Studies in History and Philosophy of Science xxx (2017) 1e11

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Studies in History and Philosophy of Science

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Was Feyerabend an anarchist? The structure(s) of anything goes

Jamie Shaw*
Rotman Institute of Philosophy, University of Western Ontario, Canada

a r t i c l e i n f o a b s t r a c t

Article history: The near consensus in the secondary literature on Feyerabend is that his epistemological anarchism,
Received 22 February 2017 characterized by the slogan anything goes, was not a positive proposal but the conclusion of a reductio
Received in revised form argument against his opponents (Lloyd 1997; Staley 1999; Munvar 2000; Farrell 2003; Tsou 2003;
17 May 2017
Oberheim 2006; Roe 2009). This makes anarchism a mere criticism rather than a substantive position in
Available online xxx
its own right. In this paper, I argue that Feyerabend held anarchism as a positive thesis. Specically, I
present two possible interpretations of anarchism: one where anarchism is entailed by Feyerabends
radical view of pluralism and another where scientists must be methodological opportunists, which
Feyerabend held simultaneously from at least 1970. I then consider how these positions fare against the
more inuential criticisms of anarchism (Nagel 1977; Worrall 1978; Godfrey-Smith 2003). I conclude by
suggesting two avenues to constraining a literal interpretation of anything goes on Feyerabendian
grounds.
Crown Copyright 2017 Published by Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

Anything goes, the central slogan of Paul Feyerabends episte-
mological anarchism, is perhaps the most notorious phrase in 20th-
century philosophy of science. Since it rst appeared in 1970, it has
provoked a largely critical response. Inuential commentators have
called this view inapplicable (Agassi, 2014), nonsensical (Nagel,
1977), difcult to take seriously (Worrall, 1978), and even
completely absurd (Bernstein, 2011). Recently, more charitable
commentators have argued that anything goes does not represent
Feyerabends view but was the conclusion of a reductio ad
absurdum. Thus, the absurdity of anything goes, these commen-
tators argue, should not be attributed to Feyerabends own position.
In this paper, I argue that this interpretation has weak textual
support and that there is ample evidence to support the interpre-
tation that anything goes does represent Feyerabends positive
philosophy. Specically, I argue that anything goes can be inter-
preted as a consequence of Feyerabends principles of tenacity and
proliferation, or as an unrestrained methodological opportunism.
By settling how anything goes is to be interpreted, I hope to
contribute to a better understanding of Feyerabends views and
resuscitate a seemingly ridiculous view into one that is potentially
plausible.
* Rotman Institute of Philosophy, Western University, Stevenson Hall 2150,
London, ON, N6A 5B8, Canada.
E-mail address: Jshaw222@uwo.ca.
In section,1 I summarize and clarify the reductio reading of
anything goes and its purported implications. In section 2, I outline
two distinct readings of anything goes. The third section defends
Feyerabend against inuential criticisms. The nal section claries
the anything goes thesis and suggests that it shouldnt be under-
stood at face value. Instead, it can be understood as constrained in
two important ways.
1. The reductio reading
The view that anything goes does not represent a positive thesis,
what I will call the reductio reading, has reached a near consensus in
the secondary literature (Farrell, 2003; Lloyd, 1997; Munvar, 2000;
Oberheim, 2006; Roe, 2009; Staley, 1999; Tsou, 2003).1 This section
outlines, reformulates, and evaluates the reductio reading.
Eric Oberheim argues that anything goes2 is not a positive
proposal for scientic methodology but an immanent criticism
1
The only exception to this trend I am aware of is Margolis (1991) who is cited
once, by Oberheim, en passant.
2
Oberheim actually claims, even more boldly, that [e]very major publication
between the 1950s and the 1970s is explicitly a critique of some existing position
(Oberheim, 2006, p. 12).

http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.shpsa.2017.06.002
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Please cite this article in press as: Shaw, J., Was Feyerabend an anarchist? The structure(s) of anything goes, Studies in History and Philosophy of
Science (2017), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.shpsa.2017.06.002
2 J. Shaw / Studies in History and Philosophy of Science xxx (2017) 1e11
dened as an argument that accept certain components of some
position in order to undermine that position (Oberheim, 2006, p.
12).3 He states this quite bluntly:
As many have already pointed out, Feyerabend was not sug-
gesting that anything actually goes. He was making an imma-
nent criticism. According to Feyerabend, on the view that there
are methodological principles that are universally valid, the only
one will be that Anything goes (33).
He offers the following textual support for this interpretation:
Some of my friends have chided me for elevating a statement
such as anything goes into a fundamental principle of epis-
temology. They did not notice that I was joking . Now there
are some people who will accept an epistemology only if it has
some stability, or rationality as they are pleased to express
themselves. Well, they can have such an epistemology, and
anything goes will be its only principle (Feyerabend, 1970b;
fn. 38 150).
always remember that the demonstration and the rhetoric used
do not express any deep convictions of mine. They merely show
how easy it is to lead people by the nose in a rational way
(Feyerabend, 1975a, 32).
In Science in a Free Society, Feyerabend writes:
anything goes does not express any conviction of mine, it is a
jocular summary of the predicament of the rationalist: if you
want universal standards, I say, if you cannot live without
principles that hold independently of situation, shape of world,
exigencies of research, temperamental peculiarities, then I can
give you such a principle. It will be empty, useless, and pretty
ridiculous - but it will be a principle. It will be the principle
anything goes (Feyerabend, 1978, 188).
In the preface to the 4th edition of Against Method (AM),4 he
writes:
anything goes is not a principle I hold . but the terried
exclamation of the rationalist who takes a closer look at history
(Feyerabend, 1975a; xvii).
Feyerabend also, at multiple points, and in every edition of
AM, claims that his philosophy should be construed as a medi-
cine5 or an antithesis, suggesting anything goes doesnt
represent a position but a tactic.6 This is the primary textual
support for the view that anything goes does not represent a
positive position.
3
Oberheim uses the language of immanent criticisms and ad hominem
interchangeably in his book. These terms are compatible with Farrells reductio
argument.
4
For the remainder of this paper, the page numbers of AM will correspond to the
4th edition unless otherwise stated.
5
In the original version of AM, Feyerabend states that anarchism is certainly an
excellent foundation for epistemology, and for the philosophy of science (emphasis
added, Feyerabend, 1970b, p. 17). Feyerabend replaces foundation with medicine
in the rst edition of AM.
6 10
This interpretation is distinct from the reductio view. On this view, anything
goes doesnt represent anyones position. Regardless of this, both the reductio and
the medicine interpretation state that anything goes was not Feyerabends view.
Please cite this article in press as: Shaw, J., Was Feyerabend an anarchist? The structure(s) of anything goes, Studies in History and Philosophy of
Science (2017), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.shpsa.2017.06.002
Oberheim claims that this interpretation entails that many of
the criticisms of anything goes simply miss the point of the
argument. For example, some commentators (Godfrey-Smith,
2003; Worrall, 1978) argue that Feyerabend contradicts himself
by criticizing the idea of formulating rational rules and then pro-
posing a new rule, anything goes, in its place. If the reductio
reading is right, then this criticism is misguided since Feyerabend is
not proposing some new rule, but showing what is entailed by
accepting rationalism (or the view that science operates according
to some speciable rules of rationality).7 Furthermore, those who
worry about anything goes being vacuous, since it doesnt forbid
any action, are similarly mistaken since it is intentionally vacuous to
show the futility of developing universal rules of rationality. Finally,
if the reductio reading is correct, then Feyerabends positive views
(e.g., proliferation, tenacity, etc.) can only be accepted conditionally
where the antecedent is some rule of reason accepted by other
philosophers of science (e.g., falsication, empiricism, etc.)
