GARCHITORENA vs.

CRESCINI Case Digest

GARCHITORENA vs. CRESCINI
39 PR 258, 1918

Facts: In June 6, 1916, an election was held in the Province of Ambos Camarines, for governor
and other provincial and municipal officers. Garchitorena, Crescini, Imperial, and Botor were
candidates for the office of governor. The provincial board of inspectors proclaimed Crescini as
the elected and issued to him a certificate to that effect.

Immediately upon notice of said proclamation, Garchitorena presented a protest against said
election, alleging that many frauds and irregularities had been committed in various
municipalities of said province, and that he had, in fact, received a majority of all legal votes
cast. After trial, the court declared that Garchitorena had, in fact, received a majority of the legal
votes cast, and ordered the provincial board of inspectors to correct its report. Later, a new trial
was ordered but the same decision was arrived at and issued the same order to the provincial
board of inspectors to correct their report or canvass in accordance with said decision. From
that decision, Crescini and Imperial appealed to this Court, briefs were presented, and the
cause was finally submitted for decision on the 16th day of December, 1918.

Issue: Whether or not the courts decision is correct.

Held: Judges Mina and Paredes, after discussion of the various frauds committed in said
municipalities arrived at the same conclusion, to wit: that said frauds and irregularities were
such as to absolutely defeat the honest expression of the desires of the voters of said
municipalities. The evidence adduced during the trial shows an unmistakable intention and
design on the part not only of the election inspectors but of many of the voters, to defeat, by the
methods adopted, the true expression of opinion, through the ballot, of the people of said
municipalities. The presumption is that an election is honestly conducted, and the burden of
proof to show it otherwise is on the party assailing the return. But when the return is clearly
shown to be wilfully and corruptly false, the whole of it becomes worthless as proof. When the
election has been conducted so irregularly and fraudulently that the true result cannot be
ascertained, the whole return must be rejected. It is impossible to make a list of all the frauds
which will invalidate an election. Each case must rest upon its own evidence. The rule, however,
is so well established that authorities need no longer be cited in its support, that whenever the
irregularities and frauds are sufficient to defeat the will of the people of the particular
municipality or precinct, the entire vote should be rejected, and those who are guilty of such
frauds and irregularities should be punished to the very limit of the law.

Garchitorena v. Crescini (December 18, 1918)

De Facto Officers
Physical possession of the Office

FACTS:

On the 6th of June 1916 an election was held in the province of Amobos, Camarines,for the electoral
position of governor and other provincial and municipal officers. The said governor position was being
vied by the names of Andres Garchitorena, Manuel Crescini, Engracio Imperial and Francisco Botor. After
the elections were closed and the returns of the ballots were made by the inspectors of the various
municipalities to the provincial board of inspectors, the following are the results of the said election,
Andres Garchitorena had received 2,468 votes; that Manuel Crescini had received 3,198 votes; that
Engracio Imperial had received 1,954 votes and Francisco Botor had received 692 votes. After the final
examination and tallying of votes by the Board of Inspectors, they declared Manuel Crescini as the newly
elected Governor, for he received the plurality of votes cast. They issued a certificate to him as he was
proclaimed the winner. Upon notice of said proclamation, immediately the runner up, Andres
Garchitorena presented a protest against said election, contending that there were many frauds and
irregularities committed in various municipalities of the said province, also he alleged that he received a
majority of all the legal votes cast. Two trials were conducted, and the judges (Mina and Paredes) both
found in favor of petitioner.

Occea vs. Commission on Elections

FACTS:

Petition for prohibition seeking to restrain respondents from implementing Batas PambansaBlg. 51 (providing for the elective
and/or appointive positions in various local governments), 52(governing the election of local government officials scheduled on
January 30, 1980), 53 (defining therights and privileges of accredited parties), and 54 (providing for a plebiscite, simultaneously
with the election of local officials on January 30, 1980, regarding the proposed amendment of Article X, Section7, of the 1973
Constitution).

ISSUE:

(1) whether or not the Interim BatasangPambansa has the power to authorize the holding of local elections; (2) assuming it has
such power, whether it can authorize said elections without enacting a local government code;(3) as it may validly perform the
foregoing, whether it can schedule such elections less than ninety, (90) days from the passage of the enabling law; and;(4),
assuming further that the proposed amendment to Article X, Section 7 of the Constitution is valid, whether the plebiscite con be
legally held together with the local elections.

HELD:

After deliberating on the memoranda and arguments adduced by both parties at the hearing as January 15, 1980, the Court finds
no merit in the petition. The legislative power granted by Section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution to the National Assembly has
been explicitly vested during the period of transition on the Interim BatasangPambansa by Amendment No. 2 to the constitution.
The power to regulate the manner of conducting elections, to Prescribe the form of the official ballot, and to provide for the
Manner in which candidates shall be chosen is inherently and historically legislative. Petitioner has not cited any provision of the
Constitution, as amended by the Amendments of 1976, which expressly or by implication deny to the Interim
BatasangPambansa the authority to call for local elections. Petitioners invocation of the Report of the Committee on Transitory
Provisions of October 13, 1972 does not support his contention that the Interim BatasangPambansa has no power to call local
elections. Neither can We find in Section 1, Article XI of the Constitution any requirement that the enactment of a local
government code is a condition sine qua non for the calling of the local elections by the Interim BatasangPambansa. Indeed, the
holding of local elections does not, in any manner, preclude the enactment of a local government code by the
BatasangPambansa at some later period. Section 6 fixes the election period by stating that unless fixed by the Commission in
special cases, the election period shall commence ninety (90) days before the day of election and shall end thirty (30) days
thereafter. Considering that the proposed amendment to Section 7 of Article X of the Constitution extending the retirement of
members of the Supreme Court and judges of inferior courts from sixty-five (65) to

Occea vs. Commission on Elections

No. L-52265. January 28, 1980.*

SAMUEL C. OCCEA, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, COMMISSION ON AUDIT, NATIONAL TREASURER,
and DIRECTOR OF PRINTING, respondents.

Constitutional Law; Legislature; Interim BatasangPambansa; Legislative power under the Constitution is vested on the Interim
BatasangPambansa during the period of transition of the government to parliamentary government; Limitations and scope of the
power.The legislative power granted by Section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution to the National Assembly has been explicitly
vested during the period of transition on the Interim BatasangPambansa by Amendment No. 2 to the Constitution. The only
limitation is that it shall not exercise its treaty ratification powers provided in Article VIII, Section 14 of the Constitution. The
legislative power has been described generally as being a power to make, alter and repeal laws. It is the peculiar province of the
legislature to prescribe general rules for the government of society. The essential of the legislative function is the determination
of the legislative policy and its formulation and promulgation as a defined and binding rule of conduct. It is a recognized principle
in constitutional law that the legislative body possesses plenary power for a 11 purposes of civil government. The legislative
power of the Interim BatasangPambansa is, therefore, complete, subject only to the limitation that the Interim
BatasangPambansa shall not exercise the power of the National Assembly in the ratification of treaties.

Same; Same; Same; Elections; Power of the Interim BatasangPambansa to call local elections not violative of the Constitution;
Reason.The power to regulate the manner of conducting elections, to prescribe the form of the official ballot, and to provide for
the manner in which candidates shall be chosen is inherently and historically legislative. Petitioner has not cited any provision of
the Constitution, as amended by the Amendments of 1976, which expressly or by implication deny to the Interim
BatasangPambansa the authority to call for local elections. It is a well established rule that where no exception is made in terms,
none will be made by mere implication or construction. The wordings of a constitutional provision do not have a narrow or
contracted meaning, but are used in a broad sense, with a view of covering all contingencies.

Same; Same; Interpretation to ascertain the meaning of the language of the Constitution, the historical basis of the constitutional
provisions must be looked into; Establishment of a government dur-. ing the period of transition of the government reflected in
the amendments to the Constitution.In the search for the meaning of the language of the Constitution, reference may be made
to the historical basis of the provisions. The historical events and circumstances which led to the ratification of Amendments Nos.
1 to 9 of the Constitution show the manifest intent and desire of the people to establish, during the period of transition, a
government that can effectively provide for the nations peaceful and orderly transition from a crisis to a full parliamentary system
of government.
Same; Same; Same; Local Government; Enactment of a local government code not a condition precedent to the calling of the
local elections by the Interim BatasangPambansa; Reasons; Calling of local elections will enable Filipinos to exercise their right
of suffrage.Neither can We find in Section 1, Article XI of the Constitution any requirement that the enactment of a local
government code is a condition sine qua non for the calling of the local elections by the Interim BatasangPambansa. Indeed, the
holding of local elections does not, in any manner, preclude the enactment of a local government code by the
BatasangPambansa at some later period. There cannot be any doubt that our local governments are basic and fundamental
units in our democratic institutions. To strengthen these institutions, the elections of local officials should be periodically held.
Accordingly, this Court is not inclined to adopt such a technical or strained construction as will unduly impair the efficiency of the
Interim BatasangPambansa in meeting the challenges and discharging its responsibilities in response to the problems arising in
a modernizing and dynamic society. The legislative decision to call for local elections in order to enable the Filipino people to
exercise their sovereign right to choose their local officials cannot, therefore, be faulted as a violation of the Constitution.

Same; Same; Same; Election period under the Constitution; 45-day period of campaign under Sec. 4 of the 1978 Election Code
not violative of Sec. 6 of Art XII of the New Constitution.Section 6 of Article XII of the Constitution does not fix an unalterable
period of ninety (90) days for an election campaign. This provision must be construed in relation to Section 5 of Article XII thereof
which grants to the Commission on Elections the power to supervise or regulate the operation of transportation, public utilities,
media of communication, etc. during the election period. Section 6 fixes the election period by stating that unless fixed by the
Commission in special cases, the election period shall commence ninety (90) days before the day of election and shall end thirty
(30) days thereafter. In Peralta v. Commission on Elections, supra, We resolved, in effect, this issue by holding that the forty-five
day period of campaign prescribed in Section 4 of the 1978 Election Code was not violative of Section 6 of Article XII of the
Constitution.

Same; Same; Same; Batas PambansaBlg. 54 providing for a plebiscite on the proposed amendment to Sec. 7 of Art. X of the
Constitution extending the retirement of members of the Judiciary from 65 to 70 held valid; Reasons.Considering that the
proposed amendment to Section 7 of Article X of the Constitution extending the retirement of members of the Supreme Court
and judges of inferior courts from sixty-five (65) to seventy(70) years is but a restoration of the age of retirement provided in the
1935 Constitution and has been intensively end extensively discussed at the Interim BatasangPambansa, as well as through the
mass media, it cannot, therefore, be said that our people are unaware of the advantages and disadvantages of the proposed
amendment.

Fernando, C.J., concurs in part:

Constitutional Law; Batas PambansaBlg. 51, 52, and 53 are constitutional.Concurs with the opinion insofar as the Court found
no merit in the petition seeking to declare unconstitutional Batas PambansaBlg. 51, 52 and 53 and takes no part as far as the
challenge to Batas PambansaBlg. 54 is concerned.

ORIGINAL ACTION in the Supreme Court. Prohibition.

The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.

Occea Law Office for petitioner.

Office of the Solicitor General for respondents.

ANTONIO, J.:

Petition for prohibition seeking to restrain respondents from implementing Batas PambansaBlg. 51 (providing for the elective
and/or appointive positions in various local governments), 52 (governing the election of local government officials scheduled on
January 30, 1980), 53 (defining the rights and privileges of accredited parties), and 54 (providing for a plebiscite, simultaneously
with the election of local officials on January 30, 1980, regarding the proposed amendment of Article X, Section 7, of the 1973
Constitution). The constitutional issues raised are: (1) whether or not the Interim BatasangPambansa has the power to authorize
the holding of local elections; (2) assuming it has such power, whether it can authorize said elections without enacting a local
government code; (3) assuming it may validly perform the foregoing, whether it can schedule such elections less than ninety (90)
days from the passage of the enabling law; and (4) assuming, further, that the proposed amendment to Article X, Section 7 of the
Constitution is valid, whether the plebiscite can be legally held together with the local elections. The thrust of petitioners
arguments is that these issues should be resolved in the negative.

After deliberating on the memoranda and arguments adduced by both parties at the hearing on January 15, 1980, the Court finds
no merit in the petition.

1. The legislative power granted by Section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution to the National Assembly has been explicitly vested
during the period of transition on the Interim BatasangPambansa by Amendment No. 2 to the Constitution. The only limitation is
that it shall not exercise its treaty ratification powers provided in Article VIII, Section 14(1) of the Constitution. The legislative
power has been described generally as being a power to make, alter and repeal laws.1 It is the peculiar province of the
legislature to prescribe general rules for the government of society. The essential of the legislative function is the determination
of the legislative policy and its formulation and promulgation as a defined and binding rule of conduct.2 It is a recognized
principle in constitutional law that the legislative body possesses plenary power for all purposes of civil government. The
legislative power of the Interim BatasangPambansa is, therefore, complete, subject only to the limitation that the Interim
BatasangPambansa shall not exercise the power of the National Assembly in the ratification of treaties.3 The power to regulate
the manner of conducting elections, to prescribe the form of the official ballot, and to provide for the manner in which candidates
shall be chosen is inherently and historically legislative. Petitioner has not cited any provision of the Constitution, as amended by
the Amendments of 1976, which expressly or by implication deny to the Interim BatasangPambansa the authority to call for local
elections. It is a well established rule that where no exception is made in terms, none will be made by mere implication or
construction. The wordings of a constitutional provision do not have a narrow or contracted meaning, but are used in a broad
sense, with a view of covering all contingencies. Petitioners invocation of the Report of the Committee on Transitory Provisions
of October 13, 1972 does not support his contention that the Interim BatasangPambansa has no power to call local elections.
The purported report refers to the interim National Assembly in Article XVII, the convening of which was rejected by the Filipino
people. As We stated in Peralta v. Commission on Elections:4

It should be recalled that under the terms of the Transitory Provisions of the Constitution, the membership of the interim National
Assembly would consist of the Incumbent President and VicePresident, the Senators and the Representatives of the old
Congress and the Delegates to the Constitutional Convention who have opted to serve therein. The Filipino people rejected the
convening of the interim National Assembly, and for a perfectly justifiable reason.

By September of 1976, the consensus had emerged for a referendum partaking of the character of a plebiscite which would be
held to establish the solid foundation for the next step towards normalizing the political process. By the will of the people, as
expressed overwhelmingly in the plebiscite of October 15 and 16, 1976, Amendments Nos. 1 to 9 were approved, abolishing the
interim National Assembly and creating in its stead an interim BatasangPambansa. This was intended as a preparatory and
experimental step toward the establishment of full parliamentary government as provided for in the Constitution. (at p. 61).

In the search for the meaning of the language of the Constitution, reference may be made to the historical basis of the
provisions. The historical events and circumstances which led to the ratification of Amendments Nos. 1 to 9 of the Constitution
show the manifest intent and desire of the people to establish, during the period of transition, a government that can effectively
provide for the nations peaceful and orderly transition from a crisis to a full parliamentary system of government.

2. Neither can We find in Section 1, Article XI of the Constitution any requirement that the enactment of a local government code
is a condition sine qua non for the calling of the local elections by the Interim BatasangPambansa. Indeed, the holding of local
elections does not, in any manner, preclude the enactment of a local government code by the BatasangPambansa at some later
period. There cannot be any doubt that our local governments are basic and fundamental units in our democratic institutions. To
strengthen these institutions, the election of local officials should be periodically held.5 Accordingly, this Court is not inclined to
adopt such a technical or strained construction as will unduly impair the efficiency of the Interim BatasangPambansa in meeting
the challenges and discharging its responsibilities in response to the problems arising in a modernizing and dynamic society. The
legislative decision to call for local elections in order to enable the Filipino people to exercise their sovereign right to choose their
local officials cannot, therefore, be faulted as a violation of the Constitution.

3. Section 6 of Article XII of the Constitution does not fix an unalterable period of ninety (90) days for an election campaign. This
provision must be construed in relation to Section 5 of Article XII thereof which grants to the Commission on Elections the power
to supervise or regulate the operation of transportation, public utilities, media of communication, etc. during the election period.
Section 6 fixes the election period by stating that unless fixed by the Commission in special cases, the election period shall
commence ninety (90) days before the day of election and shall end thirty (30) days thereafter. In Peralta v. Commission on
Elections, supra, We resolved, in effect, this issue by holding that the forty-five day period of campaign prescribed in Section 4 of
the 1978 Election Code was not violative of Section 6 of Article XII of the Constitution.

4. Considering that the proposed amendment to Section 7 of Article X of the Constitution extending the retirement of members of
the Supreme Court and judges of inferior courts from sixty-five (65) to seventy (70) years is but a restoration of the age of
retirement provided in the 1935 Constitution and has been intensively and extensively discussed at the Interim
BatasangPambansa, as well as through the mass media, it cannot, therefore, be said that our people are unaware of the
advantages and disadvantages of the proposed amendment.

ACCORDINGLY, the petition is DISMISSED. This decision is immediately executory.

SO ORDERED.

Makasiar, Aquino, Concepcion Jr., Abad Santos, De Castro and Melencio-Herrera, JJ., concur.

Fernando, C.J., concurs with the opinion insofar as the Court found no merit in the petition seeking to declare unconstitutional
Batas PambansaBlg. 51, 52 and 53 and takes no part as far as the challenge to Batas PambansaBlg. 54 is concerned.

Teehankee, J., reserves his vote.

Barredo, Fernandez and Guerrero, JJ., agree with the opinion of the Court penned by Justice Felix Q. Antonio and Chief
Justice Fernando certifies.

Petition dismissed.

Notes.The question of whether the holding of the December 17, 1977 referendum is unnecessary is a political and non-
jurisdictional question. (De la Llana vs. COMELEC, 80 SCRA 525).

The holding of the December 17, 1977 referendum is authorized by the amendment to the Constitution ratified in the October 16-
17, 1976 referendum-plebiscite. (Hidalgo vs. Marcos, 80 SCRA 538).
It is for the Court rather than the Executive to determine whether or not to take cognizance of any given case involving the
validity of acts of the Executive Department purportedly under the authority of the Martial Law proclamation. (Casibang vs.
Aquino, 92 SCRA 591).

Under the new Constitution, the trial court must continue the trial of the criminal case even when the accused jumped bail and is
abroad. (People vs. Prieto, Sr., 84 SCRA 198). Occea vs. Commission on Elections, 95 SCRA 755, No. L-52265 January 28,
1980

ISSUE:

Whether or not petitioner won the elections.

RULING:

Yes

Petitioner, in this case is the winner in the elections. The presumption is that an election is honestly
conducted, and the burden of proof to show it otherwise is on the party assailing the return. But when the
return is clearly shown to be willfully and corruptly false, the whole of it becomes worthless as proof.
When the election has been conducted so irregularly and fraudulently that the true result cannot be
ascertained, the whole return must be rejected. It is impossible to make a list of all the frauds which will
invalidate an election. Each case must rest upon its own evidence.

The record of the frauds and irregularities committed in the said municipalities in which Judges Mina and
Paredes annulled the entire vote, not only shows that legal voters were prevented from voting, but in
some instances, legal ballots were tampered with and destroyed after they had been cast, to such an
extent that no confidence can be placed in the return. The return in no sense discloses the expressed will
of the voters. Search has been made in vain for cases in jurisprudence in which the frauds and
irregularities committed were more glaring and more atrocious, and in which the real will of the voters
were more effectively defeated, than is found in the records in said municipalities in the present case. The
statements of fact made by Judges Mina and Paredes relating to said frauds and irregularities are fully
sustained by the evidence adduced during the trial of the cause.

GRAND ALLIANCE FOR DEMOCRACY vs. COMELEC Case Digest

GRAND ALLIANCE FOR DEMOCRACY vs. COMELEC
150 SCRA 665

Facts: In this special civil action for certiorari, the petitioners seeks to restrain respondent
COMELEC from canvassing the senatorial elections just concluded and to declare a failure of such
elections on the ground of alleged irregularities in the conduct thereof. The said election body is
claimed to have conspired with the private respondents, official candidates of the LakasngBansa, to
frustrate and falsify the will of the electorate.

