Case Digests in Torts and Damages

I. Vicarious Liability

1. Reyes v. Doctolero
G. R. No. 185597, 2 August 2017

Facts:
John E. R. Reyes and Orico Doctolero were involved in an incident at the outskirts of Makati
Cinema Square wherein Doctolero shot Reyes during a rage at the parking entrance. Mervin
Joseph Reyes was also shot by Romeo Avila, a co-worker of Doctolero during the same event.
Reyes filed a complaint for damages against Doctolero, Avila, and their employer Grandeur
Security and Services Corporation, in which the RTC ruled in favor of Reyes and affirmed by the
CA.

Issue:
Whether or not Grandeur may be held vicariously liable for the damages caused by Doctolero
and Avila.

Held:
No.

As a general rule, one is only responsible for his own act or omission. This general rule is laid
down in Article 2176 of the Civil Code, which provides:

Art. 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or
negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-
existing contractual relation between the parties, is called a quasi-delict and is governed by the
provisions of this Chapter.

The law, however, provides for exceptions when it makes certain persons liable for the act or
omission of another. One exception is an employer who is made vicariously liable for the tort
committed by his employee under paragraph 5 of Article 2180. Here, although the employer is
not the actual tortfeasor, the law makes him vicariously liable on the basis of the civil law
principle of pater familias for failure to exercise due care and vigilance over the acts of one's
subordinates to prevent damage to another.

It must be stressed, however, that the above rule is applicable only if there is an employer-
employee relationship. This employer-employee relationship cannot be presumed but must be
sufficiently proven by the plaintiff. The plaintiff must also show that the employee was acting
within the scope of his assigned task when the tort complained of was committed. It is only then
that the defendant, as employer, may find it necessary to interpose the defense of due diligence
in the selection and supervision of employees.

2. Greenstar Express, Inc. v. Universal Robina Corporation

G. R. No. 205090, 17 October 2016
806 SCRA 125

Facts:
The bus of Greenstar Express, Inc. collided head-on with the van owned by Universal Robina
Corporation (URC). The operations manager of Nissin Universal Robina Corporation died on the
spot, while the vehicles sustained considerable damage. Greenstar filed a complaint for
damages against URC in which the trial court dismissed the same. The CA affirmed the prior
decision.

Issue:
Whether or not URC has vicarious liability to Greenstar on the ground of negligence.

Held:
No.

In the present case, it has been established that on the day of the collision or on February
25, 2003 URC was the registered owner of the URC van, although it appears that it was
designated for use by NURC, as it was officially assigned to the latters Logistics Manager,
Florante Soro-Soro (Soro-Soro); that Bicomong was the Operations Manager of NURC and
assigned to the First Cavite Industrial Estate; that there was no work as the day was declared a
national holiday; that Bicomong was on his way home to his family in Quezon province; that the
URC van was not assigned to Bicomong as well, but solely for Soro-Soros official use; that the
company service vehicle officially assigned to Bicomong was a Toyota Corolla, which he left at
the Cavite plant and instead, he used the URC van; and that other than the Cavite plant, there is
no other NURC plant in the provinces of Quezon, Laguna or Bicol.

Applying the above pronouncement in the Caravan Travel and Tours case, it must be said that
when by evidence the ownership of the van and Bicomongs employment were proved, the
presumption of negligence on respondents part attached, as the registered owner of the van
and as Bicomongs employer. The burden of proof then shifted to respondents to show that no
liability under Article 2180 arose. This may be done by proof of any of the following:

