226 Miranda vs.

Arizona [384 US 436, 13 June 1966]

Warren (J)

Facts: [No. 759; Miranda vs. Arizona] On 13 March 1963, Ernesto Miranda was arrested at his
home and taken in custody to a Phoenix police station. He was there identified by the complaining
witness. The police then took him to "Interrogation Room No. 2" of the detective bureau. There he
was questioned by two police officers. The officers did not advise Miranda that he had a right to
have an attorney present. Two hours later, the officers emerged from the interrogation room with a
written confession signed by Miranda. At the top of the statement was a typed paragraph stating that
the confession was made voluntarily, without threats or promises of immunity and "with full
knowledge of my legal rights, understanding any statement I make may be used against me." At his
trial before a jury, the written confession was admitted into evidence over the objection of defense
counsel, and the officers testified to the prior oral confession made by Miranda during the
interrogation. Miranda was found guilty of kidnapping and rape. He was sentenced to 20 to 30
years' imprisonment on each count, the sentences to run concurrently. On appeal, the Supreme
Court of Arizona held that Miranda's constitutional rights were not violated in obtaining the
confession and affirmed the conviction. In reaching its decision, the court emphasized heavily the
fact that Miranda did not specifically request counsel.

[No. 760, Vignera vs. New York] Michael Vignera, was picked up by New York police on 14
October 1960, in connection with the robbery three days earlier of a Brooklyn dress shop. They
took him to the 17th Detective Squad headquarters in Manhattan. Sometime thereafter he was taken
to the 66th Detective Squad. While at the 66th Detective Squad, Vignera was identified by the store
owner and a saleslady as the man who robbed the dress shop. At about 3 p. m. he was formally
arrested. The police then transported him to still another station, the 70th Precinct in Brooklyn, "for
detention." At 11 p. m. Vignera was questioned by an assistant district attorney in the presence of a
hearing reporter who transcribed the questions and Vignera's answers. This verbatim account of
these proceedings contains no statement of any warnings given by the assistant district attorney. At
Vignera's trial on a charge of first degree robbery, the detective testified as to the oral confession.
The transcription of the statement taken was also introduced in evidence. Vignera was found guilty
of first degree robbery. He was subsequently adjudged a third-felony offender and sentenced to 30
to 60 years' imprisonment. The conviction was affirmed without opinion by the Appellate Division,
Second Department, and by the Court of Appeals, also without opinion, remittitur amended. In
argument to the Court of Appeals, the State contended that Vignera had no constitutional right to be
advised of his right to counsel or his privilege against self-incrimination.

[No. 761, Westover vs. United States] At approximately 9:45 p. m. on 20 March 1963, Carl Calvin
Westover was arrested by local police in Kansas City as a suspect in two Kansas City robberies. A
report was also received from the FBI that he was wanted on a felony charge in California. The
local authorities took him to a police station and placed him in a line-up on the local charges, and at
about 11:45 p. m. he was booked. Kansas City police interrogated Westover on the night of his
arrest. He denied any knowledge of criminal activities. The next day local officers interrogated him
again throughout the morning. Shortly before noon they informed the FBI that they were through
interrogating Westover and that the FBI could proceed to interrogate him. There is nothing in the
record to indicate that Westover was ever given any warning as to his rights by local police. At
noon, three special agents of the FBI continued the interrogation in a private interview room of the
Kansas City Police Department, this time with respect to the robbery of a savings and loan
association and a bank in Sacramento, California. After two or two and one-half hours, Westover
signed separate confessions to each of these two robberies which had been prepared by one of the
agents during the interrogation. At trial one of the agents testified, and a paragraph on each of the
statements states, that the agents advised Westover that he did not have to make a statement, that
any statement he made could be used against him, and that he had the right to see an attorney.
Westover was tried by a jury in federal court and convicted of the California robberies. His
statements were introduced at trial. He was sentenced to 15 years' imprisonment on each count, the
sentences to run consecutively. On appeal, the conviction was affirmed by the Court of Appeals for
the Ninth Circuit.

[No. 584, California vs. Stewart] In the course of investigating a series of purse-snatch robberies in
which one of the victims had died of injuries inflicted by her assailant, Roy Allen Stewart was
pointed out to Los Angeles police as the endorser of dividend checks taken in one of the robberies.
At about 7:15 p. m., 31 January 1963, police officers went to Stewart's house and arrested him. One
of the officers asked Stewart if they could search the house, to which he replied, "Go ahead." The
search turned up various items taken from the five robbery victims. At the time of Stewart's arrest,
police also arrested Stewart's wife and three other persons who were visiting him. These four were
jailed along with Stewart and were interrogated. Stewart was taken to the University Station of the
Los Angeles Police Department where he was placed in a cell. During the next five days, police
interrogated Stewart on nine different occasions. Except during the first interrogation session, when
he was confronted with an accusing witness, Stewart was isolated with his interrogators. During the
ninth interrogation session, Stewart admitted that he had robbed the deceased and stated that he had
not meant to hurt her. Police then brought Stewart before a magistrate for the first time. Since there
was no evidence to connect them with any crime, the police then released the other four persons
arrested with him. Nothing in the record specifically indicates whether Stewart was or was not
advised of his right to remain silent or his right to counsel. In a number of instances, however, the
interrogating officers were asked to recount everything that was said during the interrogations. None
indicated that Stewart was ever advised of his rights. Stewart was charged with kidnapping to
commit robbery, rape, and murder. At his trial, transcripts of the first interrogation and the
confession at the last interrogation were introduced in evidence. The jury found Stewart guilty of
robbery and first degree murder and fixed the penalty as death. On appeal, the Supreme Court of
California reversed.
Issue: Whether the written confessions made in uncounselled interrogation, with the accused not
appraised of his right to consult with an attorney and to have one during the inerrogation, nor his
right not to be compelled to incriminate himself, are not admissible as evidence.

Held: In No. 759, from the testimony of the officers and by the admission of the State of Arizona, it
is clear that Miranda was not in any way apprised of his right to consult with an attorney and to
have one present during the interrogation, nor was his right not to be compelled to incriminate
himself effectively protected in any other manner. Without these warnings the statements were
inadmissible. The mere fact that he signed a statement which contained a typed-in clause stating
that he had "full knowledge" of his "legal rights" does not approach the knowing and intelligent
waiver required to relinquish constitutional rights.

Similarly in No. 760, Vignera was not warned of any of his rights before the questioning by the
detective and by the assistant district attorney. No other steps were taken to protect these rights.
Thus he was not effectively apprised of his Fifth Amendment privilege or of his right to have
counsel present and his statements are inadmissible.

In No. 761, there is nothing in the facts that Westover knowingly and intelligently waived his right
to remain silent and his right to consult with counsel prior to the time he made the statement. At the
time the FBI agents began questioning Westover, he had been in custody for over 14 hours and had
been interrogated at length during that period. The FBI interrogation began immediately upon the
conclusion of the interrogation by Kansas City police and was conducted in local police
headquarters. There is no evidence of any warning given prior to the FBI interrogation nor is there
any evidence of an articulated waiver of rights after the FBI commenced its interrogation. The
record simply shows that the defendant did in fact confess a short time after being turned over to the
FBI following interrogation by local police. Despite the fact that the FBI agents gave warnings at
the outset of their interview, from Westover's point of view the warnings came at the end of the
interrogation process. In these circumstances an intelligent waiver of constitutional rights cannot be
assumed. Law enforcement authorities are not precluded from questioning any individual who has
been held for a period of time by other authorities and interrogated by them without appropriate
warnings. A different case would be presented if an accused were taken into custody by the second
authority, removed both in time and place from his original surroundings, and then adequately
advised of his rights and given an opportunity to exercise them.

Lastly in No. 584, In dealing with custodial interrogation, the Court will not presume that a
defendant has been effectively apprised of his rights and that his privilege against self-incrimination
has been adequately safeguarded on a record that does not show that any warnings have been given
or that any effective alternative has been employed. Nor can a knowing and intelligent waiver of
these rights be assumed on a silent record. Furthermore, Stewart's steadfast denial of the alleged
offenses through eight of the nine interrogations over a period of five days is subject to no other
construction than that he was compelled by persistent interrogation to forgo his Fifth Amendment
privilege.

227 People vs. Lugod [GR 136253, 21 February 2001]

En Banc, Gonzaga-Reyes (J): 14 concur

Facts: On 15 September 1997 at around 7:00 p.m., Helen Ramos was asleep in her house together
with her husband (Danilo Ramos) and children, Nimrod, Neres and Nairube, the victim. Nairube
slept close to her "on the upper part" of her body. At around 12:30 a.m., her husband woke her up
because he sensed someone going down the stairs of their house. She noticed that Nairube was no
longer in the place where she was sleeping but she assumed that Nairube merely answered the call
of nature. Nairube's blanket was also no longer at the place she slept but that her slippers were still
there. After three minutes of waiting for Nairube's return, she stood up and began calling out for
Nairube but there was no answer. Thereafter, she went downstairs and saw that the backdoor of their
house was open. She went outside through the backdoor to see if Nairube was there but she was not.
She found a pair of rubber slippers on top of a wooden bench outside of her backdoor. The sole of
the slippers was red while the strap was a combination of yellow and white; said slippers did not
belong to any member of her family. Thereafter, she proceeded to the house of Alma Diaz to ask her
for help. Then, in the morning of 16 September 1997, she went to the police station to report the
loss of her child. She also reported the discovery of the pair of slippers to SP02 Quirino Gallardo.
She then went home while the police began their search for Nairube. At around 12:30 p.m., Alma
Diaz requested her to go with the searching team. During the search, Alma Diaz found a panty
which she recognized as that of her daughter. After seeing the panty, she cried. She was thereafter
ordered to go home while the others continued the search. Thereafter, they continued the search and
found a black collared T-shirt with buttons in front and piping at the end of the sleeve hanging on a
guava twig. Alma Diaz gave the shirt to SP02 Gallardo. Loreto Veloria informed him that the two
items were worn by Clemente John Lugod when he went to the house of Violeta Cabuhat. At around
7:00 p.m., SP02 Gallardo apprehended Lugod on the basis of the pair of slippers and the black T-
shirt. He then brought Lugod to the police station where he was temporarily incarcerated. At first,
the accused denied that he did anything to Nairube but after he told him what happened to the girl.
Later, although he admitted to having raped and killed Nairube, Lugud refused to make a statement
regarding the same. After having been informed that the body of Nairube was in the grassy area,
Gallardo together with other members of the PNP, the Crime Watch and the townspeople continued
the search but they were still not able to find the body of Nairube. It was only when they brought
Lugod to Villa Anastacia to point out the location of the cadaver, on 18 September 1997, that they
found the body of Nairube. On 10 October 1997, Lugod was charged for rape with homicide. Upon
arraignment, Lugod with the assistance of counsel entered a plea of not guilty. Thereafter, trial
ensued. On 8 October 1998, the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Santa Cruz, Laguna found Lugod
guilty beyond reasonable doubt, sentenced him to death, and ordered him to indemnify the heirs of
the victim, Nairube Ramos the sum of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity for her death and P37,200.00
as actual damages. Hence, the automatic review.

Issue: Whether Lugods confession and subesequent act of pointing the location of the Nairubes
body may be used against him as evidence.

Held: Records reveal that Lugod was not informed of his right to remain silent and to counsel, and
that if he cannot afford to have counsel of his choice, he would be provided with one. Moreover,
there is no evidence to indicate that he intended to waive these rights. Besides, even if he did waive
these rights, in order to be valid, the waiver must be made in writing and with the assistance of
counsel. Consequently, Lugod's act of confessing to SPO2 Gallardo that he raped and killed
Nairube without the assistance of counsel cannot be used against him for having transgressed
Lugod's rights under the Bill of Rights. This is a basic tenet of our Constitution which cannot be
disregarded or ignored no matter how brutal the crime committed may be. In the same vein, Lugod's
act in pointing out the location of the body of Nairube was also elicited in violation of the Lugod's
right to remain silent. The same was an integral part of the- uncounselled confession and is
considered a fruit of the poisonous tree. Even if we were to assume that Lugod was not yet under
interrogation and thus not entitled to his constitutional rights at the time he was brought to the
police station, Lugod's acts subsequent to his apprehension cannot be characterized as having been
voluntarily made considering the peculiar circumstances surrounding his detention. His confession
was elicited by SPO2 Gallardo who promised him that he would help him if he told the truth.
Furthermore, when ugod allegedly pointed out the body of the victim, SPO2 Gallardo, the whole
police force as well as nearly 100 of the townspeople of Cavinti escorted him there. Ricardo Vida
stated that the townspeople were antagonistic towards Lugod and wanted to hurt him. The
atmosphere from the time Lugod was apprehended and taken to the police station up until the time
he was alleged to have pointed out the location of the body of the victim was highly intimidating
and was not conducive to a spontaneous response. Amidst such a highly coercive atmosphere,
Lugod's claim that he was beaten up and maltreated by the police officers raises a very serious
doubt as to the voluntariness of his alleged confession. The Vice-Mayor, who testified that when he
visited Lugod in the jail cell, he noticed that Lugod had bruises on his face, corroborated Lugod's
assertion that he was maltreated. Considering that the confession of Lugod cannot be used against
him, the only remaining evidence which was established by the prosecution is the fact that several
persons testified having seen Lugod the night before the murder of Nairube and on several other
occasions wearing the rubber slippers and black T-shirt found at the house of the victim and Villa
Anastacia respectively as well as the testimony of Romualdo Ramos, the tricycle driver who stated
that he saw Lugod in the early morning of 16 September 1997 leaving Villa Anastacia without a T-
shirt and without slippers. These pieces of evidence are circumstantial in nature. The combination
of the above-mentioned circumstances does not lead to the irrefutably logical conclusion that Lugod
raped and murdered Nairube. At most, these circumstances, taken with the testimonies of the other
prosecution witnesses, merely establish Lugod's whereabouts on that fateful evening and places
Lugod at the scene of the crime and nothing more. Lugod was acquitted.

228 People vs. Del Rosario [GR 127755, 14 April 1999]

En Banc, Bellosillo (J): 14 concur

Facts: On 13 May 1996 between 6:00 and 6:30 p.m., Paul Vincent Alonzo stopped his tricycle by
the side of Nita's Drugstore, General Luna St., Cabanatuan City, when three women flagged him.
Parked at a distance of about 112 meters in front of him was a tricycle driven by Joselito del
Rosario y Pascual. At that point, Alonzo saw 2 men and a woman (Virginia Bernas) grappling for
possession of a bag. After taking hold of the bag one of the two men (Ernesto "Jun" Marquez)
armed with a gun started chasing a man who was trying to help the woman, while the other snatcher
("Dodong" Bisaya) kicked the woman sending her to the ground. Soon after, the armed man
returned and while the woman was still on the ground he shot her on the head. The bag taken by the
man was brought to the tricycle of del Rosario where someone inside (Virgilio "Boy" Santos)
received the bag. The armed man then sat behind the driver while his companion entered the
sidecar. When the tricycle sped away Alonzo gave chase and was able to get the plate number of the
tricycle. He also recognized the driver, after which he went to the nearest police headquarters and
reported the incident. Upon finding the name of the owner of the tricycle, SP04 Geronimo de Leon
and his team proceeded to Bakod Bayan in the house of the barangay captain where the owner of
the tricycle was summoned and who in turn revealed the driver's name and was invited for
interview. Del Rosario volunteered to name his passengers on 13 May 1996. On the way to the
police station, del Rosario informed them of the bag and lunch kit's location and the place where the
hold-uppers may be found and they reported these findings to their officers, Capt. Biag and Capt.
Cruz. After lunch, they proceeded to Brgy. Dicarma composed of 15 armed men where a shoot-out
transpired that lasted from 1:00 to 4:00 p.m. After a brief encounter, they went inside the house
where they found Marquez dead holding a magazine and a gun. While all of these were happening,
del Rosario was at the back of the school, handcuffed by the police because allegedly they had
already gathered enough evidence against him and they were afraid that he might attempt to escape.
After the encounter, they went back to the police station. The investigator took the statement of del
Rosario on 14 May 1996, and was only subscribed on 22 May 1996. All the while, he was detained
in the police station as ordered by the Fiscal. His statements were only signed on 16 May 1996. He
also executed a waiver of his detention. His Sinumpaang Salaysay was done with the assistance of
Ex-Judge Talavera. Del Rosario, on the other hand, claimed that he was hired for P120.00 by "Boy"
Santos to drive him to a cockpit at the Blas Edward Coliseum but was directed him to proceed to
the market place to fetch "Jun" Marquez and "Dodong" Bisaya; where the robbery homicide
occurred. He claimed that the 3 men alighted and warned del Rosario not to inform the police
authorities about the incident otherwise he and his family would be harmed. Del Rosario then went
home. Because of the threat, however, he did not report the matter to the owner of the tricycle nor to
the barangay captain and the police. Del Rosario, Marquez, Santos, and John Doe alias "Dodong"
were charged with the special complex crime of Robbery with Homicide for having robbed Virginia
Bernas, a 66-year old businesswoman, of P200,000.00 in cash and jewelry and on the occasion
thereof shot and killed her. While del Rosario pleaded not guilty, Santos and alias "Dodong"
remained at large. Thus, only del Rosario was tried. The trial court found del Rosario guilty as co-
principal in the crime of Robbery with Homicide and sentencing him to death, and to pay the heirs
of victim Virginia Bernas P550,000.00 as actual damages and P100,000.00 as moral and exemplary
damages. Hence, the automatic review.

Issue: Whether del Rosario was deprived of his rights during custodial investigation at the time he
was invited for questioning at the house ofthe barangay captain.

Held: Del Rosario was deprived of his rights during custodial investigation. From the time he was
invited" for questioning at the house of the barangay captain, he was already under effective
custodial investigation, but he was not apprised nor made aware thereof by the investigating
officers. The police already knew the name of the tricycle driver and the latter was already a suspect
in the robbing and senseless slaying of Virginia Bernas. Since the prosecution failed to establish that
del Rosario had waived his right to remain silent, his verbal admissions on his participation in the
crime even before his actual arrest were inadmissible against him, as the same transgressed the
safeguards provided by law and the Bill of Rights. Herein, like victim Virginia Bernas, del Rosario
too was a hapless victim who was forcibly used by other persons with nefarious designs to
perpetrate a dastardly act. Del Rosario's defense of "irresistible force" has been substantiated by
clear and convincing evidence. Del Rosario was threatened with a gun. He could not therefore be
expected to flee nor risk his life to help a stranger. A person under the same circumstances would be
more concerned with his personal welfare and security rather than the safety of a person whom he
only saw for the first time that day. On the other hand, conspiracy between him and his co-accused
was not proved beyond a whimper of a doubt by the prosecution, thus clearing del Rosario of any
complicity in the crime charged.

229 People vs. Bolanos [GR 101808, 3 July 1992]

Second Division, Paras (J): 4 concur

Facts: The death of the victim, Oscar Pagdalian, was communicated to the Police Station where
Patrolmen Rolando Alcantara and Francisco Dayao of the Integrated National Police (INP),
Balagtas, Bulacan, are assigned. Patrolmen Alcantara and Dayao proceeded to the scene of the
crime of Marble Supply, Balagtas, Bulacan and upon arrival they saw the deceased Pagdalian lying
on an improvised bed full of blood with stab wounds. They then inquired about the circumstances
of the incident and were informed that the deceased was with 2 companions, on the previous night,
one of whom was Ramon Bolanos who had a drinking spree with the deceased and another
companion (Claudio Magtibay) till the wee hours of the following morning, 23 June
1990. When Alcantara and Dayao apprehended Bolanos, they found the firearm of the deceased on
the chair where Bolanos was allegedly seated. They boarded Ramon Bolanos and Claudio Magtibay
on the police vehicle and brought them to the police station. In the vehicle where the suspect was
riding, "Ramon Bolanos accordingly admitted that he killed the deceased Oscar Pagdalian because
he was abusive," after he was asked by the police if he killed the victim. Bolanos was charged for
murder before the Regional Trial Court of Malolos, Bulacan, Branch 14, under Criminal Case 1831-
M-90. The trial court, even if the alleged oral admission of Bolanos was given without the
assistance of counsel when it was made while on board the police vehicle on their way to the police
station, found Bolanos guilty of the crime charged and imposed on him the penalty of Reclusion
Perpetua (life imprisonment) and to pay the heirs of the victim P50,000.00. The Office of the
Solicitor General threafter filed a Manifestation (in lieu of Appellee's Brief), claiming that the lower
court erred in admitting in evidence the extra-judicial confession of Bolanos while on board the
police patrol jeep.

Issue: Whether the extra-judicial confession of Bolanos while on board the police patrol jeep may
be used to prove Bolanos guilt.

Held: Being already under custodial investigation while on board the police patrol jeep on the way
to the Police Station where formal investigation may have been conducted, Bolanos should have
been informed of his Constitutional rights under Article III, Section 12 of the 1987 Constitution
which explicitly provides: (1) Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense
shall have the right to remain silent and to have competent and independent preferably of his own
choice. If the person cannot afford the service of counsel, he must be provided with one. These
rights cannot be waived except in writing and in the presence of counsel. (2) No torture, force,
violence, threat, intimidation, or any other means which vitiate the free will shall be used against
him. Secret detention places, solitary, incommunicado, or other similar forms of detention are
prohibited. (3) Any confession or admission obtained in violation of this or the preceding section
shall be inadmissible in evidence against him. (4) The law shall provide for penal and civil
sanctions for violation of this section as well as compensation and rehabilitation of victims of
torture or similar practices and their families. Considering the clear requirements of the Constitution
with respect to the manner by which confession can be admissible in evidence, and the glaring fact
that the alleged confession obtained while on board the police vehicle was the only reason for the
conviction, besides Bolanos's conviction was not proved beyond reasonable doubt, the Court has no
recourse but to reverse the subject judgment under review.

230 Rhode Island vs. Innis [446 US 291, 12 May 1980]

Stewart (J)
Facts: On the night of 12 January 1975, John Mulvaney, a Providence, Rhode Island taxicab driver,
disappeared after being dispatched to pick up a customer. His body was discovered 4 days later
buried in a shallow grave in Coventry, Rhode Island. He had died from a shotgun blast aimed at the
back of his head. On 17 January 1975, shortly after midnight, the Providence police received a
telephone call from Gerald Aubin, also a taxicab driver, who reported that he had just been robbed
by a man wielding a sawed-off shotgun. Aubin further reported that he had dropped off his assailant
near Rhode Island College in a section of Providence known as Mount Pleasant. While at the
Providence police station waiting to give a statement, Aubin noticed a picture of his assailant on a
bulletin board. Aubin so informed one of the police officers present. The officer prepared a photo
array, and again Aubin identified a picture of the same person. That person was Innis. Shortly
thereafter, the Providence police began a search of the Mount Pleasant area. At approximately 4:30
a.m. on the same date, Patrolman Lovell, while cruising the streets of Mount Pleasant in a patrol
car, spotted Innis standing in the street facing him. When Patrolman Lovell stopped his car, Innis
walked towards it. Patrolman Lovell then arrested Innis, who was unarmed, and advised him of his
so-called Miranda rights. While the two men waited in the patrol car for other police officers to
arrive, Patrolman Lovell did not converse with Innis other than to respond to the latter's request for
a cigarette. Within minutes, Sergeant Sears arrived at the scene of the arrest, and he also gave Innis
the Miranda warnings. Immediately thereafter, Captain Leyden and other police officers arrived.
Captain Leyden advised Innis of his Miranda rights. Innis stated that he understood those rights and
wanted to speak with a lawyer. Captain Leyden then directed that Innis be placed in a "caged
wagon," a 4-door police car with a wire screen mesh between the front and rear seats, and be driven
to the central police station. 3 officers, Patrolmen Gleckman, Williams, and McKenna, were
assigned to accompany Innis to the central station. They placed Innis in the vehicle and shut the
doors. Captain Leyden then instructed the officers not to question Innis or intimidate or coerce him
in any way. The three officers then entered the vehicle, and it departed. While en route to the central
station, Patrolman Gleckman initiated a conversation with Patrolman McKenna concerning the
missing shotgun. Innis then interrupted the conversation, stating that the officers should turn the car
around so he could show them where the gun was located. At this point, Patrolman McKenna
radioed back to Captain Leyden that they were returning to the scene of the arrest, and that Innis
would inform them of the location of the gun. At the time Innis indicated that the officers should
turn back, they had traveled no more than a mile, a trip encompassing only a few minutes. The
police vehicle then returned to the scene of the arrest where a search for the shotgun was in
progress. There, Captain Leyden again advised Innis of his Miranda rights. Innis replied that he
understood those rights but that he "wanted to get the gun out of the way because of the kids in the
area in the school." Innis then led the police to a nearby field, where he pointed out the shotgun
under some rocks by the side of the road. On 20 March 1975, a grand jury returned an indictment
charging Innis with the kidnaping, robbery, and murder of John Mulvaney. Before trial, Innis moved
to suppress the shotgun and the statements he had made to the police regarding it. After an
evidentiary hearing at which Innis elected not to testify, the trial judge found that Innis had been
"repeatedly and completely advised of his Miranda rights." He further found that it was "entirely
understandable that [the officers in the police vehicle] would voice their concern [for the safety of
the handicapped children] to each other." The judge then concluded that Innis's decision to inform
the police of the location of the shotgun was "a waiver, clearly, and on the basis of the evidence that
I have heard, and [sic] intelligent waiver, of his [Miranda] right to remain silent." Thus, without
passing on whether the police officers had in fact "interrogated" Innis, the trial court sustained the
admissibility of the shotgun and testimony related to its discovery. That evidence was later
introduced at Innis's trial, and the jury returned a verdict of guilty on all counts. On appeal, the
Rhode Island Supreme Court, in a 3-2 decision, set aside Innis's conviction. Contrary to the holding
of the trial court, the appellate court concluded that the evidence was insufficient to support a
finding of waiver. Having concluded that both the shotgun and testimony relating to its discovery
were obtained in violation of the Miranda standards and therefore should not have been admitted
into evidence, the Rhode Island Supreme Court held that Innis was entitled to a new trial.

Issue: Whether Innis was "interrogated" by the police officers in violation of the former's
undisputed right under Miranda to remain silent until he had consulted with a lawyer.