(Oberheim, 2006, p. 214).
Chapter 1 of Farrells Feyerabend and Scientic Values: Tightrope-
Walking Rationality outlines what he takes to be the structure of
Feyerabends reductio.8 He states Feyerabend is not a committed
anarchist . [He] does not believe that the history of science is ir-
rational, in any absolute sense. What he does believe is that science
appears irrational when viewed from the perspective of certain
Rationalist philosophies (Farrell, 2003, p. 45). He summarizes the
reductio as this:
(1) If [I] adopt a set of held theses from our opponents (ratio-
nalists, falsicationists, and so on), then the judgment
arrived at while using those theses will be correct.
(2) Judgment J is accepted by my opponents as a paradigmatic
case.
(3) Therefore, judgment J should be explicable according to my
opponents theses.
(4) However, judgment J is not explicable according to my op-
ponents theses.
(5) Therefore, my opponents theses are inadequate at explain-
ing judgment J. (Farrell, 2003, p. 16).9
There are a few ambiguities here. First, falsicationism is a kind
of rationalism. Feyerabend has one opponent, rationalism, which he
believes encompasses every popular view in philosophy of science
at the time. Secondly, premise (1) could be interpreted as a tau-
tology (if we adopt a set of theses as true, then its judgments will be
true) or a conditional with no clear connection between the ante-
cedent and consequent (why does the truth of rationalist judg-
ments rely on our adoption of its position?). Finally, and most
devastatingly, the conclusion merely looks like a repetition of
premise (4). Regardless, this can be reformulated in a way that is
faithful to Farrells goals:
(1) If many progressive10 episodes of the history of science are
rational, then rationalism is true.
7
Feyerabend never provides a detailed denition of rationalism. See Farrell
(2003), pp. 7e12 for a discussion of this.
8
Oberheim does not commit himself to this exact structure of the argument.
9
Roe (2009), pp. 2e3 accepts this formulation.
Progressive would have to be understood on independent grounds or else the
argument would become a tautology. Feyerabends strategy here seems to be
providing examples that we pre-theoretically understand as progressive.
 J. Shaw / Studies in History and Philosophy of Science xxx (2017) 1e11
(2) The Copernican revolution, the Einsteinian revolution, and
the replacement of phenomenological theories of heat with
statistical mechanics (amongst others) are progressive10
episodes of science.
(3) These episodes are irrational.
(4) r Rationalism is false.
There is, however, a problem with this formulation of the
reductio; anything goes does not follow from the claim that
rationalism is false. This complaint has been made numerous times
by Feyerabends commentators (Agassi, 1976; Laudan, 1996; Nagel,
1977). Rationalism could be reformulated in various ways (e.g.,
become more context-sensitive, hold ceteris paribus clauses, etc.)
which would disbar certain practices but maintain that their
methodological rules are universal in some weaker sense. A more
acute version of the reductio Farrell is looking for can be formulated
as this:
(1) A universal theory of rationality, which provides context-
independent rules for scientic behavior, is desirable.
(2) These rules should be consistent with the history of science
(i.e. should conform to those rules followed in progressive
episodes).
(3) There is no self-consistent set of rules in the history of
science.
(4) Therefore, any universal rule should promote self-conicting
rules.
(5) The principle of explosion is true.
(6) r Anything Goes.11.12
The Rationalist has a few options here. First, she could claim
that (1) attacks a strawman. However, aside from the fact that
there is textual evidence that this accusation is historically false, if
Feyerabend is right and there are independent reasons needed to
apply rationalism, then rationalism on its own is a chimera. Sec-
ond, if rationalism is construed as a normative proposal, then (2)
could be denied, since the mere fact that history has not followed
rationalist dictums cannot contradict the claim that they should.13
This view seems deeply problematic, however, due to the shared
sentiment that the historical episodes Feyerabend reconstructs
were progressive endeavors and thus holding rules antithetical to
them would be unwise. Feyerabends plethora of case studies
suggest14 the conjecture that there is no self-consistent set of
methodological rules that the rationalist can deny by providing
historical counterevidence.15
While this argument is interesting and worthy of further dis-
cussion, I argue that it does not accurately depict Feyerabends
11
Of course, this argument could also be reconstructed as a straightforward
argument if premise (1) is abandoned due to premise (3). The fact that this is a
stretch suggests that anything goes was never intended to be a reductio.
12
This seems to be the explicit point of the distinction between the context of
discovery and context of justication (as found in Reichenbach, Popper, and Feigl);
rules of rationality have nothing to do with sociological/psychological contin-
gencies but are purely about the logical relationship between kinds of statements.
Since their purported logical relations are objective, they do not vary from context
to context. I will return to this point in section 3.
13
Feyerabend adopts this view in his critical rationalist phase (see his letters to
Kuhn in Hoyningen-Huene, 2006).
14
I say suggest instead of justify since premise (3) seems practically impossible
to establish (Feyerabend recognizes this point himself (Feyerabend, 1979, p. 203)).
Thus, Feyerabends historical examples motivate (3) but they do not fully justify it.
It is not claimed that rules or prescriptions are now derived from [historical] facts
. It is only asserted that inspection of facts educates a sensible person and makes
him aware of demands whose existence, urgency, and relevance he had not realized
before (Feyerabend, 1970a, p. 278).
15
For an example of this, see Machamer (1973) and Feyerabends response (1974).
Please cite this article in press as: Shaw, J., Was Feyerabend an anarchist? The structure(s) of anything goes, Studies in History and Philosophy of
Science (2017), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.shpsa.2017.06.002
3
views on anything goes. First, the only textual evidence to support
this reconstruction is retrospective. Feyerabend never makes it clear
that he is conducting a reductio while detailing his arguments; he
even says the opposite! The rst hint that Feyerabend is proposing
a positive thesis comes from the subtext of the title: Against
Method: Outline of an Anarchistic Theory of Knowledge, which is
littered with statements, quoted below, that suggest that he is
arguing for a positive view.16 Furthermore, there are multiple in-
stances where Feyerabend repeats the same argument for what his
real view is rather than the views attributed to him by his com-
mentators.17 At best, we have contradictory self-descriptive re-
marks about how Feyerabend should be interpreted. The following
section formulates two ways of understanding anything goes as a
positive thesis.
2. Reconstructing anything goes
This section outlines two distinct theses that support the
anything goes motto. The rst thesis, which I call the oppor-
tunist interpretation, argues that at least some portion of the
scientic community should use any rule they see t in a partic-
ular context. The second thesis, which I call the pluralist inter-
pretation, argues that anything goes is actually the conclusion of
Feyerabends endorsement of the principles of proliferation and
tenacity.
The phrase anything goes rst appears in Experts in a Free
Society (1970b).18 The primary thesis of the paper is to argue
against the view that scientists often follow unique methods that
are preferable to those of other professions and thus have expert
knowledge that should be privileged over, say, the knowledge of
craftsmen or artisans. To do this, Feyerabend engages in the (now
familiar) argument that even individual scientists, not to mention
science as a whole, do not follow any particular identiable
method. He writes:
Neither Galileo, nor Kepler, nor Newton19 use specic and well-
dened methods. They are eclectics, methodological oppor-
tunists . looking at the actual historical situation we see that
science was advanced in many different ways and that scientic
problems were attacked by many different methods. In practice
the only principle that is constantly adhered to seems to be
anything goes (Feyerabend, 1970b, 122-3).
