Implications of The Lisbon Treaty On The European Union's Common Security Defense Policy and The Emerging Strategic Partnership Between NATO and The EU

Implications of the Lisbon Treaty on the European
Unions Common Security Defense Policy and the

Emerging Strategic Partnership Between NATO
and the EU
Major Andreas Winter and Dr. David A. Anderson
Introduction
The Lisbon Treaty is a monumental step toward fully integrating
European Union (EU) military capabilities within its Common
Security and Defense Policy (CSDP). An underlying concern
resulting from the treaty is the amount of redundancy it creates with
the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). NATO and the EU
had already developed redundancies in military capabilities. To some
extent, this duplication is healthy and necessary to allow Europeans
to further develop their military capabilities. On the political level, the
line between healthy and unhealthy redundancy can be thin. This is
particularly true when one organization attempts to take on the role
of the other creating competition rather than cooperation.1 The
purpose of this paper is to determine the extent the Lisbon Treaty
actually promotes a complementary relationship between NATO and
the EU in the field of Security and Defense Policy.
After providing a brief historical background, the investigation begins
with a review of NATOs relationship with the EU and its CSDP and
the existing cooperation between both organizations. This sets the
stage for the subsequent assessment of the Lisbon Treaty within the
framework of NATO-EU relations. In this part, the analysis briefly
assesses the decisions implemented by the Lisbon Treaty in
relationship to the major changes it creates within the CSDP. Then,
the analysis focuses on the implications of these changes for the
NATO-EU relationship. This includes the impact on the strategic
orientation of CSDP, the effects of the Lisbon Treatys changes on
the EUs institutions and procedures, and the relevance of the Lisbon
Treaty for collaborative capability development.
Background
The North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NATO has been the cornerstone for European security for more
than sixty years and remains a vital component of the global security
framework for both the United States (US) and European members.2
Since its foundation in 1949, critics often inaccurately portrayed the
organizations condition and calculated the Alliances death in view of
its record of perpetual internal political conflict, epitomized by such
events as the Suez crisis of 1956, the French withdrawal from
NATOs integrated military command in 1966, or the stationing of
Pershing II missiles in Europe in the early
1The reviewed literature shows that in international relations competition is
predominantly used in a negative sense of rivalries and opposing interests. The
paper will follow this definition.
2NATO, Letter from President Obama (January 20, 2009),
http://www.nato.int/docu/speech/2009/s090120a.html (accessed April 26, 2011).
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Implications of the Lisbon Treaty on the European Unions Common Security

Defense Policy and the Emerging Strategic Partnership Between NATO and the EU
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Standard Form 298 (Rev. 8-98)
Prescribed by ANSI Std Z39-18
1980s. However, the Alliance has repeatedly proven its ability to

overcome internal crisis and diplomatic strategic challenges by
successful dispute resolution and effective adaptation.3
From a historical perspective, the Yugoslavia Wars in the Balkans
caused the Alliance to transform into an active provider of security
outside its territories for crisis management. Member states agreed on
a new Strategic Concept in 1999, which defined wider security risks
for NATO and shifted the focus of the organization to more global
security matters.4 In order to meet new threats where they occur, it
became necessary to transform NATO members large and
conventionally focused units into agile and deployable expeditionary
forces. Thus, member state political leaders endorsed the Defense
Capabilities Initiative during the Washington Summit in 1999 to
ensure the effectiveness of future multinational operations across
the full spectrum of Alliance missions in the present and foreseeable
security environment with a special focus on improving
interoperability among Alliance forces. 5 Promoting security and
stability in Europe, the Alliance also reached out to the east: Poland,
Bulgaria, and Albania among other countries joined NATO in
1999, 2004, and 2009. With this, NATO doubled the number of its
members in barely ten years.
Two years later, the appearance of international terrorism posed a
new threat for the Alliance. In the wake of the 9/11 attacks, when
NATO invoked collective defense under Article 5 for the first time in
its history, the member states showed their willingness to adapt to
new threats but also revealed that they had not yet transformed their
forces sufficiently to close the gap between US and European military
capabilities. Consequently, the Alliance refined the Defense
Capabilities Initiative during the 2002 Prague Summit and agreed to
improve military capabilities in eight specified areas under the Prague
Capability Commitment.6 The Prague Summit also introduced the
NATO Response Force. This high readiness force should serve as a
catalyst for focusing and promoting improvements in these areas and
should equip the Alliance with a high quality, self-sustainable,
expeditionary capability to respond to any crisis within thirty days.
