooters and C2
Raytheon MIM-104 Patriot
Medium to Long Range Capabilities
MPQ-53 uses phased array with IFF interrogator and SLC
to decrease interference
Narrow antenna beam with high frequency agility and
RWR to resist jamming
Track-Via-Missile (TVM) provides target images for the
control station to discriminate decoys
73
 Ground-Based Air Defense
MBDA Spada 2000
Medium to Long Range Capabilities
MPQ-53 radar uses phased array with IFF
interrogator and SLC to decrease interference
Narrow antenna beam with high frequency agility
and RWR to resist jamming
Thales Aster-30 SAMP/T
Medium to Long Range Capabilities
The Arabel radar is a 3D phased array radar with
beam shaping and pulse compression EP (ECCM)
74
 Ground-Based Air Defense
Rafael SPYDER (Surface-to-Air Python and
DERby)
Short to medium range missile launcher
Effective against conventional and unmanned aircraft
and threat again missile threats with low Radar Cross
Section (RCS)
ELTA EL/M 2106 ATAR 3D Surveillance Radar: solid
state TR modules, multiple beam phased array,
digital beam forming, digital pulse compression and
digital receiver

75
 Ground-Based Air Defense
Rafael PYTHON
Air-to-Air or Surface-to-Air missiles
Short range applications
EO/IR guided
IRCCM
Rafael Derby
Short range and Beyond Visual Range (BVR) Air-to-Air
missiles
Active radar seeker
Fire and Forget with advanced and customizable
ECCM (EP)
76
 Ground-Based Air Defense
Raytheon SL AMRAAM
Surface-launched Advanced Medium Range Air-to-Air
Missile
Kongsberg NASAMS 2
Network Centric Air Defense System over hard-real-
time communication network
Short to medium range applications
Works with Raytheon SL AMRAAM
MPQ64F1 Sentinel Active 3D pencil beam radar

77
 Ground-Based Air Defense
Rafael Iron Dome
Counter short-range rockets and 155 mm artillery shells up
to 70 km, day and night, under adverse weather conditions
EL/M 2048 Detection & Tracking Radar: detects the rocket's
launch and tracks its trajectory
Battle Management & Weapon Control (BMC): calculates
the impact point according to the reported data, and uses
this information to determine whether the target
constitutes a threat to a designated area
Missile Firing Unit: launches the Tamir interceptor missile,
equipped with EO and several steering fins for high
maneuverability
78
 Ground-Based Air Defense
SAAB RBS 70 NG
Very Short Range Air Defense (V-SHORAD)
Automatic Target Tracking
Integrated Thermal Imager
Unjammable Laser Guidance

79
 Electro-Optics and Infrared
EO/IR are used in
Target acquisition (detection,
recognition, identification)
Navigation and targeting
Laser ranging
Intelligence, surveillance and
reconnaissance (ISR)
EOCM, EOCCM
IRCM, IRCCM

80
 Electro-Optics and Infrared
The EO in a war fighter
Sense and collects optical frequency EM energy
Coverts optical energy to electrical signals
Amplifies and process the signals
Shares the outputs with the display unit, weapon
guidance/control unit, self-protection CM/CCM device
Recording unit

81
 Electro-Optics and Infrared
Some images captured using costal EO

82
 Electro-Optics and Infrared
In air defense, radars give detection envelope
into enemy territory and have been the most
popular sensor
Night vision sights, laser range finder and EO are
becoming more common

83
 EO/IR Countermeasure
Use of EO/IR intentionally to impair the
effectiveness of enemy activity
EO/IR is part of the EM spectrum between the
high end of the far infrared and low end of
ultraviolet
EO/IR uses broadband jammers, smokes,
aerosols, signature suppressants, decoys,
pyrotechnics, high energy lasers, direct IR energy

84
 EO/IR Countermeasure

[Video] AC-130 IR Countermeasure [Video] AH-64 Apache Helicopter Deploying

Flares Over Afghanistan

85
 Radar and Communications
Fundamentals
(Surveillance and Fire Control Radars)

What is a radar?
What is a communication system?
What are the differences between surveillance
and fire control functions?
 Communication Systems
The wired communication systems
Wired networks
Telephony
Fiber communications system
USB, HDMI, .

