CSIS WORKING PAPER SERIES WPI 060

Third World States

in the Midst of the Cold War
A Study of ASEAN’s Decision to Establish the
Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality
(ZOPFAN) Proposal, 1971-1972

Shafiah Fifi Muhibat

January 2004

International Relations Working Paper Series

http://www.csis.or.id/papers/wpi060

This paper is a revised version of the author’s Masters Dissertation at the

London School of Economics and Political Science (September 2003)

The CSIS Working Paper Series is a means by which members of the Centre for Strategic and
International Studies (CSIS) research community can quickly disseminate their research findings and
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© 2004 Centre for Strategic and International Studies, Jakarta
Third World States in the Midst of the Cold War: A Study of the Association of Southeast
Asian Nations (ASEAN)’s Decision to Establish the Zone of Peace, Freedom and
Neutrality (ZOPFAN) Proposal, 1971-1972
Shafiah Fifi Muhibat
CSIS Working Paper Series
WPI 060
January 2004

ABSTRACT

The purpose of this paper is to analyse the decision making in ASEAN in its policy to declare
Southeast Asia as a zone of peace, freedom and neutrality in 1971. Two significant and
interrelated factors served as the basis for the ASEAN member states in their decision to
establish the ZOPFAN proposal: first, the international and regional security condition during
that period; and second, the differing national interests of each ASEAN state members which
resulted in a compromise. The new power pattern in the region forced the ASEAN state
members to come up with a scenario that could best protect regional security. Each state
realised that its security might be in danger if the regional security situation did not improve.
At this point, the ASEAN states decided to collaborate to guard themselves against the worst
possible consequences. The fact that ASEAN decided to come up with such an optimistic
policy is particularly interesting to observe, because it gives an insight of how the Third
World states placed and saw themselves within the Cold War theatre.

Keywords: Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN); Zone of Peace, Freedom and
Neutrality (ZOPFAN), regional security, cold war

Shafiah Fifi Muhibat

shfifi@csis.or.id
Department of International Relations
CSIS Jakarta
Introduction

Nicholas Tarling avowed that “Historians writing about Southeast Asia struggled with
some success to make their writings take proper account for both the Asian and the European
elements in its history.”1 This divergent part of the world requires meticulous comprehension
when trying to make sense of how it has developed throughout history the way it did. Writing
a history of Southeast Asia presents challenges because it means writing about “societies that
often took quite different view of the past… (and) a region where the implications of that
historical tradition may have a political significance.”2 Just as challenging as writing the
history, an attempt to analyse foreign policy decision making of the Third World3 countries in
this region may encounter the same problem.4
The early 1970’s period was a significant turning point for the states in Southeast
Asia. It was during this period that the five original member states of the Association of
Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) decided to define its position in the ongoing Cold War
between two world superpowers by claiming to assert regional neutrality. The fact that
ASEAN decided to come up with such an optimistic policy is particularly interesting to
observe, because it can give an insight of how the Third World states placed and saw
themselves within the Cold War theatre.
In the early post-World War II years, most of Southeast Asia was engaged in its
struggle for national independence from the colonial rule of France, Great Britain, and the
Netherlands. Many of the states which had succeeded in gaining independence then soon
were confronted by the challenges of communism, nation building, national unity, and
economic modernisation. In the interim, the Cold War brought about great power rivalries in
the region, and turned Southeast Asia into a Cold War battleground with the regional states
being used as spears by the adversaries to contend each other. Having been oppressed by
external powers for centuries, the ASEAN states saw the situation as a hardship for their
chance to develop as respectable actors in the international arena. Hence, they tried to come
up with formulas to create a region free from external interference.

1
Nicholas Tarling, Southeast Asia: A Modern History (South Melbourne: Oxford University Press, 2001), p.
508
2
Ibid, p. 503
3
The ‘Third World’ terminology emerged as a consequence of the Cold War, created by the tension between the
competing poles of attraction (the US and the Soviet Union). For further explanation of the use of the
terminology during the Cold War, see for example John Lewis Gaddis, We Now Know: Rethinking Cold War
History (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997), Chapter Six.
4
See Christopher Hill, “Theories of Foreign Policy Making for the Developing Countries”, in Christopher
Clapham (Ed.), Foreign Policy Making in Developing States: A Comparative Approach, (Farnborough:
Saxon House, 1977)

1
 ‘Neutrality’ implies non-participation by a state in a war between other states, thus,
the neutral state abstains from involvement in a particular war and treats both belligerents
equally.5 In the context of Cold War, the United States (US) and the Soviet Union both
attempted to spread their spheres of influence to create blocs which support their position in
the war, at least ideologically. A neutral state thus means a state which treats both super
powers equally and non-alignment with neither of the two military blocs lead by one super
power.
The ASEAN foreign ministers adopted the neutrality concept in 1971 as the Kuala
Lumpur Declaration, and agreed to
“exert initially necessary efforts to secure the recognition of, and respect for, Southeast
Asia as a Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality (ZOPFAN), free from any form or
manner of interference by outside powers”.6
By this declaration, ASEAN states affirmed their chosen position in the ongoing Cold War,
and committed themselves to the neutralisation of Southeast Asian region. The Kuala
Lumpur declaration was since then acknowledged as the ZOPFAN proposal.
As optimistic as it was, the ZOPFAN proposal was the outcome of a decision making
process influenced by a variety of factors. This paper argues that two factors were typically
significant: first, the international and regional security condition during that period; and
second, the differing national interests of each ASEAN state members which resulted in a
“compromise”. Changes in the international system and the need to collaborate with other
states become influential factors in a state (or a group of state)’s decision making, mainly
because the international political system is nonetheless an important structure for those
responsible for designing foreign policy as “it both constrains them and shapes their
opportunities”.7 In this condition, states are required to conduct a foreign policy which can
represent their national interests and is compatible and responsive to the international trend
and changes. An organisation like ASEAN can serve as a means to respond to external
challenges and of coordinating regional position in international arena, and can also be a
means to secure welfare gains, promote common values or solve common problems,
especially problems arising from increased levels of regional interdependence.8

5
Heiner Hanggi, ASEAN and the ZOPFAN Concept (Singapore: ISEAS, 1991), p. 1-2
6
ASEAN Documents Series, 1967-1985 (Hereafter ADS): “Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality Declaration”,
Kuala Lumpur, 27 November 1971.
7
Christopher Hill, The Changing Politics of Foreign Policy (London: Palgrave, 2002), p. 174
8
Andrew Hurrell, “Explaining the Resurgence of Regionalism in World Politics”, Review of International
Studies, Vol. 21, No. 4, October 1995, p. 336

2
 This paper represents a case study in International History by aiming to do a historical
research based upon primary sources on Southeast Asia and ASEAN prior and shortly after
the establishment of ZOPFAN, while also to a certain degree endeavours to explain the
decision making process in the association through foreign policy analysis approach.
This paper is divided into three parts: the first part deals with the historiography of
the events leading to the establishment of the ZOPFAN proposal; the second part presents an
analysis of the decision making process in the Association which resulted in the proposal;
and the third part explains about the efforts to define and implement the proposal. This paper
then closes with a conclusion.