The transformation process initiated in Prague 2002 is ongoing.
NATO remains heavily dependent on United States forces and
capabilities today and European countries have not yet aligned their
efforts and resources within the Alliance sufficiently.7 Besides the
ongoing transformation process in NATO, twenty-two of NATOs
twenty-eight members have also pushed forward their integration in
security and defense within the European Union in an equally
dynamic, comprehensive, and politically transformational way.
3NATO is also often referred to as the Alliance . Both terms will be used
synonymously in this article. Ryan C. Hendrickson, "The Miscalculation of NATO's
Death," Parameter (Spring 2007): 101-104, 112. See also Lawrence S. Kaplan, NATO
Divided, NATO United - The Evolution of an Alliance (London: Praeger, 2004),
13, 31-34, 91-94.
4NATO, The Alliances Strategic Concept (April 24, 1999),
http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_27433.htm?selectedLocale=en
(accessed April 26, 2011).
5NATO, Defence Capabilities Initiative (DCI) Overview (December 1999),
http://www.nato.int/docu/comm/1999/9912- hq/fs-dci99.htm (accessed April 26,
2011).
6NATO, Prague Summit Declaration (Brussels, 21 November 2002): 1,
http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/2002/p02-127e.htm (accessed 20 April 2010).
7Sally McNamara, NATO Summit 2010: Time to Turn Words into Action
(Backgrounder No. 2498, Washington D.C.: Heritage Foundation, 2010), 8. Carl W.
Ek, NATO's Prague Capability Commitment, CRS Report for Congress
(Washington D.C.: Congressional Research Service, 2006), 1-6. NATO,
Comprehensive Political Guidance (Brussels, 29 November 2009),
http://www.nato.int/docu/basictxt/b061129e.htm (accessed 5 September 2010).
Mats Berdal, and David Ucko, "NATO at 60," Survival (Mai 2009): 60.
European Integration in Security and Defense

During the Cold War, the primary focus of European integration lay
on economic integration and economic cooperation through a
common European market within the European Communities. In
1992, the Treaty of Maastricht merged these Communities into the
European Union and expanded the level of cooperation among the
members including a Common Foreign and Security Policy. Given
the ongoing NATO transformation process triggered by the Balkan
Wars, the EU also chose to rethink its approach towards crisis
management. This led to revived interest in the idea of a European
Common Defense concept.8
NATOs intervention in Bosnia revealed a huge imbalance between
European and US military capabilities and led to the creation of a
European pillar within the NATO framework, known as the
European Security Defense Initiative. This approach, favored by US
President Clintons administration, implied that any political decision
on European defense cooperation would always require de facto US
approval. The initially hesitant US attitude towards an engagement in
the Kosovo conflict in 1998 again demonstrated the inability of
European countries to provide security in Europe and convinced
European powers to create a European Defense within the EU rather
than within NATO.9 Consequently, the British-Franco Saint Malo
initiative of 1998 proposed that the EU should handle Europes joint
defense and that European countries should correct imbalances in
Euro-American security cooperation. The initiative is often referred
to as the birth certificate of the Common Security and Defense
Policy (CSDP).10 This development raised serious questions among
non-EU NATO members, particularly because of fears that CSDP
would duplicate NATO assets, discriminate against non-EU NATO
members, and decouple the United States from Europe. Hence, the
Prime Minister of the United Kingdom (UK), Tony Blair, reaffirmed
CSDPs limitation to peacekeeping missions, particularly where
NATO as a whole chooses not to be engaged. 11 With
8The forming of the Western European Union was the first attempt at a common
European defense alliance. However, the organization was soon marginalized due to
the founding of NATO. The Western European Union nevertheless existed until 30
June 2011. The second attempt to integrate in the field of security and defense was
the French proposal of a European Defense Community. The treaty failed to come
into effect in 1954, mainly because of Frances fears that such an agreement would
threaten its national sovereignty. Margarita Mathiopoulos and Istvn Gyarmati,
Saint Malo and BeyondToward European Defense, Washington Quarterly 22,
no. 4 (Autumn 1999): 65. GlobalSecurity.org, European Defence Community (EDC)
(July 09, 2011), http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/int/edc.htm (accessed
August 17, 2011).
