PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS (Case no.

61 80)

G.R. No. 119190. January 16, 1997

CHI MING TSOI, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and GINA LAO-TSOI, respondents.

One of the essential marital obligations under the Family Code is to procreate children based on the
universal principle that procreation of children through sexual cooperation is the basic end of marriage.
In the case at bar, the senseless and protracted refusal of one of the parties to fulfil the above marital
obligation is equivalent to psychological incapacity.

G.R. No. 108763. February 13, 1997

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and RORIDEL
OLAVIANO MOLINA, respondents.

There is no clear showing that psychological defect spoken of is incapacity. It appears to be more of a
difficulty, if not, outright refusal or neglect in the performance of some marital obligations.
The mere showing of irreconcilable difference and conflicting personalities in no wise constitutes
psychological incapacity. It is not enough to prove that the parties failed to meet their responsibilities and
duties as married persons; it is essential that they must be shown to be incapable of doing so, due to some
psychological (not physical) illness.
There had been no showing of the gravity of the problem, neither its juridical antecedence nor
incurability.
From their submissions and the Courts own deliberations, the following guidelines in the
interpretation and application of Art. 36 of the Family Code are hereby handed down for the guidance of the
bench and the bar:
(1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the plaintiff. Any doubt
should be resolved in favor of the existence and continuation of the marriage and against its
dissolution and nullity. This is rooted in the fact that both our Constitution and our laws cherish the
validity of marriage and unity of the family. Thus, our Constitution devotes an entire Article on the
Family, recognizing it as the foundation of the nation. It decrees marriage as legally inviolable, thereby
protecting it from dissolution at the whim of the parties. Both the family and marriage are to be
protected by the state.
The Family Code echoes this constitutional edict on marriage and the family and emphasizes
their permanence, inviolability and solidarity.
(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be (a) medically or clinically identified,
(b) alleged in the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly explained in the
decision. Article 36 of the Family Code requires that the incapacity must be psychological -- not
physical, although its manifestations and/or symptoms may be physical. The evidence must convince
the court that the parties, or one of them, was mentally or psychically ill to such an extent that the
person could not have known the obligations he was assuming, or knowing them, could not have given
valid assumption thereof .
(3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at the time of the celebration of the
marriage. The evidence must show that the illness was existing when the parties exchanged their I

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 dos. The manifestation of the illness need not be perceivable at such time, but the illness itself must
have attached at such moment, or prior thereto.
(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent
or incurable. Such incurability may be absolute or even relative only in regard to the other spouse, not
necessarily absolutely against everyone of the same sex. Furthermore, such incapacity must be
relevant to the assumption of marriage obligations, not necessarily to those not related to marriage,
like the exercise of a profession or employment in a job. .
(5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to assume the
essential obligations of marriage. Thus, mild characteriological peculiarities, mood changes, occasional
emotional outbursts cannot be accepted as root causes. The illness must be shown as downright
incapacity or inability, not a refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less ill will. In other words, there is a
natal or supervening disabling factor in the person, an adverse integral element in the personality
structure that effectively incapacitates the person from really accepting and thereby complying with
the obligations essential to marriage.
(6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of the
Family Code as regards the husband and wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same Code
in regard to parents and their children. Such non-complied marital obligation(s) must also be stated in
the petition, proven by evidence and included in the text of the decision.
(7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic
Church in the Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by our
courts. It is clear that Article 36 was taken by the Family Code Revision Committee from Canon 1095 of
the New Code of Canon Law, which became effective in 1983 and which provides:
(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor General to
appear as counsel for the state. No decision shall be handed down unless the Solicitor General issues a
certification, which will be quoted in the decision, briefly stating therein his reasons for his agreement
or opposition, as the case may be, to the petition. The Solicitor General, along with the prosecuting
attorney, shall submit to the court such certification within fifteen (15) days from the date the case is
deemed submitted for resolution of the court. The Solicitor General shall discharge the equivalent
function of the defensor vinculi contemplated under Canon 1095.

G.R. No. 130087. September 24, 2003

DIANA M. BARCELONA, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and TADEO R.
BENGZON, respondents.