1. That they had no employment relationship with Bicomong; or

2. That Bicomong acted outside the scope of his assigned tasks; or

3. That they exercised the diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and
supervision of Bicomong.

In denying liability, respondents claimed in their respective answers the defense of absence of
negligence on their part. During trial, they presented evidence to the effect that on the day of the
collision, which was a declared national nonworking holiday, Bicomong was not performing his
work, but was on his way home to Quezon on a personal undertaking, that is, to give money to
his daughter and spend the holiday with his family; and that the vehicle he was driving was not
an NURC vehicle, nor was it assigned to him, but was registered to URC and assigned to its
Logistics Manager, Soro-Soro. Petitioners object to this, claiming that this defense was not
alleged in the respondents respective answers. The Court disagrees. The failure to allege these
facts in the answers does not preclude, respondents from proving them during trial; these facts
are precisely illustrative of their defense of absence of negligence. Just the same, petitioners
failure to object to the respondents presentation of such evidence below is tantamount to a
waiver; Section 5, Rule 10 of the 1997 Rules on amendments to conform to or authorize
presentation of evidence will have to apply, but the failure to amend the pleadings does not
affect the result of the trial of these issues.
3. Caravan Travel and Tours International, Inc. v. Abejar
G. R. No. 170631, 10 February 2016
783 SCRA 368

Facts:
Jesmariane Reyes was walking along the street when a Mitsubishi L-300 van hit her to avoid an
incoming vehicle after swerving left. A witness helped Reyes to put her at the back of the van
which was owned by Caravan Travel and Tours but instead of driving her to the hospital, the
van was only parked nearby until someone finally helped Reyes to go to the hospital. Caravan
shouldered the medical expenses, but unfortunately, Reyes died. The case was filed against
Caravan for damages, in which the trial court ruled in favor of Reyess aunt, Ermilinda Abejar,
with the affirmation of the CA.

Issue:
Whether or not Caraven Travel and Tours is liable for the death of Reyes.

Held:
Yes.
The resolution of this case must consider two (2) rules. First, Article 2180s specification that
[e]mployers shall be liable for the damages caused by their employees . . . acting within the
scope of their assigned tasks[.] Second, the operation of the registered-owner rule that
registered owners are liable for death or injuries caused by the operation of their vehicles.

These rules appear to be in conflict when it comes to cases in which the employer is also the
registered owner of a vehicle. Article 2180 requires proof of two things: first, an employment
relationship between the driver and the owner; and second, that the driver acted within the
scope of his or her assigned tasks. On the other hand, applying the registered-owner rule only
requires the plaintiff to prove that the defendant-employer is the registered owner of the vehicle.

This disputable presumption, insofar as the registered owner of the vehicle in relation to the
actual driver is concerned, recognizes that between the owner and the victim, it is the former
that should carry the costs of moving forward with the evidence. The victim is, in many cases, a
hapless pedestrian or motorist with hardly any means to uncover the employment relationship of
the owner and the driver, or any act that the owner may have done in relation to that
employment.

4. Casumpang v. Cortejo
G. R. No. 171127, 11 March 2015
752 SCRA 379

Facts:
Jesusa Cortejo brought her son Edmer to San Juan de Dios Hospital because of difficulty in
breathing, chest pain, stomach pain, and fever, which the doctor who attended the child, Dr.
Noel Casumpang, to have bronchopneumonia in the usual symptoms. When Edmer vomited
blood, he was observed and found out that he had dengue, and later died. A case was filed
against Dr. Casumpang, which the trial court ruled in favor of Cortejo, and affirmed by the CA.

Issue:
Whether or not Casumpang is liable for negligence which led to the death of Edmer Cortejo.

Held:
Yes.
A hospital can be held vicariously liable for the negligent acts of a physician (or an independent
contractor) providing care at the hospital if the plaintiff can prove these two factors: first, the
hospitals manifestations; and second, the patients reliance.

We affirm the hospitals liability not on the basis of Article 2180 of the Civil Code, but on the
basis of the doctrine of apparent authority or agency by estoppel.

5. Mamaril v. Boy Scout of the Philippines

G. R. No. 179382, 14 January 2013
688 SCRA 437

Facts:
Spouses Benjamin and Sonia Mamaril, who were jeepney operators, have one of their jeepneys
missing at the Boy Scout of the Philippines compound. They filed an action for damages against
Boy Scout on the ground of gross negligence. The trial court ruled in favor of Mamaril which was
affirmed by the CA.

Issue:
Whether or not Boy Scout is liable for the loss of one of the jeepneys of Mamaril spouses.