3
I. The Establishment of ZOPFAN

Even though the idea of neutralisation was not a new issue in international relations
including in Southeast Asia, it was Malaysia that first loudly voiced the urgency of
neutralisation in the region. Its movement towards neutralisation may be traced back to the
debate in the Malaysian House of Representatives on 23 January 1968, when Malaysia’s
Deputy Prime Minister Tun Ismail suggested that:
“(the time was) ripe for the countries in the region to declare collectively the neutralisation of
Southeast Asia. To be effective, this must be guaranteed by the big powers, including the
Communist China.”9
Although Singapore’s Prime Minister, Lee Kuan Yew, in fact proposed neutralisation as early
as April 1966 in his comment during a meeting of the Socialist International in Sweden10,
Malaysia was the one that came up with a thoroughly planned initiative of the issue, and it
took the country two years of internal debate before making the idea an official state policy in
1970.
In was in the Fourth ASEAN Ministerial Meeting (AMM) in Manila that Malaysia
first introduced its neutralisation policy. The meeting itself commenced on 12 March 1971
and lasted for two consecutive days. The discussion about the neutralisation proposal was a
significant part of the meeting, although a number of other subjects were discussed with the
same degree of importance. However, the neutralisation topic was specially highlighted by
international press and commentaries due to the optimistic nature of the policy in the period
of uncertainties during the Cold War. The meeting was concluded the next day, and a Joint
Communiqué was produced. The communiqué, however, did not mention anything about the
neutralisation issue.11
It was reported that Malaysia’s proposals evoked the other members a negative
reaction: the Thai Foreign Minister Thanat Khoman referred to the fate of Belgium (as bad
example); the Philippines considered that the neutralisation concept would take decades to
realise, and that “American umbrella was necessary for the security of the smallest Asian
paves”.12
Malaysia did not lose the spirit to continue pursuing its policy. The neutralisation
proposal was presented at the United Nations General Assembly in the fall of 1971 by the
9
Quoted in Noordin Sopiie, ”The ‘Neutralisation’ of South-East Asia”, in Hedley Bull (Ed.), Asia and the
Western Pacific (Melbourne: Australian Institute of International Affairs, 1975), p. 137
10
Ibid, p. 139
11
ADS: “Joint Communiqué of the Fourth ASEAN Ministerial Meeting”, Manila, 12-13 March 1971
12
Public Records Office, London, United Kingdom (Hereafter PRO): FCO 24/967/11b Letter from British
Embassy in Manila to Douglas, 22.3.71

4
Malaysian delegates, but its reception was not very encouraging.13 Malaysia was
understandably disappointed by this episode. However, Malaysia succeeded in making the
neutralisation issue a central topic in the region after being highlighted at the AMM. A
number of ASEAN States officials gave their comments on several occasions throughout the
year.
The decision to hold the Kuala Lumpur meeting came after a two-hour meeting in
New York in October, attended by ASEAN foreign ministers as called by the Malaysian
Prime Minister, Tun Abdul Razak, to review the recent international developments and to
find common answers. The meeting in Kuala Lumpur was designed not to be the regular
annual AMM, rather, it was a special Foreign Ministers Meeting which was held to specially
discuss the latest international developments.14 It appeared that Malaysia was hoping that the
meeting would produce some kind of public declaration about the desirability of regional
neutralisation, which would be subscribed by all ASEAN ministers.15
The Under Secretary of Foreign Affairs of the Philippines, Jose Ingles, stated on 1
November that the Philippines was willing to consider Malaysia’s proposal concerning a
‘Neutral Zone’ scheduled to be discussed in the following Kuala Lumpur meeting.16
However, in his article in the Philippines Quarterly that month he wrote that rather than using
a negative approach in the form of neutralising the region, Southeast Asian states could
accomplish more by giving a more positive contribution to disarmament and total
demilitarisation, or at least denuclearisation in the region.17
Just before leaving for Kuala Lumpur, on 22 November Indonesia’s Foreign Minister
Adam Malik spoke in front of the press after having a meeting with President Soeharto. He
explained that any discussion on neutralisation would inevitably involve military issues,
however that should not automatically lead to an establishment of a military pact.
Neutralisation was indeed different than a pact, even though Malik also confessed that the
implementation of neutrality would still be a problem since its interpretation still differed
among the ASEAN states. There would be a number of military officials joining the
Indonesian delegation. Malik refused to explain what interpretation Indonesia had of the

13
Dick Wilson, The Neutralisation of Southeast Asia (New York: Praeger, 1975), p. 22
14
Special meetings of the Foreign Ministers of ASEAN may be held when necessary as an ad hoc meeting.
Discussions in the past meetings have included the formulation of a common stand and approach to the
situation in the region, relations with big powers and the declaration and subsequent measures towards the
establishment of ZOPFAN.
15
PRO: FCO 24/967/25 Letter from J.K. Hickman to A.A. Duff, 12.10.71
16
Dokumentasi: ASEAN dalam Berita, Harapan, dan Kenyataan, 1967-1977 (Hereafter ABHK): Excerpts from
Antara/AFP, 4.11.71, p.117
17
ABHK: Excerpts from Antara/AFP, 14.11.71, p. 117

5
concept, but he explained that his delegation would come to the meeting with a set of
working paper as the guideline of its policy. Indonesia signalled its growing seriousness in
responding to the neutralisation issue. 18
Responding to Malik’s statement, the Philippines’s Foreign Minister, Carlos Romulo,
explained that he still had not had any idea about military issues being a topic to be discussed
in Kuala Lumpur. The press interpreted his reaction as the Philippines being sceptical about
the regional neutralisation plan.19
As for Thailand, internal developments did not cause a drastic shift in its policy
concerning neutralisation. The new military leaders who had just taken office confirmed the
new government’s appreciation of the proposal. On 24 November, the new state leader
Chalermchai Charuvastr appointed Thanat Khoman, then already a former foreign minister,
to head the Thai delegation to Kuala Lumpur. On the same day the Singaporean Foreign
Minister S. Rajaratnam commented that the neutralisation proposal was necessarily good,
however ASEAN states needed to rectify some problems before taking the step towards
implementing the proposal.20
On his arrival in Kuala Lumpur, Romulo immediately held a meeting with Tun Abdul
Razak to suggest a new alternative for neutralisation in Southeast Asia. The detail of the
alternative proposition was not publicised to the press, but he explained that neutralisation
should not strictly mean disarmament, rather, it could also be achieved through a form of
non-aggression pact and multilateral alliance.21
The Kuala Lumpur meeting was formally opened on 25 November, with Adam Malik,
Tun Abdul Razak, S. Rajaratnam, Carlos Romulo and Thanat Khoman representing each
state. The session was specially scheduled to discuss the neutralisation proposal and the
declaration draft formulated by Thanat Khoman based on Malaysia’s request, and also to
discuss a working paper for the neutralisation implementation prepared by Malaysia. The five
representatives held a three-hour meeting to come up with an efficient way to approach the
People’s Republic of China, the Soviet Union and the United States to guarantee the
implementation of regional neutralisation in Southeast Asia. The first day of the meeting
ended after six hours of discussion, however it failed to produce a common policy regarding
Malaysia’s neutralisation proposal, especially concerning the scope of the implementation in
the region and how to gain guarantee from the big powers.