Held: The special procedural safeguards outlined in Miranda are required not where a suspect is
simply taken into custody, but rather where a suspect in custody is subjected to interrogation.
"Interrogation," as conceptualized in the Miranda opinion, must reflect a measure of compulsion
above and beyond that inherent in custody itself. The Miranda safeguards come into play whenever
a person in custody is subjected to either express questioning or its functional equivalent. That is to
say, the term "interrogation" under Miranda refers not only to express questioning, but also to any
words or actions on the part of the police (other than those normally attendant to arrest and custody)
that the police should know are reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response from the
suspect. The latter portion of this definition focuses primarily upon the perceptions of the suspect,
rather than the intent of the police. This focus reflects the fact that the Miranda safeguards were
designed to vest a suspect in custody with an added measure of protection against coercive police
practices, without regard to objective proof of the underlying intent of the police. A practice that the
police should know is reasonably likely to evoke an incriminating response from a suspect thus
amounts to interrogation. But, since the police surely cannot be held accountable for the
unforeseeable results of their words or actions, the definition of interrogation can extend only to
words or actions on the part of police officers that they should have known were reasonably likely
to elicit an incriminating response. Herein, Innis was not "interrogated" within the meaning of
Miranda. It is undisputed that the first prong of the definition of "interrogation" was not satisfied, for
the conversation between Patrolmen Gleckman and McKenna included no express questioning of
Innis. Rather, that conversation was, at least in form, nothing more than a dialogue between the two
officers to which no response from Innis was invited. Moreover, it cannot be fairly concluded that
Innis was subjected to the "functional equivalent" of questioning. It cannot be said, in short, that
Patrolmen Gleckman and McKenna should have known that their conversation was reasonably
likely to elicit an incriminating response from Innis. There is nothing in the record to suggest that
the officers were aware that Innis was peculiarly susceptible to an appeal to his conscience
concerning the safety of handicapped children. Nor is there anything in the record to suggest that
the police knew that Innis was unusually disoriented or upset at the time of his arrest. The Rhode
Island Supreme Court erred, thus, in equating "subtle compulsion" with interrogation. That the
officers' comments struck a responsive chord is readily apparent. Thus, it may be said, as the Rhode
Island Supreme Court did say, that Innis was subjected to "subtle compulsion," but that is not the
end of the inquiry. It must also be established that a suspect's incriminating response was the
product of words or actions on the part of the police that they should have known were reasonably
likely to elicit an incriminating response. This was not established in the present case.

231 People vs. Mahinay [GR 122485, 1 February 1999]

En Banc, Per Curiam: 15 concur

Facts: Larry Mahinay y Amparado started working as houseboy with Maria Isip on 20 November
1993. His task was to take care of Isip's house which was under construction adjacent to her old
residence situated inside a compound at No. 4165 Dian Street, Gen. T. de Leon, Valenzuela, Metro
Manila. mahinay stayed and slept in an apartment also owned by Isip, located 10 meters away from
the unfinished house. The victim, Ma. Victoria Chan, 12 years old, was Isip's neighbor in Dian
Street. She used to pass by Isip's house on her way to school and play inside the compound yard,
catching maya birds together with other children. On 25 June 1995, at 8:00 a.m., Mahinay joined
Gregorio Rivera in a drinking spree. Around 10 a.m., Mahinay, who was already drunk, left
Gregorio Rivera and asked permission from Isip to go out with his friends. Sgt. Roberto Suni, also a
resident of Dian Street, went to his in-law's house between 6 to 7 p.m. met Mahinay along Dian
Street. That same evening, between 8 to 9 p.m., he saw Ma. Victoria standing in front of the gate of
the unfinished house. Later, at 9 p.m., Mahinay showed up at Norgina Rivera's store to buy lugaw.
Norgina Rivera informed Mahinay that there was none left of it. She noticed that Mahinay appeared
to be uneasy and in deep thought. She asked why he looked so worried but he did not answer. Then
he left and walked back to the compound. Meanwhile, Elvira Chan noticed that her daughter, Ma.
Victoria, was missing. She last saw her daughter wearing a pair of white shorts, brown belt, a
yellow hair ribbon, printed blue blouse, dirty white panty, white lady sando and blue rubber
slippers. Mahinay failed to show up for supper that night. On the following day, 26 June 1995, at 2
a.m., Mahinay boarded a passenger jeepney driven by Fernando Trinidad at the talipapa. Mahinay
alighted at the top of the bridge of the North Expressway and had thereafter disappeared. That same
morning, around 7:30, a certain Boy found the dead body of Ma. Victoria inside the septic tank.
Boy immediately reported what he saw to the victim's parents, Eduardo and Elvira Chan. With the
help of the Valenzuela Police, the lifeless body of Ma. Victoria was retrieved from the septic tank.
She was wearing a printed blouse without underwear. Her face bore bruises. Back in the compound,
SPO1 Arsenio Nacis and SPO1 Arnold Alabastro were informed by Isip that her houseboy,
Mahinay, was missing. At the second floor of the house under construction, they retrieved from one
of the rooms a pair of dirty white short pants, a brown belt and a yellow hair ribbon which was
identified by Elvira Chan to belong to her daughter, Ma. Victoria. They also found inside another
room a pair of blue slippers which Isip identified as that of Mahinay. Also found in the yard, three
armslength away from the septic tank were an underwear, a leather wallet, a pair of dirty long pants
and a pliers positively identified by Isip as Mahinay's belongings. These items were brought to the
police station. A police report was subsequently prepared including a referral slip addressed to the
office of the Valenzuela Prosecutor. The next day, SPO1 Virgilio Villano retrieved the victim's
underwear from the septic tank. After a series of follow-up operations, Mahinay was finally arrested
in Barangay Obario Matala, Ibaan, Batangas. He was brought to the Valenzuela Police Station. On 7
July 1995, with the assistance of Atty. Restituto Viernes, Mahinay executed an extra-judicial
confession wherein he narrated in detail how he raped and killed the victim. Also, when Mahinay
came face to face with the victim's mother and aunt, he confided to them that he was not alone in
raping and killing the victim. He pointed to Zaldy and Boyet as his co-conspirators. Thus, on 10
July 1995, Mahinay was charged with rape with homicide, to which he pleaded not guilty. After
trial, the lower court rendered a decision convicting Mahinay of the crime charged, sentenced him
to suffer the penalty of death and to pay a total of P73,000.00 to the victim's heirs. Hence, the
automatic review.

Held: Larry Mahinay during the custodial investigation and after having been informed of his
constitutional rights with the assistance of Atty. Restituto Viernes of the Public Attorney's Office
voluntarily gave his statement admitting the commission of the crime. Said confession of Mahinay
given with the assistance of Atty. Restituto Viernes is believed to have been freely and voluntarily
given. That accused did not complain to the proper authorities of any maltreatment on his person.
He did not even inform the Inquest Prosecutor when he was sworn to the truth of his statement on 8
July 1995 that he was forced, coerced or was promised of reward or leniency. That his confession
abound with details known only to him. The Court noted that a lawyer from the Public Attorneys
Office Atty. Restituto Viernes and as testified by said Atty. Viernes he informed and explained to
Mahinay his constitutional rights and was present all throughout the giving of the testimony. That
he signed the statement given by Mahinay. A lawyer from the Public Attorneys Office is expected to
be watchful and vigilant to notice any irregularity in the manner of the investigation and the
physical conditions of the accused. The post mortem findings show that the cause of death Asphyxia
by manual strangulation; Traumatic Head injury Contributory substantiate. Consistent with the
testimony of Mahinay that he pushed the victim and the latter's head hit the table and the victim lost
consciousness. There being no evidence presented to show that said confession were obtained as a
result of violence, torture, maltreatment, intimidation, threat or promise of reward or leniency nor
that the investigating officer could have been motivated to concoct the facts narrated in said
affidavit; the confession of the accused is held to be true, correct and freely or voluntarily given. In
his extrajudicial confession, Mahinay himself admitted that he had sexual congress with the
unconscious child. Such circumstantial evidence, besides 8 others, established the felony of rape
with homicide defined and penalized under Section 335 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by
Section 11, RA 7659.
232 People vs. Ayson [GR 85215, 7 July 1989]

First Division, Narvasa (J): 4 concur

Facts: Felipe Ramos was a ticket freight clerk of the Philippine Airlines (PAL), assigned at its
Baguio City station. It having allegedly come to light that he was involved in irregularities in the
sales of plane tickets, the PAL management notified him of an investigation to be conducted into the
matter of 9 February 1986. That investigation was scheduled in accordance with PAL's Code of
Conduct and Discipline, and the Collective Bargaining Agreement signed by it with the Philippine
Airlines Employees' Association (PALEA) to which Ramos pertained. On the day before the
investigation, 8 February 1986, Ramos gave to his superiors a handwritten note stating the at he was
willing to settle irregularities allegedly charged against him in the amount of P76,000
(approximately) subject to conditions as may be imposed by PAL on or before 1700/9 February
1986. At the investigation of 9 February 1986, conducted by the PAL Branch Manager in Baguio
City, Edgardo R. Cruz, in the presence of Station Agent Antonio Ocampo, Ticket Freight Clerk
Rodolfo Quitasol, and PALEA Shop Steward Cristeta Domingo, Felipe Ramos was informed "of the
finding of the Audit Team." Thereafter, his answers in response to questions by Cruz, were taken
down in writing. Ramos' answers were to the effect inter alia that he had not indeed made disclosure
of the tickets mentioned in the Audit Team's findings, that the proceeds had been "misused" by him,
that although he had planned on paying back the money, he had been prevented from doing so,
"perhaps (by) shame," that he was still willing to settle his obligation, and proferred a "compromise
to pay on staggered basis, (and) the amount would be known in the next investigation;" that he
desired the next investigation to be at the same place, "Baguio CTO," and that he should be
represented therein by "Shop stewardees ITR Nieves Blanco;" and that he was willing to sign his
statement (as he in fact afterwards did). How the investigation turned out is not dealt with the
parties at all; but it would seem that no compromise agreement was reached much less
consummated. About 2 months later, an information was filed against Felipe Ramos charging him
with the crime of estafa allegedly committed in Baguio City during the period from 12 March 1986
to 29 January 1987. On arraignment on this charge, Felipe Ramos entered a plea of "Not Guilty,"
and trial thereafter ensued. At the close of the people's case, the private prosecutors made a written
offer of evidence dated 21 June 1988, which included the statement of Ramos taken on 9 February
1986 at PAL Baguio City Ticket Office, as well as his handwritten admission given on 8 February
1986. Ramos' attorneys filed "Objections/Comments to Plaintiffs Evidence." By Order dated 9
August 1988, Judge Ruben Ayson (Branch 6, RTC Baguio City) admitted all the exhibits "as part of
the testimony of the witnesses who testified in connection therewith and for whatever they are
worth," except Ramos' statement of 9 February and his handwritten admission dated 8 February.
The private prosecutors filed a motion for reconsideration. It was denied, by Order dated 14
September 1988. The private prosecutors, in the name of the People of the Philippines, filed the
petition for certiorari and prohibition assailing the orders of 9 August 1988 and 14 September 1988.
Issue: Whether the constitutional rights of a person under custodial investigation comes into play
during the administrative inquiry.

Held: Felipe Ramos was not in any sense under custodial interrogation, as the term should be
properly understood, prior to and during the administrative inquiry into the discovered irregularities
in ticket sales in which he appeared to have had a hand. The constitutional rights of a person under
custodial interrogation did not therefore come into play, were of no relevance to the inquiry. It is
also clear, too, that Ramos had voluntarily answered questions posed to him on the first day of the
administrative investigation, 9 February 1986 and agreed that the proceedings should be recorded,
the record having thereafter been marked during the trial of the criminal action subsequently filed
against him, just as it is obvious that the note that he sent to his superiors on 8 February 1986, the
day before the investigation, offering to compromise his liability in the alleged irregularities, was a
free and even spontaneous act on his part. They may not be excluded on the ground that the so-
called "Miranda rights" had not been accorded to Ramos. As to the danger of violation of the right
of any person against self-incrimination when the investigation is conducted by the complaining
companies or employers, it suffices to draw attention to the specific and peremptory requirement of
the law that disciplinary sanctions may not be imposed on any employee by his employer until and
unless the employee has been accorded due process, by which is meant that the latter must be
informed of the offenses ascribed to him and afforded adequate time and opportunity to explain his
side. The requirement entails the making of statements, oral or written, by the employee under such
administrative investigation in his defense, with opportunity to solicit the assistance of counsel, or
his colleagues and friends. The employee may, of course, refuse to submit any statement at the
investigation, that is his privilege. But if he should opt to do so, in his defense to the accusation
against him, it would be absurd to reject his statements, whether at the administrative investigation,
or at a subsequent criminal action brought against him, because he had not been accorded, prior to
his making and presenting them, his "Miranda rights" (to silence and to counsel and to be informed
thereof, etc.) which, to repeat, are relevant only in custodial investigations. Indeed, it is self-evident
that the employee's statements, whether called "position paper," "answer," etc., are submitted by
him precisely so that they may be admitted and duly considered by the investigating officer or
committee, in negation or mitigation of his liability.

233 Office of the Court Administrator vs. Sumilang [Administrative Matter MTJ-94-989, 18
April 1997]

Second Division, Romero (J): 4 concur

Facts: Court interpreter Felicidad Malla, who was the officer-in-charge from 1 July 1992 to 15
November 1992, took a maternity leave for 1 month (16 November 1992 to 15 December 1992) and
reassumed her position on 16 December 1992, until her resignation on 31 August 1993. On 1
September 1993, Rebecca Avanzado assumed the position of officer in charge. It was during her
tenure on 8 August 1994, that an on- the-spot audit examination was conducted by the Fiscal Audit
Division of the Office of Court Administrator. In the course of the examination, several anomalous
transactions were discovered. One involved a manager's check deposited in the name of Teodorico
Dizon in connection with Civil Case 858, wherein Entero Villarica, on 7 August 1992 during the
tenure of Malla entrusted the amount of P240,000.00 to Malla instead of handling it over to the
Clerk of Court pursuant to Supreme Court Circular 13-92. When asked to explain where the
P240,000.00 was, Malla, explained that she deposited it at the Sta. Cruz, Laguna branch of the
Philippine National Bank (PNB) but she and Judge Sumilang later withdrew it allegedly under the
belief that Dizon would demand the delivery of the money upon the termination of the case. Upon
further questioning by the examining team, however, Malla admitted that she lent the amount of
P87,000.00 to steno-reporter Edelita Lagmay, P40,000.00 to steno-reporter Nieva Mercado, and
P81,000.00 to Mrs. Sumilang, wife of Judge Sumilang. She spent P32,000.00 for the hospitalization
of her husband and the remaining balance for personal purposes. Later on, she executed an affidavit
stating that only Lagmay and Mercado borrowed P55,000.00 and P40,000.00, respectively. On the
other hand, she used P100,000.00 for her personal needs. Upon learning that they were being
implicated in the anomalous transaction, Lagmay executed an affidavit stating that the amount of
P55,000.00 was from the personal account of Malla and not from the P240,000.00 amount
deposited before the court and such loan has already been paid. Mercado, on the other hand, claims
that the amount of P40,000.00 was borrowed only two weeks before the audit took place, when
Malla was no longer employed with the court. Mrs. Sumilang, for her part, denied any involvement
in any of the transactions. Judge Augusto Sumilang, Felicidad Malla, Edelita Lagmay and Nieva
Mercado, court employees of the Metropolitan Trial Court of Pila, Laguna were charged in a
memorandum report by the Office of Court Administrator dated 16 August 1994, for
misappropriating funds deposited by Spouses Entero Villarica and Felicidad Domingo in Civil Case
858. On 5 October 1994, the Supreme Court issued a resolution treating the memorandum report as
an administrative complaint (Administrative Matter MTJ-94-989). In addition, a second complaint
was lodged against Malla for removing judicial records outside the court premises. The Court
decided to include this matter in the original complaint earlier docketed as AM MTJ-94-989 in a
resolution dated 6 March 1995.

Issue: Whether Malla's constitutional rights were violated when she signed an affidavit dated 14
September 1994 before the Office of the Court Administrator, where she admitted her misdeed.

Held: The constitutional provision under Section 12, Article III of the Constitution may be invoked
only during "custodial investigation" or as in "custody investigation" which has been defined as
"questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has been taken into custody or
otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way." The investigation is defined as
an "investigation conducted by police authorities which will include investigation conducted by the
Municipal Police, P.C. (now PNP) and the NBI and such other police agencies in our government."
Thus, the Office of the Court Administrator can hardly be deemed to be the law enforcement
authority contemplated in the constitutional provision. At any rate, Malla admitted during her
testimony that she received the said check from Villarica covering the amount of P240,000.00
payable to Dizon. However, when she tried to deposit it with the Municipal Treasurer, the latter
refused because there was no order from Judge Sumilang. Consequently, Villarica entrusted said
check to her. It was at this juncture that she used the money for personal purposes. During the
investigation, Malla repeated what she basically stated in her affidavit i.e., that she used a
substantial amount of the P240,000.00 for her personal needs. This effectively refutes whatever
pressure and coercion she claims was employed against her. By repeating her confession in open
court, Malla thereby converted it into a judicial confession.

234 Gamboa vs. Cruz [GR L-56291, 27 June 1988]

En Banc, Padilla (J): 9 concur, 1 concurs pro hac vice

Facts: On 19 July 1979, at about 7:00 a.m., Christopher Gamboa y Gonzales was arrested for
vagrancy, without a warrant of arrest, by Patrolman Arturo Palencia. Thereafter, Gamboa was
brought to Precinct 2, Manila, where he was booked for vagrancy and then detained therein together
with several others. The following day, 20 July 1979, during the lineup of 5 detainees, including
Gamboa, Erlinda B. Bernal pointed to Gamboa and said, "that one is a companion." After the
identification, the other detainees were brought back to their cell but Gamboa was ordered to stay
on. While Bernal was being interrogated by the police investigator, Gamboa was told to sit down in
front of her. On 23 July 1979, an information for robbery was filed against Gamboa. On 22 August
1979, Gamboa was arraigned. Thereafter, hearings were held. On 2 April 1980, the prosecution
formally offered its evidence and then rested its case. On 14 July 1980, petitioner, by counsel,
instead of presenting his defense, manifested in open court that he was filing a Motion to Acquit or
Demurrer to Evidence. On 13 August 1980, Gamboa filed said Motion predicated on the ground that
the conduct of the line-up, without notice to, and in the absence of, his counsel violated his
constitutional rights to counsel and to due process. On 23 October 1980, the Court of First Instance
of Manila, Branch XXIX, in Criminal Case 47622 issued the order denying the Motion to Acquit.
Gamboa filed the petition for certiorari and prohibition, with prayer for a temporary restraining
order.

Issue: Whether Gamboa was entitled to a counsel, as part of his right in custodial investigation, at
the time he was placed in a police lineup.

Held: The right to counsel attaches upon the start of an investigation, i.e. when the investigating
officer starts to ask questions to elicit information and/or confessions or admissions from the
respondent/accused. At such point or stage, the person being interrogated must be assisted by
counsel to avoid the pernicious practice of extorting false or coerced admissions or confessions
from the lips of the person undergoing interrogation, for the commission of an offense. Any person
under investigation must, among other things, be assisted by counsel. Section 20, Article IV of the
1973 Constitution (similar guarantees in Section 12, Article III of the 1987 Constitution) are clear.
They leave no room for equivocation. Accordingly, in several cases, the Supreme Court has
consistently held that no custodial investigation shall be conducted unless it be in the presence of
counsel, engaged by the person arrested, or by any person in his behalf, or appointed by the court
upon petition either of the detainee himself or by anyone in his behalf, and that, while the right may
be waived, the waiver shall not be valid unless made in writing and in the presence of counsel.
However, the police line-up (at least, in this case) was not part of the custodial inquest, hence,
Gamboa was not yet entitled, at such stage, to counsel.

235 United States vs. Wade [388 US 218, 12 June 1967]

Brennan (J)

Facts: The federally insured bank in Eustace, Texas, was robbed on 21 September 1964. A man
with a small strip of tape on each side of his face entered the bank, pointed a pistol at the female
cashier and the vice president, the only persons in the bank at the time, and forced them to fill a
pillowcase with the bank's money. The man then drove away with an accomplice who had been
waiting in a stolen car outside the bank. On 23 March 1965, an indictment was returned against
Wade, and two others for conspiring to rob the bank, and against Wade and the accomplice for the
robbery itself. Wade was arrested on April 2, and counsel was appointed to represent him on April
26. Fifteen days later an FBI agent, without notice to Wade's lawyer, arranged to have the two bank
employees observe a lineup made up of Wade and five or six other prisoners and conducted in a
courtroom of the local county courthouse. Each person in the line wore strips of tape such as
allegedly worn by the robber and upon direction each said something like "put the money in the
bag," the words allegedly uttered by the robber. Both bank employees identified Wade in the lineup
as the bank robber. At trial, the two employees, when asked on direct examination if the robber was
in the courtroom, pointed to Wade. The prior lineup identification was then elicited from both
employees on cross-examination. At the close of testimony, Wade's counsel moved for a judgment
of acquittal or, alternatively, to strike the bank officials' courtroom identifications on the ground that
conduct of the lineup, without notice to and in the absence of his appointed counsel, violated his
Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination and his Sixth Amendment right to the
assistance of counsel. The motion was denied, and Wade was convicted. The Court of Appeals for
the Fifth Circuit reversed the conviction and ordered a new trial at which the in-court identification
evidence was to be excluded, holding that, though the lineup did not violate Wade's Fifth
Amendment rights, the lineup, held as it was, in the absence of counsel, already chosen to represent
Wade, was a violation of his Sixth Amendment rights.

Issue: Whether Wade was compelled to testify himself during the pretrial lineup, to which the
counsel of the accused was not given notice to.

Held: Neither the lineup itself nor anything shown by this record that Wade was required to do in
the lineup violated his privilege against self-incrimination. The privilege "protects an accused only
from being compelled to testify against himself, or otherwise provide the State with evidence of a
testimonial or communicative nature." Compelling the accused merely to exhibit his person for
observation by a prosecution witness prior to trial involves no compulsion of the accused to give
evidence having testimonial significance. It is compulsion of the accused to exhibit his physical
characteristics, not compulsion to disclose any knowledge he might have. It is no different from
compelling Schmerber to provide a blood sample or Holt to wear the blouse, and, as in those
instances, is not within the cover of the privilege. Similarly, compelling Wade to speak within
hearing distance of the witnesses, even to utter words purportedly uttered by the robber, was not
compulsion to utter statements of a "testimonial" nature; he was required to use his voice as an
identifying physical characteristic, not to speak his guilt. The Court held in Schmerber that the
distinction to be drawn under the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination is one
between an accused's "communications" in whatever form, vocal or physical, and "compulsion
which makes a suspect or accused the source of `real or physical evidence.'" The Court recognized
that "both federal and state courts have usually held that [the privilege] offers no protection against
compulsion to submit to fingerprinting, photography, or measurements, to write or speak for
identification, to appear in court, to stand, to assume a stance, to walk, or to make a particular
gesture." None of these activities becomes testimonial within the scope of the privilege because
required of the accused in a pretrial lineup. However, the Sixth Amendment guarantees an accused
the right to counsel not only at his trial but at any critical confrontation by the prosecution at pretrial
proceedings where the results might well determine his fate and where the absence of counsel might
derogate from his right to a fair trial. The post-indictment lineup (unlike such preparatory steps as
analyzing fingerprints and blood samples) was a critical prosecutive stage at which respondent was
entitled to the aid of counsel. There is a great possibility of unfairness to the accused at that point,
(1) because of the manner in which confrontations for identification are frequently conducted, (2)
because of dangers inherent in eyewitness identification and suggestibility inherent in the context of
the confrontations, and (3) because of the likelihood that the accused will often be precluded from
reconstructing what occurred and thereby obtaining a full hearing on the identification issue at trial.
This case illustrates the potential for improper influence on witnesses through the lineup procedure,
since the bank employees were allowed to see respondent in the custody of FBI agents before the
lineup began. The presence of counsel at the lineup will significantly promote fairness at the
confrontation and a full hearing at trial on the issue of identification. Further, in-court identification
by a witness to whom the accused was exhibited before trial in the absence of counsel must be
excluded unless it can be established that such evidence had an independent origin or that error in
its admission was harmless. Since it is not clear that the Court of Appeals applied the prescribed
rule of exclusion, and since the nature of the in-court identifications here was not an issue in the
trial and cannot be determined on the record, the case must be remanded to the District Court for
resolution of these issues.

236 People vs. Escordial [GR 138934-35, 16 January 2002]

En Banc, Mendoza (J): 14 concur

Facts: At around 8 p.m. of 27 December 1996, Jason Joniega, Mark Esmeralda and Mark Lucena
were playing inside a jeepney parked in front of a boarding house owned by Pacita Aguillon at No.
17 Margarita Extension, Libertad St., Purok Amelia 2, Barangay 40, Bacolod City. As one of them
hit his head on the rails of the jeepney, the boys were told by a man sitting inside the jeepney to go
home lest they would meet an accident. The man was later identified by Joniega and Esmeralda as
Anthony Escordial. Living in a boarding house in front of which the jeepney was parked were
Michelle Darunday, Erma Blanca, and Ma. Teresa Gellaver. While the three were asleep, Erma was
awakened by the presence of a man. The man had his head covered with a t-shirt to prevent
identification and carried a knife about four inches long. Michelle and Teresa were awakened
thereafter. The man was able to get P500.00 from Erma and P3,100.00 from Michelle. After getting
their money, the man gave a t-shirt to Erma to blindfold Teresa and another to Michelle to blindfold
Erma. He blindfolded Michelle himself and then began touching her in different parts of her body.
The man succeeded in inserting his penis into Michelle's vagina. Although Michelle was
blindfolded and could not see, she could feel that the man had no cover on his face when he was
raping her. She felt that his chest was rough and had some scars. When he placed her hands on his
nape, she felt that it was also rough. On the other hand, Erma claimed she was able to see through
her blindfold and that she saw the man's face because of the light coming from the lamp post
outside the boarding house. After he had finished raping Michelle, the man sat on the bed and talked
to the three women. After a while, the man told Michelle he wanted to have sex with her again.
Michelle pleaded with him, but the man threatened to call his companions and said it would be
worse for her if his companions would be the ones to rape her. He ordered Michelle to lie on her
stomach and then inserted his penis into her anus. When he was through, he gave Michelle a blanket
to cover herself and returned to her a pair of earrings which he had taken from her. He then left, but
not before warning the women not to report the matter to anyone or he would kill them. Michelle,
Erma, and Teresa were so frightened that they were not able to ask for help until 30 minutes after
the man had left. They told their neighbor, Tiyo Anong, that a man had come to the house and
robbed them. They also called up Allan Aguillon, the son of the owner of the boarding house, who
in turn reported the incident to the police. When the policemen arrived, they asked Michelle to
describe the attacker, but she told them that she could only identify his voice and his eyes.
Accompanied by the police, the three women looked for the man around the Libertad area, but they
did not find him. Michelle, Erma, and Teresa were taken to the police station at Bac-Up for
investigation. But, at Michelle's request, Erma and Teresa did not tell the others that Michelle had
been raped by their attacker. Upon returning home, Michelle found her aunt and uncle. She
embraced her aunt and told her about her ordeal. Michelle was again taken to the police
headquarters, where she was referred to the Women's Desk to report the rape. They were able to go
home to the house of Michelle's aunt at around 5 to 6 p.m. The following day, P03 Nicolas Tancinco
went around Margarita Extension and learned about the children playing on the street around the
time the intruder entered the boarding house. The description of the suspect fitted that of a worker at
a caf called Coffee Break Corner, about two houses away from the boarding house. On 2 January
1997, Tancinco and some companions proceeded to the Coffee Break Corner and interviewed the
security guard, who told them that a certain Fidel Hinolan owned the caf. When interviewed by
Tancinco and his companions, Fidel Hinolan told them that Escordial was his helper and that the
latter had gone home on 27 December 1996 to Barangay Miranda, Pontevedra, Negros Occidental.
Based on the information furnished by Hinolan, Tancinco and his fellow police officers, Michelle
Darunday, Allan Aguillon, and Pacita Aguillon went to Barangay Miranda, Pontevedra, Negros
Occidental at around 10 a.m. of 3 January 1997 and asked the assistance of the police there to locate
Escordial. PO2 Rodolfo Gemarino asked one of his colleagues at the Pontevedra police to
accompany Tancinco and his companions. They found Escordial at the basketball court and
"invited" him to go to the police station for questioning. He was transferred to the Bacolod police
station for further investigation. At the Bacolod police station, Erma Blanca, Ma. Teresa Gellaver,
Jason Joniega, and Mark Esmeralda were asked whether Escordial was the same person they saw on
the night of the incident. They were taken one by one to the jail cell and asked to point to the person
that they had seen that night. They picked Escordial out of four people who were inside the jail cell.
Escordial was charged with the crime of rape in Criminal Case 97-18117. He was also charged with
robbery with rape in Criminal Case 97-18118. When arraigned on 25 February 1997, Escordial
pleaded not guilty to the charges, whereupon the two cases were jointly tried. On 26 February 1999,
the trial court rendered a decision, finding Escordial guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
Robbery with Rape, the commission of which being attended by three aggravating circumstances of
(1) nighttime; (2) that the crime was committed in the dwelling of the offended party, and (3) that
craft, fraud and disguise were employed by the accused in the commission of the crime under
paragraphs 3, 6, and 14 of Article 14 of the Revised Penal Code. The court sentenced Escordial to
the maximum penalty of death, and condemned him to pay Darunday the sum of P3,650.00,
representing the money taken by the accused; P50,000.00 as moral damages, P30,000.00 as
exemplary damages, and the costs. Escordial appealed.