16
In a 1984 paper, Feyerabend cites the following passage from Against Method as
an indication that he was conducting a reductio (Feyerabend, 1984, p. 128):It is clear
. that the idea of a xed method or of a xed theory of rationality, rests on too
nave a view of man and his social surroundings. To those who look at the rich
material provided to history . it will become clear that there is only one principle
that can be defended under all circumstance and in all stages of human develop-
ment. It is the principle anything goes (Feyerabend, 1975a, pp. 11-2).First, this
passage attributes anything goes to those who look at the rich material provided by
history which presumably means himself. Second, earlier on that page Feyerabend
writes my thesis is that anarchism helps to achieve progress in any one of the sense
one cares to choose (emphasis in original, 11) where the italics suggest that anar-
chism is a positive view. Feyerabends retrospective remarks, therefore, seem
incorrect.
17
See chapter 18 of the 2nd edition of AM, Feyerabend, 1977a, fn. 1 368, section 2
of 1977b, and his 1979, 202-5. Given that these self-reconstructions are written
around the same time as the reductio self-reconstructions, we cannot even say that
Feyerabend changed his views post-1975.
18
Even though this paper and the paper version of Against Method (1970c) were
published within months of each other, Against Method was written rst, in 1968
(Feyerabend, 1995, p. 139).
19
In other parts of his corpus, Feyerabend adds Mach (Feyerabend, 1970d, p. 131),
Einstein (Feyerabend, 1975a, p. 10), Bohr (Feyerabend, 1969, p. 293), and Born
(Feyerabend, 1978, p. 40 fn. 25) to this list.
4 J. Shaw / Studies in History and Philosophy of Science xxx (2017) 1e11
Later on that page, he writes that great scientists, while intui-
tively adopting a methodological opportunism, or anarchism .
(emphasis added, Feyerabend, 1970b). Here, Feyerabend straight-
forwardly equates anything goes with methodological oppor-
tunism. Before detailing this position, it should be noted that this
does not appear in any explicit reductio. The paper criticizes a thesis,
develops an alternative view of science (what he later calls a fact of
history),20 and then defends that alternative using positive
arguments.21
Not only does Feyerabend think its a fact of history that most
great scientists have been opportunists, but he thinks its eminently
reasonable that they are opportunists (Feyerabend, 1975a, pp. 14e
17). This is because scientists will nd [themselves] in a complex
historical situation and that no two individuals (no two scientists;
no two pieces of apparatus; no two situations) are ever exactly alike
and that procedures [i.e. methods] should therefore be able to vary
also (Feyerabend, 1970b, pp. 122-3). Furthermore, the psychological
conditions of a group of scientists will add or subtract resistance
from certain arguments, moves, etc. and these conditions are highly
contingent. Finally, and perhaps most importantly, the results of
methodological opportunism have been more fruitful and pro-
gressive than if we had enforced a single method consistently.
Opportunism, for Feyerabend, is the only type of behavior that has
a chance of succeeding (Feyerabend, 1970b). Furthermore, Feyer-
abend equates opportunism with anarchism in the paper and book
version22 of AM. He repeatedly and approvingly quotes Lenin and
Einsteins remarks about the need to be an unscrupulous oppor-
tunist (Feyerabend, 1975a, p. 10).23 He further writes is it not clear
that successful participation in a process of this kind is possible
only for a ruthless opportunist who is not tied to any particular
philosophy and who adopts whatever procedure seems to t the
occasion? (Feyerabend, 1975a).24 This shows that there is textual
support for Feyerabends anarchism being equated with method-
ological opportunism.25
Lets briey note some features of this opportunism. First, it
should be clear that anything goes does not apply at the local
level d only at the global level. However, these local constraints
do not add up to a kind of contextual monism or the view that
there is one correct method for a given situation.26 Pluralism, even
at the local level, is allowable (and often preferable). However, this
plurality will not be an unlimited plurality (i.e., anything goes), but
a tentatively constrained version of pluralism. Second, oppor-
tunism is extremely demanding of its users. Not only must they be
well educated about discoveries within their domain, they must be
generally knowledgeable about social affairs, philosophy, the arts,
etc. Opportunism, on this view, requires exceptional talent on
20
Feyerabend writes: This liberal practice [anarchism], I repeat, is not just a fact
of the history of science. It is both reasonable and absolutely necessary for the
growth of knowledge (italics in original, Feyerabend, 1975a, p. 14). This quote is not
an anomaly as Feyerabend repeatedly calls his historical remarks facts (cf.
Feyerabend, 1965b, pp. 167-9).
21
These arguments are that diversity is necessary for a sense of perspective
(Feyerabend, 1970b, p. 117), and that having non-experts participate in public
decision-making is compatible with democracy (125-6).
22
All four editions of AM retain these remarks amidst many edits and retractions.
23
Feyerabend uses unscrupulous opportunism interchangeably with methodo-
logical opportunism.
24
These quotes remain in each edition of AM as well.
25
See also Feyerabends remarks on pragmatic philosophy in the 2nd edition of
AM pg. 234-6.
26
Farrell attributes this view to Feyerabend. He states Poppers system, for
example, may have strengths in certain areas; empiricism may also have advan-
tages in certain contexts. Consequently, the Rationalist may pick and choose in-
dividual rational rules which have been shown to be independently efcacious
(Farrell, 2003, p. 45) (see also pg. 65e68). Roe (2009, pp. 3e4) agrees with this
interpretation.
Please cite this article in press as: Shaw, J., Was Feyerabend an anarchist? The structure(s) of anything goes, Studies in History and Philosophy of
Science (2017), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.shpsa.2017.06.002
multiple fronts. Finally, there can be degrees of correctness asso-
ciated with a particular instance of opportunism that can be
determined ahead of time. An opportunist who doesnt know the
audience, who are uneducated in the methods they are defending
or rejecting, and so forth will be an ineffective opportunist. Since
the opportunist needs some foreknowledge to ourish, a lack of
such foreknowledge can result in failure.
The pluralist interpretation states that anything goes is
entailed by the joint adoption of the principle of proliferation and
the principle of tenacity. The principle of proliferation was rst
explicitly formulated in Reply to Criticism: Comments on Smart,
Sellars and Putnam (1965a, 105) though the basic idea can be
found in his letters to Kuhn circa 1960-1 (Hoyningen-Huene,
1996). However, the earliest developed argument for pluralism
can be found in his classic Explanation, Reduction and Empiri-
cism (1962). The argument here is long and dense,27 but it can be
summarized as this: since there is no epistemic distinction be-
tween observational and theoretical statements,28 theories are
never straightforwardly compared to facts but to other theories.
As Feyerabend puts it, the methodological unit to which we refer
when discussing questions of test and empirical content consists
of a whole set of partly overlapping, factually adequate, but
mutually inconsistent theories (Feyerabend, 1962, p. 72). From
this, Feyerabend argues the best way to maximize the testability of
a theory, in some cases, is to invent and use an incommensurable
theory to unearth facts to test theories (cf. Bschir 2015). His fa-
vorite example is Brownian motion, which only became a direct
refutation of the second law of thermodynamics after the advent
of Einsteins statistical theory of heat and its subsequent conr-
mation by Perrin.29
Here, pluralism of a particular kind is justied only in specic
contexts. The alternative must be independently conrmed and
comparison can only take place when both theories are sufciently
well articulated that they can be formulated as a set of propositions.