This petition could have been dismissed outright as deficient in form and substance, being couched
in general terms only, without precise indication of the time, place and manner of the commission of
the alleged irregularities as a basis for annulling the elections throughout the country, let alone the
jurisdictional infirmity.

Issue: Whether or not the Restraining Order against the COMELEC should be issued.

Held: The petition lacks merit and at best is premature until after the COMELEC has heard and
resolved petitioners complained. The alleged irregularities such as the omissions of the COMELEC
in the distribution and protection of the election forms and paraphernalia, involved the discharge of
its administrative duties and so do not come under the jurisdiction of this Court, which can review the
decisions, orders and rulings of the body onlyin cases of grave abuse of discretion committed by it in
the discharge of its quasi-judicial powers. Moreover, the administrative shortcomings complained of
should not and cannot operate to divest the people of their right of suffrage. The COMELEC is the
body entrusted by the Constitution to enforce all laws relative to the conduct of elections. It should
be permitted to discharge its constitutional role without obstruction or molestation, subject only to
review by this Court when and as the occasion may warrant in accordance with our own
constitutional duty. That occasion is not now. Hence, we hold that, as the canvass of
the senatorial elections is still in progress and there being no showing of any valid justification to
restrain it in its ascertainment of the electorates will.
 YASON VS COMELEC
134 SCRA 371

FACTS:

On January 4, 1980 at 2:45 in the afternoon, petitioner Yason filed his certificate of candidacy for Mayor
of Roxas, Oriental Mindoro with the Municipal Election Registrar. On the blank space in Item No. 4
indicating "Political Party/Group or Aggrupation," he stated "Nationalists, (NP)." Shortly afterwards, Yason
had a change of mind. A few minutes before midnight of the same day, he went back to the municipal
election registrar, asked for the certified of candidacy he had filed that afternoon, and erased the words
and letters, "Nationalista, (NP)." Over the erased items, he typed "Kilusang Bagong Lipunan (KBL)." The
same thing was done for Item No. 5, "state if nominated by Political Party/Group or Aggrupation" where
the word "Yes" was erased and "Kilusang Bagong Lipunan (KBL)" typed clearly as the answer. Both
changes in Items 4 and 5 were initialed by Mr. Yason.

On the morning of election day on January 30, 1980, after the petitioner came to know from the Certified
List of Candidates furnished by the COMELEC for posting in election booths and guidance of citizens'
election committees that COMELEC had listed him in the official line-up of NP candidates, he immediately
disclaimed knowledge of his having been nominated by the NP provincial chapter

A day later, on February 2, 1980, Suarez filed with COMELEC a petition for disqualification of Yason as
candidate for mayor. On February 13, 1980, the COMELEC ordered the citizens' election committee and
the election registrar of Roxas to consider all votes cast for Yason as stray and to declare Lucio T. Suarez
as duly elected mayor.

ISSUE:

Whether or not turncoatism is a ground for disqualification.

Held:

In elections, the first consideration of every democratic policy is to give effect to the expressed will of the
majority. It is true that constitutional and statutory provisions requiring compliance with measures
intended to enhance the quality of our democratic institutions must be obeyed. The restriction against
turncoatism is one such measure. However, even as there should be compliance with the provision on
turncoatism, an interpretation in particular cases which respects the free and untrammelled expression of
the voters' choice must be followed in its enforcement.

The various and numerous provisions of the Election Law were adopted to assist the voters in their
participation in the affairs of the Government and not to defeat that object. (Villavert v. Former, 84 Phil.
756, 763). Election cases involve not only the adjudication of the private interests of rival candidates but
also the paramount need of dispelling the uncertainty which beclouds the real choice of the electorate
with respect to who shall discharge the prerogatives of the offices within their gift. They are imbued with
public interest. (Vda. de Mesa v. Mencias, 18 SCRA 533, 538) The disenfranchisement of electors is not
favored. (Lloren v. Court of Appeals, et al., 19 SCRA 110). This is especially true where the majority of
voters are sought to be disenfranchised.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-52713 January 31, 1985

GELACIO I. YASON, petitioner,

vs.
THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, THE MUNICIPAL BOARD OF CANVASSERS OF ROXAS,
ORIENTAL MINDORO, and LUCIO T. SUAREZ, JR., respondents.

GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:

Gelacio I. Yason filed this petition for certiorari and mandamus (1) to set aside the resolution of
respondent Comelec mission on Elections (COMELEC) which denied due course to his candidacy for
Mayor of Roxas, Oriental Mindoro for having changed his party affiliation; (2) to set aside the resolution of
COMELEC which declared Lucio T. Suarez, Jr. as the duly elected Mayor after it had ordered all votes
cast for Yason to be considered stray votes; and (3) to order COMELEC or the Municipal Board of
Canvassers to proclaim petitioner Yason, who had obtained the highest number of votes, as the duly
elected Mayor.

On January 4, 1980 at 2:45 in the afternoon, petitioner Yason filed his certificate of candidacy for Mayor
of Roxas, Oriental Mindoro with the Municipal Election Registrar. On the blank space in Item No. 4
indicating "Political Party/Group or Aggrupation," he stated "Nationalists, (NP)." Shortly afterwards, Yason
had a change of mind. A few minutes before midnight of the same day, he went back to the municipal
election registrar, asked for the certified of candidacy he had filed that afternoon, and erased the words
and letters, "Nationalista, (NP)." Over the erased items, he typed "Kilusang Bagong Lipunan (KBL)." The
same thing was done for Item No. 5, "state if nominated by Political Party/Group or Aggrupation" where
the word "Yes" was erased and "Kilusang Bagong Lipunan (KBL)" typed clearly as the answer. Both
changes in Items 4 and 5 were initialed by Mr. Yason.

Around January 10, 1980, the chairman of the Nationalista Party for the province of Oriental Mindoro
submitted the NP candidates for local positions. Allegedly unknown to the petitioner, his name was
included in the complete NP line-up of candidates for his municipality.

On the morning of election day on January 30, 1980, after the petitioner came to know from the Certified
List of Candidates furnished by the COMELEC for posting in election booths and guidance of citizens'
election committees that COMELEC had listed him in the official line-up of NP candidates, he immediately
disclaimed knowledge of his having been nominated by the NP provincial chapter. He sent a telegram to
COMELEC, attention Law Department, which reads:

SIR:

THIS IS IN CONNECTION WITH THE PARTY AFFILIATION IN WHICH ALL

CANDIDATES UNDER MY FACTION WERE LISTED OFFICIALLY UNDER THE
NATIONALISTA PARTY.

RECORDS WOULD SHOW THAT MY CANDIDACY AND THAT OF THE VICE-MAYOR

AND EIGHT COUNCILORS FILED THEIR CERTIFICATES OF CANDIDACY UNDER
THE KILUSANG BAGONG LIPUNAN (KBL).

WE WANT TO PUT ON RECORD THAT WE HAVE NOT CHANGED OR AUTHORIZED

ANY REPRESENTATIVE TO CHANGE OFFICIALLY OUR PARTY FROM KBL TO
NATIONALISTA PARTY.

THANK YOU.

VERY
TRULY
YOURS
,

ENGR.
GELAC
IO I.
YASON
CANDI
DATE
FOR
MAYO
R
ROXAS
OR
MINDO
RO

Yason also sent a formal letter to COMELEC, copy furnished the Roxas Election Registrar, embodying
the same protest.

After the canvass of election returns was completed on February 1, 1980, the respondent Board of
Canvassers certified that the number of votes obtained by the candidates were:

Yason . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 933

Suarez . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3,568

thus indicating that Yason won by 365 votes over Suarez. Incidentally, only Yason and one councilor in
his line-up won. The winning candidate for vice-mayor, Oscar C. Sison, and seven of the eight councilors
who won were in the ticket of respondent Suarez. Councilor Venancio Yap, the sole candidate who won
with petitioner Yason placed fifth among the elected councilors.

A day later, on February 2, 1980, Suarez filed with COMELEC a petition for disqualification of Yason as
candidate for mayor. Notice of the petition or a copy thereof was not furnished the petitioner. Two days
later, on February 4, 1980, without the petitioner having been given an opportunity to controvert,
comment upon, or answer the petition, the COMELEC issued the questioned resolution which denied due
course to the candidacy of Yason. Having secured a copy of the resolution on his own initiative, Yason
filed on February 11, 1980 a motion for reconsideration followed by a motion to suspend proclamation of
the mayor of Roxas, Oriental Mindoro.

On February 13, 1980, the COMELEC ordered the citizens' election committee and the election registrar
of Roxas to consider all votes cast for Yason as stray and to declare Lucio T. Suarez as duly elected
mayor.

The petitioner contends that respondent COMELEC acted without jurisdiction or with grave abuse of
discretion in issuing the questioned resolutions.

On February 26, 1980, this Court restrained the respondents from enforcing the questioned resolutions.
The restraining order was later modified to enjoin respondent Suarez from assuming the office of mayor
and from discharging the duties of the mayorship.

On March 18, 1980, respondent Suarez filed a comment and counter-petition with this Court. In this
counter-petition, Suarez stated that the municipal board of canvassers proclaimed Yason as mayor-elect
on March 2, 1980. He also asks that this proclamation be set aside.

In this petition, Yason raises the following issues for consideration:

I. THE COMELEC, AFTER THE ELECTION AND ALL THE VOTES WERE PROPERLY
CANVASSED (AND WINNER PROCLAIMED) HAVE NO MORE POWER OR
JURISDICTION TO CANCEL A CERTIFICATE OF CANDIDACY OR DISQUALIFY
PETITIONER AS A CANDIDATE;

II. THE COMELEC HAS NO JURISDICTION TO ENTERTAIN THE PETITION FOR

DISQUALIFICATION, THE SAME HAVING BEEN FILED OUT OF TIME; and

III. PETITIONER, BEFORE THE COMELEC WAS DENIED DUE PROCESS OF LAW.

Under the facts of this case, may petitioner Yason be denied the mayorship of Roxas, Oriental Mindoro
on the ground of turncoatism?

There is no question from the records that Yason received 3,933 votes against the 3,568 votes cast for
Suarez. The elections were clean and orderly. As a matter of fact, only Yason and Councilor Venancio
Yap managed to win. The vice-mayoral candidate and seven out of eight candidates for councilor who
emerged winners all belonged to the Suarez camp. There is no indication of any frauds and malpractices
as would indicate a tampering with the people's choice. The only issue raised against the petitioner is
"turncoatism."

The provision applicable to the case of petitioner Yason is Section 10, Article XII-C of the Constitution as
it was worded during the 1980 local elections. At that time, it read:

SEC. 10. No elective public officer may change his political party affiliation during his
term of office, and no candidate for any elective public office may change his political
party affiliation within six months immediately preceding or following an election.

On April 7, 1981, the above provision was amended by the addition of the phrase "unless otherwise
provided by law" at its end after the word "election."

In Luna v. Rodriguez (39 Phil. 208) decided on November 29, 1918, this Court stressed the basic
principle which has governed all elections in our country from the early years of democratic government
up to the present. This Court stated:

... The purpose of an election is to give the voters a direct participation in the affairs of
their government, either in determining who shall be their public officials or in deciding
some question of public interest; and for this purpose, all of the legal voters should be
permitted, unhampered and unmolested, to cast their ballots. When that is done, and no
frauds have been committed, the ballot should be counted and the election should not be
declared null Innocent voters should not be deprived of their participation in the affairs of
their government for mere irregularities on the part of election officers for which they are
in no way responsible. A different rule would make the manner and method of performing
a public duty of greater importance than the duty itself.

In elections, the first consideration of every democratic polity is to give effect to the expressed will of the
majority. It is true that constitutional and statutory provisions requiring compliance with measures
intended to enhance the quality of our democratic institutions must be obeyed. The restriction against
turncoatism is one such measure. However, even as there should be compliance with the provision on
turncoatism, an interpretation in particular cases which respects the free and untrammelled expression of
the voters' choice must be followed in its enforcement.
The various and numerous provisions of the Election Law were adopted to assist the voters in their
participation in the affairs of the Government and not to defeat that object. (Villavert v. Former, 84 Phil.
756, 763). Election cases involve not only the adjudication of the private interests of rival candidates but
also the paramount need of dispelling the uncertainty which beclouds the real choice of the electorate
with respect to who shall discharge the prerogatives of the offices within their gift. They are imbued with
public interest. (Vda. de Mesa v. Mencias, 18 SCRA 533, 538) The disenfranchisement of electors is not
favored. (Lloren v. Court of Appeals, et al., 19 SCRA 110). This is especially true where the majority of
voters are sought to be disenfranchised.

Applying the above rules to the interpretation of the turncoatism provision in the light of the facts of this
case, we find merit in the petition.

The records are not precise and definite about petitioner Yason's being a turncoat as defined by the
Constitution. Up to the day he filed his certificate of candidacy, Yason's choice as to whether he would
remain with the KBL as an independent KBL candidate or move over to the welcoming Nationalista Party
was marked by vacillation.

Yason's final decision was, however, clear and beyond doubt. Notwithstanding the unholy hour before
midnight, on January 4, 1980, Yason withdrew the certificate of candidacy he had earlier filed that
afternoon, erased "Nationalists (NP)" from the space denoting party affiliation, typed "Kilusang Bagong
Lipunan (KBL)" thereon and initialed the change. And to remove any doubts about his choice, he erased
the word "Yes" from the query whether he was nominated by a political party and instead typed "Kilusang
Bagong Lipunan (KBL)" followed by his initials.

There is no provision of law forbidding the withdrawal of candidacy at any time before election. As a
matter of fact, the law does not require that the withdrawal of a certificate so as to validate a second filing
of another certificate of candidacy must be made on or before the deadline for filing candidacies.
(Montinola v. Commission on Elections, 98 Phil. 220). By the same token, once entries in a certificate of
candidacy are corrected, it is the corrected version which is considered filed and not the earlier one.

The records do not show that Yason ever affiliated with the Nationalists Party or that he signed any NP
membership form or took his oath as an NP member. The only records available show him as still
belonging to the KBL. The petitioner has submitted campaign leaflets which indicate that he was running
as a KBL candidate and that his campaign motto was "Umunlad sa Bagong Lipunan Boy Yason ang
ating Kailangan."

The private respondent has introduced affidavits to show that the local Nacionalista Party of Roxas,
Oriental Mindoro campaigned for Yason as its own candidate for mayor. Apart from protesting his
inclusion in the NP line-up of the provincial chapter and formally disowning such support in a telegram
and letter to COMELEC, the petitioner has not shown what other measures he took. Nevertheless, we
cannot categorically tag Yason as a "turncoat" under the law simply because he did not reject more
strongly the support which another party voluntarily gave to him.

There are other reasons for granting this petition.

A petition to disqualify a candidate, as would validly cancel any votes cast for him as "stray votes" if
granted, should be filed before the day of elections. This will enable a substitute candidacy to be filed thus
giving the electorate a choice of alternative candidates. (See Section 28, P.D. No. 1296, Election Code of
1978).

For the 1980 local elections, the COMELEC promulgated Resolution No. 8434 which mandated that the
exact deadline for the filing of petitions for disqualification was "5:00 o'clock P.M., Friday, January 25,
1980." The mandatory nature of the deadline is explicit from the statement of an exact hour, day and
date.

Respondent Suarez filed his petition for the disqualification of Yason on February 2, 1980 after the results
of the elections were already known. Suarez has submitted a copy of a letter he allegedly wrote to
COMELEC dated January 25, 1980 protesting the turncoatism of Yason and stating that a formal petition
would follow. The authenticity of this letter is doubtful because it is dated January 25, 1980 and yet, it was
supposed to have been received that same day in Manila. Suarez was campaigning for the January 30
elections in the distant town of Roxas, Oriental Mindoro. It is not shown what he was doing in Manila five
days before a hotly contested election. To reach Roxas, one has to take a car or bus ride from Manila to
Batangas City, a ferry ride of several hours to Calapan, and at least six hours ride over rough roads to
reach Roxas. At any rate, even if filed on January 25, 1980, whoever initialed its receipt by the
COMELEC Law Division was careful to extricate himself or herself from a potentially difficult situation by
pointedly entering "6:00 P.M." as the time of receipt or one hour after the official deadline. Moreover,
COMELEC was completely unaware of the letter because it acted only after the February 2, 1980 petition
was filed. There is absolutely no mention in the petition that an informal letter had earlier been filed.

We rule that the petition to disqualify the petitioner was filed long after the deadline for filing had lapsed.
Moreover, considering its lack of merit it may not be validated on equitable grounds.

The provision on turncoatism was incorporated in the 1973 Constitution to bring about disciplined political
parties with dedicated party followers. The shift to a parliamentary system at this time was clear. The
President was a nominal Head of State while executive power was exercised by the Prime Minister and
his Cabinet. The Prime Minister under the 1973 Constitution, as Chief of State, was elected by the
National Assembly, remained a member of the Parliament during Ms tenure as Chief Executive, and
could be removed by a no confidence majority vote of the legislature. The Constitution has since been
amended to have a President elected nationwide for a fixed term who can be removed by the legislature
only through impeachment. However, whether the government is pure parliamentary, modified
parliamentary, pure presidential, or modified presidential, it cannot be denied that the turncoatism
provision represents an Ideal objective. The opposition party should be strong, organized, and united in
its challenge. It should be more or less permanent, not broken up into squabbling factions after being
defeated in an election. It should present a viable alternative program of government so that when elected
to political power, the people can exact strict compliance with its promises and platforms.

Unfortunately, the 1980 experience showed that perhaps disciplined political parties with faithful and
dedicated members cannot be organized through unduly strict and peremptory legislation. Perhaps,
voluntary action through evolutionary processes helped along by carefully crafted legislation would have
been preferable. At any rate, the Constitution was amended in 1981 such that the provision on
"turncoatism" would be enforced, "unless otherwise provided by law."

Batas Pambansa Blg. 697 governing the 1984 elections for Batasan members provided otherwise "any
person, including an elective official, may change his party affiliation for purposes of the election herein
provided for." Thus, a candidate for the Batasan may change his party affiliation even within the
proscribed term or period.

True, the same Section 14 of Batas Pambansa Big. 697 provides that pending disqualification cases
before the COMELEC or the Supreme Court based on "turncoatism" shall not be affected by the
provisions of the section. Nonetheless, the spirit behind the enactment of Section 14, B.P. Blg. 697 as an
exception to the turncoatism provision of the Constitution constrains us to adopt a liberal view in applying
the law to the facts of the case before us to insure that the win of the people of Roxas, Negros Oriental
expressed through their ballots shall be respected.

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The questioned resolutions of respondent Commission
on Elections are SET ASIDE. The proclamation of petitioner Gelacio I. Yason as duly elected Mayor of
Roxas, Oriental Mindoro is AFFIRMED. The temporary restraining order dated February 26, 1980 as
subsequently modified is made PERMANENT.

SO ORDERED.

LUNA VS RODRIGUEZ
REQUISITES OF DE FACTO OFFICERSHIP
JOSE LINO LUNA vs.
EULOGIO RODRIGUEZ and SERVANDO DE LOS ANGELES
G.R. No. L-13744 November 29, 1918
Ponente: JOHNSON, J.

I. Doctrine:
The rules and regulations, for the conduct of elections, are mandatory before the
election, but when it is sought to enforce them after the election they are held to be
directory only, if that is possible, especially where, if they are held to be
mandatory, innocent voters will be deprived of their votes without any fault on their part.
When the Election Law does not provide that a departure from a prescribed form will be
fatal and such departure has been due to an honest mistake or misrepresentation of the
Election Law, and such departure has not been used as a means for fraudulent practices
and it is clear that there has been a free and honest expression of the popular will, the
law will be held to be directory and such departure will be considered a harmless
irregularity.