9The Kosovo conflict was one major contributing factor to the British shift in
attitude towards European Defense within the EU rather than the European Security
Defense Initiative within NATO (the St. Malo initiative), particularly if the US does
not want to be engaged. Europa, European Security Defense Identity (2010),
http://europa.eu/scadplus/glossary/european_security_defence_identity_en.htm
(accessed April 26, 2011). Mathiopoulos and Gyarmati, 66, 68.
10The EU officially introduced CSDP originally referred to as European Security
and Defense Policy (ESDP) during the EU summit in Cologne in June 1999. Asle
Toje, The EU, NATO and European DefenceA Slow Train Coming (Occasional
Paper, Paris: European Union Institute for Security Studies, 2008), 11. LTC (GS)
Peter Fischer, European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP) After Ten years
Current Situation and Perspectives (Monograph, Fort Leavenworth, KS: School of
Advanced Military Studies, 2010), 7.
11Secretary of State Madeleine Albright spelled out the US concerns and the US
policy towards CSDP using the three Ds and Donald Rumsfeld repeated this
warning addressing the Munich Conference on Security in 2001, expressing US
policy-makers and defense experts skepticism regarding the value of CSDP. Fischer,
13. Kori Schake, Constructive Duplication: Reducing EU Reliance on US Military
Assets (Working Paper, London: Center For European Reform, 2002), 5.
these peacekeeping missions, Blair referred to the Petersberg Tasks

that the EU had already adopted in 1997. The Union later extended
these tasks to include joint disarmament operations, military advice
and assistance, conflict prevention, and post-conflict stabilization.12
To fulfill the Petersberg Tasks, the member states of the EU needed
to transform their militaries and to gain access to the military
planning capabilities and forces of NATO to avoid unnecessary
duplications. To meet these two requirements, the EU adopted the
Helsinki Headline Goal of 1999 and the Berlin Plus agreements in
2002.13 The Helsinki Headline Goal, later transferred into the
Headline Goal 2010, set out a general capability requirement with the
objective to hold a corps size force of 50,000-60,000 deployable
within 60 days with the ability to sustain them for at least one year.
Subsequent analysis identified five key shortfalls in European military
capabilities: strategic and tactical airlift; sustainability and logistics
(including air-to-air refueling); effective engagement technologies
including precision weapons; rescue helicopters; and Command,
Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance, and
Reconnaissance systems.14
The rapid development potential within CSDP motivated EU
member states to create an EU Security Strategy for cooperative
defense. This set for the first time a policy framework for CSDP,
which led to the adoption of the Headline Goal 2010, and introduced
the European Battle Group concept.15 This should enable the EU to
contribute more visibly to external security and to
12Initially, the Ministerial Council of the Western European Union introduced the
Petersberg Tasks in June 1992, which comprised humanitarian and rescue missions,
peacekeeping missions, and tasks for combat forces in crisis management (including
peacemaking). The EU adopted these tasks from the Western European Union by
the Treaty of Amsterdam of 1997, amending the Maastricht Treaty. The extension of
the Petersberg Tasks goes back to a report of Michael Barnier, who suggested
creating a European Civil Protection Force in 2002. Assembly of Western European
Union, "Security and Defence Aspects of the Lisbon Reform Treaty," Europa
Varietas Institute (January 31, 2008): 2-3,
http://europavarietas.visuart.eu/files/combarieulisbonneen.pdf (accessed April 30,
2011). Julian He, Das Verhltnis von NATO und EUEine Analyse unter
Bercksichtigung des Lissabonner Reformvertrages (Munich: AVM-Verlag, 2009),
4. Martin Reichard, The EU-NATO RelationshipA Legal and Political Perspective
(UK, Hampshire: Ashgate, 2006), 73. European Union, Consolidated Version of the
Treaty on European Union, (May 09, 2008), http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:C:2008:115:0013:0045:EN:PDF
(accessed April 30, 2011).