Also, this only justies a theoretical pluralism (and a narrow view
about what counts as a theory)30 as opposed to a pluralism of
methods, perspectives, etc. If this argument were successful, it still
wouldnt provide a general argument for pluralism or a repudiation
of rationalism. At this stage of his career, Feyerabends views on
proliferation are meant to complement Popperian maxims of
maximizing testability. This pluralism is to be understood as a
component of rationalism. However, Feyerabends views on
pluralism gradually become broader and applicable in not just
particular circumstances, but in any circumstance. For instance,
Feyerabend writes:
The function of unusual metaphysical ideas . which are
developed in sufcient detail to given an (alternative) account
even of the most common experimental and observational sit-
uations [is to] play a decisive role in criticism and in the
development of what is generally believed and highly
conrmed; and they have therefore to be present at any state of
the development of our knowledge (emphasis added, Feyerabend,
1963, 80).
27
For a discussion of the arguments in this paper, see chapter 6 of Preston (1997)
and Oberheim (2005, chapter 6 of 2006).
28
This argument was made in detail in Feyerabends earlier publications (1957,
1960) and his dissertation (1951).
29
Feyerabend repeats the same argument using Brownian motion in multiple
locations (Feyerabend, 1963, pp. 92-3; 1964b, 205; 1966, 246-7; 1969, 157; 1981a,
144-5).
30
See Feyerabend, 1962, p. 44, fn. 1 for his operative denition of a theory in that
paper. Preston (1997, pp. 26-8) discusses this and dismisses denitions found in his
1965a and 1965b as intolerably vague (26).
 J. Shaw / Studies in History and Philosophy of Science xxx (2017) 1e11
In this paper, Feyerabend broadens the scope of pluralism in a
few ways. First, metaphysical ideas here means that ideas which
offer criticisms do not need to be conrmed31 or factually adequate.
Furthermore, criticism is meant in an intentionally32 vaguer sense
than the rather strict notion in his 1962. Additionally, Feyerabend
begins to provide (quasi) moral reasons for accepting pluralism. He
writes that the rejection of pluralism enforces an unenlightened
conformism . it leads to a deterioration of intellectual capabilities,
of the power of the imagination . it destroys the most precious gift
of the young, their tremendous power of imagination (96-7).
Monism is desirable only for the frightened victims of some
(ancient, or modern) myth, or for the weak and willing followers of
some tyrant whereas pluralism is the only method that is
compatible with a humanitarian outlook (Feyerabend, 1963).
The principle of proliferation is rst explicitly stated in his
1965a as: [One should] invent, and elaborate theories which are
inconsistent with the accepted point of view, even if the latter
should happened to be highly conrmed and generally accepted
(105). He adds, in a footnote, that by theories he includes myths,
political ideas, [and] religious systems (fn. 5).33 Furthermore,
proliferation now includes the prevention of the elimination of
older theories which have been refuted (107). Each of these
reasons independently justies pluralism at any point in history
and isnt limited to, say, pre-paradigmatic science (Kuhn) and
these reasons taken jointly justify many kinds of pluralism.34
However, Feyerabend still constrains the proliferation of the-
ories to those that are applicable to least some aspects of
everything there is (fn. 5, 105) (i.e. cosmological theories). This
excludes mere universal statements like All ravens are black
(1965a). This constraint is abandoned in AM. Not only are
cosmological theories able to increase the testability of other the-
ories, but theories that are limited in their ontological domain are
able to make particular criticisms. This brief survey shows how
Feyerabends principle of proliferation evolves to become more
general from 1962 to AM.35
The principle of proliferation on its own does not get us an
argument for anything goes. This merely shows that any kind of
proliferation36 at any time goes. It isnt until this principle is com-
bined with the principle of tenacity when we get anything goes.
Like proliferation, Feyerabend is aware of the need for tenacity
31
Strictly speaking, metaphysics cant be conrmed or disconrmed on a Pop-
perian denition. Later in this paper, Feyerabend denes metaphysics as scientic
theories in their most primitive stage (Feyerabend, 1963, p. 100) which is
compatible with Poppers views of metaphysics.
32
The increase in vagueness appears to come alongside Feyerabends changing
attitudes towards philosophy. The more historical Feyerabend gets, the more he
realizes that well dened terms rarely (if ever) refer to real entities in scientic
practice. The vaguer Feyerabend gets, the more general his arguments become (see
Feyerabend, 1975a, pp. 18e19).
33
Similarly, in his 1965b he states the term theory will be used in a wide sense,
including ordinary beliefs (e.g., the belief in the existence of material objects),
myths (e.g., the myth of eternal recurrence), religious beliefs, etc. In short, any
sufciently general point of view concern matters of fact (Feyerabend, 1965b, p.
219, fn. 3).
34
This list is elongated in Outline of a Pluralistic Theory of Knowledge and Ac-
tion (1968) to include pluralism of equipment use, interpretations, and personal
idiosyncrasies (107). He also includes more ways of criticizing theories, including
the theatre and arts (Feyerabend, 1967a, 1967b, 1975b). However, these addenda
should not be construed as exhaustive of the methods of proliferation. Rather, they
should be understood as Feyerabends increasing awareness of the seemingly un-
limited multiplicity of ways the principle of proliferation might be implemented.
See also the introduction and section 3 of Feyerabend (1970b).
35
In his 1981a, Feyerabend equates his justication of proliferation with Mills (cf.
Lloyd, 1997 and Jacobs (2003) for a criticism of Feyerabends reading of Mill).
36
I take the lack of explicit constraints on proliferation, the aforementioned
vagueness, and the use of etc.s in his lists to indicate that Feyerabend sees pro-
liferation as unrestricted.
Please cite this article in press as: Shaw, J., Was Feyerabend an anarchist? The structure(s) of anything goes, Studies in History and Philosophy of
Science (2017), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.shpsa.2017.06.002
5
before explicitly formulating it as a principle.37 The principle
makes its debut in the section Arguments for Proliferation; he
states:
considerations like these [i.e. proliferation] make us accept a
principle of tenacity, which suggests, rst that we select from a
number of theories38 the one that has the most attractive fea-
tures and that promises to lead to the most fruitful results; and,
second, that we stick to this theory despite considerable dif-
culties (Feyerabend, 1968, 107).
This formulation suggests that we have two conditions for
tenaciously pursuing a theory: attractiveness and promise. How-
ever, it is difcult to decipher what these amount to. This difculty
is compounded by the fact that this paper appears during Feyer-
abends transition away from Popper (cf. Collodel 2016). If Feyer-
abend were a straight Popperian, attractiveness and promise
could simply mean being highly falsiable. If Feyerabend has
begun his anarchist phase, these reasons would boil down to mere
idiosyncrasies. It is, therefore, unclear how tenacity should be
understood in this paper. However, when the principle appears
two years later, in Consolations for the Specialist (1970e), it has
changed.39 First, the principle is directly compared to Kuhn (203 fn.
2). Secondly, Feyerabend never provides the criteria of when
tenacity is appropriate, but repeats and justies the second clause.
He writes:
The principle of tenacity is reasonable because theories are
capable of development, because they can be improved, and
because they may eventually be able to accommodate the very
same difculties which in their original form they were quite
incapable of explaining (204).
He provides numerous reasons why we should adopt this
principle: experimental facts are often unreliable and require
time to be settled, facts are dependent on theoretical consider-
ations and it isnt always obvious what those considerations are,
many tacit ideas arent immediately made explicit, and theoret-
ical frameworks need to be detailed and criticized and reformu-
lated. The endorsement of tenacity allows scientists to violate any
of the reasons methodologists have given for rejecting theories
(recalcitrant facts, logical inconsistencies, lack of theoretical vir-
tues, etc.) because the theory can evolve to become highly suc-
cessful in any way one construes successful.
