People vs.

Silongan

Facts: The appellants in this case, who are a Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) and Moro
National Liberation Front (MNLF) rebel surrenderees, were convicted in the Regional Trial Court
for the crime of kidnapping with Serious Illegal Detention of Alexander Saldaa and his three
companions. The four victims were taken to a mountain hideout and the appellants demanded
ransom money for their release. Alexander was detained for six months until he was finally
released.

Issue: Whether or not the crime of kidnapping committed by the accused should be absorbed in
rebellion?

Held: As regards the argument that the crime was politically motivated and that consequently, the
charge should have been rebellion and not kidnapping, we find the same likewise to be without
merit. As held in Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Zamboanga Del Norte vs. CA, the political
motivation for the crime must be shown in order to justify finding the crime committed to be
rebellion. Merely because it is alleged that appellants were members of the Moro Islamic Liberation
Front or of the Moro National Liberation Front does not necessarily mean that the crime of
kidnapping was committed in furtherance of a rebellion. Here, the evidence adduced is insufficient
for a finding that the crime committed was politically motivated. Neither have the appellants
sufficiently proven their allegation that the present case was filed against them because they are
rebel surrenderees. This court has invariably viewed the defense of frame-up with disfavor. Like
the defense of alibi, it can be just as easily concocted.
Guillergan vs. People

Facts: Guillergan was convicted for an offense other than that charged in the Information based on
a claim that the essential elements of the offense of which he was convicted are also elements of
the offense charged in the Information. The Information alleged that Guillergan committed
falsification by making it appear in several public documents that P1,519,000.00 in AFP funds
intended for the CIAs payroll were paid for that purpose when in truth these were just given to Rio,
resulting in damage and prejudice to the government. Although the charge was estafa in relation
to Article 171 of the RPC, the facts alleged in the information sufficiently made out a case for
violation of Article 172 of the RPC for which Guillergan was convicted. Given that some of the
essential elements of Article 171 constitute the lesser offense of falsification of public documents
under Article 172, then the allegations in the Information were sufficient to hold Guillergan liable
under Article 172. What is important is that the Information described the latter offense intelligibly
and with reasonable certainty, enabling Guillergan to understand the charge against him and
suitably prepare his defense.

Formilleza vs Sandiganbayan
Facts: Petitioner was the personnel supervisor of the National Irrigation Administration (NIA) in
Tacloban City. Her duties include processing of appointment papers of employees. She was
charged for her alleged refusal toattend to the appointment papers of a certain Mrs. Mutia, a
coterminous employee. Mrs. Mutia testified that petitioner asked from her some money as a
consideration.

Attempts to entrap petitioner then ensued. Petitioner and Mrs. Mutia supposedly agreed to meet at
the canteen. Some of their officemates Mrs. Sevilla and a certain Mrs. Dimaano joined them
in the canteen. They occupied two squareshaped tables joined together. The petitioner sat at the
head of the table with Mrs. Mutia seated at her left, Mrs. Dimaano at her (the petitioners) right and
Mrs. Sevilla at the right of Mrs. Dimaano. Member of the Philippine Constabulary (PC) brought
along a camera in order to take photographs of the entrapment. The marked money was folded
altogether. After the money had been delivered and received, pictures were taken, one of them
depicting the accused held by member of the PC on the left hand and another showing the
accused also held on the left hand by one of the PC men, and the complainant, Mrs. Mutia,
drinking from a glass. The petitioner was arrested by the soldiers despite her objections to the
entrapment. She denied having accepted the supposed bribe money. The case was brought to the
respondent court which ruled that the crime committed by the petitioner was not Direct Bribery as
defined in Article 210 of the Revised Penal Code cited in the Information but Indirect Bribery as
defined under Article 211 of the same code.

Issue: Whether or not petitioner was properly convicted of the crime of indirect bribery?

Held: No. The essential ingredient of indirect bribery as defined in Article 211 of the Revised Penal
Code is that the public officer concerned must have accepted the gift or material consideration.
There must be a clear intention on the part of the public officer to take the gift so offered and
consider the same as his own property from then on, such as putting away the gift for safekeeping
or pocketing the same. Mere physical receipt unaccompanied by any other sign, circumstance or
act to show such acceptance is not sufficient to lead the court to conclude that the crime of indirect
bribery has been committed. An examination of the seven photographs that were allegedly taken
immediately after the passing of the money shows that the petitioner was standing up when the PC
agents apprehended her. There was no pictureshowing petitioner to be seated which should be her
position immediately after the money was handed to her under the table. None of the photographs
show the petitioner in the process of appropriating or keeping the money after it was handed to
her.