18
ABHK: Excerpts from Antara/AFP, 22.11.71, p.118
19
Ibid.
20
ABHK: Excerpts from Antara/AFP, 24.11.71, p. 119
21
Ibid.

6
 The second day of the meeting, 26 November, started off with the same discussion
concerning ‘Neutral Zone’, later followed by a discussion about the rapprochement with the
People’s Republic of China (PRC). After three days of discussion, the Kuala Lumpur
Declaration, containing the ZOPFAN Proposal, was established.
In his press conference after the meeting Tun Abdul Razak commented that the Kuala
Lumpur Declaration which declared ASEAN’s effort to establish neutralisation in Southeast
Asia would be registered at the United Nations. The five Southeast Asian states outside
ASEAN, namely Burma, Laos, Cambodia, North Vietnam and South Vietnam, which had
been included in the proposed ‘Neutral Zone’, would be contacted through diplomatic
channel and be asked to give their full support. He added in the press statement that after all
ten states had declared their full support for the proposal, the big powers, namely the People’s
Republic of China, the United States, and the Soviet Union would be approached to
“guarantee” neutrality.22 It is interesting to note that the press reported that Razak used the
word “guarantee”, while at ASEAN plenary session he used the term “recognise and respect”
to express the same statement23.
President Ferdinand Marcos of the Philippines also expressed his appreciation for the
result of the Kuala Lumpur meeting, and commented that the upcoming ministerial meeting
had been agreed to be held in Manila in March 1972 for three consecutive days. After
receiving report on the meeting from his foreign minister, Marcos, in his presidential
statement, stated that he wished for the ASEAN states to be able to establish a joint action for
the sake of regional security and development.24
Officials from outside ASEAN states also gave their comments on the Kuala Lumpur
meeting. A spokesperson from the South Vietnamese government stated that they were
willing to consider the neutralisation proposal, however they had not yet received the official
text of the Kuala Lumpur Declaration. This statement was given as a clarification to the
growing media reportage about the South Vietnamese government already agreeing to the
declaration.25 Meanwhile in North Vietnam, the government’s official newspaper wrote on 1
December that the proposal could be accepted as long as it implied the withdrawal of US
troops from the region.26

22
ABHK: Excerpts from Antara/AFP, 27.11.71, p. 121
23
Russell Fifield, National and Regional Interests in ASEAN: Competition and Cooperation in International
Politics, ISEAS Occasional Paper No. 57 (Singapore: ISEAS, 1979), p. 14
24
ABHK: Excerpts from Antara/AFP, 29.11.71, p. 121
25
PRO: FCP 24/ 967/50 Letter from R. Brash to J.W.D. Margetson, 30.11.71
26
ABHK: Excerpts from Antara/AFP, 1.12.71

7
 The Secretary of the Foreign and Commonwealth office of the Great Britain, Anthony
Royle, stated during his visit to Kuala Lumpur on 30 November that his government was
happy with the result of the Kuala Lumpur meeting. He explained that for the time being the
Five Power Defence Arrangement (involving Malaysia, Singapore, Great Britain, Australia
and New Zealand) would still be maintained due to the neutralisation proposal was still in its
early phased.27 Meanwhile from Australia, Foreign Minister Nigel Bowen stated on 25
November in Canberra that Australia welcomed the good intentions of the ASEAN states to
discuss the issues of peace, security and stability in Southeast Asia based on regional
cooperation.28
New Zealand’s Defence Minister, J.F. Robertson, during his four-day visit to Kuala
Lumpur in early December commented that the neutralisation proposal was an effort towards
the good of the regional citizens, and for this New Zealand was willing to give active support
to realise the plan.29

27
PRO: FCO 24/967/38 Excerpts from BBC, 30.11.71
28
ABHK: Excerpts from Antara/AFP, 1.12.71, p. 123
29
Ibid.

8
II. Factors Affecting the Decision Making

In International Relations, there is a type of condition known as ‘interdependence’.

When changes occur in one actor, others also experience some disturbance because “their
internal system is in part plugged into that of the outsider”30. This situation makes the
international system a factor that defines the foreign policy decision making process of a
state. It cannot be easily left out of foreign policy, and obscures relations between
governments. This is particularly so in circumstances where states are intensively connected,
whether through some regional community, or conversely through an adversary
partnership.31 And in a world which has for quite some time become more and more global,
interdependence is an inescapable condition. States are required to conduct foreign policy
which does not only represent their national interests, but is also compatible and responsive
to the current international trend.
Governments also collaborate because it is their perception that they cannot achieve
their goals at an acceptable cost through unilateral action, and because they believe that they
can do so more effectively through cooperation with others.32 Especially for small and newly
independent states with less bargaining power, this is more likely to occur, principally based
on two objectives: firstly, to gain a greater bargaining power in international arena; and
secondly, to get themselves heard or at least make a mark in world politics. One consequence
of this policy is that in pursuing their national interests, states have to come across their
collaborators’ national interests, which more that often are different to theirs. In this case,
compromising own foreign policy line is inevitable.
In his article “Explaining the Resurgence of Regionalism in World Politics”33,
Andrew Hurrell attempted to open up a series of theoretical approaches to study
contemporary regionalism. He explained that cooperative arrangements in regional
cooperation could serve a wide variety of purposes:
“On the one hand, they can serve as a means of responding to external challenges and of
coordinating regional positions in international institutions or negotiating forums. On the
other, they can be developed to secure welfare gains, to promote common values or to solve

30
Hill, The Changing Politics of Foreign Policy, p. 175
31
Ibid., p. 176
32
The neoliberal institutionalism approach argues that institutions matter because of the benefits that they
provide, and because their impact on the calculations of the players and the ways in which states define their
interests. Hence, states cooperate with each other not only because the increasing levels of interdependence
demand them to do so, but also because the cooperation provides more benefits for them. See, for example:
Robert Keohane, After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy, (Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 1984).
33
Hurrell, “Explaining the Resurgence of Regionalism in World Politics”

9
 common problems, especially problems arising from increased levels of regional
interdependence. In the security field, for example, such cooperation can range from the
stabilisation of a regional balance of power, to the institutionalisation of confidence-building
measures, to the negotiation of a region-wide security regime.”34
This theoretical approach is predominantly useful in the attempt to understand
ASEAN’s decision making process in the establishment of the ZOPFAN proposal. Two
different but closely interrelated factors became the significant decisive inputs to the process.
The first is the security situation, international and more importantly regional, at the time;
and second, the inevitable compromise of differing national interests.

II. 1. International and Regional Security Situation

At the time when ASEAN was still struggling to establish a suitable framework for
regional cooperation and to gain recognition from the international world, it already had to
face major strategic changes in the region. The shift in the power and influence pattern in the
region meant the need for adjustment, which might be difficult in a situation where regional
cooperation had not yet moved at the same pace and level for all of its members. The
alterations and realignments among the great powers were not only vital because of the
changes in ideological and political perceptions in the super power relations. It was also
noteworthy that the realignments among the great powers also transformed the character of
Southeast Asia as a problem area for each of the great powers and thus impinged on the
character of the political and economic interests they attached to the region.35
In the US, the Nixon administration had decided to begin a negotiated withdrawal of
American forces from the ongoing battlefield in the Vietnam War. En route to Asia in July
1969, Richard Nixon stopped at Guam and explained about the new line of US policy to Asia
to the press, which then became known as the Guam Doctrine (or Nixon Doctrine). In the
doctrine, Richard Nixon projected to attempt to encourage a satisfactory resolution of the
issues in Asia through the use of indigenous Asian forces without the involvement of any US
ground troops.36 The US’s intention to limit its involvement in Asia was uttered by the
statement:
“... the United States, in its relations with all of its Asian friends, should be quite emphatic on
two points: one, that we would keep our treaty commitments ... And two, that as far as the

34
Ibid., p. 336
35
Yuwono Sudarsono, “Problems of Internal Stability in the ASEAN Countries”, in Bull (Ed.), Asia and the
Western Pacific, p. 79
36
The Nixon Doctrine, July 1969.