Held:
No.
Article 20 of the Civil Code provides that every person, who, contrary to law, willfully or
negligently causes damage to another, shall indemnify the latter for the same. Similarly, Article
2176 of the Civil Code states:

Art. 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or
negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no
preexisting contractual relation between the parties, is called a quasi-delict and is governed by
the provisions of this Chapter.

In this case, it is undisputed that the proximate cause of the loss of Sps. Mamarils vehicle was
the negligent act of security guards Pea and Gaddi in allowing an unidentified person to drive
out the subject vehicle. Proximate cause has been defined as that cause, which, in natural and
continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, produces the injury or loss,
and without which the result would not have occurred. Moreover, Pea and Gaddi failed to
refute Sps. Mamarils contention that they readily admitted being at fault during the investigation
that ensued.

On the other hand, the records are bereft of any finding of negligence on the part of BSP.
Hence, no reversible error was committed by the CA in absolving it from any liability for the loss
of the subject vehicle based on fault or negligence.

Neither will the vicarious liability of an employer under Article 2180 of the Civil Code apply in this
case. It is uncontested that Pea and Gaddi were assigned as security guards by AIB to BSP
pursuant to the Guard Service Contract. Clearly, therefore, no employer-employee relationship
existed between BSP and the security guards assigned in its premises. Consequently, the
latters negligence cannot be imputed against BSP but should be attributed to AIB, the true
employer of Pea and Gaddi.
6. Del Carmen, Jr. v. Bacoy
G. R. No. 173870, 25 April 2012
671 SCRA 91

Facts:
Emilia Bacoy Monsalud with her spouse Leonardo Monsalud were ran over by a Fuso
passenger jeep owned by Oscar del Carmen, Jr. A criminal case was filed against the driver
Allan Maglasang. The trial court absolved del Carmen from liability and ordered Maglasang to
pay the aggrieved relatives damages and other expenses. The CA set aside the case, holding
del Carmen liable.

Issue:
Whether or not del Carmen is liable for the accidental death of the spouses Monsalud.

Held:
Yes.
The requisites of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur as established by jurisprudence are as follows:

1) the accident is of a kind which does not ordinarily occur unless someone is negligent;
2) the cause of the injury was under the exclusive control of the person in charge and
3) the injury suffered must not have been due to any voluntary action or contribution on the
part of the person injured.

The above requisites are all present in this case. First, no person just walking along the road
would suddenly be sideswiped and run over by an on-rushing vehicle unless the one in charge
of the said vehicle had been negligent. Second, the jeep which caused the injury was under the
exclusive control of Oscar Jr. as its owner. When Oscar Jr. entrusted the ignition key to Rodrigo,
he had the power to instruct him with regard to the specific restrictions of the jeeps use,
including who or who may not drive it. As he is aware that the jeep may run without the ignition
key, he also has the responsibility to park it safely and securely and to instruct his driver
Rodrigo to observe the same precaution. Lastly, there was no showing that the death of the
victims was due to any voluntary action or contribution on their part.

The aforementioned requisites having been met, there now arises a presumption of negligence
against Oscar Jr. which he could have overcome by evidence that he exercised due care and
diligence in preventing strangers from using his jeep. Unfortunately, he failed to do so.

II. Human Relations

a. Abuse of right

1. Ardiente v. Pastorfide
G. R. No. 161921, 17 July 2013
701 SCRA 389

Facts:
Joyce Ardiente entered into a memorandum of agreement with Ma. Theresa Pastorfide
assigning the housing unit of the former. There is a particular stipulation under the agreement
that the water and power bill of the property shall be for the account of the second party
(Pastorfide), which caused the filing of an action, wherein Pastorfide was asked to pay the water
bill earlier than the due date because it was the call of Ardiente to cut off the water line.
Pastorfide paid the said bill and after she asked who authorized the cut off, she filed a case for
damages against Ardiente. The trial court ruled in favor of Pastorfide, and affirmed by the CA.

Issue:
Whether or not there is an abuse of right in part of Pastorfide.