Chua vs Nuestro
Facts: Complainant Rina V. Chua filed an administrative charge against the respondent for
allegedly delaying the enforcement of the writ of execution in her favor after demanding and getting
from her the sum of 1500 pesos.On September 12, 1988, when the court issued a writ of
execution, Chua and counsel asked respondent Deputy-Sheriff Edgardo D. Nuestro to immediately
enforce the writ of execution against the defendant, and for the purpose, they agreed to give 1000
pesos to the respondent. Respondent received the amount of 1000 pesos on September 12, 1988;
however, the next day, they saw the respondent talking with counsel of defendant and that the
respondent was hesitant in proceeding to carry out the writ of execution. Respondent even asked
for a additional amount of P500.00; consequently, in the afternoon of the same day, respondent
went to the premises in question and when he arrived there, but he was told by the judge not to
proceed because a supersede as bond was filed. Nevertheless, he found the premises locked, and
at the insistence of the complainant, they broke the padlock and entered portion B of the premises.
Later, counsel for defendant arrived and showed them the official receipt of payment of the
supersede as bond and so he discontinued the execution proceedings.

Issue: Whether Chua and counsel be charged of corruption of public official when they gave to the
respondent the amount of 1500 pesos in consideration of enforcing the writ of execution.

Held: While we cannot fault the sheriff for his hesitance to immediately carry out the writ of
execution because the defendant still had time to file supersede as bond to stay execution, we find
duly proved by preponderance of evidence that the respondent Deputy Sheriff Edgardo D. Nuestro
received the amount of P1,500.00 from the complainant and her lawyer as a consideration for the
performance of his work. This amount is distinct from the sheriffs fee and expenses of execution
and was not intended for that purpose. It was indeed a bribe given and received by respondent
deputy sheriff from the complainant.

Davalos vs People
Facts: On January 14, 1988, petitioner Davalos, as supply officer of the Office of the Provincial
Engineer of Marinduque, received from the provincial cashier a cash advance of P18,000.00
covered by Philippine National Bank (PNB) Check No. SN-189833-N for the procurement of
working tools for a certain NALGO" project. On May 5, 1988, petitioner received a demand letter
from then Provincial Treasurer Timoteo Magalang giving him until May 16, 1988 to submit a
liquidation of the aforementioned P18,000.00 cash advance. This was followed by another letter
received by petitioner on May 26, 1988, giving him this time up to May 31, 1999 to settle his
account.
Despite his belief that he was then no longer obligated to liquidate his P18,000.00 cash advance,
petitioner nonetheless settled his account. Petitioner brushed aside the charge of malversation and
declared that he had already been relieved of his accountabilities by the Commission on Audit. He,
however, admitted receiving from the provincial treasurer the two demand letters earlier adverted
to dated May 5, 1988 and May 26, 1988 requiring him to submit his liquidation of the P18,000.00
cash advance on the dates respectively indicated therein. On June 30, 2000, the Sandiganbayan
rendered its decision, finding petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
malversation of public funds and sentencing him accordingly.

Issue: Whether or not the alleged acts of the petitioner constitute the crime charge?

Held: The elements essential for the conviction of an accused under the above penal provision are;
that the offender is a public officer; that he has the custody or control of funds or property by
reason of the duties of his office; that the funds or property are public funds or property for which
he is accountable; and that he appropriated, took, misappropriated or consented or through
abandonment or negligence, permitted another person to take them. The Supreme court ruled that
there can hardly be no dispute about the presence of the first three elements. Petitioner is a public
officer occupying the position of a supply officer at the Office of the Provincial Engineer of
Marinduque. In that capacity, he receives money or property belonging to the provincial
government for which he is bound to account. In the crime of malversation, all that is necessary for
conviction is sufficient proof that the accountable officer had received public funds, that he did not
have them in his possession when demand therefore was made, and that he could not
satisfactorily explain his failure to do so. Direct evidence of personal misappropriation by the
accused is hardly necessary as long as the accused cannot explain satisfactorily the shortage in
his accounts.