13Berlin Plus has its roots in the Berlin Agreement that allowed European
countries already limited access to NATO planning capabilities as part of the
European Security Defense Initiative. NATO, Final Communiqu (June 03, 1996),
http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/1996/p96-063e.htm (accessed April 30, 2011). Javier
Solana, "Remarks by Javier Solana, EU High Representative for the Common
Foreign and Security Policy following the agreement on the establishment of EU-
NATO permanent arrangements," Consilium (December 16, 2002), 1,
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/73803%20-%20Solana%20-
%20Permanent%20arrangements%20+%20NATO%20declaration.pdf (accessed
April 30, 2011).
14European Council, "Annex IV of the Presidency Conclusions Helsinki European
Council," Consilium (December 10- 11, 1999): 5, 9-11,
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/Helsinki%20European%20Co
uncil%20- %20Annex%20IV%20of%20the%20Presidency%20Conclusions.pdf
(accessed April 30, 2011). European Parliament, "The European Security and
Defence Policy: from the Helsinki Headline Goal to the EU Battlegroups," The
European Parliament (September 12, 2006): 4,
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/meetdocs/2009_2014/documents/sede/dv/sede03
0909noteesdp_/sede030909noteesd p_en.pdf (accessed April 30, 2011). European
Union, "The EU Battlegroups and the EU Civilian and Military Cell," Consilium
(February 2005): 1,
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/Battlegroups.pdf (accessed
April 30, 2011).
15A Battle Group is a combined arms battalion of approximately 1,500 troops;
reinforced with combat support elements, and associated with a Force Headquarters
as well as pre-identified transport and logistics elements; deployable within fifteen
days; and sustainable for 120 days. Ibid., European Council, "Headline Goal 2010,"
Consilium (June 17-18,
transform European forces more rapidly. To avoid duplicating

NATOs command structure, the member states of Alliance and the
EU also agreed on the Berlin Plus agreement, which granted the EU
access to military planning capabilities and enabled the EU to lead
military missions.16 With regard to the EUs goal of more effective
crisis management, CSDP also needed to include civilian capabilities
and effective structures to lead operations following a comprehensive
approach. From May 2000, the EU thus started to create the
structures to plan and coordinate civilian crisis management and to
deploy civilian capabilities of its members.17 The last step in European
integration marked the Lisbon Treaty, established in December 2009.
Its impact on CSDP made the three-pillar model obsolete, which has
described the functioning of the EU until 2009.18 The significant
progress in CSDP and the ongoing transformation in NATO
increased the need to improve the strategic partnership between
NATO and the EU.
The Lisbon Treaty in Light of NATO-EU Relations
NATO and the EU are founded on common values and strategic
interests, particularly in the fields of security, defense, and crisis
management. NATO and the EUs cooperation are primarily directed
at supporting the fight against terrorism, strengthening the
development of coherent and mutually reinforcing military
capabilities, and cooperating in the field of civil emergency planning.
From a NATO perspective, there is no doubt that a stronger EU
will further contribute to our common security. 19 NATO strives for
improvements in the strategic partnership with the EU, which can be
summarized by the following four premises: closer cooperation,
higher transparency, greater efficiency, and continual autonomy.20 To
achieve a closer cooperation and higher transparency,
2004): 3,
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/2010%20Headline%20Goal.p
df (accessed April 30, 2011).
16The agreement of 2002 determined the EU-NATO framework for permanent
relations. Operation Althea in Bosnia Herzegovina was the first mission in which the
EU accessed NATO command structures under Berlin Plus. Before the EU could
take over the mission from NATO, the member states had to agree on the terms,
which proved to be difficult due to the Turkish-Greek conflict on Cyprus. This
dispute resulted in three years of difficulty negotiations before Berlin Plus became
eventually effective on 17 March 2003. Solana, 1. Council of the European Union.
"Presidency Conclusions," Institute of European Integration and Policy, (October
24-25, 2002), 17, http://eeep.pspa.uoa.gr/cn- Brussels%20Octob%202002.pdf
(accessed April 30, 2011). Reichard, 284, 286, 287.
