Topic: Autonomy and Decentralization
This Constitution shall take effect immediately upon its ratification by
ALFREDO M. DE LEON, et al vs. HON. BENJAMIN ESGUERRA, et al
G.R. No. 78059
August 31, 1987
Facts:
Petitioners Alfredo De Leon was elected Barangay Captain and other petitioners Angel S.
Salamat, Mario C. Sta. Ana, Jose C. Tolentino, Rogelio J. de la Rosa and Jose M. Resurreccion
were elected as Barangay Councilors of Barangay Dolores, Taytay, Rizal on May 17, 1982
Barangay elections.
However, on Feb 9, 1987 (antedated on Dec. 1, 1986) petitioner Alfredo received a
Memorandum from OIC Governor Benjamin Esguerra (respondent) designating Florentino
Magno as Barangay Captain (the designation was by authority of the Minister of Local
Government).
Also, on Feb. 8, 1987 (antedated December 1, 1986), same OIC Governor signed a
Memorandum designating respondents Remigio M. Tigas, Ricardo Z. Lacanienta Teodoro V.
Medina, Roberto S. Paz and Teresita L. Tolentino as members of the Barangay Council.
So, petitioners filed a case before the court (action for Prohibition) seeking to have the 2
Memoranda declared void and to prohibit the respondents (usurpers sa ilang position) from
taking over their barangay positions.
Arguments of Petitioners:
Pursuant of Sec. 3 (Barangay Election Act of 1982 BP Blg 222), their term of office shall be
six (6) years which shall commence on June 7, 1982 and shall continue until their successors
shall have elected and shall have qualified or up to June 7, 1988
Since the 1987 Constitution has been ratified, OIC Governor no longer has authority to
replace them with designated successors
Arguments of Respondents:
Main argument relied on Sec. 2, Article III, Provisional Constitution (March 25, 1986):
SECTION 2. All elective and appointive officials and employees under the 1973
Constitution shall continue in office until otherwise provided by proclamation or
executive order or upon the designation or appointment and qualification of
their successors, if such appointment is made within a period of one year from
February 25,1986.
They contend that terms of office of elective and appointive officials were abolished and
petitioners continued in office by virtue of such provision; not because their term of 6 years
had not yet expired.
Provision in BP Blg 222 (Barangay Election Act) fixing their term to 6 years must be deemed
repealed for being inconsistent with the Provisional Constitution.
Issue:
WON designation of respondents to replace the petitioners (via Memoranda) was validly made?
Ruling:
No, the designation of respondents to replace the petitioners (thru Memoranda) was NOT VALID.
Since the Memoranda were antedated, Court held that effective date of replacement should be on
February 8, 19877, not Dec. 1, 1986.
Sec. 2, Article III, Provisional Constitution was deemed to have been overtaken by Sec. 27, Article XVIII
of the 1987 Constitution:
SECTION 27.
a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite held for the purpose and shall supersede
all previous Constitutions.
The 1987 Constitution was ratified in a plebiscite on February 2, 1987. By that date, therefore, the
Provisional Constitution must be deemed to have been superseded. Having become inoperative,
respondent OIC Governor could no longer rely on Section 2, Article III, thereof to designate respondents
to the elective positions occupied by petitioners.
Petitioners must now be held to have acquired security of tenure especially considering that the
Barangay Election Act of 1982 declares it "a policy of the State to guarantee and promote the
autonomy of the barangays to ensure their fullest development as self-reliant communities.
Similarly, the 1987 Constitution ensures the autonomy of local governments and of political
subdivisions of which the barangays form a part, and limits the President's power to "general
supervision" over local governments.
Relevantly, Section 8, Article X of the same 1987 Constitution further provides in part:
Sec. 8. The term of office of elective local officials, except barangay officials, which
shall be determined by law, shall be three years.
Until the term of office of barangay officials has been determined by law, the term of office (6 years)
provided in the Barangay Election Act of 1982 should still govern.
Was the provision under the Barangay Election Act (fixing the term for 6 years) inconsistent with the
1987 Constitution?
There is NO INCONSISTENCY between the two and the same should be considered as still operative
pursuant to Sec. 3, Art. XVIII of the 1987 Constitution:
Sec. 3. All existing laws, decrees, executive orders, proclamations letters of
instructions, and other executive issuances not inconsistent, with this Constitution
shall remain operative until amended, repealed or revoked.
Topic: Autonomy and Decentralization
SAN JUAN vs. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION, DBM and Cecilia Almajose
GR No. 92299
April 19, 1991
Facts:
The position for Provincial Board Officer (PBO) of the Province of Rizal was left vacant by its
former holder (Henedima del Rosario).
Thereafter, petitioner Governor San Juan informed Director Abella (DBM Region VII) that
Ms. Dalisay Santos assumed office as Acting PBO pursuant to a Memorandum he issued and
further requested the endorsement of the appointment of Ms. Dalisay as PBO.
However, DBM Director Abella recommended the appointment of Cecilia Almajose (private
respondent) as PBO of Rizal since she was the most qualified among the nominees of the
petitioner and that the nominees submitted by the Governor did not meet the required
qualifications for the position.
Subsequently, DBM Undersecretary signed the appointment papers of Almajose as PBO of
Rizal based on the endorsement of Director Abella.
Petitioner wrote a letter to the DBM Secretary protesting the appointment of Alamajose
contending that under EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 112, IT IS THE PROVINCIAL GOVERNOR, not
the Regional Director or a Congressman, WHO HAS THE POWER TO RECOMMEND
NOMINEES FOR THE POSITION AS PBO.
DBM responded that it validly exercised its prerogative in filling-up the contested position
since none of the nominees submitted by petitioner were qualified.
 Therefore, petitioner wrote to the CSC protesting the appointment and reiterated his position
however CSC denied his petition.
Arguments of Petitioner Governor:
He has the sole right and privilege to recommend nominees to the position of PBO and that
the appointee should come only from his nominees.
o Legal Basis: Sec. 1, EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 112:
Sec. 1. All budget officers of provinces, cities and municipalities shall be appointed
henceforth by the Minister of Budget and Management upon recommendation of the
local chief executive concerned, subject to civil service law, rules and regulations, and
they shall be placed under the administrative control and technical supervision of the
Ministry of Budget and Management.
He states that the phrase "upon recommendation of the local chief executive concerned"
must be given mandatory application in consonance with the state policy of local autonomy
as guaranteed by the 1987 Constitution under Art. II, Sec. 25 and Art. X, Sec. 2.
His power to recommend cannot be defeated by a mere administrative issuance of DBM
reserving to itself the right to fill up any existing vacancy in case the petitioners nominees
were not qualified.
Arguments of Respondent CSC/DBM:
The recommendation of the local chief executive is merely directory and not a condition sine
qua non to the exercise by the Secretary of DBM of his appointing prerogative taking into
consideration that said officer has been nationalized and is directly under the control and
supervision of the DBM Secretary or through his duly authorized representative.
o Legal basis: LOCAL BUDGET CIRCULAR NO. 31:
Sec. 6.0 The DBM reserves the right to fill up any existing vacancy where none
of the nominees of the local chief executive meet the prescribed requirements
Since the purpose is to preserve and maintain the independence of the said officer from the
LGU, the appointing official is not restricted or circumscribed to the list submitted or
recommended by the local chief executive in the final selection of an appointee for the
position. He may consider other nominees for the position vis a vis the nominees of the local
chief executive.
Issues:
Main Issue:
WON DBM has the power to appoint Almajose (private respondent) as PBO of Rizal even though she
was not included in the list of nominees recommended by the Governor?
Can the DBM Head appoint on its own an officer to the said position in the event that none of the
nominees of the Governor were qualified?
What is the DIFFERENCE between the Presidents powers of CONTROL vs. SUPERVISION?
Ruling:
No, DBM has no power to the appoint Almajose as PBO of Rizal since the DBM may appoint only from
the list of qualified recommendees nominated by the Governor.
Before the promulgation of Executive Order No. 112 on December 24, 1986, Batas Pambansa Blg. 337,
otherwise known as the Local Government Code vested upon the Governor, subject to civil service rules
and regulations, the power to appoint the PBO (Sec. 216, subparagraph (1), BP 337).
This case involves the most important constitutional policy and principle, that of LOCAL AUTONOMY.
Where a law is capable of two interpretations, one in favor of centralized power in Malacaang and
the other beneficial to local autonomy, the scales must be weighed in favor of autonomy.
The 1935 Constitution had no specific article on local autonomy. However, in distinguishing between
presidential control and supervision as follows:
The President shall have control of all the executive departments, bureaus, or offices,
exercise general supervision over all local governments as may be provided by law, and take
care that the laws be faithfully executed. (Sec. 11, Article VII, 1935 Constitution)
the Constitution clearly limited the executive power over local governments to "general supervision.
The exercise of greater local autonomy is even more marked in the present Constitution.
Article II, Section 25 on State Policies provides:
Sec. 25. The State shall ensure the autonomy of local governments
The 14 sections in Article X on Local Government not only reiterate earlier doctrines but give in greater
detail the provisions making local autonomy more meaningful. Thus, Sections 2 and 3 of Article X
provide:
Sec. 2. The territorial and political subdivisions shall enjoy local autonomy.
Sec. 3. The Congress shall enact a local government code which shall provide for a more
responsive and accountable local government structure instituted through a system of
decentralization with effective mechanisms of recall, initiative, and referendum, allocate
among the different local government units their powers, responsibilities, and resources, and
provide for the qualifications, election, appointment and removal, term, salaries, powers and
functions and duties of local officials, and all other matters relating to the organization and
operation of the local units.
When the Civil Service Commission interpreted the recommending power of the Provincial Governor as
purely directory, it went against the letter and spirit of the constitutional provisions on local autonomy
and the right given by Local Budget Circular No. 31 giving DBM the right to fill up an existing vacancy
where none of the nominees of the local chief executive were qualifies is ULTRA VIRES.
Can the DBM Head appoint on its own an officer to the said position in the event that none of the
nominees of the Governor were qualified?
NO, If none is qualified, he must return the list of nominees to the Governor explaining why no one
meets the legal requirements and ask for new recommendees who have the necessary eligibilities and
qualifications.
What is the DIFFERENCE between the Presidents powers of CONTROL vs. SUPERVISION?
SUPERVISION (exercised over local governments)
- It goes no further than "overseeing or the power or authority of an officer to see that
subordinate officers perform their duties. If the latter fail or neglect to fulfill them the former
may take such action or step as prescribed by law to make them perform their duties
CONTROL (exercised over all executive departments, bureaus and offices)
- "Means the power of an officer to alter or modify or nullify or set aside what a subordinate had
done in the performance of their duties and to substitute the judgment of the former for that of
the latter."
EN BANC
G.R. No. 93252 August 5, 1991
RODOLFO T. GANZON, petitioner,
vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and LUIS T. SANTOS, respondents.
G.R. No. 93746 August 5,1991
MARY ANN RIVERA ARTIEDA, petitioner,
vs.
HON. LUIS SANTOS, in his capacity as Secretary of the Department of Local Government, NICANOR M.
PATRICIO, in his capacity as Chief, Legal Service of the Department of Local Government and
SALVADOR CABALUNA JR., respondents.
G.R. No. 95245 August 5,1991
RODOLFO T. GANZON, petitioner,
vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and LUIS T. SANTOS, in his capacity as the Secretary of the
Department of Local Government, respondents.
SARMIENTO, J.:p
The petitioners take common issue on the power of the President (acting through the
Secretary of Local Government), to suspend and/or remove local officials.
The petitioners are the Mayor of Iloilo City (G.R. Nos. 93252 and 95245) and a member of the
Sangguniang Panglunsod thereof (G.R. No. 93746), respectively.
The petitions of Mayor Ganzon originated from a series of administrative complaints, ten in
number, filed against him by various city officials sometime in 1988, on various charges,
among them, abuse of authority, oppression, grave misconduct, disgraceful and immoral
conduct, intimidation, culpable violation of the Constitution, and arbitrary detention. He was
said to have locked officials out of their offices and ousted them from where they temporarily
held office.
hearings on the complaints followed. The secretary of local govt, finding probable cause,
preventively suspended the mayor.
Amidst two successive suspensions, Mayor Ganzon instituted an action for prohibition against
the respondent Secretary of Local Government (now, Interior) in the Regional Trial Court,
Iloilo City, where he succeeded in obtaining a writ of preliminary injunction. Presently, he
instituted CA-G.R. SP No. 16417, an action for prohibition, in the respondent Court of
Appeals.
Meanwhile, on May 3, 1990, the respondent Secretary issued another order, preventively
suspending Mayor Ganzon for another sixty days, the third time in twenty months, and
designating meantime Vice-Mayor Mansueto Malabor as acting mayor.
Mayor Ganzon commenced CA-G.R. SP No. 20736 of the Court of Appeals, a petition for
prohibition,
On June 26,1990, SC issued a Temporary Restraining Order, barring the respondent Secretary
from implementing the suspension orders, and restraining the enforcement of the Court of
Appeals' two decisions.
Mayor Ganzon's primary argument (G.R. Nos. 93252 and 95245) is that the Secretary of Local
Government is devoid, in any event, of any authority to suspend and remove local officials, an argument
reiterated by the petitioner Mary Ann Rivera Artieda (G.R. No. 93746)
Issue: Whether or not the Secretary of Local Government, as the President's alter ego, can suspend
and/or remove local officials.
Held: yes, per general supervision, in accordance with law
It is the petitioners' argument that the 1987 Constitution 20 no longer allows the President, as the 1935
and 1973 Constitutions did, to exercise the power of suspension and/or removal over local officials.