People vs Acumen
People vs Unlagada

Facts:
On January 27, 1989 at around 9:00 in the evening Danilo Laurel left his house together with
Edwin Selda, a visitor from Bacolod City, to attend a public dance at Negros Occidental. After two
hours, Danilo asked Edwin to take a short break from dancing to attend to their personal
necessities outside the dance hall. Once outside, they decided to have a drink and bought beer.
Not long after, Danilo, halfway on his first bottle, left to look for a place to relieve himself. According
to Edwin, he was only about three meters from Danilo who was relieving himself when a short,
dark bearded man walked past him, approached Danilo and stabbed him at the side. Danilo
retaliated by striking his assailant with half- filled bottle of beer. Almost simultaneously, a group of
men numbering of seven (7), ganged up on Danilo and hit him with assorted weapons. Edwin, who
was petrified, could only watch helplessly as Danilo was being mauled and overpowered by his
assailants. Danilo fell to the ground and died before he could be given medical attention.
Edwin Selda confirmed the identity of the suspect who was then in the custody of the police.
Thereat, he executed an affidavit and affirmed before the police authorities, that the man under
detention, Anecito Unlagada, was the same man who stabbed his friend Danilo. The accused
assails his conviction.

Issue: Whether or not the trial court erred in finding Unlagada guilty of murder instead of
tumultuous affray under Art. 251 of the Revised Penal Code?

Held: No, a tumultuous affray takes place when a quarrel occurs between several persons who
engage in a confused and tumultuous manner, in the course of which a person is killed or wounded
and the author thereof cannot be ascertained. The quarrel in the instant case is between a distinct
group of individuals , one of whom was sufficiently identified as the principal author of the killing, as
against a common, particular victim. It is not, as the defense suggests, a tumultuous affray
within the meaning of Art. 251 of The Revised Penal Code, that is, a melee or free- for- all, where
several persons not comprising definite or identifiable groups attack one another in a confused and
disorganized manner, resulting in the death or injury of one or some of them.
Verily, the attack was qualified by treachery. The deceased was relieving himself, fully unaware of
any danger to his person when suddenly the accused walked past witness Edwin Selda,
approached the victim and stabbed him at the side. There was hardly any risk at all to accused-
appellant; the attack was completely without warning, the victim was caught by surprise, and given
no chance to put up any defense.
Wherefore, the decision of conviction appealed from is affirmed.

People v. Oga
Facts: At around 2:00 a.m. of August 10, 1998, Ignacio and his wife were awakened by the loud
banging of corrugated GI sheet coming from the barracks of his co-construction worker which was
about 3 meters away. Ignacio and his wife proceeded in haste to investigate but they were
surprised and disarrayed to see his co-worker, herein appellant, naked on top of their daughter,
Irene, who was also naked.
Irene testified that at around 10:00 p.m. of August 9, 1999, the appellant summoned her to his
barracks. Thinking he had the usual errand for her she approached him. However, appellant
suddenly pulled her and laid her on a wooden bed (papag). The appellant then took off her pants
and panty, as well as his clothes. He inserted his penis into her vagina. It was only at around 2:00
a.m. that she was able to finally kick the galvanized iron sheet that enclosed the appellants
barracks.
Appellant did not deny that he had several intercourse with Irene but interposed sweetheart
story.

Issue: Whether or not force and intimidation are attendant in this case?

Held: Neither was intimidation employed against her. Even if she was pulled down to the bed, she
was not threatened with bodily or physical harm by a knife, bolo or any object or instrument that the
appellant could have employed so as to create a real apprehension of dangerous consequences
or serious bodily harm. Irenes overall deportment during her ordeal defies comprehension and the
reasonable standard of human conduct when faced with a similar situation. It is unnatural for an
intended rape victim, as in the case at bar, not to make even a feeble attempt to free herself
despite a myriad of opportunities to do so. This constrained us to entertain a reasonable doubt on
the guilt of the appellant.

People v. Llaguno
Facts: Accused Llaguno, along with several others, were charged with Kidnapping with Murder
when they allegedly kidnapped and detained Bienvenido Mercado, and while under detention, shot
and killed said victim. Although charged with kidnapping with murder, the accused was only
convicted for murder and not for serious illegal detention.