17Andreas Winter, The Lisbon Treaty and its Implications for the CSDP in the
Light of the Emerging Strategic Partnership Between NATO and the EU (Masters
Thesis, Fort Leavenworth, KS: Command and General Staff College, 2010), 38-43.
Manfred Lange, Militrische Aspekte der ESVP aus der Perspektive des deutschen
EU- Vorsitzes, Militrische Aspekte der Europischen Sicherheits- und
Verteidigungspolitik im Lichte der EU-Ratsprsidentschaft (Michael Staack (ed.),
WIFIS No 26, 2008), 20.
18 From 1992 until 2009, the three pillar model explained best the functioning of
the EU. Supranational treaties (the original European Communities) characterized the
first and strongest pillar. The second and third pillars represented the Common
Foreign and Security Policy and the Justice and Home Affairs (transferred into Police
and Judicial Co- operation on Criminal Matters by the Treaty of Amsterdam in 1997).
19NATO, Riga Summit Declaration (Brussels, 29 November 2006): paragraph 41,
http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/2006/p06-150e.htm (accessed 5 September 2010).
20Ibid. NATO, Bucharest Summit Declaration (Brussels, 3 April 2008): paragraph
14, http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_8443.htm (accessed 18
September 2010). NATO, Strasbourg/Kehl Summit Declaration, (Brussels, 4 April
2009): paragraph 20,
http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/news_52837.htm?mode=pressrelease
(accessed 9 August 2010).
NATO took various initiatives within the NATO-EU Capability

Groupa forum established in 2003 to allow formal coordination
between both organizations besides the existing informal NATO-
EU staff-to-staff dialogue.21 To achieve greater efficiency in NATO
operations, the Alliance also agreed to integrate civilian public service
planners (e.g., police) into the planning and conduct of military
operations, following the idea of a comprehensive approach for
conflict resolution. Considering the scarce resources of its members,
NATO cannot afford to develop its own civilian capabilities and thus
relies on cooperation in this field with other organizations, namely
the EU.22 Avoiding unnecessary duplications would also allow greater
efficiency to get more (capabilities) out of less (resources).
Particularly, NATO encourages nations to re-prioritize financial
resources, including through pooling and other forms of bilateral or
multilateral cooperation. 23 However, two major political obstacles
prevent closer cooperation, higher transparency, and greater
efficiency between NATO and the EU. First, France and the UK
differ substantially in their political end state of CSDP and the
question of how to progressively carry forward European integration
in the defense sector. Second, the Greece-Turkey conflict over
Cyprus blocks effective cooperation within the NATO-EU Capability
Group. The missing security agreement between the EU and NATO
allows Turkey to block cooperation with Cyprus. In return, Cyprus
and Greece oppose Turkey having closer relationships with the EU,
particularly through administrative arrangements with the European
Defense Agency (EDA), which hinders effective cooperation
between NATO and the EDA. Those political obstacles have a huge
impact on NATO who is struggling to define how the Alliance wants
to achieve an effective strategic partnership with the EU, how to
achieve greater transparency in its relations with the EU, and how
CSDP could effectively contribute to NATOs missions and vice
versa. Particularly, this materializes in sharing information and
intelligence in such missions, the development and employment of
military and civilian capabilities, and the overcoming of the highly
fragmentized European industrial defense market, which is a major
factor in military capability shortfalls of European countries.24
The Lisbon Treaty and CSDP
The effect of the Lisbon Treaty on the EU, and in particular, on the
Unions CSDP is considerable. The changes concern three areas: the
strategic goal and orientation of CSDP, the modification of
institutional structures responsible for carrying out CSDP, and the
procedures for future capability development under the head of
EDA.25 The modified strategic goal for CSDP is a continuation of the
provisions of the European Security Strategy, which aimed at
strengthening mutual solidarity of the EU [to make the EU] a more
credible and effective actor. 26 This will eventually lead to a common
defense and solidarity among EU member states in case of an armed
attack, a natural
21Paul Sturm, NATO and the EU: Cooperation? European Security Review No.