According to both petitioners, the Constitution is meant, first, to strengthen self-rule by local
government units and second, by deleting the phrase 21 as may be provided by law to strip the President
of the power of control over local governments. It is a view, so they contend, that finds support in the
debates of the Constitutional Commission. The provision in question reads as follows:
Sec. 4. The President of the Philippines shall exercise general supervision over local
governments. Provinces with respect to component cities and municipalities, and
cities and municipalities with respect to component barangays shall ensure that
the acts of their component units are within the scope of their prescribed powers
and functions. 22
It modifies a counterpart provision appearing in the 1935 Constitution, which we quote:
Sec. 10. The President shall have control of all the executive departments,
bureaus, or offices, exercise general supervision over all Local governments as
may be provided by law, and take care that the laws be faithfully executed. 23
The petitioners submit that the deletion (of "as may be provided by law") is significant, as their
argument goes, since: (1) the power of the President is "provided by law" and (2) hence, no law may
provide for it any longer.
It is to be noted that in meting out the suspensions under question, the Secretary of Local Government
acted in consonance with the specific legal provisions of Batas Blg. 337, the Local Government Code,
we quote:
Sec. 62. Notice of Hearing. Within seven days after the complaint is filed, the
Minister of local Government, or the sanggunian concerned, as the case may be,
shall require the respondent to submit his verified answer within seven days from
receipt of said complaint, and commence the hearing and investigation of the case
within ten days after receipt of such answer of the respondent. No investigation
shall be held within ninety days immediately prior to an election, and no
preventive suspension shall be imposed with the said period. If preventive
suspension has been imposed prior to the aforesaid period, the preventive
suspension shall be lifted. 24
Sec. 63. Preventive Suspension. (1) Preventive suspension may be imposed by
the Minister of Local Government if the respondent is a provincial or city official,
by the provincial governor if the respondent is an elective municipal official, or by
the city or municipal mayor if the respondent is an elective barangay official.
(2) Preventive suspension may be imposed at any time after the issues are joined,
when there is reasonable ground to believe that the respondent has committed
the act or acts complained of, when the evidence of culpability is strong, when the
 gravity of the offense so warrants, or when the continuance in office of the
respondent could influence the witnesses or pose a threat to the safety and
integrity of the records and other evidence. In all cases, preventive suspension
shall not extend beyond sixty days after the start of said suspension.
(3) At the expiration of sixty days, the suspended official shall be deemed
reinstated in office without prejudice to the continuation of the proceedings
against him until its termination. However ' if the delay in the proceedings of the
case is due to his fault, neglect or request, the time of the delay shall not be
counted in computing the time of suspension. 25
1) Did the 1987 Constitution, in deleting the phrase "as may be provided by law" intend to divest the
President of the power to investigate, suspend, discipline, and/or remove local officials?
NO
notwithstanding the change in the constitutional language, the charter did not intend to divest the
legislature of its right or the President of her prerogative as conferred by existing legislation to provide
administrative sanctions against local officials. It is our opinion that the omission (of "as may be
provided by law") signifies nothing more than to underscore local governments' autonomy from
congress and to break Congress' "control" over local government affairs. The Constitution did not,
however, intend, for the sake of local autonomy, to deprive the legislature of all authority over municipal
corporations, in particular, concerning discipline.
Autonomy does not, after all, contemplate making mini-states out of local government units, as in the
federal governments of the United States of America (or Brazil or Germany), although Jefferson is said to
have compared municipal corporations euphemistically to "small republics." 26 Autonomy, in the
constitutional sense, is subject to the guiding star, though not control, of the legislature, albeit the
legislative responsibility under the Constitution and as the "supervision clause" itself suggest-is to wean
local government units from over-dependence on the central government.
It is noteworthy that under the Charter, "local autonomy" is not instantly self-executing, but subject to,
among other things, the passage of a local government code, 27 a local tax law, 28 income distribution
legislation, 29 and a national representation law, 30 and measures 31 designed to realize autonomy at the
local level. It is also noteworthy that in spite of autonomy, the Constitution places the local government
under the general supervision of the Executive. It is noteworthy finally, that the Charter allows Congress
to include in the local government code provisions for removal of local officials, which suggest that
Congress may exercise removal powers, and as the existing Local Government Code has done, delegate
its exercise to the President.
"Control" has been defined as "the power of an officer to alter or modify or nullify or set aside what a
subordinate officer had done in the performance of his duties and to substitute the judgment of the
former for test of the latter." 36 "Supervision" on the other hand means "overseeing or the power or
authority of an officer to see that subordinate officers perform their duties. 37 As we held, 38 however,
"investigating" is not inconsistent with "overseeing", although it is a lesser power than "altering".
(2) Has the Constitution repealed Sections 62 and 63 of the Local Government Code?
NO
The Court is consequently reluctant to say that the new Constitution has repealed the Local Government
Code, Batas Blg. 37. As we said, "supervision" and "removal" are not incompatible terms and one may
stand with the other notwithstanding the stronger expression of local autonomy under the new Charter.
(3) What is the significance of the change in the constitutional language?
As the Constitution itself declares, local autonomy means "a more responsive and accountable local
government structure instituted through a system of decentralization." 53 The Constitution as we
observed, does nothing more than to break up the monopoly of the national government over the
affairs of local governments and as put by political adherents, to "liberate the local governments from
the imperialism of Manila." Autonomy, however, is not meant to end the relation of partnership and
inter-dependence between the central administration and local government units, or otherwise, to user
in a regime of federalism. The Charter has not taken such a radical step. Local governments, under the
Constitution, are subject to regulation, however limited, and for no other purpose than precisely, albeit
paradoxically, to enhance self- government.
As we observed in one case, 54 decentralization means devolution of national administration but not
power to the local levels. Thus:
Now, autonomy is either decentralization of administration or decentralization of
power. There is decentralization of administration when the central government
delegates administrative powers to political subdivisions in order to broaden the
base of government power and in the process to make local governments "more
responsive and accountable," and "ensure their fullest development as self-
reliant communities and make them more effective partners in the pursuit of
national development and social progress." At the same time, it relieves the
central government of the burden of managing local affairs and enables it to
concentrate on national concerns. The President exercises "general supervision"
over them, but only to "ensure that local affairs are administered according to
law." He has no control over their acts in the sense that he can substitute their
judgments with his own.
Decentralization of power, on the other hand, involves an abdication of political
power in the favor of local governments units declared to be autonomous, In
that case, the autonomous government is free to chart its own destiny and shape
its future with minimum intervention from central authorities. According to a
constitutional author, decentralization of power amounts to "self-immolation,"
since in that event, the autonomous government becomes accountable not to the
central authorities but to its constituency. 55
The successive sixty-day suspensions imposed on Mayor Rodolfo Ganzon is albeit another matter. What
bothers the Court, and what indeed looms very large, is the fact that since the Mayor is facing ten
administrative charges, the Mayor is in fact facing the possibility of 600 days of suspension, in the event
that all ten cases yield prima facie findings. The Court is not of course tolerating misfeasance in public
office (assuming that Mayor Ganzon is guilty of misfeasance) but it is certainly another question to make
him serve 600 days of suspension, which is effectively, to suspend him out of office. As we held: 56
2. Petitioner is a duly elected municipal mayor of Lianga, Surigao del Sur. His term
of office does not expire until 1986. Were it not for this information and the
suspension decreed by the Sandiganbayan according to the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act, he would have been all this while in the full discharge of his
functions as such municipal mayor. He was elected precisely to do so. As of
 October 26, 1983, he has been unable to. it is a basic assumption of the electoral
process implicit in the right of suffrage that the people are entitled to the services
of elective officials of their choice. For misfeasance or malfeasance, any of them
could, of course, be proceeded against administratively or, as in this instance,
criminally. In either case, Ms culpability must be established. Moreover, if there be
a criminal action, he is entitled to the constitutional presumption of innocence. A
preventive suspension may be justified. Its continuance, however, for an
unreasonable length of time raises a due process question. For even if thereafter
he were acquitted, in the meanwhile his right to hold office had been nullified.
Clearly, there would be in such a case an injustice suffered by him. Nor is he the
only victim. There is injustice inflicted likewise on the people of Lianga They were
deprived of the services of the man they had elected to serve as mayor. In that
sense, to paraphrase Justice Cardozo, the protracted continuance of this
preventive suspension had outrun the bounds of reason and resulted in sheer
oppression. A denial of due process is thus quite manifest. It is to avoid such an
unconstitutional application that the order of suspension should be lifted. 57
The plain truth is that this Court has been ill at ease with suspensions, for the above reasons, 58 and so
also, because it is out of the ordinary to have a vacancy in local government. The sole objective of a
suspension, as we have held, 59 is simply "to prevent the accused from hampering the normal cause of
the investigation with his influence and authority over possible witnesses" 60 or to keep him off "the
records and other evidence. 61
As we observed earlier, imposing 600 days of suspension which is not a remote possibility Mayor Ganzon
is to all intents and purposes, to make him spend the rest of his term in inactivity. It is also to make, to all
intents and purposes, his suspension permanent.
The Court is not to be mistaken for obstructing the efforts of the respondent Secretary to see that justice
is done in Iloilo City, yet it is hardly any argument to inflict on Mayor Ganzon successive suspensions
when apparently, the respondent Secretary has had sufficient time to gather the necessary evidence to
build a case against the Mayor without suspending him a day longer. What is intriguing is that the
respondent Secretary has been cracking down, so to speak, on the Mayor piecemeal apparently, to pin
him down ten times the pain, when he, the respondent Secretary, could have pursued a consolidated
effort.
We reiterate that we are not precluding the President, through the Secretary of Interior from exercising
a legal power, yet we are of the opinion that the Secretary of Interior is exercising that power
oppressively, and needless to say, with a grave abuse of discretion.
We are therefore allowing Mayor Rodolfo Ganzon to suffer the duration of his third suspension and
lifting, for the purpose, the Temporary Restraining Order earlier issued.
Insofar as the seven remaining charges are concerned, we are urging the Department of Local
Government, upon the finality of this Decision, to undertake steps to expedite the same, subject to
Mayor Ganzon's usual remedies of appeal, judicial or administrative, or certiorari, if warranted, and
meanwhile, we are precluding the Secretary from meting out further suspensions based on those
remaining complaints, notwithstanding findings of prima facie evidence.
In resume the Court is laying down the following rules:
1. Local autonomy, under the Constitution, involves a mere decentralization of administration, not of
power, in which local officials remain accountable to the central government in the manner the law may
provide;
2. The new Constitution does not prescribe federalism;
3. The change in constitutional language (with respect to the supervision clause) was meant but to deny
legislative control over local governments; it did not exempt the latter from legislative regulations
provided regulation is consistent with the fundamental premise of autonomy;
4. Since local governments remain accountable to the national authority, the latter may, by law, and in
the manner set forth therein, impose disciplinary action against local officials;
5. "Supervision" and "investigation" are not inconsistent terms; "investigation" does not signify "control"
(which the President does not have);
6. The petitioner, Mayor Rodolfo Ganzon. may serve the suspension so far ordered, but may no longer
be suspended for the offenses he was charged originally; provided:
a) that delays in the investigation of those charges "due to
his fault, neglect or request, (the time of the delay) shall not
be counted in computing the time of suspension. [Supra,
sec. 63(3)]
b) that if during, or after the expiration of, his preventive
suspension, the petitioner commits another or other crimes
and abuses for which proper charges are filed against him by
the aggrieved party or parties, his previous suspension shall
not be a bar to his being preventively suspended again, if
warranted under subpar. (2), Section 63 of the Local
Government Code.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petitions are DISMISSED. The Temporary Restraining Order
issued is LIFTED. The suspensions of the petitioners are AFFIRMED, provided that the petitioner, Mayor
Rodolfo Ganzon, may not be made to serve future suspensions on account of any of the remaining
administrative charges pending against him for acts committed prior to August 11, 1988. The Secretary
of Interior is ORDERED to consolidate all such administrative cases pending against Mayor Ganzon.
The sixty-day suspension against the petitioner, Mary Ann Rivera Artieda, is AFFIRMED. No costs.
Basco v PAGCOR
GR No 91649
May 14, 1991
Paras
( ang point ani k naa sa page 3, , the principle of local autonomy under the 1987 Constitution simply
means "decentralization"It does not make local governments sovereign within the state or an "imperium
in imperio."; In a unitary system of government, such as the government under the Philippine
Constitution, local governments can only be an intra sovereign subdivision of one sovereign nation, it
cannot be an imperium in imperio. Local government in such a system can only mean a measure of
decentralization of the function of government )
1. not imperium in imperio
2. congress has control over taxation (keyword: limitations prescribed by Comgress)
3. instrumentality cannot be locally taxed because it is an agent of the national government
Facts:
Petitioners filed the instant petition seeking to annul the Philippine Amusement and Gaming
Corporation (PAGCOR) Charter PD 1869, because it is allegedly contrary to morals, public
policy and order, and because
A. It constitutes a waiver of a right prejudicial to a third person with a
right recognized by law. It waived the Manila City government's right to
impose taxes and license fees, which is recognized by law;
B. For the same reason stated in the immediately preceding paragraph,
the law has intruded into the local government's right to impose local
 taxes and license fees. This, in contravention of the constitutionally
enshrined principle of local autonomy;
C. It violates the equal protection clause of the constitution in that it
legalizes PAGCOR conducted gambling, while most other forms of
gambling are outlawed, together with prostitution, drug trafficking and
other vices;
D. It violates the avowed trend of the Cory government away from
monopolistic and crony economy, and toward free enterprise and
privatization. (p. 2, Amended Petition; p. 7, Rollo)
The Philippine Amusements and Gaming Corporation (PAGCOR) was "to establish, operate and maintain
gambling casinos on land or water within the territorial jurisdiction of the Philippines."
Petitioners contend that P.D. 1869 constitutes a waiver of the right of the City of Manila to
impose taxes and legal fees; that the exemption clause in P.D. 1869 is violative of the
principle of local autonomy. They must be referring to Section 13 par. (2) of P.D. 1869 which
exempts PAGCOR, as the franchise holder from paying any "tax of any kind or form, income or
otherwise, as well as fees, charges or levies of whatever nature, whether National or Local."