Issue: Whether or not the accused was guilty of Kidnapping with murder?

Held: The Court found the accused guilty only for serious illegal detention and not for murder. It
held that the Trial Court erred in convicting the accused for murder when the circumstances do not
clearly and sufficiently prove beyond a reasonable doubt that accused was guilty of murder.
Parenthetically, when the prosecutions case is anchored only on circumstantial evidence, all the
circumstances must be consistent with the hypothesis that the accused is guilty of the crime sought
to be proven, and no other. In addition, the circumstances under consideration must not support
any rational hypothesis consistent with the innocence of the accused. Consequently, appellant may
not be held criminally liable for killing the victim. The TC also erred in finding the accused not
guilty of serious illegal detention as the period of detention was less that 5 days. The evidence
presented by the prosecution, which was sustained by the trial court, clearly established that
appellant had in fact detained the victim without authority to do so. At this juncture, we deem it
significant to reiterate that the trial court merely made a finding that appellant could not be
convicted of serious illegal detention for the sole reason that the victims detention did not exceed
five days. The court a quo, however, found that appellant illegally detained the victim for at least
one day, which act by itself constitutes slight illegal detention. Besides, the trial court appreciated
the act constituting slight illegal detention as a qualifying circumstance, i.e., employing means to
weaken the defense. While we find no proof beyond reasonable doubt to sustain a conviction for
murder, the records indisputably prove culpability for slight illegal detention.

People vs Villamar
Facts: Marilyn Villamar was charged with the crime of illegal detention and frustrated murder in an
information. On February 11, 1993, Villamar went to the house of the private offended party Cortez
and inquired if the latter was interested in adopting her daughter, explaining that her offer was due
her husband's hasty departure. Unable to refuse, Cortez accepted the offer and immediately
prepared a "Sinumpaang Salaysay" to formalize the adoption. Unfortunately, on June 5, 1993,
Villamar, apparently regretting her decision, went to the house of Cortez and decided to take her
daughter back. This sudden reversal was, of course, not taken lightly by Cortez, who vehemently
refused to relinquish custody of the girl to Villamar.
Thereupon, a scuffle ensued between the two, during which Villamar managed to hit Cortez with a
chisel on the head rendering the latter weak and immobilized, after which she threatened her with
a pair of scissors. Villamar was demanding that Cortez reveal where the "Sinumpaang Salaysay"
was located. Meanwhile, attracted by the commotion, a curious crowd was already gathering
outside the Cortez residence. Sensing imminent danger, Villamar demanded money and a get-
away vehicle to extricate herself from her predicament. However, on her way to the car, a melee
ensued resulting in her immediate arrest by the responding policemen.

Issue: Whether or not accused is guilty of serious illegal detention?

Held: No. The court is of the opinion that the accused had no intention to kidnapor deprive Cortez
of her personal liberty. What actually transpired was the rage of a woman scorned. The undeniable
fact that the purpose of Villamar was to seek the return of her child was never assailed by the
prosecution. Until the defendant's purpose to detain the offended party is shown, a prosecution for
illegal detention will not prosper.
Under the law, as presently worded, it is essential that the kidnapping or detention was committed
for the purpose of extorting ransom. In the instant case, there is no showing whatsoever that
Villamar wanted to extort money from Cortez prior to their confrontation.
When accused-appellant coerced Cortez to reveal the whereabouts of the "Sinampaang Salaysay"
for the purpose of destroying the same, the act merely constituted grave coercion, as provided in
Article 286 of the RPC. The crime of grave coercion has three elements: (a) that any person is
prevented by another from doing something not prohibited by law, or compelled to do something
against his or her will, be it right or wrong; (b) that the prevention or compulsion is effected by
violence, either by material force or such a display of it as would produce intimidation and,
consequently, control over the will of the offended party; and (c) that the person who restrains the
will and liberty of another has no right to do so; in other words, that the restraint is not made under
authority of law or in the exercise of any lawful right.