The complete facts should allege the physical manifestations, if any, as are indicative of psychological
incapacity at the time of the celebration of the marriage but expert opinion need not be alleged.
The obvious effect of the new Rules providing that expert opinion need not be alleged in the petition is
that there is also no need to allege the root cause of the psychological incapacity. Only experts in the fields of
neurological and behavioral sciences are competent to determine the root cause of psychological incapacity.
Since the new Rules do not require the petition to allege expert opinion on the psychological incapacity, it
follows that there is also no need to allege in the petition the root cause of the psychological incapacity.
The petition states a cause of action since it states the legal right of respondent Tadeo, the correlative
obligation of petitioner Diana, and the act or omission of petitioner Diana in violation of the legal right.

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 G.R. No. 149498. May 20, 2004
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. LOLITA QUINTERO-
HAMANO, respondent.

The court cannot presume psychological defect from the mere fact that Toshio abandoned his family
immediately after the celebration of the marriage. As we ruled in Molina, it is not enough to prove that a
spouse failed to meet his responsibility and duty as a married person; it is essential that he must be shown to
be incapable of doing so due to some psychological, not physical, illness. There was no proof of a natal or
supervening disabling factor in the person, an adverse integral element in the personality structure that
effectively incapacitates a person from accepting and complying with the obligations essential to marriage.
In proving psychological incapacity, there is no distinction between an alien spouse and a Filipino
spouse. The court cannot be lenient in the application of the rules merely because the spouse alleged to be
psychologically incapacitated happens to be a foreign national. The medical and clinical rules to determine
psychological incapacity were formulated on the basis of studies of human behavior in general. Hence, the
norms used for determining psychological incapacity should apply to any person regardless of nationality.

G.R. No. 136490. October 19, 2000

BRENDA B. MARCOS, petitioner, vs. WILSON G. MARCOS, respondent.

Article 36 is not to be equated with legal separation in which the grounds need not be rooted in
psychological incapacity but on physical violence, moral pressure, civil interdiction, drug addiction, habitual
alcoholism, sexual infidelity, abandonment and the like.
Psychological incapacity, as a ground for declaring the nullity of a marriage, may be established by the
totality of evidence presented. There is no requirement, however that the respondent should be examined by
a physician or a psychologist as a condition sine qua non for such declaration.
Although the respondent failed to provide support and resorted to physical abuse and abandonment,
there is absolutely no showing that his defects were already present at the inception of the marriage or that
they were incurable.
The petitioner failed to show that the alleged psychological incapacity is characterized by gravity,
juridical antecedence and incurability (Santos vs. CA 240 SCRA 20) and failed to observe the guidelines as
outlined in Republic vs. CA and Molina, 268 SCRA 198.

G.R. No. 151867. January 29, 2004

DAVID B. DEDEL, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and SHARON L. CORPUZ-DEDEL
a.k.a. JANE IBRAHIM, respondents.REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, oppositor-respondent.

Personality disorder is a very complex and elusive phenomenon which defies easy analysis and
definition. In this case, respondents sexual infidelity can hardly qualify as being mentally or psychically ill to
such an extent that she could not have known the obligations she was assuming, or knowing them, could not
have given a valid assumption thereof. It appears that respondents promiscuity did not exist prior to or at the
inception of the marriage.
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 Respondents sexual infidelity or perversion and abandonment do not by themselves constitute
psychological incapacity within the contemplation of the Family Code. Neither could her emotional immaturity
and irresponsibility be equated with psychological incapacity. It must be shown that these acts are
manifestations of a disordered personality which make respondent completely unable to discharge the
essential obligations of the marital state, not merely due to her youth, immaturity or sexual promiscuity.
The evidence presented by petitioner refers only to grounds for legal separation, not for declaring a
marriage void.

G.R. No. 158896. October 27, 2004

JUANITA CARATING-SIAYNGCO, petitioner vs. MANUEL SIAYNGCO, respondent.

The marital obligation which respondent Manuel was not able to fulfill, if any, is the obligation of
fidelity. Sexual infidelity, per se, however, does not constitute psychological incapacity within the
contemplation of the Family Code. It must be shown that respondent Manuels unfaithfulness is a
manifestation of a disordered personality which makes him completely unable to discharge the essential
obligations of the marital state and not merely due to his ardent wish to have a child of his own flesh and
blood.
Respondent failed to prove that his wifes lack of respect for him, her jealousies and obsession with
cleanliness, her outbursts and her controlling nature (especially with respect to his salary), and her inability to
endear herself to his parents are grave psychological maladies that paralyze her from complying with the
essential obligations of marriage. Neither is there any showing that these defects were already present at the
inception of the marriage or that they are incurable
An unsatisfactory marriage, however, is not a null and void marriage. Mere showing of irreconcilable
differences and conflicting personalities in no wise constitutes psychological incapacity.

