Legazpi v Minister of Finance
because detainees were arrested for offenses under
- Petitioner (a member of interim BP) is questioning PD
1840
- Petitioner: PD is invalid because it was issued not in
concurrence with the Interim BP
Issue: W/N the president can act as the legislative authority
by himself
Held: Yes
- PD 1840 was issued under Amendment No. 6 (issued
in 1976)
- Amendment no. 6: interpreted by the Court as a
constitutional authority vested to the President so he
can act swiftly in times of emergency or in cases he
deems needs immediate action (also, as an
alternative to Martial Law)
- Amendment no. 6 allows Marcos to act as a legislator
without the concurrence of the Interim BP
Garcia-Padilla v Ponce Enrile
- Petitioner Josefina Garcia-Padilla is questioning the
arrest and subsequent detention of 14 individuals
(which includes her son), and filed a petition for writ of
habeas corpus and mandamus
- Detainees were arrested by virtue of a Presidential
Communication Order (PCO) in relation to
Proclamation No. 2045
- The writ of habeas corpus was then issued by the
Court
- SolGen (contesting HC issuance): Arrest was valid
Proc. No. 2045 and mandated by the President through
the PCO
ISSUE: W/N the arrest was valid
Held: Yes
- The detainees were caught in flagrante delicto planning
a subversive act, and arrest was done to prevent a
potential rebellion planned by the detainees
- PCO merely validates the detention of offenses
covered by Proc. No. 2045 (w/c provides for the
offenses covered AND suspends the writ of HC)
since writ is suspended by Proc. No. 2045,
detention is legal
- LOI: a mere directive to the AFP on how the military
can arrest violators of Proc. No. 2045
Both PCO and LOI are not controlling but only
supplement Proc. No. 2045
But, if president wants to include LOI as law, he can
do so in exercise of his legislative power
When can President wield legislative powers?
Amendment No. 6 (See Legazpi case)
Aquino v COMELEC
Petitioners are contesting the validity of the
Presidential Decrees issued by President Marcos
(the PDs call for a referendum and the
appropriation of funds for said referendum)
ISSUE: W/N the presidential decrees issued are valid
Held: Yes
- First: SC established that Marcos is the de jure
president of the Philippines
1973 Constitution was ratified while he was the
incumbent president (consti commission/public had
Marcos in mind when they ratified the Constitution)
1973 constitution provides that President
decrees/issuances shall be part of the law of the
land
- Second: Marcos issued the assailed PDs during martial
law
Martial Law allowed Marcos to wield legislative
authority
PDs are essential to the security and preservation
of the public.
1973 Constitution itself provides Presidential
decrees and issuances before ratification of said
consti shall form part of the law of the land.
Caltex v. Palomar
- Caltex implemented a contest called the Hooded
Pump Contest, which would award prizes to
contestants by simply guessing the number dispensed
by the hooded pump.
- There is no need to pay a fee or purchase a Caltex
product to participate in said contest
- Caltex asked the permission of the Postmaster General
(respondent) in anticipation of its usage of mail for the
promotion and communication of the contest
- Postmaster General denied petitioner, relying on the
opinion of the DOJ on what constitutes a gift
enterprise, violated provisions of the Postal Law
- Caltex filed for declaratory relief before TC and was
granted
- Respondent appealed TC decision before SC
ISSUE: W/N the Caltex promotion violated the Postal Law
Held: No
- Postal Law condemns any lottery, gift enterprise, or
scheme for the distribution of money or any property by
lot, chance or drawing of any kind.
- Three essential elements of lottery: prize (), chance
() and consideration (none because Caltex does not
require customers to pay a fee or purchase their
products to participate); therefore, it is not considered a
lottery
- In the Postal Law, gift enterprise was used in
association with the term lottery
noscitur a sociis term under a statute should be
accorded no other meaning other than that of the word
it is associated with; hence, gift enterprise = lottery
Bolos v Bolos
- Petitioner Cynthia filed for declaration of nullity (under
Art 36) of her marriage with respondent Danilo
- RTC granted the petition and declared their marriage
null and void
 - Danilo filed an appeal before the CA without filing a
motion for consideration first (as required by AM 02-11-
10-SC), which CA granted.
