GARCIA VS. FACULTY OF ADMISSION
In
(see HTML file)
DLSU v. CA
FACTS:
On May 30, 2000, some of De La Salle University
Employees Association (DLSUEA-NAFTEU)
members headed by Belen Aliazas (the Aliazas
faction) filed a petition for the election of union
officers in the Bureau of Labor Relations (BLR).
They alleged therein that there has been no election
for DLSUEA-NAFTEUs officers since 1992 in
supposed violation of the unions constitution and by-
laws which provided for an election of officers every
three years. It would appear that DLSUEA-NAFTEU
repeatedly voted to approve the hold-over of the
previously elected officers led by Baylon Baez
(Baez faction).
When the matter was eventually elevated to the BLR
Director, the latter ruled that the Baez factions
tenure in office is valid and subsisting until their
successors have been duly elected and qualified.
Thereafter, DLSUEA-NAFTEU entered into a five-
year CBA with De La Salle University (DLSU). The
Aliazas faction wrote a letter to DLSU requesting it
to place in escrow the union dues and other fees
deducted from the salaries of employees pending the
resolution of the intra-union conflict. DLSUEA-
NAFTEU filed a complaint for unfair labor practice
in the NLRC alleging that DLSU violated Article
248(a) and (g) of the Labor Code. DLSUEA-
NAFTEU asserted that that the creation of escrow
accounts was not an act of neutrality as it was
influenced by the Aliazas factionss letter and was an
act of interference with the internal affairs of the
union. The Labor Arbiter dismissed the complaint for
unfair labor practice.
Subsequently, DLSUEA-NAFTEU sent a letter to
DLSU requesting for the renegotiation of the
economic terms for the fourth and fifth years of the
then current CBA. DLSU denied the request
prompting DLSUEA-NAFTEU to file a notice of
strike. The Secretary of Labor assumed jurisdiction
and found DLSU guilty of unfair labor practice.
Consequently, DLSUEA-NAFTEU reiterated its
demand on DLSU to bargain collectively pursuant to
the aforementioned Decision of the Secretary of
Labor. Again, DLSU declined the request. Thus,
DLSUEA-NAFTEU filed another notice of strike.
The Secretary of Labor cited his earlier decision and
ruled that DLSU is guilty of unfair labor practice.
accordance with the said decision, DLSU turned over
to DLSUEA-NAFTEU the collected union dues and
agency fees from employees which were previously
placed in escrow.
Aggrieved, DLSU appealed to the Court of Appeals
(CA). The CA dismissed the petition. When the
matter was elevated to the Supreme Court, the Court
affirmed the CA. DLSU moved to reconsider but the
Court denied the same. Thus, the decision attained
finality. Meanwhile, DLSUEA-NAFTEU was
ordered to file a comment, and, subsequently, this
petition was given due course.
ISSUE: Whether or not DLSU is guilty of unfair
labor practice when it refused to bargain collectively
with DLSUEA-NAFTEU in light of the intra-union
dispute between DLSUEA-NAFTEU two opposing
factions?
HELD: The petition is denied.
Inevitably, G.R. No. 168477 and this petition seek
only one relief, that is, to absolve petitioner from
respondents charge of committing an unfair labor
practice, or specifically, a violation of Article 248(g)
in relation to Article 252 of the Labor Code. In other
words, our previous affirmance of the Court of
Appeals finding that petitioner erred in suspending
collective bargaining negotiations with the union and
in placing the union funds in escrow considering that
the intra-union dispute between the Aliazas and
Baez factions was not a justification therefor is
binding herein.
The law of the case has been defined as the opinion
delivered on a former appeal. It means that whatever
is once irrevocably established as the controlling
legal rule or decision between the same parties in the
same case continues to be the law of the case,
whether correct on general principles or not, so long
as the facts on which such decision was predicated
continue to be the facts of the case before the court.
Neither can petitioner seek refuge in its defense that
as early as November 2003 it had already released the
escrowed union dues to respondent and normalized
relations with the latter. The fact remains that from its
receipt of the July 28, 2003 Decision of the Secretary
of Labor in OS-AJ-0015-2003 until its receipt of the
November 17, 2003 Decision of the Secretary of
Labor in OS-AJ-0033-2003, petitioner failed in its
duty to collectively bargain with respondent union
without valid reason.

Petition is DENIED.
CSC v. SOJOR
FACTS:
Herein respondent, Henry Sojor, president of Negros
Oriental State University (formerly known as Central
Visayas Polytechnic College) was charged of
nepotism, dishonesty, falsification of official
documents, grave misconduct and conduct prejudicial
to the best interest of the service before the Civil
Service Commission.
Herein petitioner moved to dismiss these cases on the
grounds of lack of jurisdiction. Academic freedom
was also invoked.
ISSUE:
1. Whether or not a president of a State University
is outside the reach of the disciplinary
jurisdiction constitutionally granted to the Civil
Service Commission
2. Whether or not the assumption by the Civil
Service Commission of jurisdiction over a
president of a State University violate academic
freedom
RULING:
1. No, the president of a State University is still
within the reach of the disciplinary jurisdiction
constitutionally granted to the Civil Service
Commission (CSC).
As explained by the court, except as otherwise
provided by the Constitution or by law, the CSC shall
have the final authority to pass upon the removal,
separation and suspension of all officers and
employees in the civil service and upon all matters
relating to the conduct, discipline, and efficiency of
such officers and employees.
In the case at bar, it is clear that while the Board of
Regents (BOT) of the Negros Oriental State
University (NORSU) has the sole power of
administration over the university, such power is not
exclusive in the matter of disciplining and removing
its employees. Instead, such power is concurrent
between the BOT and the CSC.