People vs Hiposa
People vs Tamayo

Facts: On March 29, 1998, Mary Ann Guazon, a 24-year old sewer, was alone in her home in
Tatalon,Quezon City, her husband at work in Baliwag, Bulacan, while her children are with her aunt
inFairview Quezon City,. At 1 in the morning, she was suddenly roused from her sleep by a
man,who simultaneously covered her mouth and poked a knife to at the side of her neck. She was
told not to move or she would b killed. The light on her house has been turned off, but she
recognized the man as accused-appellant Nelson Tamayo, because of the light coming from the
market outside.Despite the fierce resistance Mary Ann showed, the accused succeeded in raping
her. After he had finished, she sensed that the accused was going to kill her. She thus pretended
that she enjoyed the encounter and pleaded with him to spare her. Accused relented and warned
her not to report the incident or else she will be killed. He told her to get dressed and handed over
her clothes. It was then that she discovered that the P500.00 she earned from doing aundry that
day, which she kept in her shorts' pocket, was gone.

Issue: Whether the the trial court erred in finding accused-appellant guilty of the special complex
crimeof robbery with rape, despite his guilt not having been proven beyond reasonable ground.

Held: Yes. That the accused is the person who raped complainant and stole the
P500.00 is beyond doubt. The court finds his identification as the perpetrator of the crime to
be positive and certain.It was sufficiently explains that the light coming from the market was bright
enough to enable complainant to identify him as the one who raped her.She also took note of
specific details that would ascertain the identity of the rapist. The contention of fabrication must be
rejected as the complainant has no ill motive to falsely implicate him in the commission of the
offense. Also, her conducts after the crime, strengthened her account and fortified her credibility.
No decent and sensible woman will publicly admit being a rape victim and thus run the risk of
public contempt unless she is, in fact, a rape victim.

People vs Salvia
Ong vs People

Facts: Petitioner Goretti Ong, had for years been buying jewelry from Gold Asia which is owned
and operated by the family of Rosa Cabuso (the private complainant). While she normally bought
jewelry on cash basis, she was allowed to issue postdated checks to cover the jewelry she bought
in December 1994 up to February 1995, upon her assurance that the checks would be funded on
their due dates. When, on maturity, the checks were deposited, they were returned with the stamp
"Account Closed. Hence, petitioner was indicted for Estafa. She was likewise indicted for 10
counts of violation of B.P. 22 before the RTC of Manila, docketed as Criminal Case Nos. 213645-
CR to 213654-CR. However, the Information dated August 10, 1995, petitioner was charged before
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila for Estafa, without specification under what mode in
Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code the offense was allegedly committed. The RTC convicted
petitioner of Estafa under Article 315, paragraph 2(a) of the Revised Penal Code. The Court of
Appeals affirmed the conviction on appeal but modified the penalty and the amount of indemnity.

Issue: Whether or not the accused-appellant can be convicted of the crime of estafa despite the
failure of the prosecution to prove her guilt beyond reasonable doubt.

Held: The Supreme Court acquitted Goretti Ong, of the crime charged for failure of the prosecution
to establish all the elements of Estafa under Article 315, paragraph 2(d) of the RPC. Section 14(2)
of Article III of the Constitution grants the accused the right to be informed of the nature and cause
of the accusation. This is to enable the accused to adequately prepare for his defense. An accused
cannot thus be convicted of an offense unless it is clearly charged in the complaint or information.

People vs Remullo
Amployo vs People

Facts: Alvin Amployo was charged with violation of RA 7610 or Child Abuse. Private complainant
Kristine Joy alleged that one morning, while she was walking to school, Alvin approached her and
placed his hand on her shoulder where it went down to her breast. Kristine Joy told her
grandmother about it. Along with her mother and grandmother, they went to DSWD to report the
incident. The latter filed a complaint with the RTC. The latter rendered decision finding Alvin
Amployo guilty of the crime charged. CA affirmed the decision of the RTC. Amployo contends that
the element of lewd design was not sufficiently proven. Furthermore, he posits that even if lewd
design was sufficiently proved, he must only be charged for the offense of Acts of Lasciviousness
and not Child Abuse.

Issue: Whether or not Alvin Ampayo is guilty of Child Abuse under RA 7610?

Held: Yes. The term 'lewd is commonly defined as something indecent or obscene. It is
characterized by or intended to excite crude sexual desire. That an accused is entertaining a lewd
or unchaste design is necessarily a mental process the existence of which can be inferred by overt
acts carrying out such intention. The presence or absence of lewd designs is inferred from the
nature of the acts themselves and the environmental circumstances.
In the present case it would have been easy to entertain the possibility that what happened was
merely an accident if it only happened once. Such is not the case, however, as Alvin Ampayo did
the very same act to Kristine Joy in the past. As to Alvins argument that human experience
negates the presence of lewd design as Kristine Joy had no developed breasts with which to entice
him, human experience has taught us painfully well that sexual misconduct defies categorization
and what might be an unusual, unlikely or impossible sexual conduct for most might very well be
the norm for some.