II. Facts:
An election for the office of governor of the Province of Rizal was held on the 6th day of
June, 1916. At said election Jose Lino Luna, Eulogio Rodriguez and Servando de los
Angeles were candidates for said office.
The election was closed, the votes cast in the various municipalities were counted, and a
return was made by the inspectors of said municipalities to the provincial board of
canvassers, who, after a canvass of said returns, proclaimed the following result:
That Eulogio Rodriguez received 4,321 votes; (b) Jose Lino Luna 4,157; (c) Servando de
los Angeles 3,576 votes; and (d) that Eulogio Rodriguez, having received a plurality of
said votes, was duly elected governor of said province.
Jose Lino Luna presented a protest in the Court of First Instance and a new trial was
ordered. Additional evidence was adduced.
By deducting the said votes in the municipality of Taytay and those cast after six o'clock
p.m. in the municipality of Binangonan, Judge McMahon concluded that Jose Lino Luna
had received a plurality of the legal votes cast at said election and ordered the provincial
board of canvassers to correct its canvass accordingly.
III. Issue:
Whether or not the ballots cast after the hour fixed for closing were valid.
IV. Held/Ruling: YES.
The ballots were valid. The law provides that at all elections, the polls shall be open
from seven oclock in the morning until six oclock in the afternoon. The polls should be
open and closed in strict accord with said provisions. Voters who do not appear and offer
to vote within the hours designated by the law should not be permitted to vote if the time
for closing the polls has arrived. Upon the other hand, if the voter is prevented, during
the voting hours, from voting, and is not permitted to vote by reason of the failure of the
inspectors to do their duty, then, certainly, in the absence of some fraud, neither such
votes nor the entire vote of the precinct should be annulled simply because some votes
were cast after the regular hours.
When the Election Law does not provide that a departure from a prescribed form will be
fatal and such departure has been due to an honest mistake or misrepresentation of the
Election Law, and such departure has not been used as a means for fraudulent practices
and it is clear that there has been a free and honest expression of the popular will, the
law will be held to be directory and such departure will be considered a harmless
irregularity. However, the irregularities may be so numerous as not to be attributed to
ignorance or honest mistake, but to a design to defeat the will of the voters or to such
careless disregard of the law as to amount not only to laches but to fraudulent intent. In
such cases, the election officers should be punished, the election should be declared
null and a new election held.
The purpose of an election is to give the voters a direct participation in the affairs of their
government, either in determining who shall be their public officials or in deciding some
question of public interest; and for that purpose all of the legal voters should be
permitted, unhampered and unmolested, to cast their ballot. When that is done and no
frauds have been committed, the ballots should be counted and the election should not
be declared null. Innocent voters should not be deprived of their participation in the
affairs of their government for mere irregularities on the part of the election officers, for
which they are in no way responsible. A different rule would make
the manner and method of performing a public duty of greater importance than the duty
itself. (Loomis vs.Jackson, 6 W. Va., 613.)
In the present case there seems to be no justification, under the facts, there being no
fraud committed, for annulling the votes of innocent voters who were permitted by the
election inspectors to cast their votes in a legal manner after the regular hour for closing
the polls. In this conclusion, however, we do not desire to be understood to have
decided that in no case should the courts not annul and set aside an election, where
fraud is clearly proved, for a violation of the section under discussion. When the polls are
kept open after the hour prescribed by the law for the purpose of defeating the will of the
people, such a violation of the law should result in annulling and setting aside the
election of that precinct. No such facts exist in the present case. It is true, perhaps, that
a number of the votes cast after the hour for closing the polls were sufficient to change
the result of the election, but the result would have been the same had those same
voters been permitted to vote, except for the negligence of the inspectors, during the
regular hours for voting. There seems to be no more reason for annulling the votes cast,
after the hour for closing the election, than for annulling the election for the reason that
the inspectors failed to provide the means for voting at the time fixed for opening the
polls in the morning.
We are firmly of the opinion that instead of depriving the innocent voters of their right to
participate in the affairs of their government for irregularities committed by the election
inspectors, the latter should be proceeded against in a criminal action for failure, on their
part, to comply with the law and be punished in accordance with section 29 of Act No.
1592; section 2632 of Act No. 2657 and section 2639 of Act No. 2711.
The various and numerous provisions of the Election Law are adopted to assist the
voters in their participation in the affairs of the government, and not to defeat that object.
When the voters have honestly cast their ballots, the same should not be nullified simply
because the officers appointed, under the law to direct the election and guard the purity
of elections, have not done their duty. The law provides a remedy, by criminal action,
against them. They should be prosecuted, and the will of the honest voter, as expressed
through his ballot, should be protected and upheld.
V. Dispositive
The ballot of the innocent voter should not be annulled and he should not be deprived of his
participation in the affairs of his government when he was guilty of no illegal act or fraud. The
election inspectors should be held to comply strictly with the law. If they violate the law, they
should be punished and not the innocent voter.
UNDA VS COMELEC
BAQUIT S. UNDA, petitioner,
vs.
HON. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, HON. DIMAPORO T. CASAR, Presiding Judge of the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 10, of Lanao del Sur, and HADJI ACMAD DITANGONGAN
RANGIRIS, respondents.

Esmeraldo U. Goloy for petitioner.

Ariraya P. Corot and Mangorsi Mindalano for private respondent.

REGALADO, J.:

The sole issue presented herein for resolution involves the jurisdiction of the trial court over an election protest filed against a protestee who
had died prior to the filing thereof.

The instant petition for certiorari seeks to annul the resolution of respondent Commission on
Elections (COMELEC), promulgated on July 12, 1990 in SPR No. 1-90, dismissing the petition
for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus filed by petitioner Baquit Unda and ordering the court a
quo to proceed with the trial of the election protest.1

Hadji Minandang Guiling and private respondent Hadji Acmad Ditangongan Rangiris were the
rival candidates for mayor of Masiu, Lanao del Sur in the local elections of February 4, 1988. On
February 8, 1988, Hadji Minandang Guiling was proclaimed as the duly elected mayor of Masiu,
along with herein petitioner who was proclaimed as the duly elected vice-mayor of the same
municipality. Both officials duly took their oaths of office and entered upon the performance of
their duties.

On February 12, 1988, private respondent filed in the COMELEC a petition questioning the said
proclamation, docketed therein as SPC No. 88-645. On October 26, 1988, private respondent
received the decision of the COMELEC dismissing his aforesaid petition, without prejudice to
the filing of an election contest within ten days from receipt thereof.

On November 1, 1988, Mayor Minandang Guiling passed away and, the allowing day, petitioner
took his oath of office as mayor and forthwith assumed and exercised the duties of said office.

On November 3, 1988, private respondent filed an election protest against the deceased Mayor
Minandang Guiling with Branch 10 of the Regional Trial Court of Lanao del Sur, docketed as
Election Case No. 77-88. The summons issued to Mayor Minandang Guiling was returned
unserved on December 8, 1988 since protestee Minandang Guiling had already been dead for
over a month.

Thereafter, the protest filed by private respondent was brought to the COMELEC three times
on certiorari.

The first was SPR No. 4-89 in which the COMELEC declared null and void the order of the
aforesaid regional trial court denying petitioner's motion for intervention, and ordered the trial
court to admit the intervention and proceed with the trial of the case on the basis of the protest
and petitioner's answer in intervention.

The second was SPR No. 17-89 wherein the COMELEC reversed the resolution of the trial
court denying petitioner's motion for reconsideration and affirming the order of the same court
denying petitioner's motion for inhibition and manifestation, and ordered the court a quo to
proceed with the hearing on the affirmative defenses raised by herein petitioner.

The third is SPR No. 1-90 wherein the COMELEC issued the resolution, now subject of this
petition, ordering the court below to proceed with the trial of the case on the ground, among
others, that the death of the protestee does not divest the court of jurisdiction over the election
protest.

On August 30, 1990, the Court issued a temporary restraining order directing the Presiding
Judge of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 10 at Marawi City, to cease and desist from taking
further action on the election case pending before him. 2
Petitioner argues that there is no law which allows a deceased person to be sued as a party
defendant, much less as a protestee in an election contest; and that the COMELEC misapplied,
in support of its challenged resolution, the case of Vda. de De Mesa, etc., et al., vs. Mencias,
etc., et al. 3 Impliedly suggested thereby is that the procedure would be to have the case
dismissed without prejudice, to be refiled against the proper protestee. This may be the
conventional procedure but it overlooks the time element which is of the essence of and
constitutes a major consideration in this case.

It has been frequently decided, and it may be stated as a general rule recognized by all courts,
that statutes providing for election contests are to be liberally construed to the end that the will
of the people in the choice of public officers may not be defeated by mere technical objections.
To that end, immaterial defects in pleadings should be disregarded and necessary and proper
amendments should be allowed as promptly as possible. 4

An election case, unlike an ordinary action, is imbued with public interest since it involves not
only the adjudication of the private interests of rival candidates but also the paramount need of
dispelling the uncertainty which beclouds the real choice of the electorate with respect to who
shall discharge the prerogatives of the office within their gift. 5Moreover, it is neither fair nor just
to keep in office for an uncertain period one whose right to it is under suspicion. It is imperative
that his claim be immediately cleared not only for the benefit of the winner but for the sake of
public interest, which can only be achieved by brushing aside technicalities of procedure which
protract and delay the trial of an ordinary action. 6

On the procedural aspect, it is established that amendments to pleadings may be permitted by

this Court even for the first time on appeal in order to substitute the name of the real party in
interest, provided that such an amendment would not involve a change in the cause of action or
result in undue prejudice to the adverse party. For, as long as there is justice done upon the
merits, all the imperfections of form and technicalities of procedure ought to be brushed aside
as wholly trivial and indecisive. 7

It follows, therefore, that the election protest filed by private respondent can and ought to be
amended by striking out the name of Hadji Minandang Guiling, as the protestee, and
substituting, in his place, petitioner Baquit S. Unda. Besides, we do not find that such a course
of procedure will be productive of any undue substantial prejudice to herein private respondent.
For that matter, said procedure should have been inceptively adopted by the trial court under
the circumstances of the election case before it.

We agree with private respondent that Vda. de De Mesa, as well as the other cases invoked
and relied upon by public respondent, do not present the same factual situation obtaining in the
case before us. In the decisions cited by public respondent, the protestees had been duly
served with summons and died either during the pendency of the election protest or on appeal,
which is not so in the case at bar wherein the protestee was already dead at the time of the
filing of the election protest. However, as earlier explained, we cannot allow public interest to be
fettered by procedural lapses or technicalities where the circumstances demand and warrant the
adjudication of the case on the merits as early as practicable.

We can, however, for purposes of the present case avail of the ruling in the Vda. de De Mesa
case to the effect that Section 17, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court, on substitution of parties,
applies to election contests to the same extent and with the same force and effect as it does in
ordinary civil actions.

Now, under the Local Government Code, 8 the vice-mayor stands next in the line of succession
to the mayor in case of a permanent vacancy in the latter's position. Upon the death of the
protestee mayor in the case at bar, petitioner, as then incumbent vice-mayor, succeeded by
operation of law to the vacated office and is ordinarily entitled to occupy the same for the
unexpired term thereof The outcome of the election contest necessarily and primarily bears
upon his right to his present position and he is the person directly concerned in the fair and
regular conduct of the election in order that the true will of the electorate will be upheld. His
status as a real party in interest in the continuation of said case cannot thus be disputed.

It appears that petitioner became a party to the election protest as an intervenor with the
approval of respondent COMELEC. As already discussed, the pleadings in the election protest
should properly be amended to substitute petitioner as the party protestee, instead of his being
merely an intervenor therein, and that the proceedings be thereafter conducted accordingly.

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered:

1. AFFIRMING the resolution of public respondent Commission on Elections promulgated on

July 12,1990 in SPR No. 1-90;
2. ORDERING the court a quo to forthwith appoint petitioner as the legal representative of the
deceased protestee, and cause the amendment of the pleadings and processes concerned to
substitute petitioner therein in the name and stead of the late protestee;

3. ALLOWING petitioner to file an answer in said election case within ten (10) days from receipt
of this resolution, failing which his aforestated answer in intervention shall stand as his answer
to the amended protest; and

4. DIRECTING the lower court to grant full representation of and participation by petitioner
Baquit S. Unda as protestee in all proceedings and incidents in Election Case No. 77-88 of said
court.

The temporary restraining order issued in this case is LIFTED, and the court a quo is hereby
ORDERED to proceed with the trial and adjudication of said election case with deliberate
dispatch.

SO ORDERED

Badelles v. Cabili
Facts:
In the 1967 election for mayor of Iligan City wherein Camilo Cabili and Mariano Badelles were
candidates. Cabili was proclaimed as the winner. This prompted Badelles to file a protest before the CFI of
Lanao. He alleged that flagrant violations of Election Code attended the election. He pointed out that more
than 200 voters were registered per precinct contrary to what the law mandated at 200 voters per precinct.
He also alleged that no publication of lists of voters per precinct was made up to the election day itself
enabling around 8,300 persons to vote illegally while around 8,000 qualified voters were not able to vote
since their names were not found on the lists.
Camilo Cabili filed a motion to dismiss the protest based on three grounds namely: (1) failure to file
the protest within the reglementary period; (2) lack of jurisdiction on the part of the trial court over the
subject-matter of the case; and (3) failure to state a cause of action. Motion to dismiss the protest was
granted but only on the ground of failure to state a cause of action. In granting the MTD, the court argued
that while irregularities as well as misconduct on the part of election officers were alleged in the election
protests filed, there was however an absence of an allegation that they would change the result of the
election in favor of the protestants and against the protestees, that such irregularities would destroy the
secrecy and integrity of the ballots cast, or that the protestees knew of or participated in the commission
thereof. It also declared that voters should not be deprived of their right to vote occasioned by the failure of
the election officials to comply with the formal prerequisites to the exercise of the right of suffrage and that
the rules and regulations for the conduct of elections while mandatory before the voting should be
considered directory thereafter.

Issue:
Whether the trial court erred in granting the motion to dismiss

Held:
Yes. In resolving the motion to dismiss, the allegations contained in the complaint should be
hypothetically admitted. In this case, the court obviously erred in dismissing the protest. The seriousness
and gravity of the imputed failure to have election conducted freely and honestly, with such irregularities
alleged, give rise to doubts, rational and honest, as to who were the duly elected officials.

IMPORTANCE OF PRESERVING THE RIGHT OF SUFFRAGE

If the right of suffrage would be disregarded or frittered away, popular sovereignty becomes a
myth. In the case of Moya v. Del Fierro, it was declared by Justice Laurel, to wit:
As long as popular government is an end to be achieved and safeguarded, suffrage, whatever may
be the modality and form devised, must continue to be the means by which the great reservoir of power
must be emptied into the receptacular agencies wrought by the people through their Constitution in the
interest of good government and the common weal. Republicanism, in so far as it implies the adoption of a
representative type of government, necessarily points to the enfranchised citizen as a particle of popular
sovereignty and as the ultimate source of the established authority."
A republic then to be true to its name requires that the government rests on the consent of the
people, consent freely given, intelligently arrived at, honestly recorded, and thereafter counted. Only thus
can they be really looked upon as the ultimate sources of established authority. It is their undeniable right to
have officials of their unfettered choice. The election law has no justification except as a means for assuring
a free, honest and orderly expression of their views. It is of the essence that corruption and irregularities
should not be permitted to taint the electoral process.

Badelles vs Cabili
GR L-29333, February 27, 1969
Topic: Citizens Participation in Election: Right to Vote

Facts:
These are two consolidated petitions protesting the proclamation of Cabili as mayor of
Iligan City. Badelles, the opposing candidate, claimed that there were more than 200 voters per
precinct rather than the limited 200 announced, and that the election officials failed to publish
the list of voters for each precinct thus allowing those not registered to cast their votes. He also
claims that no list of registered voters were posted in the precincts, and that more or less 8,000
registered voters were unable to vote because they had no proper ID and were not included in
the list of voters. Badelles then prayed for the nullification of the proclamation of Cabili to be null
and void.
The RTC dismissed both cases stating that the allegations of the election officers'
misconduct failed to allege that their misconduct changed the result of the election in favor of
Cabili. The court also stated "there were no allegations that the non-compliance of the election
officials of the provisions of the election laws regarding registration of voters were intentional for
committing fraud."

Issue:
Did the protestants have a cause of action though they failed to make the specific allegations
regarding the election officers' misconduct affecting the election results?

Held:
YES
(They said there was actually lack of one, but that the seriousness and gravity of the imputed
failure gives rise to doubts on the duly elected officials..)

Ruling:
In the language of Justice Sanchez: "The boundaries of the forbidden area into which
Comelec may not tread are also marked by jurisprudence. That Comelec is not the proper forum
to seek annulment of an election based on terrorism, frauds and other illegal practices, is a
principle emphasized in decisions of this Court." For as announced in Nacionalista Party v.
Commission on Elections, assuming that there be a failure to conduct an election in a free,
orderly and honest manner, "the duty to cure or remedy the resulting evil" did not rest with the
Commission on Elections but in "some other agencies of the Government." More specifically,
with reference to provincial and municipal officials, election contests "are entrusted to the
courts." Then came this express affirmation: "The power to decide election contests necessarily
includes the power to determine the validity or nullity of the votes questioned by either of the
contestants."
As so emphatically observed in the Abes opinion, "there has been neither deviation nor
retreat from the foregoing pronouncement." After which came the following: "The ratiocination
advanced that there was failure of election due to rampancy of terrorism, frauds, and other
irregularities, before and during elections, such that allegedly about 51% of the registered voters
were not able to vote, will not carry the day for petitioners. For, in the first place, this is grounded
upon bare assertions. Respondents contest the correctness thereof. And in the answer of
respondents Amoranto, Mathay and others, they aver that out of 162,457 registered voters in
Quezon City, 100,382 voters actually cast their votes about 62% of the registered voters.
But above all, as pointed out in City Board of Canvassers vs. Moscoso, [the] nullity of an
election for municipal officials should be determined in a petition contesting the election of
municipal officers-elect to be filed before the Court of First Instance."

KABATAAN PARTY LIST, et. al., Petitioners,

vs.

COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent.

G.R. No. 221318 December 16, 2015

 PONENTE: Perlas-Bernabe

TOPIC: Biometrics validation

FACTS:

RA 10367 mandates the COMELEC to implement a mandatory biometrics registration

system for new voters in order to establish a clean, complete, permanent, and updated list of
voters through the adoption of biometric technology.

RA 10367 likewise directs that registered voters whose biometrics have not been
captured shall submit themselves for validation. Voters who fail to submit for validation on or
before the last day of filing of application for registration for purposes of the May 2016 elections
shall be deactivated x x x.

COMELEC issued Resolution No. 9721 as amended by Resolutions No. 9863 and
10013. Among others, the said Resolution provides that: the registration records of voters
without biometrics data who failed to submit for validation on or before the last day of filing of
applications for registration for the purpose of the May 9, 2016 National and Local Elections
shall be deactivated.

Herein petitioners filed the instant petition with application for temporary restraining
order (TRO) and/or writ of preliminary mandatory injunction (WPI) assailing the constitutionality
of the biometrics validation requirement imposed under RA 10367, as well as COMELEC
Resolution Nos. 9721, 9863, and 10013, all related thereto.

ISSUES:

1. Whether or not the statutory requirement of biometrics validation is an unconstitutional

requirement of literacy and property.
2. Whether or not biometrics validation passes the strict scrutiny test.
3. Whether or not Resolution No. 9863 which fixed the deadline for validation on October 31, 2015
violates Section 8 of RA 8189.

HELD:

FIRST ISSUE: No.

The Court held that biometrics validation is not a qualification to the exercise of the
right of suffrage, but a mere aspect of the registration procedure, of which the State has the
right to reasonably regulate.

The Court reiterated their ruling in several cases that registration regulates the
exercise of the right of suffrage. It is not a qualification for such right. The process of registration
is a procedural limitation on the right to vote.

Thus, although one is deemed to be a qualified elector, he must nonetheless still

comply with the registration procedure in order to vote.

