[G.R. Nos. 132875-76. February 3, 2000]
The provision granting an exemption as a
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs. ROMEO G. JALOSJOS, accused-appellant.
RESOLUTION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
The accused-appellant, Romeo G. Jalosjos is a full-fledged
member of Congress who is now confined at the national
penitentiary while his conviction for statutory rape on two
counts and acts of lasciviousness on six counts [1] is pending
appeal. The accused-appellant filed this motion asking that
he be allowed to fully discharge the duties of a
Congressman, including attendance at legislative sessions
and committee meetings despite his having been convicted
in the first instance of a non-bailable offense.
The issue raised is one of first impression.
Does membership in Congress exempt an accused from
statutes and rules which apply to validly incarcerated
persons in general? In answering the query, we are called
upon to balance relevant and conflicting factors in the
judicial interpretation of legislative privilege in the context
of penal law.
The accused-appellants "Motion To Be Allowed To Discharge
Mandate As Member of House of Representatives" was filed
on the grounds that
1. Accused-appellants reelection being
an expression of popular will cannot be
rendered inutile by any ruling, giving
priority to any right or interest not
even the police power of the State.
2. To deprive the electorate of their
elected representative amounts to
taxation without representation.
3. To bar accused-appellant from
performing his duties amounts to his
suspension/removal and mocks the
renewed mandate entrusted to him by
the people.
4. The electorate of the First District of
Zamboanga del Norte wants their voice
to be heard.
5. A precedent-setting U.S. ruling restrictive sense.
allowed a detained lawmaker to attend
sessions of the U.S. Congress.
6. The House treats accused-appellant
as a bona fide member thereof and
urges a co-equal branch of government
to respect its mandate.
7. The concept of temporary detention
does not necessarily curtail the duty of
accused-appellant to discharge his
mandate.
8. Accused-appellant has always
complied with the
conditions/restrictions when allowed to
leave jail.
The primary argument of the movant is the "mandate of
sovereign will." He states that the sovereign electorate of
the First District of Zamboanga del Norte chose him as their
representative in Congress. Having been re-elected by his
constituents, he has the duty to perform the functions of a
Congressman. He calls this a covenant with his constituents
made possible by the intervention of the State. He adds
that it cannot be defeated by insuperable procedural
restraints arising from pending criminal cases.
True, election is the expression of the sovereign power of
the people. In the exercise of suffrage, a free people
expects to achieve the continuity of government and the
perpetuation of its benefits. However, inspite of its
importance, the privileges and rights arising from having
been elected may be enlarged or restricted by law. Our
first task is to ascertain the applicable law.
We start with the incontestable proposition that all top
officials of Government-executive, legislative, and judicial
are subject to the majesty of law. There is an unfortunate
misimpression in the public mind that election or
appointment to high government office, by itself, frees the
official from the common restraints of general law.
Privilege has to be granted by law, not inferred from the
duties of a position. In fact, the higher the rank, the
greater is the requirement of obedience rather than
exemption.
The immunity from arrest or detention of Senators and
members of the House of Representatives, the latter
customarily addressed as Congressmen, arises from a
provision of the Constitution. The history of the provision
shows that the privilege has always been granted in a
special privilege cannot be extended beyond the ordinary
meaning of its terms. It may not be extended by
intendment, implication or equitable considerations.
The 1935 Constitution provided in its Article VI on the
Legislative Department:
Sec. 15. The Senators and Members of
the House of Representatives shall in
all cases except treason, felony, and
breach of the peace be privileged from
arrest during their attendance at the
sessions of Congress, and in going to
and returning from the same; xxx.
Because of the broad coverage of felony and breach of the
peace, the exemption applied only to civil arrests. A
congressman like the accused-appellant, convicted under
Title Eleven of the Revised Penal Code could not claim
parliamentary immunity from arrest. He was subject to the
same general laws governing all persons still to be tried or
whose convictions were pending appeal.
The 1973 Constitution broadened the privilege of immunity
as follows:
Article VIII, Sec. 9. A Member of the
Batasang Pambansa shall, in all
offenses punishable by not more than
six years imprisonment, be privileged
from arrest during his attendance at its
sessions and in going to and returning
from the same.
For offenses punishable by more than six years
imprisonment, there was no immunity from arrest. The
restrictive interpretation of immunity and the intent to
confine it within carefully defined parameters is illustrated
by the concluding portion of the provision, to wit:
xxx but the Batasang Pambansa shall
surrender the member involved to the
custody of the law within twenty four
hours after its adjournment for a recess
or for its next session, otherwise such
privilege shall cease upon its failure to
do so.
The present Constitution adheres to the same restrictive
rule minus the obligation of Congress to surrender the
subject Congressman to the custody of the law. The
requirement that he should be attending sessions or
committee meetings has also been removed. For relatively
minor offenses, it is enough that Congress is in session.
The accused-appellant argues that a member of Congress
function to attend sessions is underscored by Section 16
(2), Article VI of the Constitution which states that
(2) A majority of each House shall
constitute a quorum to do business, but
a smaller number may adjourn from
day to day and may compel the
attendance of absent Members in such
manner, and under such penalties, as
such House may provide.
However, the accused-appellant has not given any reason
why he should be exempted from the operation of Section
11, Article VI of the Constitution. The members of Congress