48 (February 2010): 1, http://www.isis- europe.org/pdf/2010_artrel_445_eu-nato-
capabilities.pdf (accessed 20 September 2010).
22NATO, Comprehensive Political Guidance, paragraph 7e. 23 Ibid., paragraph
15.24 Winter, 55, 61-62, 90-91.
25For a more detailed assessment of the changes of the Lisbon Treaty: Winter, 62-73.
European Union, Treaty of LisbonAmending the Treaty on European Union and
the Treaty Establishing the European Community (Brussels, 3 December 2007),
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/cg00014.en07.pdf (accessed
20 September 2010).26 European Union, A Secure Europe in a Better World
European Security Strategy (Brussels, 12 December 2003): 1,
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/78367.pdf (accessed 11
September 2010).

disaster, or a man-made accident. Additionally, the EU also adopted
the extended Petersberg Tasks for CSDP from the Western
European Union, which now include joint disarmament operations,
humanitarian and rescue tasks, military advice and assistance tasks,
conflict prevention and peacekeeping tasks, tasks of combat forces
in crisis management, including peace-making and post- conflict
stabilization. 27
The major changes to the institutional structures and main decision
making bodies responsible for implementing CSDP impact various
areas. First, the Treaty establishes the European Council as an official
institution, which is now chaired by a long term and full-time
President in contrast to the former six month rotation cycle of the
Presidency. Second, the treaty adapted the office of the High
Representative for Common Foreign and Security Policy (HR) and,
third, establishes the European External Action Service as a
diplomatic service of the EU.28 With this step, the EU merges two
former areas of EU foreign relations and takes the next step towards
more coherent and consistent external relations. The bureau of the
HR is in fact a new and independent office, which now coordinates
and conducts CSDP as a link between the Council of the EU. The
European Commission now also serves as head of the European
External Action Service, and as president of the EDA. Lastly, the EU
integrates EU civilian and crisis management structures at the
strategic planning level introducing the Crisis Management and
Planning Directorate (CMPD).29 The directorate will streamline
existing structures responsible for civilian crisis management, will
unify civilian and military planning at the strategic level as integral
part of EEAS, and will serve as the highest institution of civilian
crisis management planning within the EU.30
The treaty also officially introduces Permanent Structured
Cooperation in Defense (PSCD) as a tool to foster the military
capacity of its member states and to harmonize, pool, and specialize
military needs, means and capabilities including higher cooperation
in the fields of training and logistics, particularly through EDA. The
Lisbon Treaty elevated the EDA from Joint Action to Treaty level,
which provides a much firmer legal base to work from and clarifies
existing practices in armament cooperation. EDA is now an official
part of CSDP andunder the direction of the HRidentifies
27After the Lisbon Treaty came into effect, the Western European Union treaty was
terminated in 2010 and the organization ceased to exist on 30 June 2011. The
extended Petersberg Tasks can be executed within the Union framework only by a
group of member states, which are willing and have the necessary capability for
such a task. Western European Union, Western European Union (Brussels, 27 May
2011), http://www.weu.int/ (accessed 28 November 2011). European Union, Treaty
of LisbonAmending the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty Establishing
the European Community (Brussels, 3 December 2007): 47,
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/cg00014.en07.pdf (accessed
20 September 2010).
The EU also renamed the post to High Representative of the Union for Foreign
28
Affairs and Security Policy.

29Although not introduced by the Lisbon Treaty, CMPD is very important for
gaining a better understanding of the Treatys impact adapting its institutional level.
European Peacebuilding Liaison Office, Statement on Civilian-Military Integration
in European Security and Defence Policy (Brussels, 6 January 2009): 8, and 14,
http://www.eplo.org/documents/EPLO_Statement.pdf (accessed 21 June 2010).