Held:
Yes.
It is true that it is within petitioners right to ask and even require the Spouses Pastorfide to
cause the transfer of the formers account with COWD to the latters name pursuant to their
Memorandum of Agreement. However, the remedy to enforce such right is not to cause the
disconnection of the respondent spouses water supply. The exercise of a right must be in
accordance with the purpose for which it was established and must not be excessive or unduly
harsh; there must be no intention to harm another. Otherwise, liability for damages to the injured
party will attach. In the present case, intention to harm was evident on the part of petitioner
when she requested for the disconnection of respondent spouses water supply without warning
or informing the latter of such request. Petitioner claims that her request for disconnection was
based on the advise of COWD personnel and that her intention was just to compel the Spouses
Pastorfide to comply with their agreement that petitioners account with COWD be transferred in
respondent spouses name. If such was petitioners only intention, then she should have
advised respondent spouses before or immediately after submitting her request for
disconnection, telling them that her request was simply to force them to comply with their
obligation under their Memorandum of Agreement. But she did not. What made matters worse is
the fact that COWD undertook the disconnection also without prior notice and even failed to
reconnect the Spouses Pastorfides water supply despite payment of their arrears. There was
clearly an abuse of right on the part of petitioner, COWD and Gonzalez. They are guilty of bad
faith.

The principle of abuse of rights as enshrined in Article 19 of the Civil Code provides that every
person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his duties, act with justice,
give everyone his due, and observe honesty and good faith.

2. Yuchengco v. The Manila Chronicle Publishing Corporation

G. R. No. 184315, 28 November 2011
661 SCRA 392

Facts:
The Manila Chronicle Publishine Corporation published in its newspaper The Manila Chronicle
several allegedly defamatory articles against Alfonso Yuchengco, causing the latter to file an
action for damages against the publishing company. The trial court ruled in favor of Yuchengco,
which was affirmed by the CA but later on reversed through motion for reconsideration. The
Supreme Court partially granted the petition. Manila Chronicle filed its motion for
reconsideration.

Issue:
Whether or not there is an abuse of right in part of the Manila Chronicle.

Held:
Yes.
We reiterate that factual findings of the trial court, when adopted and confirmed by the CA, are
binding and conclusive on this Court and will generally not be reviewed on appeal. While this
Court has recognized several exceptions to this rule, none of these exceptions exists in the
present case. Accordingly, this Court finds no reason to depart from the findings of fact of the
trial court and the CA.

More importantly and contrary again to Coyiuto, Jr.s contention, the cause of action of petitioner
based on abuse of rights, or Article 19, in relation to Article 20 of the Civil Code, warrants the
award of damages.

The principle of abuse of rights as enshrined in Article 19 of the Civil Code provides:

Art. 19. Every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his duties,
act with justice, give everyone his due, and observe honesty and good faith.

This provision of law sets standards which must be observed in the exercise of ones rights as
well as in the performance of its duties, to wit: to act with justice; give everyone his due; and
observe honesty and good faith.

b. Acts Contra Bonus Mores

1. Go v. Cordero
G. R. No. 164703, 4 May 2010
620 SCRA 1

Facts:
Mortimer Cordero of Pamana Marketing Corporation entered into an agreement with Tony
Robinson of Aluminium Fast Ferries Australia regarding the distribution of the latters vessels
and catamarans. Cordero transacted with Allan Go of ACG Express Liner for the purchase of 2
SEACAT 25 catamarans. Later, Cordero discovered that Go directly transacted with Robinson
which Cordero believes that it violated his exclusive distributorship. A case was filed in court, in
which the trial court ruled in favor of Cordero and affirmed by the CA.

Issue:
Whether or not there is bad faith in this case.

Held:
No.
The existence of malice, ill will or bad faith is a factual matter. As a rule, findings of fact of the
trial court, when affirmed by the appellate court, are conclusive on this Court. We see no
compelling reason to reverse the findings of the RTC and the CA that respondents acted in bad
faith and in utter disregard of the rights of Cordero under the exclusive distributorship
agreement.

The failure of Robinson, Go, Tecson and Landico to act with fairness, honesty and good faith in
securing better terms for the purchase of high-speed catamarans from AFFA, to the prejudice of
Cordero as the duly appointed exclusive distributor, is further proscribed by Article 19 of the
Civil Code:

Art. 19. Every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his duties,
act with justice, give everyone his due, and observe honesty and good faith.