(2) Income and other taxes. a) Franchise Holder: No tax of any kind or form,
income or otherwise as well as fees, charges or levies of whatever nature, whether
National or Local, shall be assessed and collected under this franchise from the
Corporation; nor shall any form or tax or charge attach in any way to the earnings
of the Corporation, except a franchise tax of five (5%) percent of the gross
revenues or earnings derived by the Corporation from its operations under this
franchise. Such tax shall be due and payable quarterly to the National Government
and shall be in lieu of all kinds of taxes, levies, fees or assessments of any kind,
nature or description, levied, established or collected by any municipal, provincial
or national government authority (Section 13 [2]).
Issue: WON P.D. 1869 constitutes a waiver of the right of the City of Manila to impose taxes and legal
fees
Held:
Their contention stated hereinabove is without merit for the following reasons:
(a) The City of Manila, being a mere Municipal corporation has no inherent right to impose
taxes Thus, "the Charter or statute must plainly show an intent to confer that power or the
municipality cannot assume it" (Medina v. City of Baguio, 12 SCRA 62). Its "power to tax"
therefore must always yield to a legislative act which is superior having been passed upon by
the state itself which has the "inherent power to tax" (Bernas, the Revised [1973] Philippine
Constitution, Vol. 1, 1983 ed. p. 445).
(b) The Charter of the City of Manila is subject to control by Congress. It should be stressed
that "municipal corporations are mere creatures of Congress" (Unson v. Lacson, G.R. No.
7909, January 18, 1957) which has the power to "create and abolish municipal corporations"
due to its "general legislative powers" (Asuncion v. Yriantes, 28 Phil. 67; Merdanillo v.
Orandia, 5 SCRA 541). Congress, therefore, has the power of control over Local governments
(Hebron v. Reyes, G.R. No. 9124, July 2, 1950). And if Congress can grant the City of Manila
the power to tax certain matters, it can also provide for exemptions or even take back the
power.
(c) The City of Manila's power to impose license fees on gambling, has long been revoked. As
early as 1975, the power of local governments to regulate gambling thru the grant of
"franchise, licenses or permits" was withdrawn by P.D. No. 771 and was vested exclusively on
the National Government, thus:
Sec. 1. Any provision of law to the contrary notwithstanding, the authority of
chartered cities and other local governments to issue license, permit or other form
of franchise to operate, maintain and establish horse and dog race tracks, jai-alai
and other forms of gambling is hereby revoked.
Sec. 2. Hereafter, all permits or franchises to operate, maintain and establish,
horse and dog race tracks, jai-alai and other forms of gambling shall be issued by
the national government upon proper application and verification of the
qualification of the applicant . . .
Therefore, only the National Government has the power to issue "licenses or permits" for the
operation of gambling. Necessarily, the power to demand or collect license fees which is a
consequence of the issuance of "licenses or permits" is no longer vested in the City of Manila.
(d) Local governments have no power to tax instrumentalities of the National Government.
PAGCOR is a government owned or controlled corporation with an original charter, PD 1869.
All of its shares of stocks are owned by the National Government. In addition to its corporate
powers (Sec. 3, Title II, PD 1869) it also exercises regulatory powers thus:
Sec. 9. Regulatory Power. The Corporation shall maintain a Registry of the
affiliated entities, and shall exercise all the powers, authority and the
responsibilities vested in the Securities and Exchange Commission over such
affiliating entities mentioned under the preceding section, including, but not
limited to amendments of Articles of Incorporation and By-Laws, changes in
corporate term, structure, capitalization and other matters concerning the
operation of the affiliated entities, the provisions of the Corporation Code of the
Philippines to the contrary notwithstanding, except only with respect to original
incorporation.
This doctrine emanates from the "supremacy" of the National Government over local
governments.
Justice Holmes, speaking for the Supreme Court, made reference to the entire
absence of power on the part of the States to touch, in that way (taxation) at least,
the instrumentalities of the United States (Johnson v. Maryland, 254 US 51) and it
can be agreed that no state or political subdivision can regulate a federal
instrumentality in such a way as to prevent it from consummating its federal
responsibilities, or even to seriously burden it in the accomplishment of them.
(Antieau, Modern Constitutional Law, Vol. 2, p. 140, emphasis supplied)
Otherwise, mere creatures of the State can defeat National policies thru extermination of
what local authorities may perceive to be undesirable activities or enterprise using the power
to tax as "a tool for regulation" (U.S. v. Sanchez, 340 US 42).
The power to tax which was called by Justice Marshall as the "power to destroy" (Mc Culloch
v. Maryland, supra) cannot be allowed to defeat an instrumentality or creation of the very
entity which has the inherent power to wield it.
(e) Petitioners also argue that the Local Autonomy Clause of the Constitution will be violated
by P.D. 1869. This is a pointless argument. Article X of the 1987 Constitution (on Local
Autonomy) provides:
Sec. 5. Each local government unit shall have the power to create its own source of
revenue and to levy taxes, fees, and other charges subject to such guidelines and
limitation as the congress may provide, consistent with the basic policy on local
autonomy. Such taxes, fees and charges shall accrue exclusively to the local
government. (emphasis supplied)
The power of local government to "impose taxes and fees" is always subject to "limitations"
which Congress may provide by law. Since PD 1869 remains an "operative" law until
"amended, repealed or revoked" (Sec. 3, Art. XVIII, 1987 Constitution), its "exemption clause"
remains as an exception to the exercise of the power of local governments to impose taxes
and fees. It cannot therefore be violative but rather is consistent with the principle of local
autonomy.
Besides, the principle of local autonomy under the 1987 Constitution simply means "decentralization" It
does not make local governments sovereign within the state or an "imperium in imperio."
Local Government has been described as a political subdivision of a nation or state which is constituted
by law and has substantial control of local affairs. In a unitary system of government, such as the
government under the Philippine Constitution, local governments can only be an intra sovereign
subdivision of one sovereign nation, it cannot be an imperium in imperio. Local government in such a
system can only mean a measure of decentralization of the function of government. (emphasis supplied)
As to what state powers should be "decentralized" and what may be delegated to local government units
remains a matter of policy, which concerns wisdom. It is therefore a political question.
What is settled is that the matter of regulating, taxing or otherwise dealing with gambling is a State
concern and hence, it is the sole prerogative of the State to retain it or delegate it to local governments.
As gambling is usually an offense against the State, legislative grant or express charter power is generally
necessary to empower the local corporation to deal with the subject. . . . In the absence of express grant
of power to enact, ordinance provisions on this subject which are inconsistent with the state laws are
void.
5. Magtajas v. Pryce
G.R. No. 111097 July 20, 1994 CRUZ, J
FACTS:
PAGCOR is a corporation created directly by P.D. 1869 to help centralize and regulate all
games of chance, including casinos on land and sea within the territorial jurisdiction of the
Philippines.
PAGCOR planned to operate a casino in Cagayan de Oro City and leased buildings from Pryce
Properties for this purpose.
The reaction of the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Cagayan de Oro City was swift and hostile. It
enacted the following ordinances:
ISSUE: Whether or not the ordinances issued by Cagayan de Oro City pursuant to Art. 3, section 458,
No. (4), sub paragraph VI of the Local Government Code of 1991 (Rep. Act 7160) and under Art. 99, No.
(4), Paragraph VI of the implementing rules of the Local Government Code are valid
RULING: NO. We hold that the power of PAGCOR to centralize and regulate all games of chance,
including casinos on land and sea within the territorial jurisdiction of the Philippines, remains
unimpaired. P.D. 1869 has not been modified by the Local Government Code, which empowers the local
government units to prevent or suppress only those forms of gambling prohibited by law.
What can be prohibited by the LGU is illegal/prohibited gambling
We begin by observing that under Sec. 458 of the Local Government Code, local government units are
authorized to prevent or suppress, among others, "gambling and other prohibited games of chance."
Obviously, this provision excludes games of chance which are not prohibited but are in fact permitted
by law.
Under the rule of noscitur a sociis, a word or phrase should be interpreted in relation to, or given the
same meaning of, words with which it is associated. Accordingly, we conclude that since the word
"gambling" is associated with "and other prohibited games of chance," the word should be read as
referring to only illegal gambling which, like the other prohibited games of chance, must be prevented or
suppressed.
PD 1869 not repealed by LGC of 1991 (RA 7620)

Date Title Brief Content
December 7, 1992 ORDINANCE NO. 3353 AN ORDINANCE PROHIBITING
THE ISSUANCE OF BUSINESS
PERMIT AND CANCELLING
EXISTING BUSINESS PERMIT TO
ANY ESTABLISHMENT FOR THE
USING AND ALLOWING TO BE
USED ITS PREMISES OR
PORTION THEREOF FOR THE
OPERATION OF CASINO.
On January 4, 1993 Ordinance No. 3375-93 AN ORDINANCE PROHIBITING
THE OPERATION OF CASINO
AND PROVIDING PENALTY FOR
VIOLATION THEREFOR.
Other resolutions passed by CDO: (but ang ordinances ra an gi-assail haaaa)
City Council established a policy as early as 1990 against CASINO under its Resolution No.
2295
October 14, 1992, the City Council passed another Resolution No. 2673, reiterating its policy
against the establishment of CASINO
It is noteworthy that the petitioners have cited only Par. (f) of the repealing clause, conveniently
discarding the rest of the provision which painstakingly mentions the specific laws or the parts thereof
which are repealed (or modified) by the Code. Significantly, P.D. 1869 is not one of them.
Furthermore, it is a familiar rule that implied repeals are not lightly presumed in the absence of a clear
and unmistakable showing of such intention. There is no sufficient indication of an implied repeal of P.D.
1869. On the contrary, as the private respondent points out, PAGCOR is mentioned as the source of
funding in two later enactments of Congress, to wit, R.A. 7309 and R.A. 7648.
It is a canon of legal hermeneutics that instead of pitting one statute against another in an inevitably
destructive confrontation, courts must exert every effort to reconcile them, remembering that both laws
deserve a becoming respect as the handiwork of a coordinate branch of the government.
The proper resolution of the problem at hand is to hold that under the Local Government Code, local
government units may (and indeed must) prevent and suppress all kinds of gambling within their
territories except only those allowed by statutes like P.D. 1869. The exception reserved in such laws
must be read into the Code, to make both the Code and such laws equally effective and mutually
complementary.
Municipal ordinances should not contravene statute

Pryce assailed the ordinances before the Court of Appeals, where it was joined by PAGCOR as intervenor
and supplemental petitioner. Their challenge succeeded. On March 31, 1993, the Court of Appeals
declared the ordinances invalid and issued the writ prayed for to prohibit their
enforcement. 1 Reconsideration of this decision was denied on July 13, 1993. Hence, this instant petition
filed by the Mayor on behalf of CDO City
On the contrary, we find that the ordinances violate P.D. 1869, which has the character and force of a
statute, as well as the public policy expressed in the decree allowing the playing of certain games of
chance despite the prohibition of gambling in general.
The rationale of the requirement that the ordinances should not contravene a statute is obvious.
Municipal governments are only agents of the national government. Local councils exercise only
delegated legislative powers conferred on them by Congress as the national lawmaking body. The
delegate cannot be superior to the principal or exercise powers higher than those of the latter. It is a
heresy to suggest that the local government units can undo the acts of Congress, from which they have
derived their power in the first place, and negate by mere ordinance the mandate of the statute.
Relationship between local and national governments
Municipal corporations owe their origin to, and derive their powers and rights
wholly from the legislature. It breathes into them the breath of life, without which
they cannot exist. As it creates, so it may destroy. As it may destroy, it may abridge
and control. Unless there is some constitutional limitation on the right, the
legislature might, by a single act, and if we can suppose it capable of so great a
folly and so great a wrong, sweep from existence all of the municipal corporations
in the State, and the corporation could not prevent it. We know of no limitation on
the right so far as to the corporation themselves are concerned. They are, so to
phrase it, the mere tenants at will of the legislature. 11
This basic relationship between the national legislature and the local government units has not been
enfeebled by the new provisions in the Constitution strengthening the policy of local autonomy. Without
meaning to detract from that policy, we here confirm that Congress retains control of the local
government units although in significantly reduced degree now than under our previous Constitutions.
The power to create still includes the power to destroy. The power to grant still includes the power to
withhold or recall. True, there are certain notable innovations in the Constitution, like the direct
conferment on the local government units of the power to tax, 12 which cannot now be withdrawn by
mere statute. By and large, however, the national legislature is still the principal of the local government
units, which cannot defy its will or modify or violate it.
Further point for PAGCOR:
The morality of gambling is not a justiciable issue. Gambling is not illegal per se. While it is generally
considered inimical to the interests of the people, there is nothing in the Constitution categorically
proscribing or penalizing gambling or, for that matter, even mentioning it at all. It is left to Congress to
deal with the activity as it sees fit. In the exercise of its own discretion, the legislature may prohibit
gambling altogether or allow it without limitation or it may prohibit some forms of gambling and allow
others for whatever reasons it may consider sufficient.
Hence, the ordinances are invalid.
Arguments of Petitioners and Powers granted to municipal corporations under the LGC (OPTIONAL
READING)
1. GENERAL WELFARE CLAUSE
Cagayan de Oro City, like other local political subdivisions, is empowered to enact ordinances for the
purposes indicated in the Local Government Code. It is expressly vested with the police power under
what is known as the General Welfare Clause now embodied in Section 16 as follows:
Sec. 16. General Welfare. Every local government unit shall exercise the
powers expressly granted, those necessarily implied therefrom, as well as
powers necessary, appropriate, or incidental for its efficient and effective
governance, and those which are essential to the promotion of the general
welfare. Within their respective territorial jurisdictions, local government units
shall ensure and support, among other things, the preservation and enrichment of
culture, promote health and safety, enhance the right of the people to a balanced
ecology, encourage and support the development of appropriate and self-reliant
scientific and technological capabilities, improve public morals, enhance economic
prosperity and social justice, promote full employment among their residents,
maintain peace and order, and preserve the comfort and convenience of their
inhabitants.
2. Sec. 458.
The Sangguniang Panlungsod, as the legislative body of the city, shall enact
ordinances, approve resolutions and appropriate funds for the general welfare of
the city and its inhabitants pursuant to Section 16 of this Code.