People vs Alvarez

Facts: On June 6, 1969, Loreta T. dela Concepcion, a 13-year old girl, was raped by her brother-in-
law, Nicanor Alvarez. Loreta narrated that the accused raped her in the presence of her sister (wife
of the accused) while they were sleeping in the sala. Loreta resisted but she was not able to shout
because she was allegedly weak and tired. She told the incident to her sister the following morning
but the latter did not pay heed. She eventually got pregnant and a child was born.. The trial court
found the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape.
Issue: Whether or not the accused is guilty of rape or quite possibly, of the crime of qualified
seduction?

Held: SC acquitted the accused for the crime of rape but charged him of the crime of qualified
seduction, the elements of which were included in the facts alleged in the Information. Nothing
remains to be added except that in a situation like the present, where, in keeping with Filipino
mores, a younger sister is called upon to be of help to those ahead of her and to stay, even if
intermittently, in the latter's house, especially so after marital ties are formed and children born,
may give rise to situations of this character considering that among the poorer elements of our
society, all the members of a family are huddled together within briefest confines, and insistence
on personal modesty and privacy is practically out of the question. If the ascendancy of a brother-
in-law, instead, were used for moral purposes, then, certainly, there is more than a justification for
adherence to the view first announce in the landmark Arlante decision that thereby the offense
qualified seduction was in fact committed.

People vs Napud

Facts: At around 1:00 A.M. on September 21, 1994, appellant with his co-accused, Tomas
Amburgo and Romel Brillo, went to the house of the spouses Esmaylita and Ernesto Benedicto at
Barangay Jibolo, Janiuay, Iloilo. Amburgo called aloud for the occupants of the house to come
down. The Benedictos were awakened by the call, but just kept quiet since they sensed that it
would be dangerous to respond. Unable to elicit any response from the Benedictos, the trio then
approached the house of Esmaylitas parents, the spouses Evelyn and Manuel Cantiller, just a few
meters away. Again, they called for the residents of the house to come down. The Cantillers were
awakened by the call but chose to remain silent. Their grandson Greg Cantiller, who was staying
with them, also remained quiet.Appellant dragged Esmaylita some distance away from
Amburgo. He forcibly stripped her naked. He then told her to lie down. When Esmaylita refused,
appellant poked a knife at her and made signs that he would kill her. Faced with imminent death,
Esmaylita obeyed. Appellant had intercourse with her. After some minutes, appellant made
Esmaylita stand up. Esmaylita begged to be allowed to go home, but appellant ignored her and
ordered her to sit on top of him. Esmaylita remained motionless as he put his organ into her
vagina. Angered, appellant ordered her to do what she usually does with her husband. Esmaylita
then made up-and-down motions with her buttocks. After some five minutes of sexual intercourse,
appellant made her stand up, forced her legs apart, and again inserted his penis inside her
vagina. Appellant then had sexual intercourse with her until his lust was satisfied. At around four
oclock in the morning, Esmaylita was finally released and allowed to go home.

Issue: Whether the appellant is correct in alleging that the trial court erred in convicting the
appellant of rape by means of force and intimidation absent physical injuries found on the bodies of
either complainants?

Held: No. The absence of external injuries does not negate rape.The trial court correctly held that
the crime of rape charged and proved in Criminal Case No. 44263 already absorbed the forcible
abduction with rape complained of in Criminal Case No. 44264 and also found the accused-
appellant guilty of the special complex crime of robbery with rape under Criminal Case No.
44262.Coming now to Criminal Case No. 44262, the information charged appellant and his co-
accused with robbery with rape. When appellant forcibly entered the Cantillers chicken coop and
took their chickens, while his confederate Amburgo was threatening the Cantiller spouses, he
committed the crime of robbery. The elements of the offense -viz: (a) personal property belonging
to another; (b) unlawful taking; (c) intent to gain; and (d) violence or intimidation - were all present.
Though robbery appears to have preceded the rape of Evelyn, it is enough that robbery shall have
been accompanied by rape to be punished under the Revised Penal Code (as amended) for the
Code does not differentiate whether the rape was committed before, during, or after the robbery.
Thus, Accused- appellant is found guilty of the special complex crime of robbery with rape and
sentenced by this court to reclusion perpetua with damages.

