Vda. DE BATACLAN vs.
MEDINA ISSUE: Whether or not it was the negligence of Medina, owner of
FACTS:
Medina is the owner and operator of a bus. This bus, on Sept. 13,
1952 around 2:00AM somewhere in Imus, Cavite, crashed and fell
into a ditch. Apparently, its front tire burst, zig-zagged and turned
turtle into the ditch. Bataclan was one of the 18 passengers. Most of
the passengers were able to get out, but Bataclan and 3 others were
trapped. It appears that the bus drivers and the passengers who
already got out did not try to help Bataclan et al get out, instead,
about 10 of the locals in the area came to their aid, they were
carrying a burning torch for illumination, but then a fierce fire started
and engulfed the bus and killed Bataclan et al. It appears that there
was a gas leak from the bus and it caught fire from the torch the
would-be rescuers were using.
The heirs of Bataclan sued Medina.
The trial court found that there was a breach of a contract of carriage
where Medina undertook to take Bataclan to his destination safely.
The trial court also found that there was negligence on the part of
Medina since at the time of the blow-out, the bus was speeding.
There is no question that under the circumstances, the defendant
carrier is liable. The only question is to what degree. The trial court
argued that Medina is only liable for the injuries suffered by
Bataclan and not by his death, the proximate cause of which was the
fire, which was not caused by Medina.
the bus company, which was the proximate cause of the death of
Bataclan.
HELD:
Yes. In this case, the proximate cause of the death was the
overturning of the bus, because of the overturning, it leaked gas
which is not unnatural or unexpected. The locals coming to the aid of
the trapped passengers was most likely because the driver and the
conductor went out looking for help. It is only natural that the would-
be rescuers bring with them a torch because it was 2:30AM and the
place was unlit. The fire could also be attributed to the bus driver and
conductor because he should have known, from the circumstances,
and because he should have been able to smell gasoline and therefore
he should have warned the rescuers not to bring the torch. Said
negligence on the part of the agents of the carrier come under the
codal provisions above-reproduced, particularly, Articles 1733, 1759
and 1763.
Proximate Cause that cause, which, in natural and continuous
sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, produces the
injury, and without which the result would not have occurred. And
more comprehensively, the proximate legal cause is that acting first
and producing the injury, either immediately or by setting other
events in motion, all constituting a natural and continuous chain of
events, each having a close causal connection with its immediate
predecessor, the final event in the chain immediately effecting the
injury as a natural and probable result of the cause which first acted,
under such circumstances that the person responsible for the first
event should, as an ordinarily prudent and intelligent person, have
reasonable ground to expect at the moment of his act or default that
an injury to some person might probably result therefrom.