As we have expounded in another case:

Elsewhere, we explained that when a right is exercised in a manner which does not conform
with the norms enshrined in Article 19 and results in damage to another, a legal wrong is
thereby committed for which the wrongdoer must be responsible. The object of this article,
therefore, is to set certain standards which must be observed not only in the exercise of ones
rights but also in the performance of ones duties. These standards are the following: act with
justice, give everyone his due and observe honesty and good faith. Its antithesis, necessarily, is
any act evincing bad faith or intent to injure. Its elements are the following: (1) There is a legal
right or duty; (2) which is exercised in bad faith; (3) for the sole intent of prejudicing or injuring
another. When Article 19 is violated, an action for damages is proper under Articles 20 or 21 of
the Civil Code. Article 20 pertains to damages arising from a violation of law x x x. Article 21, on
the other hand, states:

Art. 21. Any person who willfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary
to morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for the damage.

Article 21 refers to acts contra bonus mores and has the following elements: (1) There is an act
which is legal; (2) but which is contrary to morals, good custom, public order, or public policy;
and (3) it is done with intent to injure.

A common theme runs through Articles 19 and 21, and that is, the act complained of must be
intentional.

III. Independent Civil Action

1. Consing, Jr. v. People

G. R. No. 161075, 15 July 2013
701 SCRA 132

Facts:
Rafael Jose Consing, Jr. with his mother Cecilia del Cruz obtained various loans totaling
P18,000,000.00 from Unicapital, Inc., secured by a real estate mortgage constituted on a parcel
of land registered in the name of dela Cruz. Unicapital and its joint venture partner Pius
Builders, Inc. purchased the property and divided among them. Before they develop the
property, they learned that it was in the name of another person in whom dela Cruz acquired it.
Unicapital demanded the return of the sum of money but Consing ignored it. Hence, an action
was filed by Consing and a criminal action of estafa through falsification of public document was
filed by Unicapital. The trial court suspended the proceedings because of a prejudicial question,
which was upheld by the CA.

Issue:
Whether or not there is a prejudicial question in this case.

Held:
No.
A perusal of Unicapitals complaint in the Makati civil case reveals that the action was
predicated on fraud. This was apparent from the allegations of Unicapital in its complaint to the
effect that Consing and de la Cruz had acted in a wanton, fraudulent, oppressive, or malevolent
manner in offering as security and later object of sale, a property which they do not own, and
foisting to the public a spurious title. As such, the action was one that could proceed
independently of Criminal Case No. 00-120 pursuant to Article 33 of the Civil Code, which states
as follows:

Article 33. In cases of defamation, fraud, and physical injuries a civil action for damages,
entirely separate and distinct from the criminal action, may be brought by the injured party. Such
civil action shall proceed independently of the criminal prosecution, and shall require only a
preponderance of evidence.

It is well settled that a civil action based on defamation, fraud and physical injuries may be
independently instituted pursuant to Article 33 of the Civil Code, and does not operate as a
prejudicial question that will justify the suspension of a criminal case. This was precisely the
Courts thrust in G.R. No. 148193, thus:

Moreover, neither is there a prejudicial question if the civil and the criminal action can, according
to law, proceed independently of each other. Under Rule 111, Section 3 of the Revised Rules
on Criminal Procedure, in the cases provided in Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code,
the independent civil action may be brought by the offended party. It shall proceed
independently of the criminal action and shall require only a preponderance of evidence. In no
case, however, may the offended party recover damages twice for the same act or omission
charged in the criminal action.

xxxx

In the instant case, Civil Case No. 99-95381, for Damages and Attachment on account of the
alleged fraud committed by respondent and his mother in selling the disputed lot to PBI is an
independent civil action under Article 33 of the Civil Code. As such, it will not operate as a
prejudicial question that will justify the suspension of the criminal case at bar.