Issue: Whether the out-of-court identification in the show up at the police station, made after the
start of the custodial investigation, may be used in court.

Held: While it cannot be denied that Escordial was deprived of his right to be informed of his rights
to remain silent and to have competent and independent counsel, he has not shown that, as a result
of his custodial interrogation, the police obtained any statement from him whether inculpatory or
exculpatory - which was used in evidence against him. No uncounseled statement was obtained
from Escordial which should have been excluded as evidence against him. However, Escordial was
never assisted by counsel, whether of his own choice or provided by the police officers, from the
time of his arrest in Pontevedra, Negros Occidental to the time of his continued detention at the
Bacolod police station. Although Escordial made no statement during this time, this fact remains
important insofar as it affects the admissibility of the out-of-court identification of Escordial by the
prosecution witnesses, namely, Michelle Darunday, Erma Blanca, Ma. Teresa Gellaver, Mark
Esmeralda, and Jason Joniega. As a rule, an accused is not entitled to the assistance of counsel in a
police line-up considering that such is usually not a part of the custodial inquest. However, the
previous cases are different inasmuch as Escordial, having been the focus of attention by the police
after he had been pointed to by a certain Ramie as the possible perpetrator of the crime, was already
under custodial investigation when these out-of-court identifications were conducted by the police.
An out-of-court identification of an accused can be made in various ways. In a show-up, the accused
alone is brought face to face with the witness for identification, while in a police line-up, the suspect
is identified by a witness from a group of persons gathered for that purpose. During custodial
investigation, these types of identification have been recognized as "critical confrontations of the
accused by the prosecution" which necessitate the presence of counsel for the accused. This is
because the results of these pre-trial proceedings "might well settle the accused's fate and reduce the
trial itself to a mere formality." The Court thus ruled that any identification of an uncounseled
accused made in a police line-up, or in a show-up for that matter, after the start of the custodial
investigation is inadmissible as evidence against him. Herein, Escordial was identified by Michelle
Darunda in a show-up on 3 January 1997 and by Erma Blanca, Ma. Teresa Gellaver, Jason Joniega,
and Mark Esmeralda in a police line-up on various dates after his arrest. Having been made when
Escordial did not have the assistance of counsel, these out-of-court identifications are inadmissible
in evidence against him. Consequently, the testimonies of these witnesses regarding these
identifications should have been held inadmissible for being "the direct result of the illegal lineup
'come at by exploitation of [the primary] illegality.'"

237 People vs. Piedad [GR 131923, 5 December 2002]

First Division, Ynares-Santigao (J): 3 concur, 1 on official leave

Facts: On 10 April 1996, at around 11 p.m., Luz Lactawan left her house at No. 2 Scout Bayoran,
Barangay South Triangle, Quezon City, to follow Mateo, her husband, who had earlier gone. As she
was walking by the gate of the company compound where they reside, she heard Fidel Piquero
shouting for help because Mateo was being mauled by a group of men. She rushed out of the
compound and saw her husband being beaten up by Niel Piedad, Richard Palma, Lito Garcia and
five others. She tried to pacify the aggressors, but was beaten herself. Luz embraced Mateo in an
effort to protect him. It was then that Niel picked up a large stone, measuring about a foot and a
half, and struck Mateos head with it. Then, Lito approached Mateos side and stabbed him at the
back, while Richard hit Mateo in the face. Mateo was rushed to the East Avenue Medical Center
where he later died because of the injuries he sustained. Niel Piedad y Consolacion, Lito Garcia y
Francisco and Richard Palma y Ider were charged with Murder. Upon arraignment, all the accused
pleaded not guilty to the charge. Trial ensued thereafter. The trial court rendered a decision, finding
Piedad and Garcia guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder with no modifying
circumstances present, and sentenced each of them to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua
pursuant to Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code. Piedad and Garcia were likewise held solidarily
liable to indemnify the heirs of the victim Mateo Lactawan in the sum of P50,000.00. Richard
Palma was acquitted on the ground of reasonable doubt. Piedad and Garcia appealed.

Issue: Whether the way that Piedad was identified by prosecution witnesses was suggestive and
fatally flawed; that Piedad should have been put in a police lineup instead of being shoveled into a
confrontation with the alleged witnesses and immediately singled out by the police as suspects.

Held: The claim by the defense that Piedads pre-trial identification was suggestive due to the
absence of a police lineup is more theoretical than real. It must be pointed out that even before the
incident, Luz Lactawan knew the accused. Fidel, on the other hand, knew Piedad because they
played basketball together. Hence, the witnesses were not identifying persons whom they were
unfamiliar with, where arguably, improper suggestion may set in. On the contrary, when the accused
were presented before the witnesses, they were simply asked to confirm whether they were the ones
responsible for the crime perpetrated. The witnesses did not incriminate the accused simply because
they were the only ones presented by the police, rather, the witnesses were certain they recognized
the perpetrators of the crime. Besides, there is no law which requires a police lineup before a
suspect can be identified as the culprit of a crime. What is important is that the prosecution
witnesses positively identify the persons charged as the malefactors. In this regard, the Court finds
no reason to doubt the veracity of Luzs and Fidels testimony. The records show that Luz and Fidel
positively, categorically and unhesitatingly identified Piedad as the one who struck Mateo on the
head with a stone, and Garcia as the one who stabbed Mateo on the back, thereby inflicting
traumatic head injuries and a stab wound which eventually led to Mateos death. Indeed, if family
members who have witnessed the killing of a loved one usually strive to remember the faces of the
assailants, the Court sees no reason how a wife, who witnessed the violence inflicted upon her
husband and who eventually died by reason thereof, could have done any less. It must be stressed
that Luz was right beside her husband when the concrete stone was struck on his head, hence, Luz
could not have mistaken the identity of the person responsible for the attack. She was only a foot
away from Piedad before the latter hit Mateo on the head. Garcia on the other hand was identified
by both Luz and Fidel as the one who was shirtless at the time of the incident. There was light from
a bulb 5 meters away from the scene of the crime. Experience dictates that precisely because of the
unusual acts of violence committed right before their eyes, eyewitnesses can remember with a high
degree of reliability the identity of the criminals at any given time. Hence, the proximity and
attention afforded the witnesses, coupled with the relative illumination of the surrounding area,
bolsters the credibility of identification of Piedad, et. al. Neither is the lack of counsel during the
pre-trial identification process of Piedad, et. al. fatal. Piedad, et. al. did not make any extrajudicial
confession or admission with regard to the crime charged. While Piedad and Garcia may have been
suspects, they were certainly not interrogated by the police authorities, much less forced to confess
to the crime imputed against them. Piedad and Garcia were not under custodial investigation. In
fact, Piedad averred during cross-examination that the police never allowed them to say anything at
the police station on the day they voluntarily presented themselves to the authorities.
238 Magtoto vs. Manguera [GR L-37201-02, 3 March 1975]; also Simeon vs. Villaluz [GR
L-37424] and People vs. Isnani [GR L-38929]

En Banc, Fernandez (J): 6 concur

Facts: No preliminary facts are available in the body of the case. Judge Miguel M. Manguera of the
Court of First Instance (Branch II) of Occidental Mindoro (in GR L-37201-02) and Judge Judge
Onoftre A. Villaluz of the Criminal Circuit Court of Pasig, Rizal (in GR L-37424) declarede
admissible the confessions of the accused in said cases (Clemente Magtoto in GR L-37201-02; and
Maximo Simeon, Louis Mednatt, Inocentes De Luna, Ruben Miranda, Alfonso Ballesteros, Rudolfo
Suarez, Manuel Manalo, Alberto Gabion, and Rafael Brill in GR L-37424). District Judge Asaali S.
Isnani of Court of First Instance (Branch II) of Zamboanga de Sur (in GR L-38928), on the other
hand, declared inadmissible the confessions of the accused in said case (Vicente Longakit and Jaime
Dalion), although they have not been informed of their right to remain silent and to counsel before
they gave the confessions, because they were given before the effectivity of the 1973 Constitution.
Petitions for certiorari were filed with the Supreme Court.

Issue: Whether the right to counsel and to be informed in such right, incorporated in Section 20,
Article IV of the 1973 Constitution, applies prospectively or retroactively.

Held: Section 20, Article IV of the 1973 Constitution granted, for the first time, to a person under
investigation for the commission of an offense, the right to counsel and to be informed of such
right. And the last sentence thereof which, in effect, means that any confession obtained in violation
of this right shall be inadmissible in evidence, can and should be given effect only when the right
already existed and had been violated. Consequently, because the confessions of the accused in GRs
L-37201-02, 37424 and 38929 were taken before the effectivity of the 1973 Constitution in
accordance with the rules then in force, no right had been violated as to render them inadmissible in
evidence although they were not informed of "their right to remain silent and to counsel," "and to be
informed of such right," because, no such right existed at the time. The argument that the second
paragraph of Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code, which was added by Republic Act 1083
enacted in 1954, which reads that "In every case, the person detained shall be informed of the cause
of his detention and shall be allowed, upon his request, to communicate and confer at anytime with
his attorney or counsel," impliedly granted to a detained person the right to counsel and to be
informed of such right, is untenable. The only right granted by said paragraph to a detained person
was to be informed of the cause of his detention. But he must make a request for him to be able to
claim the right to communicate and confer with counsel at any time. The historical background of
Section 20, Article IV of the 1973 Constitution shows that the new right granted therein to a
detained person to counsel and to be informed of such right under pain of his confession being
declared inadmissible in evidence, has and should be given a prospective and not a retroactive
effect. Furthermore, to give a retroactive effect to this constitutional guarantee to counsel would
have a great unsettling effect on the administration of justice in this country. It may lead to the
acquittal of guilty individuals and thus cause injustice to the People and the offended parties in
many criminal cases where confessions were obtained before the effectivity of the 1973
Constitution and in accordance with the rules then in force although without assistance of counsel.
The Constitutional Convention could not have intended such a disastrous consequence in the
administration of justice. For if the cause of justice suffers when an innocent person is convicted, it
equally suffers when a guilty one is acquitted.

239 People vs. Page [GR L-37507, 7 June 1977]

Second Division, Aquino (J): 3 concur, 1 concurs in result, 1 designated to sit in Second Division, 1
on leave

Facts: At around 4:00 p.m. of 13 February 1972, Crisanto Camposano, alias Boy Sangkay, a
resident of Bagong Ilog, Baclaran, Paraaque, Rizal, went to the house of William Page y Ubina
located at 143 Pildira Street, near the Manila International Airport, Pasay City. They were friends
since boyhood. Page was an 18- year old third year high school student at the Arellano University in
Pasay City. From Page's house, the two went to Camposano's house, where they met the latter's
father who was drinking with a companion. Camposano's father gave Page some liquor to drink.
Page and Camposano stayed at the latter's house up to 10:00 p.m. At past 10, Page and Camposano
went to the rotonda or intersection of Taft Avenue and F. B. Harrison Boulevard, where they
boarded a Manila-bound jeepney. Page was armed with a balisong knife. Camposano had a
revolver. Page seated himself beside a male passenger who was near the driver on the front seat.
Camposano took a seat at the back of the jeepney where two female passengers were seated. (The
male passenger turned out to be Randolf Scot, a 30-year old employee of the Hyatt Regency Hotel
who was on his way to work. The female passengers were the sisters, Veronica Villaverde-Balacapo
and Cesarea Villaverde). With the jeepney was in front of the San Antonio Savings Bank on
Harrison Boulevard, Page and Camposano told the driver to turn left on Russel Avenue, going to M.
Roxas Boulevard, and then to turn left going to Paraaque. There, they held up the driver and the
three passengers. They got the money and pieces of jewelry of the passengers and the driver. When
the jeepney was in front of Casa Marcos and El Presidente Hotel, one of the women (Veronica
Balacapo) jumped out of the jeepney. (The husband of one of the women was a waiter at Casa
Marcos). The other woman (Cesarea Villaverde) shouted. Camposano kicked her, thus causing her
to fall out of the jeepney. Then, the two directed the driver to proceed to the airport. After the Page
and Camposano told the driver to stop (at Pildira Street, according to Page; or at Baltao Street near
the airport, according to Scot), the two malefactors fled to a dark alley. Balacapo was brought to the
Philippine General Hospital by a good Samaritan, Manolo Daval Santos. She was already dead
when she reached the hospital. Villaverde was brought to the Ospital ng Maynila. The record is not
clear as to whether she survived. Scot and the driver reported the holdup to the police of Paraaque
at 11:00 p.m. Lieutenant Casiano Eugenio, the precinct commander, showed them a photograph of
Camposano. Dilla and Scot identified him as one of the two hoodlums. Eugenio and the two
robbery victims repaired to the residence of Camposano at Bagong Ilog, Baclaran. They saw
Camposano, whom Dilla fingered, but Camposano fired shots at them and was able to elude pursuit
due to the darkness of the night. He was killed by the Pasay City policemen while he was
committing another crime. The next day policemen went to Page's residence near the airport to
apprehend him. He was not there. His father, in the presence of his aunt, promised to surrender him.
Page was arrested in the morning of 24 February 1972 at the Jose Abad Santos High School of the
Arellano University in Pasay City. In the afternoon of that day, his statement was taken down by
Patrolman C. Prepena and sworn to before the municipal judge. On 25 February 1972, the chief of
police filed a complaint for robbery with murder in the municipal court of Paraaque against
Camposano and John Doe (Criminal Case 30039). The complaint was based on the investigation of
Dilla and Scot. Page did not present any evidence at the preliminary investigation. The case was
remanded to the Court of First Instance where the fiscal filed an information for robbery with
homicide against Page and Camposano. After trial and on 21 July 1973, the trial court rendered the
judgment convicting Page of robbery with homicide, sentencing him to reclusion perpetua, and
ordering him to pay the heirs of Veronica Villaverde-Balacapo an indemnity of P12,000 plus
P20,000 as moral damages. Page appealed.

Issue: Whether Pages confession, without observing the requisites in Section 20 of Article IV, be
admissible as evidence.

Held: Page admitted that when he was brought before the municipal judge for the administration of
the oath on his confession, he could have complained to the latter about the alleged maltreatment.
He did not complain. The confession was voluntary. Certain details found in the confession are
strong indicia of its authenticity. Page specified therein that his residence was at 143 Pildira Street,
an address which jibes with the address in his school record; that his maternal surname is Ubia;
that he met Camposano at 4:00 p.m. of 13 February 1972; that they went to Camposano's residence,
where Page was given liquor by Camposano's father; that he directed the driver to follow a certain
route; that Camposano was from Sorsogon; that Page was acquainted with some hoodlums, and that
Page was charged with theft. These details would not have been embodied in the confession had not
Page freely disclosed them to the police. Page's confession, having been taken before the 1973
Constitution took effect, is admissible although the requisites in section 20 of Article IV were not
observed, in line with the ruling in Magtoto vs. Manguera (GR L-37201-2, 3 March 1975).

240 People vs. Caguioa [GR L-38975, 17 January 1980]

En Banc, Fernando (CJ): 8 concur, 1 concurs in result

Facts: The Provincial Fiscal of Bulacan filed on 14 September 1973, in the Court of First Instance
of Bulacan, an information for murder against Paquito Yupo y Gonzales (Criminal Case 146-V-73),
with the case, after the raffle, being assigned to Branch VIII, presided by Judge Eduardo P. Caguioa.
Upon arraignment on 5 October 1973, Yupo pleaded not guilty. The trial of the case then proceeded,
the prosecution having presented 6 witnesses, including the father of the deceased, Miguel Tribol,
and his common-law wife, Lydia Begnotia, who allegedly received the ante mortem statement of
the victim, Rodolfo Tribol. Then, at the hearing on 3 June 1974, the prosecution presented Corporal
Conrado Roca of the Meycauayan Police Department, before whom a written statement of Yupo and
his alleged waiver of his right to remain silent and to be assisted by a counsel of his own choice was
taken. After this witness had identified the statement of Yupo and the waiver, he was questioned on
the incriminating answers in such statement to the police, but there was an objection on the part of
the defense counsel based on the ground of such statement being inadmissible in evidence, as the
statement was taken by the police without any counsel assisting the accused in the investigation.
Judge Caguioa sustained the objection of the defense on the view that such judicial confession of
the accused is inadmissible in evidence for being unconstitutional, it appearing that the accused was
not assisted by a counsel when it was given. He likewise stated that such right could not be waived.
Upon his refusal to reconsider such ruling, the petition for certiorari was filed.

Issue: Whether the right to remain silent and right to counsel during custodial investigation may be
waived.

Held: While there could be a waiver of the rights of an accused, it must be intelligently waived,
otherwise a court's jurisdiction starting at the beginning of the trial may be lost in the course of the
proceeding. Statements made during the period of custodial interrogation to be admissible require a
clear intelligent waiver of constitutional rights, the suspect being warned prior to questioning that
he has a right to remain silent, that any utterance may be used against him, and that he has the right
to the presence of a counsel, either retained or appointed. The prosecution may not use statements,
whether exculpatory or inculpatory, stemming from custodial interrogation of the defendant unless
it demonstrates the use of procedural safeguards effective to secure the privilege against self-
incrimination. By custodial interrogation, we mean questioning initiated by law enforcement
officers after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in
any significant way. As for the procedural safeguards to be employed, unless other fully effective
means are devised to inform accused persons of their right of silence and to assure a continuous
opportunity to exercise it, the following measures are required. Prior to any questioning, the person
must be warned that he has a right to remain silent, that any statement he does not make may be
used as evidence against him, and that he has a right to the presence of an attorney, either retained
or appointed. The defendant may waive effectuation of those rights, provided the waiver is made
voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently. If, however, he indicates in any manner and at any stage of
the process that he wishes to consult with an attorney before speaking, there can be no questioning.
Likewise, if the individual is alone and indicates in any manner that he does not wish to be
interrogated, the police may not question him. The mere fact that he may have answered some
questions or volunteered some statements on his own does not deprive him of the right to refrain
from answering any further inquiries until he has consulted with an attorney and thereafter consents
to be questioned. Tested by such a clear and unequivocal standard, the alleged waiver herein falls
far short. Yupo merely answered in a monosyllabic "Opo" to Corporal Conrado B. Roca of the
Police Force of Meycauayan, worded thus: "Ipinaaalam ko sa iyo na ikaw ay sinisiyasat tungkol sa
isang paglabag sa batas na iyong ginawa, bago ko ipagpatuloy ang pagtatanong sa iyo, ikaw ay may
karapatan na huwag magsalita kung ayaw mo at may karapatan ka rin na magkaroon ng abogado na
iyong gusto, at dapat mo ring mabatid na anuman ang sabihin mo dito ay maaaring gamitin ng ayon
o laban sa iyo, magsasalaysay ka pa rin ba?" and that was all.

241 People vs. Tampus [GR L-44690, 28 March 1980]

En Banc, Aquino (J): 8 concur, 1 took no part

Facts: At around 10:00 a.m. of 14 January 1976, Celso Saminado, a prisoner in the national
penitentiary at Muntinlupa, Rizal and a patient in the emergency ward of the prison hospital, went
to the toilet to answer a call of nature and to fetch water. Jose Tampus y Ponce and Rodolfo Avila,
prisoners in the same penal institution, who were tubercular patients in the hospital, followed
Saminado to the toilet and, by means of their bladed weapons, assaulted him. Tampus inflicted 8
incised wounds on Saminado while Avila stabbed him nine times. Saminado died upon arrival at
11:00 a.m. on that same morning in the prison hospital. After emerging from the toilet, Tampus and
Avila surrendered to a prison guard with their knives. They told the guard: "Surrender po kami, sir.
Gumanti lang po kami." The motive of the killing was revenge. Tampus and Avila, both members of
the Oxo gang, avenged the stabbing of Eduardo Rosales (also a member of the Oxo gang) in
December 1975 by a member of the Batang Mindanao gang, a group hostile to the Oxo gang.
Saminado was a member of the Batang Mindanao gang. The officer of the day investigated the
incident right away. In his written report submitted on the same day when the tragic occurrence
transpired, he stated that, according to his on-the-spot investigation, Avila stabbed Saminado when
the latter was seated in the comfort room and his back was turned to Avila, while Tampus stabbed
the victim on the chest and neck. Two days after the killing, or on January 16, another prison guard
investigated Tampus and Avila and obtained their extrajudicial confessions wherein they admitted
that they assaulted Saminado. Tampus and Avila were charged for murder before the Court of First
Instance of Rizal, Makati Branch 36 (Criminal Case 18510). After trial, the court convicted Tampus
for murder, sentencing him to death and ordering him to pay the heirs of the victim, Celso
Saminado, an indemnity of P12,000.00. In the same decision, Rodolfo Avila, the co- accused of
Tampus, was convicted of the same offense and was sentenced to suffer imprisonment of 14 years
and 8 months of reclusion temporal as minimum to 20 years of reclusion temporal as maximum and
to pay the same indemnity. Avila did not appeal. (Avila was sentenced to death, together with
Frankisio Aro and Pedro Lasala, in another case, Criminal Case 1187. The death sentence is under
review in GR L-38141). The present automatic review involves Tampus' conviction.

Issue: Whether the custodial investigation pursued by Lahoz, where allegedly Tampus was not
informed as to his rights to have counsel and to remain silent, negates the extra-judicial confession
made by Tampus in the killing of Saminado.
Held: As the confession in the present case was obtained after the 1973 Constitution took effect,
section 20 of Article IV applies thereto. There is no doubt that the confession was voluntarily made.
Investigator Buenaventura de la Cuesta in taking it endeavored, according to his understanding, to
comply with section 20. Even considering that Vivencio C. Lahoz investigated the killing two days
before the confession was taken by investigator de la Cuesta on 16 January 1976 and that allegedly
during said custodial interrogation Tampus was not informed as to his rights to have counsel and to
remain silent, Tampus and Avila had already admitted it when, after coming out of the toilet, the
scene of the crime, they surrendered to Reynaldo S. Eustaquio, the first guard whom they
encountered, and they revealed to him that they had committed an act of revenge. That spontaneous
statement, elicited without any interrogation, was part of the res gestae and at the same time was a
voluntary confession of guilt. Not only that; the two accused, by means of that statement given
freely on the spur of the moment without any urging or suggestion, waived their right to remain
silent and to have the right to counsel. That admission was confirmed by their extrajudicial
confession, plea of guilty and testimony in court. They did not appeal from the judgment of
conviction. It is further contended that after the fiscal had presented the prosecution's evidence and
when counsel de oficio called upon Tampus to testify, the trial court should have advised him of his
constitutional right to remain silent. That contention is not well-taken considering that Tampus
pleaded guilty and had executed an extrajudicial confession. The court during the trial is not duty-
bound to apprise the accused that he has the right to remain silent. It is his counsel who should
claim that right for him. If he does not claim it and he calls the accused to the witness stand, then he
waives that right. It should be stressed that, however, even without taking into account Tampus'
admission of guilt, confession, plea of guilty and testimony, the crime was proven beyond
reasonable doubt by the evidence of the prosecution.

242 People vs. Galit [GR 51770, 20 March 1985]

En Banc, Concepcion (J): 12 concur, 1 took no part

Facts: In the morning of 23 August 1917, Mrs. Natividad Fernando, a widow, was found dead in
the bedroom of her house located at Barrio Geronimo, Montalban, Rizal, as a result of 7 wounded
inflicted upon different parts of her body by a blunt instrument. More than 2 weeks thereafter, police
authorities of Montalban picked up Francisco Galit, an ordinary construction worker (pion) living in
Marikina, Rizal, or suspicion of the murder. On the following day, however, 8 September 1977, the
case was referred to the

National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) for further investigation in view of the alleged limited
facilities of the Montalban police station. Accordingly, Galit was brought to the NBI where he was
investigated by a team headed by NBI Agent Carlos Flores. NBI Agent Flores conducted a
preliminary interview of the suspect who allegedly gave evasive answers to his questions. But the
following day, 9 September 1977, Francisco Galit allegedly voluntarily executed a Salaysay
admitting participation in the commission of the crime. He implicated Juling Dulay and Pabling
Dulay as his companions in the crime. Actually, Galit had been obtained and interrogated almost
continuously for 5 days, to no avail as he consistently maintained his innocence. The investigating
officers began to maul him and to torture him physically. They covered his face with a rag and
pushed his face into a toilet bowl full of human waste. With Galit's will having been broken, he
admitted what the investigating officers wanted him to admit and he signed the confession they
prepared. Galit was charged with the Crime of Robbery with Homicide, in an information filed
before the Circuit Criminal Court of Pasig, Rizal. Trial was held, and on 11 August 1978,
immediately after the accused had terminated the presentation of his evidence, the trial judge
dictated his decision on the case in open court, finding Galit guilty as charged and sentencing him to
suffer the death penalty; to indemnify the heirs of the victim in the sum of P110,000.00, and to pay
the costs. Hence, the automatic review.