(v) Enact ordinances intended to prevent, suppress and impose appropriate
penalties for habitual drunkenness in public places, vagrancy, mendicancy,
prostitution, establishment and maintenance of houses of ill repute, gambling and
other prohibited games of chance, fraudulent devices and ways to obtain money
or property, drug addiction, maintenance of drug dens, drug pushing, juvenile
delinquency, the printing, distribution or exhibition of obscene or pornographic
materials or publications, and such other activities inimical to the welfare and
morals of the inhabitants of the city
regulate properties and businesses within their territorial limits in the interest of
the general welfare.
Arguments:
1. LGC empowered LGUs to prohibit all kinds of gambling without distinction. Ubi lex non
distinguit, nec nos distinguere debemos.
2. It is submitted that this interpretation is consonant with the policy of local autonomy (Sec. 25,
Art. X)
3. adoption of the Local Government Code, it is pointed out, had the effect of modifying the
charter of the PAGCOR. The Code is not only a later enactment than P.D. 1869 and so is
deemed to prevail in case of inconsistencies between them.
4. assuming there is doubt regarding the effect of the Local Government Code on P.D. 1869, the
doubt must be resolved in favor of the petitioners, in accordance with the direction in the
Code calling for its liberal interpretation in favor of the local government units.
5. petitioners also attack gambling as intrinsically harmful and cite various provisions of the
Constitution and several decisions of this Court expressive of the general and official
disapprobation of the vice.
G.R. No. 129093 August 30, 2001
HON. JOSE D. LINA, JR., SANGGUNIANG PANLALAWIGAN OF LAGUNA, and HON. CALIXTO
CATAQUIZ,petitioners,
vs.
HON. FRANCISCO DIZON PAO and TONY CALVENTO, respondents.
FACTS:
This is a petition for review seeking the reversal of the decision of the RTC, enjoining petitioners from
implementing or enforcing KAPASIYAHAN BILANG 508, TAON 1995, of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of
laguna..
On 29 December 1995, Respondent Tony Calvento was appointed agent by the PCSO to install Terminal
OM for the operation of lotto. He asked Mayor Calixto Cataquiz for mayors permit to open the lotto
outlet. However, this was denied by the said mayor in its letter. The ground for the said denial was
ordinace passed by the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Laguna entitled KAPASIYAHAN BILANG 508, TAON
1995.
Respondent filed a complaint for declaratory relief with prayer for preliminary injunction and TRO.
On February 10, 1997, the respondent judge, Francisco Dizon Pao, promulgated his decision enjoining
the petitioners from implementing or enforcing resolution or Kapasiyahan Blg. 508, T. 1995
Petitioners contend that the assailed resolution is a valid policy declaration of the Provincial Government
of Laguna of its vehement objection to the operation of lotto and all forms of gambling.
For his part, respondent Calvento argues that the questioned resolution is, in effect, a curtailment of the
power of the state since in this case the national legislature itself had already declared lotto as legal and
permitted its operations around the country.
ISSUE:
1. whether Kapasiyahan Blg. 508, T. 1995 of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Laguna and the
denial of a mayor's permit based thereon are valid; and;
2. Whether prior consultations and approval by the concerned Sanggunian are needed before a
lotto system can be operated in a given local government unit.
HELD:
As a policy statement expressing the local government's objection to the lotto, such resolution is valid.
This is part of the local government's autonomy to air its views which may be contrary to that of the
national government. However, this freedom to exercise contrary views does not mean that local
governments may actually enact ordinances that go against laws duly enacted by Congress.
In our system of government, the power of local government units to legislate and enact ordinances
and resolutions is merely a delegated power coming from Congress. As held in Tatel vs.
Virac,ordinances should not contravene an existing statute enacted by Congress. The reasons for this is
obvious, as elucidated in Magtajas v. Pryce Properties Corp.
Municipal governments are only agents of the national government. Local councils exercise
only delegated legislative powers conferred upon them by Congress as the national
lawmaking body. The delegate cannot be superior to the principal or exercise powers higher
than those of the latter. It is a heresy to suggest that the local government units can undo
the acts of Congress, from which they have derived their power in the first place, and
negate by mere ordinance the mandate of the statute.
Municipal corporations owe their origin to, and derive their powers and rights wholly from
the legislature. It breathes into them the breath of life, without which they cannot exist. As it
creates, so it may destroy. As it may destroy, it may abridge and control. Unless there is some
constitutional limitation on the right, the legislature might, by a single act, and if we can
suppose it capable of so great a folly and so great a wrong, sweep from existence all of the
municipal corporations in the state, and the corporation could not prevent it. We know of no
limitation on the right so far as the corporation themselves are concerned. They are, so to
phrase it, the mere tenants at will of the legislature (citing Clinton vs. Ceder Rapids, etc.
Railroad Co., 24 Iowa 455).
To conclude our resolution of the first issue, respondent mayor of San Pedro, cannot avail
of Kapasiyahan Bilang 508, Taon 1995, of the Provincial Board of Laguna as justification to prohibit lotto
in his municipality. For said resolution is nothing but an expression of the local legislative unit concerned.
The Board's enactment, like spring water, could not rise above its source of power, the national
legislature.
As for the second issue, we hold that petitioners erred in declaring that Sections 2 (c) and 27 of Republic
Act 7160, otherwise known as the Local Government Code of 1991, apply mandatorily in the setting up
of lotto outlets around the country.
Pimentel vs. Ochoa
GAA of 2011 re: P21B Conditional Cast Transfer Program : recentralization of of government functions.
Petitioner Aquilino Pimentel, Jr., a former Senator, joined by Sergio Tadeo, incumbent President of the
Association of Barangay Captains of Cabanatuan City, Nueva Ecija, and Nelson Alcantara, incumbent
Barangay Captain of Barangay Sta. Monica, Quezon City, challenges before the Court the disbursement
of public funds and the implementation of the CCTP which are alleged to have encroached into the local
autonomy of the LGUs.
The Issue
THE P21 BILLION CCTP BUDGET ALLOCATION UNDER THE DSWD IN THE GAA FY 2011 VIOLATES ART. II,
SEC. 25 & ART. X, SEC. 3 OF THE 1987 CONSTITUTION IN RELATION TO SEC. 17 OF THE LOCAL
GOVERNMENT CODE OF 1991 BY PROVIDING FOR THE RECENTRALIZATION OF THE NATIONAL
GOVERNMENT IN THE DELIVERY OF BASIC SERVICES ALREADY DEVOLVED TO THE LGUS.
Ruling:
While the aforementioned provision charges the LGUs to take on the functions and responsibilities that
have already been devolved upon them from the national agencies on the aspect of providing for basic
services and facilities in their respective jurisdictions, paragraph (c) of the same provision provides a
categorical exception of cases involving nationally-funded projects, facilities, programs and services,
The essence of this express reservation of power by the national government is that, unless an LGU is
particularly designated as the implementing agency, it has no power over a program for which funding
has been provided by the national government under the annual general appropriations act, even if the
program involves the delivery of basic services within the jurisdiction of the LGU.
The national government is, thus, not precluded from taking a direct hand in the formulation and
implementation of national development programs especially where it is implemented locally in
coordination with the LGUs concerned.
WHEREFORE, premtses considered, the petition ts hereby DISMISSED.
GRECO BELGICA VS EXECUTIVE SECRETARY PAQUITO OCHOA
This case is consolidated with G.R. No. 208493 and G.R. No. 209251.
The so-called pork barrel system has been around in the Philippines since about 1922. Pork Barrel is
commonly known as the lump-sum, discretionary funds of the members of the Congress. It underwent
several legal designations from Congressional Pork Barrel to the latest Priority Development
Assistance Fund or PDAF. The allocation for the pork barrel is integrated in the annual General
Appropriations Act (GAA).
Since 2011, the allocation of the PDAF has been done in the following manner:
a. P70 million: for each member of the lower house; broken down to P40 million for hard projects
(infrastructure projects like roads, buildings, schools, etc.), and P30 million for soft projects
(scholarship grants, medical assistance, livelihood programs, IT development, etc.);
b. P200 million: for each senator; broken down to P100 million for hard projects, P100 million for soft
projects;
c. P200 million: for the Vice-President; broken down to P100 million for hard projects, P100 million for
soft projects.
The PDAF articles in the GAA do provide for realignment of funds whereby certain cabinet members may
request for the realignment of funds into their department provided that the request for realignment is
approved or concurred by the legislator concerned.
Presidential Pork Barrel
The president does have his own source of fund albeit not included in the GAA. The so-called presidential
pork barrel comes from two sources: (a) the Malampaya Funds, from the Malampaya Gas Project this
has been around since 1976, and (b) the Presidential Social Fund which is derived from the earnings of
PAGCOR this has been around since about 1983.
Pork Barrel Scam Controversy
Ever since, the pork barrel system has been besieged by allegations of corruption. In July 2013, six
whistle blowers, headed by Benhur Luy, exposed that for the last decade, the corruption in the pork
barrel system had been facilitated by Janet Lim Napoles. Napoles had been helping lawmakers in
funneling their pork barrel funds into about 20 bogus NGOs (non-government organizations)
which would make it appear that government funds are being used in legit existing projects but are in
fact going to ghost projects. An audit was then conducted by the Commission on Audit and the results
thereof concurred with the exposes of Luy et al.
Motivated by the foregoing, Greco Belgica and several others, filed various petitions before the Supreme
Court questioning the constitutionality of the pork barrel system.
ISSUES:
I. Whether or not the congressional pork barrel system is constitutional.
II. Whether or not presidential pork barrel system is constitutional.
HELD:
I. No, the congressional pork barrel system is unconstitutional. It is unconstitutional because it violates
the following principles:
a. Separation of Powers
As a rule, the budgeting power lies in Congress. It regulates the release of funds (power of the purse).
The executive, on the other hand, implements the laws this includes the GAA to which the PDAF is a
part of. Only the executive may implement the law but under the pork barrel system, whats happening
was that, after the GAA, itself a law, was enacted, the legislators themselves dictate as to which projects
their PDAF funds should be allocated to a clear act of implementing the law they enacted a violation
of the principle of separation of powers. (Note in the older case of PHILCONSA vs Enriquez, it was ruled
that pork barrel, then called as CDF or the Countrywide Development Fund, was constitutional insofar as
the legislators only recommend where their pork barrel funds go).
This is also highlighted by the fact that in realigning the PDAF, the executive will still have to get the
concurrence of the legislator concerned.
b. Non-delegability of Legislative Power
As a rule, the Constitution vests legislative power in Congress alone. (The Constitution does grant the
people legislative power but only insofar as the processes of referendum and initiative are concerned).
That being, legislative power cannot be delegated by Congress for it cannot delegate further that which
was delegated to it by the Constitution.
Exceptions to the rule are:
(i) delegated legislative power to local government units but this shall involve purely local matters;
(ii) authority of the President to, by law, exercise powers necessary and proper to carry out a declared
national policy in times of war or other national emergency, or fix within specified limits, and subject to
such limitations and restrictions as Congress may impose, tariff rates, import and export quotas, tonnage
and wharfage dues, and other duties or imposts within the framework of the national development
program of the Government.
In this case, the PDAF articles which allow the individual legislator to identify the projects to which his
PDAF money should go to is a violation of the rule on non-delegability of legislative power. The power to
appropriate funds is solely lodged in Congress (in the two houses comprising it) collectively and not
lodged in the individual members. Further, nowhere in the exceptions does it state that the Congress can
delegate the power to the individual member of Congress.
c. Principle of Checks and Balances
One feature in the principle of checks and balances is the power of the president to veto items in the
GAA which he may deem to be inappropriate. But this power is already being undermined because of the
fact that once the GAA is approved, the legislator can now identify the project to which he will
appropriate his PDAF. Under such system, how can the president veto the appropriation made by the
legislator if the appropriation is made after the approval of the GAA again, Congress cannot choose a
mode of budgeting which effectively renders the constitutionally-given power of the President useless.
d. Local Autonomy
As a rule, the local governments have the power to manage their local affairs. Through their Local
Development Councils (LDCs), the LGUs can develop their own programs and policies concerning their
localities. But with the PDAF, particularly on the part of the members of the house of representatives,
whats happening is that a congressman can either bypass or duplicate a project by the LDC and later on
claim it as his own. This is an instance where the national government (note, a congressman is a national
officer) meddles with the affairs of the local government and this is contrary to the State policy
embodied in the Constitution on local autonomy. Its good if thats all that is happening under the pork
barrel system but worse, the PDAF becomes more of a personal fund on the part of legislators.
II. Yes, the presidential pork barrel is valid.
The main issue raised by Belgica et al against the presidential pork barrel is that it is unconstitutional
because it violates Section 29 (1), Article VI of the Constitution which provides:
No money shall be paid out of the Treasury except in pursuance of an appropriation made by law.
Belgica et al emphasized that the presidential pork comes from the earnings of the Malampaya and
PAGCOR and not from any appropriation from a particular legislation.
The Supreme Court disagrees as it ruled that PD 910, which created the Malampaya Fund, as well as PD
1869 (as amended by PD 1993), which amended PAGCORs charter, provided for the appropriation, to
wit:
(i) PD 910: Section 8 thereof provides that all fees, among others, collected from certain energy-related
ventures shall form part of a special fund (the Malampaya Fund) which shall be used to further finance
energy resource development and for other purposes which the President may direct;
(ii) PD 1869, as amended: Section 12 thereof provides that a part of PAGCORs earnings shall be allocated
to a General Fund (the Presidential Social Fund) which shall be used in government infrastructure
projects.
These are sufficient laws which met the requirement of Section 29, Article VI of the Constitution. The
appropriation contemplated therein does not have to be a particular appropriation as it can be a general
appropriation as in the case of PD 910 and PD 1869.
6. ABBAS v. COMELEC
G.R. No. 89651 November 10, 1989, G.R. No. 89965 November 10, 1989
FACTS:
The present controversy relates to the plebiscite in thirteen (13) provinces and nine (9) cities in
Mindanao and Palawan, 1 scheduled for November 19, 1989, in implementation of Republic Act No.