87
 Communication Systems
The wireless and mobile communication systems
TV and Radio Broadcasting
Mobile phones
Wireless networks and wireless communications
Satellite communications
WiFi, WiMAX, Bluetooth,

88
 Communication Systems
Block diagram of a typical communication
system
Input message Output message

Input Input
Transducer Transducer

Input signal output signal

Transmitter Channel Receiver

transmitted received
signal signal

Distortion
and noise

89
 Communication Systems
A communication system is typical made of
Source: originates a message such as voice, video and
text
Input transducer: converts the message in electrical
waveform called baseband signal
Transmitter: modifies the baseband signal for efficient
transmission over a channel
Channel: medium such as cable, waveguide, fiber or
wireless link
Noise: undesirable signal that affects the transmission
Receiver: receives the noise corrupted signals and
receiver the original baseband signal
Output transceiver: presents the received signal in an
appropriate format such as TV, microphone, computer
90
 Communication Systems
A must-have component in todays defense force
Voice communications
In military, wireless networks are used in
vehicular applications, command posts, ad-hoc
networking, .
Other unattended ground sensors for
surveillance, intelligence

91
 Communication Systems
Spectrum radio frequencies not limited to
specified set of values
Spectrum management process of regulating use
of radio frequencies
In Singapore, the spectrum is divided in terms of
services such as aeronautical, land mobile,
meteorological and satellite services
The unlicensed bands are free for use but users are
to comply to the regulation set
The unlicensed band are also known as ISM band
(Instrument, Scientific and Medical)
92
 Communication Systems
The Singapore Spectrum Allocation Chart

93
 Communication Systems
The communication links in the Rafael Spyder
ADS

Spyder-SR
Battery

EL/M-2016
Radar Antenna

94
 RADAR
RADAR- Radio Detection and Ranging
Theory of reflection, absorption and scattering
Higher the frequency better the result
Location parameters: Range, height, direction,
direction of motion, relative velocity

95
 RADAR
Applications
Maritime, Aviation and Land navigational aids
Height measurement (radar altimeter)
Instrument landing (in poor visibility)
Space applications (planetary observations)
Radars for determining speed of moving targets
(Police radars Law enforcement and Highway safety)
Remote sensing (weather monitoring)
Air traffic control (ATC) and aircraft safety
Vessel traffic safety
96
 RADAR
Military
Detection and ranging of targets in all weathers
Weapon control aiming guns at target
Early warning on approaching aircrafts or ships
Direct guided missiles
Search submarines, land masses and buoys

97
 RADAR
Ranging Concept
Target distance is calculated from the total time
(tdelay) taken by the pulse to travel to the target
and back
c = 3 x 108 m/s, speed of light

98
 RADAR
Block Diagram of a Monostatic Radar
Scan Pattern Waveform
Transmitter
Generator Generator

Radar
Antenna Duplexer
Display

Signal Data Data

Receiver
Processor Extractor Processor

TX RX
99
 RADAR
Radar System Components
Antenna is highly directive with large gain
Duplexer switches automatically
Tx remains silent during Rx period
Tx pulse is high power, short duration
Rx has sensitivity to receive weak echo signals and is
be highly immune to noise

100
 RADAR
Band Designation ITU Nominal Specific radar bands based
Frequency Range on ITU assignment
HF 3 30 MHz
VHF 30 300 MHz 138-144, 216-225 MHz
UHF 300 1000 MHz 420-450, 590-942 MHz
L 1 2 GHz 1215-1400 MHz
S 2 4 GHz 2300-2500, 2700-3700MHz
C 4 8 GHz 5250-5925 MHz
X 8 12 GHz 8500-10680 MHz
Ku 1 2 18 GHz 13.4-14, 15.7-17.7 GHz
K 18 27 GHz 24.05-24.25 GHz
Ka 27 40 GHz 33.4-36 GHz
Radar Frequency Band Designations
101
 Surveillance Radar
A surveillance radar detects the presence of a target
(aircraft or ship) and determines its position and
bearing
Usually, it observes the target over a period of time
to obtain its track
Antenna Beam
Pattern (Cosecant2)