Issue: Whether a monosyllabic answer to a long question suffices as a voluntary admission that
may be used against the accused.

Held: As held in Morales vs. Ponce Enrile, "At the time a person is arrested, it shall be the duty of
the arresting officer to inform him of the reason for the arrest and he must be shown the warrant of
arrest, if any. He shall be informed of his constitutional rights to remain silent and to counsel, and
that any statement he might make could be used against him. The person arrested shall have the
right to communicate with his lawyer, a relative, or anyone he chooses by the most expedient means
by telephone if possible or by letter or messenger. It shall be the responsibility of the arresting
officer to see to it that this is accomplished. No custodial investigation shall be conducted unless it
be in the presence of counsel engaged by the person arrested, by any person on his behalf, or
appointed by the court upon petition either of the detainee himself or by anyone on his behalf. The
right to counsel may be waived but the waiver shall not be valid unless made with the assistance of
counsel. Any statement obtained in violation of the procedure herein laid down, whether
exculpatory or inculpatory, in whole or in part, shall be inadmissible in evidence." Herein, there
were no eyewitnesses, no property recovered from the accused, no state witnesses, and not even
fingerprints of the accused at the scene of the crime. The only evidence against Galit is his alleged
confession. A long question followed by a monosyllabic answer does not satisfy the requirements of
the law that the accused be informed of his rights under the Constitution and our laws. Instead there
should be several short and clear questions and every right explained in simple words in a dialect or
language known to the person under investigation. Galit is from Samar and there is no showing that
he understands Tagalog. Moreover, at the time of his arrest, Galit was not permitted to communicate
with his lawyer, a relative, or a friend. In fact, his sisters and other relatives did not know that he
had been brought to the NBI for investigation and it was only about two weeks after he had
executed the salaysay that his relatives were allowed to visit him. His statement does not even
contain any waiver of right to counsel and yet during the investigation he was not assisted by one.
At the supposed reenactment, again Galit was not assisted by counsel of his choice. These constitute
gross violations of his rights. Trial courts are cautioned to look carefully into the circumstances
surrounding the taking of any confession, especially where the prisoner claims having been
maltreated into giving one. Where there is any doubt as to the voluntariness, the same must be
rejected in toto.

243 People vs. Bandula [GR 89223, 27 May 1994]

First Division, Bellosillo (J): 2 concur, 2 on leave

Facts: On 27 January 1986, at around 10:00 p.m., 6 armed men barged into the compound of Polo
Coconut Plantation in Tanjay, Negros Oriental. The armed men were identified by Security Guard
Antonio Salva of the plantation as Aurelio Bandula, Teofilo Dionanao, Victoriano Ejan and
Pantaleon Sedigo while the two others who wore masks were simply referred to as "Boy Tall" and
"Boy Short." At gunpoint, the 2 masked men held Salva who was manning his post, disarmed him
of his shotgun and tied his hands behind his back. They then went up the house of Leoncio
Pastrano, Chief of Security and General Foreman of the plantation, hog-tied him, and divested him
of his driver's license, goggles, wristwatch and .38 cal. snubnose revolver. From there, the 6 armed
men with Salva and Pastrano in tow proceeded to the house of Atty. Juanito Garay, Manager of the
Polo Coconut Plantation. Dionanao, Ejan and Sedigo stayed downstairs while Bandula and the two
masked men with Salva and Pastrano went up the house of Atty. Garay. After forcing their way into
the house, the masked men and Bandula ransacked the place and took with them money and other
valuables. Thereafter, the hooded men who were bringing with them Atty. Garay locked Pastrano
inside his house together with Salva. A few minutes later, Pastrano and Salva heard gunshots
coming from the direction of the gate of the compound. After succeeding in untying themselves,
Pastrano and Salva went to report the matter to the police. On their way, they found outside the gate
the lifeless body of Atty. Garay (dead with 3 gunshot wounds). On 28 January 1986, Dionanao was
"picked-up for investigation" and interrogated by Cpl. Ephraim Valles inside the Police Station in
Tanjay where he implicated accused Sedigo. The following day, on 29 January 1986, he was
brought to the Office of the Municipal Attorney of Tanjay, Atty. Ruben Zerna, where he supposedly
executed his extrajudicial confession in the presence of the latter. On 4 February 1986, upon the
suggestion of another investigator, Cpl. Valles took the Supplementary Sworn Statement of
Dionanao, again in the presence of Atty. Zerna. In his Sworn Statement, Dionanao supposedly
admitted that he was with Bandula when the latter, together with "Boy Short" and "Boy Tall," shot
Atty. Garay. He added that he was going to be killed if he did not join the group. He also said that
Sedigo and Ejan were with them that evening. Then, in his Supplementary Sworn Statement, he
implicated 3 more persons but they were not thereafter included in the Information. Pn the other
hand, Bandula was arrested on 28 January 1986, at around 6:00 a.m., brought to the Tanjay Police
Station and there interrogated. He was investigated by Cpl. Borromeo, Cpl. Esparicia, Cpl. Ebarso,
Pat. Moso and Pat. Baldejera. In that investigation, Bandula allegedly admitted that he together with
2 others shot Atty. Garay with a .38 cal. revolver. At that time, there was no counsel present
"because that (investigation) was not yet in writing." Two weeks after his arrest, Bandula allegedly
gave a sworn statement in the presence of Atty. Zerna admitting his participation in the killing of
Atty. Garay. In that statement, Bandula narrated that after "Boy Short" and "Boy Tall" shot Atty.
Garay, he (Bandula) was ordered likewise to shoot the latter which he did. Bandula, Sedigo,
Dionanao and Ejan were were charged for robbery with homicide. On 5 May 1989, after hearing 12
prosecution and 9 defense witnesses, the trial court rendered judgment finding Bandula guilty of the
crime charged. However, his 3 co-accused were acquitted "for insufficiency of evidence."

Issue: Whether admissions obtained during custodial interrogations requires mere counsel or
independent counsel present.

Held: Bandula and Dionanao were investigated immediately after their arrest, they had no counsel
present. If at all, counsel came in only a day after the custodial investigation with respect to
Dionanao, and two weeks later with respect to Bandula. And, counsel who supposedly assisted both
accused was Atty. Ruben Zerna, the Municipal Attorney of Tanjay. On top of this, there are telltale
signs that violence was used against Bandua. Certainly, these are blatant violations of the
Constitution which mandates in Section 12, Art. III, that (1) Any person under investigation for the
commission of an offense shall have the right to be informed of his right to remain silent and to
have competent and independent counsel preferably of his own choice. If the person cannot afford
the services of counsel, he must be provided with one. These rights cannot be waived except in
writing and in the presence of counsel. (2) No torture, force, violence, threat, intimidation or any
other means which vitiate the free will shall be used against him. Secret detention places, solitary,
incommunicado, or other similar forms of detention are prohibited. (3) Any confession or admission
obtained in violation of this or Section 17 hereof shall be inadmissible in evidence against him. (4)
The law shall provide for penal and civil sanctions for violations of this section as well as
compensation to and rehabilitation of victims of torture or similar practices, and their families. The
present case is analogous to the more recent case of People v. De Jesus, where it was held that
admissions obtained during custodial interrogations without the benefit of counsel although later
reduced to writing and signed in the presence of counsel are still flawed under the Constitution. The
Constitution also requires that counsel be independent. Obviously, he cannot be a special counsel,
public or private prosecutor, counsel of the police, or a municipal attorney whose interest is
admittedly adverse to the accused. Granting that Atty. Zerna assisted Dionanao and Bandula when
they executed their respective extrajudicial confessions, still their confessions are inadmissible in
evidence considering that Atty. Zerna does not qualify as an independent counsel. As a legal officer
of the municipality, he provides legal assistance and support to the mayor and the municipality in
carrying out the delivery of basic services to the people, including the maintenance of peace and
order. It is thus seriously doubted whether he can effectively undertake the defense of the accused
without running into conflict of interests. He is no better than a fiscal or prosecutor who cannot
represent the accused during custodial investigations.
244 People vs. Quidato [GR 117401, 1 October 1998]

Third Division, Romero (J): 2 concur, 1 on leave

Facts: Bernardo Quidato, Sr. was the father of Bernardo Quidato, Jr. and Leo Quidato. Being a
widower, Bernardo lived alone in his house at Sitio Libod, Brgy. Tagbaobo, Kaputian, Davao. He
owned 16 hectares of coconut land in the area. On 16 September 1988, Bernardo, accompanied by
his son, and two hired hands, Reynaldo Malita and Eddie Malita, went to Davao City to sell 41
sacks of copra. After selling the copra, Bernardo paid the Malita brothers for their labor, who
thereafter left. Bernardo Sr. and Bernardo Jr. went back to Sitio Libod that same day. At around 6:00
p.m. of 17 September 1988, Bernardo Jr. asked Reynaldo Malita to come to the former's house to
discuss an important matter. Upon Reynaldo's arrival at Bernardo Jr.'s house, he saw that his brother
Eddie was already there. They started drinking beer. Bernardo Jr. thereafter proposed that they rob
and kill his father. They went to Bernardo's house only at 10:00 p.m., after the rain had stopped.
Reynaldo brought along a bolo. Upon reaching the house, Bernardo Jr. knocked on the door, asking
his father to let them in. When Bernardo opened the door, Eddie rushed in and knocked the old man
down. Reynaldo then hacked Bernardo on the nape and neck. Bernardo Jr. and Eddie ransacked
Bernardo's aparador looking for money but they found none; so, the 3 of them left. The body of
Bernardo was discovered the next day by Bernardo Jr.'s son, who had gone there to call his Lolo for
breakfast. On 27 September 1988, Leo Quidato confronted his brother regarding the incident and
learned that Reynaldo and Eddie Malita were the ones responsible for Bernardo's death. The two
were promptly arrested by the police. Aside from arresting the latter two, however, the police also
arrested Bernardo Jr. On 29 September 1988, the Malita brothers were interrogated by Patrolman
Lucrecio Mara at the Kaputian Police Station. When Mara apprised them of their constitutional
rights, including their right to counsel, they signified their intent to confess even in the absence of
counsel. Aware that the same would be useless if given in the absence of counsel, Mara took down
the testimony of the two but refrained from requiring the latter to sign their affidavits. Instead, he
escorted the Malita brothers to Davao City and presented them, along with their unsigned affidavits,
to a CLAO (now PAO) lawyer, Jonathan Jocom. Informed of the situation, Atty. Jocom conferred
with Reynaldo and Eddie, again advising the two of their constitutional rights. The CLAO lawyer
explained the contents of the affidavits, in Visayan, to the Malita brothers, who affirmed the veracity
and voluntary execution of the same. Only then did Reynaldo and Eddie affix their signatures on the
affidavits. On 17 January 1989, Bernardo Jr. was charged with the crime of parricide before the
Regional Trial Court of Davao. A murder case was likewise filed against his co-accused, Reynaldo
Malita and Eddie Malita. Bernardo Jr. and the Malita brothers pleaded not guilty. The two cases
were tried jointly. The Malita brothers withdrew their "not guilty" plea during trial and were
accordingly sentences. Only Bernardo Jr.'s case was tried on merits. After due trial and on 2 March
1994, the Regional Trial Court of Davao, Branch 4, rendered judgment finding Bernardo Quidato,
Jr., guilty beyond reasonable doubt as a co-principal in the offense of Parricide which falls under
Article 246 (of the Revised Penal Code), for the death of his father, Bernardo Quidato, Sr., and
accordingly, was sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua, with all the accessory
penalties provided by law and to indemnify the other heirs of Bernardo Quidato, Sr., the amount of
P50,000.00, and to pay the costs. Bernardo Jr. appealed.

Issue: Whether an initially uncounseled extrajudicial confession, signed in the presence of a

counsel in a later day, is admissible as evidence against the accused.

Held: The prosecution relied heavily on the affidavits executed by Reynaldo and Eddie. The two
brothers were, however, not presented on the witness stand to testify on their extrajudicial
confessions. The failure to present the two gives these affidavits the character of hearsay. It is
hornbook doctrine that unless the affiants themselves take the witness stand to affirm the averments
in their affidavits, the affidavits must be excluded from the judicial proceeding, being inadmissible
hearsay. The voluntary admissions of an accused made extrajudicially are not admissible in
evidence against his co-accused when the latter had not been given an opportunity to hear him
testify and cross-examine him. Likewise, the manner by which the affidavits were obtained by the
police render the same inadmissible in evidence even if they were voluntarily given. The settled rule
is that an uncounseled extrajudicial confession without a valid waiver of the right to counsel that
is, in writing and in the presence of counsel is inadmissible in evidence. It is undisputed that the
Malita brothers gave their statements to Patrolman Mara in the absence of counsel, although they
signed the same in the presence of counsel the next day. Given the inadmissibility in evidence of
Gina Quidato's (accuseds wife) testimony, as well as of Reynaldo and Eddie's extrajudicial
confessions, nothing remains on record with which to justify a judgment unfavorable to Bernardo
Jr. He was therefore acquitted.

245 People vs. Rous [GR 103803-04, 27 March 1995]

Third Division, Melo (J): 4 concur

Facts: At around 3:30 a.m. of 15 December 1987; the victim Pastor Pasahol in his car driven by
Rolando Laygo who was only his companion, and left Candon, Ilocos Sur bound for Meycauayan,
Bulacan. When they reached Barangay Santiago, Bauang, La Union, 2 armed men who, according
to Rolando Laygo, alighted from a red car which stopped beside the victim's car, and then the 2 shot
the victim. Thereupon, one of the assailants took the clutch bag from the compartment of the
victim's car which, according to the victim's wife, Selwyn Pasahol, contained gold coins, earrings
with diamond and refined gold worth more than P600,000.00. Thereafter the hold-uppers took the
victim's car a Mitsubishi Lancer bearing Plate DEF 888, which was found abandoned by the peace
officers at Barangay Urayong, Bauang, La Union, about 2 kilometers away from the place at
Barangay Santiago, where the crime was committed. 2 days thereafter or specifically on 17
December 1987; the victim died in the Lorma Hospital at San Fernando, La Union where he was
brought by Rolando Laygo, as a result of the inflicted gun shot wounds. Sgt. Gaddi invited Laygo to
the CIS Office in the afternoon of 15 December 1987, and interviewed the latter, who denied
knowledge of the incident. On the next day, Sgt. Gaddi again invited Laygo to the CIS Office and
after questioning him for 30 minutes, Laygo broke down and he admitted that he and Socrates Rous
were parties to the conspiracy of the original plan to commit Robbery and not to inflict harm on
Pastor Pasahol. With Laygo's revelation, Sgt. Gaddi took his sworn statement denominated as
"Sinumpaang Salaysay" on 16 December 1987 with the assistance of Atty. Abraham Datlag, which
is a confession of his participation in the commission of robbery and implicated Socrates Rous in
the commission of the crime. Laygo, on the same date, also executed a document entitled "Kusang
Loob na Kahilingan" also assisted by Atty. Abraham Datlag who assisted him in the custodial
investigation and witnessed by spouses Fely Laygo and Tiburcio Laygo. Both documents bear the
signatures of Ally. Abraham Datlag who assisted him in the custodial investigation and witness a by
spouses Fely Laygo and Tiburcio Laygo. Rolando Laygo also executed another "Sinumpaang
Salaysay" on 22 December 1987 without the assistance of a lawyer. On December 29 or 30, 1987,
Socrates Rous alias Bobby was arrested by Sgt. Gaddi when he accompanied Capt. Luvimindano
Garcia in the latter's appearance before the CIS District Commander, Lt. Col. Pimentel, in the CIS
Office at San Fernando, La Union. With Laygo's confession, Sgt. Gaddi also investigated Rous who,
on 7 January 1987, executed the "Sinumpaang Salaysay" with the assistance of Atty. Roberto Ferrer
who affixed his signature thereon. Subsequently, on the basis of the affidavit of the victim's wife,
Selwyn Pasahol, the affidavit of Sgt. Roberto Gaddi and the sworn statements of Rolando Laygo,
the Provincial Fiscal filed on 17 December 1987 the case (Highway Robbery with Homicide)
against Rolando Laygo, Bobby Rous, John Doe and Peter Doe, and on 21 December 1987, the case
for Carnapping was filed against Bobby Rous, John Doe and Peter Doe. Later, the original
Information in both cases were amended after the identities of the other Does were known as
Primitivo Pradis and Celestino Rabina. After joint trial against Laygo and Rous only, as the other
accused were never arrested and have remained at large, the trial court rendered a decision
acquitting Rous of the charge of carnapping, but finding both Rous and Laygo guilty under the
charge of Highway Robbery and sentencing each to an imprisonment term of reclusion perpetua,
aside from the payment in solidum of civil indemnity. From said decision, Laygo and Rous
appealed, with both of them ascribing as error the admission of their extrajudicial confessions.

Issue: Whether Laygos and Rous extra-judicial confessions, signed in the presence of the counsel,
are admissible as evidence even if the counsel arrived shortly after the custodial investigation has
started and left before the last 3 questions were asked.

Held: The record shows that the investigating officer fully informed Laygo of his right to counsel
and categorically asked Laygo whether he wanted the assistance of counsel, to which inquiry,
Laygo expressed his desire to be so assisted by counsel. Thereupon, the investigating officer, Sgt.
Robert Gaddi, brought him to the office of Atty. Abraham Datlag. Laygo and Atty. Datlag conferred
for a while; thereafter, Sgt. Gaddi and Laygo returned to the CIS Office of Sgt. Gaddi and Sgt.
Gaddi started the investigation. Atty. Datlag arrived soon after the investigation started and left
before the last three questions were asked, instructing them to follow him to his office. After the
extra-judicial statement of Laygo was finished, Gaddi and Laygo went to the office of Atty. Datlag,
after which, Atty. Datlag conferred with Laygo and then advised Laygo to sign. Laygo did so and
Atty. Datlag thereupon likewise signed. Thus, there was more than substantial compliance with the
constitutional requirement that a person under investigation for the commission of a crime should
be provided with counsel, (Section 12 (1), Article III, The Constitution of the Republic of the
Philippines). The very purpose of said constitutional requirement is to prevent the use of coercion in
extracting a confession from a suspect. Nowhere in the evidence is it shown that coercion was ever
employed by the investigating officer in obtaining the confession of Laygo. The investigation was
even witnessed by the relatives of Laygo. The fact that Atty. Datlag arrived shortly after the
investigation of Laygo had begun and left before the confession was concluded does not negate the
validity and admissibility of said confession for the reason that after the confession was put down in
writing, Laygo and the investigating officer proceeded to the office of Atty. Datlag and the latter
then read the confession, conferred with Laygo and then advised Laygo to sign the confession. It
will be readily seen that the confession was voluntary and the signing thereof by Laygo was done
upon advice of counsel. The constitutional requirements were thus fully complied with. Moreover,
the presence of Rolando's uncle, Tiburcio Laygo, and the latter's wife, Fely, clearly precluded the
use of coercion in extracting the confession. A confession constitutes evidence of high order since it
is supported by the strong presumption that no person of normal mind would deliberately and
knowingly confess to a crime unless prompted by truth and his conscience. A confession is
admissible until the accused successfully proves that it was given as a result of violence,
intimidation, threat, or promise of reward or leniency. There is not a speck of evidence to show that
the confession of Laygo was extracted by such means or promise. Atty. Datlag would not have
affixed his signature to the extrajudicial confession of Laygo as counsel for Laygo had he known or
had he been informed by Laygo of any infirmity in its execution. Said confession is, therefore,
admissible in evidence. The same ruling applies to the extrajudicial confession of Rous.

Note: Compare Rous ruling with other cases, especially People vs. Morial; as per aspect on partial
absence of counsel during custodial investigation, where the affidavit of the accused was
subsequently signed in presence of counsel.

246 People vs. Januario [GR 98252, 7 February 1997]

Third Division, Panganiban (J): 4 concur

Facts: Vicente Dilanco Pons, Santiago Cid's cousin, purportedly acting upon the instructions of
Doris Wolf, borrowed from Myrna Temporas the amount of P48,500.00 and used the an Isuzu
passenger type jeepney (Plate DFB 550) as a collateral. The amount was given to Pons in
P10,000.00 cash and the balance in a check payable to Doris Wolf. The check was encashed as it
was cleared from Myrna Temporas' account. It bore a signature supposedly of Doris Wolf at its back
portion and a second endorsement by Pons who subsequently deposited it in his account. On
September 11, Temporas asked Pons to secure a special power of attorney from Doris Wolf. Pons
promised to comply in one or two weeks. But Pons failed to pay the indebtedness. So, Myrna
Temporas repeatedly went to his house in Digmaan, Camarines Sur to collect the amount borrowed
but Pons always promised that he himself would go to her house to pay. Inasmuch as Pons also
failed to produce a deed of sale covering the jeepney, Temporas lodged a complaint against him for
estafa before the NBI. Meanwhile, Andrew Patriarca, Sr. reported the disappearance of his son,
Andrew, Jr., the jeepney and its driver to the police detachment in Bulihan, Silang, Cavite and the
police stations in Silang and Imus, Cavite. Two weeks after 4 September 1987, the body of 23-year-
old Andrew Patriarca, Jr. was found in a sugarcane plantation in Maguyam. His head was severed
from his body. The body of the driver, Geronimo Malibago, stepfather of Doris Wolf, the owner of
the jeepney, was recovered after the harvest of sugarcane in the plantation in Maguyam. Malibago's
widow identified the body from its clothing. Acting on the complaint, the NBI contacted the
relatives of the owner of the jeepney who went to Camarines Sur, identified the jeepney and
informed the NBI that its driver (deceased Geronimo Malibago) and conductor (deceased Andrew
Patriarca, Jr.) had been killed by carnappers. Patriarca's widow also filed a complaint with the NBI.
Upon investigation, an NBI team led by Supervising Agent Magno Toribio found out that the
carnapping of the jeepney and the killing of Patriarca and Malibago were the "handiwork" of a
group of 4 persons named Rene Januario, Efren Canape, Eliseo Sarita alias Toto, and Eduardo
Sarinos alias Digo. The team also discovered that the jeepney was disposed of through Cid.
Januario and Canape, as well as Cid, were arrested in Camarines Sur. The NBI then invited Pons
and Temporas to shed light on the carnapping incident. The jeepney was recovered in an auto shop
with its engine partly dismantled. Upon being informed by the NBI that the jeepney had been found,
an insurance company brought it back to Manila. From the "oral investigation" they conducted at
the Naga City NBI office on 27 March 1988, the team learned that Sarita and Sarinos took Patriarca
and Malibago inside a sugar plantation where presumably they were killed. Because Januario and
Canape volunteered that their companions were their neighbors in Paliparan, Dasmarias, Cavite
who could be in Manila already, the NBI team decided to take down their statements at the NBI
head office in Manila. The team traveled with Januario and Canape to Manila, arriving there at
around 1:00 p.m. of 28 March 1988. At the Taft Avenue head office of the NBI, the team took the
statements of Januario and Canae one at a time. They asked Atty. Carlos Saunar, who was "just
around somewhere," to assist Januario and Canape during the investigation. Agent Arlis Vela took
the statement of Januario while Supervising Agent Toribio took that of Canape. On 7 November
1988, an Information signed by Assistant Provincial Fiscal Jose M. Velasco, Jr., was filed against
Rene Januario and Efren Canape, and their co-accused Santiago Cid, Eliseo Sarita @ Toto and
Eduardo Sarinos @ Digo charging them with violation of Republic Act 6539 (Anti- Carnapping
Law). Arraigned on 7 February 1989, Januario and Canape, assisted by counsel de oficio, pleaded
not guilty. On 30 May 1989, Cid, assisted by counsel de parte, likewise entered a plea of not guilty.
Sarita and Sarinos remained at large. After trial, the Regional Trial Court of Cavite, Branch XVIII
in Tagaytay City, disposing of Criminal Case TG-1392-89, rendered judgment finding Januario and
Canape guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Violation of Section 14, last sentence, of
Republic act 6539, otherwise known as the Anti-Carnapping Law, and imposed upon them the
supreme penalty of Reclusion Perpetua or life imprisonment, and ordered them to pay jointly and
severally, but separately, the heirs of their victims, namely, Geronimo Malibago and Andrew
Patriarca, Jr., the sums of: (a) P50,000.00 for moral damages; (b) P50,000.00 for exemplary
damages; (c) P25,000.00 for actual damages, and to pay the costs of the proceeding. Januario and
Canape appealed.

Issue: Whether Saunars presence as counsel in the custodial investigations satisfies the
requirements of Article III, section 12 (1).

Held: Proof of Saunar's presence during the custodial investigation of Januario and Canape is,
however, not a guarantee that their respective confessions had been taken in accordance with Article
III, Section 12 (1) of the Constitution. This constitutional provision requires that a person under
investigation for the commission of an offense shall have no less than "competent and independent
counsel preferably of his own choice." Saunar was not the choice of Januario as his custodial
investigation counsel. Arguendo that Saunar's competence as a lawyer is beyond question, under the
circumstances described by the prosecution however, he could not have been the independent
counsel solemnly spoken of by the Constitution. He was an applicant for a position in the NBI and
therefore it can never be said that his loyalty was to the confessants. In fact, he was actually
employed by the NBI a few months after. Further, although Saunar might have really been around
to properly apprise Januario of his constitutional right as reflected in the written sworn statement
itself, the same cannot be said about Canape. Canape was not properly informed of his
constitutional rights. Perfunctorily informing a confessant of his constitutional rights, asking him if
he wants to avail of the services of counsel and telling him that he could ask for counsel if he so
desires or that one could be provided him at his request, are simply not in compliance with the
constitutional mandate. In this case, appellant Canape was merely told of his constitutional rights
and posthaste, asked whether he was willing to confess. His affirmative answer may not, by any
means, be interpreted as a waiver of his right to counsel of his own choice. Furthermore, the right of
a person under custodial investigation to be informed of his rights to remain silent and to counsel
implies a correlative obligation on the part of the police investigator to explain and to contemplate
an effective communication that results in an understanding of what is conveyed. Canape's sworn
statement, which reads and sounds so lifeless on paper, fails to reflect compliance with this
requirement. Neither does the testimony of NBI Agent Toribio. Bearing in mind that Canape
reached only the fifth grade, the NBI agents should have exerted more effort in explaining to him
his constitutional rights. The law enforcement agents' cavalier disregard of Januario's and Canape's
constitutional rights is shown not only by their failure to observe Section 12 (1) of Article III of the
Constitution. They have likewise forgotten the third paragraph of Section 12 of the same article
which mandates that an admission of facts related to a crime must be obtained with the assistance of
counsel; otherwise it would be inadmissible in evidence against the person so admitting.