6734, entitled "An Act Providing for an Organic Act for the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao."
December 23, 1976- Tripoli Agreement between MNLF and RP for creation of an autonomous
region in Mindanao
In 1987, a new Constitution was ratified, which for the first time provided for regional
autonomy, Article X, section 15 of the charter.
Pursuant to the constitutional mandate, R.A. No. 6734 was enacted and signed into law on
August 1, 1989.
ISSUE: Whether or not RA 6734 is unconstitutional
RULING: NO.
(We shall go through the case per argument of the petitioners)
1. Petitioners claim that RA 6734 contradicts the Tripoli Agreement. (Solicitor General claims
that the Tripoli Agreement is not a binding treaty/international agreement)
We find it neither necessary nor determinative of the case to rule on the nature of the Tripoli
Agreement and its binding effect on the Philippine Government whether under public
international or internal Philippine law. In the first place, it is now the Constitution itself that
provides for the creation of an autonomous region in Muslim Mindanao.
Assuming for the sake of argument that the Tripoli Agreement is a binding treaty or
international agreement, it would then constitute part of the law of the land. But as internal
law it would not be superior to R.A. No. 6734, an enactment of the Congress of the
Philippines, rather it would be in the same class as the latter.
 2. Abbas argues that R.A. No. 6734 unconditionally creates an autonomous region in
Mindanao, contrary to the aforequoted provisions of the Constitution on the autonomous
region which make the creation of such region dependent upon the outcome of the
plebiscite. He claims that the tenor of RA 6734 makes the creation of an autonomous region
absolute, such that even if only two provinces vote in favor of autonomy, an autonomous
region would still be created composed of the two provinces where the favorable votes
were obtained.
Under the Constitution and R.A. No 6734, the creation of the autonomous region shall take
effect only when approved by a majority of the votes cast by the constituent units in a
plebiscite, and only those provinces and cities where a majority vote in favor of the Organic
Act shall be included in the autonomous region. The provinces and cities wherein such a
majority is not attained shall not be included in the autonomous region. It may be that even if
an autonomous region is created, not all of the thirteen (13) provinces and nine (9) cities
mentioned in Article II, section 1 (2) of R.A. No. 6734 shall be included therein. The single
plebiscite contemplated by the Constitution and R.A. No. 6734 will therefore be
determinative of (1) whether there shall be an autonomous region in Muslim Mindanao and
(2) which provinces and cities, among those enumerated in R.A. No. 6734, shall comprise it.
Will it require the majority of all the votes cast in the plebiscite or the majority of each
constituent unit?
It will readily be seen that the creation of the autonomous region is made to depend, not on the total
majority vote in the plebiscite, but on the will of the majority in each of the constituent units and the
proviso underscores this. It is thus clear that what is required by the Constitution is a simple majority
of votes approving the organic Act in individual constituent units and not a double majority of the
votes in all constituent units put together, as well as in the individual constituent units.
3. He insists that R.A. No. 6734 is unconstitutional because only the provinces of Basilan, Sulu,
Tawi-Tawi, Lanao del Sur, Lanao del Norte and Maguindanao and the cities of Marawi and
Cotabato, and not all of the thirteen (13) provinces and nine (9) cities included in the
Organic Act, possess such concurrence in historical and cultural heritage and other relevant
characteristics.
The Constitution lays down the standards by which Congress shall determine which areas should
constitute the autonomous region. Guided by these constitutional criteria, the ascertainment by
Congress of the areas that share common attributes is within the exclusive realm of the
legislature's discretion. Any review of this ascertainment would have to go into the wisdom of the
law. This the Court cannot do without doing violence to the separation of governmental powers.
4. Okay so why not include other non-Muslim areas in Mindanao. Those excluded will have
their rights to equal protection violated.
Any determination by Congress of what areas in Mindanao should compromise the
autonomous region, taking into account shared historical and cultural heritage, economic and
social structures, and other relevant characteristics, would necessarily carry with it the
exclusion of other areas. Any review of this ascertainment would have to go into the wisdom
of the law. Moreover, equal protection permits of reasonable classification
5. Both petitions also question the validity of R.A. No. 6734 on the ground that it violates the
constitutional guarantee on free exercise of religion. RA 6734 any conflict between the
Muslim Code [P.D. No. 1083] and the Tribal Code (still be enacted) on the one had, and the
national law on the other hand, the Shari'ah courts created under the same Act should
apply national law.
No justiciable controversy. In the present case, no actual controversy between real litigants exists.
There are no conflicting claims involving the application of national law resulting in an alleged violation
of religious freedom. This being so, the Court in this case may not be called upon to resolve what is
merely a perceived potential conflict between the provisions the Muslim Code and national law.
6. They impugn the constitutionality of Article XIX, section 13 of R.A. No. 6734 which provides:
that the President may, by administrative determination, merge the existing regions.
said provision grants the President the power to merge regions, a power which is not
conferred by the Constitution upon the President.
It must be pointed out that what is referred to in R.A. No. 6734 is the merger of
administrative regions, i.e. Regions I to XII and the National Capital Region, which are mere
groupings of contiguous provinces for administrative purposes. Administrative regions are
not territorial and political subdivisions like provinces, cities, municipalities and barangays
[see Art. X, sec. 1 of the Constitution]. While the power to merge administrative regions is
not expressly provided for in the Constitution, it is a power which has traditionally been
lodged with the President to facilitate the exercise of the power of general supervision over
local governments.
7. They question the validity of provisions in the Organic Act which create an Oversight
Committee to supervise the transfer to the autonomous region of the powers,
appropriations, and properties vested upon the regional government by the organic Act.
Under the Constitution, the creation of the autonomous region hinges only on the result of
the plebiscite, the Oversight Committee will delay its creation.
The questioned provisions in R.A. No. 6734 requiring an oversight Committee to supervise
the transfer do not provide for a different date of effectivity. Much less would the
organization of the Oversight Committee cause an impediment to the operation of the
Organic Act, for such is evidently aimed at effecting a smooth transition period for the
regional government.
Every law has in its favor the presumption of constitutionality. Based on the grounds raised by
petitioners to challenge the constitutionality of R.A. No. 6734, the Court finds that petitioners have failed
to overcome the presumption. The dismissal of these two petitions is, therefore, inevitable.
Chiongbian v. Orbos
G.R. No. 96754, June 22, 1995
FACTS:
Arm, 4 ra ang nisugut, ang others kay wala so niana man ang law nga mu-remain sila sa existing regions
pero pwd ra imerge sa president through administrative determination.
Question? Pwd ba diay mag-in-ana ang Pres? Undue delegation kay legislative power? Or administrative
power?
Ans: Reorganization ang nahitabo. Part na sha sa administrative power sa pres. Admin regions are not
politicxl subdivisions. The division here only appears in paper and does not affect the composition and
territories of the respective provincies and municipalities. Administrative reorganization is historically
lodged with the Pres. In pursuant to his general supervision power over local governments.
Petitioners challenge the validity of a provision of the Organic Act for the Autonomous Region
in Muslim Mindanao (R.A. No. 6734), authorizing the President of the Philippines to "merge"
by administrative determination the regions remaining after the establishment of the
Autonomous Region, and the Executive Order issued by the President pursuant to such
authority, "Providing for the Reorganization of Administrative Regions in Mindanao."
Pursuant to Art. X, 18 of the 1987 Constitution, Congress passed R.A. No. 6734, the Organic
Act for the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao,
In the ensuing plebiscite held on November 16, 1989, FOUR provinces voted in favor of
creating an autonomous region. These are the provinces of Lanao del Sur, Maguindanao, Sulu
and Tawi-Tawi. In accordance with the constitutional provision, these provinces became the
Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao.
On the other hand, with respect to provinces and cities not voting in favor of the Autonomous
Region, Art. XIX, 13 of R.A. No. 6734 provides,
That only the provinces and cities voting favorably in such plebiscites shall be
included in the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao. The provinces and cities
which in the plebiscite do not vote for inclusion in the Autonomous Region shall
 remain in the existing administrative regions. Provided, however, that the
President may, by administrative determination, merge the existing regions.
Pursuant to the authority granted by this provision, then President Corazon C. Aquino issued
on October 12, 1990, Executive Order No. 429, "providing for the REORGANIZATION of the
Administrative Regions in Mindanao." Several provinces were transferred from one region to
another and regional center of Region IX was transferred from Zamboanga City to Pagadian
City
Petitioners in G.R. No. 96754 were members of Congress representing various legislative
districts in South Cotobato, Zamboanga del Norte, Basilan, Lanao del Norte and Zamboanga
City. On November 12, 1990, they wrote then President Aquino protesting E.O. No. 429. They
contended that:
There is NO LAW WHICH AUTHORIZES the President to pick certain provinces and
cities within the existing regions some of which did not even take part in the
plebiscite as in the case of the province of Misamis Occidental and the cities of
Oroquieta, Tangub and Ozamiz and restructure them to new administrative
regions.
On the other hand, the law (Sec. 13, Art. XIX, R.A. 6734) is specific to the point,
that is, that "the provinces and cities which in the plebiscite do not vote for
inclusion in the Autonomous Region shall remain in the existing administrative
regions."
The transfer of the provinces of Misamis Occidental from Region X to Region IX;
Lanao del Norte from Region XII to Region IX, and South Cotobato from Region XI
to Region XII are alterations of the existing structures of governmental units, in
other words, reorganization.
With due respect to Her Excellency, we submit that while the authority necessarily
includes the authority to merge, the authority to merge does not include the
authority to reorganize. Therefore, the President's authority under RA 6734 to
"merge existing regions" cannot be construed to include the authority to
reorganize them. To do so will violate the rules of statutory construction.
The transfer of regional centers under Executive Order 429 is actually a
restructuring (reorganization) of administrative regions. While this reorganization,
as in Executive Order 429, does not affect the apportionment of congressional
representatives, the same is NOT VALID under the penultimate paragraph of Sec.
13, Art. XIX of R.A. 6734 AND Ordinance appended to the 1986 Constitution
apportioning the seats of the House of Representatives of Congress of the
Philippines to the different legislative districts in provinces and cities
As their protest went unheeded, while Inauguration Ceremonies of the New Administrative
Region IX were scheduled on January 26, 1991, petitioners brought this suit for certiorari and
prohibition.
Petitioners contention:
o Art. XIX, 13 of R.A. No. 6734 IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL because:
(1) it UNDULY DELEGATES LEGISLATIVE POWER to the President by
authorizing him to "merge [by administrative determination] the
existing regions"
provides NO STANDARD for the exercise of the power delegated and
(2) the POWER granted is NOT EXPRESSED IN THE TITLE of the law.
o E.O. No. 429 is INVALID on the ground that the power granted by Art. XIX, 13 to
the President is only to "merge regions IX and XII" but NOT TO REORGANIZE THE
ENTIRE ADMINISTRATIVE REGIONS in Mindanao and certainly not to transfer the
regional center of Region IX from Zamboanga City to Pagadian City.
Such transfer of provincial or regional capital is an ACT OF CONGRESS.
Solicitor-Generals defense:
o reorganization of regions in Mindanao by E.O. No. 429 is merely the exercise of a
power "traditionally lodged in the President," as held in Abbas v. Comelec, 2 and as
a mere incident of his power of general supervision over local governments and
control of executive departments, bureaus and offices under Art. X, 16 and Art.
VII, 17, respectively, of the Constitution.
o He contends that there is no undue delegation of legislative power but only a grant
of the power to "fill up" or provide the details of legislation because Congress did
not have the facility to provide for them.
o the grant to the President of the power "to merge the existing regions" is fairly
embraced in the title of R.A. No. 6734, to wit, "An Act Providing for an Organic Act
for the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao," because it is germane to it.
o the power of merger extends to all regions in Mindanao as necessitated by the
establishment of the autonomous region.
o Finally, he invokes P.D. No. 1416, as amended by P.D. No. 1772 which provides:
1. The President of the Philippines shall have the continuing authority
to REORGANIZE the National Government.
For purposes of this Decree, the coverage of the continuing
authority of the President to reorganize shall be interpreted
to encompass all agencies, entities, instrumentalities, and
units of the National Government, including all government
owned or controlled corporations as well as the entire range
of the powers, functions, authorities, administrative
relationships, acid related aspects pertaining to these
agencies, entities, instrumentalities, and units.
2. [T]he President may, at his discretion, take the following actions:
xxx xxx xxx
f. Create, abolish, group, consolidate, merge, or integrate
entities, agencies, instrumentalities, and units of the
National Government, as well as expand, amend, change, or
otherwise modify their powers, functions and authorities,
including, with respect to government-owned or controlled
corporations, their corporate life, capitalization, and other
relevant aspects of their charters.
ISSUE:
(1) whether the power to "merge" administrative regions is legislative or administrative in character,
and, in any event, whether Art. XIX, 13 is invalid because it unduly delegates legislative power to the
President;
(2) whether or not the power granted authorizes the reorganization even of regions the provinces and
cities in which either did not take part in the plebiscite on the creation of the Autonomous Region or did
not vote in favor of it; and
(3) whether or not the power granted to the President includes the power to transfer the regional center
of Region IX from Zamboanga City to Pagadian City

RULING:
1. It is ADMINISTRATIVE in nature.
Historically, the creation and subsequent reorganization of administrative regions have been
by the President pursuant to authority granted to him by law. In conferring on the President the power
"to merge [by administrative determination] the existing regions" following the establishment of the
Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao, Congress merely followed the pattern set in previous
legislation dating back to the initial organization of administrative regions in 1972.
The choice of the President as delegate is LOGICAL because the division of the country into regions is
intended TO FACILITATE not only THE ADMINISTRATION of local governments but ALSO THE DIRECTION
OF EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENTS which the law requires SHOULD HAVE REGIONAL OFFICES.
As this Court observed in Abbas, "while the power to merge administrative regions is not expressly
provided for in the Constitution, it is a POWER WHICH HAS TRADITIONALLY BEEN LODGED WITH THE
PRESIDENT to facilitate the exercise of the power of general supervision over local governments [see Art.