10
 problems of international security are concerned, as far as problems of military defense,
except for the threat of a major power involving nuclear weapons, that the United States was
going to encourage and had a right to expect that this problem would be increasingly handled
by, and the responsibility for it taken by, the Asian nations themselves.”37
The US government officials gave further confirmation concerning the attainment of the
Nixon Doctrine, which confirmed how seriously the US planned to significantly reduce its
involvement in Southeast Asia.38
The American policy shift occurred the same time as the PRC’s entry to the United
Nations, which was subsequently followed by Nixon’s visit to Beijing. The US-PRC
rapprochement occurred as the ties between Moscow and Beijing deteriorated to the point of
military exchanges along the Ussuri River and the Soviet’s cross-border penetrations into
Xinjiang. At his visit to China in February 1972, Nixon held a meeting with Premier Chou
En-Lai, which concluded with a US-China Communiqué, in which both leaders clearly stated
their intention to normalise relations.39 The visit and the Shanghai Communiqué symbolised
the end of more than two decades of hostility between the US and China.
These events resulted in anxiety for the ASEAN states. Carlos Romulo and Thanat
Khoman expressed annoyance that the US government failed to consult them in advance
about Nixon’s visit to China.40 All of the Southeast Asian states were concerned about the
US’s withdrawal from the region. However, there was substantial disagreement among the
states about the timing and terms of the withdrawal. Supporters of the American involvement
argued against a swift withdrawal while the other extreme urged a rapid exit. But on the
prospect of the American role in the region, most of the Southeast Asian states agreed to a
certain extent that an American presence was desirable in order to offset the influences of
China and other powers. As long as intervention and confrontation could be avoided, it was
important to gain the US’s “guarantee” of the region.
The increasing power and international role of the PRC came as a blow and seen as a
challenge in the eyes of Southeast Asian states, due to the uncertainties of how they could
deal with the new giant. The possibility that China might carry out threatening foreign policy
towards Southeast Asia resulted in apprehension for the ASEAN leaders. They feared that the
new power pattern might lead to Southeast Asia being forcefully shaped into different
spheres of influence. At the fifth AMM in Singapore in 1972, all of the ASEAN Foreign

37
Ibid.
38
PRO: FCO 15/1375/2 Letter from J.D. Boyd to E.C. Glover, 15.2.1971
39
The US-China Communiqué at the Conclusion of President Nixon’s Visit to China, 27 February 1972
40
PRO: FCO 24/967/34 Telegram from Johnston to FCO, 26.11.71

11
Ministers mentioned in their opening statements the significant developments in the
international scene, particularly Nixon’s China visit and the PRC’s entry to the United
Nations. They all agreed that these events marked important changes in international settings
which were highly influential to the Southeast Asian region.41 To respond to these changes,
ASEAN decided to formulate a common stance.
As Ghazalie Shafie argued, the idea to assert regional neutralisation was not premised
upon a euphoric view of the world or of the natural tendencies of states in international
relations, rather, it was based on the long view of the developing mood on the regional as
well as the international stage.42 It was to regulate these ongoing changes and their negative
impacts that ZOPFAN was instigated to ostensibly safeguard the security of Southeast Asia
in general, and the non-communist ASEAN states in particular. The Manila Chronicle in its
26 November edition highlighted that whatever the result of the Kuala Lumpur meeting was,
the meeting itself had shown that there had been a significant dialog to show the region’s
awareness of its security importance, which could only be achieved through regional
cooperation.43 The ASEAN states felt like they had to have a common voice, which was
deemed to be stronger than an individual state’s voice to get itself heard in the midst of the
world’s big powers’ rivalries. Coming up with a perfect scenario for this was seen inefficient,
because a quick and loud response was necessary, or at least considered necessary, to prevent
unexpected impacts of the international changes.
Even though the idea of neutralisation had been introduced openly for discussion
before, the decision to establish the Kuala Lumpur Declaration was accelerated, deliberately
or not, due to these international changes. The uncertainties caused by the new power pattern
forced the ASEAN leaders to come up with the second best scenario of compromise within
the least possible amount of time, and thus established the ZOPFAN proposal. Collaborative
undertaking between Southeast Asian states suggested a common ambition that foreign
powers should become more responsive to them, whose destiny was largely moulded by the
big powers. There was also the expectation that regional cooperation could generate greater
bargaining power with foreign powers that individual government lacked.

41
In their opening statements, all ministers mentioned clearly Nixon’s China visit as significant events affecting
the region (Malik phrased the event as “process of rapprochement in the relations between the USA and the
PRC”), while Ingles and Tun Ismail also clearly mentioned the PRC’s UN entry. See the ADS: “Opening
Statements of the Fifth ASEAN Ministerial Meeting”, Singapore, 13 April 1972
42
Ghazali Shafie, “The Neutralisation of Southeast Asia”, in Hamzah (Ed.), Southeast Asia and Regional Peace,
p. 43
43
ABHK: Excerpts from Antara/AFP, 26.11.71, p.121

12
 From this perspective, it was clearly demonstrated how the ASEAN states, in their
capacity as Third World states in the midst of the ongoing Cold War, would like to create
‘borders’ to their attachment to the war. They had the strength of mind to demand the
fulfilment of their interests, which they thought could be jeopardised by the creation of a
front line of the war in their region.

II.2. Compromising National Interests

For the attainment of neutralisation, a commitment of any single state was not
sufficient. The full commitment of all five ASEAN states was compulsory. This was not an
easy compromise to achieve, since each state had its own foreign policy line and agenda to
fulfil. The five ASEAN members, with differing history and political cultures, could barely
be expected to cooperate intensely, especially when regional cooperation had only been
recent phenomena.
Malaysia embarked on a policy to obtain international recognition of, and support for,
its neutralisation idea. However, other ASEAN states had other interests in mind. Indonesia
was pursuing a policy to have Southeast Asia assuming its own responsibility for the
management of regional affairs. Thus it sought to have the great powers interference out of
the region and was in search of all possibilities to become a regional power itself. Thailand
and the Philippines, bound by alliance commitments with the US, were at a different position
from neutralisation. As for Singapore, being tiny in size it was in great need of economic and
security guarantee, thus was also in favour of a permanent great power presence in the region,
particularly that of the US.
Domestic political aspect played an essential role in Malaysia’s promotion for
neutralisation. In 1969, Malaysia had contended with racial riots between ethnic Malay and
Chinese. By reaching out to the PRC, Malaysia sought to encourage domestic reconciliation,
and neutralisation was considered to be able to accommodate emerging Chinese interests in
Southeast Asia.44 External changes also influenced Malaysia’s decision making, especially
the fact that its relations with its patron, the Great Britain, had gradually been loosened.
In his opening statement at the Fourth AMM, Tun Ismail introduced Malaysia’s
neutralisation policy to his fellow ASEAN colleagues. He stated that
“The (neutralisation) policy is meant to be a proclamation that this region of ours is no longer
to be regarded as an area to be divided into spheres of influence of the big powers. It may be