Thus, unless it is shown that a registration requirement rises to the level of a literacy,
property or other substantive requirement as contemplated by the Framers of the Constitution -
that is, one which propagates a socio-economic standard which is bereft of any rational basis to
a persons ability to intelligently cast his vote and to further the public good -the same cannot be
struck down as unconstitutional, as in this case.

SECOND ISSUE: Yes.

 In applying strict scrutiny, the focus is on the presence of compelling, rather than
substantial, governmental interest and on the absence of less restrictive means for achieving
that interest, and the burden befalls upon the State to prove the same.

Presence of compelling state interest

Respondents have shown that the biometrics validation requirement under RA 10367
advances a compelling state interest. It was precisely designed to facilitate the conduct of
orderly, honest, and credible elections by containing -if not eliminating, the perennial problem of
having flying voters, as well as dead and multiple registrants. The foregoing consideration is
unquestionably a compelling state interest.

Biometrics validation is the least restrictive means for achieving the above-said interest

Section 6 of Resolution No. 9721 sets the procedure for biometrics validation,
whereby the registered voter is only required to: (a) personally appear before the Office of the
Election Officer; (b) present a competent evidence of identity; and (c) have his photo, signature,
and fingerprints recorded.

Moreover, RA 10367 and Resolution No. 9721 did not mandate registered voters to
submit themselves to validation every time there is an election. In fact, it only required the voter
to undergo the validation process one (1) time, which shall remain effective in succeeding
elections, provided that he remains an active voter.

Lastly, the failure to validate did not preclude deactivated voters from exercising their
right to vote in the succeeding elections. To rectify such status, they could still apply for
reactivation.

THIRD ISSUE: No.

Section 8 of RA 8189 provides that:

System of Continuing Registration of Voters. x x x No registration shall, however, be

conducted during the period starting one hundred twenty (120) days before a regular election
and ninety (90) days before a special election.

The Court held that the 120-and 90-day periods stated therein refer to the prohibitive
period beyond which voter registration may no longer be conducted. The subject provision does
not mandate COMELEC to conduct voter registration up to such time; rather, it only provides a
period which may not be reduced, but may be extended depending on the administrative
necessities and other exigencies.

Kabataan Party-list vs. COMELEC Case DIgest (G.R. No. 189868, December 15, 2009)

FACTS:

In the instant case, the petitioners, Kabataan Party-List, seeks to extend the voters registration
for the May 10, 2010 national and local elections from October 31, 2009, as fixed by COMELEC
Resolution No. 8514, to January 9, 2010 which is the day before the 120-day prohibitive period
starting on January 10, 2010.

The petitioners anchor its ground on the provision of Section 8 of R.A. 8189 which reads: "The
personal filing of application of registration of voters shall be conducted daily in the office of the
Election Officer during regular office hours. No registration shall, however, be conducted during
the period starting one hundred twenty (120) days before a regular election and ninety (90) days
before a special election."

On the other hand, COMELEC maintains that the Constitution and the Omnibus Election Code
confer upon it the power to promulgate rules and regulations in order to ensure free, orderly and
honest elections; that Section 29 of R.A. 6646 and Section 28 of R.A. 8436 authorize it to fix
other dates for pre-election acts which include voters registration; and that the October 31, 2009
deadline was impelled by operational and pragmatic considerations, citing Akbayan-Youth v.
COMELEC.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the COMELEC has the authority to fix the voter's registration beyond the
prohibitive period set forth by R.A. 8189.

RULING:

The Court ruled in favor of the petitioners.

It held that the right of every Filipino to choose its leaders and participate to the fullest extent in
every national or local election is so zealously guarded by Article V of the 1987 Constitution.

The Court explained that Section 8 of R.A. 8189 decrees that voters be allowed to register daily
during office hours, except during the period starting 120 days before a regular election and 90
days before a special election. The Court is bound to respect the determination of Congress that
the 120 day or 90 day period, as the case may be, was enough to make the necessary
preparations with respect to the coming elections and COMELEC's rule making power should
be exercised in accordance with the prevailing law.

R.A. 6646 and R.A. 8436 is not in conflict with the mandate of continuing voter's registration
under R.A. 8189. R.A. 6646 and R.A. 8436 both grant COMELEC the power to fix other period
for pre-election activities only if the same cannot be reasonable held within the period provided
by law. However, this grant of power, is for the purpose of enabling the people to exercise the
right of suffrage -- the common underlying policy under R.A. 8189, R.A. 6646 and R.A. 8436.

In the case at bar, the Court did not find any ground to hold that continuing voter's registration
cannot be reasonably held within the period provided by R.A. 8189.

With regard to the Court's ruling in Akbayan-Youth v. COMELEC, The court explained that if the
petitioners had only filed their petition, and sought extension, before the 120 day prohibitive
period, the prayer would have been granted pursuant to the mandate of R.A. 8189.

As a result, the petition was granted and the COMELEC resolution fixing voters registration for
the May 10, 2010 national and local elections on October 31, 2009 was declared null and void.

PURISIMA VS SALANGA
G.R. No. L-22335 December 31, 1965

AMANTE P. PURISIMA, petitioner,

vs.
HON. ANGELINO C. SALANGA, Judge of the Court of First Instance of Ilocos Sur. THE
PROVINCIAL BOARD OF CANVASSERS, THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and
GREGORIO CORDERO, respondents.
Jose W. Diokno for petitioner.
Provincial Fiscal Juvenal K. Guerrero for respondent Provincial Board of Canvassers
Antonio Barredo for respondents Judge Salanga and Gregorio Cordero
Ramon Barrios for respondent Commission on Elections.

BENGZON, J.P., J.:

In the election of November 12, 1963, Amante Purisima and Gregorio Cordero were among the
candidates for any of the three offices of Provincial Board Member of Ilocos Sur. After the
election or on November 25, 1963 the provincial board of canvassers met and started
canvassing the returns for said office.

Purisima noted during the canvass that the returns from some precincts, forty-one (41) in all,
showed on their face that the words and figures for Cordero's votes had been "obviously and
manifestly erased" and superimposed with other words and figures. For purposes of
comparison, the Nacionalista Party copies of the returns for the aforesaid precincts were
submitted to the board. A discrepancy of 5,042 votes in favor of Cordero was thereby found,
thus:

Provincial Treasurer's 7,277 votes for

copy: Cordero

Nacionalista Party's copy 2,235 votes for

Cordero

A request for suspension of the canvass was thereupon made by Purisima. The board of
canvassers denied said request upon the ground that it was not yet ascertainable if the
discrepancies would materially affect the result. Canvass proceeded.

After the returns had all been read, the result for the office of third (and last) member of the
Provincial Board was the following:

Cordero 41,229 votes

Purisima 39,372 votes.

Difference 1,857 votes

Purisima again called attention to the erasures and discrepancies and asked for suspension of
canvass for him to have recourse to judicial remedy. Denying said request, the board of
canvassers finished the canvass and proclaimed Cordero the winner, on November 28.

On November 29, Purisima filed a petition in the Commission on Elections to annul the canvass
and proclamation above-mentioned. The Commission on Elections issued a resolution on
November 30, annulling the canvass and proclamation, as regards Cordero and Purisima.

Purisima, on December 10, filed in the Court of First Instance a petition for recount under
Section 163 of the Revised Election Code. Subsequently, motions to dismiss the same were
filed by the board of canvassers and by Cordero. In his motion to dismiss, Cordero admitted the
erasures and discrepancies on the face of the returns from 41 precincts, but denied that said
erasures were due to tampering or falsification.

After a preliminary hearing on the motions to dismiss, the Court of First Instance, on December
27, dismissed the petition for recount. And on December 28, Cordero filed in the Commission on
Elections a motion for resumption of the canvass.

Purisima, on January 2, 1964, moved for reconsideration of the Court of First Instance's order of
dismissal. In the same case, he also filed, on January 8, a petition for preliminary injunction to
restrain the holding of another canvass. Annexed to said petition were certified photostatic
copies of the Comelec's copies of the returns from the 41 precincts in question. Furthermore,
Purisima filed with the Commission on Elections, on January 11, an opposition to the
resumption of the canvass.

Alleging that the Commission on Elections was about to order the canvass resumed, Purisima
came to this Court, on January 17, 1964, by petition for certiorari with preliminary injunction.
Petitioner asked that the lower court's order dismissing his petition for recount be set aside and
that the Commission on Elections be enjoined from ordering resumption of the canvass until
after the judicial recount.
On January 22, 1964 we ordered respondents to answer, and allowed preliminary injunction to
be issued as prayed for upon the posting of a bond of P500.00. After respondents filed their
answer the case was heard and submitted for decision.

The requisites for judicial recount are set forth in Section 163 of the Revised Election Code:

When statements of precinct are contradictory. In case it appears to the provincial

board of canvassers that another copy or other authentic copies of the statement from
an election precinct submitted to the board give to a candidate a different number of
votes and the difference affects the result of the election, the Court of First Instance of
the province, upon motion of the board or of any candidate affected, may proceed to
recount the votes cast in the precinct for the sole purpose of determining which is the
true statement or which is the true result of the count of the votes cast in said precinct for
the office in question. Notice of such proceeding shall be given to all candidates
affected.

In dismissing the petition for recount, respondent Judge stated that some of the requisites were
not present, namely: first, that it appears to the provincial board of canvassers that a
discrepancy exists; second, that said discrepancy is between the copy submitted to the board
and another authentic copy thereof; third, that said authentic copy must also be submitted to the
board.

First of all, it is not disputed that a candidate affected can file the petition for recount, even if he
does so alone, without the concurrence of the provincial board of canvassers (Cawa v. Del
Rosario, L-16837-40, May 30,1960). From the fact, therefore, that the provincial board of
canvassers has not petitioned for a recount it cannot be inferred that they were not convinced a
discrepancy existed.

In fact, when Purisima first called attention to the discrepancy between the Nacionalista Party
copies and the Provincial Treasurer's copies, the board of canvassers admitted the discrepancy
but stated that it was not yet ascertainable whether the discrepancy would amount to enough
votes as to affect the result. There is no more question now that the number of votes involved in
said discrepancy is more than enough to alter the result.

Finally, in the motion to dismiss filed by the board of canvassers, the existence of the
discrepancy is not disputed, and the board merely raises the defense that the recount is up to
the court and not to said board (Annex D, Petition).

Passing on to the next point, the basis of the petition for recount was not merely a discrepancy
between the Nacionalista Party copies and the Provincial Treasurer's copies of the returns.
Paragraph 8 of said petition shows that, in addition, the Commission on Elections' copies were
relied upon:

That as a result of the aforesaid erasures, tampering and apparent falsifications, there
exist discrepancies between the Provincial Treasurer's copies (the basis of the canvass)
of the election returns in the precincts in question, on one hand, and the copies
pertaining to the Nacionalista Party and those pertaining to the Commission on
Elections, on the other, and that said discrepancies materially affect the result of the
election as between herein petitioner and respondent Gregorio Cordero;

Accordingly, even assuming for the nonce a point we do not here decide that the
Nacionalista Party copies are not copies that may be the basis of a petition for recount, the fact
remains that the Commission on Elections' copies were said to reflect the same discrepancy
with the Provincial Treasurer's copies. It is settled that the Commission on Elections' copies are
authentic copies within the meaning of Section 163 of the Revised Election Code (Laws in v.
Escalona, L-22540, July 31, 1964; Matanog v. Alejandro, L-22502-08, June 30, 1964.)

The trial court. however, ruled that the Commission on Elections' copies had no application to
the petition for recount because they were not submitted to the board of canvassers. The record
definitely shows that the reason why Purisima was not able to submit to the board said
Commission on Elections' copies was because the board declined to suspend the canvass and
proclamation.

It is the duty of the board of canvassers to suspend the canvass in case of patent irregularity in
the election returns. In the present case, there were patent erasures and superimpositions, in
words and figures on the face of the election returns submitted to the board of canvassers. It
was therefore imperative for the board to stop the canvass so as to allow time for verification of
authentic copies and recourse to the courts (Javier v. Commission on Elections, L-22248,
January 30, 1965). A canvass or proclamation made notwithstanding such patent defects,
without awaiting proper remedies, is null and void (Ibid.). In fact, as stated, the Commission on
Elections declared the canvass and proclamation, made by respondent provincial board of
canvassers, null and void.

Since the board of canvassers prevented Purisima from securing the Commission on Elections'
copies of the returns to establish a discrepancy between them and the Provincial Treasurer's
copies, the failure to submit the Commission on Elections' copies to said board should not
prejudice Purisima's right to petition for recount before the court. It was therefore grave abuse of
discretion for respondent court to refuse to consider the Commission on Elections' copies,
regardless of the patent and admitted irregularities on the face of the Provincial Treasurer's
copies and the alleged discrepancy amounting to thousands of votes sufficient to affect the
results.

Interpretation of election laws should give effect to the expressed will of the electorate. Patent
erasures and superimpositions in words and figures of the votes stated in the election returns
strike at the reliability of said returns as basis for canvass and proclamation. A comparison with
the other copies, and, in case of discrepancy, a recount, is the only way to remove grave doubts
as to the correctness of said returns as well as of ascertaining that they reflect the will of the
people.

WHEREFORE, the dismissal of the petition for recount is set aside, respondent Judge is
ordered to proceed with the petition for recount, and respondents Commission on Elections and
Provincial Board of Canvassers are enjoined, until after the termination of proceedings in the
petition for recount, from ordering or holding another canvass and proclamation as between
petitioner Purisima and respondent Cordero.

CAUTON V. COMELEC
(En Banc)

Petitioner : LUCAS V. CAUTON

Respondents :COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and PABLO SANIDAD

When : April 27, 1967

Ponente : ZALDIVAR, J

Statement of Facts

In the national elections held on November 9, 1965, petitioner Lucas V. Cauton and respondent
Pablo Sanidad, along with Godofredo S. Reyes, were candidates for the office of
Representative in the second congressional district of Ilocos Sur.

During the canvass by the Provincial Board of Canvassers of Ilocos Sur, respondent Sanidad
brought to the attention of the Board the fact that the entries of votes for the candidates for
Representative in copies of the election returns from each of the election precincts in the
municipalities of Candon, Santiago and Sta. Cruz presented by the provincial treasurer differed
from the entries appearing in the copies of the returns from the same election precincts that
were in the possession of the Liberal Party.

He(Sanidad) filed a petition with the Commission on Elections praying for the opening of the
ballot boxes in all the precincts of Candon, Santiago and Sta. Cruz, in order to retrieve the
election returns deposited therein and that in the meantime the Provincial Board of Canvassers
of Ilocos Sur be ordered to refrain from proclaiming the winning candidate for the office of
Representative in said district. The Commission on Elections issued the restraining order
prayed for by respondent Sanidad and set his petition for hearing.

After hearing, the Commission on Elections found that the copies of the election returns for the
Municipal Treasurer, for the Commission on Elections and for the Provincial Treasurer for the
municipality of Santa Cruz have uniform alterations in the entries of the votes, as well as in
places of Candon and Santiago (though never verified since municipal treasurers of those two
municipalities did not comply with the subpoena)

On December 22, 1965, respondent Commission on Elections issued an order providing to

enable the aggrieved party to establish discrepancy between copies of the election returns, to
direct immediately the opening of the ballot boxes of the municipalities of Candon, Sta. Cruz
and Santiago.
December 23, 1965, herein petitioner, Lucas V. Cauton, filed before this Court a petition for
certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction, praying that the resolution of the
respondent Commission on Elections dated December 22, 1965 ordering the opening of the
ballot boxes used in all the precincts of Candon, Sta. Cruz and Santiago in the elections of
November 9, 1965 be annulled and set aside.

In his petition, petitioner alleges that the respondent Commission on Elections acted without or
in excess of its jurisdiction in issuing the resolution of December 22, 1965. This Court gave due
course to the petition, but did not issue the writ of preliminary injunction prayed for. This petition
is now the case before Us.

Cauton contends:

a. under Section 157 of the Revised Election Code the Commission on Elections has
authority to order the opening of the ballot boxes "only in connection with an investigation
conducted for the purpose of helping the prosecution of any violation of the election laws
or for the purely administrative purpose but not when the sole purpose is, as in this case,
to assist a party in trying to win the election.

b. the mere fact that the copies of the returns in the precincts in question in the possession
of the Liberal Party do not tally with the returns involving the same precincts in the
possession of the Provincial Treasurer, the Commission of Elections and the Nacionalista
Party as well does not legally support the validity of the resolution of the respondent
Commission in question

Upon instructions by respondent Commission on Elections, on December 28, 1966, the

envelopes that were taken from the ballot boxes were opened and the election returns were
taken out and their contents examined and recorded by a committee appointed by the
Commission. This was done in a formal hearing with notice to the parties concerned.

In the meantime, on the basis of the discrepancies in the entries of the votes, respondent Pablo
C. Sanidad filed a petition with the Court of First Instance of Ilocos Sur, docketed as Election
Case No. 16-N, for a recount of the votes in all the precincts of Candon, Sta. Cruz and
Santiago.

On February 14, 1966, petitioner(Cauton) filed before this Court in urgent motion, from further
proceeding with Election Case No. 16-N, upon the ground that the recount of the ballots in that
case in the court below would render the instant case moot and academic.

Issue:

WON the COMELEC acted without jurisdiction to issue, or has acted in excess of jurisdiction in
issuing the resolution made on December 22, 1965, for the for the purpose of obtaining judicial
remedy under the provisions of Section 163 of the Revised Election Code.

Held:

No, in issuing the resolution in question the Commission on Elections simply performed a
function as authorized by the Constitution, that is, to "have exclusive charge of the enforcement
and administration of all laws relative to the conduct of elections and ... exercise all other
functions which may be conferred upon it by law." The Commission has the power to decide all
administrative questions affecting elections, except the question involving the right to vote.

Commission on Election has the power to investigate and act on the propriety or legality of the
canvass of election returns made by the board of canvassers. The power of the Commission on
Elections in this respect is simply administrative and supervisory intended to secure the
proclamation of the winning candidate based on the true count of the votes cast.

Once the Commission on Elections is convinced that the elections returns in the hands of the
board of canvassers do not constitute the proper basis in ascertaining the true result of the
elections, it should be its concern, nay its duty, to order the taking of such steps as may be
necessary in order that the proper basis for the canvass is obtained or made available.

The election law requires the board of inspectors to prepare 4 copies of the election return in
each precinct one to be deposited in the ballot box, one to be delivered to the municipal
treasurer, one to be sent to the provincial treasurer, and one to be sent to the Commission on
Elections.

Certainly, the Commission on Elections, in the exercise of its power, may order the opening of
the ballot boxes to ascertain whether the copy inside each ballot box is also tampered like the
three copies outside the ballot box, corresponding to each precinct. The Commission on
Elections may do this on its own initiative, or upon petition by the proper party.
 Once it is found that the copy of the election return inside the ballot box is untampered, the
Commission on Elections would then have accomplished two things, namely: (1) secured a
basis for the prosecution for the violation of the laws relative to elections, and (2) afforded the
party aggrieved by the alteration of the election returns outside the ballot box a basis for a
judicial recount of the votes as provided for in Section 163 of the Revised Election Code.

The purpose of the Revised Election Code is to protect the integrity of elections and to suppress
all evils that may violate its purity and defeat the will of the voters.

Lastly, Under section 157, the ballot boxes may be opened in case there is an election contest.
They may also be opened even if there is no election contest when their contents have to be
used as evidence in the prosecution of election frauds.12Moreover, they may be opened when
they are the subject of any official investigation which may be ordered by a competent court or
other competent authority.13The "competent authority" must include the Commission on
Elections which is charged with the administration and enforcement of the laws relative to the
conduct of elections.