X, 4 of the Constitution]."
The regions themselves are not territorial and political divisions like provinces, cities, municipalities and
barangays but are "mere groupings of contiguous provinces for administrative purposes, not for political
representation." 7
The power conferred on the President is similar to the power to adjust municipal boundaries 8which has
been described in Pelaez v. Auditor General 9 or as "administrative in nature."
The regrouping is done only on paper. It involves no more than are definition or redrawing of the lines
separating administrative regions for the purpose of facilitating the administrative supervision of local
government units by the President and insuring the efficient delivery of essential services.
There will be no "transfer" of local governments from one region to another except as they may thus be
regrouped so that a province like Lanao del Norte, which is at present part of Region XII, will become
part of Region IX.
There is, therefore, no abdication by Congress of its legislative power in conferring on the President the
power to merge administrative regions.
Sidenote: The Law in question has SUFFICIENT LEGISLATIVE STANDARD
A legislative standard need not be expressed. It may simply be gathered or implied. 10 Nor need it be found in the
law challenged because it may be embodied in other statutes on the same subject as that of the challenged
legislation. 11
With respect to the power to merge existing administrative regions, the standard is to be found in the same policy
underlying the grant to the President in R.A. No. 5435 of the power to reorganize the Executive Department, to wit:
"to promote simplicity, economy and efficiency in the government
2. Yes, power to merge granted authorizes the reorganization even of regions the provinces and
cities in which did not vote for inclusion.
While Art. XIX, 13 provides that "The provinces and cities which do not vote for inclusion in the
Autonomous Region shall remain in the existing administrative regions," this provision is subject to the
qualification that "the President may by administrative determination merge the existing regions."
Moreover, President's power cannot be so limited without neglecting the necessities of administration.
In fact, as petitioners admit, the reorganization of administrative regions in E.O. No. 429 is based on
relevant criteria, to wit: (1) contiguity and geographical features; (2) transportation and communication
facilities; (3) cultural and language groupings; (4) land area and population; (5) existing regional centers
adopted by several agencies; (6) socio-economic development programs in the regions and (7) number
of provinces and cities.
3. YES, the power granted to the President includes the power to transfer the regional center of
Region IX from Zamboanga City to Pagadian City
The Court said in Abbas, 16 administrative regions are mere "groupings of contiguous provinces for
administrative purposes, . . . There is, therefore, no basis for contending that only Congress can change
or determine regional centers.
To the contrary, the examples of P.D. Nos. 1, 742, 773 and 1555 suggest that the power to reorganize
administrative regions carries with it the power to determine the regional center.
It may be that the transfer of the regional center in Region IX from Zamboanga City to Pagadian City may
entail the expenditure of large sums of money for the construction of buildings and other infrastructure
to house regional offices. That contention is addressed to the wisdom of the transfer rather than to its
legality and it is settled that courts are not the arbiters of the wisdom or expediency of legislation.
Cordillera Broad Coalition v. COA
G.R. No. 79956 & 82217, January 29, 1990
FACTS:
After the 1986 EDSA Movement, as a result of negotiations between the Philippine
government and the Cordillera Peoples Liberation Army and Cordillera people, Executive
Order No. 220, issued by President Cory Aquino in the exercise of her legislative powers
under Art. XVIII, sec. 6 of the 1987 Constitution. It created the Cordillera Administrative
Region (CAR) , which covers the provinces of Abra, Benguet, Ifugao, Kalinga-Apayao and
Mountain Province and the City of Baguio [secs. 1 and 2]. It was created to accelerate
economic and social growth in the region and to prepare for the establishment of the
 autonomous region in the Cordilleras.
o Its main function is to coordinate the planning and implementation of programs
and services in the region, particularly, to coordinate with the local government
units and the executive departments of the National Government in the
supervision of field offices
o The CAR shall have a Cordillera Regional Assembly as a policy-formulating body
and a Cordillera Executive Board as an implementing arm [secs. 7, 8 and 10]. The
CAR and the Assembly and Executive Board shall exist until such time as the
autonomous regional government is established and organized [sec. 17].
o RATIONALE: pending the convening of the first Congress and the enactment of
the organic act for a Cordillera autonomous region, there is an URGENT NEED, in
the interest of national security and public order, for the President to
REORGANIZE IMMEDIATELY the existing administrative structure in the
Cordilleras to suit it to the existing political realities therein
Petitioners filed the instant petition, assailing the constitutionality of Executive Order No.
220 on the primary ground that IT PRE-EMPTS the enactment of an organic act by the
Congress and the creation of the autonomous region in the Cordilleras conditional on the
approval of the act through a plebiscite.
o EO 220 VIOLATED Secs. 1 and 10, Art. X of the Constitution as it created a NEW
territorial and political subdivision, OR MERGED existing ones into a larger
subdivision not in accordance with the law
o the creation of the CAR CONTRAVENED the constitutional guarantee of the LOCAL
AUTONOMY for the provinces (Abra, Benguet, Ifugao, Kalinga-Apayao and
Mountain Province) and city (Baguio City) which compose the CAR
NOTE: During the pendency of this case, Republic Act No. 6766 entitled "An Act Providing for
an Organic Act for the Cordillera Autonomous Region," was enacted and signed into law.
o SEC. 3. The Cordillera Executive Board, the Cordillera Region Assembly as well as
all offices and agencies created under Execute Order No. 220 SHALL CEASE TO
EXIST IMMEDIATELY UPON THE RATIFICATION of this Organic Act.
o All funds, properties and assets of the Cordillera Executive Board and the
Cordillera Regional Assembly shall AUTOMATICALLY BE TRANSFERRED to the
Cordillera Autonomous Government.
ISSUES:
1. WON EO 220 pre-empted the enactment of an organic act by the Congress and the creation
of the autonomous region in the Cordilleras?
2. WON EO 220 created a new territorial and political subdivision, or merged existing ones into a
larger subdivision not in accordance with the law?
3. WON the creation of the car contravened the constitutional guarantee of the local autonomy
for the provinces (Abra, Benguet, Ifugao, Kalinga-Apayao and Mountain Province) and city
(Baguio City) which compose the CAR?
RULING:
1. WON EO 220 pre-empted the enactment of an organic act by the Congress and the creation
of the autonomous region in the Cordilleras?
NO. It DOES NOT create the autonomous region contemplated in the Constitution. It merely
provides for transitory measures consolidation and coordination of the delivery of services of line
departments and agencies of the National Government in the areas covered to prepare the ground
for autonomy. NEITHER does the transitory nature of the CAR mean that it is "the interim autonomous
region in the Cordilleras.
The Constitution provides for a basic structure of government in the autonomous region composed of
an elective executive and legislature and special courts with personal, family and property law
jurisdiction [Art. X, sec. 18].
Here, E.O. No. 220 did not establish an autonomous regional government. It created a region, covering
a specified area, FOR ADMINISTRATIVE PURPOSES with the main objective of coordinating the
planning and implementation of programs and services [secs. 2 and 5].
To determine policy, it created a representative assembly.
To serve as an implementing body, it created the Cordillera Executive Board composed of the Mayor of
Baguio City, provincial governors and representatives of the Cordillera Bodong Administration, ethno-
linguistic groups and non-governmental organizations as regular members and all regional directors of
the line departments of the National Government as ex-officiomembers and headed by an Executive
Director [secs. 10 and 11].
The bodies created by E.O. No. 220 do not supplant the existing local governmental structure, nor are
they autonomous government agencies. They merely constitute the mechanism for an "umbrella" that
brings together the existing local governments, the agencies of the National Government, the ethno-
linguistic groups or tribes, and non-governmental organizations in a concerted effort to spur
development in the Cordilleras.
The Constitution outlines a complex procedure for the creation of an autonomous region in the
Cordilleras which would UNDOUBTEDLY TAKE TIME. The President, in 1987 still exercising legislative
powers, as the first Congress had not yet convened, saw it fit to provide for some measures to address
the urgent needs of the Cordilleras in the meantime that the organic act had not yet been passed and
the autonomous region created.
2. WON EO 220 created a new territorial and political subdivision, or merged existing ones into
a larger subdivision not in accordance with the law?
NO, it did not create a new territorial and political subdivision or merge existing ones into a
larger subdivision.
The Constitution provides in Article X:
Section 1. The territorial and political subdivisions of the Republic of the
Philippines are the provinces, cities, municipalities, and barangays. There shall be
autonomous regions in Muslim Mindanao and the Cordilleras as hereinafter
provided.
xxx xxx xxx
Sec. 10. No province, city, municipality, or barangay may be created, divided,
merged, abolished, or its boundary substantially altered, except in accordance
with the criteria established in the local government code and subject to
approval by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite in the political units
directly affected.
However, in the instant case, CAR is NOT a public corporation or a territorial and political subdivision. It
DOES NOT have a separate juridical personality, unlike provinces, cities and municipalities. Neither is it
vested with the powers that are normally granted to public corporations, e.g. the power to sue and be
sued, the power to own and dispose of property, the power to create its own sources of revenue, etc. As
stated earlier, the CAR was created primarily to coordinate the planning and implementation of
programs and services in the covered areas.
Considering the control and supervision exercised by the President over the CAR and the offices
created under E.O. No. 220, and considering further the indispensable participation of the line
departments of the National Government, the CAR may be considered more than anything else AS A
REGIONAL COORDINATING AGENCY of the National Government, SIMILAR TO THE REGIONAL
DEVELOPMENT COUNCILS which the President may create under the Constitution [Art. X, sec. 14].
These councils are "composed of local government officials, regional heads of departments and other
government offices, and representatives from non-governmental organizations within the region for
purposes of administrative decentralization to strengthen the autonomy of the units therein and to
accelerate the economic and social growth and development of the units in the region." [Ibid.] In this
wise, the CAR may be considered as a more sophisticated version of the regional development council.
3. WON the creation of the car contravened the constitutional guarantee of the local
autonomy for the provinces (Abra, Benguet, Ifugao, Kalinga-Apayao and Mountain
Province) and city (Baguio City) which compose the CAR?
NO.
It must be clarified that the constitutional guarantee of local autonomy in the Constitution [Art. X, sec.
2] refers to the administrative autonomy of local government units or, cast in more technical language,
the decentralization of government authority [Villegas v. Subido, G.R. No. L-31004, January 8, 1971, 37
SCRA 1].
On the other hand, the creation of autonomous regions in Muslim Mindanao and the Cordilleras, which
is peculiar to the 1987 Constitution contemplates the grant of political autonomy, and not just
administrative autonomy these regions, with an autonomous regional government with a basic
structure consisting of an executive department and a legislative assembly and special courts with
personal, family and property law jurisdiction in each of the autonomous regions [Art. X, sec. 18].
As already establihed, the CAR is a MERE TRANSITORY COORDINATING AGENCY that would prepare the
stage for political autonomy for the Cordilleras. It fills in the resulting gap in the process of transforming
a group of adjacent territorial and political subdivisions already enjoying local or administrative
autonomy into an autonomous region vested with political autonomy.
Ordilllo v.COMELEC
Ordillo is a member of the Cordillera Regional Assembly
Facts:
On January 30, 1990, the people of the provinces of Benguet, Mountain Province, Ifugao, Abra and
Kalinga-Apayao and the city of Baguio cast their votes in a plebiscite held pursuant to Republic Act No.
6766 entitled "An Act Providing for an Organic Act for the Cordillera Autonomous Region."
The COMELEC results of the plebiscite showed that the creation of the Region was approved by a
majority only in the Ifugao Province and was overwhelmingly rejected in the rest of the provinces and
city above-mentioned.
Consequently, the COMELEC, issued Resolution No. 2259 stating that the Organic Act for the Region has
been approved and/or ratified by majority of the votes cast only in the province of Ifugao. On the same
date, the Secretary of Justice issued a memorandum for the President reiterating the COMELEC
resolution.
As a result of this, Congress enacted Republic Act No. 6861 setting the elections in the Cordillera
Autonomous Region of Ifugao on the first Monday of March 1991.:
On March 30, 1990, the President issued Administrative Order No. 160 declaring among others that the
Cordillera Executive Board and Cordillera Regional Assembly and all the offices created under Executive
Order No. 220 were abolished in view of the ratification of the Organic Act.- nad
The petitioners maintain that there can be no valid Cordillera Autonomous Region in only one province
as the Constitution and Republic Act No. 6766 require that the said Region be composed of more than
one constituent unit.
Issue:
WON the province of Ifugao, being the only province which voted favorably for the creation of the
Cordillera Autonomous Region can, alone, legally and validly constitute such Region.
Ruling:
No. The sole province of Ifugao cannot validly constitute the Cordillera Autonomous Region.
It is explicit in Article X, Section 15 of the 1987 Constitution that:
"Section 15. There shall be created autonomous regions in Muslim Mindanao and in the
Cordillera consisting of provinces, cities, municipalities and geographical areas sharing
common and distinctive historical and cultural heritage, economic and social structures, and
other relevant characteristics within the framework of this Constitution and the national
sovereignty as well as territorial integrity of the Republic of the Philippines."
The keywords provinces, cities, municipalities and geographical areas connote that "region" is to be
made up of more than one constituent unit. The term "region" used in its ordinary sense means two or
more provinces. This is supported by the fact that the thirteen (13) regions into which the Philippines is
divided for administrative purposes are groupings of contiguous provinces. Ifugao is a province by itself.
To become part of a region, it must join other provinces, cities, municipalities, and geographical areas. It
joins other units because of their common and distinctive historical and cultural heritage, economic and
social structures and other relevant characteristics. The Constitutional requirements are not present in
this case.- nad
The well-established rule in statutory construction that the language of the Constitution, as much as
possible should be understood in the sense it has in common use and that the words used in
constitutional provisions are to be given their ordinary meaning except where technical terms are
employed, must then, be applied in this case.
Aside from the 1987 Constitution, a reading of the provisions of Republic Act No. 6766 strengthens the
petitioner's position that the Region cannot be constituted from only one province.