Scanning
Direction

2D Scanning (Range and Bearing)

102
 Tracking Radar
Tracking radars provide the tracks of a target
Single Target Tracking (STT) tracks a single target at high
data rate to provide accurate tracking of a maneuvering
target, for firing purpose
Automatic Detection and Tracking (ADT) tracking
performed by surveillance radar where many targets are
tracked
Track-While-Scan (TWS) combined searching and
tracking where a radar performs surveillance function in
normal scan and tracks all detected targets with tracking
algorithm
Phased Array Tracking tracking more than one track at
high update rate with electronically scanned phased
array antenna that transmits
103
multiple beams
 Fire Control System
A Fire Control System is generally made up of
Computer predicts the motion of the target and
extrapolates its position to some time in the future based
on assumed constant course, speed and altitude (air
target) and carries out ballistic computation to ensure
that the shell arrives at the desired point in space at a
future time
Director a mechanical or electronic auxiliary predictor
that computes the firing solutions for use against a
moving targets
Radar FCR (a STT radar) provides target information to
the computer for computation of the firing solution (so
as to direct the weapon to hit the target)
104
 Fire Control Radar
A STT radar that provides target information
(range, bearing, elevation or velocity) to the Fire
Control Computer
FCR transmits narrow pencil beam pattern (gives
high directional gain) for accuracy purpose

Pencil Beam Antenna Pattern

Parabolic Dish Antenna

105
 Fire Control Radar
A dish antenna consists of 1
Reflector (Secondary Radiator)
parabolic reflector and a
point source situated in the
Feed
focal point of this reflector (Primary
This point source is called Radiator)
primary feed or feed
The parabolic reflector acts as
a mirror for the transmitted Waveguide
RF energy
Parabolic antenna gives
ideally one single reflected
RF Energy from
ray parallel to the main axis Transmitter
with minimum sidelobes
106
 Sequential Lobing
A narrow beam alone is not sufficient to track a target
because as the track moves out of the beam, the FCR
will not be able to follow the move direction
Sequential lobing the antenna beam is switched
between 2 adjacent positions
Resulting amplitudes from
the two main lobes
(The difference between
the two amplitudes is zero)

Target on the
boresight
107
 Sequential Lobing
The target moves off the boresight
Amplitude against Angular Error
Target off Amplitude Plot
boresight obtained from
main lobe A is
higher showing
that the target is
to the left of
boresight

The plot gives the angular error

from the amplitude difference

108
 Conical Scanning
In conical scanning, the offset of the main beam
is rotated around the boresight

When the target is on the boresight, the return

signal strength remains constant throughout the
scans
109
 Conical Scanning
When the target moves off boresight, the return
signal strength is modulated by the position of
the target as the beam rotates

Period/Frequency
is determined by
Amplitude varies scan rate
accordingly to the
offset position

110
 Monopulse Tracking
In monopulse tracking, 4 beams are transmitted
simultaneously
Target on boresight:
(A + B) (C + D) = 0
(A + C) (B + D) = 0
The beams will NOT
be squinted.
TR:
Duplexer

111
 Monopulse Tracking
The bearing error Planar Feeding
Network
and summation
channels in the
monopulse receiver

Waveguide
Feeding Network Feeding Network

112
 Anti-Aircraft Defence FCS
[Video] Royal Danish Navy anti-aircraft defence
artillery system

113
Radar and Communications
Vulnerabilities
Difference between Radar EW and
Communications EW
Weaknesses of radars and communication
systems
 Radar versus Communications
EW is reactive to threats
EW receivers are designed to detect, identify and
locate threats
EW countermeasures are designed to reduce the
effectiveness of those threats
Radar measures location, distance and velocity
Communications carry information from one
point to another
Radar and communications are different by
functions
115
 Radar versus Communications
Radar signals are pulsed or continuous wave
Communication signals generally continuous
wave (with some pulsed wave)
Radar signals are generally in the microwave
frequency range, but can also be as low as VHF
and into mm range
Communication signals carry voice or data in the
HF, VHF or UHF frequency range and sometimes
in VLF to mm range

