18. United Airlines v. Willie Uy, Nov.
19, 1999 and social humiliation; and (2) the slashing of his luggage and the loss of personal
Topic:
C. Aviation Law
1. The Warsaw Convention
Doctrine:
Applicability of the Warsaw Convention: the Convention's provisions do not regulate or
exclude liability for other breaches of contract by the carrier or misconduct of its officers and
employees, or for some particular or exceptional type of damage. Neither may the Convention
be invoked to justify the disregard of some extraordinary sort of damage resulting to a
passenger and preclude recovery therefor beyond the limits set by said Convention. Likewise,
we have held that the Convention does not preclude the operation of the Civil Code and other
pertinent laws. It does not regulate, much less exempt, the carrier from liability for damages
for violating the rights of its passengers under the contract of carriage, especially if willful
misconduct on the part of the carrier's employees is found or established
Emergency recit: Uy, a passenger of United airlines checked in his baggage but was overweight
and an employee of petitioner rebuked him saying that he should have known the maximum
weight allowance per bag. Upon arrival in manila, he discovered that one of his bags had been
slashed and its contents stolen. Petitioner moved to dismiss the complaint invoking the
provisions of Article 29 of the Warsaw Convention. Court held that in our jurisdiction, we have
held that the Warsaw Convention can be applied, or ignored, depending on the peculiar facts
presented by each case.
Facts:
Respondent Willie Uy is a passenger of petitioner United Airlines, bound from San
Francisco to Manila. While in San Francisco, it was found that one piece of his luggage
was over the maximum weight allowance of 70 kg. per bag. (Overweight luggage)
A United Airlines employee rebuked him and in a loud voice, in front of the milling
crowd, ordered him to repack his things accordingly. Wishing not to create a scene,
Willie did as asked. Unfortunately, his luggage was still overweight so the airline
billed him overweight charges. Willie offered to pay the charges with a Miscellaneous
Charge Order (MCO) or an airline pre-paid credit but the same employee, and an
airline supervisor, refused to honor it, contending that there were discrepancies in
the figures. Thus, Willie was forced to pay the charges with his American Express
credit card.
Upon arrival in Manila, Willie discovered that one of his bags had been slashed and
its contents, amounting to US$5,310.00, stolen. (Stolen contents)
He sent his first letter of demand to United Airlines. The airline did not refute Willies
allegations and mailed a check representing payment of his loss based on the
maximum liability of US$9.70 per pound. Willie, thinking the amount to be grossly
inadequate to compensate him for his losses as well as for the indignities he was
subjected to, sent two more letters to petitioner airline, demanding out-of-court
settlement of P1,000,000.00.
Willie filed a complaint for damages before the Philippine courts. He had two causes
of action: (1) the shabby and humiliating treatment he received from petitioners
employees at the San Francisco Airport which caused him extreme embarrassment
effects amounting to US$5,310.00. (Action for damages)
United Airlines moved to dismiss the complaint on the ground that it was filed out
of time. Under Art. 29 of the Warsaw Convention, the right to damages shall be
extinguished if an action is not brought within 2 years. However, the second
paragraph of the said provision stated that the method of calculating the period of
limitation shall be determined by the law of the court to which the case is submitted.
It is Willies position that our rules on interruption of prescriptive period should
apply. When he sent his letters of demand, the 2-year period was tolled, giving him
ample time to file his complaint. (Prescriptive period)
TC - The trial court ordered the dismissal of the case, holding that Art. 29(2) refers
not to the local forums rules in interrupting the prescriptive period but only to the
rules of determining the time in which the action was deemed commenced (meaning
filed). Willie filed his motion for reconsideration of the order of dismissal only on
the 14th day. The trial court denied his motion and 2 days later Willie filed his notice
of appeal. United Airlines this time contended that the notice of appeal was filed
beyond the 15-day reglementary period and should therefore be dismissed.
CA - The CA, however, took cognizance of the case in the interest of justice and ruled
in favour of respondent. Hence, this petition for certiorari.
Issue:
1) Does the Warsaw Convention preclude the operation of the Civil Code and other
pertinent laws?
2) Has the respondents cause of action prescribed?
Held:
1) No.
Within our jurisdiction we have held that the Warsaw Convention can be applied, or
ignored, depending on the peculiar facts presented by each case.
Convention provisions do not regulate or exclude liabilities for other breaches of
contract by the carrier or misconduct of its officers and employees, or for some
particular or exceptional type of damage.
Neither may the Convention be invoked to justify the disregard of some
extraordinary type of damage. Neither may the Convention be invoked to justify the
disregard of some extraordinary sort of damage resulting to a passenger and
preclude recovery therefore beyond the limits et by said convention.
Likewise, we have held that the Convention does not preclude the operation of the
Civil Code and other pertinent laws. It does not regulate, much less exempt, the
carrier from liability for damages for violating the rights of its passengers under the
contract of carriage, especially if willful misconduct on the part of the carriers
employees is found or established.
2) No.
While his 2nd cause of action (an action for damages arising from theft or damage
to property or goods) is well within the bounds of the Warsaw convention, his 1st
cause of action (an action for damages arising from the misconduct of
 the airline employees and the violation of respondents rights as passengers) clearly
is not.
The 2-yr limitation incorporated in Art. 29 of the Warsaw Convention as an absolute
bar to suit and not to be made subject to the various tolling provisions of the laws of
the forum, forecloses the application of our own rules on interruption of prescriptive
periods. (Art. 29, par. 2 was indented only to let local laws determine whether an
action shall be deemed commenced upon the filing of a complaint.) Since, it
is indisputable that respondent filed the present action beyond the 2-yr time frame
his 2nd cause of action must be barred.
However, it is obvious that respondent was forestalled from immediately filing an
action because petitioner gave him the runaround, answering his letters but not
giving in to his demands.
True, respondent should have already filed an action at the first instance when
petitioner denied his claims but the same could only be due to his desire to make an
out-of-court settlement for which he cannot be faulted.
Hence, despite the express mandate of Article 29 of the Warsaw Convention that an
action for damages should be filed within 2 years from the arrival at the place of
destination, such rule shall not be applied in the instant case because of the
delaying tactics employed by petitioner airlines itself.
Thus, respondents 2nd cause of action cannot be considered as time barred.