247 People vs. Labtan [GR 127493, 8 December 1999]

First Division, Puno (J): 4 concur

Facts: On 28 March 1993, at more or less 10:30 p.m. while inside a motor vehicle in the national
highway at Barangay Agusan up to the road at Camaman-an, all of Cagayan de Oro City,
Philippines, Henry Feliciano y Lagura and Orlando Labtan y Daquihon took away, through
intimdation or violence, cash amounting to P720.00, pioneer stereo, booster and twitters owned by
and belonging to Roman S. Mercado, and a Seiko Diver wristwatch owned by Ismael P. Ebon, all in
all amounting to P10,800.00. Later on, on or about 16 April 1993, at about 2:30 p.m., more or less,
at Buntong, Camaman-an, Cagayan de Oro City, Philippines, Feliciano, Orlando Labtan, and
Jonelto Labtan robbed Florentino Bolasito of P30 in cash money. In the course thereof, Orlando and
Jonelto Labtan stabbed Bolasito to death. On 23 April 1993, an information was filed against
Feliciano, Orlando Labtan, and Jonelto Labtan charging them with robbery with homicide (as per
16 April 1993 incident). Subsequently, another information dated 20 May 1993 was filed against
Feliciano and Orlando Labtan charging them with highway robbery (as per 28 March 1993
incident). Only Feliciano pleaded not guilty to the two charges. Orlando Labtan had escaped the
Maharlika Rehabilitation and Detention Center in Carmen, Cagayan de Oro City where he was
detained while Jonelto Labtan has eluded arrest. The two cases were tried together. After trial, the
Regional Trial Court of Cagayan de Oro City, Branch 25 found Feliciano guilty beyond reasonable
doubt as principal by direct participation in the crime of robbery with homicide and sentenced him
to reclusion perpetua and to indemnify the offended party (the heirs of Florentino Bolasito) the sum
of P50,000.00 and to pay the offended party the sum of P35,000.00 representing funeral expenses
and to pay the cost. The trial court also found Feliciano guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime
of highway robbery, and sentenced him to an indeterminate penalty of 12 years of prision mayor as
the minimum term to 14 years, 8 months of reclusion temporal in its minimum period as the
maximum term and to indemnify Roman S. Mercado the sum of P8,000.00, representing the value
of the P700.00 cash, stereo, booster, and twitter and to indemnify Ismael Ebon the sum of
P2,500.00, the value of the Seiko Wrist watch divested from him and to pay the cost. The trial court
convicted Feliciano on the basis of his sworn statement which he repudiated during the trial.
Feliciano appealed.

Issue: Whether the counselling of Atty. Pepito Chavez to Feliciano cured the initial lack of counsel.

Held: Feliciano had been denied of his right to have a competent and independent counsel when he
was questioned in the Cagayan de Oro City Police Station. SPO1 Alfonso Cuarez testified that he
started questioning Feliciano at 8:00 a.m. of 22 April 1993 regarding his involvement in the killing
of jeepney driver Florentino Bolasito, notwithstanding the fact that he had not been apprised of his
right to counsel. Feliciano had been subjected to custodial investigation without a counsel;
inasmuch as when SPO1 Cuarez investigated Feliciano, the latter was already a suspect in the
killing of jeepney driver Bolasito. Further, Atty. Chavez did not provide the kind of counselling
required by the Constitution. He did not explain to Feliciano the consequences of his action that
the sworn statement can be used against him and that it is possible that he could be found guilty and
sent to jail. Furthermore, Atty. Chavezs independence as counsel is suspect he is regularly
engaged by the Cagayan de Oro City Police as counsel de officio for suspects who cannot avail the
services of counsel. He even received money from the police as payment for his services.

248 People vs. Samus [GR 135957-58, 17 September 2002]

En Banc, Panganiban (J): 14 concur

Facts: Guillermo Samus was a farmer, tilling and living in the land of Miguel Completo at
Barangay Niugan, Cabuyao, Laguna. The victims, 62 year old Dedicacion Balisi and her grandson,
6 year old John Ardee Balisi, were the neighbors of Samus father at San Ramon de Canlubang,
Brgy. Canlubang, Calamba, Laguna. At 4:20 P.M. on 2 September 1996, Senior Police (SP)
Inspector Rizaldy H. Garcia was at his office at the 4th PNP Criminal Investigation Group Regional
Office at Camp Vicente Lim in Calamba, Laguna when he received an order from his superior to
investigate the murder of the two victims. Their office had received a telephone call from a local
barangay official informing them of the victims deaths. Arriving at the victims residence at Block
8, Lot 6 at San Ramon, Brgy. Canlubang, Calamba, Garcia and his team conducted an investigation,
making a sketch of the relative positions of the victims, lifting fingerprints from the crime scene and
taking pictures. Thereafter, an investigation report was prepared by Garcia and signed by his
superior, Colonel Pedro Tango. The investigators likewise found a pair of maong pants, a white T-
shirt, a handkerchief and dirty slippers in the bathroom and roof of the house. A pair of earrings
worn by Dedicacion Balisi was likewise reported missing from her body by her daughter, Nora B.
Llorera. The victims bodies were brought to the Funeraria Seerez de Mesa in Calamba. On that
same day, Ponciano Pontanos, Jr., then a resident of Barangay Niugan, Cabuyao and an
acquaintance of Samus, happened to meet Samus at Sammy Pachecas house in the same barangay
where Samus asked Ponciano to accompany him to Poncianos wife to pawn a pair of earrings.
Poncianos wife was mad at first but upon Poncianos prodding, gave Samus P300.00 with no
interest. The earrings were placed in a jewelry box; thereafter, Samus received another P250.00. At
6:00 P.M. on 10 September 1996, Major Jose Pante of the Criminal Investigation Group received
information that Samus was the principal suspect in the killing of the 2 victims and that he was
sighted inside the residence of spouses Rolly and Josie Vallejo at Barangay Macabling, Sta. Rosa,
Laguna. He then formed and led a team composed of SPO3 Galivo, Intelligence Commission
Officer Casis and SPO3 Mario Bitos. Arriving at the site at past 7:00 P.M., the team, accompanied
by local barangay authorities, asked permission from the Vallejo spouses to enter the house, which
was granted. Shortly thereafter, they heard loud footsteps on the roof. Rushing outside, they saw
Samus crawling on the roof. They ordered him to stop, but he suddenly jumped from the roof and
landed hard on the ground, sustaining an injury on his ankle and bruises on his left and right
forearm. At that point, the police team closed in on Samus who, while trembling and shaking,
admitted the killings upon a query from Rolly Vallejo. Samus was brought to the Camp Vicente Lim
PNP Investigation Office where he was informed of his constitutional rights by SPO3 Alex
Malabanan. In the morning of 11 September 1996, Samus, assisted by Atty. Arturo Juliano, gave his
statement admitting the killings. SPO3 Malabanan also took the statements of tricycle driver Rafael
Baliso, the victims relatives Salvacion and Mona Balisi and witness Mary Arguelles, who saw
Samus enter the house of Dedicacion Balisi. On the same day, PNP Fingerprint Examiner Reigel
Allan Sorra took fingerprint samples from Samus. His prints exactly matched with a set of prints
found at the crime scene. Later that day, SPO3 Mario Bitos was able to recover the pawned earrings
from Ponciano who turned them over to SPO3 Malabanan. Two separate Informations were filed on
27 November 1996, charging Samus (in Criminal Case 5015-96-C) with homicide for the death of
one Dedicacion Balisi y Soriano (61 years old), and (in Criminal Case 5016-96-C) with murder for
the death of one John Ardee Balisi y Soriano (6 years old). When arraigned on 28 May 1997,
Samus, assisted by his counsel de oficio, pleaded not guilty. In due course, the Regional Trial Court
of Calamba, Laguna, Branch 36, found Samus guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
Homicide (Criminal Case 5015-96-C), sentenced him to suffer the penalty of imprisonment of 10
years and 1 day of Prision Mayor as minimum up to 20 years of Reclusion Temporal as maximum,
and ordered him to indemnify the heirs of Dedicacion Balisi the amount of P50,000.00 for her death
and another P50,000.00 as and for moral and actual damages and cost of suit. The trial court also
found Samus guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Murder (Criminal Case 5016-96-C),
sentenced him to suffer the penalty of death, and ordered him to indemnify the heirs of John Ardee
Balisi the amount of P50,000.00 for his death and another P50,000.00 as and for moral and actual
damages and cost of suit. Hence, the automatic review.

Issue: Whether uncounselled admission are absolutely inadmissible.

Held: After being illegally arrested, Samus was not informed of his constitutional rights to remain
silent and to have competent and independent counsel. Hence, any admission elicited from him by
the law enforcers during custodial investigation are normally inadmissible in evidence. In their
affidavits, the police officers readily admitted that Samus was subjected to a preliminary interview.
Yet, during their examination in open court, they tried to skirt this issue by stating that it was only
the media that had questioned Samus, and that they were merely present during the interview.
However, an examination of the testimonies of the three law enforcers show the folly of their crude
attempts to camouflage inadmissible evidence. In the absence of testimony from any of the media
persons who allegedly interviewed Samus, the uncertainties and vagueness about how they
questioned and led him to his confession lead us to believe that they themselves investigated Samus
and elicited from him uncounselled admissions. This fact is clearly shown by the Affidavits they
executed on 11 September 1997, as well as by their testimonies on cross-examination. Nonetheless,
even if the uncounselled admission per se may be inadmissible, under the present circumstances the
Court cannot rule it out because of Samus' failure to make timely objections. Indeed, the admission
is inadmissible in evidence under Article III, Section 12(1) and (3) of the Constitution, because it
was given under custodial investigation and was made without the assistance of counsel. However,
the defense failed to object to its presentation during the trial, with the result that the defense is
deemed to have waived objection to its admissibility. If only Samus had made a timely objection to
the admissibility of Pontaos testimony and the picture of a pair of earrings together with the
turnover receipt, which Samus identified during his testimony, the prosecution could have been
warned of the need to present additional evidence to support its case. To disregard unceremoniously
a major portion of its case at this late stage when it can no longer present additional evidence as
substitute for that which is now claimed to be inadmissible goes against fundamental fairness.

249 People vs. Gallardo [GR 113684, 25 January 2000]

First Division, Pardo (J): 4 concur

Facts: On 28 July 1991, the lifeless body of Edmundo Orizal was found in the rest house of Ronnie
Balao in Balzain, Tuguegarao, Cagayan. In an autopsy performed by Dr. Edmundo Borja,
Tuguegarao Municipal Health Officer, the victim was found to have sustained 7 gunshot wounds in
the chest, abdomen, back, left and right thighs, and two (2) grazing wounds on the left arm and
back. Investigation by the Tuguegarao police station identified the suspects in the murder of
Edmundo Orizal as Armando Gallardo y Gander, Alfredo Columna y Correa (alias Fermin), and
Jessie Micate y Orteza. The police received information that the suspects were detained at the
Camalaniugan Police Station because of other criminal charges. So elements of the Tuguegarao
police went to the Camalaniugan Police Station in August 1991 to fetch the suspects. Only

Gallardo and Columna were in the custody of the Camalaniugan Police Station. Gallardo and
Columna were brought to the Tuguegarao Police Department. On August 18, 1991, they were
investigated by Police Investigator SPO4 Isidro Marcos, and they gave statements admitting that
they, together with Jessie Micate, killed Edmundo Orizal. During the investigation, the dialect used
was Ilocano, the native tongue of the accused, and during the taking of the statements, Atty.
Rolando Velasco assisted them. Judge Vilma Pauig was present. She administered the oath on the
jurat of the statements. Galardo and Columna signed their statements admitting the killing of
Edmundo Orizal. On 7 November 1991, on the basis of the sworn confessions of the accused, the
Provincial Prosecutor of Cagayan filed with the Regional Trial Court, Tuguegarao, Cagayan an
information charging the accused with murder. On 2 December 1991, all three accused entered a
plea of not guilty. Trial ensued. In due course, the trial court found them guilty of murder for the
treacherous killing of Edmundo Orizal and sentencing each of them to reclusion perpetua and to pay
in solidum the heirs of Edmundo Orizal in the sum of P50,000.00 as indemnity for death and
P150,000.00 as moral damages. Gallardo, Columna and Micate appealed.

Issue: Whether the counsel provided by the State to the accused satisfies the Constitutionlal
requirement that a competent and independent counsel be present in a custodial investigation.
Held: The extrajudicial confessions of the accused were given after they were completely and
clearly apprised of their Constitutional rights. A lawyer assisted them and a judge administered their
oath. while the initial choice of the lawyer in cases where a person under custodial investigation
cannot afford the services of a lawyer is naturally lodged in the police investigators, the accused
really has the final choice as he may reject the counsel chosen for him and ask for another one. A
lawyer provided by the investigators is deemed engaged by the accused where he never raised any
objection against the former's appointment during the course of the investigation and the accused
thereafter subscribes to the veracity of his statement before the swearing officer. Herein, although
Atty. Velasco was provided by the State and not by the accused themselves, the accused were given
an opportunity whether to accept or not to accept him as their lawyer. They were asked and they
immediately agreed to have Atty. Velasco as their counsel during the investigation. There is no
requirement in the Constitution that the lawyer of an accused during custodial investigation be
previously known to them. The Constitution provides that the counsel be a competent and
independent counsel, who will represent the accused and protect their Constitutionally guaranteed
rights. Further, to be an effective counsel, a lawyer need not challenge all the questions being
propounded to his client. The presence of a lawyer is not intended to stop an accused from saying
anything which might incriminate him but, rather, it was adopted in our Constitution to preclude the
slightest coercion as would lead the accused to admit something false. The counsel, however,
should never prevent an accused from freely and voluntarily telling the truth. Herein, Atty. Velasco
acted properly in accordance with the dictates of the Constitution and informed the accused of their
Constitutional rights. Atty. Velasco assisted the accused and made sure that the statements given by
the accused were voluntary on their part, and that no force or intimidation was used by the
investigating officers to extract a confession from them. Under rules laid by the Constitution,
existing laws and jurisprudence, a confession to be admissible must satisfy all four fundamental
requirements, namely: (1) the confession must be voluntary; (2) the confession must be made with
the assistance of competent and independent counsel; (3) the confession must be express; and (4)
the confession must be in writing. All these requirements were complied with.

250 People vs. Barasina [GR 109993, 21 January 1994]

Third Division, Melo (J): 4 concur

Facts: It was around 6:40 p.m. of 17 July 1988 when Fiscal Lino Mayo of Olongapo City
succumbed to a single bullet on his side of his face fired by a gunman from an unlicensed .45
caliber firearm while the former was walking at the VIP parking lot of the Victory Liner Compound
at Caloocan City. The gun man continued walking at the same time holding his gun with two hands
trying to cock it. After walking a few meters, the gun man tucked the gun in his right waist and
began running away. Barangay Councilman Prudencio Motos and about four other men (among
them, Ruel Ganiola and Michael Estapia, both porters) chased the gun man. When the gun man was
about to reach the LRT Station, they shouted at the policeman conducting traffic in the area and
pointed at the running man. The policeman, Pfc. Napoleon Francia, shouted at the gun man, who
stopped and raised his hands. Pfc. Francia then confiscated a .45 cal. pistol from the gun man.
Afterwards, Pfc. Francia, Councilman Motos and others brought the gun man to the Kalookan City
Police Headquarters aboard a passenger jeep. The gun man was identified later as Elias Barasina y
Laynesa. Barasina was charged for violation of Preisdential Decree 1866 (illegal possession of
firearms). Barasina, "John Doe" and "Peter Doe" (true names, real identities and present
whereabouts of the last two mentioned accused, still unknown) were also charge for the crime of
murder. When haled to respond to the inculpations, Barasina was indifferent in entering any plea,
thus the plea of not guilty to the two criminal charges was entered by the trial court in his behalf. In
the course of the trial, Barasina, through counsel, filed a Motion to Quash on the ground of double
jeopardy, i.e. in jeopardy of being convicted of two offenses Murder and Illegal Possession of
Firearms. In an Order, dated 17 August 1989, the Court denied the Motion to Quash. On trial, one of
the principal defenses set up by Barasina was that he was mauled, maltreated and forced to sign two
documents by the Caloocan policemen while he was inside a small cell inside the Caloocan City
Police Headquarters. He identified those 2 documents, the "Paalala", dated 18 July 1988, and his
statement dated 18 July 1988. He further claimed that he never read any of those documents and
that he was not assisted by any lawyer during their execution, and that he does not know of any
Atty. Abelardo Torres. He signed an Affidavit of retraction dated 22 July 1988. On 28 February
1990, the trial court found Barasina guilty beyond reasonable doubt of (1) violation of Par. 1 of P.D.
1866 (Illegal Possession of Firearm); and (2) Murder, and sentenced him (1) as a result of his
conviction under PD 1866 to suffer imprisonment of 17 Years, 4 Months and 1 Day of Reclusion
Temporal as minimum to 20 Years of Reclusion Temporal, as maximum, and to pay the costs, and
(2) as a result of his conviction of Murder, to suffer imprisonment of 10 Years and 1 Day of Prision
Mayor, as minimum to 18 Years, 8 Months and 1 Day of Reclusion Temporal, as maximum, and to
pay the costs. The trial court also directed Barasina to indemnify the heirs of the victim, Fiscal Lino
Mayo, the amount of P61,000.00 representing the funeral and burial expenses of the victim and the
amount of P500 ,000.00 representing the moral damages suffered by his widow and the loss of
income as a result of the victim's death at the age of 50 years. On 29 December 1992, the Court of
Appeals (de Pano, Elbias, Gutierrez [P], JJ.), acting on the appeal interposed by Barasina, rendered
a decision increasing the penalties imposed on Barasina to reclusion perpetua for each of the two
crimes committed. The records do not show that the case was certified by the Court of Appeals to
the Supreme Court pursuant to Section 13, Rule 124 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure
although the records of the case were forwarded to to the Supreme Court by the Court of Appeals on
11 May 1993 after the assailed decision was promulgated on 29 December 1992. In any event, the
appeal was later accepted by the Supreme Court and Barasina was thereupon required to file his
brief following which the Solicitor General filed a brief for the People.

Issue: Whether the admissions made in the custodial investigation attended to by Atty. Abelardo
Torres, a lawyer which Barasina did not expressly choose as counsel to assist him therein, are
inadmissible.
Held: Section 12 (1), Article 3 of the 1987 Constitution dealing with the rights of a person
undergoing investigation reads "Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense
shall have the right to be informed of his right to remain silent and to have competent and
independent counsel preferably of his own choice. If the person cannot afford the services of
counsel, he must be provided with one. These rights cannot be waived except in writing and in the
presence of counsel." The phrase "competent and independent" and "preferably of his own choice"
were explicit details which were added upon the persistence of human rights lawyers in the 1986
Constitutional Commission who pointed out cases where, during the martial law period, the lawyers
made available to the detainee would be one appointed by the military and therefore beholden to the
military. Yet, the apprehension of the human rights advocates then along this line hardly inspires
belief in the present inasmuch as there was no indication below that Barasina did in fact choose
Atty. Romeo Mendoza to assist him while in the process of offering the inculpatory statements, to
the exclusion of other lawyers (The hiring of Atty. Romeo Mendoza as counsel by Barasina after the
custodial investigation appears to be an afterthought). Withal, the word "preferably" under Section
12 [1], Article 3 of the 1987 Constitution does not convey the message that the choice of a lawyer
by a person under investigation is exclusive as to preclude other equally competent and independent
attorneys from handling his defense. If the rule were otherwise, then, the tempo of a custodial
investigation will be solely in the hands of the accused who can impede, nay, obstruct the progress
of the interrogation by simply selecting lawyer who for one reason or another, is not available to
protect his interest. This absurd scenario could not have been contemplated by the framers of the
charter.

251 People vs. Morial [GR 129295, 15 August 2001]

En Banc, Per Curiam: 13 concur, 1 out of town on official business, 1 on leave

Facts: At 6:00 p.m. on 6 January 1996, at Benjamin Morial's house at Barangay Cagnituan, Maasin,
Southern Leyte, Gabriel Guilao (62 years old) saw Nonelito Abion slapped Paula Bandibas' neck.
Paula fell and was stabbed by Edwin Morial with a small, sharp, pointed weapon. Leonardo Morial
stood outside the house. Gabriel also saw Paula Bandibas' grandson, Albert Bandibas, run towards
his grandmother's garden, and later heard the crushing sound of a stone against flesh. Abinon and
the two Morials stayed in the house for about 10 minutes after the killing the victims. Thereafter,
they departed and headed towards the nearby houses. Benjamin Morial, Paula's common-law
husband, who was in neighboring Barangay Maria Clara (712 kilometers away from Barangay
Cagnituan) when the incident took place, arrived at Barangay Cagnituan at around 4:00 p.m. the
next day. As was his wont, Benjamin called out Paula's name when he was some 5 meters from the
house. There was no answer. Benjamin raced to the house, heading straight to the bedroom. There,
he found the clothes all topsy-turvy. The box where he and Paula hid their money was turned upside
down. Someone had ransacked their house. Benjamin moved back and saw Paula lying on the floor
with a cut in her neck. He shouted for help. Responding to his cries, Benjamin's neighbors,
including barangay kagawads Patricio Abion and Rufino Guilao, rushed to his house. Benjamin
asked his neighbors to help search for Albert, who was found shortly some 50 meters from the
house. Albert Bandibas laid flat on the ground with two stones near his head. Benjamin requested
Patricio to send someone to report the incident to the police. Upon learning of Benjamin's return to
Barangay Cagnituan, Gabriel Guilao hurried to Benjamin's house. He revealed to the grieving
Benjamin that he witnessed Paula's killing and that Edwin Morial, Leonardo Morial and Nonelito
Abion were the perpetrators. Benjamin advised Gabriel not to tell anyone about what he knew for
fear that they would all be killed since the Abions were "saturated in their place." Gabriel heeded
Benjamin's advice. The police arrived at around 10:00 p.m. SPO4 Antonio Macion, along with four
other police officers, investigated the tragedy. They found wounds in Paula Bandibas' stomach,
breast and neck. Albert Bandibas, on the other hand, had a contusion on the right side of his head.
Beside him were two stones. After examining the victims' wounds, the police officers, along with
Benjamin Morial, proceeded to the bedroom. Benjamin informed the officers that P11,000.00 was
missing from the moneybox. Other than the cash, nothing else was missing. Outside the house,
Benjamin disclosed to the officers his three suspects, the accused in this case. He advised them,
however, to bring only Leonardo and Edwin Morial into custody and not to include Nonelito
Abion, who had many relatives in Cagnituan. As a former barangay captain of 22 years, he knew
that the Abions were "most feared" in Cagnituan. Benjamin did not tell the police that Gabriel
Guilao had witnessed the incident. The police found Edwin and Leonardo Morial in the house of
Nonelito Abion and invited the two to the police station, where they were turned over to SPO4
Andres Fernandez. Leonardo Morial told SPO4 Fernandez that he had no money to pay for the
services of counsel. SPO4 Fernandez informed him that there are many lawyers in their
municipality and named some of them. Leonardo said he did not know any of the lawyers
mentioned. SPO4 Fernandez thus volunteered to obtain a lawyer for the suspect, to which Leonardo
Morial consented. SPO4 Fernandez then contacted Atty. Aguilar. At about 8:00 a.m. of 9 January
1996, Atty. Tobias Aguilar arrived. After being introduced to Leonardo Morial, Atty. Aguilar had a
short conference with him. He asked Leonardo if he was willing to answer the questions that may
be propounded by the police investigator. Atty. Aguilar warned him that the statements that he may
give might be used in evidence against him. Leonardo said he was willing to answer the questions
voluntarily. According to Atty. Aguilar, Leonardo was bent on revealing what really happened.
Thereafter, SPO4 Fernandez conducted the investigation in Cebuano. Midway into the
investigation, after the police investigator had asked "all the material points," Atty. Aguilar asked
the investigator that he be given leave as he had a very important engagement. The investigator
agreed to the lawyer's request. Before leaving, Atty. Aguilar asked Leonardo if he was willing to
answer the questions in his absence. He also instructed the police that, after the written confession
had been prepared, the accused and the document containing the confession should be brought to
his office for "further examination." Atty. Aguilar was in the police station for less than thirty
minutes from the start of the interrogation. At about 1:30 or 2:00 p.m., Leonardo and his policeman-
escort arrived at Atty. Aguilar's office. Atty. Aguilar asked the accused whether he was maltreated
while he was away and examined the suspect's body for contusions or abrasions. Leonardo told him
that he was not harmed by the police officer. The lawyer then studied the document to determine
whether its contents conformed to the answers given by the accused in his (counsel's) presence. He
propounded questions to Leonardo with reference to the document. Atty. Aguilar asked him whether
he understood its contents and whether he was willing to sign it. Leonardo replied in the positive
and signed the document in the presence of Atty. Aguilar and the policeman-escort. Edwin Morial,
Leonardo Morial (@ Carding) and Nonelito Abion (@ Noly) were charged with robery with
homicide. Upon arraignment, the three accused pleaded not guilty. After trial, the Regional Trial
court rendered a decision convicting all the three accused for the crime of robbery with homicide, as
defined under Article 293 and penalized under Article 294 (1) of the Revised Penal Code and
sentenced (1) Leonardo Morial and Nonelito Abion to suffer the supreme penalty of death by
lethal injection; and (2) Edwin Morial, due to his minority, to suffer the lesser penalty of reclusion
perpetua. On the civil aspect of the case, the court held the three accused libale jointly and severally
(1) to indemnify the heirs of Paula Bandibas the amount of P50,000.00 as death indemnity; (2) to
indemnify the heirs of Albert Bandibas the amount of P50,000.00 as death indemnity; (3) to
indemnify complainant Benjamin Morial the amount of P20,546.00 as actual damages for the
funeral, burial and wake expenses; (4) to pay to the heirs [the] aforementioned moral damages of
P60,000.00 for each death; and (5) to restitute or restore to Benjamin Morial the P11,000.00 amount
robbed. The court also ordered them to pay the costs. Hence, the automatic review.

Issue: Whether Leonardo Morilas extra-judicial confession was valid, inasmuch as the material
points were tackled when the counsel, Atty. Aguilar Tobias, was present.