Buatis vs. People

Facts: On 18 August 1995, the wife of Respondent Atty. Jose J. Pieraz retrieved a letter, not
contained in an envelope, from their mailbox addressed to her husband. The letter contained
malicious and insulting words. The letter was signed by herein Petitioner Jose Buatis, Jr., attorney-
in-fact of one Mrs. Teresita Quingco. Not personally knowing who the sender was, nonetheless,
Respondent replied to the letter. Reacting to the insulting words used by Petitioner, Respondent
filed a complaint for libel against Buatis, Jr. On the other hand, Petitioners defense was denial.
Petitioner invokes that such letter was for his clients cause, Mrs. Quingco, president of an
association subjected to demolition, and as the latters counsel, it is his responsibility to defend his
client. After trial on the merits, the Regional Trial Court (RTC) found Petitioner guilty of the crime of
libel invoking that calling the lawyer with words inutil, stupid and capable only of using English
carabao was prejudicial to the good name of Respondent and an affront to his good standing as a
lawyer. Petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals (CA) but the latter affirmed the RTCs decision
in its entirety. The CA found Petitioners words used in the letter to be defamatory as they
impeached the good reputation of Respondent as a lawyer. The CA denied Petitioners Motion for
Reconsideration as well. Hence, this present case.

Issue: Whether or not the letter is libellous?

Held: Yes, For an imputation to be libellous, the imputation must be: (1) defamatory; (2) malicious;
(3) be given publicity; and, (4) victim must be identified. All requisites are present since the letter
was not contained in an envelope and furnished not only to Respondent, hence, there was a
publication. Second, the victim was identifiable since it is addressed specifically to Respondent.
The issue is more on whether the letter was defamatory and malicious as to comply with all the
requisites of libel. The court held that it was because the words used in the said letter casted
aspersion on the character, integrity and reputation of Respondent as a lawyer. No evidence need
not be adduced to prove it. Thus, when the imputation is defamatory, there is no need to prove if it
is malicious for the law presumes that it is with malice. The letter of Petitioner showed that he
malevolently castigated Respondent for writing such a demand letter to his client. There was
nothing in the letter that showed the good intention and justifiable motive of Respondent for the
benefit of his client.

Pader vs People

Facts: On April 20, 1995, at about 8:00 p.m., Atty. Benjamin C. Escolango was conversing with his
political leaders at the terrace of his house at Morong, Bataan when petitioner appeared at the gate
and shouted putang ina mo Atty. Escolango. Napakawalanghiya mo! The latter was dumbfounded
and embarrassed. At that time, Atty. Escolango was a candidate for vice mayor of Morong, Bataan
in the elections of May 8, 1995. On June 16, 1995 Atty. Escolango filed with the Municipal Trial
Court, Bagac, Bataan a complaint against petitioner for grave oral defamation, to which petitioner
pleaded not guilty. After due trial, on October 30, 1997 the Municipal Circuit Trial Court, Bagac,
Bataan rendered decision convicting petitioner of grave oral defamation.
Issue: Whether petitioner is guilty of slight or serious oral defamation?

Held: The petitioner was guilty of slight oral defamation. the trial court failed to appreciate the fact
that the parties were also neighbors; that petitioner was drunk at the time he uttered the
defamatory words; and the fact that petitioners anger was instigated by what Atty. Escolango did
when petitioners father died. In which case, the oral defamation was not of serious or insulting
nature.

The expression putang ina mo is a common enough utterance in the dialect that is often employed,
not really to slender but rather to express anger or displeasure. In fact, more often, it is just an
expletive that punctuates ones expression of profanity. We do not find it seriously insulting that
after a previous incident involving his father, a drunk Rogelio Pader on seeing Atty. Escolango
would utter words expressing anger. Obviously, the intention was to show his feelings of
resentment and not necessarily to insult the latter. Being a candidate running for vice mayor,
occasional gestures and words of disapproval or dislike of his person are not uncommon.