44
Narine, Explaining ASEAN, p. 20

13
 regarded as a project to end or prevent small countries used as pawns in the conflict between
the big powers...to ensure stability and preserve peace in this area...”45
He also explained in the statement that the policy was to be guaranteed by the big powers,
namely the US, the Soviet Union, and the PRC. However, before seeking such undertaking,
Tun Ismail suggested that it was imperative to develop a strong sense of regional
consciousness and solidarity.46
For Indonesia, membership in a regional organisation was to a certain degree regarded
as a means of introducing its free and active foreign policy doctrine to a wider region.47 The
pursuit for a greater degree of regional autonomy by reducing the roles of external powers
has been the central spirit of Indonesia’s preoccupation in ASEAN. In April 1971, when Tun
Razak asked him to support the Malaysian neutralisation idea, Indonesia’s President Soeharto
emphasised the need for “national resilience”, which had been known as the Indonesian
doctrine of self-reliance.48 With the doctrine, Indonesia stressed the importance of being
reliant at the least possible degree on external backing in guaranteeing national and regional
security. A declaration of neutralisation guaranteed by the great powers would be
unfavourable for Indonesia, because it would provide a way in for great power intervention in
the region and would also make the regional situation inflexible for the Southeast Asian states
in pursuing their national interests.
Adam Malik had before the Kuala Lumpur Meeting expressed his government’s
policy to minimise dependence on external powers. In his opening statement at the Fourth
AMM, Malik emphasised this policy by affirming that “...the primary responsibility for
prosperity and stability in Southeast Asia rests on ourselves.”49 Later, at the 3rd Asian Press
Foundation meeting in Bali on 24 August 1971, Malik in his opening speech titled “Asia’s
Role in the World Politics of the 70’s” proposed three alternatives to the development of
Asia’s role, more specifically Southeast Asia, in the international arena.50 First, the Southeast
Asian states could become allies with one or a combination of the big powers, with which the
Southeast Asians could trust to assist them with security and welfare aids. The second
alternative was to gain the big powers’ support in declaring Southeast Asia as a neutral
region, free from external interference. The last alternative was to develop among the
45
ADS: “Opening Statement by H.E. Tun Ismail Bin Dato Abdul Rahman Deputy Prime Minister of Malaysia at
the Fourth ASEAN Ministerial Meeting”, Manila, 12 March 1971
46
Ibid.
47
Dewi Fortuna Anwar, Indonesia in ASEAN: Foreign Policy and Regionalism (Singapore: ISEAS, 1994)p. 174
48
Wilson, The Neutralization of Southeast Asia, p. 56
49
ADS: “Opening Statement by H.E. Mr. Adam Malik Foreign Minister of the Republic of Indonesia at the
Fourth ASEAN Ministerial Meeting”, Manila, 12 March 1971
50
ABHK: Excerpts from Antara/AFP, 13.3.71, p. 116

14
Southeast Asian states a stable condition, relying on their own social, political and economic
strengths. Malik explained that the first alternatives seemed to be the easiest but the least
productive, while the second was an alternative which had been previously brought up by
European and Asian statesmen but still had very vague interpretation. The third alternative
could be considered the most possibly effective to guarantee a long term stability and
harmony in the region. He also added that by developing an internal cohesion and stability
through the region’s own social, political and economic strengths, Southeast Asia could
develop a new balance in Asia and be free of external intervention.51
The following year, at the Fifth AMM, Malik proudly introduced Indonesia’s
National Resilience doctrine to other ASEAN states in his opening statement. He stated that
“(National Resilience) means to enhance the capabilities and abilities of each member country
and its people in all fields of national endeavour, in order to withstand and to overcome all
kinds of outside interference and adverse influences, harmful to its sound and harmonious
development...therefore, our regional response to the challenges of the Seventies should lie
within the concept of National Resilience...that should become the guiding principle for each of
us, in our present strategic approach, towards regional peace and stability.”52
After the ZOPFAN proposal had been established, Indonesia seemed to be unwilling
to shift away from this doctrine. It was obvious that Indonesia wished to spread its line of
policy to its neighbours, and being the largest and influential state in the region, it had the
opportunity to do so.
Thailand could not escape the fact that it was bound by alliance commitment with the
US, and it was in its best interest to continue such commitment. In his opening statement at
the Fourth AMM Thai Foreign Minister Thanat Khoman did not propose any concrete
suggestions on how to confront the new international challenges. He used diplomatic words
to comment on the future of regional security and stated that “our common interest will be
well protected if we continue to have a strong and united stand in dealing with other
parties.”53 He then made a remark during a press conference after the meeting about
Malaysia’s neutralisation concept, of which he considered positive, and could be effectively
achieved only with respectful interaction between the member states and also with external
powers.54 From this statement, Thailand seemed to be very cautious in considering the

51
Ibid.
52
ADS: “Opening Statement by H.E. Mr. Adam Malik Foreign Minister of the Republic of Indonesia at the Fifth
ASEAN Ministerial Meeting”, Singapore, 13 April 1972
53
ADS: “Opening Statement by H.E. Mr. Thanat Khoman Foreign Minister of the Kingdom of Thailand at the
Fourth ASEAN Ministerial Meeting”, Manila, 12 March 1971
54
ABHK: Excerpts from Antara/AFP, 13.3.71, p. 116

15
neutralisation plan, while at the same time doing its best not to jeopardise its good relations
with, and dependency on, the US.
On 7 August 1972, Thailand’s Vice Chairman of National Executive Committee,
Praphas Charisthira, commented that the ZOPFAN Proposal would not guarantee peace. He
viewed it impossible to establish neutralisation of the communists still conducted aggressive
acts and stressed that peace should be attained before neutralisation could be thought of.55
This highly pessimistic view of the regional neutralisation plan raised questions on
Thailand’s commitment on ZOPFAN. Some analysts questioned the background of the
comment, accusing that it might have been influenced by pressures from the big powers.56
As for the Philippines, it seemed that it had a difficult time to respond to the
neutralisation idea at the beginning, because it was imperative for the Philippines to first
clarify the concept as to whether it meant the elimination of foreign military bases in
Southeast Asia. Its close ties with the US, including in military, prevented the Philippines to
embrace the idea of being totally dependent of external powers. In his opening statement at
the Fourth AMM, Carlos Romulo deliberately avoided any mentioning of the issue. In the
statement, he made long and thoroughly review of ASEAN’s economic cooperation during
the past year, but not a single remark concerning the current security issue.57
Jose Ingles’s Philippines Quarterly article reflected this policy line. He wrote that
rather than using a “negative approach” in the form of neutralising the region, Southeast
Asian states could be better off with giving a more positive contribution to disarmament and
total demilitarisation, or at least denuclearisation in the region.58 This article reflected the
initial not-so-eager spirit of the Philippines to consider Malaysia’s suggestion. At the Fifth
AMM, Ingles who represented the Philippines presented an opening statement without
making a significant reference to the ZOPFAN proposal which was established just five
months earlier. He only brought up ZOPFAN when speaking of Nixon’s visit to Beijing, and
commenting the result of the visit as in harmony with the principles of ZOPFAN.59
Even though it was clear that the Philippines sought to avert both Southeast Asia’s
neutralisation and the withdrawal of America’s naval presence, its position was nonetheless
characterised by ambivalence. On the one hand, the Philippines greatly benefited from its