Feyerabend then makes one crucial addendum to tenacity due
to his correspondence with Lakatos. Lakatos methodology of
research programs (Lakatos, 1968) attempts to combine the in-
sights of tenacity (which Lakatos takes from Kuhn) with Popperian
methodology. The basic view can be understood as such:
(1) Theories are to be replaced by research programs, or a
succession of theories, as the unit of methodological
appraisal.
(2) Research programs are allowed to make ad hoc adjustments
(as long as they lead to new predictions) and be retained
37
He writes, for example, I agree with Kuhn that theories should be taken
seriously and that one should not eliminate a good idea at the sight of the smallest
difculty (Feyerabend, 1964a, p. 253) and discusses how Copernicanism required
persistence to overcome its initial difculties (Feyerabend, 1964b, p. 196).
38
Theory here is meant in the broad sense previously dened.
39
Feyerabend claims this was in part due to criticisms from Isaac Levi
(Feyerabend, 1970e, p. 203 fn. 2).
6 J. Shaw / Studies in History and Philosophy of Science xxx (2017) 1e11
despite purported refutations (contra Popper) insofar as they
leads to progressive problem shifts.
(3) Research programs are theoretically progressive if they
makes new predictions and solves anomalies that their rival
cannot and they are empirically progressive if those pre-
dictions are independently conrmed.
(4) Research programs are degenerating when they make ad hoc
adjustments without increasing in empirical content.
What is crucial, for our current purposes, is what to do with
degenerating research programs. For Lakatos, it is perfectly rational
to continue pursuing degenerating research programs.40 Feyer-
abend gives three reasons for this. First, research programs are
capable of making comebacks. That is, research programs that are
degenerating today may become progressive tomorrow. This is not
a mere logical possibility (as Achinstein, 2000 suggests), but has
been substantiated many times throughout the history of science.41
Therefore, as Feyerabend argues, the very idea of a cut off point for
degenerating research programs is counterproductive to the rea-
sons for endorsing tenacity in the rst place (providing research
programs breathing space). Second, any cut off point will be
arbitrary (if now, why not wait a bit longer (1970b, 77; 1970d,
215)?). Finally, the idea that a research program cannot make a
comeback requires metaphysical assumptions that failing research
programs will continue fail to identify the real constituents of na-
ture (Feyerabend, 1975a; fn. 12 185).42
Despite the fact that these arguments appear as a criticism of
Lakatos, they can be read as making a crucial recognition that
tenacity has no expiry date. There are no rational means of
deciding when weve been tenacious long enough. This does not
require that we should be tenacious forever, but merely that there is
no rational way of deciding when to abandon a research program.
We now see that tenacity neither has conditions for its initial
endorsement,43 nor conditions for its termination. What is impor-
tant, to come to the anything goes conclusion, is the combination
with the principle of proliferation. To use a familiar slogan, tenacity
without proliferation is blind and proliferation without tenacity is
empty. Tenacity is required for proliferation for a number of rea-
sons. First, theories must be elaborated to be useful critical in-
struments (Feyerabend, 1968, p. 108). This takes time and effort.
Second, proliferation on its own would lead to a wild mess of half-
baked ideas; tenacity is required to transform half-baked ideas into
sophisticated theories. Third, theories are intimately connected to
forms of life that are necessary for human ourishing. Finally, and
most importantly, all theories are constantly beset by anomalies
and giving up on theories at the rst hint of trouble would
40
Lakatos does, however, argues that one can do many things in private to prevent
the pursuit of degenerating research programs (e.g., without funds, refuse to
publish their results, etc.). Feyerabend criticizes this view as either making ratio-
nality a chimera, which Lakatos is at pains to avoid, or completely vacuous since it
does not allow degenerating research programs to have the material conditions
necessary for pursuit.
41
Feyerabend states that atomism and the heliocentric theories are examples of
this. Additionally, while Feyerabend never explicitly makes this connection, many
of his examples of ideas that disappear altogether and reappear in later stages of
history (etc. Pythagorean cosmology in Copernicus, Hermeticism in Newton, the
cosmological constant in dark energy models, etc.) can also be understood as
comebacks.
42
I am citing from the rst edition of AM here.
43
In his 1970a, Feyerabend stipulates that partial support and partial plausibility
[are sufcient] to start a new trend (301) suggesting that we do have some min-
imal condition for theory pursuit. However, Feyerabend also states that there
exists hardly any idea that is totally without merit . No invention is ever made in
isolation, and no idea is, therefore, completely without abstract or empirical sup-
port (1970a). This suggests that the criteria of partial support is a criteria which
nearly every idea, or perhaps every idea in principle, already meets.
Please cite this article in press as: Shaw, J., Was Feyerabend an anarchist? The structure(s) of anything goes, Studies in History and Philosophy of
Science (2017), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.shpsa.2017.06.002
eliminate many of our greatest scientic achievements
(Feyerabend, 1975a, p. 31). The principle of tenacity is also anti-
thetical to the principle of proliferation in practice; proliferation
demands the invention of new ideas, while tenacity involves
working on old ideas. This contradiction can be remedied tempo-
rally or through a division of cognitive labor (cf. Kitcher, 1990).
Either we rst we proliferate and then we are tenacious or some
scientists proliferate and others tenaciously develop established
ideas simultaneously.44 Similarly, the principle of proliferation is
necessary for tenacity. This is shown in his many criticisms of Kuhn:
since facts require theories, testing theories with new facts requires
new theories. Progress would be inexplicable without proliferation.
Despite the fact that Feyerabend calls them principles, which
suggests they are rules to be followed, Feyerabend has a rather
different understanding of what a principle is. He repeatedly states
that principles should be conceived as rules of thumb not to be
followed absolutely.45 The balance, therefore, between tenacity and
proliferation, is not subject to any denite rules. Additionally, as we
have seen, there isnt a single context in which it is rational to
refrain from proliferating alternatives or tenaciously developing
established theories. Therefore, anything goes. Alternatively, as
Feyerabend puts it:
I regard each piece of research both as a potential instance of
application for a rule [tenacity] and as a test case of the rule
[proliferation]: we may permit the rule to guide our research i.e.,
to exclude some actions and to mould others, but we may also
permit our research to suspend the rule, or to regard it as inap-
plicable even though all the known conditions demand its
application. In making the latter decision we are not guided by
any clear insight into the limitations of the rule . [w]e are
guided, rather, by the vague hope that working without the rule,
or on the basis of a contrary rule we shall eventually nd a new
form of rationality . This is also what is meant by the slogan
anything goes: there is no guarantee that the known forms of
rationality will succeeds and that the known forms of irratio-
nality will fail. Any procedure, however ridiculous, may lead to
progress, any procedure, however sound and rational, may get
us stuck in the mud (Feyerabend, 1977a; fn. 1368).
These readings of anything goes can certainly be developed
further. However, we can understand them as coherent positive
position developed throughout Feyerabends papers. It is difcult to
see how the reductio reading could explain this continuous
renement and defense of these views.46 However, it is worth
motivating these positions as not only worthy of historical interest
but also of contemporary interest by showing that these views have
some degree of plausibility. While I do not have the space to argue
for the superiority of one of these approaches here, the following
two sections seek to add to the plausibility of these theses by
addressing some of the most inuential criticisms of anything goes
and suggesting some qualications.