G.R. No. 167206. November 18, 2005

JAIME F. VILLALON, petitioner vs. MA. CORAZON N. VILLALON, respondent.

The totality of the evidence in this case does not support a finding that petitioner is psychologically
incapacitated to fulfill his marital obligations. On the contrary, what is evident is the fact that petitioner was a
good husband to respondent for a substantial period of time prior to their separation, a loving father to their
children and a good provider of the family. Although he engaged in marital infidelity in at least two occasions,
the same does not appear to be symptomatic of a grave psychological disorder which rendered him incapable
of performing his spousal obligations. The same appears as the result of a general dissatisfaction with his
marriage rather than a psychological disorder rooted in petitioners personal history.
Sexual infidelity, by itself, is not sufficient proof that petitioner is suffering from psychological
incapacity. It must be shown that the acts of unfaithfulness are manifestations of a disordered personality
which make petitioner completely unable to discharge the essential obligations of marriage. The evidence on
record fails to convince us that petitioners marital indiscretions are symptomatic of psychological incapacity
under Article 36 of the Family Code.

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 G.R. No. 162368. July 17, 2006
MA. ARMIDA PEREZ-FERRARIS, petitioner, vs. BRIX FERRARIS, respondent.

There is hardly a doubt that the intendment of the law has been to confine the meaning of
psychological incapacity to the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter
insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage. The respondent's alleged mixed
personality disorder, the "leaving-the-house" attitude whenever they quarreled, the violent tendencies during
epileptic attacks, the sexual infidelity, the abandonment and lack of support, and his preference to spend
more time with his band mates than his family, are not rooted on some debilitating psychological condition
but a mere refusal or unwillingness to assume the essential obligations of marriage.
While petitioner's marriage with the respondent failed and appears to be without hope of
reconciliation, the remedy however is not always to have it declared void ab initio on the ground of
psychological incapacity. An unsatisfactory marriage, however, is not a null and void marriage. No less than
the Constitution recognizes the sanctity of marriage and the unity of the family; it decrees marriage as legally
"inviolable" and protects it from dissolution at the whim of the parties. Both the family and marriage are to be
"protected" by the state.

G.R. No. 155800. March 10, 2006

LEONILO ANTONIO petitioner, vs.MARIE IVONNE F. REYES, respondent.

The court held that the final point of contention is the requirement in the case of Republic vs. CA and
Molina that psychological incapacity be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable. It was on
this score that the Court of Appeals reversed the judgment of the trial court, the appellate court noting that it
did not appear certain that respondents condition was incurable and that Dr. Abcede did not testify to such
effect.
From the totality of the evidence, it would seem, at least, that respondents psychosis is quite grave,
and a cure thereof a remarkable feat. Certainly, it would have been easier had petitioners expert witnesses
characterized respondents condition as incurable. Instead, they remained silent on whether the psychological
incapacity was curable or incurable.
The guidelines laid down the case of Molina are not set in stone, and that the interpretation of Article
36 relies heavily on a case-to-case perception. It would be insensate to reason to mandate in this case an
expert medical or clinical diagnosis of incurability, since the parties would have had no impelling cause to
present evidence to that effect at the time this case was tried by the RTC more than ten (10) years ago. From
the totality of the evidence, the court is sufficiently convinced that the incurability of respondents
psychological incapacity has been established by the petitioner

G.R. No. 166579. February 18, 2010

JORDAN CHAN PAZ, petitioner, vs. JEANICE PAVON PAZ, respondent

It is true that there is no requirement that a party to be declared psychologically incapacitated should
be personally examined by a physician or a psychologist, there is nevertheless a need to prove the
psychological incapacity through independent evidence adduced by the person alleging said disorder. In this
case, the only basis upon which Dr. Gates made her conclusion were the information fed to her by

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Jeanice. Consequently, Gates report and testimony were hearsay evidence since she had no personal
knowledge of the alleged facts she was testifying on. Gates testimony should have thus been dismissed for
being unscientific and unreliable.