Roque, Jr. vs. Commission on Elections

G.R. No. 188456. September 10, 2009

FACTS:

(1) Petitioners filed a petitioner for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus with prayer for a
restraining order and/or preliminary injunction and are suing as taxpayers and concerned
citizens. They seek to nullify respondent COMELECs award of the 2010 Elections
Automation Project to the joint venture of Total Information Management Corporation
(TIM) and Smartmatic International Corporation (Smartmatic)1 and to permanently
prohibit the Comelec, TIM and Smartmatic from signing and/or implementing the
corresponding contract-award.
(2) On Dec 22, 1997 Congress enacted RA 8346 authorizing the adoption of an automated
election system (AES) in the May 11, 1998 national and local elections and onwards.
However during 1998, 2001 and 2004, purely manual elections were done.
(3) On Jan 23, 2007, the amendatory of RA 9369 was passed authorizing again
theCOMELEC to use the AES. Sec 5 of that law authorised the COMELEC to:

Use an automated election system or systems in the same election in different

provinces, whether paper-based or a direct recording automated election system as it
may deem appropriate and practical for the process of voting, counting of votes and
canvassing/consolidation and transmittal of results of electoral exercises: Provided, that
for the regular national and local election, which shall be held immediately after
effectivity of this Act, the AES shall be used in at least two highly urbanized cities and
two provinces each in Luzon, Visayas and Mindanao, to be chosen by the Commission x
xxx In succeeding regular national or local elections, the AES shall be implemented
nationwide.

(4) However, the COMELEC did not use any AES in the May 14 2007 elections.
(5) On July 19, 2009, the COMELEC and the TIM and Smartmatic (provider) signed the
contract for the automated tallying and recording of votes cast nation-wide in the May
2010 elections.
(6) For around P7 billion, the COMELEC leased 82,200 optical scanners, related equipment
and hired ancillary services provider to be used in the May 2010 elections.
(7) Hence this petition was filed to enjoin the signing of the Contract or its implementation
and to compel disclosure of the terms of the contract and other agreements between the
provider and its subcontractors.
(8) Petitioners sought the Contract's invalidation for non-compliance with the requirement in
Section 5 of RA 8436, as amended, mandating the partial use of an automated election
system before deploying it nationwide.

To further support their claim on the Contract's invalidity, petitioners alleged that:
 (1) the optical scanners leased by the COMELEC do not satisfy the minimum systems
capabilities" under RA 8436, as amended (he was claiming that the COMELEC must
pilot test in 12 areas in the country in the national elections of 2010, before doing fully
computerized elections in the national elections after 2010)

(2) the Provider not only failed to submit relevant documents during the bidding but also
failed to show "community of interest" among its constituent corporations as required in
Information Technology Foundation of the Philippines v. COMELEC (Infotech).

ISSUE:

Is there a need for pilot testing of the PCOS machines offered by Smartmatic and TIM?
NO.
Was there an invalid joint venture agreement between COMELEC and the provider
during the bidding that would be in violation of the SCs holding in the Information
Technology Foundation of the Philippines v. COMELEC (Infotech) which requires a joint
venture to include a copy of its JVA DURING the bidding? NONE
Was there an infringement of the constitutional right of the people to secrecy of the
ballot? NONE

HELD:

Pilot testing

The plain wordings of Republic Act No. 9369 (that amended RA 8436) commands that
the 2010 elections shall be fully automated, and such full automation is not conditioned
on pilot testing in the May 2007 elections. Congress merely gave COMELEC the
flexibility to partially use the AES in some parts of the country for the May 2007
elections.
Any lingering doubt on the issue of whether or not full automation of the 2010 regular
elections can validly proceed without a pilot run of the Automated Election System (AES)
should be put to rest with the enactment in March 2009 of Republic Act No. 9525, in
which Congress appropriated PhP 11.301 billion to automate the 2010 electionsthe
Republic Act No. 9525 is a compelling indication that it was never Congress intent to
make the pilot testing of a particular automated election system in the 2007 elections a
condition precedent to its use or award of the 2010 Automation Project.

Joint venture

As petitioners observed, that the TIM- Smartmatic joint venture remained an

unincorporated aggroupment during the bid- opening and evaluation stages. It ought to
be stressed, however, that the fact of non-incorporation was without a vitiating effect on
the validity of the tender offers.
For the bidding ground rules, as spelled out primarily in the RFP and the clarificatory bid
bulletins, does not require, for bidding purposes, that there be an incorporation of the
bidding joint ventures or consortiums

In fact, Bid Bulletin Nos. 19 and 20 recognize the existence and the acceptability of
proposals of unincorporated joint ventures. In response to a poser, for example,
regarding the 60% Filipino ownership requirement in a joint venture arrangement, the
SBAC, in its Bid Bulletin No. 22, stated:
 In an unincorporated joint venture, determination of the required Filipino participation
may be made by examining the terms and conditions of the [JVA] and other supporting
financial documents submitted by the joint venture.

And the Court held that petitioners have not shown that incorporation is part of the
pass/fail criteria used in determining eligibility

Infringement on secrecy and sanctity of the ballot and the possible violation of the Anti-
Dummy Law

Petitioners were contending that the COMELEC relinquished its supervision and control
of the system to be used for the automated elections since the COMELEC would not be
the one holding possession of the public and private keys pair of the machines.
But Court held that the role of Smartmatic TIM Corporation is basically to supply the
goods necessary for the automation project, such as but not limited to the PCOS
machines, PCs, electronic transmission devices and related equipment, both hardware
and software, and the technical services pertaining to their operation.
As lessees of the goods and the back-up equipment, the corporation and its operators
would provide assistance with respect to the machines to be used by the Comelec
which, at the end of the day, will be conducting the election thru its personnel and
whoever it deputizes. And if only to emphasize a point, Comelecs contract is with
Smartmatic TIM Corporation of which Smartmatic is a 40% minority owner, per the JVA
of TIM and Smartmatic and the Articles of Incorporation of Smartmatic TIM Corporation.
Accordingly, any decision on the part or on behalf of Smartmatic will not be binding on
Comelec. As a necessary corollary, the board room voting arrangement that Smartmatic
and TIM may have agreed upon as joint venture partners, inclusive of the veto vote that
one may have power over the other, should really be the least concern of the Comelec.

As to petitioners contention that the PCOS would infringe on the secrecy and sanctity of the
ballot because the voter would be confronted with a three feet long ballot:

The Court held that, surely, the Comeleccould put up such infrastructure as to insure
that the voter can write his preference in relative privacy. And as demonstrated during
the oral arguments, the voter himself will personally feed the ballot into the machine. A
voter, if so minded to preserve the secrecy of his ballot, will always devise a way to do
so. By the same token, one with least regard for secrecy will likewise have a way to
make his vote known.

As to the issue of the possible violation of the Anti Dummy Law given that the RFP requirement
of a joint venture bidder to be at least be 60% Filipino:

The winning bidder, TIM-Smartmatic joint venture, has Smartmatic, a foreign

corporation, owning 40% of the equity in, first, the joint venture partnership, and then in
Smartmatic TIM Corporation.
The Anti-Dummy Law has been enacted to limit the enjoyment of certain economic
activities to Filipino citizens or corporations. For liability for violation of the law to attach,
it must be established that there is a law limiting or reserving the enjoyment or exercise
of a right, franchise, privilege, or business to citizens of the Philippines or to corporations
or associations at least 60 per centum of the capital of which is owned by such citizens.
In the case at bench, the Court is not aware of any constitutional or statutory provision
classifying as a nationalized activity the lease or provision of goods and technical
services for the automation of an election. In fact, Sec. 8 of RA 8436, as amended, vests
the Comelec with specific authority to acquire AES from foreign sources, thus:
SEC 12. Procurement of Equipment and Materials.To achieve the purpose of this
Act, the Commission is authorized to procure, xxx, by purchase, lease, rent or other
forms of acquisition, supplies, equipment, materials, software, facilities, and
other services, from local or foreign sources xxx.
Petitioners cite Executive Order No. (EO) 584,98 Series of 2006, purportedly limiting
contracts for the supply of materials, goods and commodities to government- owned or
controlled corporation, company, agency or municipal corporation to corporations that
are 60% Filipino.
 But the Court did not see the governing relevance of EO 584. For let alone the fact that
RA 9369 is, in relation to EO 584, a subsequent enactment and, therefore, enjoys
primacy over the executive issuance, the Comelec does fall under the category of a
government-owned and controlled corporation, an agency or a municipal corporation
contemplated in the executive order.

ARROYO VS DOJ AND COMELEC

Facts:

Due to allegations of massive electoral fraud and manipulation of election results in the 2004
and 2007 National Elections, on August 2, 2011, the Comelec issued Resolution No. 9266
approving the creation of a committee jointly with the Department of Justice (DOJ).
On August 4, 2011, the Secretary of Justice issued Department Order No. 640naming three
(3) of its prosecutors to the Joint Committee.
On August 15, 2011, the Comelec and the DOJ issued Joint Order No. 001-2011 creating
and constituting a Joint Committee and Fact-Finding Team on the 2004 and 2007 National
Elections electoral fraud and manipulation cases with the mandate to conduct the necessary
preliminary investigation on the basis of the evidence gathered and the charges recommended
by the Fact-Finding Team created and referred.
The Fact-Finding Team,on the other hand, was created for the purpose of gathering
real, documentary, and testimonial evidence which can be utilized in the preliminary
investigation to be conducted by the Joint Committee.
The members of the Fact-Finding Team unanimously agreed that the subject of the Initial
Report would be the electoral fraud and manipulation of election results allegedly
committed during the May 14, 2007 elections. Thus, in its Initial Report dated October 20,
2011, the Fact-Finding Team concluded that manipulation of the results in the May 14, 2007
senatorial elections in the provinces of North and South Cotabato and Maguindanao were
indeed perpetrated.
The Fact-Finding Team recommended that petitioner Abalos and ten (10) others be
subjected to preliminary investigation for electoral sabotage for conspiring to manipulate the
election results in North and South Cotabato. Twenty-six (26)persons, including petitioners
GMA and Abalos, were likewise recommended for preliminary investigation for electoral
sabotage for manipulating the election results in Maguindanao.Several persons were also
recommended to be charged administratively, while others, including petitioner Mike Arroyo,
were recommended to be subjected to further investigation. The case resulting from the
investigation of the Fact-Finding Team was docketed as DOJ-Comelec Case No. 001-2011.
Petitioners filed before the Court separate Petitions for Certiorari and Prohibition with Prayer
for the Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction
assailing the creation of the Joint Panel. The petitions were eventually consolidated.
GMA filed before the Joint Committee an Omnibus Motion Ad Cautelam to require Senator
Pimentel to furnish her with documents referred to in his complaint-affidavit and for the
production of election documents as basis for the charge of electoral sabotage. GMA contended
that for the crime of electoral sabotage to be established, there is a need to present election
documents allegedly tampered which resulted in the increase or decrease in the number
of votes of local and national candidates. The Joint Committee denied the aforesaid motion.
GMA subsequently filed a motion for reconsideration.
On November 18, 2011, after conducting a special session, the Comelec en banc issued a
Resolutionapproving and adopting the Joint Resolution of the Joint Committee subject to
modifications. The dispositive portion of the Comelec Resolution reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Resolution of the Joint DOJ-COMELEC
Preliminary Investigation Committee in DOJ-COMELEC Case No. 001-2011 and DOJ-
COMELEC Case No. 002-2011, upon the recommendation of the COMELECs own
representatives in the Committee, is hereby APPROVED and ADOPTED, subject to the
following MODIFICATIONS:

1. That information/s for the crime of ELECTORAL SABOTAGE be filed against GLORIA
MACAPAGAL-ARROYO, BENJAMIN ABALOS, SR., LINTANG H. BEDOL, DATU ANDAL
AMPATUAN, SR. and PETER REYES; xxx

3. That the charges against JOSE MIGUEL T. ARROYO, BONG SERRANO, ALBERTO
AGRA, ANDREI BON TAGUM, GABBY CLAUDIO, ROMY DAYDAY, JEREMY JAVIER,
JOHN DOE a.k.a BUTCH, be DISMISSED for insufficiency of evidence to establish probable
 cause;

xxx

On even date, pursuant to the above Resolution, the Comelecs Law Department filed with
the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Pasay City, an Information against petitioner GMA, Governor
Andal Ampatuan, Sr., and Atty. Lintang H. Bedol. The case was raffled to Branch 112 and the
corresponding Warrant of Arrest was issued which was served on GMA on the same day.
On November 18, 2011, petitioner GMA filed with the RTC an Urgent Omnibus Motion Ad
Cautelamwith leave to allow the Joint Committee to resolve the motion for reconsideration
filed by GMA, to defer issuance of a warrant of arrest and a Hold Departure Order, and to
proceed to judicial determination of probable cause. She, likewise, filed with the Comelec a
Motion to Vacate Ad Cautelam praying that its Resolution be vacated for being null and void.
The RTC nonetheless issued a warrant for her arrest which was duly served. GMA thereafter
filed a Motion for Bail which was granted.

Issues:

1. Whether or not Joint Order No. 001-2011 "Creating and Constituting a Joint DOJ-COMELEC
Preliminary Investigation Committee and Fact-Finding Team on the 2004 and 2007 National
Elections Electoral Fraud and Manipulation Cases" is constitutional in light of the following:

due process clauseYES, it is constitutional

equal protection clause of the 1987 Constitution- YES, it is constitutional
the principle of separation of powers- YES, it is constitutional
the independence of the COMELEC as a constitutional body- YES, it is constitutional
2. Whether or not the COMELEC has jurisdiction under the law to conduct preliminary
investigation jointly with the DOJ.- YES

3. Whether or not due process was observed by the Joint DOJ-COMELEC Fact-Finding Team
and Preliminary Investigation Committee, andand the COMELEC in the conduct of the
preliminary investigation and approval of the Joint Panels Resolution.

Held:

Jurisdiction over the validity of theconduct of the preliminary investigation

Substantive IssuesBases for the Creation of theFact-Finding Team and Joint

Committee

Section 2, Article IX-C of the 1987 Constitution enumerates the powers and functions of the
Comelec. Paragraph (6) thereof vests in the Comelec the power to:(6) File, upon a verified
complaint, or on its own initiative, petitions in court for inclusion or exclusion of voters;
investigate and, where appropriate, prosecute cases of violations of election laws, including
acts or omissions constituting election frauds, offenses, and malpractices.
The grant to the Comelec of the power to investigate and prosecute election offenses as an
adjunct to the enforcement and administration of all election laws is intended to enable the
Comelec to effectively insure to the people the free, orderly, and honest conduct of elections.
The failure of the Comelec to exercise this power could result in the frustration of the true will
of the people and make a mere idle ceremony of the sacred right and duty of every qualified
citizen to vote.
The constitutional grant of prosecutorial power in the Comelec was reflected in Section 265 of
Batas Pambansa Blg. 881, otherwise known as the Omnibus Election Code, to wit:Section
265. Prosecution. The Commission shall, through its duly authorized legal officers, have the
exclusive power to conduct preliminary investigation of all election offenses punishable under
this Code, and to prosecute the same. The Commission may avail of the assistance of other
prosecuting arms of the government: Provided, however, That in the event that the
Commission fails to act on any complaint within four months from his filing, the complainant
may file the complaint with the office of the fiscal [public prosecutor], or with the Ministry
Department of Justice for proper investigation and prosecution, if warranted.
Under the above provision of law, the power to conduct preliminary investigation is vested
exclusively with the Comelec. The latter, however, was given by the same provision of law
the authority to avail itself of the assistance of other prosecuting arms of the
government.Thus, under Section 2, Rule 34 of the Comelec Rules of Procedure, provincial
and city prosecutors and their assistants are given continuing authority as deputies to conduct
preliminary investigation of complaints involving election offenses under election laws and to
prosecute the same. The complaints may be filed directly with them or may be indorsed to
 them by the petitioner or its duly authorized representatives.
Thus, under the Omnibus Election Code, while the exclusive jurisdiction to conduct
preliminary investigation had been lodged with the Comelec, the prosecutors had been
conducting preliminary investigations pursuant to the continuing delegated authority given by
the Comelec. The reason for this delegation of authority has been explained in Commission
on Elections v. Espaol:The deputation of the Provincial and City Prosecutors is necessitated
by the need for prompt investigation and dispensation of election cases as an indispensable
part of the task of securing fine, orderly, honest, peaceful and credible elections. Enfeebled by
lack of funds and the magnitude of its workload, the petitioner does not have a sufficient
number of legal officers to conduct such investigation and to prosecute such cases.
Section 43 of R.A. No. 9369reads:
Section 43. Section 265 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881 is hereby amended to read as
follows:

SEC. 265. Prosecution. The Commission shall, through its duly authorized legal
officers, have the power, concurrent with the other prosecuting arms of the government,
to conduct preliminary investigation of all election offenses punishable under this Code,
and to prosecute the same.72

As clearly set forth above, instead of a mere delegated authority, the other prosecuting arms
of the government, such as the DOJ, now exercise concurrent jurisdiction with the Comelec to
conduct preliminary investigation of all election offenses and to prosecute the same.
It is, therefore, not only the power but the duty of both the Comelec and the DOJ to
perform any act necessary to ensure the prompt and fair investigation and prosecution
of election offenses. Pursuant to the above constitutional and statutory provisions, and as
will be explained further below, we find no impediment for the Comelec and the DOJ to
create the Joint Committee and Fact-Finding Team for the purpose of conducting a
thorough investigation of the alleged massive electoral fraud and the manipulation of
election results in the 2004 and 2007 national elections relating in particular to the
presidential and senatorial elections.

Constitutionality of Joint-Order No. 001-2011

Equal Protection Clause

Unlike the matter addressed by the Courts ruling in Biraogo v. Philippine Truth Commission of
2010, Joint Order No. 001-2011 cannot be nullified on the ground that it singles out the
officials of the Arroyo Administration and, therefore, it infringes the equal protection clause.
The Philippine Truth Commission of 2010 was expressly created for the purpose of
investigating alleged graft and corruption during the Arroyo Administration since Executive
Order No. 1 specifically referred to the "previous administration"; while the Joint Committee
was created for the purpose of conducting preliminary investigation of election
offenses during the 2004 and 2007 elections. While GMA and Mike Arroyo were among
those subjected to preliminary investigation, not all respondents therein were linked to GMA
as there were public officers who were investigated upon in connection with their acts in the
performance of their official duties. Private individuals were also subjected to the investigation
by the Joint Committee.
As the constitutional body granted with the broad power of enforcing and administering all
laws and regulations relative to the conduct of an election, plebiscite, initiative, referendum
and recall, and tasked to ensure free, orderly, honest, peaceful, and credible elections,the
Comelec has the authority to determine how best to perform such constitutional mandate.
Pursuant to this authority, the Comelec issues various resolutions prior to every local or
national elections setting forth the guidelines to be observed in the conduct of the elections.
This shows that every election is distinct and requires different guidelines in order to ensure
that the rules are updated to respond to existing circumstances.
Moreover, as has been practiced in the past, complaints for violations of election laws may be
filed either with the Comelec or with the DOJ. The Comelec may even initiate, motu proprio,
complaints for election offenses.
Pursuant to law and the Comelecs own Rules, investigations may be conducted either
by the Comelec itself through its law department or through the prosecutors of the
DOJ. These varying procedures and treatment do not, however, mean that respondents are
not treated alike. Thus, petitioners insistence of infringement of their constitutional right to
equal protection of the law is misplaced.

Due Process

It is settled that the conduct of preliminary investigation is, like court proceedings, subject to
the requirements of both substantive and procedural due process. Preliminary investigation is
 considered as a judicial proceeding wherein the prosecutor or investigating officer, by the
nature of his functions, acts as a quasi-judicial officer. The authority of a prosecutor or
investigating officer duly empowered to preside over or to conduct a preliminary investigation
is no less than that of a municipal judge or even an RTC Judge.
It must also be emphasized that Joint Order No. 001-2011 created two bodies, namely: (1) the
Fact-Finding Team tasked to gather real, documentary and testimonial evidence which can be
utilized in the preliminary investigation to be conducted by the Joint Committee; and (2) the
Joint Committee mandated to conduct preliminary investigation. It is, therefore, inaccurate to
say that there is only one body which acted as evidence-gatherer, prosecutor and judge.