44
While the latter option seems closer to Feyerabends view of science as being
constantly pluralistic (Andersson, 1994, pp. 55-6 holds this view), Feyerabends later
views, where some forms of life are (at least tentatively) isolated from criticism, are
compatible with the former.
45
He also states that he calls them principles for mnemonic reasons only
(Feyerabend, 1970e, p. 205).
46
Even Feyerabends rst paper as a graduate student in 1948 argues that
methodological criteria for theory appraisal (in this case, that theories must be
visualizable and intelligible) must be violated by constructing alternative meta-
physical frameworks for conceiving of physical processes (Feyerabend, 1948/2016).
 J. Shaw / Studies in History and Philosophy of Science xxx (2017) 1e11
3. Response to the critics
It is worth asking how these views fare given the criticisms that
have been launched at Feyerabends anarchism over the past 50
years. As seen in section 1, the reductio interpretation largely
dodges these criticisms. Since I interpret anything goes as playing
a vital role in a positive thesis, I must meet these challenges head
on. In this section, I defend the positions outlined in section 2
against three primary criticisms: that anything goes amounts to
a full renunciation of method, that Feyerabends criticism of ratio-
nalism attacks a straw man, and that anything goes ultimately
collapses into a traditional and nave form of relativism.
One objection is that Feyerabend is promoting a complete
relinquishment of all methods. For example, Peter Godfrey-Smith
writes that Feyerabend claims that because some principle or
rule may go wrong, we should completely ignore it . this claim is
obviously crazy (Godfrey-Smith, 2003, 114). Similarly, Harr reads
Feyerabend as claiming that there is no method in the advance-
ment of science (Harr, 1977, p. 298). On this reading of Feyer-
abend, he is discarding most of the work done in philosophy of
science since historical reections warrant their total abandon-
ment.47 This couldnt be farther away from the truth. Feyerabend is
not claiming there is no method that leads to progress, but a plu-
rality of (potentially) incompatible methods:
A naive anarchist says (a) that both absolute rules and context-
dependent rules have their limits and infer (b) that all rules and
standards are worthless and should be given up. Most reviewers
regard me as a naive anarchist in this sense, overlooking the
many passages where I show how certain procedures aided
scientists in their research. For in my [historical] studies . I not
only demonstrate the failures of familiar standards, I also try to
show what not so familiar procedures did actually succeed. Thus
while I agree with (a) I do not agree with (b). I argue that all rules
have their limits and that there is no comprehensive rational-
ity, I do not argue that we should proceed without rules and
standards (emphasis in original, Feyerabend, 1975a, 242).
The principle of proliferation promotes the exact opposite of
claiming the worthlessness of any standard; rational or not. There
are many methods that result in scientic successes, some of which
are endorsed by rationalists and others which arent. Science will,
and has, benetted from those scientists who have attempted to
design crucial experiments and look for severe refutations,48 those
who have carefully qualied experimental results to constrain
generalizations,49 and those who salvaged theories against
apparent recalcitrant evidence. However, each of these methods
must be interpreted anarchistically50; they must be tolerant and
even complement of each other (e.g., inductivists should allow
conjectures that go past, and even contradict current evidence,
falsicationists should allow ad hoc adjustments, etc.) even of
methods that are their complete opposite (counter methods in
Feyerabends terminology, see chapter 2 of AM). As Feyerabend
states, the one thing [the anarchist] opposes positively . are
universal standards though he does not deny that it is often good
policy to act as if such laws existed (emphasis added, 189).
47
Laudan also interprets Feyerabend in this manner: Feyerabend nor anyone else
has shown that all the extant rules of scientic methodology are inadequate,
let alone that all possible rules are discredited (Laudan, 1996, p. 105).
48
Whether or not there are actually crucial experiments is beside the point. What
matters more is the impact of purported crucial experiments.
49
See Changs (chapter 2, 2004) depiction of Regnault for an example of this.
50
This is Margolis (1991) interpretation of anything goes.
Please cite this article in press as: Shaw, J., Was Feyerabend an anarchist? The structure(s) of anything goes, Studies in History and Philosophy of
Science (2017), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.shpsa.2017.06.002
7
Another objection is that the opponent of anarchism is merely a
straw man. As Nagel claims, he is attacking what is pretty much a
straw man when he argues against a notion of method according to
which there are rm, unchanging, and absolutely binding princi-
ples for conducting the business of science (Nagel, 1977, p.
1133).51 On this reading, despite the apparent extremism of
Feyerabends views, Feyerabend is proposing a benign criticism of
absolutism. There are a few ways to respond to this. First, it seems
historically false. Many philosophers from Aristotle onwards have
assumed that science progresses according to a unique rule or set of
rules which are constitutive of what science is.52 Second, the
strength of falsicationism and vericationist criteria of meaning
depends on the fact that science should operate in a certain way. For
Popper, non-falsiable theories are pseudo-science and should be
ignored. For the logical empiricists, meaningless metaphysics only
results in sterile debates. The ensuing demarcation criteria of what
constitutes good science have force because they are exceptionless.
What would the practical efcacy of, say, empiricism be if we are
consistently allowed to pursue non-empirical avenues of
research? Seen in this light, it is clear that Feyerabend is delivering
a deep criticism of many mainstream views in philosophy of science
that science has (or should have) some rational structure. Finally,
many of Feyerabends arguments attempt to show why empiricism,
falsicationism, etc. are committed to rationalism. Without
showing how these commitments can be avoided, the claim that
Feyerabend is attacking a strawman is empty.
Another way of interpreting Feyerabends criticisms is that
Feyerabend is trying to change the topic. By showing how prob-
lematic these principles would be if applied, philosophers of sci-
ence must clarify the conditions of their application.53 Rather than
continuing to compare their logical advantages (e.g., falsication-
ism avoids the problem of induction and paradoxes of conrmation,
inductivists avoid problems with corroboration, conventionalists
avoid problems of holism, etc.), methods must compare their
practical advantages and disadvantages. Consider the following
statement on the status of philosophy of science in 1970:
Much of contemporary philosophy of science and especially
those ideas which have now replaced the older epistemologies
are castles in the air, unreal dreams which have but the name in
common with the activity they try to represent, that they have
been erected in a spirit of conformism rather than with the
intention of inuencing the development of science, and that
they have lost any chance of making a contribution to our
knowledge of the world. (The medieval problem of the number
of angels at the point of a pin had some rather interesting
ramications in optics and in psychology. The problem of grue
has ramications only in the these of those unfortunate students
who happen to have an engruesiast for a teacher (Feyerabend,
1970d, 127).
51
Similarly, Gellner claims that Feyerabends position is frivolous (336) and a
mlange of truisms and extravagances (341) and Newton-Smith states that
Feyerabend . erroneously assumes that the rationalist is committed to believing
in exceptionless algorithmic rules of comparison (Newton-Smith, 1981, 134).
52
Psillos, for example, resists the outright denial that there is an area of culture,
viz., science, with a special relation to rationality and objectivity and/or a special
claim to knowledge of the world (Psillos, 2012, p. 93). He provides a cursory
history of philosophy of science that maintains that there is something unique
about science in general rather than Feyerabends view, quoted as an epigraph, that
[t]he one monster called SCIENCE that speaks with a single voice is a paste job
constructed by propagandists, reductionists and educators (Feyerabend, 2011, p.
56). See also Psillos, 2016 for further discussion.
53
Feyerabend claims that traditional problems of epistemology (i.e., the creation
of the ideal demands of knowledge and knowledge-acquisition (AMB 203)) will
eventually transform into anthropological investigations about what results these
epistemologies produce or inhibit.