2. Hambon v. Court of Appeals

G. R. No. 122150, 17 March 2003
399 SCRA 255

Facts:
George (Culhi) Hambon filed a complaint for damages for the injuries and expenses he
sustained after the truck driven by Valentino Carantes bumped him. In response, Carantes
contended that an earlier criminal case for serious physical injuries through reckless
imprudence had been provisionally dismissed by the MTC due to lack of interest of Hambon and
with respect to both criminal and civil liabilities of Carantes. The RTC ruled that Hambon is
entitled to damages, but it was reversed by the CA.

Issue:
Whether or not the civil action for damages may be filed and proved independently of the
criminal action even without reservation to file the same has been made.

Held:
No.
The Court expounded (in the case of Maniago v. Court of Appeals):

. . . 1 quite clearly requires that a reservation must be made to institute separately all civil
actions for the recovery of civil liability, otherwise they will be deemed to have been instituted
with the criminal case. ... In other words the right of the injured party to sue separately for the
recovery of the civil liability whether arising from crimes (ex delicto) or from quasi-delict under
Art. 2176 of the Civil Code must be reserved otherwise they will be deemed instituted with the
criminal action.
...

Contrary to private respondents contention, the requirement that before a separate civil action
may be brought it must be reserved does not impair, diminish or defeat substantive rights, but
only regulates their exercise in the general interest of procedure. The requirement is merely
procedural in nature. For that matter the Revised Penal Code, by providing in Art. 100 that any
person criminally liable is also civilly liable, gives the offended party the right to bring a separate
civil action, yet no one has ever questioned the rule that such action must be reserved before it
may be brought separately.

IV. Strict Liability

a. Abatement

a.1. Nuisance

1. Rana v. Wong
G. R. No. 192861, 30 June 2014
727 SCRA 539

Facts:
Spouses Reynaldo and Linda Rana cemented a portion of the road that runs between theirs and
of those beside them, co-owned by spouses Shirley and Ruben Ang Ong and Teresita Lee Ong.
Rana backfilled a portion of the perimeter fence separating their respective properties without a
retaining wall that would hold the weight of the added filling materials. The case was filed after
the Barangay Captain of Lahug, Cebu and the City Building Official of Cebu City failed to
resolve their dispute. The trial court ruled in favor of Wong but when it was implemented, the
property of Rana was damaged, thus, an action for damages was filed, which was dismissed by
the RTC. The CA affirmed the prior decision.

Issue:
Whether or not abatement is necessary in this case.

Held:
Yes.
In Pampanga Bus Co., Inc. v. Municipality of Tarlac where the appellant-municipality similarly
argued that the terminal involved therein is a nuisance that may be abated by the Municipal
Council via an ordinance, this Court held: Suffice it to say that in the abatement of nuisances
the provisions of the Civil Code (Articles 694-707) must be observed and followed. This
appellant failed to do. (Emphases supplied; citations omitted)

Aside from the remedy of summary abatement which should be taken under the parameters
stated in Articles 704 (for public nuisances) and 706 (for private nuisances) of the Civil Code, a
private person whose property right was invaded or unreasonably interfered with by the act,
omission, establishment, business or condition of the property of another may file a civil action
to recover personal damages. Abatement may be judicially sought through a civil action therefor
if the pertinent requirements under the Civil Code for summary abatement, or the requisite that
the nuisance is a nuisance per se, do not concur. To note, the remedies of abatement and
damages are cumulative; hence, both may be demanded.

In the present cases, Wong, et al., availed of the remedy of judicial abatement and damages
against Sps. Rana, claiming that both the elevated and cemented subject portion and the
subject backfilling are nuisances caused/created by the latter which curtailed their use and
enjoyment of their properties.