Separation of powers

Petitioners claim that the Joint Panel is a new public office as shown by its composition, the
creation of its own Rules of Procedure, and the source of funding for its operation. It is their
position that the power of the DOJ to investigate the commission of crimes and the Comelecs
constitutional mandate to investigate and prosecute violations of election laws do not include
the power to create a new public office in the guise of a joint committee. Thus, in creating the
Joint Panel, the DOJ and the Comelec encroached upon the power of the Legislature to
create public office.
As clearly explained above, the Comelec is granted the power to investigate, and where
appropriate, prosecute cases of election offenses. This is necessary in ensuring free, orderly,
honest, peaceful and credible elections. On the other hand, the DOJ is mandated to
administer the criminal justice system in accordance with the accepted processes thereof
consisting in the investigation of the crimes, prosecution of offenders and administration of the
correctional system. It is specifically empowered to "investigate the commission of crimes,
prosecute offenders and administer the probation and correction system." Also, the provincial
or city prosecutors and their assistants, as well as the national and regional state prosecutors,
are specifically named as the officers authorized to conduct preliminary investigation.
Recently, the Comelec, through its duly authorized legal offices, is given the power,
concurrent with the other prosecuting arms of the government such as the DOJ, to conduct
preliminary investigation of all election offenses.
Undoubtedly, it is the Constitution, statutes, and the Rules of Court and not the assailed Joint
Order which give the DOJ and the Comelec the power to conduct preliminary investigation. No
new power is given to them by virtue of the assailed order. As to the members of the Joint
Committee and Fact-Finding Team, they perform such functions that they already perform by
virtue of their current positions as prosecutors of the DOJ and legal officers of the Comelec.
Thus, in no way can we consider the Joint Committee as a new public office.

Independence of the Comelec

Petitioners claim that in creating the Joint Panel, the Comelec has effectively abdicated its
constitutional mandate to investigate and, where appropriate, to prosecute cases of violation
of election laws including acts or omissions constituting election frauds, offenses, and
malpractices in favor of the Executive Department acting through the DOJ Secretary. Under
the set- up, the Comelec personnel is placed under the supervision and control of the DOJ.
The chairperson is a DOJ official. Thus, the Comelec has willingly surrendered its
independence to the DOJ and has acceded to share its exercise of judgment and discretion
with the Executive Branch.
Prior to the amendment of Section 265 of the Omnibus Election Code, the Comelec had the
exclusive authority to investigate and prosecute election offenses. In the discharge of this
exclusive power, the Comelec was given the right to avail and, in fact, availed of the
assistance of other prosecuting arms of the government such as the prosecutors of the DOJ.
By virtue of this continuing authority, the state prosecutors and the provincial or city
prosecutors were authorized to receive the complaint for election offense and delegate the
conduct of investigation to any of their assistants. The investigating prosecutor, in turn, would
make a recommendation either to dismiss the complaint or to file the information. This
recommendation is subject to the approval of the state, provincial or city prosecutor, who
himself may file the information with the proper court if he finds sufficient cause to do so,
subject, however, to the accuseds right to appeal to the Comelec.
Clearly, the Comelec recognizes the need to delegate to the prosecutors the power to conduct
preliminary investigation. Otherwise, the prompt resolution of alleged election offenses will not
be attained. This delegation of power, otherwise known as deputation, has long been
recognized and, in fact, been utilized as an effective means of disposing of various election
offense cases. Apparently, as mere deputies, the prosecutors played a vital role in the
conduct of preliminary investigation, in the resolution of complaints filed before them, and in
the filing of the informations with the proper court.
In view of the foregoing disquisition, we find no impediment for the creation of a Joint
Committee. While the composition of the Joint Committee and Fact-Finding Team is
dominated by DOJ officials, it does not necessarily follow that the Comelec is inferior. Under
 the Joint Order, resolutions of the Joint Committee finding probable cause for election
offenses shall still be approved by the Comelec in accordance with the Comelec Rules of
Procedure. This shows that the Comelec, though it acts jointly with the DOJ, remains in
control of the proceedings. In no way can we say that the Comelec has thereby abdicated its
independence to the executive department.

Validity of the Conduct ofPreliminary Investigation

In questioning the propriety of the conduct of the preliminary investigation in her Supplemental
Petition, GMA only raises her continuing objection to the exercise of jurisdiction of the Joint
Committee and the Comelec. There is, therefore, no impediment for the Court to rule on the
validity of the conduct of preliminary investigation.
The right to have a preliminary investigation conducted before being bound for trial and before
being exposed to the risk of incarceration and penalty is not a mere formal or technical right; it
is a substantive right. To deny the accused's claim to a preliminary investigation is to deprive
him of the full measure of his right to due process.
In a preliminary investigation, the Rules of Court guarantee the petitioners basic due process
rights such as the right to be furnished a copy of the complaint, the affidavits, and other
supporting documents, and the right to submit counter-affidavits, and other supporting
documents in her defense.
Admittedly, GMA received the notice requiring her to submit her counter-affidavit. Yet, she did
not comply, allegedly because she could not prepare her counter-affidavit. She claimed that
she was not furnished by Senator Pimentel pertinent documents that she needed to
adequately prepare her counter-affidavit.
The Joint Committee, however, denied GMAs motion which carried with it the denial to extend
the filing of her counter-affidavit. Consequently, the cases were submitted for resolution sans
GMAs and the other petitioners counter-affidavits. This, according to GMA, violates her right
to due process of law.
The subpoena issued against respondent therein should be accompanied by a copy of the
complaint and the supporting affidavits and documents. GMA also has the right to examine
documents but such right of examination is limited only to the documents or evidence
submitted by the complainants (Senator Pimentel and the Fact-Finding Team) which she may
not have been furnished and to copy them at her expense.
While it is true that Senator Pimentel referred to certain election documents which served as
bases in the allegations of significant findings specific to the protested municipalities involved,
there were no annexes or attachments to the complaint filed.As stated in the Joint
Committees Order dated November 15, 2011 denying GMAs Omnibus Motion Ad Cautelam,
Senator Pimentel was ordered to furnish petitioners with all the supporting evidence.However,
Senator Pimentel manifested that he was adopting all the affidavits attached to the
Fact-Finding Teams Initial Report.Therefore, when GMA was furnished with the
documents attached to the Initial Report, she was already granted the right to examine
as guaranteed by the Comelec Rules of Procedure and the Rules on Criminal
Procedure. Those were the only documents submitted by the complainants to the
Committee.
We must, however, emphasize at this point that during the preliminary investigation, the
complainants are not obliged to prove their cause beyond reasonable doubt. It would be unfair
to expect them to present the entire evidence needed to secure the conviction of the accused
prior to the filing of information. A preliminary investigation is not the occasion for the full and
exhaustive display of the parties respective evidence but the presentation only of such
evidence as may engender a well-grounded belief that an offense has been committed and
that the accused is probably guilty thereof and should be held for trial.Precisely there is a trial
to allow the reception of evidence for the prosecution in support of the charge.
With the denial of GMAs motion to be furnished with and examine the documents referred to
in Senator Pimentels complaint, GMAs motion to extend the filing of her counter-affidavit and
countervailing evidence was consequently denied. Indeed, considering the nature of the crime
for which GMA was subjected to preliminary investigation and the documents attached to the
complaint, it is incumbent upon the Joint Committee to afford her ample time to examine the
documents submitted to the Joint Committee in order that she would be able to prepare her
counter-affidavit. She cannot, however, insist to examine documents not in the
possession and custody of the Joint Committee nor submitted by the complainants.
Otherwise, it might cause undue and unnecessary delay in the disposition of the cases. The
constitutional right to speedy disposition of cases is not limited to the accused in criminal
proceedings but extends to all parties in all cases, including civil and administrative cases,
and in all proceedings, including judicial and quasi-judicial hearings. Any party to a case has
the right to demand on all officials tasked with the administration of justice to expedite its
disposition.

To recapitulate, we find and so hold that petitioners failed to establish any constitutional or legal
impediment to the creation of the Joint DOJ-Comelec Preliminary Investigation Committee and
Fact-Finding Team.

First, while GMA and Mike Arroyo were among those subjected to preliminary investigation,
not all respondents therein were linked to GMA; thus, Joint Order No. 001-2011 does not
violate the equal protection clause of the Constitution.
Second, the due process clause is likewise not infringed upon by the alleged prejudgment of
the case as petitioners failed to prove that the Joint Panel itself showed such bias and
partiality against them. Neither was it shown that the Justice Secretary herself actually
intervened in the conduct of the preliminary investigation. More importantly, considering that
the Comelec is a collegial body, the perceived prejudgment of Chairman Brillantes as head of
the Comelec cannot be considered an act of the body itself.
Third, the assailed Joint Order did not create new offices because the Joint Committee and
Fact-Finding Team perform functions that they already perform by virtue of the Constitution,
the statutes, and the Rules of Court.
Fourth, in acting jointly with the DOJ, the Comelec cannot be considered to have abdicated its
independence in favor of the executive branch of government. Resolution No. 9266 was
validly issued by the Comelec as a means to fulfill its duty of ensuring the prompt investigation
and prosecution of election offenses as an adjunct of its mandate of ensuring a free, orderly,
honest, peaceful, and credible elections. The role of the DOJ in the conduct of preliminary
investigation of election offenses has long been recognized by the Comelec because of its
lack of funds and legal officers to conduct investigations and to prosecute such cases on its
own. This is especially true after R.A. No. 9369 vested in the Comelec and the DOJ the
concurrent jurisdiction to conduct preliminary investigation of all election offenses. While we
uphold the validity of Comelec Resolution No. 9266 and Joint Order No. 001-2011, we declare
the Joint Committees Rules of Procedure infirm for failure to comply with the publication
requirement. Consequently, Rule 112 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure and the 1993
Comelec Rules of Procedure govern.
Fifth, petitioners were given the opportunity to be heard. They were furnished a copy of the
complaint, the affidavits, and other supporting documents submitted to the Joint Committee
and they were required to submit their counter-affidavit and countervailing evidence. As to
petitioners Mike Arroyo and Abalos, the pendency of the cases before the Court does not
automatically suspend the proceedings before the Joint Committee nor excuse them from
their failure to file the required counter-affidavits. With the foregoing disquisitions, we find no
reason to nullify the proceedings undertaken by the Joint Committee and the Comelec in the
electoral sabotage cases against petitioners.

REGINA ONGSIAKO REYES, Petitioner, v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS AND JOSEPH

SOCORRO B. TAN, Respondents.
G.R. No. 207264, June 25, 2013

Facts:
The petitioners assail through a Petition for Certiorari with prayer for Temporary
Restraining Order and/or Preliminary Injunction resolution of the Commission on Election
ordering the cancellation of the Certificate of Candidacy of petitioner for the position of
the Representative of the lone district of Marinduque.
On October 31. 2012, Joseph Socorro Tan filed with the Comelec an Amended Petition
to Deny Due Course or to Cancel the Certificate of Candidacy of Regina Ongsiako
Reyes, the petitioner, on the ground that it contained material representations.On March
27, 2013, the COMELEC cancelled the certificate of candidacy of the petitioner. She
filed an MR on April 8, 2013. On May 14, 2013, COMELEC en banc denied her MR.
However, on May 18, 2013, she was proclaimed winner of the May 13, 2013 Elections.
On June 5, 2013, COMELEC declared the May 14, 2013 Resolution final and Executory.
On the same day, petitioner took her oath of office before Feliciano Belmonte, the
Speaker of the House of Representatives. She has yet to assume office at that time, as
her term officially starts at noon of June 30, 2013.According to petitioner, the COMELEC
was ousted of its jurisdiction when she was duly proclaimed20 because pursuant to
Section 17, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution, the HRET has the exclusive jurisdiction to
be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of the
Members of the House of Representatives.

Issue:
Whether or not COMELEC has jurisdiction over the petitioner who is proclaimed as
winner and who has already taken her oath of office for the position of member of the
House of Representative of Marinduque.
Held:
Yes, COMELEC retains jurisdiction because the jurisdiction of the HRET begins only
after the candidate is considered a Member of the House of Representatives, as stated
in Section 17, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution. For one to be considered a Member of
 the House of Representatives, there must be a concurrence of these requisites: (1) valid
proclamation; (2) proper oath, and (3) assumption of office.
Thus the petitioner cannot be considered a member of the HR yet as she has not
assumed office yet. Also, the 2nd requirement was not validly complied with as a valid
oath must be made (1) before the Speaker of the House of Representatives, and (2) in
open session. Here, although she made the oath before Speaker Belmonte, there is no
indication that it was made during plenary or in open session and, thus, it remains
unclear whether the required oath of office was indeed complied.
Furthermore, petition for certiorari will prosper only if grave abuse of discretion is
alleged and proved to exist. For an act to be struck down as having been done
with grave abuse of discretion, the abuse of discretion must be patent and gross.
Here, this Court finds that petitioner failed to adequately and substantially show that
grave abuse of discretion exists.

Alunan vs Mirasol
GR No. 108399 July 31, 1997

Facts:
LGC of 1991 provided for an SK in every barangay to be composed of a chairman, 7 members, a
secretary and a treasurer, and provided that the first SK elections were to be held 30 days after
the next local elections. The Local Government Code was enacted January 1, 1992.
The first elections under the code were held May of 1992. August 1992, COMELEC provided
guidelines for the holding of the general elections for the SK on Sept. 30, 1992, which also placed
the SK elections under the direct control and supervision of DILG, with the technical assistance of
COMELEC. After postponements, they were held December 4, 1992.
Registration in 6 districts of Manila was conducted. 152,363 people aged 15-21 registered,
15,749 of them filing certificated of candidacy. The City Council passed the necessary
appropriations for the elections.
September 18, 1992 The DILG, through Alunan, issued a letter-resolution exempting Manila
from holding SK elections because the elections previously held on May 26, 1990 were to be
considered the first SK elections under the new LGC. DILG acted on a letter by Santiago, acting
President of the KB (Kabataang Barangay) City Federation of Manila and a member of the City
Council of Manila, which stated that elections for the Kabataang Barangay were held on May 26,
1990. In this resolution, DILG stated that the LGC intended to exempt those barangay chapters
which conducted their KB elections from January 1, 1998 to January 1, 1992 from the
forthcoming SK elections. The terms of those elected would be extended to coincide with the
terms of those elected in the SK elections
Private respondents, claiming to represent 24,000 members of the Katipunan ng Kabataan, filed
a petition for certiorari and mandamus, arguing that the DILG had no power to amend the
resolutions of the COMELEC calling for general elections for SKs, and that DILG denied them
equal protection of laws.
RTC issued an injunction and ordered petitioners to desist from implementing the order of the
DILG Secretary, and ordered them to perform the specified pre-election activities in order to
implement the general elections. The case was reraffled to a different branch of the same court,
and the new judge held that DILG had no power to exempt Manila from holding SK elections,
because that power rests solely in COMELEC, and that COMELEC already determined that
Manila has not previously held elections for KB by calling for a general election, and that the
exemption of Manila violated the equal protection clause because of the 5,000 barangays that
previously held elections, only in Manila, 897 barangay, were there no elections.

Issue:
Whether COMELEC can validly vest the DILG with the power of direct control and supervision over the
SK elections with the technical assistance of COMELEC
Whether DILG can exempt an LGU from holding SK elections

Held:
Despite the holding of SK elections in 1996, the case is not moot; it is capable of repetition, yet
evading review.
DILG had the authority to determine whether Manila would be required to hold SK elections.
o COMELEC vesting DILG with such powers is not unconstitutional. Election for SK officers
are not subject to the supervision of COMELEC in the same way that contests involving
elections of SK officials do not fall within the jurisdiction of COMELEC.
o Justice Davide, in Mercado vs Board of Election Supervisors, stated that the provision in
the Omnibus Election Code that states that COMELEC shall have exclusive appellate
jurisdiction over contest involving elective barangay officials only refer to elective
barangay officials under the laws in force at the time the Code was enacted, which was
the old LGC.
o Moreover, DILG was only acting or performing tasks in accordance to the framework of
detailed and comprehensive rules embodied in a resolution of COMELEC. Although it is
 argued that no barangays were named in the resolution, DILG was not given
discretionary powers because they merely used the time period set by COMELEC as a
reference in designating exempted barangays. Likewise, the LGC of 1991 was held to be
curative, and thus should be given retroactive effect, giving the mayor the authority to call
elections; thus, the 1990 KB elections were not null and void for being conducted without
authority.
o The contention of violation of the equal protection clause could not be determined from
the records of this case. The mere showing that there were other barangays that held KB
elections during the set period but were not exempted from the 1992 SK elections is not
sufficient to prove that violation. An article in manila Bulletin stated that barangays in
Bulacan did not have elections in 1992 because they held elections on January 1, 1988.

ESTRELLA vs COMELEC Case Digest

ROMEO M. ESTRELLA v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, et al.
429 SCRA 789 (2004), EN BANC (Carpio Morales, J.)

Nowhere in the COMELEC Rules does it allow a Commissioner to voluntarily inhibit with
reservation.

FACTS: Rolando Salvador was proclaimed winner in a mayoralty race in May 14, 2001
elections. His opponent, Romeo Estrella, filed before Regional Trial Court (RTC) an election
protest which consequently annulled Salvadors proclamation and declared Estrella as the duly
elected mayor and eventually issued writ of execution. While Salvador filed a petition for
certiorari before the Commission on Elections (COMELEC), raffled to the Second Division
thereof, Estrella moved for inhibition of Commissioner Ralph Lantion, but a Status Quo Ante
Order was issued. However, Commissioner Lantion voluntarily inhibited himself and designated
another Commissioner to substitute him. The Second Division, with the new judge, affirmed with
modifications the RTC decision and declared Estrella as the duly elected mayor. Salvador filed
a Motion for Reconsideration which was elevated to the COMELEC En Banc, in which this time,
Commissioner Lantion participated by virtue of Status Quo Ante Order issued by the COMELEC
En Banc. He said that as agreed upon, while he may not participate in the Division
deliberations, he will vote when the case is elevated to COMELEC En Banc. Hence, Estrella
filed a Petition for Certiorari before the Supreme Court.

ISSUE: Whether a COMELEC Commissioner who inhibited himself in Division deliberations

may participate in its En Banc deliberation

HELD: The Status Quo Ante Order dated November 5, 2003 issued by the COMELEC En Banc
is nullified. Commissioner Lantions voluntary piecemeal inhibition cannot be countenanced.
Nowhere in the COMELEC Rules does it allow a Commissioner to voluntarily inhibit with
reservation. To allow him to participate in the En Banc proceedings when he previously inhibited
himself in the Division is, absent any satisfactory justification, not only judicially unethical but
legally improper and absurd.

Since Commissioner Lantion could not participate and vote in the issuance of the questioned
order, thus leaving three (3) members concurring therewith, the necessary votes of four (4) or
majority of the members of the COMELEC was not attained. The order thus failed to comply
with the number of votes necessary for the pronouncement of a decision or order.
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ESTRELLA vs COMELEC

GR No. 160465 May 27, 2004

FACTS: Rolando Salvador was proclaimed winner in a mayoralty race in May 14, 2001
elections. His opponent, Romeo Estrella, filed before Regional Trial Court (RTC) an election
protest which consequently annulled Salvadors proclamation and declared Estrella as the duly
elected mayor and eventually issued writ of execution. While Salvador filed a petition for
certiorari before the Commission on Elections (COMELEC), raffled to the Second Division
thereof, Estrella moved for inhibition of Commissioner Ralph Lantion, but a Status Quo Ante
Order was issued. However, Commissioner Lantion voluntarily inhibited himself and designated
another Commissioner to substitute him. The Second Division, with the new judge, affirmed with
modifications the RTC decision and declared Estrella as the duly elected mayor. Salvador filed
a Motion for Reconsideration which was elevated to the COMELEC En Banc, in which this time,
Commissioner Lantion participated by virtue of Status Quo Ante Order issued by the COMELEC
En Banc. He said that as agreed upon, while he may not participate in the Division
deliberations, he will vote when the case is elevated to COMELEC En Banc. Hence, Estrella
filed a Petition for Certiorari before the Supreme Court.