116
 Communication Signal Threats
Communication signals include voice
communication and digital data transmission
Some communication signals are generally one way
but in either direction
It is important to note that only transmitter can be
located by an emitter locator
Communication signals are continuous and
generally have very high duty cycle compared to
radar signals
Communications take place in the HF, VHF and UHF
ranges using amplitude, frequency and phase
modulation
117
 Tactical Communication Threats
Tactical communication signals ground-to-ground,
ground-to-air and air-to-air
In the HF, VHF and UHF
Antennas are omni-directional such as whipped
antennas, dipoles
Directional antennas are used between fixed sites
for high gain and isolate undesired signals
Tactical communications use signals that are
randomly spread in azimuth and frequency to avoid
being detected
The signal bandwidth must be large enough to
ensure that on 5% - 10% will be occupied
118
 Digital Data Link Threats
Digital data links carry digital information, e.g.
UAV control station links
Uplink antennas usually have narrow beamwidth
to provide higher gain

119
 Digital Data Link
The uplink is usually encrypted to protect the
control station from detection and location by
hostile emitter location systems

120
 Common Weakness
The need to transmit via the spectrum
If there is no transmission there is no potential
danger

121
 Jamming Concepts
Define Jamming, Is interference Jamming?
Techniques used in Radar and Communication
System Jamming
 Jamming
It all started with radio jamming (obvious, radios
appeared before radars)
Jamming to prevent intended receiver from using
the radio links free in tactical environment
Practically limit the use of radio spectrum so that
it becomes useless tactically to the enemy (not
always jamming the link completely)
Radio link in communications propagation path
from the transmitter to the receiver
Radio link in radar link from the target to the radar
receiver
123
 Basic Working Principles
Jamming power (J) must be larger than the
transmitted signal power (S) (J/S >> 1)
The Jamming-to-Signal ratio (J/S) is usually
expressed in dB, i.e. J/S must always remain
positive in dB for effective jamming (J/SdB > 0 dB)
Enemy Communications Link
ENEMY TRANSMITTER ENEMY RECEIVER
Signal Power (S)
Jamming
Power (J)

Jammer to Enemy Link

ENEMY TRANSMITTER

124
 Basic Working Principles
The jammer must transmit within the bandwidth
of the enemy communications link
Transmitted power attenuates as the RF energy
travels further from the transmitter
If the enemy transmitter-receiver distance (de) is
much shorter than the jammer-receiver distance
(dj) then the enemy transmitted power may be
high enough to over the jamming power
This is known as burn-through

125
 Basic Working Principles
Burn-Through of Jamming
de
ENEMY TRANSMITTER ENEMY RECEIVER
Signal Power (S)
Jamming
Power (J)
When de << dj,
burn-through of
jamming occurs
when S >> J

ENEMY TRANSMITTER

126
 Noise and Interference
Noise and Interference - unwanted signals by the
system, just like jamming signal
Noise atmosphere and unintended sources
Atmosphere celestial noise source (Sun and
other stars), atmospheric noise (gases and
hydrometeors),
Unintended man-made source (machinery that
produces RF energy)
Thermal noise receiver internal noise
Noise affects the radio link performance
127
 Noise and Interference
Interference unwanted contributed from other
intended radio systems (very different from noise)
Intra-network interference caused by other
transmitters within the same network
Inter-network interference from similar radio
network caused by transmitter within the same
radio network (e.g. two VHF communication
networks)
Inter-network interference from difference radio
network caused by transmitter within the same
radio network (e.g. Bluetooth and WiFi)
128
 Types of Communications Jammers
Jam on Tune Jamming Jammer transmits at same
frequency and bandwidth but with higher
transmitter power
power