Held: Leonardo Morial's extra-judicial confession invalid since he was effectively deprived of his
right to counsel during the custodial investigation. An accused under custodial interrogation must
continuously have a counsel assisting him from the very start thereof. SPO4 Fernandez cannot
justify Atty. Aguilar's leaving by claiming that when the lawyer left, he knew very well that the
suspect had already admitted that Leonardo and his companions committed the crime. Neither can
Atty. Aguilar rationalize his abandoning his client by saying that he left only after the latter had
admitted the "material points," referring to the three accused's respective participation in the crime.
For even as the person under custodial investigation enjoys the right to counsel from its inception,
so does he enjoy such right until its termination indeed, "in every phase of the investigation." An
effective and vigilant counsel "necessarily and logically requires that the lawyer be present and able
to advise and assist his client from the time the confessant answers the first question asked by the
investigating officer until the signing of the extrajudicial confession." Furthermore, Section 2(a) of
RA 7438 requires that "[a]ny person arrested, detained or under custodial investigation shall at all
times be assisted by counsel." The last paragraph of Section 3 of the same law mandates that "[i]n
the absence of any lawyer, no custodial investigation shall be conducted." The right of Leonardo
Morial to counsel was therefore completely negated by the precipitate departure of Atty. Tobias
before the termination of the custodial investigation. If it were true that Atty. Tobias had to attend to
matters so pressing that he had to abandon a client undergoing custodial investigation, he could
have terminated the same to be continued only until as soon as his schedule permitted, advising the
suspect in the meantime to remain silent. This he failed to do. Appallingly, he even asked his client
whether he was willing to answer questions during the lawyer's absence. The records also disclose
that Atty. Tobias never informed appellant of his right to remain silent, not even before the custodial
investigation started. Atty. Tobias, by his failure to inform appellant of the latter's right to remain
silent, by his "coming and going" during the custodial investigation, and by his abrupt departure
before the termination of the proceedings, can hardly be the counsel that the framers of the 1987
Constitution contemplated when it added the modifier "competent" to the word "counsel." Neither
can he be described as the "vigilant and effective" counsel that jurisprudence requires. Precisely, it
is Atty. Tobias' nonchalant behavior during the custodial investigation that the Constitution abhors
and which this Court condemns. His casual attitude subverted the very purpose for this vital
right.That the extra-judicial confession was subsequently signed in the presence of counsel did not
cure its constitutional defects. As Leonardo Morial was effectively deprived of his right to counsel
during custodial investigation, his extra-judicial confession is inadmissible in evidence against him.

252 People vs. Castro [GR 106583, 19 June 1997]

Second Division, Romero (J): 4 concur

Facts: At about 5:30 p.m. of 19 March 1991, Capt. Allyn Evasco together with Sgt. Rogelio
Raguine, Sgt. Emilio de Guzman and CIC Julian Discargar formed a team for the purpose of
conducting a buy-bust operation. The team went to their target area in San Roque, San Miguel,
Pangasinan and proceeded to deploy themselves as planned. Sgt. de Guzman who acted as poseur-
buyer and civilian informer Discargar proceeded to Victoriano Castro y Calagno's house. Sgt.
Raguine, meanwhile, hid in a grassy spot near the house. Discargar introduced Castro to Sgt. de
Guzman who said that he wanted to purchase a kilo of dried marijuana leaves. After going inside
the house, Castro emerged with a plastic bag which he handed to Sgt. de Guzman who, in turn, paid
him P600.00. After the exchange, Sgt. de Guzman made the pre-arranged signal, indicating that the
transaction was complete, by raising his right hand. Upon espying the signal, Sgt. Raguine and the
other team members approached Castro, introduced themselves as NARCOM (Narcotics
Command) agents, and arrested him. He was thereafter brought to the San Manuel Police Station.
While the arresting team went to San Fernando, La Union for further investigation, the marijuana
leaves were sent to Camp Crame for examination where it was discovered that the actual weight of
the confiscated marijuana leaves was 930 grams. Castro was charged before the Regional Trial
Court of Pangasinan, Branch 38 in an information dated 21 March 1991, for violation of Section 4,
Article II of Republic Act 6425 (Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972). After Castro entered a plea of not
guilty, trial on the merits commenced. On 29 April 1992, the trial court rendered its decision finding
Castro guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the offense charged, and sentencing him to suffer the
penalty of life imprisonment and to pay a fine of P25,000.00, without subsidiary imprisonment in
case of insolvency and to pay the costs of the proceedings. Castro appealed.

Issue: Whether Castros signature on the Receipt of Property Seized is admissible in evidence.
Held: Castro's signature on the "Receipt of Property Seized" is inadmissible in evidence as there is
no showing that he was assisted by counsel when he signed the same. Since this is a document
tacitly admitting the offense charged, the constitutional safeguard must be observed. Be that as it
may, even disregarding this document, there is still ample evidence to prove Castro's guilt beyond
reasonable doubt, the same having been shown by the detailed testimonies of the law officers who
took part in the buy-bust operation.

253 People vs. Wong Chuen Ming [GR 112801-11, 12 April 1996]

First Division, Padilla (J): 4 concur

Facts: On 7 September 1991, at about 1:00 p.m., Philippine Air Lines (PAL) Flight PR 301 from
Hongkong arrived at the Ninoy Aquino International Airport (NAIA) in Pasay City, Metro Manila.
Among the many passengers who arrived on board said flight were Wong Chuen Ming, Au Wing
Cheung ,Tan Soi Tee, Chin Kok Wee, Lim Chan Fatt, Chin Kin Yong, Yap Boon Ah, Chin Kong
Song, Chin Kin Fah, Chai Min Huwa and Lim Nyuk Sun. Their respective passports showed that
Wong Chuen Ming and Au Wing Cheung are the only British (Hongkong) nationals in the group
while the rest are all Malaysian nationals. Their passports also revealed that all Malaysians (except
Lim Chan Fatt) originally came from Malaysia, traveled to Singapore and

Hongkong before proceeding to Manila. Upon the other hand, Wong Chuen Ming and Au Wing
Cheung, as well as Lim Chan Fatt, directly came from Hongkong to Manila. Wong Chuen Ming, et.
al. arrived in Manila as a tour group arranged by Select Tours International Co., Ltd. Au Wing
Cheung, an employee of Select Tours International Co., Ltd. acted as their tour guide. After passing
through and obtaining clearance from immigration officers at the NAIA, the tour group went to the
baggage claim area to retrieve their respective checked-in baggages. They placed the same in one
pushcart and proceeded to Express Lane 5 which at the time was manned by customs examiner
Danilo Gomez. Au Wing Cheung handed to Gomez the tour group's passenger's manifest, their
baggage declarations and their passports. Danilo Gomez instructed the tour group to place their
baggages on the examiner's table for inspection. They were directed to hold on to their respective
baggages while they wait for their turn to be examined. Chin Kong Song's baggage was first to be
examined by Gomez. Gomez put his hand inside the baggage and in the course of the inspection, he
found 3 brown colored boxes similar in size to powdered milk boxes underneath the clothes. The
boxes were marked Alpen Cereals and as he found nothing wrong with them, Gomez returned them
inside the baggage and allowed Chin Kong Song to go. Following the same procedure, Gomez next
examined the baggage of Wong Chuen Ming. Gomez again found and pulled out 2 boxes of Alpen
Cereals from said baggage and like in the previous inspection, he found nothing wrong with them
and allowed Wong Chuen Ming to go. The third baggage to be examined belonged to Lim Nyuk
Sun. When Gomez pulled out another 3 boxes of Alpen Cereals from said baggage, he became
suspicious and decided to open one of the boxes with his cutter. Inside the box was a plastic bag
containing white crystalline substance. Alarmed, Gomez immediately called the attention of
Appraiser Oreganan Palala and Duty Collector Zenaida Reyes Bonifacio to his discovery. Upon
learning about the boxes containing the white crystalline substance, Zenaida Reyes Bonifacio
(Chief of the Collection Division and Acting Duty Collector of the Customs Office at the NAIA)
immediately ordered the tour group to get their baggages and proceed to the district collector's
office. Chin Kong Song and Wong Chuen Ming, who were previously cleared by Gomez, were also
brought inside together with the rest of the group. Inside the collector's office, Gomez continued to
examine the baggages of the other members of the tour group. He allegedly found that each
baggage contained 1, 2 or 3 boxes similar to those previously found in the baggages of Chin Kong
Song, Wong Chuen Ming and Lim Nyuk Sun. A total of 30 boxes of Alpen Cereals containing white
crystalline substance were allegedly recovered from the baggages of the 11 accused. As Gomez
pulled out these boxes from their respective baggages, he bundled said boxes by putting masking
tape around them and handed them over to Bonifacio. Upon receipt of these bundled boxes,
Bonifacio called out the names of accused as listed in the passengers' manifest and ordered them to
sign on the masking tape placed on the boxes allegedly recovered from their respective baggages.
Also present at this time were Capt. Rustico Francisco and his men, agents of the Bureau of
Customs and several news reporters. A few minutes later, District Collector Antonio Marquez
arrived with General Job Mayo and then NBI Deputy Director Mariano Mison. Shortly after all
boxes of Alpen Cereals were recovered, Capt. Rustico Francisco, Officer in Charge (OIC) of the
Philippine National Police Narcotics Command Detachment at the NAIA, conducted a field test on
a sample of the white crystalline substance. His test showed that the substance was indeed "shabu."
Capt. Francisco immediately informed the 11 accused that they were under arrest. Thereafter, all
accused, as well as the Alpen Cereals boxes which were placed inside a big box, were brought to
Camp Crame. At Camp Crame, accused were asked to identify their signatures on the boxes and
after having identified them, they were again made to sign on the plastic bags containing white
crystalline substance inside the boxes bearing their signatures. The examination by Elizabeth
Ayonon, a forensic chemist at the Philippine National Police Crime Laboratory at Camp Crame,
confirmed that the white crystalline substance recovered from accused was "shabu." The total
weight of "shabu" recovered was placed at 34.45 kilograms. 11 separate criminal informations were
filed against all of the accused individually. The counsel of Au Wing Cheung earlier filed a petition
for reinvestigation and deferment of his arraignment but the same was denied by the trial court for
lack of merit. At their respective arraignments, all accused with the assistance of their counsels,
includin Au Wing Cheung pleaded not guilty to the charge. The trial court conducted a joint and/or
consolidated trial of all the cases upon motion by the prosecution considering that the State had
common testimonial and documentary evidence against all accused. On 29 November 1991, the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 109 of Pasay City, found the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt
of violating Section 15, Article III of Republic Act 6425, as amended, otherwise known as the
Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972; and sentenced each to life imprisonment and a fine of P20,000.00.
Wong Chuen Ming and Au Wing Cheung appealed.

Issue: Whether the signatures of accused on the boxes, as well as on the plastic bags containing
"shabu", are admissible in evidence.

Held: The Court holds that the signatures of accused on the boxes, as well as on the plastic bags
containing "shabu", are inadmissible in evidence. A careful study of the records reveals that accused
were never informed of their fundamental rights during the entire time that they were under
investigation. Specifically, accused were not informed of their Miranda rights i.e. that they had the
right to remain silent and to counsel and any statement they might make could be used against them,
when they were made to affix their signatures on the boxes of Alpen Cereals while they were at the
NAIA and again, on the plastic bags when they were already taken in custody at Camp Crame. By
affixing their signatures on the boxes of Alpen Cereals and on the plastic bags, accused in effect
made a tacit admission of the crime charged for mere possession of "shabu" is punished by law.
These signatures of accused are tantamount to an uncounselled extra-judicial confession which is
not sanctioned by the Bill of Rights (Section 12[1][3], Article III, 1987 Constitution). They are,
therefore, inadmissible as evidence for any admission wrung from the accused in violation of their
constitutional rights is inadmissible against them. The fact that all accused are foreign nationals
does not preclude application of the "exclusionary rule" because the constitutional guarantees
embodied in the Bill of Rights are given and extend to all persons, both aliens and citizens.

254 Marcelo vs. Sandiganbayan (First Division) [GR 109242, 26 January 1999]

Second Division, Mendoza (J): 4 concur

Facts: On 10 February 1989, Jacinto Merete, a letter carrier in the Makati Central Post Office,
disclosed to his chief, Projecto Tumagan, the existence of a group responsible for the pilferage of
mail matter in the post office. Among those mentioned by Merete were Arnold Pasicolan, an
emergency laborer assigned as a bag opener in the Printed Matters Section, and Redentor
Aguinaldo, a mail sorter of the Makati Post Office. Merete likewise described the modus operandi
of the group. For this reason, Tumagan sought the aid of the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI)
in apprehending the group responsible for mail pilferage in the Makati Post Office. On 17 February
1989, NBI Director Salvador Ranin dispatched NBI agents to Legaspi Village following a report
that the group would stage a theft of mail matter on that day. Tumagan accompanied a team of NBI
agents composed of Senior Agent Arles Vela and two other agents in a private car. They arrived at
Legaspi Village at about 1:00 p.m. They stayed at the corner of Adelantado and Gamboa Streets,
while two other teams of NBI agents waited at Amorsolo Street, near the Esquerra Building. At 2:00
p.m., a postal delivery jeep, driven by one Henry Orindai, was parked in front of the Esguerra
Building on Adelantado Street. The passengers of the postal delivery jeep were Arnold Pasicolan,
Jacinto Merete, and the driver, Henry Orindai. Pasicolan alighted from the jeep bringing with him a
mail bag. Merete stayed inside the jeep. Pasicolan then passed through an alley between Esguerra
and Montepino Buildings going towards Amorsolo St. Upon reaching Amorsolo St., Pasicolan gave
the mail bag to two persons, who were later identified as Ronnie Romero and Lito Marcelo. The
latter transferred the contents of the mail bag (i.e., assorted mail matter) to a travelling bag. The two
then secured the bag to the back of their motorcycle. Meanwhile, the NBI team led by agent Vela,
upon seeing Pasicolan going towards Amorsolo St., moved their car and started towards Amorsolo
St. They were just in time to see Pasicolan handing over the mail bag to Marcelo and Romero. At
that point, Atty. Sacaguing and Arles Vela arrested Marcelo and Romero. Unaware of the arrest of
Romero and Marcelo, Pasicolan went back to the postal delivery jeep and proceeded toward Pasay
Road. The NBI agents followed the postal delivery jeep, overtook it, and arrested Pasicolan. The
NBI agents brought Pasicolan, Marcelo, and Romero to their headquarters. They also brought along
with them the motorcycle of Romero and Marcelo and the bag of unsorted mail found in their
possession. On their way to the NBI headquarters, they passed by the Makati Central Post Office,
intending to arrest another suspect, Redentor Aguinaldo. However, they were not able to find him
there. The unsorted mail seized from Marcelo and Romero consisted of 622 letters. The names of
the addressees were listed. They were subsequently notified by the Bureau of Posts to claim their
letters. Many of them, after proper identification, were able to claim their letters. Some letters
contained money. Romero, Marcelo, and Pasicolan were asked to affix their signatures on the
envelopes of the letters. They did so in the presence of the members of the NBI Administrative and
Investigative Staff and the people transacting business with the NBI at that time. According to
Director Ranin, they required the accused to do this in order to identify the letters as the very same
letters confiscated from them. Arnold Pasicolan y Mabazza, Ronnie Romero y Santos, and Lito
Marcelo y Cruz were charged with infidelity in the custody of documents. The case was later
withdrawn and another information for qualified theft was filed before the Sandiganbayan. On 8
March 1993, the Sandiganbayan found all the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt as principals
of the crime of qualified theft. The Sandiganbayan sentenced Pasiclon the penalty ranging from 8
years, 8 months, and 1 day of Prision mayor, as minimum, to 13 years, 1 month, and 11 days of
reclusion temporal, as maximum; Romero and Marcelo, the penalty ranging from 7 YEARS, 4
months, and 1 day of prision mayor, as minimum, to 11 years, 6 months, and 21 days of prision
mayor, as maximum, each. Marcelo filed the petition for review on certiorari with the Supreme
Court.

Issue: Whether the exclusion of the admission, made through the signatures on the envelopes,
extend to the exclusion from evidence of the letters themselves.

Held: The purpose for securing the signature of Marcelo, et. al. on the envelopes was to
authenticate the envelopes as the ones seized from him and Ronnie Romero. This purpose and their
signatures on the envelope, when coupled with the testimony of prosecution witnesses that the
envelopes seized from Marcelo were those given to him and Romero, undoubtedly help establish
the guilt of Marcelo. Since these signatures are actually evidence of admission obtained from
Marcelo and his co-accused under circumstances contemplated in Art. III. 12(1) and 17 of the
Constitution, they should be excluded. For indeed, Marcelo and his co-accused signed following
their arrest. Hence, they were at the time under custodial investigation, defined as questioning
initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise
deprived of his freedom of action in a significant way. Under the Constitution, among the rights of a
person under custodial investigation is the right to have competent and independent counsel
preferably of his own choice and if the person cannot afford the services of counsel, that he must be
provided with one. However, the letters are themselves not inadmissible in evidence. The letters
were validly seized from Marcelo and Romero as an incident of a valid arrest. A ruling that
Marcelo's admission that the letters in question were those seized from him and his companion on
17 February 1989 is inadmissible in evidence does not extend to the exclusion from evidence of the
letters themselves. The letters can stand on their own, being the fruits of a crime validly seized
during a lawful arrest. That these letters were the ones found in the possession of Marcelo and his
companion and seized from them was shown by the testimonies of Vela and Tumagan. Indeed,
Marcelo and his co-accused were not convicted solely on the basis of the signatures found on the
letters but on other evidence, notably the testimonies of NBI agents and other prosecution
witnesses.

255 People vs. Andan [GR 116437, 3 March 1997]

En Banc, Per Curiam: 15 concur

Facts: On 19 February 1994 at about 4:00 P.M., in Concepcion Subdivision, Baliuag, Bulacan,
Marianne Guevarra, 20 years of age and a second-year student at the Fatima School of Nursing, left
her home for her school dormitory in Valenzuela, Metro Manila. She was to prepare for her final
examinations on 21 February 1994. Marianne wore a striped blouse and faded denim pants and
brought with her two bags containing her school uniforms, some personal effects and more than
P2,000.00 in cash. Marianne was walking along the subdivision when Pablito Andan y Hernandez
invited her inside his house. He used the pretext that the blood pressure of his wife's grandmother
should be taken. Marianne agreed to take her blood pressure as the old woman was her distant
relative. She did not know that nobody was inside the house. Andan then punched her in the
abdomen, brought her to the kitchen and raped her. His lust sated, Andan dragged the unconscious
girl to an old toilet at the back of the house and left her there until dark. Night came and Andan
pulled Marianne, who was still unconscious, to their backyard. The yard had a pigpen bordered on
one side by a 6-foot high concrete fence. On the other side was a vacant lot. Andan stood on a bench
beside the pigpen and then lifted and draped the girl's body over the fence to transfer it to the vacant
lot. When the girl moved, he hit her head with a piece of concrete block. He heard her moan and hit
her again on the face. After silence reigned, he pulled her body to the other side of the fence,
dragged it towards a shallow portion of the lot and abandoned it. At 11:00 a.m. of the following day,
the body of Marianne was discovered. She was naked from the chest down with her brassiere and T-
shirt pulled toward her neck. Nearby was found a panty with a sanitary napkin. Marianne's
gruesome death drew public attention and prompted Mayor Cornelio Trinidad of Baliuag to form a
crack team of police officers to look for the criminal. Searching the place where Marianne's body
was found, the policemen recovered a broken piece of concrete block stained with what appeared to
be blood. They also found a pair of denim pants and a pair of shoes which were identified as
Marianne's. Andan's nearby house was also searched by the police who found bloodstains on the
wall of the pigpen in the backyard. They interviewed the occupants of the house and learned from
Romano Calma, the stepbrother of Andan's wife, that Andan also lived there but that he, his wife
and son left without a word. Calma surrendered to the police several articles consisting of
pornographic pictures, a pair of wet short pants with some reddish brown stain, a towel also with
the stain, and a wet T-shirt. The clothes were found in the laundry hamper inside the house and
allegedly belonged to Andan. The police tried to locate Andan and learned that his parents live in
Barangay Tangos, Baliuag, Bulacan. On February 24 at 11:00 P.M., a police team led by Mayor
Trinidad traced Andan in his parents' house. They took him aboard the patrol jeep and brought him
to the police headquarters where he was interrogated. Initially, Andan denied any knowledge of
Marianne's death. However, when the police confronted him with the concrete block, the victim's
clothes and the bloodstains found in the pigpen, Andan relented and said that his neighbors, Gilbert
Larin and Reynaldo Dizon, killed Marianne and that he was merely a lookout. He also said that he
knew where Larin and Dizon hid the two bags of Marianne. Immediately, the police took Andan to
his house. Larin and Dizon, who were rounded up earlier, were likewise brought there by the police.
Andan went to an old toilet at the back of the house, leaned over a flower pot and retrieved from a
canal under the pot, two bags which were later identified as belonging to Marianne. Thereafter,
photographs were taken of Andan and the two other suspects holding the bags. By this time, people
and media representatives were already gathered at the police headquarters awaiting the results of
the investigation. Mayor Trinidad arrived and proceeded to the investigation room. Upon seeing the
mayor, Andan approached him and whispered a request that they talk privately. The mayor led
Andan to the office of the Chief of Police and there, Andan broke down and said "Mayor, patawarin
mo ako! I will tell you the truth. I am the one who killed Marianne." The mayor opened the door of
the room to let the public and media representatives witness the confession. The mayor first asked
for a lawyer to assist Andan but since no lawyer was available he ordered the proceedings
photographed and videotaped. In the presence of the mayor, the police, representatives of the media
and Andan's own wife and son, Andan confessed his guilt. He disclosed how he killed Marianne and
volunteered to show them the place where he hid her bags. He asked for forgiveness from Larin and
Dizon whom he falsely implicated saying he did it because of ill-feelings against them. He also said
that the devil entered his mind because of the pornographic magazines and tabloid he read almost
everyday. After his confession, Andan hugged his wife and son and asked the mayor to help him.
His confession was captured on videotape and covered by the media nationwide. Andan was
detained at the police headquarters. The next two days, February 26 and 27, more newspaper, radio
and television reporters came. Andan was again interviewed and he affirmed his confession to the
mayor and reenacted the crime. Pablito Andan y Hernandez alias "Bobby" was charged with rape
with homicide. On arraignment, however, Andan entered a plea of "not guilty." In a decision dated 4
August 1994, the trial court convicted Andan and sentenced him to death pursuant to Republic Act
7659. The trial court also ordered Andan to pay the victim's heirs P50,000.00 as death indemnity,
P71,000.00 as actual burial expenses and P100,000.00 as moral damages. Hence, the automatic
review.

Issue: Whether Andans confession to the police, the mayor, and the newsmen may be admitted as
evidence against Andan.

Held: Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the right (1) to
remain silent; (2) to have competent and independent counsel preferably of his own choice; and (3)
to be informed of such rights. These rights cannot be waived except in writing and in the presence
of counsel. Any confession or admission obtained in violation of this provision is inadmissible in
evidence against him. The exclusionary rule is premised on the presumption that the defendant is
thrust into an unfamiliar atmosphere and runs through menacing police interrogation procedures
where the potentiality for compulsion, physical and psychological, is forcefully apparent. The
incommunicado character of custodial interrogation or investigation also obscures a later judicial
determination of what really transpired. When the police arrested Andan, they were no longer
engaged in a general inquiry about the death of Marianne. Indeed, Andan was already a prime
suspect even before the police found him at his parents' house. Andan was already under custodial
investigation when he confessed to the police. It is admitted that the police failed to inform
appellant of his constitutional rights when he was investigated and interrogated. His confession is
therefore inadmissible in evidence. So too were the two bags recovered from Andan's house. The
victim's bags were the fruits of Andan's uncounselled confession to the police. They are tainted
evidence, hence also inadmissible.

On the other hand, however, Andan's confession to the mayor was not made in response to any
interrogation by the latter. In fact, the mayor did not question Andan at all. No police authority
ordered Andan to talk to the mayor. It was Andan himself who spontaneously, freely and voluntarily
sought the mayor for a private meeting. The mayor did not know that Andan was going to confess
his guilt to him. When Andan talked with the mayor as a confidant and not as a law enforcement
officer, his uncounselled confession to him did not violate his constitutional rights.

Andan's confessions to the media were properly admitted. The confessions were made in response
to questions by news reporters, not by the police or any other investigating officer. Statements
spontaneously made by a suspect to news reporters on a televised interview are deemed voluntary
and are admissible in evidence. The records show that Alex Marcelino, a television reporter for
"Eye to Eye" on Channel 7, interviewed Andan on 27 February 1994. The interview was recorded
on video and showed that Andan made his confession willingly, openly and publicly in the presence
of his wife, child and other relatives. Orlan Mauricio, a reporter for "Tell the People" on Channel 9
also interviewed appellant on 25 February 1994. Andan's confessions to the news reporters were
given free from any undue influence from the police authorities. The news reporters acted as news
reporters when they interviewed Andan. They were not acting under the direction and control of the
police. They were there to check Andan's confession to the mayor. They did not force Andan to
grant them an interview and reenact the commission of the crime. In fact, they asked his permission
before interviewing him. They interviewed him on separate days not once did Andan protest his
innocence. Instead, he repeatedly confessed his guilt to them. He even supplied all the details in the
commission of the crime, and consented to its reenactment. All his confessions to the news reporters
were witnessed by his family and other relatives. There was no coercive atmosphere in the
interview of Andan by the news reporters. Thus, Andan's verbal confessions to the newsmen are not
covered by Section 12 (1) and (3) of Article III of the Constitution. The Bill of Rights does not
concern itself with the relation between a private individual and another individual. It governs the
relationship between the individual and the State. The prohibitions therein are primarily addressed
to the State and its agents. They confirm that certain rights of the individual exist without need of
any governmental grant, rights that may not be taken away by government, rights that government
has the duty to protect. Governmental power is not unlimited and the Bill of Rights lays down these
limitations to protect the individual against aggression and unwarranted interference by any
department of government and its agencies.