8 J. Shaw / Studies in History and Philosophy of Science xxx (2017) 1e11
It is clear that Feyerabend wants philosophers of science to be
active in the development of science. It makes sense, as a tactic, to
attempt to demonstrate the futility of empiricist and falsicationist
methodologies to reveal their triviality from a practical perspective.
Philosophical problems, for Feyerabend, should not be blown up
into formalistic tumour which grow incessantly by feeding on their
own juices but they should be kept in close contact with the process
of science even if this means lots of uncertainty and a low level of
precision (137). Indeed, Feyerabend also writes that I now set
myself the task of widening [the abyss between theory and prac-
tice] so that the mechanisms which underlie the actual develop-
ment of knowledge will stand out and be recognized more easily
and, similarly, [t]he aim of this present essay is . to progress by
emphasizing the contrast between the customary methodologies
and certain important episodes in the history of thought
(emphasis added, Feyerabend, 1970a, p. 277). On this view, Feyer-
abend is engaging in propaganda. Therefore, either Feyerabend is
not targeting a strawman or it is irrelevant whether he is targeting a
straw man or not.
Finally, some assert that Feyerabend holds a form of relativism
that entails that no position is superior to any other, making all
positions epistemic equals. Worrall claims that Feyerabend does
no more than rephrase the sceptics claim to read: Every proposi-
tion is epistemologically on a par with any other (Worrall, 1978, p.
279). Similarly, as Ernest Gellner puts it, [i]f there are no methods
and hence no criteria, it follows that all substantive propositions are
equally good or bad (Gellner, 1975, p. 334).54 This interpretation, in
some circles, survives until the present day: I [am not] ready for
the anything goes avor of much of the post-modernist relativism
. (Wimsatt, 2007, p. 148).55 If this is Feyerabends position, then it
is problematic due to the age-old concern that if all propositions are
true relative to some conceptual scheme, then relativism itself
cannot be absolutely true. Despite the vagueness of this accusation,
neither view outlined in section 2 is committed to this kind of
relativism. While Feyerabends later works articulate and defend a
form of relativism,56 Feyerabend never claims that abandoned
theories, pseudo-sciences, and the fantasies of cranks
(Feyerabend, 1975a, p. 26) are as true as mainstream science.
Feyerabend sidesteps these kinds of epistemological evaluations
and instead chooses to focus on the value that these ideas have for
progress. Feyerabend is not endorsing the thesis that all ideas are
equally true, but the claim that all ideas are potentially valuable.57
We may pursue theories because they may turn out to be suc-
cessful, given enough tenacity58; or as instruments of criticisms,
heuristics for understanding other theories better, pedagogical
contrasts, and for many other reasons. None of these reasons are
54
Similarly, Musgrave understands Feyerabends thesis as any theory or research
programme is as good as any other (Musgrave, 1978, p. 192) or, conversely, as Kukla
puts it: all methodologies are equally bad (Kulka, 1977, p. 279).
55
Sandra Mitchell also implies this when she states that This is not to recom-
mend an anything goes pluralism. Not all explanations are equally good
(Mitchell, 2003, p. 189).
56
This relativism also isnt equivalent to the nave kind Feyerabend is accused of
holding. See Kusch (2016) for a discussion of the development of Feyerabends
thought on relativism.
57
Harr claims that Professor Feyerabend seems to insist on the idea that success
or power must go to those who have the least respect for consistency and truth
(Harr, 1977, p. 295). This objection is also misguided since Feyerabend simply
wants to defend that any idea can have value and aims to show that many theories
dismissed by philosophers have had, and could have, value. He is not attempting to
create a hierarchy of ideas, but defending the thesis that no idea should be
completely ignored.
58
Notice that this would make, say, Voodoo as currently practiced inferior to
modern physiology (at least on some grounds of comparison) but this is not the
same claim as future incarnations of Voodoo.
Please cite this article in press as: Shaw, J., Was Feyerabend an anarchist? The structure(s) of anything goes, Studies in History and Philosophy of
Science (2017), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.shpsa.2017.06.002
equivalent to the nave relativist motto that acupuncture and
evolution are equally good. Thus, the charges of relativism are
misguided.
Although there are many more criticisms of Feyerabends views
that have and could be launched (see Hooker, 1991; Stegmller &
Wohlhueter, 1976), I hope to have addressed some of the most
inuential ones in this section. The nal section in this paper pro-
vides brief remarks about how anything goes may be suitably
constrained to be practically efcacious.
4. Suggestions for qualications
If anything goes is understood as a serious proposal for
normative methodology, then it seems clearly troublesome at face
value. In this section, I consider three proposals for qualifying
anything goes on Feyerabendian grounds: 1) that anything goes is
restricted by the fact that we are always limited in our resources, 2)
that anything goes is constrained by ethical norms, and 3) that
anything goes is constrained by some minimal view of rationality. I
will reject 1), accept 2), and partially accept 3).59
It is a clear desideratum of Feyerabends philosophy that it
makes a practical difference. This makes it prudent to ask how
anything goes could be implemented. We have limited resources,
both nancial and in terms of imaginative power, and thus we are
forced to limit what research we pursue. This much is uncontro-
versial. What is purported to follow from this is that we should
pursue particular kinds of research. Put another way, while idealis-
tically we should pursue every idea that we conceive and pursue it
as vigorously as possible, we can rationally allocate resources for
pursuing some projects over others. This criticism, however, ulti-
mately begs the question. The anarchist argues there is no way to
rank programs according to their promise on rationalist grounds
(even probabilistically). To show that some theories are more likely
to be successful, one must provide some constraints on prolifera-
tion or tenacity. If anarchism is true, rationalism cannot be justied
by mere pragmatic constraints.60
Feyerabends anarchism is an epistemological anarchism. Feyer-
abend is silent on what implications, if any, anarchism has for
ethics. However, some of Feyerabends remarks suggest that any-
thing goes is constrained on purely ethical grounds. Feyerabend
even goes so far as to call ethics a foundation for methodology in his
pre-anarchist writings. He writes:
Which attitude shall we adopt and which kind of life shall we
lead? . is the most fundamental problem of all epistemology .
[W]e are confronted with a real decision, that is, a real choice
with a situation which has to be resolved on the basis of our
demands and preferences, and which cannot be resolved by
proof. It is easy to see that these demands these preferences
concern the welfare of human beings are therefore ethical de-
mands: epistemology, or the structure of knowledge we accept,
59
There are many more ways anything goes may be qualied. Many realists, for
example, argue that the phenomena themselves constrains scientic reasoning
(Mitchell, 2003), neo-Kantians argue that the mind is inherently limited in what it
can know (Cassirer, 1944), and others argue that theorizing should be constrained
by those well-conrmed theories within their domain (Ereshefsky, 1992). It should
be clear that anything goes is incompatible with all of these arguments, but I will
not detail this here.
60
To clarify this point, anything goes does not entail everything goes. Every-
thing goes requires that an indenite (or perhaps innite) number of things go,
which is clearly impossible. Anything goes merely requires some distribution of
projects pursued within a scientic community and that this distribution is not
constrained by rationalist criteria (see Stanford, 2015).