Article III, Sections 1 and 2 of the Statute provide that the Cordillera Autonomous Region is to be
administered by the Cordillera government consisting of the Regional Government and local government
units. It further provides that:
 "SECTION 2. The Regional Government shall exercise powers and functions necessary for the
proper governance and development of all provinces, cities, municipalities, and barangay or ili
within the Autonomous Region . . ."
From these sections, it can be gleaned that Congress never intended that a single province may
constitute the autonomous region. Otherwise, we would be faced with the absurd situation of having
two sets of officials, a set of provincial officials and another set of regional officials exercising their
executive and legislative powers over exactly the same small area.
Article V, Sections 1 and 4 of Republic Act 6766 vest the legislative power in the Cordillera Assembly
whose members shall be elected from regional assembly districts apportioned among provinces and the
cities composing the Autonomous Region. chanrobles virtual law library
If we follow the respondent's position, the members of such Cordillera Assembly shall then be elected
only from the province of Ifugao creating an awkward predicament of having two legislative bodies
the Cordillera Assembly and the Sangguniang Panlalawigan exercising their legislative powers over the
province of Ifugao. And since Ifugao is one of the smallest provinces in the Philippines, population-wise,
it would have too many government officials for so few people.law
The entirety of Republic Act No. 6766 creating the Cordillera Autonomous Region is infused with
provisions which rule against the sole province of Ifugao constituting the Region.ralaw
To contemplate the situation envisioned by the respondent would not only violate the letter and intent
of the Constitution and Republic Act No. 6766 but would also be impractical and illogical.
Harmonizing the decision in Abbas with the present case
Our decision in Abbas, et al. v. COMELEC, (G.R. No. 89651, November 10, 1969), is not applicable in the
case at bar contrary to the view of the Secretary of Justice.
The Abbas case laid down the rate on the meaning of majority in the phrase "by majority of the votes
cast by the constituent units called for the purpose" found in the Constitution, Article X, Section 18. It
stated:
x x x
". . . [I]t is thus clear that what is required by the Constitution is simple majority of votes
approving the Organic Act in individual constituent units and not a double majority of the
votes in all constituent units put together, as well as in the individual constituent units."
The plebiscites mandated by the Constitution and Republic Act No. 6766 for the Cordillera and Republic
Act No. 6734 for the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao determine (1) whether there shall be
an autonomous region in the Cordillera and in Muslim Mindanao and (2) which provinces and cities,
among those enumerated in the two Republic Acts, shall comprise said Autonomous Regions. (See III,
Record of the Constitutional Commission, 487-492 [1986]).
The Abbas case established the rule to follow on which provinces and cities shall comprise the
autonomous region in Muslim Mindanao which is, consequently, the same rule to follow with regard to
the autonomous region in the Cordillera. However, there is nothing in the Abbas decision which deals
with the issue on whether an autonomous region, in either Muslim Mindanao or Cordillera could exist
despite the fact that only one province or one city is to constitute it.chanrobles virtual law library
Stated in another way, the issue in this case is whether the sole province of Ifugao can validly and legally
constitute the Cordillera Autonomous Region. The issue is not whether the province of Ifugao is to be
included in the Cordillera Autonomous Region. It is the first issue which the Court answers in the instant
case.
Bagabuyo v. COMELEC
Facts:
Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9371.was passed which increased Cagayan de Oro's legislative district from one to
two. For the election of May 2007, Cagayan de Oro's voters would be classified as belonging to either the
first or the second district, depending on their place of residence. The constituents of each district would
elect their own representative to Congress as well as eight members of the Sangguniang Panglungsod.
Petitioner Rogelio Bagabuyo filed the present petition against the COMELEC. In asking for the
nullification of R.A. No. 9371 and Resolution No. 7837 on constitutional grounds, the petitioner argued
that the COMELEC cannot implement R.A. No. 9371 without providing for the rules, regulations and
guidelines for the conduct of a plebiscite which is indispensable for the division or conversion of a local
government unit.
Issues:
1) Does R.A. No. 9371 merely provide for the legislative reapportionment of Cagayan de Oro City, or does
it involve the division and conversion of a local government unit?
2) Does R.A. No. 9371 violate the equality of representation doctrine?
Ruling:
1. The law merely provides for a legislative reapportionment
Legislative apportionment is defined by Black's Law Dictionary as the determination of the number of
representatives which a State, county or other subdivision may send to a legislative body. 17It is the
allocation of seats in a legislative body in proportion to the population; the drawing of voting district lines
so as to equalize population and voting power among the districts. 18 Reapportionment, on the other
hand, is the realignment or change in legislative districts brought about by changes in population and
mandated by the constitutional requirement of equality of representation.19
Article VI (entitled Legislative Department) of the 1987 Constitution lays down the rules on legislative
apportionment under its Section 5 which provides:
Sec. 5(1). (1) The House of Representatives shall be composed of not more than two hundred fifty
members unless otherwise fixed by law, who shall be elected from legislative districts apportioned
among the provinces, cities, and the Metropolitan Manila area in accordance with the number of their
respective inhabitants, and on the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio, and those who, as provided
by law, shall be elected through a party-list system of registered national, regional and sectoral parties or
organizations.
xxx
(3) Each legislative district shall comprise, as far as practicable, contiguous, compact, and adjacent
territory. Each city with a population of at least two hundred fifty thousand, or each province, shall have
at least one representative.
(4) Within three years following the return of every census, the Congress shall make a reapportionment
of legislative districts based on the standards provided in this section.
Separately from the legislative districts that legal apportionment or reapportionment speaks of, are the
local government units (historically and generically referred to as "municipal corporations") that the
Constitution itself classified into provinces, cities, municipalities and barangays.20 In its strict and proper
sense, a municipality has been defined as "a body politic and corporate constituted by the incorporation
of the inhabitants of a city or town for the purpose of local government thereof."21 The creation, division,
merger, abolition or alteration of boundary of local government units, i.e., of provinces, cities,
municipalities, and barangays, are covered by the Article on Local Government (Article X). Section 10 of
this Article provides:
No province, city, municipality, or barangay may be created, divided, merged, abolished, or
its boundary substantially altered, except in accordance with the criteria established in the
local government code and subject to approval by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite
in the political unit directly affected.
The concern of Art. VI, Sec. 5 is equality of representation while that of Art. X Sec. 10 is the
commencement, the termination, and the modification of local government units' corporate existence
and territorial coverage. A pronounced distinction between Article VI, Section 5 and, Article X, Section
10 is on the requirement of a plebiscite.
The legislative district that Article VI, Section 5 speaks of may, in a sense, be called a political unit
because it is the basis for the election of a member of the House of Representatives and members of the
local legislative body. It is not, however, a political subdivision through which functions of government
are carried out. It can more appropriately be described as a representative unit that may or may not
encompass the whole of a city or a province, but unlike the latter, it is not a corporate unit. Not being a
corporate unit, a district does not act for and in behalf of the people comprising the district; it merely
delineates the areas occupied by the people who will choose a representative in their national affairs.
Unlike a province, which has a governor; a city or a municipality, which has a mayor; and a barangay,
which has a punong barangay, a district does not have its own chief executive. The role of the
congressman that it elects is to ensure that the voice of the people of the district is heard in Congress,
not to oversee the affairs of the legislative district. Not being a corporate unit also signifies that it has no
legal personality that must be created or dissolved and has no capacity to act. Hence, there is no need
for any plebiscite in the creation, dissolution or any other similar action on a legislative district.
The local government units, on the other hand, are political and corporate units. They are the territorial
and political subdivisions of the state.35 They possess legal personality on the authority of the
Constitution and by action of the Legislature. The Constitution defines them as entities that Congress
can, by law, create, divide, abolish, merge; or whose boundaries can be altered based on standards again
established by both the Constitution and the Legislature.36 A local government unit's corporate existence
begins upon the election and qualification of its chief executive and a majority of the members of
its Sanggunian.37
These considerations clearly show the distinctions between a legislative apportionment or
reapportionment and the division of a local government unit. Historically and by its intrinsic nature, a
legislative apportionment does not mean, and does not even imply, a division of a local government unit
where the apportionment takes place. Thus, the plebiscite requirement that applies to the division of a
province, city, municipality or barangay under the Local Government Code should not apply to and be a
requisite for the validity of a legislative apportionment or reapportionment.
Under these wordings, no division of Cagayan de Oro City as a political and corporate entity takes place
or is mandated. Cagayan de Oro City politically remains a single unit and its administration is not divided
along territorial lines. Its territory remains completely whole and intact; there is only the addition of
another legislative district and the delineation of the city into two districts for purposes of
representation in the House of Representatives. Thus, Article X, Section 10 of the Constitution does not
come into play and no plebiscite is necessary to validly apportion Cagayan de Oro City into two districts.
Admittedly, the legislative reapportionment carries effects beyond the creation of another congressional
district in the city by providing, as reflected in COMELEC Resolution No. 7837, for additional Sangguniang
Panglunsod seats to be voted for along the lines of the congressional apportionment made. The effect on
the Sangguniang Panglunsod, however, is not directly traceable to R.A. No. 9371 but to another law -
R.A. No. 6636.
However, neither does this law have the effect of dividing the City of Cagayan de Oro into two political
and corporate units and territories. Rather than divide the city either territorially or as a corporate
entity, the effect is merely to enhance voter representation by giving each city voter more and greater
say, both in Congress and in the Sangguniang Panglunsod.
2. No.
The petitioner argues that the distribution of the legislative districts is unequal. District 1 has only 93,719
registered voters while District 2 has 127,071. District 1 is composed mostly of rural barangays while
District 2 is composed mostly of urban barangays.43 Thus, R.A. No. 9371 violates the principle of equality
of representation.
A clarification must be made. The law clearly provides that the basis for districting shall be the number of
the inhabitants of a city or a province, not the number of registered voters therein.
The Constitution, however, does not require mathematical exactitude or rigid equality as a standard in
gauging equality of representation. Its requirements are satisfied despite some numerical disparity if the
units are contiguous, compact and adjacent as far as practicable.
The petitioner's contention that there is a resulting inequality in the division of Cagayan de Oro City into
two districts because the barangays in the first district are mostly rural barangays while the second
district is mostly urban, is largely unsubstantiated. But even if backed up by proper proof, we cannot
question the division on the basis of the difference in the barangays' levels of development or
developmental focus as these are not part of the constitutional standards for legislative apportionment
or reapportionment. What the components of the two districts of Cagayan de Oro would be is a matter
for the lawmakers to determine as a matter of policy. In the absence of any grave abuse of discretion or
violation of the established legal parameters, this Court cannot intrude into the wisdom of these
policies.47
G.R. No. 183591 October 14 2008
Province of North Cotabato vs Government of the Republic of the Philippines
FACTS:
On August 5, 2008, the Government of the Republic of the Philippines and the Moro Islamic Liberation
Front (MILF) were scheduled to sign a Memorandum of Agreement of the Ancestral Domain Aspect of
the GRP - MILF Tripoli Agreement on Peace of 2001 in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia.
Invoking the right to information on matters of public concern, the petitioners seek to compel
respondents to disclose and furnish them the complete and official copies of the MA-AD and to prohibit
the slated signing of the MOA-AD and the holding of public consultation thereon. They also pray that the
MOA-AD be declared unconstitutional. The Court issued a TRO enjoining the GRP from signing the same.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the constitutionality and the legality of the MOA is ripe for adjudication;
2. Whether or not there is a violation of the people's right to information on matters of public concern
(Art 3 Sec. 7) under a state policy of full disclosure of all its transactions involving public interest (Art 2,
Sec 28) including public consultation under RA 7160 (Local Government Code of 1991)
3. Whether or not the signing of the MOA, the Government of the Republic of the Philippines would be
binding itself
a) to create and recognize the Bangsamoro Juridical Entity (BJE) as a separate state, or a juridical,
territorial or political subdivision not recognized by law;
b) to revise or amend the Constitution and existing laws to conform to the MOA;
c) to concede to or recognize the claim of the Moro Islamic Liberation Front for ancestral domain in
violation of Republic Act No. 8371 (THE INDIGENOUS PEOPLES RIGHTS ACT OF 1997),
particularly Section 3(g) & Chapter VII (DELINEATION,
RECOGNITION OF ANCESTRAL DOMAINS)
RULINGS:
1. Yes, the petitions are ripe for adjudication. The failure of the respondents to consult the local
government units or communities affected constitutes a departure by respondents from their mandate
under EO No. 3. Moreover, the respondents exceeded their authority by the mere act of guaranteeing
amendments to the Constitution. Any alleged violation of the Constitution by any branch of government
is a proper matter for judicial review.
As the petitions involve constitutional issues which are of paramount public interest or of transcendental
importance, the Court grants the petitioners, petitioners-in-intervention and intervening respondents
the requisite locus standi in keeping with the liberal stance adopted in David v. Macapagal- Arroyo.
In Pimentel, Jr. v. Aguirre, this Court held:
x x x [B]y the mere enactment of the questioned law or the approval of the challenged action, the
dispute is said to have ripened into a judicial controversy even without any other overt act . Indeed,
even a singular violation of the Constitution and/or the law is enough to awaken judicial duty.x x x x
By the same token, when an act of the President, who in our constitutional scheme is a coequal of
Congress, is seriously alleged to have infringed the Constitution and the laws x x x settling the dispute
becomes the duty and the responsibility of the courts.
That the law or act in question is not yet effective does not negate ripeness.
2. Yes. The Court finds that there is a grave violation of the Constitution involved in the matters of public
concern (Sec 7 Art III) under a state policy of full disclosure of all its transactions involving public interest
(Art 2, Sec 28) including public consultation under RA 7160 (Local Government Code of 1991).
(Sec 7 ArtIII) The right to information guarantees the right of the people to demand information, while
Sec 28 recognizes the duty of officialdom to give information even if nobody demands. The complete and
effective exercise of the right to information necessitates that its complementary provision on public
disclosure derive the same self-executory nature, subject only to reasonable safeguards or limitations as
may be provided by law.