256 People vs. Endino [GR 133026, 20 February 2001]

Second Division, Bellosillo (J): 4 concur

Facts: On a busy street in Puerto Princesa City in the evening of 16 October 1991, an emboldened
Gerry

Galgarin (@ Toto), uncle of Edward Endino, suddenly and without warning lunged at Dennis
Aquino and stabbed him repeatedly on the chest. Dennis' girlfriend Clara Agagas who was with
him, stunned by the unexpected attack, pleaded to Galgarin to stop. Dennis struggled and succeeded
momentarily to free himself from his attacker. Dennis dashed towards the nearby Midtown Sales
but his escape was foiled when from out of nowhere Edward Endino appeared and fired at Dennis.
As Dennis staggered for safety, the 2 assailants fled in the direction of the airport. Meanwhile,
Dennis, wounded and bleeding, sought refuge inside the Elohim Store where he collapsed on the
floor. He was grasping for breath and near death. Clara with the help of some onlookers took him to
the hospital but Dennis expired even before he could receive medical attention. On 18 October
1991, an Information for the murder of Dennis Aquino was filed against Edward Endino and Gerry
Galgarin and warrants were issued for their arrest. However, as both accused remained at large, the
trial court issued on 26 December 1991 an order putting the case in the archives without prejudice
to its reinstatement upon their apprehension. On 19 November 1992, Gerry Galgarin was arrested
through the combined efforts of the Antipolo and Palawan police forces at a house in Sitio Sto.
Nio, Antipolo, Rizal. He was immediately taken into temporary custody by the Antipolo Police.
Early in the evening of the following day, he was fetched from the Antipolo Police Station by PO3
Gaudencio Manlavi and PO3 Edwin Magbanua of the Palawan police force to be taken to Palawan
and be tried accordingly. On their way to the airport, they stopped at the ABS-CBN television
station where Galgarin was interviewed by reporters. Video footages of the interview were taken
showing Galgarin admitting his guilt while pointing to his nephew Edward Endino as the gunman.
According to Galgarin, after attacking Aquino, they left for Roxas, Palawan, where his sister
Langging who is Edward's mother, was waiting. Langging gave them money for their fare for
Manila. They took the boat for Batangas, where they stayed for a few days, and proceeded to
Manila where they separated, with him heading for Antipolo. Galgarin appealed for Edward to give
himself up to the authorities. His interview was shown over the ABS-CBN evening news program
TV Patrol. During trial, Galgarin disowned the confession which he made over TV Patrol and
claimed that it was induced by the threats of the arresting police officers. He asserted that the
videotaped confession was constitutionally infirmed and inadmissible under the exclusionary rule
provided in Sec. 12, Art. III, of the Constitution. The trial court found Galgarin guilty of murder
qualified by Treachery, sentenced him to reclusion perpetua, and ordered him to indemnify the heirs
of Dennis Aquino in the amount of P50,000.00 as compensatory damages and P72,725.35 as actual
damages.

Issue: Whether the ABS-CBN interview recording Galgarins confession is admissible as evidence.

Held: The interview was recorded on video and it showed Galgarin unburdening his guilt willingly,
openly and publicly in the presence of newsmen. Such confession does not form part of custodial
investigation as it was not given to police officers but to media men in an attempt to elicit sympathy
and forgiveness from the public. Besides, if he had indeed been forced into confessing, he could
have easily sought succor from the newsmen who, in all likelihood, would have been sympathetic
with him. However, because of the inherent danger in the use of television as a medium for
admitting one's guilt, and the recurrence of this phenomenon in several cases, it is prudent that trial
courts are reminded that extreme caution must be taken in further admitting similar confessions. For
in all probability, the police, with the connivance of unscrupulous media practitioners, may attempt
to legitimize coerced extra-judicial confessions and place them beyond the exclusionary rule by
having an accused admit an offense on television. Such a situation would be detrimental to the
guaranteed rights of the accused and thus imperil our criminal justice system. It is not suggested
that videotaped confessions given before media men by an accused with the knowledge of and in
the presence of police officers are impermissible. Indeed, the line between proper and invalid police
techniques and conduct is a difficult one to draw, particularly in cases such as this where it is
essential to make sharp judgments in determining whether a confession was given under coercive
physical or psychological atmosphere. A word of counsel then to lower courts: "we should never
presume that all media confessions described as voluntary have been freely given. This type of
confession always remains suspect and therefore should be thoroughly examined and scrutinized.
Detection of coerced confessions is admittedly a difficult and arduous task for the courts to make. It
requires persistence and determination in separating polluted confessions from untainted ones. We
have a sworn duty to be vigilant and protective of the rights guaranteed by the Constitution."

257 People vs. Ordono [GR 132154, 29 June 2000]

En Banc, Per Curiam: 15 concur

Facts: On 5 August 1994, the decomposing body of a young girl was found among the bushes near
a bridge in Barangay Poblacion, Santol, La Union. The girl was later identified as Shirley Victore,
15 years old, a resident of Barangay Guesset, Poblacion, Santol, La Union, who 3 days before was
reported missing. Post- mortem examination conducted by Dr. Arturo Llavore, a medico-legal
officer of the NBI, revealed that the victim was raped and strangled to death. Unidentified sources
pointed to Pacito Ordoo and Apolonio Medina as the authors of the crime. Acting on this lead, the
police thereupon invited the 2 suspects and brought them to the police station for questioning.
However, for lack of evidence then directly linking them to the crime, they were allowed to go
home. On 10 August 1994, Ordoo and Medina returned to the police station one after another and
acknowledged that they had indeed committed the crime. Acting on their admission, the police
immediately conducted an investigation and put their confessions in writing. The investigators
however could not at once get the services of a lawyer to assist the 2 accused in the course of the
investigation because there were no practicing lawyers in the Municipality of Santol, a remote town
of the Province of La Union. Be that as it may, the statements of the 2 accused where nevertheless
taken. But before doing so, both accused were apprised in their own dialect of their constitutional
right to remain silent and to be assisted by a competent counsel of their choice. Upon their
acquiescence and assurance that they understood their rights and did not require the services of
counsel, the investigation was conducted with the Parish Priest, the Municipal Mayor, the Chief of
Police and other police officers of Santol, La Union, in attendance to listen to and witness the giving
of the voluntary statements of the 2 suspects who admitted their participation in the crime. After
Medina said his piece, his wife and mother suddenly burst into tears. He then affixed his signature
on his statement and so did his wife, followed by all the other witnesses who listened to his
confession. Pacito Ordoo narrated his story in the afternoon. At the end of his narration Ordoo
affixed his thumbmark on his statement in lieu of his signature as he did not know how to write.
Thereafter, Medina and Ordoo were detained at the Santol police station. News about the
apprehension and detention of the culprits of the rape-slay of Shirley Victore soon spread that
Roland Almoite, leading radio announcer of radio station DZNL, visited and interviewed them. In
the interview, which was duly tape-recorded both accused admitted again their complicity in the
crime and narrated individually the events surrounding their commission thereof. According to
Medina, his remorse in having committed the crime was so great but his repentance came too late.
He and Ordoo hoped that the parents of Shirley Victore would forgive them. Upon conclusion of
the interview, Roland Almoite immediately went to radio station DZNL and played the taped
interview on the air. The same interview was played again on the air the following morning and was
heard by thousands of listeners. A couple of days later, the police brought the 2 accused to the office
of the PAO lawyer in Balaoan, La Union, for assistance and counseling. In a closed-door session,
PAO lawyer Oscar B. Corpuz apprised each of the accused of his constitutional rights and, even
though their confessions were already written in their dialect, explained to them each of the
questions and answers taken during the investigation. He likewise advised them to ponder the
consequences of their confessions, leading them to defer the affixing of their second signature/
thumbmark thereon. After a week or so, the 2 separately went back to Atty. Corpuz and informed
him of their willingness to affix their signatures and thumbmarks for the second time in their
respective confessions. Once again Atty. Corpuz apprised the 2 accused of their constitutional
rights, explained the contents of their respective statements, and finally, accompanied them to Judge
Fabian M. Bautista, MTC judge of Balaoan, La Union, who further apprised the 2 accused of their
constitutional rights and asked them if they had been coerced into signing their confessions. They
assured Judge Bautista that their statements had been given freely and voluntarily. Upon such
assurance that they had not been coerced into giving and signing their confessions, Judge Bautista
finally asked Ordoo and Medina to affix their signatures/thumbmarks on their respective
confessions, and to subscribe the same before him. Atty. Corpuz then signed their statements as
their assisting counsel, followed by a few members of the MTC staff who witnessed the signing.
Ordono and Medina were charged for rape with homicide. On arraignment, in a complete turnabout,
the 2 accused pleaded not guilty. On 11 December 1997, the trial court adjudged Ordoo and
Medina guilty of the crime of rape with homicide attended with conspiracy, and imposed upon each
of them 2 death penalties on the basis of their extrajudicial confessions. Hence, the automatic
review.

Issue: Whether the custodial investigation made in the presence of the municipal mayor, parish
priest, etc. and/or the taped interview containing the accuseds confessions are admissible as
evidence.

Held: Custodial investigation began when the accused Ordoo and Medina voluntarily went to the
Santol Police Station to confess and the investigating officer started asking questions to elicit
information and/or confession from them. At such point, the right of the accused to counsel
automatically attached to them. Concededly, after informing the accused of their rights the police
sought to provide them with counsel. However, none could be furnished them due to the non-
availability of practicing lawyers in Santol, La Union, and the remoteness of the town to the next
adjoining town of Balaoan, La Union, where practicing lawyers could be found. At that stage, the
police should have already desisted from continuing with the interrogation but they persisted and
gained the consent of the accused to proceed with the investigation. To the credit of the police, they
requested the presence of the Parish Priest and the Municipal Mayor of Santol as well as the
relatives of the accused to obviate the possibility of coercion, and to witness the voluntary execution
by the accused of their statements before the police. Nonetheless, this did not cure in any way the
absence of a lawyer during the investigation. In the absence of such valid waiver, the Parish Priest
of Santol, the Municipal Mayor, the relatives of the accused, the Chief of Police and other police
officers of the municipality could not stand in lieu of counsel's presence. The apparent consent of
the 2 accused in continuing with the investigation was of no moment as a waiver to be effective
must be made in writing and with the assistance of counsel. Consequently, any admission obtained
from the 2 accused emanating from such uncounselled interrogation would be inadmissible in
evidence in any proceeding. Securing the assistance of the PAO lawyer 5 to 8 days later does not
remedy this omission either. Although there was a showing that the PAO lawyer made a thorough
explanation of the rights of the accused, enlightened them on the possible repercussions of their
admissions, and even gave them time to deliberate upon them, this aid and valuable advice given by
counsel still came several days too late. It could have no palliative effect. It could not cure the
absence of counsel during the custodial investigation when the extrajudicial statements were being
taken. The second affixation of the signatures/thumbmarks of the accused on their confessions a few
days after their closed-door meeting with the PAO lawyer, in the presence and with the signing of
the MTC judge, the PAO lawyer and other witnesses, likewise did not make their admissions an
informed one. Admissions obtained during custodial investigation without the benefit of counsel
although reduced into writing and later signed in the presence of counsel are still flawed under the
Constitution. If the lawyer's role is diminished to being that of a mere witness to the signing of a
prepared document albeit an indication therein that there was compliance with the constitutional
rights of the accused, the requisite standards guaranteed by Art. III, Sec. 12, par. (1), are not met.
The standards utilized by police authorities to assure the constitutional rights of the accused
therefore fell short of the standards demanded by the Constitution and the law.

As with the interview taken by DZNL radio announcer Roland Almoite, the taped interview was
offered to form part of the testimony of witness Roland Almoite to whom the admissions were made
and to prove through electronic device the voluntary admissions by the 2 accused that they raped
and killed Shirley Victore. The defense objected to its acceptance on the ground that its integrity
had not been preserved as the tape could easily have been spliced and tampered with. However, as
Roland Almoite testified, it was the original copy of the taped interview; it was not altered; the
voices therein were the voices of the 2 accused; and, the defense never submitted evidence to prove
otherwise. Under the circumstances, the Court is inclined to admit the authenticity of the taped
interview. A review of the contents of the tape as included in Roland Almoite's testimony reveals
that the interview was conducted free from any influence or intimidation from police officers and
was done willingly by the accused. Despite allegations to the contrary, no police authority ordered
or forced the accused to talk to the radio announcer. While it may be expected that police officers
were around since the interview was held in the police station, there was no showing that they were
within hearing distance nor within the vicinity where the interview was being conducted. At most,
the participation of the police authorities was only to allow Roland Almoite to conduct an interview.
The taped interview likewise revealed that the accused voluntarily admitted to the rape-slay and
even expressed remorse for having perpetrated the crime. We have held that statements
spontaneously made by a suspect to news reporters on a televised interview are deemed voluntary
and are admissible in evidence. By analogy, statements made by herein accused to a radio
announcer should likewise be held admissible. The interview was not in the nature of an
investigation as the response of the accused was made in answer to questions asked by the radio
reporter, not by the police or any other investigating officer. When the accused talked to the radio
announcer, they did not talk to him as a law enforcement officer, as in fact he was not, hence their
uncounselled confession to him did not violate their constitutional rights. Sections 12, pars. (1) and
(3), Art. III, of the Constitution do not cover the verbal confessions of the 2 accused to the radio
announcer. What the Constitution bars is the compulsory disclosure of incriminating facts or
confessions. The rights enumerated under Sec. 12, Art. III, are guaranteed to preclude the slightest
use of coercion by the state as would lead the accused to admit something false, not to prevent him
from freely and voluntarily telling the truth. In relation to this, the admissions of the accused before
the radio announcer and duly tape-recorded are bolstered and substantiated by the findings of the
NBI Medico-Legal Officer as reflected in the Autopsy Report/Post Mortem Findings.

258 People vs. Guillermo [GR 147786, 20 January 2004]

En Banc, Quisumbing (J): 13 concur

Facts: Victor Francisco Keyser, was the owner and manager of Keyser Plastic Manufacturing Corp.,
with principal place of business at Sitio Halang, Lornaville, San Roque, Antipolo City. Keyser
Plastics shared its building with Greatmore Corporation, a manufacturer of faucets. Separating the
respective spaces being utilized by the two firms in their operations was a wall, the lower portion of
which was made of concrete hollow blocks, while the upper portion was of lawanit boards. The part
of the wall made of lawanit had two large holes, which could allow a person on one side of the wall
to see what was on the other side. On 22 March 1998, Romualdo Campos, a security guard assigned
to Greatmore was on duty. At around 8:00 a.m., he saw Eric G. Guillermo enter the premises of
Keyser Plastics. Campos ignored Guillermo, as he knew him to be one of the trusted employees of
Keyser Plastics. An hour later, he saw Victor F. Keyser arrive. Keyser checked the pump motor of
the deep well, which was located in the area of Greatmore, after which he also went inside the part
of the building occupied by Keyser Plastics. Campos paid scant attention to Keyser. Later, at around
10:00 a.m., Campos was making some entries in his logbook, when he heard some loud noises
(kalabugan) coming from the Keyser Plastics area. He stopped to listen, but thinking that the
noise was coming from the machines used to make plastics, he did not pay much attention to the
sound. At around noontime, Campos was suddenly interrupted in the performance of his duties
when he saw Guillermo look through one of the holes in the dividing wall. According to Campos,
appellant calmly told him that he had killed Victor Keyser and needed Campos assistance to help
him carry the corpse to the garbage dump where he could burn it. Shocked by this revelation,
Campos immediately dashed off to telephone the police. The police told him to immediately secure
the premises and not let the suspect escape, while a reaction team was being dispatched to the
scene. 10 minutes later, a team composed of SPO4 Felix Bautista, SPO1 Carlito Reyes, and Police
Aide Jovenal Dizon, Jr., all from the Antipolo Philippine National Police (PNP) Station, arrived at
the crime scene. With them was Felix Marcelo, an official police photographer. They were
immediately met by Campos, who informed them that Guillermo was still inside the building. The
law enforcers tried to enter the premises of Keyser Plastics, but found the gates securely locked.
The officers then talked to Guillermo and after some minutes, persuaded him to give them the keys.
This enabled the police to open the gate. Once inside, SPO4 Bautista and SPO1 Reyes immediately
accosted Guillermo, who was clad only in a pair of shorts, naked from the waist up. SPO1 Reyes
then asked him where the body of the victim was and Guillermo pointed to some cardboard boxes.
On opening the boxes, the police found the dismembered limbs and chopped torso of Keyser. The
victims head was found stuffed inside a cement bag. When the police asked how he did it,
according to the prosecution witness, Guillermo said that he bashed the victim on the head with a
piece of wood, and after Keyser fell, he dismembered the body with a carpenters saw. He then
mopped up the blood on the floor with a plastic foam. Guillermo then turned over to the police a
bloodstained, two-foot long piece of coconut lumber and a carpenters saw. Photographs were taken
of the suspect, the dismembered corpse, and the implements used in committing the crime. When
asked as to his motive for the killing, Guillermo replied that Keyser had been maltreating him and
his co-employees. He expressed no regret whatsoever about his actions. The police then brought
Guillermo to the Antipolo PNP Station for further investigation. SPO1 Carlos conducted the
investigation, without apprising Guillermo about his constitutional rights and without providing him
with the services of counsel. SPO1 Carlos requested the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) to
conduct a post-mortem examination on Keysers remains. The Antipolo police then turned over the
bloodstained piece of wood and saw, recovered from the locus delicti, to the PNP Crime Laboratory
for testing. Keysers death shocked the nation. Guillermo, who was then in police custody, was
interviewed on separate occasions by two TV reporters, namely: Augusto Gus Abelgas of ABS-
CBN News and Kara David of GMA Channel 7. Both interviews were subsequently broadcast
nationwide. Guillermo admitted to David that he committed the crime and never gave it second
thought. He disclosed to David the details of the crime, including how he struck Keyser on the head
and cut up his body into pieces, which he placed in sacks and cartons. When asked why he killed
his employer, Guillermo stated that Keyser had not paid him for years, did not feed him properly,
and treated him like an animal. Both Abelgas and David said that Guillermo expressed absolutely
no remorse over his alleged misdeed during the course of their respective interviews with him. On
23 March 1998, Guillermo was charged by State Prosecutor Jaime Augusto B. Valencia, Jr., of
murdering his employer, Victor Francisco Keyser. When arraigned on 3 April 1998, Guillermo,
assisted by counsel de oficio, pleaded guilty to the charge. On 23 April 1998, however, Guillermo
moved to withdraw his plea of guilty and prayed for a re-arraignment. The trial court granted the
motion and on 28 April 1998, he was re-arraigned. Assisted by counsel de parte, he entered a plea of
not guilty. The case then proceeded to trial. After trial, the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Antipolo
City, Branch 73, dated 7 March 2001 (Criminal Case 98-14724), found Eric Guillermo y Garcia
guilty of murder and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of death. The court also ordered
Guillermo to pay the mother of the victim P50,000.00 for death indemnity, P50,000.00 for funeral
expenses, P500,000.00 as compensatory damages, P500,000.00 as moral damages, P300,000.00 as
exemplary damages, and P100,000 plus P3,000 per court appearance as attorney's fees. Hence, the
automatic review.

Issue: Whether Guillermos confession to the police officers, to the security guard of Greatmore
Corp., and to the newsmen are admissible as evidence.

Held: The confession Guillermo made while he was under investigation by SPO1 Carlito Reyes for
the killing of Keyser at the Antipolo PNP Station, falls short of the protective standards laid down
by the Constitution. The investigating officer made no serious effort to make Guillermo aware of his
basic rights under custodial investigation. While the investigating officer was aware of Guillermos
right to be represented by counsel, the officer exerted no effort to provide him with one on the
flimsy excuse that it was a Sunday. Despite the absence of counsel, the officer proceeded with said
investigation. Moreover, the record is bare of any showing that Guillermo had waived his
constitutional rights in writing and in the presence of counsel. Be that as it may, however, the
inadmissibility of Guillermos confession to SPO1 Reyes at the Antipolo PNP Station as evidence
does not necessarily lead to his acquittal. For constitutional safeguards on custodial investigation
(known, also as the Miranda principles) do not apply to spontaneous statements, or those not
elicited through questioning by law enforcement authorities but given in an ordinary manner
whereby the appellant verbally admits to having committed the offense. The rights enumerated in
the Constitution, Article III, Section 12, are meant to preclude the slightest use of the States
coercive power as would lead an accused to admit something false. But it is not intended to prevent
him from freely and voluntarily admitting the truth outside the sphere of such power. Herein,
Guillermo admitted the commission of the crime not just to the police but also to private
individuals. According to the testimony of the security guard, Romualdo Campos, on the very day
of the killing Guillermo called him to say that he had killed his employer and needed assistance to
dispose of the cadaver. Campos testimony was not rebutted by the defense, and thus Guillermo's
statements to Campos are admissible for being part of the res gestae. Further, when interviewed on
separate occasions by the media, Guillermo not only agreed to be interviewed by the news
reporters, but he spontaneously admitted his guilt to them. He even supplied the details regarding
the commission of the crime to reporter Kara David of GMA Channel 7. The TV news reporters
were acting as media professionals when they interviewed Guillermo. They were not under the
direction and control of the police. There was no coercion for Guillermo to face the TV cameras.
The interviews also took place on several occasions, not just once. Each time, Guillermo did not
protest or insist on his innocence. Instead, he repeatedly admitted what he had done. He even
supplied details of Keysers killing. As held in Andan, statements spontaneously made by a suspect
to news reporters during a televised interview are voluntary and admissible in evidence.

259 People vs. Gomez [GR 101817, 26 March 1997]

First Division, Vitug (J): 4 concur

Facts: On 27 February 1990, Art David, an employer of Felipe Immaculata sent the latter to
Bangkok, Thailand, to canvass ready-to-wear clothes. David and Eduardo Gomez followed
Immaculata about a week later (04 March 1990). Immaculata fetched the two at the Bangkok
Airport. Immaculata, David and Gomez proceeded to and stayed at the Union Towers Hotel. After 2
days, they transferred to the apartment of one Lito Tuazon where they spent the rest of their stay in
Bangkok. On 14 March 1990, Immaculata, Gomez and Aya Yupangco left Bangkok and boarded
Manila-bound flight PR-731. Immaculata and Yupangco occupied seats 2A and No. 54D. Gomez
was on the same flight. He checked-in two golfbags, and he was issued interline claim tags PR
77-28-71 and 77-28-72. In Manila, Gomez deposited the two golfbags with the interline baggage
room for his connecting flight from Manila to San Francisco via United Airlines ("UAL") flight 058
scheduled to depart the following morning (15 March 1990). The golfbags were kept in the transit
rack baggage along with other pieces of luggage destined for San Francisco via the UAL flight.
Well before flight time on 15 March 1990, Romeo Dumag, a customs policeman at the Ninoy
Aquino International Airport ("NAIA"), was requested by Customs Collector Edgardo de Leon to
help facilitate the checking-in of Eduardo Gomez. Dumag sought from his security officer, a certain
Capt. Reyes, the latter's permission. Having received the go-signal, Dumag accepted from De Leon
the ticket and passport of Gomez. Dumag proceeded to the UAL check-in counter. The airline's lady
staff, Annabelle Lumba, directed Dumag to first claim the passenger's items to be checked-in at the
interline baggage room. At the interline baggage room, Dumag spoke to Michael Angelo Benipayo,
a PAL employee assigned at the NAIA central baggage division and baggage handling section, and
presented the two claim tags of Gomez together with the latter's passport and plane ticket.
Convinced that Dumag had been duly authorized to retrieve the baggage, Benipayo released, upon
the approval of a customs examiner named Nick, the two golfbags wrapped in blue cloth. To
acknowledge the release, Dumag affixed his signature to the "unclaimed baggage/transit list." PAL
loader Edgardo Villafuerte helped carry the golfbags to the UAL check-in counter. Annabelle
Lumba attached a San Francisco laser tag (UA Tag 594513 and Tag 594514) and wrote the name
"Gomez" on each side of the golfbags. She then handed to Dumag the boarding pass and UAL plane
ticket for Gomez. Dumag proceeded to Patio Manila, a restaurant at the NAIA, where he turned
over to Collector De Leon the travel papers of Gomez. Gomez failed to board the UAL flight. The
two golfbags were off-loaded from the aircraft. At around 4:00 p.m., PAL staff Dennis Mendoza
brought the golfbags back to the check-in counter for a security check- up. The x-ray machine
showed unidentified dark masses. Alarmed, Mendoza immediately relayed the information to Capt.
Ephraim Sindico of the 801st Aviation Security Squadron of the Philippine Air Force Security
Command ("PAFSECOM") then deployed at the NAIA. Capt. Sindico rushed to the check-in area.
He instructed his men to get the golfbags pass through the x-ray machine once again. Satisfied that
something was indeed wrong, Capt. Sindico reported the matter to Col. Claudio Cruz who ordered
his men to have the golfbags go, for the third time, through the x-ray machine. The unidentified
dark masses having been definitely confirmed, Col. Cruz ordered his men to open the glued bottom
zipper of the golfbags. The golfbags yielded 31 single packs, each with an approximate size of 1" x
6" x 4," containing a white powder substance suspected to be "heroin" with a total weight of
20.1159 kilograms. The examination by the PAFSECOM personnel was witnessed by the NAIA
manager, a representative of the UAL and other customs personnel. Eduardo Gomez, a bartender,
and Felipe Immaculata, a former bus driver, were implicated in the crime of transporting 20
kilograms of heroin, estimated to be worth $40,000,000.00, contained in two golfbags. Also
charged, with having violated Section 4, Article II, in relation to Section 21, Article IV, of Republic
Act 6425 (the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972), as amended, were Aya Yupangco, Art David, Lito
Tuazon and Benito Cunanan, who all were able to evade arrest. Gomez surrendered to the officer-
in-charge of the then Clark Air Force Base in Angeles City. The OIC of Clark Air Force Base turned
over custody of Gomez to the Drug Enforcement Agency ("DEA") of the United States in Manila.
The DEA, in turn, surrendered him to the NBI. On the other hand, on 22 March 1990, David and
Immaculata left for Hongkong reportedly to get some spare parts for David's Mercedes Benz car. In
Hongkong, after buying the car spare parts, David and Immaculata went to the U.S. Department of
Justice in Hongkong. While waiting for David, Immaculata was confronted by a group of people,
who turned out to be from the Hongkong Immigration Office, requesting for his travel papers.
Immaculata was brought in for investigation because of an expired visa, then turned over to the
police authorities and finally to the court which decreed his imprisonment. In the Hongkong prison,
Immaculata was visited by NBI agents for his implication in the "heroin" case. He denied the
accusation. Later, he agreed, without the assistance of counsel, to execute a sworn statement at the
Stanley Prison. After his prison term, Immaculata was deported to Manila. Gomez and Immaculata
entered a plea of "not guilty" to the accusation. After trial, Gomez and Immaculata were each meted
the penalty of reclusion perpetua and ordered to pay a P20,000.00 fine by the Regional Trial Court
of Pasay City, Branch 113 (Criminal Case 90-4717). While Gomez and Immaculata filed separate
notices of appeal to the Supreme Court from their conviction, only Immaculata, however, filed his
brief. Gomez, assisted by counsel, filed a "manifestation of withdrawal of appeal" to which the
Solicitor General interposed no objection. The Court would only thus consider the appeal of
Immaculata.

Issue: WhetherImmaculatas uncounselled statement made in Stanley Prison in Hongkong is

admissible as evidence in the Philippines.