 J. Shaw / Studies in History and Philosophy of Science xxx (2017) 1e11
is grounded upon an ethical decision (Feyerabend, 1961, 55-6).61
He also makes numerous comments about the value of human
happiness, liberation, and expanding human capabilities for living
meaningful lives (see section 6 of Feyerabend, 1970d; Feyerabend,
1981b). He even goes so far as to say that no action should
violate the principle of hedonism (see his letter to Lakatos in
Motterlini, 1999, p. 121).62 This suggests that we have grounds for
ethically constraining scientic practices. This could include the
practices themselves (e.g., human and nonhuman experimentation,
racist or sexist presuppositions in biology or neuroscience, etc.) or
what practices we choose to engage with (cf. Kitcher, 2011).63 For
example, certain topics are of urgent concern (e.g. climate change)
and may take precedence over other projects as a result.64 This also
would tame the worries that the unrestricted nature of prolifera-
tion could be dangerous since, if an instance of proliferating some
theory is dangerous, it could be managed on an ethical basis.
Feyerabend never details what these ethical constraints would be,
nor is it clear that he would want an ethical framework to provide
such constraints. This simply means that a range of ethical concerns
may constrain scientic practices and still be compatible with
anything goes.
The nal restraint is quite tricky. Some have argued that
Feyerabend holds some sort of minimal rationality in an unsys-
tematic and vague sense (Farrell, 2003; Lugg, 1977). This is just the
deated rationality we use in our ordinary affairs.65 There is
certainly some textual support for this view. Most notably,
throughout Feyerabends texts he makes numerous disparaging
remarks about the cranks. In an earlier paper, he writes:
The distinction between the crank and the respectable thinker
lies in the research that is done once a certain point of view is
adopted. The crank usually is content with defending the point
of view in its original, undeveloped, metaphysical form, and he
is not prepared to test its usefulness in all those cases which
seem to favor the opponent, or even admit that there exists a
problem. It is this further investigation, the details of it, the
knowledge of the difculties, of the general state of knowledge,
the recognition of objections, which distinguishes the respect-
able thinker from the crank. The original content of his theory
does not (Feyerabend, 1964b, 305).
61
This foundationalist view does not resurface in Feyerabends later writings and
it is best left as the vague pronouncement that ethical concerns can trump
epistemic ones.
62
Here, Feyerabend writes [t]he only theoretical restriction . of science which I
am prepared to tolerate is what follows from a principle of general hedonism: all
those elements of science which are inconsistent with hedonism must go. This
comment should not be taken to suggest that Feyerabend is a hedonist. Indeed, he
never espoused any consistent ethical views. I take these comments merely as
starting points for future discussion.
63
I should mention that I am not swayed by this argument, but I will not argue
this here. See Eigi (2012).
64
This would not mean that all research should be geared towards climate change
but merely, perhaps, a larger portion. Feyerabend discusses the issue of urgency in
chapter 1 of The Tyranny of Science.
65
Lugg argues that AM argues merely that science has no distinctive rationality.
Science merely uses the rationality of common sense (though what constitutes
common sense rationality is left unspecied). Farrell agrees with this view (Farrell,
2003, p. 188, fn. 1) and tries to supplement it with his own tightrope-walking ra-
tionality (see his chapter 8). I think this particular view is mistaken (specically
because Feyerabend repeatedly states that common sense contains older views of
rationality and must be criticized), but I will not argue this here. I want to focus on
the kernel of truth that Feyerabend does have some quasi-principled resistance to
accepting anything goes full stop.
Please cite this article in press as: Shaw, J., Was Feyerabend an anarchist? The structure(s) of anything goes, Studies in History and Philosophy of
Science (2017), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.shpsa.2017.06.002
9
Feyerabend also complains that much of the practice of current
astrology makes no attempt to proceed into new domains and to
enlarge our knowledge of extra-terrestrial inuences; [it] simply
serve[s] as a reservoir of nave rules and phrases suited to impress
the ignorant (Feyerabend, 1978, p. 96). Moreover, one can infer
what kind of science Feyerabend is interested based on who he
cites. For instance, in his defense of Voodoo, he doesnt defend con-
artists on Bourbon street but the sophisticated and extensive work
by C.R. Richter and W.H. Cannon (Feyerabend, 1975a; ft. 7 30) which
is scientic by any reasonable standard! The same is true of his
defense of traditional Chinese medicine, witchcraft, and
astrology.66 The fact that Feyerabend never explicitly defends those
who most people would consider cranks67 supports the view that
Feyerabends anarchism does not let any kind of person in.68 The
remarks about cranks can be easily reconciled with the oppor-
tunist reading. Clearly, cranks fall short of being good opportunists
by refusing to seriously engage with (or understand) the ideological
cultures that surround them and tune their actions accordingly.69
With the pluralist reading, the situation seems more difcult.
Proliferation may begin with crankish ideas and cranks may be
consulted for this. Cranks, by denition, dont seem to be tenacious
since they refuse to develop their ideas. However, since prolifera-
tion is reasonable at every point in time, cranks can be involved in
science anytime on this view. I cannot give a full analysis here, but it
seems as if Feyerabend can tolerate, or maybe even support, the
inclusion of some cranks in particular roles within the scientic
community though it would be problematic if cranks gained sig-
nicant degrees of power. So maybe it is important to have a witch
on the advisory board of the NSF, but David Icke shouldnt be the
president of NASA.70
5. Concluding remarks
Anything goes represents one of the most provocative,
controversial, and misunderstood slogans that has been espoused
in recent memory. I hope this paper has contributed to a better
understanding of its role within Feyerabends texts and has put
forward some novel views for future consideration. This paper
provides only the beginnings of how Feyerabends opportunism
and pluralism can be conceived, what puzzles they have, and how
they may be applied. Furthermore, it remains an open question
66
The case is more difcult with witchcraft and ancient Chinese medicine since
his references are more oblique and sporadic. For witchcraft, Feyerabend writes
every witch trial, every confession of presence at a witches Sabbath, every
otherwise unexplained occurrence of pestilence, oods disease of cattle, impotence,
nightmares, unfaithfulness of wives . malformation at birth, schizophrenia e all
these things would give direct proof of the existence of incubi, succubi, and other
evil spirits, so that nally denying them would seem to be as nonsensical, arbitrary,
and whimsical as the denial of the existence of tables and chairs appears to some
philosophers of today (Feyerabend, 1965b; fn. 8225). See chapter 4 of Against
Method for a somewhat sustained discussion of ancient Chinese medicine and The
Strange Case of Astrology in Science in a Free Society for his defense of astrology.
67
He does, however, defend the use of the cranks ideas (Feyerabend, 1975a, p.
26). This can also be seen in the 1964 quote where he states that the content does
not distinguish the respectable thinker from the crank.
68
In the rst appendix of the 2nd edition of AM, Feyerabend complains of in-
tellectual pollution where illiterate and incompetent books ood the market,
empty verbiage full of strange and esoteric terms claims to express profound in-
sights, experts without brains, without character, and without even a modicum of
intellectual, stylistic, emotional temperament tell us about our condition and the
means for improving it (Feyerabend, 1975a, pp. 166-7). He admits that [t]his is a
disastrous situation, and one not easily mended (167) and then makes some
suggestions for educational reform to combat this issue.
69
There certainly may be particular cases where the contingencies demand
specic uses of the cranks.
70
Shaw (2017) situates Feyerabends discussion of the cranks in the context of
demarcation and epistemic virtues.
10 J. Shaw / Studies in History and Philosophy of Science xxx (2017) 1e11
what implications interpreting anarchism in this way has for
scholarship on Feyerabend. Think of this paper as having prolifer-
ated new ideas for philosophers of science; it requires a community
to tenaciously develop them further.
Acknowledgements
REMOVED FOR REVIEW.
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Please cite this article in press as: Shaw, J., Was Feyerabend an anarchist? The structure(s) of anything goes, Studies in History and Philosophy of
Science (2017), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.shpsa.2017.06.002