55
ABHK: Excerpts from Indonesia Raya, 8.8.72, p. 151
56
ABHK: Excerpts from Merdeka, 11.8.72, p. 151
57
ADS: “The Opening Statement by H.E. Mr. Carlos P. Romulo Foreign Minister of the Republic of the
Philippines at the Fourth ASEAN Ministerial Meeting”, Manila, 12 March 1971
58
ABHK: Excerpts from Antara/Reuter, 14.11.71, p. 117
59
ADS: “The Opening Statement by H.E. Dr. Jose D. Ingles Under Secretary of the Republic of the Philippines
at the Fifth ASEAN Ministerial Meeting”, Singapore, 13 April 1972

16
defence ties with Washington, while on the other hand it was also tempted to reduce its
security dependence on Washington for nationalistic reasons.60 The foremost problem for the
Philippines was the future of the American bases in its territory, and this was more than a
simple question of defence.61 This complex situation made it difficult for the Philippines to
express a definite support for the neutralisation plan.
Singapore was also in favour of a permanent big power existence in the region,
predominantly that of the US. Economy was the main issue in Singapore’s foreign policy,
due to the significance of its economic development. Its area size and population hindered
Singapore to achieve higher bargaining power in international relations, thus it relied on its
advancement in economy to mark its strength as a respectable state. Of all the countries of
Southeast Asia, Singapore was the most dependent on world markets and the “friendship” of
the big powers62, but it was determined to affirm its sovereignty. In this sense, economic
development came first in any of Singapore’s policies. In particular, Singapore saw ASEAN
as restrictively an economic association thus disliked the suggestion that ASEAN should be
given political or defence teeth.63
In his opening statement at the Fourth AMM, Rajaratnam spoke comprehensively
about the importance of dynamic national economies for an effective regionalism. He
emphasised that economic development was the best strategy to elevate Southeast Asia’s role
in world politics, which implied Southeast Asia being “something more than a convenient
arena to stage big power conflicts.” 64
With this background, the Kuala Lumpur meeting was characterised by fierce debate
between Malaysia on one side, and the Philippines on the other.65 The discussion heated up
when it touched the definition and use of the neutralisation concept. The delegation of the
Philippines was reported to be strongly opposing the declaration draft prepared by Thailand,
which stated the Southeast Asian region as a zone of peace, freedom and neutrality with the
support of the big powers. The Philippines had a problem with the use of the concept
‘neutrality’ because it viewed it as a vague and unclear concept, and asked for it to be

60
Jurgen Haacke, ASEAN's Diplomatic and Security Culture: Origins, Developments and Prospects (London:
RoutledgeCurzon, 2003), p. 57
61
PRO: FCO 24/1269/4 Letter from J.J. Taylor to A. Grant, 2.12.71
62
Nicholas Tarling, The Cambridge History of Southeast Asia. Volume: The Nineteenth and Twentieth
Centuries (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992) p. 620
63
PRO: FCO 24/967/4 Letter from R.C. Samuel to P.J. Sullivan, 2.2.71
64
ADS: “The Opening Statement by H.E. Mr. S. Rajaratnam Foreign Minister of the Republic of Singapore at
the Fourth ASEAN Ministerial Meeting”, Manila, 12 March 1971
65
Hanggi, ASEAN and the ZOPFAN Concept, p.17

17
eliminated from the declaration.66 Meanwhile, the Indonesian delegation was also reported to
be not so keen on the use of the concept, while Singapore held on to its wait-and-see policy.67
It was not Malaysia’s neutralisation proposal which had been agreed upon by the
foreign ministers in the meeting, but simply the idea that the neutralisation issue was an
important topic which needed to be specifically addressed. The “real” talk about
neutralisation as proposed by Malaysia was actually difficult to discuss. At the end of the
second day, a compromise was reached, and the ZOPFAN proposal came out as a modified
version of Malaysia’s neutralisation proposal. The important modification was that the three
major powers were no longer asked to be guarantors. There was no mentioning of external
powers’ guarantee in the Declaration.68
The meeting also compromised on the scope of the Neutral Zone to cover all ASEAN
states plus Burma, Laos, Cambodia, North Vietnam and South Vietnam. However, the issue
of big powers’ guarantee was decided to be put aside at the end of the meeting.69 It seemed
that the five ASEAN states preferred to concentrate on the internal regional security issues
first.
As an approach to enhance regional security and to engage the regional major powers,
ZOPFAN was very different from the original Malaysian proposal of regional neutralisation.
When ASEAN foreign ministers agreed on a collective response at the Kuala Lumpur
meeting, they started off from a draft prepared by Thanat Khoman. During the discussion,
Indonesia’s version of neutrality seemed to succeed in influencing the others’ position.
Indonesia objected to the original neutralisation proposal because Indonesia sought not legal
guarantees but political pledges to attain a zone of neutrality. Significantly, the revised draft,
which was later adopted as the Kuala Lumpur Declaration, followed Indonesia’s version. It is
important to note that Indonesia, whose officials previously made objecting remarks
concerning Malaysia’s idea, had a shift of policy and decided to take the lead in establishing
ASEAN. Indonesia started to have a shift in policy in early 1971 when Adam Malik and the
Deputy Commander in Chief of the Indonesian Armed Forces, General Panggabean, on
different occasions gave surprising comments about the possibility of defence arrangements
among ASEAN countries.70 This surprising shift appeared to be influenced by the
government’s consideration that Indonesia’s security was bound to be affected by the defence
66
ABHK: Excerpts from Antara/Reuters, 25.11.71, p. 121
67
Ibid.
68
ADS: “Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality Declaration”.
69
ABHK: Excerpts from Antara, 26.11.71, p. 121
70
PRO: FCO 24/967/2 Letter from R.M. Hunt to P.J. Sullivan, 26.1.71; FCO 24/967/3 Letter from R.M. Hunt to
P.J. Sullivan, 2.2.1971

18
capabilities and security situation of its neighbours in the region. The security situation at the
time was not very promising, for example there had been social problems in Malaysia with
the racial issue. This situation apparently convinced Indonesia that a joint action was needed
to improve its own security environment.
Haacke argued that although the Kuala Lumpur Declaration was a compromise, which
revolved around a shared commitment to the norms of sovereign equality and non-
interference, it best articulated Indonesia’s foreign policy position, in terms of its struggle for
security and recognition.71 This is an interesting point, because as had been explained,
Malaysia was the one that first voiced the neutralisation idea. Malaysia was also the one who
requested Khoman to write the draft. But at the end, Indonesia gained a larger voice in
influencing the declaration. As argued by Michael Leifer, Indonesia had scored a diplomatic
victory in Kuala Lumpur, because “it had been able to set to one side the concept of
neutralisation and had reinstated its own strategic perspective as the common platform of the
ASEAN states, though without making more than a declaratory impact”72. This more or less
reflected the bargaining positions within the Association at the time.
ZOPFAN, like other major documents and agreements signed by the ASEAN leaders,
was established as the outcome of a process of diplomatic interaction which centred on
consultation and consensus among the member states.73 It was thus forged to satisfy the
diverse national interests. To make it acceptable to all of the members and to satisfy the
divergent and conflicting interests, generality and ambiguity were the hallmark of the Kuala
Lumpur Declaration.74 Because of the different security perceptions and different preferred
means of overcoming perceived threats, the declaration had to be loosely worded to make it
documentarily acceptable for all of the five states, even though this risked the possibility that
the ZOPFAN proposal might not be proper to be realised or made effective. As argued by
Hanggi, the Kuala Lumpur Declaration was not an ASEAN declaration of neutrality but a
mere declaration of intent which did not impose legal obligations on its signatories.
Particularly, the declaration made no reference to foreign military bases in the region and
military alliances with foreign powers75, which implied that there were still a number of