cannot compel absent members to attend sessions if the
reason for the absence is a legitimate one. The
confinement of a Congressman charged with a crime
punishable by imprisonment of more than six months is not
merely authorized by law, it has constitutional foundations.
Accused-appellants reliance on the ruling in Aguinaldo v.
Santos[2], which states, inter alia, that
The Court should never remove a public
officer for acts done prior to his
present term of office. To do otherwise
would be to deprive the people of their
right to elect their officers. When a
people have elected a man to office, it
must be assumed that they did this
with the knowledge of his life and
character, and that they disregarded or
forgave his fault or misconduct, if he
had been guilty of any. It is not for the
Court, by reason of such fault or
misconduct, to practically overrule the
will of the people.
will not extricate him from his predicament. It can be
readily seen in the above-quoted ruling that
the Aguinaldo case involves the administrative removal of a
public officer for acts done prior to his present term of
office. It does not apply to imprisonment arising from the
enforcement of criminal law. Moreover, in the same way
that preventive suspension is not removal, confinement
pending appeal is not removal. He remains a congressman
unless expelled by Congress or, otherwise, disqualified.
One rationale behind confinement, whether pending appeal
or after final conviction, is public self-defense. Society
must protect itself. It also serves as an example and
warning to others.
A person charged with crime is taken into custody for
purposes of the administration of justice. As stated
in United States v. Gustilo,[3] it is the injury to the public
which State action in criminal law seeks to redress. It is not
the injury to the complainant. After conviction in the
Regional Trial Court, the accused may be denied bail and
thus subjected to incarceration if there is risk of his
absconding.[4]
The accused-appellant states that the plea of the
electorate which voted him into office cannot be
supplanted by unfounded fears that he might escape
eventual punishment if permitted to perform congressional
duties outside his regular place of confinement.
It will be recalled that when a warrant for accused-
appellants arrest was issued, he fled and evaded capture
despite a call from his colleagues in the House of
Representatives for him to attend the sessions and to
surrender voluntarily to the authorities. Ironically, it is now
the same body whose call he initially spurned which
accused-appellant is invoking to justify his present motion.
This can not be countenanced because, to reiterate, aside
from its being contrary to well-defined Constitutional
restrains, it would be a mockery of the aims of the States
penal system.
Accused-appellant argues that on several occasions, the
Regional Trial Court of Makati granted several motions to
temporarily leave his cell at the Makati City Jail, for
official or medical reasons, to wit:
a) to attend hearings of the House
Committee on Ethics held at the
Batasan Complex, Quezon City, on the
issue of whether to expel/suspend him
from the House of Representatives;
b) to undergo dental examination and
treatment at the clinic of his dentist in
Makati City;
c) to undergo a thorough medical
check-up at the Makati Medical Center,
Makati City;
d) to register as a voter at his
hometown in Dapitan City. In this case,
accused-appellant commuted by
chartered plane and private vehicle.
He also calls attention to various instances, after his
transfer at the New Bilibid Prison in Muntinlupa City, when
he was likewise allowed/permitted to leave the prison
premises, to wit:
a) to join "living-out" prisoners on
"work-volunteer program" for the
purpose of 1) establishing a mahogany
seedling bank and 2) planting
mahogany trees, at the NBP
reservation. For this purpose, he was
assigned one guard and allowed to use
his own vehicle and driver in going to
and from the project area and his place
of confinement.
b) to continue with his dental
treatment at the clinic of his dentist in
Makati City.
c) to be confined at the Makati Medical
Center in Makati City for his heart
condition.
There is no showing that the above privileges are peculiar
to him or to a member of Congress. Emergency or
compelling temporary leaves from imprisonment are
allowed to all prisoners, at the discretion of the authorities
or upon court orders.
What the accused-appellant seeks is not of an emergency
nature. Allowing accused-appellant to attend congressional
sessions and committee meetings for five (5) days or more
in a week will virtually make him a free man with all the
privileges appurtenant to his position. Such an aberrant
situation not only elevates accused-appellants status to
that of a special class, it also would be a mockery of the
purposes of the correction system. Of particular relevance
in this regard are the following observations of the Court
in Martinez v. Morfe:[5]
The above conclusion reached by this
Court is bolstered and fortified by
policy considerations. There is, to be
sure, a full recognition of the necessity
to have members of Congress, and
likewise delegates to the Constitutional
Convention, entitled to the utmost
freedom to enable them to discharge
their vital responsibilities, bowing to no
other force except the dictates of their
 conscience. Necessarily the utmost
latitude in free speech should be
accorded them. When it comes to
freedom from arrest, however, it would
amount to the creation of a privileged
class, without justification in reason, if
notwithstanding their liability for a
criminal offense, they would be
considered immune during their
attendance in Congress and in going to
and returning from the same. There is
likely to be no dissent from the
proposition that a legislator or a
delegate can perform his functions
efficiently and well, without the need
for any transgression of the criminal
law. Should such an unfortunate event
come to pass, he is to be treated like
any other citizen considering that there
is a strong public interest in seeing to it
that crime should not go unpunished.
To the fear that may be expressed that
the prosecuting arm of the government
might unjustly go after legislators
belonging to the minority, it suffices to
answer that precisely all the safeguards
thrown around an accused by the
Constitution, solicitous of the rights of
an individual, would constitute an
obstacle to such an attempt at abuse of