G.R. No. 164493. March 10, 2010

JOCELYN M. SUAZO, petitioner, vs. ANGELITO SUAZO and REPUBLIC OF
THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.

The court held that Jocelyns evidence insufficient to establish Angelitos psychological incapacity to
perform essential marital obligations. Both the psychologists testimony and the psychological report did not
conclusively show the root cause, gravity and incurability of Angelitos alleged psychological condition.
Habitual drunkenness, gambling and refusal to find a job, while indicative of psychological incapacity,
do not, by themselves, show psychological incapacity. All these simply indicate difficulty, neglect or mere
refusal to perform marital obligations that, as the cited jurisprudence holds, cannot be considered to be
constitutive of psychological incapacity in the absence of proof that these are manifestations of an incapacity
rooted in some debilitating psychological condition or illness.

G.R. No. 104818. September 17, 1993

ROBERTO DOMINGO, petitioner, vs.COURT OF APPEALS and DELIA SOLEDAD AVERA
represented by her Attorney-in-Fact MOISES R. AVERA, respondents
(Article 40, Family Code)

Relevant issue: Whether or not a petition for judicial declaration of a void marriage is necessary. If in
the affirmative, whether the same should be filed only for purposes of remarriage.

Supreme Courts Ruling:

Article 40 of the Family Code provides:

The absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked for purposes of remarriage on the basis
solely of a final judgment declaring such previous marriage void.

A declaration of the absolute nullity of marriage is now explicitly required either as a cause of action or
a ground for defense. Where the absolute nullity of a previous marriage is sought to be invoked for purpose of
contracting a second marriage, the sole basis acceptable in law for the said projected marriage be free from
legal infirmity is a final judgment declaring the previous marriage void.
The requirement for a declaration of absolute nullity of a marriage is also for the protection of the
spouse who, believing that his or her marriage is illegal and void, marries again. With the judicial declaration of
the nullity of his or her first marriage, the person who marries again cannot be charged with bigamy.
Article 40 as finally formulated included the significant clause denotes that final judgment declaring
the previous marriage void need not be obtained only for purposes of remarriage. A person can conceive of
other instances other than remarriage, such as in case of an action for liquidation, partition, distribution and
separation of property between the spouses, as well as an action for the custody and support of their common

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children and the delivery of the latters' presumptive legitimes. In such cases, however, one is required by law
to show proof that the previous one was an absolute nullity.
Marriage is an inviolable social institution, is the foundation of the family; as such, it shall be
protected by the State. As a matter of policy, there should be a final judgment declaring the marriage void and
a party should not declare for himself or herself whether or not the marriage is void.

G.R. No. 137567. June 20, 2000

MEYNARDO L. BELTRAN, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, and HON. JUDGE
FLORENTINO TUAZON, JR., being the Judge of the RTC, Branch 139, Makati City, respondents.
(Article 40, Family Code)

Relevant issue: Whether or not the pendency of the petition for declaration of nullity of marriage
based on psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code is a prejudicial question that should
merit the suspension of the criminal case for concubinage.

Supreme Courts Ruling: The rationale behind the principle of prejudicial question is to avoid two
conflicting decisions. It has two essential elements: (a) the civil action involves an issue similar or intimately
related to the issue raised in the criminal action; and (b) the resolution of such issue determines whether or
not the criminal action may proceed.
The pendency of the case for declaration of nullity of petitioner's marriage is not a prejudicial question
to the concubinage case. For a civil case to be considered prejudicial to a criminal action as to cause the
suspension of the latter pending the final determination of the civil case, it must appear not only that the said
civil case involves the same facts upon which the criminal prosecution would be based, but also that in the
resolution of the issue or issues raised in the aforesaid civil action, the guilt or innocence of the accused would
necessarily be determined.

G.R. No. 138509. July 31, 2000

IMELDA MARBELLA-BOBIS, petitioner, vs. ISAGANI D. BOBIS, respondent.
(Article 40, Family Code)

Relevant issue: Whether the subsequent filing of a civil action for declaration of nullity of a previous
marriage constitutes a prejudicial question to a criminal case for bigamy.