ISSUE: Whether or not the COMELEC shall decide a case or matter by a majority vote of all its
members

RULING: Yes. The provision of the Constitution is clear that decisions reached by the
COMELEC En Banc should be the majority vote of ALL its members and not only those who
participated and took part in the deliberations. Under the rules of statutory construction, it is to
be assumed that the words in which constitutional provisions are couched express the objective
sought to be attained. Since the above-quoted constitutional provision states all of its
members, without any qualification, it should be interpreted as such. In the case at bar,
following the clear provision of the Constitution, counting out Commissioner Lantions vote from
the questioned COMELEC en banc resolution would leave just three votes out of all seven
members of the COMELEC.

Had the framers intended that it should be the majority of the members who participated or
deliberated, it would have clearly phrased it that way as it did with respect to the Supreme Court
in Section 4(2), Article VIII of the Constitution. For this reason, the Court hereby abandons the
doctrine laid down in Cua and holds that COMELEC En Banc shall decide a case or matter
brought before it by a majority vote of all its members and NOT majority of the members who
deliberated and voted thereon.

ROMEO M. ESTRELLA v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, et al.

429 SCRA 789 (2004), EN BANC (Carpio Morales, J.)

Nowhere in the COMELEC Rules does it allow a Commissioner to voluntarily inhibit with
reservation.

FACTS: Rolando Salvador was proclaimed winner in a mayoralty race in May 14, 2001
elections. His opponent, Romeo Estrella, filed before Regional Trial Court (RTC) an election
protest which consequently annulled Salvadors proclamation and declared Estrella as the duly
elected mayor and eventually issued writ of execution. While Salvador filed a petition for
certiorari before the Commission on Elections (COMELEC), raffled to the Second Division
thereof, Estrella moved for inhibition of Commissioner Ralph Lantion, but a Status Quo Ante
Order was issued. However, Commissioner Lantion voluntarily inhibited himself and designated
another Commissioner to substitute him. The Second Division, with the new judge, affirmed with
modifications the RTC decision and declared Estrella as the duly elected mayor. Salvador filed
a Motion for Reconsideration which was elevated to the COMELEC En Banc, in which this time,
Commissioner Lantion participated by virtue of Status Quo Ante Order issued by the COMELEC
En Banc. He said that as agreed upon, while he may not participate in the Division
deliberations, he will vote when the case is elevated to COMELEC En Banc. Hence, Estrella
filed a Petition for Certiorari before the Supreme Court.

ISSUE: Whether a COMELEC Commissioner who inhibited himself in Division deliberations

may participate in its En Banc deliberation
HELD: The Status Quo Ante Order dated November 5, 2003 issued by the COMELEC En Banc
is nullified. Commissioner Lantions voluntary piecemeal inhibition cannot be countenanced.
Nowhere in the COMELEC Rules does it allow a Commissioner to voluntarily inhibit with
reservation. To allow him to participate in the En Banc proceedings when he previously inhibited
himself in the Division is, absent any satisfactory justification, not only judicially unethical but
legally improper and absurd.

FRIVALDO vs. COMELEC Case Digest

FRIVALDO vs. COMELEC
174 SCRA 245
G.R. No. 87193
June 23, 1989

Facts: Petitioner Juan G. Frivaldo was proclaimed governor-elect and assume office in due
time. The League of Municipalities filed with the COMELEC a petition for annulment of
Frivaldos election and proclamation on the ground that he was not a Filipino citizen, having
been naturalized in the United States. Frivaldo admitted the allegation but pleaded the special
and affirmative defenses that his naturalization was merely forced upon himself as a means of
survival against the unrelenting prosecution by the Martial Law Dictators agent abroad.

Issue: Whether or not Frivaldo was a citizen of the Philippines at the time of his election.

Held: No. Section 117 of the Omnibus Election Code provides that a qualified voter must be,
among other qualifications, a citizen of the Philippines, this being an indispensable requirement
for suffrage under Article V, Section 1, of the Constitution.

Even if he did lose his naturalized American citizenship, such forfeiture did not and could not
have the effect of automatically restoring his citizenship in the Philippines that he had earlier
renounced.

Qualifications for public office are continuing requirements and must be possessed not only at
the time of appointment or election or assumption of office but during the officers entire tenure.

Frivaldo declared not a citizen of the Philippines and therefore disqualified from serving as a
Governor of the Province of Sorsogon.

Aquino v COMELEC (1995)

Aquino vs. Comelec
Agapito A. Aquino, petitioner vs. Commission on Election, Move Makati, Mateo Bedon, and
Juanito Icaro, respondents
Sept, 18, 1995
Special Civil Action in the Supreme Court. Certiorari.

Relevant Provisions:
Section 6, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution
No person shall be a Member of the House of Representatives unless he is a natural-
born citizen of the Philippines and, on the day of the election, is at least twenty-five years of
age, able to read and write, and, except the party-list representatives, a registered voter in the
district in which he shall be elected, and a resident thereof for a period of not less than one year
immediately preceding the day of the election.

Facts:
On 20 March 1995, Agapito A. Aquino, the petitioner, filed his Certificate of Candidacy for the
position of Representative for the new (remember: newly created) Second Legislative District of
Makati City. In his certificate of candidacy, Aquino stated that he was a resident of the
aforementioned district (284 Amapola Cor. Adalla Sts., Palm Village, Makati) for 10 months.
Move Makati, a registered political party, and Mateo Bedon, Chairman of LAKAS-NUCD-UMDP
of Barangay Cembo, Makati City, filed a petition to disqualify Aquino on the ground that the
latter lacked the residence qualification as a candidate for congressman which under Section 6,
Article VI of the 1987 Constitution, should be for a period not less than one year preceding the
(May 8, 1995) day of the election.
Faced with a petition for disqualification, Aquino amended the entry on his residency in his
certificate of candidacy to 1 year and 13 days. The Commission on Elections passed a
resolution that dismissed the petition on May 6 and allowed Aquino to run in the election of 8
May. Aquino, with 38,547 votes, won against Augusto Syjuco with 35,910 votes.
Move Makati filed a motion of reconsideration with the Comelec, to which, on May 15, the latter
acted with an order suspending the proclamation of Aquino until the Commission resolved the
issue. On 2 June, the Commission on Elections found Aquino ineligible and disqualified for the
elective office for lack of constitutional qualification of residence.
Aquino then filed a Petition of Certiorari assailing the May 15 and June 2 orders.

Issue:
1. Whether residency in the certificate of candidacy actually connotes domicile to warrant the
disqualification of Aquino from the position in the electoral district.
2. WON it is proven that Aquino has established domicile of choice and not just residence (not
in the sense of the COC)in the district he was running in.

Held:
1. Yes, The term residence has always been understood as synonymous with domicile not
only under the previous constitutions but also under the 1987 Constitution. The Court cited the
deliberations of the Constitutional Commission wherein this principle was applied.
Mr. Nolledo:
I remember that in the 1971 Constitutional Convention, there was an attempt to require
residence in the place not less than one year immediately preceding the day of elections.

What is the Committees concept of residence for the legislature? Is it actual residence or is it
the concept of domicile or constructive residence?
Mr. Davide:
This is in the district, for a period of not less than one year preceding the day of election. This
was in effect lifted from the 1973 constituition, the interpretation given to it was domicile.
Mrs. Braid:
On section 7, page2, Noledo has raised the same point that resident has been interpreted at
times as a matter of intention rather than actual residence.

Mr. De los Reyes

So we have to stick to the original concept that it should be by domicile and not physical and
actual residence.
Therefore, the framers intended the word residence to have the same meaning of domicile.
The place where a party actually or constructively has his permanent home, where he, no
matter where he may be found at any given time, eventually intends to return and remain, i.e.,
his domicile, is that to which the Constitution refers when it speaks of residence for the
purposes of election law.
The purpose is to exclude strangers or newcomers unfamiliar with the conditions and needs of
the community from taking advantage of favorable circumstances existing in that community for
electoral gain.
While there is nothing wrong with the purpose of establishing residence in a given area for
meeting election law requirements, this defeats the essence of representation, which is to place
through assent of voters those most cognizantand sensitive to the needs of a particular district,
if a candidate falls short of the period of residency mandated by law for him to qualify.
Which brings us to the second issue.

2. No, Aquino has not established domicile of choice in the district he was running in.
The SC agreed with the Comelecs contention that Aquino should prove that he established a
domicile of choice and not just residence.
The Constitution requires a person running for a post in the HR one year of residency prior to
the elections in the district in which he seeks election to .
Aquinos certificate of candidacy in a previous (May 11, 1992) election indicates that he was a
resident and a registered voter of San Jose, Concepcion, Tarlac for more than 52 years prior to
that election. His birth certificate indicated that Conception as his birthplace and his COC also
showed him to be a registered voter of the same district. Thus his domicile of origin (obviously,
choice as well) up to the filing of his COC was in Conception, Tarlac.
Aquinos connection to the new Second District of Makati City is an alleged lease agreement of
a condominium unit in the area. The intention not to establish a permanent home in Makati City
is evident in his leasing a condominium unit instead of buying one. The short length of time he
claims to be a resident of Makati (and the fact of his stated domicile in Tarlac and his claims of
other residences in Metro Manila) indicate that his sole purpose in transferring his physical
residence is not to acquire a new, residence or domicile but only to qualify as a candidate for
Representative of the Second District of Makati City.
Aquinos assertion that he has transferred his domicile from Tarlac to Makati is a bare assertion
which is hardly supported by the facts in the case at bench. To successfully effect a change of
domicile, petitioner must prove an actual removal or an actual change of domicile, a bona fide
intention of abandoning the former place of residence and establishing a new one and definite
acts which correspond with the purpose.
Aquino was thus rightfully disqualified by the Commission on Elections due to his lack of one
year residence in the district.
Decision
Instant petition dismissed. Order restraining respondent Comelec from proclaiming the
candidate garnering the next highest number of votes in the congressional elections of Second
district of Makati City made permanent.
Dicta:
I. Aquinos petition of certiorari contents were:
A. The Comelecs lack of jurisdiction to determine the disqualification issue involving
congressional candidates after the May 8, 1995 elections, such determination reserved with the
house of representatives electional tribunal
B. Even if the Comelec has jurisdiction, the jurisdiction ceased in the instant case after the
elections and the remedy to the adverse parties lies in another forum which is the HR Electoral
Tribunal consistent with Section 17, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution.
C. The COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion when it proceeded to promulagate its
questioned decision despite its own recognition that a threshold issue of jurisdiction has to be
judiciously reviewed again, assuming arguendo that the Comelec has jurisdiction
D. The Comelecs finding of non-compliance with the residency requirement of one year against
the petitioner is contrary to evidence and to applicable laws and jurisprudence.
E. The Comelec erred in failing to appreciate the legal impossibility of enforcing the one year
residency requirement of Congressional candidates in newly created political districts which
were only existing for less than a year at the time of the election and barely four months in the
case of petitioners district in Makati.
F. The Comelec committed serious error amounting to lack of jurisdiction when it ordered the
board of canvassers to determine and proclaim the winner out of the remaining qualified
candidates after the erroneous disqualification of the petitioner in disregard of the doctrine that a
second place candidate or a person who was repudiated by the electorate is a loser and cannot
be proclaimed as substitute winner.
II. Modern day carpetbaggers cant be allowed to take advantage of the creation of new political
districts by suddenly transplanting themselves in such new districts, prejudicing their genuine
residents in the process of taking advantage of existing conditions in these areas.
III. according to COMELEC: The lease agreement was executed mainly to support the one year
residence requirement as a qualification for a candidate of the HR, by establishing a
commencement date of his residence. If a oerfectly valid lease agreement cannot, by itself
establish a domicile of choice, this particular lease agreement cannot be better

AKBAYAN-YOUTH v. COMELEC
Facts:

Petitioners in this case represent the youth sector and they seek to seek to direct COMELEC to
conduct a special registration before the May 14, 2001 General Elections, of new voters ages
18 to 21. According to them, around four million youth failed to register on or before the
December 27, 2000 deadline set by the respondent COMELEC. However, the COMELEC
issued Resolution No. 3584 disapproving the request for additional registration of voters on the
ground that Section 8 of R.A. 8189 explicitly provides that no registration shall be conducted
during the period starting one hundred twenty (120) days before a regular election and that the
Commission has no more time left to accomplish all pre-election activities.

Aggrieved by the denial, petitioners filed before the SC the instant which seeks to set aside and
nullify respondent COMELECs Resolution and/or to declare Section 8 of R. A. 8189
unconstitutional insofar as said provision effectively causes the disenfranchisement of
petitioners and others similarly situated. Likewise, petitioners pray for the issuance of a writ of
mandamus directing respondent COMELEC to conduct a special registration of new voters and
to admit for registration petitioners and other similarly situated young Filipinos to qualify them to
vote in the May 14, 2001 General Elections.

Issues:

1. Whether or not respondent COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in issuing

COMELEC Resolution
2. Whether or not the SC can compel respondent COMELEC to conduct a special
registration of new voters during the period between the COMELECs imposed
December 27, 2000 deadline and the May 14, 2001 general elections.

Held:

1. No

The right of suffrage invoked by petitioners is not at all absolute. The exercise of the right of
suffrage, as in the enjoyment of all other rights is subject to existing substantive and
procedural requirements embodied in our Constitution, statute books and other repositories
of law. As to the procedural limitation, the right of a citizen to vote is necessarily conditioned
 upon certain procedural requirements he must undergo: among others, the process of
registration. Specifically, a citizen in order to be qualified to exercise his right to vote, in
addition to the minimum requirements set by the fundamental charter, is obliged by law to
register, at present, under the provisions of Republic Act No. 8189, otherwise known as the
Voters Registration Act of 1996. Section 8, of the R.A. 8189, explicitly provides that No
registration shall, however, be conducted during the period starting one hundred twenty
(120) days before a regular election and ninety (90) days before a special election. The
100-day prohibitive period serves a vital role in protecting the integrity of the registration
process. Without the prohibitive periods, the COMELEC would be deprived of any time to
evaluate the evidence on the application. If we compromise on these safety nets, we may
very well end up with a voters list full of flying voters, overflowing with unqualified
registrants, populated with shadows and ghosts

Likewise, petitioners invoke the so called standby powers or residual powers of the
COMELEC, as provided under the relevant provisions of Sec. 28 of RA 8436
Designation of Other Dates for Certain Pre-election Acts. The act of registration is
concededly, by its very nature, a pre-election act. Under Section 3(a) of R.A. 8189, (a)
Registration refers to the act of accomplishing and filing of a sworn application for
registration by a qualified voter before the election officer of the city or municipality
wherein he resides and including the same in the book of registered voters upon
approval by the Election Registration Board. It bears emphasis that the provisions of
Section 29 of R.A. 8436 invoked by herein petitioners and Section 8 of R.A. 8189
volunteered by respondent COMELEC, far from contradicting each other. SC hold that Section
8 of R.A. 8189 applies in the present case, for the purpose of upholding the assailed
COMELEC Resolution and denying the instant petitions, considering that the aforesaid
law explicitly provides that no registration shall be conducted during the period starting
one hundred twenty (120) days before a regular election. The provisions of Section 28, R.A.
8436 would come into play in cases where the pre-election acts are susceptible of
performance within the available period prior to election day.The stand-by power of the
respondent COMELEC under Section 28 of R.A. 8436, presupposes the possibility of its
being exercised or availed of, and not otherwise.

Moreover, the petitioners in the instant case are not without fault or blame. They admit
in their petition that they failed to register, for whatever reason, within the period of
registration and came to this Court and invoked its protective mantle not realizing, so to
speak, the speck in their eyes. Impuris minibus nemo accedat curiam. Let no one come
to court with unclean hands. Well-entrenched is the rule in our jurisdiction that the law
aids the vigilant and not those who slumber on their rights. Vigilantis sed non
dormientibus jura in re subveniunt.

2. NO

SC believes that petitioners failed to establish, to the satisfaction of this Court, that they
are entitled to the issuance of this extraordinary writ so as to effectively compel
respondent COMELEC to conduct a special registration of voters.

MACALINTAL VS COMELEC
FACTS:

This is a petition for certiorari and prohibition filed by Romulo B. Macalintal, a member
of the Philippine Bar, seeking a declaration that certain provisions of Republic Act No.
9189 (The Overseas Absentee Voting Act of 2003)1 suffer from constitutional infirmity.
Claiming that he has actual and material legal interest in the subject matter of this case
in seeing to it that public funds are properly and lawfully used and appropriated,
petitioner filed the instant petition as a taxpayer and as a lawyer.

ISSUES:

A. Does Section 5(d) of Rep. Act No. 9189 allowing the registration of voters who
are immigrants or permanent residents in other countries by their mere act of
executing an affidavit expressing their intention to return to the Philippines,
violate the residency requirement in Section 1 of Article V of the Constitution?
 B. Does Section 18.5 of the same law empowering the COMELEC to proclaim
the winning candidates for national offices and party list representatives including
the President and the Vice-President violate the constitutional mandate under
Section 4, Article VII of the Constitution that the winning candidates for President
and the Vice-President shall be proclaimed as winners by Congress?

C. May Congress, through the Joint Congressional Oversight Committee created

in Section 25 of Rep. Act No. 9189, exercise the power to review, revise, amend,
and approve the Implementing Rules and Regulations that the Commission on
Elections shall promulgate without violating the independence of the COMELEC
under Section 1, Article IX-A of the Constitution?

HELD:

In resolving the issues , the application of the rules in Statutory Construction

must be applied

1. All laws are presumed to be constitutional

2. The constitution must be construed as a whole
3. In case of doubt in the interpretation of the provision of the constitution, such
meaning must be deduced from the discussions of the members of the
constitutional commission.

A. Does Section 5(d) of Rep. Act No. 9189 violate Section 1, Article V of the 1987
Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines?

Section 4 of R.A. No. 9189 provides for the coverage of the absentee voting
process, to wit:

SEC. 4. Coverage. All citizens of the Philippines abroad, who are not otherwise
disqualified by law, at least eighteen (18) years of age on the day of elections,
may vote for president, vice-president, senators and party-list representatives.

which does not require physical residency in the Philippines; and Section 5 of the
assailed law which enumerates those who are disqualified, to wit:

SEC. 5. Disqualifications. The following shall be disqualified from voting under

this Act:

a) Those who have lost their Filipino citizenship in accordance with Philippine
laws;

b) Those who have expressly renounced their Philippine citizenship and who
have pledged allegiance to a foreign country;

c) Those who have committed and are convicted in a final judgment by a court or
tribunal of an offense punishable by imprisonment of not less than one (1) year,
including those who have committed and been found guilty of Disloyalty as
defined under Article 137 of the Revised Penal Code, such disability not having
been removed by plenary pardon or amnesty: Provided, however, That any
person disqualified to vote under this subsection shall automatically acquire the
right to vote upon expiration of five (5) years after service of sentence; Provided,
further, That the Commission may take cognizance of final judgments issued by
foreign courts or tribunals only on the basis of reciprocity and subject to the
formalities and processes prescribed by the Rules of Court on execution of
judgments;

d) An immigrant or a permanent resident who is recognized as such in the host

country, unless he/she executes, upon registration, an affidavit prepared for the
purpose by the Commission declaring that he/she shall resume actual physical
permanent residence in the Philippines not later than three (3) years from
 approval of his/her registration under this Act. Such affidavit shall also state that
he/she has not applied for citizenship in another country. Failure to return shall
be cause for the removal of the name of the immigrant or permanent resident
from the National Registry of Absentee Voters and his/her permanent
disqualification to vote in absentia.

e) Any citizen of the Philippines abroad previously declared insane or

incompetent by competent authority in the Philippines or abroad, as verified by
the Philippine embassies, consulates or foreign service establishments
concerned, unless such competent authority subsequently certifies that such
person is no longer insane or incompetent.