With respect to the elevated and cemented subject portion, the Court finds that the same is not
a nuisance per se. By its nature, it is not injurious to the health or comfort of the community. It
was built primarily to facilitate the ingress and egress of Sps. Rana from their house which was
admittedly located on a higher elevation than the subject road and the adjoining Uy and Wong-
Ong properties. Since the subject portion is not a nuisance per se (but actually a nuisance per
accidens as will be later discussed) it cannot be summarily abated. As such, Wong, et al.s
demolition of Sps. Ranas subject portion, which was not sanctioned under the RTCs November
27, 1997 Order, remains unwarranted. Resultantly, damages ought to be awarded in favor of
Sps. Rana particularly that of (a) nominal damages for the vindication and recognition of Sps.
Ranas right to be heard before the court prior to Wong, et al.s abatement of the subject portion
(erroneously perceived as a nuisance per se) and (b) temperate damages for the
pecuniary loss owing to the demolition of the subject portion, which had been established albeit
uncertain as to the actual amount of loss.

2. Gancayco v. City Government of Quezon City

G. R. No. 177807, 11 October 2011
658 SCRA 853

Facts:
The property of retired Supreme Court Associate Justice Emilio Gancayco along EDSA was
covered by a city ordinance requiring the construction of arcades for commercial buildings along
Quezon City. After many decades, Gancayco was notified of a demolition notice from the
MMDA clearing all illegal structures and obstructions in all public places but failed to comply
within 15 days. The party wall or the wing walls was demolished afterwards. Gancayco filed a
case against MMDA and the Quezon City Government, which the trial court ruled in his favor
but the CA partly granted the appeal of MMDA and Quezon City Government.

Issue:
Whether or not the wing walls are considered nuisance.

Held:
No.
The fact that in 1966 the City Council gave Justice Gancayco an exemption from constructing
an arcade is an indication that the wing walls of the building are not nuisances per se. The wing
walls do not per se immediately and adversely affect the safety of persons and property. The
fact that an ordinance may declare a structure illegal does not necessarily make that structure a
nuisance.

Article 694 of the Civil Code defines nuisance as any act, omission, establishment, business,
condition or property, or anything else that (1) injures or endangers the health or safety of
others; (2) annoys or offends the senses; (3) shocks, defies or disregards decency or morality;
(4) obstructs or interferes with the free passage of any public highway or street, or any body of
water; or, (5) hinders or impairs the use of property. A nuisance may be per se or per accidens.
A nuisance per se is that which affects the immediate safety of persons and property and may
summarily be abated under the undefined law of necessity.29

Clearly, when Justice Gancayco was given a permit to construct the building, the city council or
the city engineer did not consider the building, or its demolished portion, to be a threat to the
safety of persons and property. This fact alone should have warned the MMDA against
summarily demolishing the structure.

Neither does the MMDA have the power to declare a thing a nuisance. Only courts of law have
the power to determine whether a thing is a nuisance.

b. Unjust enrichment

b.1. Requisites of accion in rem verso

1. Land Bank of the Philippines v. Ong

G. R. No. 190755, 24 November 2010
636 SCRA 266

Facts:
Spouses Johnson and Evangeline Sy secured a loan from Land Bank which was secured by 3
residential lots, 5 cargo trucks and a warehouse. When they failed to pay their loan, they sold 3
of their mortgaged parcels of land to Angelina Gloria Ong. Alfredo Ong went to Land Bank to
inform about the assumption of mortgage which his application was not approved by the bank.
After the properties were foreclosed, a case was filed by Ong against Land Bank. The trial court
ruled in his favor and affirmed by the CA.

Issue:
Whether or not accion in rem verso applies in the case.

Held:
Yes.
We turn then on the principle upon which Land Bank must return Alfredos payment. Unjust
enrichment exists when a person unjustly retains a benefit to the loss of another, or when a
person retains money or property of another against the fundamental principles of justice, equity
and good conscience. There is unjust enrichment under Art. 22 of the Civil Code when (1) a
person is unjustly benefited, and (2) such benefit is derived at the expense of or with damages
to another.

Additionally, unjust enrichment has been applied to actions called accion in rem verso. In order
that the accion in rem verso may prosper, the following conditions must concur: (1) that the
defendant has been enriched; (2) that the plaintiff has suffered a loss; (3) that the enrichment of
the defendant is without just or legal ground; and (4) that the plaintiff has no other action based
on contract, quasi-contract, crime, or quasi-delict. The principle of unjust enrichment essentially
contemplates payment when there is no duty to pay, and the person who receives the payment
has no right to receive it.