B
S

fc frequency
Detected enemy signal
J
power

fc frequency
Jamming signal
129
 Types of Communications Jammers
Sweep Jamming for target signal that changes in frequency
or multiple signals, the jamming signal frequency is varied
and the enemy signal is not jammed all of the time
power

B
S

fc1 fc2 frequency

Detected enemy signals
Frequency

fc2
fc1

Jamming signal frequency

130
 Types of Communications Jammers
Barrage Jamming A broad band of spectrum is
jammed simultaneously, the jammer transmitter is
very high power to spread over a wide bandwidth

Jamming signal
power

fc1 fc2 frequency

Detected enemy signals

131
 Radar Jamming
Radar jamming intentional radiation or re-
radiation of RF signals to interfere the radar
operation by
Saturating the display with false targets (noise
jamming)
Gives replicates the return signals enemy receiver is
expecting but with false characteristics (deceptive
jamming)

132
Active versus Passive Jamming
Discuss active and passive jamming in terms of
the differences and applications
 Definitions
Active jammers function by transmitting a new
signal to confuse the enemy
Passive jammers re-radiate the radar signal after
distorting it by adding noise or shift the
frequency to distort the actual signal

134
 A Radar Jammer
Speed gun one that TP use in speed detection,
it usually reads the frequency shift from the
moving target
Jammer determines how the gun computes
the shift and manipulate the computation to
output a signal at a frequency that will deceive
the TP
Speed gun translates the received frequency
information into a speed estimate

135
 A Radar Jammer
Assume that the speed gun use a center
frequency of 1 GHz
The spectrum is obtained by
Fourier Transform where the
frequency components of the
signals are obtained and
displayed.

Practically, it can be measured

using a Spectrum Analyzer.

136
 A Radar Jammer
When a vehicle that is moving at 100 km/h is
detected ahead of the speed gun, a shifted
component is obtained
The spectrum is obtained at the
speed gun receiver. In addition
to the carrier frequency
component, the speed
component in the form of
frequency shift is also present.

Noise floor

137
 A Radar Jammer
The carrier frequency component can be filtered
off by the use of low-pass filter
The low-pass filter removes the
high frequency components,
leaving the frequency shift from
the target.

The speed of 100 km/h gives a

frequency shift of about 120 Hz

138
 A Radar Jammer
Effect of jammer angular position relative to the target
It is important to
position the jammer
so that useful
information can be
obtained in passive
jamming.

The effect shown is

known as Cosine
Effect . The
measured speed,
vm va cos

139
 A Radar Jammer
Active noise jamming jammer transmits white
noise of high amplitude causing the speed gun to
receive random signal
Noise jamming can be continuous or selective
(turn on when a radar transmission is detected)
Needs high power, broadband transmitter and
usually at close range
Easily realized (display shows random readings
or specific pattern)
Easy to be detected (by DF)
140
 A Radar Jammer
Active noise jamming spectrum similar to noise
floor, the receiver (using matched filter) shows
random speed components

141
 A Radar Jammer
Active deceptive jamming when radar
transmission is detected, a signal corresponding
to a legal speed is transmitted by the jammer
Works well as it takes time for the enemy to
realize
Can be countered by frequency hopping
technique

142
 A Radar Jammer
The jammer can transmit any frequency shift, for
instance, 55 km/h while it is traveling at 100 km/h

143
 A Radar Jammer
Passive jammers re-radiate the radar signal after
distorting it
Add noise and/or frequency shift such that the true
target information is being masked off
Passive jammers neither amplify nor generate the
signal, it only redirect the radar signal back to the
speed gun
Large antenna is required to absorb the incident
radar beams and this makes it easy to be discovered
The re-radiated signal must be stronger than the
original radar signal and jammer must be aligned to
the speed gun
144
 A Radar Jammer
The jammer shifts the frequency of the incoming radar
signal slightly, the speed gun receives 3 peaks carrier,
actual and shifted frequency components
At the receiver output, a speed of about 60 km/h will be
displayed