power. The presumption of course is
that the judiciary would remain
independent. It is trite to say that in
each and every manifestation of
judicial endeavor, such a virtue is of
the essence.
The accused-appellant avers that his constituents in the
First District of Zamboanga del Norte want their voices to
be heard and that since he is treated as bona fide member
of the House of Representatives, the latter urges a co-
equal branch of government to respect his mandate. He
also claims that the concept of temporary detention does
not necessarily curtail his duty to discharge his mandate
and that he has always complied with the
conditions/restrictions when he is allowed to leave jail.
We remain unpersuaded.
No less than accused-appellant himself admits that like any
other member of the House of Representatives "[h]e is
provided with a congressional office situated at Room N-
214, North Wing Building, House of Representatives
Complex, Batasan Hills, Quezon City, manned by a full
complement of staff paid for by Congress. Through [an]
inter-department coordination, he is also provided with an
office at the Administration Building, New Bilibid Prison, compelling under the law of nature. A doctor with unique
Muntinlupa City, where he attends to his constituents." skills has the duty to save the lives of those with a
Accused-appellant further admits that while under particular affliction. An elective governor has to serve
detention, he has filed several bills and resolutions. It also provincial constituents. A police officer must maintain
appears that he has been receiving his salaries and other peace and order. Never has the call of a particular duty
monetary benefits. Succinctly stated, accused-appellant lifted a prisoner into a different classification from those
has been discharging his mandate as a member of the others who are validly restrained by law.
House of Representative consistent with the restraints upon
one who is presently under detention. Being a detainee,
A strict scrutiny of classifications is essential lest wittingly
accused-appellant should not even have been allowed by
or otherwise, insidious discriminations are made in favor of
the prison authorities at the National Pentientiary to
or against groups or types of individuals.[8]
perform these acts.
The Court cannot validate badges of inequality. The
When the voters of his district elected the accused-
necessities imposed by public welfare may justify exercise
appellant to Congress, they did so with full awareness of
of government authority to regulate even if thereby certain
the limitations on his freedom of action. They did so with
groups may plausibly assert that their interests are
the knowledge that he could achieve only such legislative
disregarded.[9]
results which he could accomplish within the confines of
prison. To give a more drastic illustration, if voters elect a
person with full knowledge that he is suffering from a We, therefore, find that election to the position of
terminal illness, they do so knowing that at any time, he Congressman is not a reasonable classification in criminal
may no longer serve his full term in office. law enforcement. The functions and duties of the office
are not substantial distinctions which lift him from the
class of prisoners interrupted in their freedom and
In the ultimate analysis, the issue before us boils down to a
restricted in liberty of movement. Lawful arrest and
question of constitutional equal protection.
confinement are germane to the purposes of the law and
apply to all those belonging to the same class.[10]
The Constitution guarantees: "x x x nor shall any person be
denied the equal protection of laws." [6] This simply means
Imprisonment is the restraint of a mans personal liberty;
that all persons similarly situated shall be treated alike
coercion exercised upon a person to prevent the free
both in rights enjoyed and responsibilities imposed.[7] The
exercise of his power of locomotion.[11]
organs of government may not show any undue favoritism
or hostility to any person. Neither partiality nor prejudice
shall be displayed. More explicitly, "imprisonment" in its general sense, is the
restraint of ones liberty. As a punishment, it is restraint by
judgment of a court or lawful tribunal, and is personal to
Does being an elective official result in a substantial
the accused.[12] The term refers to the restraint on the
distinction that allows different treatment? Is being a
personal liberty of another; any prevention of his
Congressman a substantial differentiation which removes
movements from place to place, or of his free action
the accused-appellant as a prisoner from the same class as
according to his own pleasure and will.[13] Imprisonment is
all persons validly confined under law?
the detention of another against his will depriving him of
his power of locomotion[14] and it "[is] something more than
The performance of legitimate and even essential duties by mere loss of freedom. It includes the notion of restraint
public officers has never been an excuse to free a person within limits defined by wall or any exterior barrier."[15]
validly in prison. The duties imposed by the "mandate of
the people" are multifarious. The accused-appellant asserts
It can be seen from the foregoing that incarceration, by its
that the duty to legislate ranks highest in the hierarchy of
nature, changes an individuals status in society.[16] Prison
government. The accused-appellant is only one of 250
officials have the difficult and often thankless job of
members of the House of Representatives, not to mention
preserving the security in a potentially explosive setting, as
the 24 members of the Senate, charged with the duties of
well as of attempting to provide rehabilitation that
legislation. Congress continues to function well in the
prepares inmates for re-entry into the social mainstream.
physical absence of one or a few of its members.
Necessarily, both these demands require the curtailment
Depending on the exigency of Government that has to be
and elimination of certain rights.[17]
addressed, the President or the Supreme Court can also be
deemed the highest for that particular duty. The
importance of a function depends on the need for its Premises considered, we are constrained to rule against the
exercise. The duty of a mother to nurse her infant is most accused-appellants claim that re-election to public office
gives priority to any other right or interest, including the
police power of the State.