Supreme Courts ruling: Article 40 of the Family Code, which was effective at the time of celebration
of the second marriage, requires a prior judicial declaration of nullity of a previous marriage before a party
may remarry.
The respondent, without first having obtained the judicial declaration of nullity of the first marriage, ca
not be said to have validly entered into the second marriage. Per current jurisprudence, a marriage though
void still needs a judicial declaration of such fact before any party can marry again; otherwise the second
marriage will also be void. The reason is that, without a judicial declaration of its nullity, the first marriage is
presumed to be subsisting. In the case at bar, respondent was for all legal intents and purposes regarded as a
married man at the time he contracted his second marriage with petitioner. Against this legal backdrop, any
decision in the civil action for nullity would not erase the fact that respondent entered into a second marriage
during the subsistence of a first marriage. Thus, a decision in the civil case is not essential to the determination
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of the criminal charge. It is, therefore, not a prejudicial question. As stated above, respondent cannot be
permitted to use his own malfeasance to defeat the criminal action against him.

G.R. No. 137110. August 1, 2000

VINCENT PAUL G. MERCADO a.k.a. VINCENT G. MERCADO, petitioner, vs. CONSUELO
TAN, respondent.
(Article 40, Family Code)

Relevant issue: Effect of Nullity of Previous Marriage

Supreme Courts ruling: A judicial declaration of nullity of a previous marriage is necessary before a
subsequent marriage can be legally contracted. In the instant case, petitioner contracted a second marriage
although there was yet no judicial declaration of nullity of his first marriage. In fact, he instituted the Petition
to have the first marriage declared void only after complainant had filed a letter-complaint charging him with
bigamy. By contracting a second marriage while the first was still subsisting, he committed the acts punishable
under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code.
That he subsequently obtained a judicial declaration of the nullity of the first marriage was
immaterial. To repeat, the crime had already been consummated by then. Moreover, his view effectively
encourages delay in the prosecution of bigamy cases; an accused could simply file a petition to declare his
previous marriage void and invoke the pendency of that action as a prejudicial question in the criminal
case. Under the circumstances of the present case, he is guilty of the charge against him.

G.R. No. 145226. February 06, 2004

LUCIO MORIGO y CACHO, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.
(Article 40, Family Code)

Relevant issue: Whether or not the petitioner is guilty of bigamy

Supreme Courts ruling: The first element of bigamy as a crime requires that the accused must have
been legally married. But in this case, legally speaking, the petitioner was never married to the private
respondent. Thus, there is no first marriage to speak of. Under the principle of retroactivity of a marriage
being declared void ab initio, the two were never married from the beginning. The contract of marriage is null;
it bears no legal effect. Taking this argument to its logical conclusion, for legal purposes, petitioner was not
married to the respondent at the time he contracted the second marriage. The existence and the validity of
the first marriage being an essential element of the crime of bigamy, it is but logical that a conviction for said
offense cannot be sustained where there is no first marriage to speak of.
In the instant case, however, no marriage ceremony at all was performed by a duly authorized
solemnizing officer. The mere private act of signing a marriage contract bears no semblance to a valid
marriage and thus, needs no judicial declaration of nullity. Such act alone, without more, cannot be deemed to
constitute an ostensibly valid marriage for which petitioner might be held liable for bigamy unless he first
secures a judicial declaration of nullity before he contracts a subsequent marriage.

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 G.R. No. 136467. April 6, 2000
ANTONIA ARMAS Y CALISTERIO, petitioner, vs. MARIETTA CALISTERIO, respondent.
(Article 40, Family Code)

Relevant Issue: Whether or not judicial declaration of presumptive death of the prior spouse is
necessary to nullify marriage with an absentee spouse

Supreme Courts ruling: A subsequent marriage contracted during the lifetime of the first spouse is
illegal and void ab initio unless the prior marriage is first annulled or dissolved. A judicial declaration of
absence of the absentee spouse is not necessary as long as the prescribed period of absence is met. It is
equally noteworthy that the marriage in these exceptional cases are, by the explicit mandate of Article 83, to
be deemed valid "until declared null and void by a competent court." It follows that the burden of proof would
be, in these cases, on the party assailing the second marriage.
In contrast, under the 1988 Family Code, in order that a subsequent bigamous marriage may
exceptionally be considered valid, the following conditions must concur; (a) The prior spouse of the
contracting party must have been absent for four consecutive years, or two years where there is danger of
death under the circumstances stated in Article 391 of the Civil Code at the time of disappearance; (b) the
spouse present has a well-founded belief that the absent spouse is already dead; and (c) there is, unlike the
old rule, a judicial declaration of presumptive death of the absentee for which purpose the spouse present can
institute a summary proceeding in court to ask for that declaration. The last condition is consistent and in
consonance with the requirement of judicial intervention in subsequent marriages as so provided in Article 41,
in relation to Article 40, of the Family Code. Me
This second marriage, having been contracted during the regime of the Civil Code, should thus be
deemed valid notwithstanding the absence of a judicial declaration of presumptive death of the prior spouse.