As finally approved into law, Section 5(d) of R.A. No. 9189 specifically disqualifies an
immigrant or permanent resident who is "recognized as such in the host country"
because immigration or permanent residence in another country implies renunciation of
ones residence in his country of origin. However, same Section allows an immigrant
and permanent resident abroad to register as voter for as long as he/she executes an
affidavit to show that he/she has not abandoned his domicile in pursuance of the
constitutional intent expressed in Sections 1 and 2 of Article V that "all citizens of the
Philippines not otherwise disqualified by law" must be entitled to exercise the right of
suffrage and, that Congress must establish a system for absentee voting; for otherwise,
if actual, physical residence in the Philippines is required, there is no sense for the
framers of the Constitution to mandate Congress to establish a system for absentee
voting.

B. Is Section 18.5 of R.A. No. 9189 in relation to Section 4 of the same Act in
contravention of Section 4, Article VII of the Constitution?

Section 4 of R.A. No. 9189 provides that the overseas absentee voter may vote
for president, vice-president, senators and party-list representatives.

Section 18.5 of the same Act provides:

SEC. 18. On-Site Counting and Canvassing.

.........

18. 5 The canvass of votes shall not cause the delay of the proclamation of a
winning candidate if the outcome of the election will not be affected by the results
thereof. Notwithstanding the foregoing, the Commission is empowered to order
the proclamation of winning candidates despite the fact that the scheduled
election has not taken place in a particular country or countries, if the holding of
elections therein has been rendered impossible by events, factors and
circumstances peculiar to such country or countries, in which events, factors and
circumstances are beyond the control or influence of the Commission. (Emphasis
supplied)

SEC. 4 . . .

The returns of every election for President and Vice-President, duly certified by
the board of canvassers of each province or city, shall be transmitted to the
Congress, directed to the President of the Senate. Upon receipt of the certificates
of canvass, the President of the Senate shall, not later than thirty days after the
day of the election, open all the certificates in the presence of the Senate and the
House of Representatives in joint public session, and the Congress, upon
determination of the authenticity and due execution thereof in the manner
provided by law, canvass the votes.

The person having the highest number of votes shall be proclaimed elected, but
in case two or more shall have an equal and highest number of votes, one of
them shall forthwith be chosen by the vote of a majority of all the Members of
both Houses of the Congress, voting separately.

The Congress shall promulgate its rules for the canvassing of the certificates.
 ...

Such provison gives the Congress the duty to canvass the votes and proclaim
the winning candidates for president and vice-president.

It was held that this provision must be harmonized with paragraph 4, Section 4,
Article VII of the Constitution and should be taken to mean that COMELEC can only
proclaim the winning Senators and party-list representatives but not the President and
Vice-President.41

The phrase, proclamation of winning candidates, in Section 18.5 of R.A. No.

9189 is far too sweeping that it necessarily includes the proclamation of the winning
candidates for the presidency and the vice-presidency.

clashes with paragraph 4, Section 4, Article VII of the Constitution which provides
that the returns of every election for President and Vice-President shall be certified by
the board of canvassers to Congress.

Congress could not have allowed the COMELEC to usurp a power that
constitutionally belongs to it or, as aptly stated by petitioner, to encroach "on the power
of Congress to canvass the votes for president and vice-president and the power to
proclaim the winners for the said positions." The provisions of the Constitution as the
fundamental law of the land should be read as part of The Overseas Absentee Voting
Act of 2003 and hence, the canvassing of the votes and the proclamation of the winning
candidates for president and vice-president for the entire nation must remain in the
hands of Congress.

C. Are Sections 19 and 25 of R.A. No. 9189 in violation of Section 1, Article IX-A of the
Constitution?

Section 1. The Constitutional Commissions, which shall be independent, are the

Civil Service Commission, the Commission on Elections, and the Commission on
Audit.

SEC. 17. Voting by Mail.

17.1. For the May, 2004 elections, the Commission shall authorize voting by mail
in not more than three (3) countries, subject to the approval of the Congressional
Oversight Committee. Voting by mail may be allowed in countries that satisfy the
following conditions:

a) Where the mailing system is fairly well-developed and secure to prevent

occasion for fraud;

b) Where there exists a technically established identification system that would

preclude multiple or proxy voting; and

c) Where the system of reception and custody of mailed ballots in the embassies,
consulates and other foreign service establishments concerned are adequate
and well-secured.

Thereafter, voting by mail in any country shall be allowed only upon review and
approval of the Joint Congressional Oversight Committee . . . . . . . . . (Emphasis
supplied)

Such provision is unconstitutional as it violates Section 1, Article IX-A mandating the

independence of constitutional commissions.

The phrase, "subject to the approval of the Congressional Oversight Committee" in the
first sentence of Section 17.1 which empowers the Commission to authorize voting by
mail in not more than three countries for the May, 2004 elections; and the phrase, "only
upon review and approval of the Joint Congressional Oversight Committee" found in the
second paragraph of the same section are unconstitutional as they require review and
approval of voting by mail in any country after the 2004 elections. Congress may not
confer upon itself the authority to approve or disapprove the countries wherein voting by
mail shall be allowed, as determined by the COMELEC pursuant to the conditions
provided for in Section 17.1 of R.A. No. 9189.48 Otherwise, Congress would overstep the
bounds of its constitutional mandate and intrude into the independence of the
COMELEC.

WHEREFORE, the petition is partly GRANTED. The following portions of R.A.

No. 9189 are declared VOID for being UNCONSTITUTIONAL:

Lambino Vs. Comelec Case Digest

Lambino Vs. Comelec
G.R. No. 174153
Oct. 25 2006

Facts: Petitioners (Lambino group) commenced gathering signatures for an initiative petition to
change the 1987 constitution, they filed a petition with the COMELEC to hold a plebiscite that
will ratify their initiative petition under RA 6735. Lambino group alleged that the petition had the
support of 6M individuals fulfilling what was provided by art 17 of the constitution. Their petition
changes the 1987 constitution by modifying sections 1-7 of Art 6 and sections 1-4 of Art 7 and
by adding Art 18. the proposed changes will shift the present bicameral- presidential form of
government to unicameral- parliamentary. COMELEC denied the petition due to lack of enabling
law governing initiative petitions and invoked the Santiago Vs. Comelec ruling that RA 6735 is
inadequate to implement the initiative petitions.

Issue:

Whether or Not the Lambino Groups initiative petition complies with Section 2, Article XVII of
the Constitution on amendments to the Constitution through a peoples initiative.

Whether or Not this Court should revisit its ruling in Santiago declaring RA 6735 incomplete,
inadequate or wanting in essential terms and conditions to implement the initiative clause on
proposals to amend the Constitution.

Whether or Not the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in denying due course to
the Lambino Groups petition.

Held: According to the SC the Lambino group failed to comply with the basic requirements for
conducting a peoples initiative. The Court held that the COMELEC did not grave abuse of
discretion on dismissing the Lambino petition.

1. The Initiative Petition Does Not Comply with Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution on
Direct Proposal by the People

The petitioners failed to show the court that the initiative signer must be informed at the time of
the signing of the nature and effect, failure to do so is deceptive and misleading which renders
the initiative void.

2. The Initiative Violates Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution Disallowing Revision through
Initiatives

The framers of the constitution intended a clear distinction between amendment and revision,
it is intended that the third mode of stated in sec 2 art 17 of the constitution may propose only
amendments to the constitution. Merging of the legislative and the executive is a radical change,
therefore a constitutes a revision.

3. A Revisit of Santiago v. COMELEC is Not Necessary

Even assuming that RA 6735 is valid, it will not change the result because the present petition
violated Sec 2 Art 17 to be a valid initiative, must first comply with the constitution before
complying with RA 6735

Petition is dismissed.

LambinoVs. Comelec Case Digest G.R. No. 174153

LambinoVs. Comelec
G.R. No. 174153
Oct. 25 2006

Facts: Petitioners (Lambino group) commenced gathering signatures for an initiative

petition to change the 1987 constitution, they filed a petition with the COMELEC to hold
a plebiscite that will ratify their initiative petition under RA 6735. Lambino group alleged
that the petition had the support of 6M individuals fulfilling what was provided by art 17
of the constitution. Their petition changes the 1987 constitution by modifying sections 1-
7 of Art 6 and sections 1-4 of Art 7 and by adding Art 18. the proposed changes will shift
the present bicameral- presidential form of government to unicameral- parliamentary.
COMELEC denied the petition due to lack of enabling law governing initiative petitions
and invoked the Santiago Vs. Comelec ruling that RA 6735 is inadequate to implement
the initiative petitions.

Issue:

Whether or Not the Lambino Groups initiative petition complies with Section 2, Article
XVII of the Constitution on amendments to the Constitution through a peoples initiative.

Whether or Not this Court should revisit its ruling in Santiago declaring RA 6735
incomplete, inadequate or wanting in essential terms and conditions to implement the
initiative clause on proposals to amend the Constitution.

Whether or Not the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in denying due
course to the Lambino Groups petition.

Held: According to the SC the Lambino group failed to comply with the basic
requirements for conducting a peoples initiative. The Court held that the COMELEC did
not grave abuse of discretion on dismissing the Lambino petition.

1. The Initiative Petition Does Not Comply with Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution
on Direct Proposal by the People

The petitioners failed to show the court that the initiative signer must be informed at the
time of the signing of the nature and effect, failure to do so is deceptive and
misleading which renders the initiative void.

2. The Initiative Violates Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution Disallowing Revision
through Initiatives

The framers of the constitution intended a clear distinction between amendment and
revision, it is intended that the third mode of stated in sec 2 art 17 of the constitution
may propose only amendments to the constitution. Merging of the legislative and the
executive is a radical change, therefore a constitutes a revision.

3. A Revisit of Santiago v. COMELEC is Not Necessary

Even assuming that RA 6735 is valid, it will not change the result because the present
petition violated Sec 2 Art 17 to be a valid initiative, must first comply with the
constitution before complying with RA 6735

Petition is dismissed.

FACTS
On 15 February 2006, the group of Raul Lambino and Erico Aumentado (Lambino Group)
commenced gathering signatures for an initiative petition to change the 1987 Constitution. On
25 August 2006, the Lambino Group filed a petition with the Commission on Elections
(COMELEC) to hold a plebiscite that will ratify their initiative petition under Section 5(b) and (c)
and Section 7 of Republic Act No. 6735 or the Initiative and Referendum Act. The proposed
changes under the petition will shift the present Bicameral-Presidential system to a Unicameral-
Parliamentary form of government.
The Lambino Group claims that: (a) their petition had the support of 6,327,952 individuals
constituting at least 12% of all registered voters, with each legislative district represented by at
least 3% of its registered voters; and (b) COMELEC election registrars had verified the
signatures of the 6.3 million individuals.

The COMELEC, however, denied due course to the petition for lack of an enabling law
governing initiative petitions to amend the Constitution, pursuant to the Supreme Courts
ruling in Santiago vs. Commission on Elections. The Lambino Group elevated the matter to the
Supreme Court, which also threw out the petition.

1. The initiative petition does not comply with Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution
on direct proposal by the people

Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution is the governing provision that allows a peoples
initiative to propose amendments to the Constitution. While this provision does not expressly
state that the petition must set forth the full text of the proposed amendments, the deliberations
of the framers of our Constitution clearly show that: (a) the framers intended to adopt the
relevant American jurisprudence on peoples initiative; and (b) in particular, the people must first
see the full text of the proposed amendments before they sign, and that the people must sign on
a petition containing such full text.

The essence of amendments directly proposed by the people through initiative upon a petition
is that the entire proposal on its face is a petition by the people. This means two essential
elements must be present.

First, the people must author and thus sign the entire proposal. No agent or representative can
sign on their behalf.

Second, as an initiative upon a petition, the proposal must be embodied in a petition.

These essential elements are present only if the full text of the proposed amendments is first
shown to the people who express their assent by signing such complete proposal in a petition.
The full text of the proposed amendments may be either written on the face of the petition, or
attached to it. If so attached, the petition must state the fact of such attachment. This is an
assurance that every one of the several millions of signatories to the petition had seen the full
text of the proposed amendments before not after signing.

Moreover, an initiative signer must be informed at the time of signing of the nature and effect of
that which is proposed and failure to do so is deceptive and misleading which renders the
initiative void.

In the case of the Lambino Groups petition, theres not a single word, phrase, or sentence of
text of the proposed changes in the signature sheet. Neither does the signature sheet state that
the text of the proposed changes is attached to it. The signature sheet merely asks a question
whether the people approve a shift from the Bicameral-Presidential to the Unicameral-
Parliamentary system of government. The signature sheet does not show to the people the draft
of the proposed changes before they are asked to sign the signature sheet. This omission is
fatal.

An initiative that gathers signatures from the people without first showing to the people the full
text of the proposed amendments is most likely a deception, and can operate as a gigantic fraud
on the people. Thats why the Constitution requires that an initiative must be directly proposed
by the people x x x in a petition meaning that the people must sign on a petition that contains
the full text of the proposed amendments. On so vital an issue as amending the nations
fundamental law, the writing of the text of the proposed amendments cannot be hidden from the
people under a general or special power of attorney to unnamed, faceless, and unelected
individuals.

2. The initiative violates Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution disallowing revision
through initiatives

Article XVII of the Constitution speaks of three modes of amending the Constitution. The first
mode is through Congress upon three-fourths vote of all its Members. The second mode is
through a constitutional convention. The third mode is through a peoples initiative.

Section 1 of Article XVII, referring to the first and second modes, applies to any amendment to,
or revision of, this Constitution. In contrast, Section 2 of Article XVII, referring to the third mode,
applies only to amendments to this Constitution. This distinction was intentional as shown by
the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission. A peoples initiative to change the
Constitution applies only to an amendment of the Constitution and not to its revision. In contrast,
Congress or a constitutional convention can propose both amendments and revisions to the
Constitution.

Does the Lambino Groups initiative constitute an amendment or revision of the Constitution?
Yes. By any legal test and under any jurisdiction, a shift from a Bicameral-Presidential to a
Unicameral-Parliamentary system, involving the abolition of the Office of the President and the
abolition of one chamber of Congress, is beyond doubt a revision, not a mere amendment.

Courts have long recognized the distinction between an amendment and a revision of a
constitution. Revision broadly implies a change that alters a basic principle in the constitution,
like altering the principle of separation of powers or the system of checks-and-balances. There
is also revision if the change alters the substantial entirety of the constitution, as when the
change affects substantial provisions of the constitution. On the other hand, amendment broadly
refers to a change that adds, reduces, or deletes without altering the basic principle involved.
Revision generally affects several provisions of the constitution, while amendment generally
affects only the specific provision being amended.

Where the proposed change applies only to a specific provision of the Constitution without
affecting any other section or article, the change may generally be considered an amendment
and not a revision. For example, a change reducing the voting age from 18 years to 15 years is
an amendment and not a revision. Similarly, a change reducing Filipino ownership of mass
media companies from 100% to 60% is an amendment and not a revision. Also, a change
requiring a college degree as an additional qualification for election to the Presidency is an
amendment and not a revision.

The changes in these examples do not entail any modification of sections or articles of the
Constitution other than the specific provision being amended. These changes do not also affect
the structure of government or the system of checks-and-balances among or within the three
branches.

However, there can be no fixed rule on whether a change is an amendment or a revision. A

change in a single word of one sentence of the Constitution may be a revision and not an
amendment. For example, the substitution of the word republican with monarchic or
theocratic in Section 1, Article II of the Constitution radically overhauls the entire structure of
government and the fundamental ideological basis of the Constitution. Thus, each specific
change will have to be examined case-by-case, depending on how it affects other provisions, as
well as how it affects the structure of government, the carefully crafted system of checks-and-
balances, and the underlying ideological basis of the existing Constitution.

Since a revision of a constitution affects basic principles, or several provisions of a constitution,

a deliberative body with recorded proceedings is best suited to undertake a revision. A revision
requires harmonizing not only several provisions, but also the altered principles with those that
remain unaltered. Thus, constitutions normally authorize deliberative bodies like constituent
assemblies or constitutional conventions to undertake revisions. On the other hand,
constitutions allow peoples initiatives, which do not have fixed and identifiable deliberative
bodies or recorded proceedings, to undertake only amendments and not revisions.

In California where the initiative clause allows amendments but not revisions to the constitution
just like in our Constitution, courts have developed a two-part test: the quantitative test and the
qualitative test. The quantitative test asks whether the proposed change is so extensive in its
provisions as to change directly the substantial entirety of the constitution by the deletion or
alteration of numerous existing provisions. The court examines only the number of provisions
affected and does not consider the degree of the change.

The qualitative test inquires into the qualitative effects of the proposed change in the
constitution. The main inquiry is whether the change will accomplish such far reaching
changes in the nature of our basic governmental plan as to amount to a revision. Whether
there is an alteration in the structure of government is a proper subject of inquiry. Thus, a
change in the nature of [the] basic governmental plan includes change in its fundamental
framework or the fundamental powers of its Branches. A change in the nature of the basic
governmental plan also includes changes that jeopardize the traditional form of government and
the system of check and balances.

Under both the quantitative and qualitative tests, the Lambino Group initiative is a revision and
not merely an amendment. Quantitatively, the Lambino Group proposed changes overhaul two
articles Article VI on the Legislature and Article VII on the Executive affecting a total of 105
provisions in the entire Constitution. Qualitatively, the proposed changes alter substantially the
basic plan of government, from presidential to parliamentary, and from a bicameral to a
unicameral legislature.
A change in the structure of government is a revision of the Constitution, as when the three
great co-equal branches of government in the present Constitution are reduced into two. This
alters the separation of powers in the Constitution. A shift from the present Bicameral-
Presidential system to a Unicameral-Parliamentary system is a revision of the Constitution.
Merging the legislative and executive branches is a radical change in the structure of
government. The abolition alone of the Office of the President as the locus of Executive Power
alters the separation of powers and thus constitutes a revision of the Constitution. Likewise, the
abolition alone of one chamber of Congress alters the system of checks-and-balances within the
legislature and constitutes a revision of the Constitution.

The Lambino Group theorizes that the difference between amendment and
revision is only one of procedure, not of substance. The Lambino Group posits that
when a deliberative body drafts and proposes changes to the Constitution, substantive changes
are called revisions because members of the deliberative body work full-time on the
changes. The same substantive changes, when proposed through an initiative, are called
amendments because the changes are made by ordinary people who do not make an
occupation, profession, or vocation out of such endeavor. The SC, however, ruled that
the express intent of the framers and the plain language of the Constitution contradict the
Lambino Groups theory. Where the intent of the framers and the language of the
Constitution are clear and plainly stated, courts do not deviate from such categorical intent and
language.

3. A revisit of Santiago vs. COMELEC is not necessary

The petition failed to comply with the basic requirements of Section 2, Article XVII of the
Constitution on the conduct and scope of a peoples initiative to amend the Constitution. There
is, therefore, no need to revisit this Courts ruling in Santiago declaring RA 6735 incomplete,
inadequate or wanting in essential terms and conditions to cover the system of initiative to
amend the Constitution. An affirmation or reversal of Santiago will not change the outcome of
the present petition. It settled that courts will not pass upon the constitutionality of a statute if the
case can be resolved on some other grounds.

Even assuming that RA 6735 is valid, this will not change the result here because the present
petition violates Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution, which provision must first be
complied with even before complying with RA 6735. Worse, the petition violates the following
provisions of RA 6735:

a. Section 5(b), requiring that the people must sign the petition as signatories. The 6.3 million
signatories did not sign the petition or the amended petition filed with the COMELEC. Only
Attys. Lambino, Donato and Agra signed the petition and amended petition.

b. Section 10(a), providing that no petition embracing more than one subject shall be submitted
to the electorate. The proposed Section 4(4) of the Transitory Provisions, mandating the interim
Parliament to propose further amendments or revisions to the Constitution, is a subject matter
totally unrelated to the shift in the form of government