145
 Denial and Deception
Jamming
Define denial and deception jamming
Understand the operating concepts and
deployments of denial and deception jamming
 Denial Jamming
Denial jamming to overload the enemys receiver so that
it becomes useless
Transmits a noise signal powerful enough to mask the
signal the enemys receiver intended to receive (denial
jammer noise jammer)
amplitude

t No jamming
Power
Signal

time
PRT (PRF)
Effective jamming noise floor is
amplitude

raised so that SNR is reduced greatly

Power
Signal

ineffective
jamming time

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 Denial Jamming
Active denial jamming CW, short pulse, long
pulse, spot noise, barrage noise, sidelobe
repeater
Passive denial jamming chaff and radar
absorbing material (RAM)
Denial chaff deployed to screen targets
residing or near the deployed chaff clouds

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 Denial Jamming
Denial jamming has an
advantage over the enemy
radar as the jamming signal
travels only in one direction
(half the atmospheric loss)
Denial jammers are much more
simple to construct than
deceptive jammers
Maximum transmitted jamming signal power is limited
Burn-through range at which the radar signal is equal or
greater than the jamming signal (where jamming becomes
ineffective)
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 Denial Jamming
Tactical picture denial
Preventing enemy from understanding the nature of
attacking force
Introducing uncertainty to enemy on where and
what the attacking force is targeting on
Decoying the enemy defense to the jamming
platform
Strategic picture denial
Jamming strategic defense systems to produce
confuse
Decoying to change the enemy perception of the
actual threat
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 Denial Jamming
In wireless communications, it is commonly
known as Denial of Service
Jamming the transmission of the wireless signal that
will interfere with the carrier frequencies used
Base station Within the jamming
region, jamming
The Jammer and mobile signals
transmits on the collide and the
same radio power level will be
frequencies to reduced.
disrupt the SS will have no
subscriber and mobile service.
base station Mobile
Switching
Subscriber Center
station
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 Deception Jamming
Deception jamming injects false information into
the enemy radar to deny critical information
such as bearing, range, velocity or combination
Deception jammer must receive the enemy radar
signal, modify the signal and transmit the
modified radar signal back to the enemy radar
Radar signal characteristics: PRF, pulse width,
scan radar scan rate
The process is repetitive, deception jamming is
also called repeater jamming
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 Deception Jamming
Active deception jamming use of repeater
jammer and false target generator
Passive deception jamming use of chaff and
RAM
Denial chaff the chaff cloud is dispersed to
complicate the tracking process by luring the
enemy tracker away from the target and/or
creating multiple false targets

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 Deception Jamming
Deception jammers require lower power than noise
jammers as the power requirement is defined by the
average power of the enemy radar
The process to generate a radar signal with similar
characteristic of another radar is more complex
Enemy radar Stores signal
Modified radar signal
signal characteristics
RF Signal RF RF
Memory
Receiver Oscillator Oscillator

Delay Line

Signal
Detector
Modifier
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 Deception Jamming
The signal characteristic of enemy radar signal
requires ELINT to collect, update and provide
changes to the jammer
It is common to deploy deception jamming to
tracking radar (or fire control radar) so as to take
the advantage in target tracking weaknesses
using false target jamming, range deception
jamming, angle deception jamming, velocity
deception jamming or monopulse jamming

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 Deception Jamming
False target jamming
To confuse enemy by generating many false targets
Use against acquisition, early warning and ground control
intercept radar
Range deception jamming
After the range gate locks on cover pulse (sent by the
jammer), the radar tracks the false target in range
Angle deception jamming
Explore the weaknesses in antenna pattern that gives
large sidelobe
False target enters via sidelobe to create a bearing
error
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 Deception Jamming
Velocity deception jamming
From ELINT, the Doppler information is provided
Jammer transmits higher power CW or pulse Doppler
signal with a spurious Doppler shift
Monopulse deception jamming
Monopulse tracking obtains azimuth, range and
height information on pulse-by-pulse basis
Use of filter skirt jamming to explore the weakness in
the mismatch receiver IF filter and transmitting
frequency and requires detailed knowledge of radar
receiver (not effective)

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