G.R. No. 94053. March 17, 1993

Republic of the Philippines, petitioner vs. Nolasco, respondent
(Article 41, Family Code)

Relevant issue: Existence of well-founded belief

Supreme Courts ruling: Under Article 41 of the Family Code, there are four (4) essential requisites for
the declaration of presumptive death:
1. That the absent spouse has been missing for four consecutive years, or two consecutive years if the
disappearance occurred where there is danger of death under the circumstances laid down in Article
391, Civil Code;
2. That the present spouse wishes to remarry;
3. That the present spouse has a wellfounded belief that the absentee is dead; and
4. That the present spouse files a summary proceeding for the declaration of presumptive death of the
absentee
Nolasco failed to prove that he had complied with the third requirement under the Article 41 of the
Family Code, the existence of a "well-founded belief" that Janet is already dead.

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 The time required for the presumption to arise has been shortened to 4 years; however, there is a
need for judicial declaration of presumptive death to enable the spouse present to marry. However, Article
41 imposes a stricter standard before declaring presumptive death of one spouse. It requires a "well-founded
belief" that the absentee is already dead before a petition for declaration of presumptive death can be
granted.
In the case at bar, the Court found Nolasco's alleged attempt to ascertain about Janet's whereabouts
too sketchy to form the basis of a reasonable or well-founded belief that she was already dead.
Nolasco, after returning from his employment, instead of seeking help of local authorities or of the
British Embassy, secured another contract to London. Janet's alleged refusal to give any information about her
was too convenient an excuse to justify his failure to locate her. He did not explain why he took him 9 months
to finally reached San Jose after he asked leave from his captain. He refused to identify his friends whom he
inquired from. When the Court asked Nolasco about the returned letters, he said he had lost them. Moreover,
while he was in London, he did not even dare to solicit help of authorities to find his wife.
The circumstances of Janet's departure and Nolasco's subsequent behavior make it very difficult to
regard the claimed belief that Janet was dead a well-founded one.

G.R. No. 184621 December 10, 2013

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES,petitioner, vs. MARIA FE ESPINOSA
CANTOR, respondent.
(Article 41, Family Code)
Relevant issue: Existence of well-founded belief

Supreme Courts ruling: Before a judicial declaration of presumptive death can be obtained, it must be
shown that the prior spouse had been absent for four consecutive years and the present spouse had a well-
founded belief that the prior spouse was already dead.
Under Article 41 of the Family Code, there are four (4) essential requisites for the declaration of
presumptive death:
1. That the absent spouse has been missing for four consecutive years, or two consecutive years if the
disappearance occurred where there is danger of death under the circumstances laid down in Article 391,
Civil Code;
2. That the present spouse wishes to remarry;
3. That the present spouse has a wellfounded belief that the absentee is dead; and
4. That the present spouse files a summary proceeding for the declaration of presumptive death of the
absentee
The law did not define what is meant by wellfounded belief. It depends upon the circumstances of
each particular case. Its determination, so to speak, remains on a casetocase basis. To be able to comply
with this requirement, the present spouse must prove that his/her belief was the result of diligent and
reasonable efforts and inquiries to locate the absent spouse and that based on these efforts and inquiries,
he/she believes that under the circumstances, the absent spouse is already dead. It requires exertion of active
effort (not a mere passive one).
In the case at bar, the respondents "well-founded belief" was anchored on her alleged "earnest
efforts" to locate Jerry by inquiries and through the patients directory when she went to the hospital.
These efforts, however, fell short of the "stringent standard" and degree of diligence required by
jurisprudence. There was no other corroborative evidence to support the respondents claim that she

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conducted a diligent search. Neither was there supporting evidence proving that she had a well-founded belief
other than her bare claims that she inquired from her friends and in-laws about her husbands whereabouts.
The application of this stricter standard becomes even more imperative if we consider the States policy
to protect and strengthen the institution of marriage

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