71
Haacke, ASEAN's Diplomatic and Security Culture, p. 58
72
Michael Leifer, Indonesia’s Foreign Policy (London: Allen & Unwin, 1983), p. 150
73
This type of informal intramural interaction is also known as the ‘ASEAN Way’. For more details of the
‘ASEAN Way’ see Haacke, ASEAN's Diplomatic and Security Culture.
74
Bilveer Singh, ZOPFAN and the New Security Order in the Asia Pacific (Malaysia: Pelanduk Publications,
1992), p. 81
75
Hanggi, ASEAN and the ZOPFAN Concept, p. 19

19
unanswered question. Thus, the declaration was not more than the expression of the lowest
mutual denominator among ASEAN states.

20
III. Efforts to Define and Implement ZOPFAN

The year 1972 was marked by efforts to implement the result of the Kuala Lumpur
Meeting. On a press conference in Jakarta on 11 March 1972 during his visit to the
Indonesian capital, Tun Ismail commented on the current status of the progress of regional
neutralisation. He explained that every statement made by ASEAN head of states concerning
neutralisation had been own views, which implied that there had not been any organisational
policy concerning the implementation of the ZOPFAN proposal.76 After their meeting in
Jakarta, both Tun Ismail and Adam Malik agreed that major powers’ involvement in regional
neutralisation was vital.77
Post-Kuala Lumpur Declaration, ASEAN tried to clarify the meaning of ZOPFAN but
did not reach much success. To smooth the implementation process of the ZOPFAN
Proposal, a Committee of Senior Officials of ASEAN Countries (CSO) was established with
the tasks to: (1) formulate the regulations or working framework of the proposal; (2) take the
necessary steps to gain international recognition and respect to the proposal; and (3)
formulate a framework to strengthen the relations between the Southeast Asian states.78 With
these tasks at hand, the CSO held six consecutive meetings, starting in Kuala Lumpur on 6-8
July 1972, attended by 26 officials from the foreign ministers of all ASEAN members. The
sessions were all closed and confidential.
At the meeting, the Malaysians led off by suggesting that the paper which they had
prepared should be the basis of the meeting’s discussion. This idea was opposed by other
participants -Singapore being the strongest one to object- who claimed that the meeting’s
term of reference had been previously set to discuss the operative paragraphs of the Kuala
Lumpur Declaration and to concentrate on the ZOPFAN proposal, which was not the similar
thing as Malaysia’s neutralisation proposal.79 This triggered a heated debate between the
Malaysian and Singaporean participants, resulting in extended sessions with no efficient
results. Because of the semantic problems which occupied most of the first day of the
meeting, the committee set up a working group with the task to produce acceptable
definitions of the terms used to produce acceptable definitions of the terms used in the

76
ABHK: Excerpts from Suara Karya, 17.4. 72, p. 137
77
Ibid.
78
C.P.F. Luhulima et al., Laporan Penelitian: Dimensi Kerangka Kegiatan dalam Kerjasama ASEAN (Jakarta:
LIPI, 1985)
79
PRO: FCO/24/1270/29b, Telegram from the British High Commission in Kuala Lumpur to the British High
Commission in Wellington, 10.7.72

21
declaration, particularly the words “peace”, “freedom”, and “neutrality”. The working group
came up with a satisfactory result, but did not really resolve the semantic problems.
The Suara Karya daily in Jakarta reported on 14 July 1972 that although there had not
been a clear and uniform definition of the ‘neutralisation’ concept, the earlier CSO meeting in
Kuala Lumpur gave a lot of inputs for the Ministerial Meeting in Manila. The CSO meeting
resulted among others the understanding that neutralisation was a long term goal which
required a step-by-step implementation, and for this national resilience was the main pre-
requisite. Thus, what was more urgent to establish at the time being was not the
conceptualisation of neutralisation, but the efforts to move towards it as enabled by the
current regional condition. 80
The second ad hoc Foreign Ministers Meeting as, held as a continuation of the first
meeting in Kuala Lumpur, took place in Manila on 13-14 July. It was attended by Malik,
Rajaratnam, Tun Ismail, Romulo, and Thailand’s Vice Chairman of National Executive
Council Pote Sarasin, who requested that the sessions were closed to public, and no opening
speech or other official statements from the ministers were to be made.81
At the meeting, the ministers assessed the work of the CSO and came up with the
evaluation that:
“...the Committee had reached a common understanding of the interpretation of a “Zone of
Peace, Freedom and Neutrality” in the context of Southeast Asia. It reiterated the view that
neutralisation of Southeast Asia is a desirable objective and also noted with satisfaction that
the Committee at its next meeting will continue its study of neutralisation as a means of
establishing Southeast Asia as a Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality and that other means
will also be considered.”82
The statement was somewhat vague and failed to make any clear definition of the
ZOPFAN Proposal. Even though it had an optimistic tone of the prospective work of the
CSO, such optimism seemed to be deliberately forced to cover the genuine stagnation of the
neutralisation plan.
Upon returning from Manila, Adam Malik explained to the Indonesian press that
neutralisation proposal was impossible to be realised as long as there was still a war going on

80
ABHK: Excerpts from Suara Karya, 14.7.72, p. 146
81
At the end of the meeting a document titled The ASEAN Foreign Ministers Meeting to Discuss International
Developments Affecting the Region, Manila, 12-14 July 1972 was produced. It served as a kind of Joint
Communiqué but was not labelled as such.
82
ADS: “The ASEAN Foreign Ministers Meeting to Discuss International Developments Affecting the Region”,
Manila, 13-14 July 1972