Held: While the sworn statement taken from Immaculata by an NBI agent at the Stanley Prison in
Hongkong during his incarceration was not made the basis for Immaculata's conviction by the court,
a word could be said about the manner in which it was procured. It would seem that Immaculata
was merely apprised in general terms of his constitutional rights to counsel and to remain silent. He
then was asked if he would be willing to give a statement. Having answered in the affirmative, the
NBI investigating agent asked him whether he needed a lawyer. After that response, the
investigation forthwith proceeded. This procedure hardly was in compliance with Section 12(1),
Article III, of the Constitution which requires the assistance of counsel to a person under custody
even when he waives the right to counsel. It is immaterial that the sworn statement was executed in
a foreign land. Immaculata, a Filipino citizen, should enjoy these constitutional rights, like anyone
else, even when abroad.

260 Illinois vs. Perkins [496 US 292, 4 June 1990]

Kennedy (J)

Facts: In November 1984, Richard Stephenson was murdered in a suburb of East St. Louis, Illinois.
The murder remained unsolved until March 1986, when one Donald Charlton told police that he had
learned about a homicide from a fellow inmate at the Graham Correctional Facility, where Charlton
had been serving a sentence for burglary. The fellow inmate was Lloyd Perkins. Charlton told police
that, while at Graham, he had befriended Perkins, who told him in detail about a murder that
Perkins had committed in East St. Louis. On hearing Charlton's account, the police recognized
details of the Stephenson murder that were not well known, and so they treated Charlton's story as a
credible one. By the time the police heard Charlton's account, Perkins had been released from
Graham, but police traced him to a jail in Montgomery County, Illinois, where he was being held
pending trial on a charge of aggravated battery, unrelated to the Stephenson murder. The police
wanted to investigate further Perkins' connection to the Stephenson murder, but feared that the use
of an eavesdropping device would prove impracticable and unsafe. They decided instead to place an
undercover agent in the cellblock with Perkins and Charlton. The plan was for Charlton and
undercover agent John Parisi to pose as escapees from a work release program who had been
arrested in the course of a burglary. Parisi and Charlton were instructed to engage Perkins in casual
conversation and report anything he said about the Stephenson murder. Parisi, using the alias "Vito
Bianco," and Charlton, both clothed in jail garb, were placed in the cellblock with Perkins at the
Montgomery County jail. The cellblock consisted of 12 separate cells that opened onto a common
room. Perkins greeted Charlton who, after a brief conversation with Perkins, introduced Parisi by
his alias. Parisi told Perkins that he "wasn't going to do any more time" and suggested that the three
of them escape. Perkins replied that the Montgomery County jail was "rinky-dink" and that they
could "break out." The trio met in Perkins' cell later that evening, after the other inmates were
asleep, to refine their plan. Perkins said that his girlfriend could smuggle in a pistol. Charlton said:
"Hey, I'm not a murderer, I'm a burglar. That's your guys' profession." After telling Charlton that he
would be responsible for any murder that occurred, Parisi asked Perkins if he had ever "done"
anybody. Perkins said that he had and proceeded to describe at length the events of the Stephenson
murder. Parisi and Perkins then engaged in some casual conversation before Perkins went to sleep.
Parisi did not give Perkins Miranda warnings before the conversations. Perkins was charged with
the Stephenson murder. Before trial, he moved to suppress the statements made to Parisi in the jail.
The trial court granted the motion to suppress, and the State appealed. The Appellate Court of
Illinois affirmed, holding that Miranda v. Arizona (384 U.S. 436 [1966]), prohibits all undercover
contacts with incarcerated suspects that are reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response.
Issue: Whether strategic deception may be employed by law enforcers to solicit confessions from
suspects, such as the deployment of an undercover agent posing as an inmate, and without the need
to give Miranda warnings.

Held: Conversations between suspects and undercover agents do not implicate the concerns
underlying Miranda. The essential ingredients of a "police-dominated atmosphere" and compulsion
are not present when an incarcerated person speaks freely to someone whom he believes to be a
fellow inmate. Miranda forbids coercion, not mere strategic deception by taking advantage of a
suspect's misplaced trust in one he supposes to be a fellow prisoner. As recognized in Miranda:
"Confessions remain a proper element in law enforcement. Any statement given freely and
voluntarily without any compelling influences is, of course, admissible in evidence." Ploys to
mislead a suspect or lull him into a false sense of security that do not rise to the level of compulsion
or coercion to speak are not within Miranda's concerns. Miranda was not meant to protect suspects
from boasting about their criminal activities in front of persons whom they believe to be their
cellmates. Herein, Perkins had no reason to feel that undercover agent Parisi had any legal authority
to force him to answer questions or that Parisi could affect Perkins' future treatment. Perkins viewed
the cellmate- agent as an equal and showed no hint of being intimidated by the atmosphere of the
jail. In recounting the details of the Stephenson murder, Perkins was motivated solely by the desire
to impress his fellow inmates. He spoke at his own peril. The tactic employed here to elicit a
voluntary confession from a suspect does not violate the Self-Incrimination Clause. As held in
Hoffa v. United States (385 US 293 [1966]), that placing an undercover agent near a suspect in
order to gather incriminating information was permissible under the Fifth Amendment. The only
difference between the present case and Hoffa is that the suspect here was incarcerated, but
detention, whether or not for the crime in question, does not warrant a presumption that the use of
an undercover agent to speak with an incarcerated suspect makes any confession thus obtained
involuntary. Law enforcement officers will have little difficulty putting into practice the Court's
holding that undercover agents need not give Miranda warnings to incarcerated suspects. The use of
undercover agents is a recognized law enforcement technique, often employed in the prison context
to detect violence against correctional officials or inmates, as well as for the purposes served here.
The interests protected by Miranda are not implicated in these cases, and the warnings are not
required to safeguard the constitutional rights of inmates who make voluntary statements to
undercover agents.

261 People vs. Lugod [GR 136253, 21 February 2001]

En Banc, Gonzaga-Reyes (J): 14 concur

Facts: On 15 September 1997 at around 7:00 p.m., Helen Ramos was asleep in her house together
with her husband (Danilo Ramos) and children, Nimrod, Neres and Nairube, the victim. Nairube
slept close to her "on the upper part" of her body. At around 12:30 a.m., her husband woke her up
because he sensed someone going down the stairs of their house. She noticed that Nairube was no
longer in the place where she was sleeping but she assumed that Nairube merely answered the call
of nature. Nairube's blanket was also no longer at the place she slept but that her slippers were still
there. After three minutes of waiting for Nairube's return, she stood up and began calling out for
Nairube but there was no answer. Thereafter, she went downstairs and saw that the backdoor of their
house was open. She went outside through the backdoor to see if Nairube was there but she was not.
She found a pair of rubber slippers on top of a wooden bench outside of her backdoor. The sole of
the slippers was red while the strap was a combination of yellow and white; said slippers did not
belong to any member of her family. Thereafter, she proceeded to the house of Alma Diaz to ask her
for help. Then, in the morning of 16 September 1997, she went to the police station to report the
loss of her child. She also reported the discovery of the pair of slippers to SP02 Quirino Gallardo.
She then went home while the police began their search for Nairube. At around 12:30 p.m., Alma
Diaz requested her to go with the searching team. During the search, Alma Diaz found a panty
which she recognized as that of her daughter. After seeing the panty, she cried. She was thereafter
ordered to go home while the others continued the search. Thereafter, they continued the search and
found a black collared T-shirt with buttons in front and piping at the end of the sleeve hanging on a
guava twig. Alma Diaz gave the shirt to SP02 Gallardo. Loreto Veloria informed him that the two
items were worn by Clemente John Lugod when he went to the house of Violeta Cabuhat. At around
7:00 p.m., SP02 Gallardo apprehended Lugod on the basis of the pair of slippers and the black T-
shirt. He then brought Lugod to the police station where he was temporarily incarcerated. At first,
the accused denied that he did anything to Nairube but after he told him what happened to the girl.
Later, although he admitted to having raped and killed Nairube, Lugud refused to make a statement
regarding the same. After having been informed that the body of Nairube was in the grassy area,
Gallardo together with other members of the PNP, the Crime Watch and the townspeople continued
the search but they were still not able to find the body of Nairube. It was only when they brought
Lugod to Villa Anastacia to point out the location of the cadaver, on 18 September 1997, that they
found the body of Nairube. On 19 September 1997, at around 3:30 p.m., Floro Esguerra, the Vice-
Mayor of Cavinti attended the funeral of Nairube. After the funeral, he visited the accused in his
cell. In the course of his conversation with Lugod, Lugod allegedly confessed to the commission of
the offense. On 10 October 1997, Lugod was charged for rape with homicide. Upon arraignment,
Lugod with the assistance of counsel entered a plea of not guilty. Thereafter, trial ensued. On 8
October 1998, the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Santa Cruz, Laguna found Lugod guilty beyond
reasonable doubt, sentenced him to death, and ordered him to indemnify the heirs of the victim,
Nairube Ramos the sum of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity for her death and P37,200.00 as actual
damages. Hence, the automatic review.

Issue: Whether Lugods alleged confession to the Mayor and Vice-Mayor of Cavanti can be used
against him.

Held: The records do not support the confession allegedly made by Lugod to the Mayor and Vice-
Mayor of Cavinti. Records show that the Mayor of Cavinti did not testify in the criminal trial.
Moreover, the testimony of the Vice-Mayor with respect to the alleged confession made by Lugod is
not conclusive. From the testimony of the Vice-Mayor, Lugod merely responded to the ambiguous
questions that the Vice-Mayor propounded to him. He did not state in certain and categorical terms
that he raped and killed Nairube. In fact, the Vice-Mayor admitted that Lugod did not tell him that
he raped and killed Nairube. In addition, the Court notes the contradiction between the testimony of
the Vice-Mayor who stated that he was alone when he spoke to Lugod and that of SPO2 Gallardo
who claimed that he was present when Lugod confessed to the Mayor and Vice-Mayor. Considering
that the confession of Lugod cannot be used against him, the only remaining evidence which was
established by the prosecution are circumstantial in nature. The circumstances, taken with the
testimonies of the other prosecution witnesses, merely establish Lugod's whereabouts on that fateful
evening and places Lugod at the scene of the crime and nothing more. The evidence of the
prosecution does not provide a link which would enable the Court to conclude that he in fact killed
and raped Nairube.

262 People vs. Luvendino [GR 69971, 3 July 1992]

Second Division, Feliciano (J): 10 concur

Facts: On the morning of 17 January 1983, 18-year old Rowena Capcap left her home at Deva
Village, Tambak, Taguig, Metro Manila to attend classes at the University of Manila where she was
a sophomore commerce student. She would usually be home by 7:30 to 8:00 on school evenings,
but on that tragic day, she would not reach home alive. On that particular evening, her father Panfilo
Capcap arriving home from work at around 7:30 p.m., noted her absence and was told by his wife
and other children that Rowena was not yet home from school. Later, a younger brother of Rowena,
sent on an errand, arrived home carrying Rowena's bag which he had found dropped in the middle
of a street in the village. Panfilo Capcap lost no time in seeking the help of the barangay captain of
Hagonoy, Taguig. Not being satisfied with the latter's promise to send for a "tanod" to help locate
his missing daughter, Panfilo went to the Taguig Police Station to report his daughter as missing.
The desk officer there advised him that a search party would be mounted presently. Panfilo returned
home and, with the help of some neighbors, launched a search party for the missing Rowena. The
search ended in a grassy vacant lot within the Deva Village Subdivision, only about 70 to 80 meters
from the Capcap residence, where lay the apparently lifeless body of Rowena, her pants pulled
down to her knees and her blouse rolled up to her breasts. Her underwear was blood-stained and
there were bloody fingerprint marks on her neck. Rowena, her body still warm, was rushed to a
hospital in Taguig, where on arrival she was pronounced dead. The autopsy report stated that the
multiple injuries indicated the victim had struggled vigorously with her attacker(s); that the
presence of spermatozoa showed that the victim had sexual intercourse prior to death; and that
death was due to asphyxia by manual strangulation. By 5 March 1984, an information had been
filed in the trial court charging Ernesto C. Luvendino, Cesar Borca alias "Cesar Putol" and Ricardo
de Guzman alias "Ric" with the crime of rape with murder. Warrants of arrest were issued against
all the accused but only Ernesto Luvendino was actually apprehended; the other 2 have remained at
large. It appears that Luvendino re-enacted the events that transpired in the evening of January 17 at
the crime scene, where pictures were taken by a photographer brought by the police officers. In the
course of the demonstration, Luvendino allegedly remarked: "Inaamin ko po na kasama ko si Cesar
Borca sa pag re-rape kay Rowena." At arraignment, Luvendino assisted by his counsel, Atty. Luisito
Sardillo, pleaded not guilty and then proceeded to trial. On 12 December 1984, the trial court
rendered a decision finding Luvendino guilty, sentencing him to death, and requiring him to
indemnify the heirs of the victim Rowena in the amount of P50,000.00 for the damages suffered as
a result of her death.

Issue: Whether Luvendinos re-enactment of the crime may be admitted as evidence against the
accused.

Held: The trial court took into account the testimony given by Panfilo Capcap on what had occurred
during the re-enactment of the crime by Luvendino. The re-enactment was apparently staged
promptly upon apprehension of Luvendino and even prior to his formal investigation at the police
station. The decision of the trial court found that the accused was informed of his constitutional
rights "before he was investigated by Sgt. Galang in the police headquarters" and cited the
"Salaysay" of appellant Luvendino. The decision itself, however, states that the re-enactment took
place before Luvendino was brought to the police station. Thus, it is not clear from the record that
before the re-enactment was staged by Luvendino, he had been informed of his constitutional rights
including, specifically, his right to counsel and that he had waived such right before proceeding with
the demonstration. Under these circumstances, the Court must decline to uphold the admissibility of
evidence relating to that re-enactment.

263 People vs. Alicando [GR 117487, 12 December 1995]

En Banc, Puno (J): 9 concur

Facts: In the afternoon of 12 June 1994, Romeo Penecilla, father of the four year old victim Khazie
Mae, was drinking liquor with Ramil Rodriguez and Remus Gaddi in his (Penecilla's) house at
Barangay Rizal, Zone 1, Pulo Bala, Iloilo. Arnel Alicando y Briones joined them but every now and
then would take leave and return. Alicando was living in his uncle's house some 5 arm's length from
Penecilla's house. At about 4:30 p.m., Penecilla's group stopped drinking and left. At about 5:30
p.m. of that day, Luisa Rebada saw the victim at the window of Alicando's house. She offered to
buy her "yemas" but Alicando closed the window. Soon she heard the victim crying. She
approached Alicando's house and peeped through an opening between its floor and door. The sight
shocked her Alicando was naked, on top of the victim, his left hand choking her neck. She
retreated to her house in fright. She gathered her children together and informed her compadre,
Ricardo Lagrana, then in her house, about what she saw. Lagrana was also overcome with fear and
hastily left. Romeo Penecilla returned to his house at 8:00 p.m.. He did not find Khazie Mae. He
and his wife searched for her until 1:00 a.m. Their effort was fruitless. Rebada was aware that the
Penecillas were looking for their daughter but did not tell them what she knew. Instead, Rebada
called out Alicando from her window and asked him the time Khazie Mae left his house. Alicando
replied he was drunk and did not know. As the sun started to rise, another neighbor, Leopoldo
Santiago went down from his house to answer the call of nature. He discovered the lifeless body of
Khazie Mae under his house. Her parents were informed and so was the police. At 9:00 a.m.,
Rebada suffered a change of heart. She informed Romeo Penecilla and his wife Julie Ann, that
Alicando committed the crime. Forthwith, Alicando was arrested and interrogated by P03 Danilo
Tan. He verbally confessed his guilt without the assistance of counsel. On the basis of his
uncounseled verbal confession and follow up interrogations, the police came to know and recovered
from Alicando's house, Khazie Mae's green slippers, a pair of gold earrings, a buri mat, a stained
pillow and a stained T-shirt. Alicando was charged with the crime of rape with homicide. On 29
June 1994, Alicando was arraigned with the assistance of Atty. Rogelio Antiquiera of the PAO,
Department of Justice. Alicando pleaded guilty. After Alicando's plea of guilt, the trial court ordered
the prosecution to present its evidence. It also set the case for reception of evidence for Alicando, if
he so desired. On 20 July 1994, the trial court found Alicando guilty and sentenced him to death,
and to indemnify the heirs of the offended party, Khazie Mae D. Penecilla, the sum of P50,000.00.
Hence, the automatic review.

Issue: Whether the pillow and the T-shirt with the alleged bloodstains, evidence derived from the
uncounselled confession illegally extracted by the police from Alicando, may be admitted as
evidence.

Held: It is now familiar learning that the Constitution has stigmatized as inadmissible evidence
uncounselled confession or admission. Section 12 paragraphs (1) and (3) of Article III of the
Constitution provide that "Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall
have the right to be informed of his right to remain silent and to have competent and independent
counsel preferably of his own choice. If the person cannot afford the services of counsel, he must be
provided with one. These rights cannot be waived except in writing and in the presence of counsel";
and "Any confession or admission obtained in violation of this or the preceding section shall be
inadmissible against him"; respectively. Herein, PO3 Tan did not even have the simple sense to
reduce the all important confession of Alicando in writing. Neither did he present any writing
showing that Alicando waived his right to silence and to have competent and independent counsel.
It is not only the uncounselled confession that is condemned as inadmissible, but also evidence
derived therefrom. The pillow and the T-shirt with the alleged bloodstains were evidence derived
from the uncounselled confession illegally extracted by the police from Alicando. The Court has not
only constitutionalized the Miranda warnings in Philippine jurisdiction. It has also adopted the
libertarian exclusionary rule known as the "fruit of the poisonous tree," a phrase minted by Mr.
Justice Felix Frankfurter in the celebrated case of Nardone v. United States. According to this rule,
once the primary source (the "tree") is shown to have been unlawfully obtained, any secondary or
derivative evidence (the "fruit") derived from it is also inadmissible. Stated otherwise, illegally
seized evidence is obtained as a direct result of the illegal act, whereas the "fruit of the poisonous
tree" is the indirect result of the same illegal act. The "fruit of the poisonous tree" is at least once
removed from the illegally seized evidence, but it is equally inadmissible. The rule is based on the
principle that evidence illegally obtained by the State should not be used to gain other evidence
because the originally illegally obtained evidence taints all evidence subsequently obtained. The
burden to prove that an accused waived his right to remain silent and the right to counsel before
making a confession under custodial interrogation rests with the prosecution. It is also the burden of
the prosecution to show that the evidence derived from confession is not tainted as "fruit of the
poisonous tree." The burden has to be discharged by clear and convincing evidence.

264 Harris vs. New York [401 US 222, 24 February 1971]

Burger (CJ)

Facts: The State of New York charged Harris in a two-count indictment with twice selling heroin to
an undercover police officer. At a subsequent jury trial the officer was the State's chief witness, and
he testified as to details of the two sales. A second officer verified collateral details of the sales, and
a third offered testimony about the chemical analysis of the heroin. Harris took the stand in his own
defense. He admitted knowing the undercover police officer but denied a sale on 4 January 1966.
He admitted making a sale of contents of a glassine bag to the officer on January 6 but claimed it
was baking powder and part of a scheme to defraud the purchaser. On cross-examination, Harris
was asked seriatim whether he had made specified statements to the police immediately following
his arrest on January 7 - statements that partially contradicted his direct testimony at trial. In
response to the cross-examination, Harris testified that he could not remember virtually any of the
questions or answers recited by the prosecutor. At the request of Harris' counsel the written
statement from which the prosecutor had read questions and answers in his impeaching process was
placed in the record for possible use on appeal; the statement was not shown to the jury. The trial
judge instructed the jury that the statements attributed to Harris by the prosecution could be
considered only in passing on Harris' credibility and not as evidence of guilt. In closing summations
both counsel argued the substance of the impeaching statements. The jury then found Harris guilty
on the second count of the indictment. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed in a per curiam
opinion.

Issue: Whether the statements made by the accused after his arrest should be absolutely excluded,
or whether such statements can be used to impeach the accused who acted as his own witness.

Held: Some comments in the Miranda opinion can indeed be read as indicating a bar to use of an
uncounseled statement for any purpose, but discussion of that issue was not at all necessary to the
Court's holding and cannot be regarded as controlling. Miranda barred the prosecution from making
its case with statements of an accused made while in custody prior to having or effectively waiving
counsel. It does not follow from Miranda that evidence inadmissible against an accused in the
prosecution's case in chief is barred for all purposes, provided of course that the trustworthiness of
the evidence satisfies legal standards. In Walder v. United States (347 US 62 [1954]), the Court
permitted physical evidence, inadmissible in the case in chief, to be used for impeachment
purposes. It is true that Walder was impeached as to collateral matters included in his direct
examination, whereas Harris here was impeached as to testimony bearing more directly on the
crimes charged. There is no difference in principle that warrants a result different from that reached
by the Court in Walder. Harris' testimony in his own behalf concerning the events of January 7
contrasted sharply with what he told the police shortly after his arrest. The impeachment process
here undoubtedly provided valuable aid to the jury in assessing Harris' credibility, and the benefits
of this process should not be lost because of the speculative possibility that impermissible police
conduct will be encouraged thereby. Assuming that the exclusionary rule has a deterrent effect on
proscribed police conduct, sufficient deterrence flows when the evidence in question is made
unavailable to the prosecution in its case in chief. The shield provided by Miranda cannot be
perverted into a license to use perjury by way of a defense, free from the risk of confrontation with
prior inconsistent utterances. The Court holds, therefore, that Harris' credibility was appropriately
impeached by use of his earlier conflicting statements.

265 New York vs. Quarles [467 US 649, 12 June 1984]

Rehnquist (J)

Facts: On 11 September 1980, at approximately 12:30 a. m., Officer Frank Kraft and Officer Sal
Scarring were on road patrol in Queens, New York, when a young woman approached their car. She
told them that she had just been raped by a black male, approximately six feet tall, who was wearing
a black jacket with the name "Big Ben" printed in yellow letters on the back. She told the officers
that the man had just entered an A & P supermarket located nearby and that the man was carrying a
gun. The officers drove the woman to the supermarket, and Officer Kraft entered the store while
Officer Scarring radioed for assistance. Officer Kraft quickly spotted Quarles, who matched the
description given by the woman, approaching a checkout counter. Apparently upon seeing the
officer, Quarles turned and ran toward the rear of the store, and Officer Kraft pursued him with a
drawn gun. When Quarles turned the corner at the end of an aisle, Officer Kraft lost sight of him for
several seconds, and upon regaining sight of Quarles, ordered him to stop and put his hands over his
head. Although more than three other officers had arrived on the scene by that time, Officer Kraft
was the first to reach Quarles. He frisked him and discovered that he was wearing a shoulder holster
which was then empty. After handcuffing him, Officer Kraft asked him where the gun was. Quarles
nodded in the direction of some empty cartons and responded, "the gun is over there." Officer Kraft
thereafter retrieved a loaded .38- caliber revolver from one of the cartons, formally placed Quarles
under arrest, and read him his Miranda rights from a printed card. Quarles indicated that he would
be willing to answer questions without an attorney present. Officer Kraft then asked Quarles if he
owned the gun and where he had purchased it. Quarles answered that he did own it and that he had
purchased it in Miami, Florida. Benjamin Quarles was charged in the New York trial court with
criminal possession of a weapon. The trial court suppressed the gun in question, and a statement
made by Quarles, because the statement was obtained by police before they read Quarles his
"Miranda rights." That ruling was affirmed on appeal through the New York Court of Appeals.

Issue: Whether the statement, "the gun is over there," and the gun itself should be excluded as
evidence in light of the officer's failure to read Quarles his Miranda rights before attempting to
locate the weapon.

Held: There is a "public safety" exception to the requirement that Miranda warnings be given
before a suspect's answers may be admitted into evidence, and that the availability of that exception
does not depend upon the motivation of the individual officers involved. In a kaleidoscopic situation
such as the one confronting these officers, where spontaneity rather than adherence to a police
manual is necessarily the order of the day, the application of the exception which the Court
recognizes should not be made to depend on post hoc findings at a suppression hearing concerning
the subjective motivation of the arresting officer. Undoubtedly most police officers, if placed in
Officer Kraft's position, would act out of a host of different, instinctive, and largely unverifiable
motives -- their own safety, the safety of others, and perhaps as well the desire to obtain
incriminating evidence from the suspect. Whatever the motivation of individual officers in such a
situation, the Court does not believe that the doctrinal underpinnings of Miranda require that it be
applied in all its rigor to a situation in which police officers ask questions reasonably prompted by a
concern for the public safety. The Miranda decision was based in large part on the Court's view that
the warnings which it required police to give to suspects in custody would reduce the likelihood that
the suspects would fall victim to constitutionally impermissible practices of police interrogation in
the presumptively coercive environment of the station house. The police herein, in the very act of
apprehending a suspect, were confronted with the immediate necessity of ascertaining the
whereabouts of a gun which they had every reason to believe the suspect had just removed from his
empty holster and discarded in the supermarket. So long as the gun was concealed somewhere in
the supermarket, with its actual whereabouts unknown, it obviously posed more than one danger to
the public safety: an accomplice might make use of it, a customer or employee might later come
upon it. In such a situation, if the police are required to recite the familiar Miranda warnings before
asking the whereabouts of the gun, suspects in Quarles' position might well be deterred from
responding. Procedural safeguards which deter a suspect from responding were deemed acceptable
in Miranda in order to protect the Fifth Amendment privilege; when the primary social cost of those
added protections is the possibility of fewer convictions, the Miranda majority was willing to bear
that cost. Here, had Miranda warnings deterred Quarles from responding to Officer Kraft's question
about the whereabouts of the gun, the cost would have been something more than merely the failure
to obtain evidence useful in convicting Quarles. Officer Kraft needed an answer to his question not
simply to make his case against Quarles but to insure that further danger to the public did not result
from the concealment of the gun in a public area. Thus, the need for answers to questions in a
situation posing a threat to the public safety outweighs the need for the prophylactic rule protecting
the Fifth Amendment's privilege against self- incrimination. The Court declines to place officers
such as Officer Kraft in the untenable position of having to consider, often in a matter of seconds,
whether it best serves society for them to ask the necessary questions without the Miranda warnings
and render whatever probative evidence they uncover inadmissible, or for them to give the warnings
in order to preserve the admissibility of evidence they might uncover but possibly damage or
destroy their ability to obtain that evidence and neutralize the volatile situation confronting them.
Here, Officer Kraft asked only the question necessary to locate the missing gun before advising
Quarles of his rights. It was only after securing the loaded revolver and giving the warnings that he
continued with investigatory questions about the ownership and place of purchase of the gun. The
exception which the Court recognizes, far from complicating the thought processes and the on-the-
scene judgments of police officers, will simply free them to follow their legitimate instincts when
confronting situations presenting a danger to the public safety. The Court hold that the Court of
Appeals erred in excluding the statement, "the gun is over there," and the gun because of the
officer's failure to read Quarles his Miranda rights before attempting to locate the weapon.