WHEREFORE, the instant motion is hereby DENIED.

SO ORDERED.

Kapunan, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Purisima, Pardo,

Buena, and De Leon, Jr., JJ., concur.

Gonzaga-Reyes, J., see separate concurring opinion.

Davide, Jr., C.J., Bellosillo, Melo, Puno,

Vitug, and Mendoza, JJ., concurs in the main and separate
opinion.

[1]
RTC Decision, pp. 54-55.
[2]
212 SCRA 768, at 773 [1992].
[3]
19 Phil. 208, 212.
[4]
Cubillo v. City Warden, 97 SCRA 771 [1980].
[5]
44 SCRA 37 [1972].
[6]
Art. III, Sec. 1.
[7]
Ichong v. Hernandez, 101 Phil. 1155.
[8]
Skinuer v. Oklahoma, 315 US 535.
[9]
See Fernando, Constitution of the Philippines, 2nd
Edition, p. 548.
[10]
See Felwa v. Salas, 18 SCRA 606 [1966];
Ichong v. Hernandez, 101 Phil. 1155; Dumlao v. Commission
on Elections, 95 SCRA 392 [1980]; Ceniza v. Commission on
Elections, 96 SCRA 763 (1980); People v. Cayat, 68 Phil. 12.
[11]
Blacks Law Dictionary, Special Deluxe 5th Ed., p. 681.
[12]
20 Words And Phrases, Permanent Ed., p. 466, citing
US v. Safeway Stores [Tex.] C.C.C.A. Kan. 140 F 2d 834,
839 and US v. Mitchell, 163 F. 1014, 1016 at p. 470.
[13]
Ibid., p. 470, citing Pine v. Okzewski, 170 A. 825, 827,
112 N.J.L. 429.
[14]
Id., p. 472, citing US v. Benner, 24 Fed. Cas. 1084, 1087.
[15]
Id., citing Bird v. Jones, 4 N.Y. Leg. Obs. 158, 159.
[16]
Sheldon, Krantz, 1988 Supplement. The Law of
Correction and Prisoners Rights, 3rd Ed., p. 121.
[17]
Ibid.