The contents of the MOA-AD is a matter of paramount public concern involving public interest in the
highest order. In declaring that the right to information contemplates steps and negotiations leading to
the consummation of the contract, jurisprudence finds no distinction as to the executory nature or
commercial character of the agreement.
E.O. No. 3 itself is replete with mechanics for continuing consultations on both national and local levels
and for a principal forum for consensus-building. In fact, it is the duty of the Presidential Adviser on the
Peace Process to conduct regular dialogues to seek relevant information, comments, advice, and
recommendations from peace partners and concerned sectors of society.
3.
a) to create and recognize the Bangsamoro Juridical Entity (BJE) as a separate state, or a juridical,
territorial or political subdivision not recognized by law;
Yes. The provisions of the MOA indicate, among other things, that the Parties aimed to vest in the BJE
the status of an associated state or, at any rate, a status closely approximating it.
The concept of association is not recognized under the present Constitution.
No province, city, or municipality, not even the ARMM, is recognized under our laws as having an
associative relationship with the national government. Indeed, the concept implies powers that go
beyond anything ever granted by the Constitution to any local or regional government. It also implies
the recognition of the associated entity as a state. The Constitution, however, does not contemplate
any state in this jurisdiction other than the Philippine State, much less does it provide for a transitory
status that aims to prepare any part of Philippine territory for independence.
The BJE is a far more powerful entity than the autonomous region recognized in the Constitution. It is
not merely an expanded version of the ARMM, the status of its relationship with the national
government being fundamentally different from that of the ARMM. Indeed, BJE is a state in all but
name as it meets the criteria of a state laid down in the Montevideo Convention, namely, a permanent
population, a defined territory, a government, and a capacity to enter into relations with other states.
Even assuming arguendo that the MOA-AD would not necessarily sever any portion of Philippine
territory, the spirit animating it which has betrayed itself by its use of the concept of association runs
counter to the national sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Republic.
The defining concept underlying the relationship between the national government and the BJE being
itself contrary to the present Constitution, it is not surprising that many of the specific provisions of the
MOA-AD on the formation and powers of the BJE are in conflict with the Constitution and the laws. The
BJE is more of a state than an autonomous region. But even assuming that it is covered by the term
autonomous region in the constitutional provision just quoted, the MOA-AD would still be in conflict
with it.
b) to revise or amend the Constitution and existing laws to conform to the MOA:
The MOA-AD provides that any provisions of the MOA-AD requiring amendments to the existing legal
framework shall come into force upon the signing of a Comprehensive Compact and upon effecting the
necessary changes to the legal framework, implying an amendment of the Constitution to
accommodate the MOA-AD. This stipulation, in effect, guaranteed to the MILF the amendment of the
Constitution .
It will be observed that the President has authority, as stated in her oath of office, only to preserve and
defend the Constitution. Such presidential power does not, however, extend to allowing her to change
the Constitution, but simply to recommend proposed amendments or revision. As long as she limits
herself to recommending these changes and submits to the proper procedure for constitutional
amendments and revision, her mere recommendation need not be construed as an unconstitutional act.
The suspensive clause in the MOA-AD viewed in light of the above-discussed standards.
Given the limited nature of the Presidents authority to propose constitutional amendments, she
cannot guarantee to any third party that the required amendments will eventually be put in place, nor
even be submitted to a plebiscite. The most she could do is submit these proposals as recommendations
either to Congress or the people, in whom constituent powers are vested.
c) to concede to or recognize the claim of the Moro Islamic Liberation Front for ancestral domain in
violation of Republic Act No. 8371 (THE INDIGENOUS PEOPLES RIGHTS ACT OF 1997),
particularly Section 3(g) & Chapter VII (DELINEATION,
RECOGNITION OF ANCESTRAL DOMAINS)
This strand begins with the statement that it is the birthright of all Moros and all Indigenous peoples of
Mindanao to identify themselves and be accepted as Bangsamoros. It defines Bangsamoro people as
the natives or original inhabitants of Mindanao and its adjacent islands including Palawan and the Sulu
archipelago at the time of conquest or colonization, and their descendants whether mixed or of full
blood, including their spouses.
Thus, the concept of Bangsamoro, as defined in this strand of the MOA-AD, includes not only Moros
as traditionally understood even by Muslims, but all indigenous peoples of Mindanao and its adjacent
islands. The MOA-AD adds that the freedom of choice of indigenous peoples shall be respected. What
this freedom of choice consists in has not been specifically defined. The MOA-AD proceeds to refer to
the Bangsamoro homeland, the ownership of which is vested exclusively in the Bangsamoro people by
virtue of their prior rights of occupation. Both parties to the MOA-AD acknowledge that ancestral
domain does not form part of the public domain.
Republic Act No. 8371 or the Indigenous Peoples Rights Act of 1997 provides for clear-cut procedure for
the recognition and delineation of ancestral domain, which entails, among other things, the observance
of the free and prior informed consent of the Indigenous Cultural Communities/Indigenous Peoples.
Notably, the statute does not grant the Executive Department or any government agency the power to
delineate and recognize an ancestral domain claim by mere agreement or compromise.
Two, Republic Act No. 7160 or the Local Government Code of 1991 requires all national offices to
conduct consultations beforeany project or program critical to the environment and human ecology
including those that may call for the eviction of a particular group of people residing in such locality, is
implemented therein. The MOA-AD is one peculiar program that unequivocally and unilaterally vests
ownership of a vast territory to the Bangsamoro people, which could pervasively and drastically result to
the diaspora or displacement of a great number of inhabitants from their total environment.
CONCLUSION:
In sum, the Presidential Adviser on the Peace Process committed grave abuse of discretion when he
failed to carry out the pertinent consultation process, as mandated by E.O. No. 3, Republic Act No. 7160,
and Republic Act No. 8371. The furtive process by which the MOA-AD was designed and crafted runs
contrary to and in excess of the legal authority, and amounts to a whimsical, capricious, oppressive,
arbitrary and despotic exercise thereof. It illustrates a gross evasion of positive duty and a virtual refusal
to perform the duty enjoined.
The MOA-AD cannot be reconciled with the present Constitution and laws. Not only its specific
provisions but the very concept underlying them, namely, the associative relationship envisioned
between the GRP and the BJE, are unconstitutional, for the concept presupposes that the associated
entity is a state and implies that the same is on its way to independence.
Evardone v. COMELEC
Evardone- Mayor
Evardone v. Comelec, 204 SCRA 464, 472, December 2, 1991Petitioner: Felipe EvardoneRespondents:
Comelec, Alexander Apelado, Victorino Aclana and Noel NivalPonente: Padilla
Facts:
Felipe Evardone the mayor of Sulat, Eastern Samar, having been elected to the position during the 1988
local elections. He assumedoffice immediately after proclamation. In 1990, Alexander R. Apelado,
Victozino E. Aclan and Noel A. Nival filed a petition for the recall of Evardone with the Office of the Local
Election Registrar, Municipality of Sulat. The Comelec issued a Resolution approving therecommendation
of Election Registrar Vedasto Sumbilla to hold the signing of petition for recall against
Evardone.Evardone filed a petition for prohibition with urgent prayer of restraining order and/or writ of
preliminary injunction. Later, inan en banc resolution, the Comelec nullified the signing process for being
violative of the TRO of the court. Hence, this present petition.
Issue 1:
WON Resolution No. 2272 promulgated by the COMELEC by virtue of its powers under the Constitution
and BP 337 (Local GovernmentCode) was valid.
Held:
Yes
Ratio:
Evardone maintains that Article X, Section 3 of the 1987 Constitution repealed Batas Pambansa Blg. 337
in favor of one to be enacted byCongress. Since there was, during the period material to this case, no
local government code enacted by Congress after the effectivity of the 1987 Constitution nor any law for
that matter on the subject of recall of elected government officials, Evardone contends that there isno
basis for COMELEC Resolution No. 2272 and that the recall proceedings in the case at bar is
premature.The COMELEC avers that the constitutional provision does not refer only to a local
government code which is
in futurum
butalso in
esse
. It merely sets forth the guidelines which Congress will consider in amending the provisions of the
present LGC. Pending theenactment of the amendatory law, the existing Local Government Code
remains operative.Article XVIII, Section 3 of the 1987 Constitution express provides that all existing laws
not inconsistent with the 1987Constitution shall remain operative, until amended, repealed or revoked.
Republic Act No. 7160 providing for the Local Government Codeof 1991, approved by the President on
10 October 1991, specifically repeals B.P. Blg. 337 as provided in Sec. 534, Title Four of said Act.But the
Local Government Code of 1991 will take effect only on 1 January 1992 and therefore the old Local
Government Code (B.P. Blg.337) is still the law applicable to the present case. Prior to the enactment of
the new Local Government Code, the effectiveness of B.P.Blg. 337 was expressly recognized in the
proceedings of the 1986 Constitutional Commission. We therefore rule that Resolution No.
2272promulgated by the COMELEC is valid and constitutional. Consequently, the COMELEC had the
authority to approve the petition for recalland set the date for the signing of said petition.
Issue 2:
WON the TRO issued by this Court rendered nugatory the signing process of the petition for recall held
pursuant to Resolution No. 2272.
Held:
No
Ratio:
In the present case, the records show that Evardone knew of the Notice of Recall filed by Apelado, on or
about 21 February 1990 asevidenced by the Registry Return Receipt; yet, he was not vigilant in following
up and determining the outcome of such notice. Evardonealleges that it was only on or about 3 July 1990
that he came to know about the Resolution of the COMELEC setting the signing of thepetition for recall
on 14 July 1990. But despite his urgent prayer for the issuance of a TRO, Evardone filed the petition for
prohibition onlyon 10 July 1990. Indeed, this Court issued a TRO on 12 July 1990 but the signing of the
petition for recall took place just the same on thescheduled date through no fault of the COMELEC and
Apelado. The signing process was undertaken by the constituents of theMunicipality of Sulat and its
Election Registrar in good faith and without knowledge of the TRO earlier issued by this Court. As
attested byElection Registrar Sumbilla, about 2,050 of the 6,090 registered voters of Sulat, Eastern Samar
or about 34% signed the petition for recall.As held in Parades vs. Executive Secretary there is no turning
back theclock.The right to recall is complementary to the right to elect or appoint. It is included in the
right of suffrage. It is based on thetheory that the electorate must maintain a direct and elastic control
over public functionaries. It is also predicated upon the idea that apublic office is "burdened" with public
interests and that the representatives of the people holding public offices are simply agents orservants
of the people with definite powers and specific duties to perform and to follow if they wish to remain in
their respective offices.Whether or not the electorate of Sulat has lost confidence in the incumbent
mayor is a political question. It belongs to the realm of politics where only the people are the judge.
"Loss of confidence is the formal withdrawal by an electorate of their trust in a person'sability to
discharge his office previously bestowed on him by the same electorate. The constituents have made a
judgment and their willto recall Evardone has already been ascertained and must be afforded the highest
respect. Thus, the signing process held last 14 July1990 for the recall of Mayor Felipe P. Evardone of said
municipality is valid and has legal effect.However, recall at this time is no longer possible because of the
limitation provided in Sec. 55 (2) of B.P. Blg, 337. TheConstitution has mandated a synchronized national
and local election prior to 30 June 1992, or more specifically, as provided for in ArticleXVIII, Sec. 5 on the
second Monday of May, 1992. Thus, to hold an election on recall approximately seven (7) months before
the regularlocal election will be violative of the above provisions of the applicable Local Government
Code.
Secretary of Health v. CA, Sibbaluca
Facts:
An administrative complaint was filed against private respondent Fe Sibbaluca, the Administrative
Officer III of the Provincial Health Office of Cagayan, for grave misconduct, dishonesty; etc. As a
consequence of the administrative case, private respondent was placed under preventive suspension for
ninety [90] days by herein petitioner Secretary of Health.
Private respondent sought the lifting of her suspension. Pending resolution of her said motion, private
respondent instituted an action for prohibition,mandamus, and injunction with a prayer for a temporary
restraining order and a writ of preliminary injunction before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Tuguegarao
(Branch 1). Her action is anchored on her contention that when the New Local Government Code took
effect on January 1, 1992, the Secretary of Health had lost his disciplinary power and authority over her,
considering that such power to discipline the personnel of the Provincial Health Office is now vested in
the Provincial Governor.
RTC found merit to the ancillary remedy sought by private respondent so it issued a temporary
restraining order.
Issue:
WON the Secretary of Health has jurisdiction over the respondent
Ruling:
Yes.
The pertinent provision of the Local Government Code of 1991 provides:
Sec. 536. Effectivity Clause. This code shall take effect on January first, nineteen hundred ninety-two,
unless otherwise, provided herein, after its complete publication in at least one (1) newspaper of general
circulation.
It is explicit in the abovestated law that the local Government Code of 1991 shall take effect on January
1, 1992. It is an elementary principle of statutory construction that where the words and phrases of a
statute are not obscure and ambiguous, the meaning and intention of the legislature should be
determined from the language employed, and where there is no ambiguity in the words, there is no
room for construction.
Furthermore, it is well-settled that jurisdiction is determined by the statute in force at the time of the
commencement of the action (Philippine Singapore Ports Corporation v. NLRC, 218 SCRA 77 [1993]).
In the case at bar, respondent Fe Sibbaluca was administratively charged before petitioner department
in 1991. The case was docketed as Administrative Case No. 000023 S. 1991 and the suspension order was
issued by petitioner Secretary of Health on December 17, 1991. At the time of the commencement of
the administrative action, the operative laws are the Administrative Code of 1987 and Executive Order
No. 119. Under the said laws, the Secretary of Health exercises control, direction and supervision over
his subordinates, which include private respondent. Consequently, since jurisdiction has been acquired
by the Secretary of Health over the person of private respondent before the effectivity of the Local
Government Code on January 1, 1992, it continues until the final disposition of the administrative case.
This Court already ruled in a number of cases that jurisdiction once acquired by a court over a case
remains with it until the full termination of the case, unless a law provides the contrary.