22
in the region. He said that the proposal had not yet been finalised and was still in its early
phase.83
For the rest of 1972, no significant progress was achieved in the realisation of the
proposal. ASEAN states officials spoke out their comments and views about the proposal, but
no actual action was taken. In Manila, Romulo in his interview with the Bangkok Post re-
emphasised the importance of cooperation and unity of the Southeast Asian region especially
due to the latest changes occurring in world politics.84 Meanwhile in Kuala Lumpur, during a
parliamentary session on 4 December, Tun Razak explained that ASEAN could not put high
hopes on the big powers to guarantee the regional neutrality.85 Another CSO meeting was
held in Jakarta on 18-20 December specially to discuss the definition of the neutralisation
concept. Although the meeting was said to have resulted in a common understanding about
the concept, no definite definition was explained to public to demonstrate it. The CSO
explained that more discussions were still needed to reach a compromise.
Even though efforts had been taken to fully define the substance of the proposal, at
least four significant problems still persisted. The first problem was of terminology. While
the definition of ‘Peace’ had been commonly understood, the extent to which the concept of
‘Freedom’ and ‘Neutrality’ can be measured was still indeterminate. There were still
confusions of whether the two concepts meant the elimination of all foreign military presence
in the region, prohibition of all ASEAN member states to take part in any form of security
pact, refusing any form of military aid and assistance, a number of other undefined clauses.
This was obvious if we take a look at the varying statements the five Kuala Lumpur
participants used during many occasions. Terms like “neutrality” and “neutralisation” were
often mixed as if they were identical.
Secondly, there had not yet been any mechanism which was specifically designed to
implement the proposal. This mechanism issue seemed to have been abandoned by the
euphoria to merely establish the proposal. Consequently, the Kuala Lumpur Declaration was
announced without any clear elucidation of how to implement it, either through some forms
of dialogue, a special body within the ASEAN, some forms of international agreement, or
other measures.
The third problem was that there were still differing perceptions of the proposal,
especially in relation to each ASEAN state’s national interest and policy line. What is meant

83
ABHK: Excerpts from Nusantara, 20.7.72, p. 147
84
ABHK: Excerpts from Nusantara, 22.9.72, p. 152
85
ABHK: Excerpts from Berita Yudha, 6.12.72, p. 152

23
by ‘perception’ is how each state actually perceived regional neutralisation, whether they
really took the issue seriously or merely taking part due to its attachment to the association.
This condition was made worse by the fact that some of the ASEAN members were still
bound to certain security agreements with the world’s major powers. The last imminent
problem was created by the uncertainty of the major powers’ reaction and policy towards
ASEAN’s decision to establish the ZOPFAN proposal. These states had their own interests in
the Southeast Asian region, thus affecting their policy towards the regional movements.
These four problems hindered any efforts to realise ZOPFAN. Until the end of 1972,
ZOPFAN had not moved any step further than simply being a declaration to enunciate
ASEAN’s voice to the world. As depressing as it might seem, the ASEAN leaders seemed to
find the condition as satisfactory. Even though it was almost impossible to properly realise
the ZOPFAN proposal at the time, the fact that ASEAN had succeeded in establishing a
declaration which enabled them to express their important position in world politics was in
itself considered an achievement.

24
Conclusion: Third World States in World Politics

The purpose of this paper is to analyse the decision making in ASEAN in its policy to
declare Southeast Asia as a zone of peace, freedom and neutrality in 1971. Two significant
and interrelated factors served as the basis for the ASEAN member states in their decision to
establish the ZOPFAN proposal.
The first factor was the international and regional security situation at the time. The
shift in US policy towards Asia, the US-PRC rapprochement, and the PRC’s entry to the
United Nations created a new pattern of big powers’ involvement in Southeast Asia. The
ongoing Cold War had come to a point where Southeast Asia was in danger of being used as
pawns by the big powers in their rivalries. This situation might have undesirable
consequences for Southeast Asian states as their fate more or less is defined by the outcome
of the big powers’ interaction.
The second factor was the differing national interests of ASEAN members, which
compelled them to come up with a compromise. A somewhat vague declaration of neutrality
was the result of this compromise, and for the five ASEAN states, it was what they desired. A
vague declaration could open opportunity for various interpretations which meant that no
state was put in the position to sacrifice its national interests for others’. Although this risked
a big problem in the realisation of the proposal, the ASEAN states were satisfied with the
declaration because it was sufficient to enable them to voice their stance in world politics.
This was considered the most important objective at the time.
Thus, the new power pattern in the region forced the ASEAN state members to come
up with a scenario that could best protect regional security. Each state realised that its
security might be in danger if the regional security situation did not improve. At this point,
the ASEAN states decided to collaborate to guard themselves against the worst possible
consequences.
Put in the wider context of the Cold War, this study gives an insight of how the Third
World countries placed themselves within the Cold War theatre. As had been argued by
Gaddis, the “Third World” was created by the tension between the competing poles of
attraction. These states did not fit easily within the “centre-periphery” relationships, due to
the fact there was not a single “centre”. As there was disparity in capabilities between the
“First World” and the “Third World” there was the potential for an imperial rivalry on a
global scale.86 Being the object in dispute, especially after having left their colonial past

86
Gaddis, We Now Know, p. 153-154

25
behind, the Third World states then actually were in a position to choose during the Cold
War. Not only the opportunity to choose, they also to certain degree could take advantage and
even manipulate the big powers because the big powers were competing to embrace them to
join their spheres of influence in order to gain more prestige and hegemony. Hence, the
Americans and their allies could not take these states for granted, while the collapse of
colonialism was also creating new opportunities for Soviet (and then Chinese)
expansionism.87 Having this opportunity to choose, the ASEAN states chose to declare their
region as a “zone of peace, freedom and neutrality”.
Brought into the context of the current era, ASEAN in the post-Cold War era has
endeavoured to maintain and enhance its institutional status in the region, and also
internationally, and at the same time has tried to assume significant responsibilities for
regional security. However, while the issue of ‘asserting regional neutrality’ is out of the
question with the end of competition between superpowers, the international politics of the
Asia Pacific is in fact currently determined by American hegemony. The significance of the
US in the Asia Pacific region can be understood within the framework of hegemonic stability,
which accounts for the need for a hegemonic power to make order and stability/equilibrium
in a region. The distribution of power among states constitutes the principal form of control
in every international system. The dominant state(s) organises and maintains the network of
political, economic, and other relationships within the system and especially in the sphere of
influence.88
In such a condition, the effort to assert regional neutrality is thus replaced by the
effort to limit the hegemony of a superpower upon the region. These are not similar issues,
but not so different in the context of freeing the region from external interference. Just as
ASEAN came up with ZOPFAN in 1971, more recent formulas to place ASEAN in the
driver’s seat for regional security have also been exercised, for example the ASEAN
Regional Forum (ARF). However, ARF’s success still requires the prior existence of a stable
region, which among other prerequisites the existence of a hegemon to guarantee stability.
The involvement of the US in ARF is inevitably determinant in its relevance in Asia Pacific.
Nonetheless, just as ZOPFAN emerged to enable ASEAN to voice their stance in
world politics in the midst of the Cold War, the ARF could also bear the same significance in
the contemporary world politics. ASEAN’s role in promoting the ARF reflected its growing
self-confidence about the relevance of its norms of regional cooperation. Through the ARF,

87
Ibid., p. 154
88
Robert Gilpin, War and Change in World Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981), pp. 29-30.

26
ASEAN may be able to exercise a degree of influence over the Great Power geopolitics, and
even contribute to shape the balance of power by providing norms of restraint and avenues of
confidence building among the regional major powers.89 Indeed, another optimistic formula.
The dynamics in Southeast Asia can also be found in other parts of the world, as the
Third World states struggle to earn a greater role in the international arena, whether through a
regional organisation or individually. With this course of action, Third World states wish to
address the questions of whether they are less accountable for their international actions, and
also whether they have less independence in formulating their foreign policies. Having a
strong stance in world politics is inexorably one of the priorities of foreign policy, and this is
of a greater substance for small states.

89
Acharya, Constructing a Security Community in Southeast Asia, p. 184

27
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29