Hence, herein respondent Henry Sojor, the president
of NORSU, is within the disciplinary jurisdiction of
the CSC.
2. No, the assumption by the CSC of jurisdiction
over a president of a State University does not
violate academic freedom.
While it is certain that academic institutions and
personnel are granted with wide latitude of academic
freedom, such freedom does not give an institution
the unbridled authority to perform acts without any
statutory basis. For that reason, as the court explained
in its ruling, a school official, who is a member of the
civil service, may not be permitted to commit
violations of civil service rules under the justification
that he was free to do so under the principle of
academic freedom.
In the case at bar, the respondent is facing charges of
grave offenses punishable with suspension or even
dismissal. And evidently, these cases have not been
acted upon by the university officials based on the re-
appointment they have given to respondent. And
according to the law, in complaints against civil
service officials and employees which are not acted
upon by the agencies and such other complaints
requiring direct or immediate action, in the interest
of justice the CSC may take over.
Hence, the assumption of the CSC of jurisdiction
over herein respondent State University president is
only deemed proper and not in violation of academic
freedom.
MERCADO vs. AMACC
Facts:
The petitioners were faculty members who started
teaching at AMACC on May 25, 1998.The
petitioners executed individual Teachers Contracts
for each of the trimesters that they were
engaged to teach, with the following common stipulat
ion: 1. POSITION. The TEACHER has agreed to
accept a non-tenured appointment to work in the
College of xxx effective xxx to xxx or for the
duration of the last term that the TEACHER is given
a teaching load based on the assignment duly
approved by the DEAN/SAVP-COO. For the school
year 2000-2001, AMACC implemented new faculty
screening guidelines, set forth in its Guidelines on the
Implementation of AMACC Faculty Plantilla. Under
the new screening guidelines, teachers were to be
hired or maintained based on extensive teaching
experience, capability, potential, high academic
qualifications and research background. On
September 7, 2000, the petitioners individually
received a memorandum from AMACC, through,
informing them that with the expiration of their
contract to teach, their contract would no longer be
renewed.
The Labor Arbiter Ruling
declared that the petitioners had been illegally
dismissed. On appeal, the NLRC in a Resolution
dated July 18, 2005 denied AMACCs appeal for lack
of merit and affirmed in toto the LAs ruling. The NLRC,
however, observed that the applicable law is Section
92 of the Manual of Regulations for Private Schools
(which mandates a probationary period of nine
consecutive trimesters of satisfactory service for
academic personnel in the tertiary level where
collegiate courses are offered on a trimester basis),
not Article 281 of the Labor Code(which prescribes a
probationary period of six months) as the LA ruled.
The CA Ruling
the CA granted AMACCs petition for
certiorari and dismissed the petitioners complaint for
illegal dismissal.
Issue:
WON the CA correctly found that the NLRC
committed grave abuse of discretion in ruling that the
petitioners were illegally dismissed.
Ruling:
The use of employment for fixed periods during the
teachers probationary period is likewise an accepted
practice in the teaching profession. AMACCs
right to academic freedom is particularly important in
the present case, because of the new screening
guidelines for AMACC faculty put in place for the
school year 2000-2001. We agree with the CA that
AMACC has the inherent right to establish
high standards of competency and efficiency for its
faculty members in order to achieve and maintain
academic
excellence. The schools prerogative to provide
standards for its teachers and to determine whether or
not these standards have been met is in accordance
with academic freedom that gives the educational
institution the right to choose who should teach. The
provision on employment on probationary status
under the Labor Code is a primary example of the
fine balancing of interests between labor and
management that the Code has
institutionalized pursuant to the underlying intent of
the Constitution. Labor, for its part, is given the
protection during the probationary period of
knowing the company standards the new hires have
to meet during the probationary period,
and to be judged on the basis of these standards
, aside from the usual standards applicable to
employees after they achieve permanent status. Under
the terms of the Labor Code, these standards should
be made known to the teachers on probationary status
at the start of their probationary period, or at the very
least under the circumstances of the present case, at the start of the
semester or the trimester during which the probationary
standards are to be applied.
Of critical importance in invoking a failure to meet
the probationary standards, is that the school should
show as a matter of due process how these
standards have been applied .The school, however, cannot
forget that its system of fixed-term contract is a system that
operates during the probationary period and for this
reason is subject to the terms of Article 281 of the
Labor Code. Unless this reconciliation is made, the
requirements of this Article on probationary status
would be fully negated as the school may freely
choose not to renew contracts simply because their
terms have expired. The inevitable effect of course is
to wreck the scheme that the Constitution and the
Labor Code established to balance relationships
between labor and management.
Given the clear constitutional and statutory
intents, we cannot but conclude that in a situation
where the probationary status overlaps with a fixed-
term contract not specifically used for the fixed term it
offers, Article 281 should assume primacy and the
fixed-period character of the contract must give way.
This conclusion is immeasurably strengthened by the
petitioners and the AMACCs hardly concealed
expectation that the employment on probation could
lead to permanent status, and that the contracts are
renewable unless the petitioners fail to pass the
schools standards. While we can grant that the
standards were duly communicated to the petitioners
and could be applied beginning the 1 st trimester
of the school year 2000-2001, glaring and very basic
gaps in the schools evidence still exist. The exact
terms of the standards were never introduced as
evidence; neither does the evidence show how these
standards were applied to the petitioners. Without
these pieces of evidence (effectively, the finding of
just cause for the non-renewal of the petitioners
contracts), we have nothing to consider and pass
upon as valid or invalid for each of the petitioners.
In this light, the CA decision is reversed.
CALAWAG vs. UP VISAYAS
(see pdf)