- CA: AM 02-11-10-SC does not apply to the spouses
because it was contracted before FC
- Petitioner (on appeal to SC): AM should apply
ISSUE: W/N AM 02-11-10-SC should apply
Held: No
- Sec. 1 of AM: It only applies to marriages under the
Family Code; spouses were married in 1980
- When the law is clear and free of doubt/ambiguity,
there is no room for construction or interpretation
(verba legis)
US v Keitel
- District Court of Colorado granted the motion to quash
(on two counts) filed by respondent
- US appealed to SC, but respondent is contending that
the Court does not have jurisdiction on the case (citing
the Act of March 1907) because the Court only
construes and does not interpret the law
ISSUE: W/N statute construction is different from statute
interpretation
Held: No
- Court conceded that abstractly speaking, construction
and interpretation have different meanings
- BUT: in common usage or practice, both words have
the same meaning and significance
- Therefore: Under Act of 1907, construction and
interpretation have the same meaning, and the Court
has jurisdiction of the case
Roberts v Portland Water District
- Petitioners are land owners whose land was taken
(thru eminent domain) by the respondent
- Petitioners contend that the taking of their land was
unnecessary
- Commissioners determined the taking of the land was
necessary due to the exigency of the situation and
determined a compensation that would benefit
respondent
- Petitioners wanted to be exempted from the ruling
ISSUE: W/N the taking of the land was appropriate
Held: Yes
- Court deemed that the word particular (by looking at
all and not just one provision of the statute) should
mean detailed within the context of the law
- Respondent must specify the details of the land being
appropriated
- BUT, due to the exigency of the situation, the taking of
the land from petitioners is valid (provided they are
justly compensated)
 - Construction draws warranted conclusions not always
included in the direct expression of the law
FDC v ERC
- Petition for injunction and TRO issuance was filed by
FDC against ERC contending the ERC Order (w/c
would allow MERALCO to increase electric utility rates)
- FDCs argument (among others): Order is void
because ERC has no legal or statute authority to do so
- Petitioners: EPIRA repealed CA 142 and EO 172
(creation of ERB) both of which grant ERB (ERCs
precursoRs) the power to issue provisional orders;
power to issue provisional orders would be
contradictory to EPIRA provision in protecting public
interest
ISSUE: W/N ERC has the authority to issue assailed order
Held: Yes
- EPIRA: provides a structure for the privatization of the
energy industry so the services can be improved
- EPIRA did not repeal said laws, but supplemented it (it
added new powers to ERC apart from those already
wielded by ERB)
- Implied repeals are not favored: In fact, EPIRA
specifies the laws it repealed
- Legislative body is presumed to know the existing laws
Neal v US
- Petitioner Neal was arrested for possession of LSD
- 1988: He was convicted under the terms of the then
guidelines (LSD + blotter paper)
- 1991: Chapman ruling: paper + LSD need to be
weighed to determined LSD possession
- 1993: Congress Sentencing Commission passed a
new guideline (which has retroactive effect) in
calculating LSD (each dose has a presumed weight)
- Weight needed to be sentenced to 10 years in prison =
10grams.
- Neals LSD under old guideline: 109 g; under new
guideline: 4g
ISSUE: W/N the new guideline shall be controlling over
the Chapman ruling
Held: No,
- Court looked at the intent of the Congress Sentencing
Commission and concluded that:
it is doubtful that new guidelines intended to
replace Chapman guidelines and that the legislative
intended that the new guidelines calculation to be
INDEPENDENT of the guidelines used in Chapman;
and that the old guideline shall be controlling in case
of conflict between the two
Illinois Brick v Illinois
- Petitioners are manufacturers and distributors of
concrete bricks in Chicago while respondents is the
State of Illinois acting on behalf of all its local
government units
 - Respondent filed an antitrust lawsuit vs petitioner for
violating section 4 of the Clayton Act (
- State of Illinois: petitioner engaged in a conspiracy to
fix the prices of concrete blocks and due to this, they
(respondents) paid more than the market value of said
materials
- Petitioner: Invoking decision in Hanover Shoe v US,
only DIRECT buyers are allowed to file an action vs
them
ISSUE: W/N Hanover Shoe decision can apply in this case
Held: Yes
- In the absence of any proof that the court erred in the
Hanover Shoe ruling, the Court needs to adhere to
past jurisprudence (stare decisis)
Abad v Auditor General
- For his service and patriotism as the Chief Justice
during the Japanese invasion (w/c led to his death),
Jose Abad-Santos widow was rewarded a lump sum
(Commonwealth Act 708)
- However, during his time as Associate Justice of the
SC, Abad-Santos secured a life insurance policy under
Commonwealth Act 186
- Respondent: As petitioner is already compensated for
under CA 708, she can no longer collect the pension
under CA 186
- Respondents used an opinion penned by Abad-Santos
himself (during his time as Justice Secretary) in order
to bolster their argument
ISSUE: W/N the opinion of Abad-Santos (as DOJ Secretary)
is mandatory
Held: No
- Jurisprudence will still be followed over the opinion of a
member of the Executive Branch (ironically, Abad-
Santos himself)
- As a government employee, Abad-Santos contributed
5% of his salary for his pension, and thus his family is
entitled to recoup said contributions
- For the purposes of justice and equity, a martyr like
Abad-Santos cannot be deprived of his benefits in
which he duly contributed as a govt. employee
PNOC v CA
-
Union Pac v US
- Union Pac bougt an action vs US to recover
compensation due for services rendered
- 1950: Union Pac and US government entered into a
contract to use the petitioners railway to deliver US
mail
 - Part of the contract states the fixed compensation of
the govt to petitioner
- 1962: a new statute was enacted in which the
compensation of petitioner was placed in the hands of
the Postmaster General
ISSUE: W/N Act of 1862 applies
Held: No
- Act of 1862 did not change the provisions of the
contract between petitioner and US Govt, which is
considered a private contract.
Collector of Internal Revenue v. Manila Lodge
- CIR assessed taxes of Manila Lodge and concluded
that they should be liable to taxes from 1946-1953 and
1954-1955
- CIR cited Sec. 178 (privilege taxes on business) and
Sec. 193 (fixed taxes on liquor retailers) of the Tax
Code
- CTA: ruled in favor of Manila Lodge
defined business as engaged in profit and
livelihood
Manila Lodge only sells liquor to cover for
operational expenses
Issue: W/N CTA ruling is correct
Held: Yes
- Petitioner cannot rely on a definition of a word from a
single section of the Tax Code
- Business as defined in Sec. 193 should be read in
relation to Sec. 178 of the Tax Code
- Words/phrases should be construed in the whole
context of the tax code, not individually or per section
(ut magis valeat quam pereat)
Salaysay v. Castro
- Salaysay became the acting Mayor of San Juan del
Monte, Rizal when the incumbent mayor was
suspended
- While acting Mayor, he filed for CoC as Mayor for
upcoming elections
- His opponents claim that the filing is a violation of Sec.
27 of the Revised Election Code, and he should be
deemed automatically resigned
- Salaysay: Sec. 27 does not apply to him
Issue: W/N Salaysay is covered by Sec. 27 of the Revised
Election Code
Held: Yes
- SC looked into the history of Sec. 27 (from
Commonwealth Act 666 up to the present)
- SC concluded that the intent of the legislative body is
to extend the benefit and privilege to incumbent
officials (both elected and appointed)
- Salaysay, being temporary Mayor, is covered by Sec.
27 of REC
- Ascertain the intention of the lawmakers (ratio legis est
anima)