30Carmen Gebhard, The Crisis Management and Planning Directorate:
Recalibrating ESDP Planning and Conduct Capacities, CFSP Forum Vol. 7, No. 4
(Vienna, Institute for Advanced Studies, July 2009): 8,
http://carmengebhard.com/CFSP_Forum_vol_7_no_4_Gebhard.pdf (accessed 3
July 2010).
operational requirements and implements any measures needed to

strengthen a competitive European defense market and a strong
European industrial base.31
The Lisbon Treaty and its Effects on the NATO-EU Relationship
The Lisbon Treaty constitutes a very important juncture for CSDP
and its strategic orientation, even though the Treaty does not resolve
the Unions lack of strategic culture. First, by unifying the EC and the
EU, the EU undoubtedly assumes a single legal personality, which
strengthens the organizations position in negotiating international
agreements (the treaty making power) using its entire means. It also
allows the Union to establish bilateral diplomatic relations with
international actors, by speaking and acting as one body.
Furthermore, the Lisbon Treaty provides a possible end state for
CSDP (mutual defense), amends its spectrum of future missions (the
extended Petersberg Tasks), and specifies its strategic vision of a
more active, more coherent, and more capable Union.32
Despite these important strategic effects on the EU, it is equally
important to address remaining shortcomings in European strategy
development. The EU has not initiated a continuous progression in
its strategic thinking, even though it is already demanded by the EU
Security Strategy and suggested by a variety of international scholars.
The absence of corresponding objectives for the Unions political,
diplomatic, military, civilian, and trade and development activities
actually fosters internal disputes and internal division about strategic
objectives and priorities, which leads to EU actions that appear
unpredictable and weak to external actors.33 However, the Lisbon
Treaty as a next step towards higher integration in the European
defense sector would address all of the shortfalls in European
strategic development.34
Mutual Defense and the Solidarity Clause
At first glance, the intent of mutual defense duplicates NATOs role
of providing a common defense of member states. This would be
contradictory to achieving a complementary relationship and
probably promote competition between both organizations.
However, for the EU to act as
31Jean-Pierre Darnis et. Al., Lessons Learned from European Defence Equipment
Programmes, Occasional Paper (Paris: European Union Institute for Security Studies,
2007), 18. Ibid., 89. European Union, Treaty of LisbonAmending the Treaty on
European Union and the Treaty Establishing the European Community, 46.
32European Union, Treaty of LisbonAmending the Treaty on European Union
and the Treaty Establishing the European Community, 11. Klaus Olshausen, Zehn
Jahre Europische Sicherheits- und Verteidigungspolitik, Der Mittler-Brief 24. Jg
(Herford, 2009), 5-6. Lange, 17. Sven Biscop, A
European Army for the EU and
NATO? Egmont Paper (Brussels: EgmontRoyal Institute for International
Relations, 3 March 2007), 12. Winter, 73-74.
33Sven Biscop and Jo Coelmont. A Strategy for CSDPEuropes Ambitions as a
Global Security Provider, Egmont Paper No. 37 (Brussels: EgmontRoyal Institute
for International Relations, October 2010): 8,
http://www.egmontinstitute.be/paperegm/ep37.pdf, (accessed 11 October 2010).
Biscop, A European Army for the EU and NATO? 12.
34The bottom-up approach is an important characteristic of the EUs external
policies. Usually, (a group of) individual states take the initiative to create something
new and/or to build up their involvement in CSDP, rather than following a
supranational decision to become involved. A good example is the creation of the
European Security Strategy, which was provided in 2003, after European countries
had already started building capabilities under CSDP five years earlier.
another provider of collective defense is questionable for two

reasons. First, the Lisbon Treaty explicitly defines NATOs primacy
in this regard. The Treaty clearly states that the EU respects the
obligations of certain Member States, which see their common
defence realized in [NATO] and that its policy will be compatible
with the common security and defence policy established within that
framework. 35 Second, the EUs six neutral Member States do not
indicate any intent to change their distinct national defense policies of
not participating in a CSDP. In practice, this means that the EU will
not be able to organize its military forces for a territorial defense.
Given NATOs and the EUs similar threat assessment, such an
attempt would also be unnecessary and redundant. However, the
solidarity clause might have important legal implications for the
Union, for instance, in case of a terrorist attack. Meeting such threats
remains vital for the EU, especially in conjunction with proliferation
of weapons of mass destruction. Mutual defense may allow the EU to
use military force internally to meet such threats and their
consequences, including natural disasters, man-made accidents, or
collapses of supply networks and communications. The mutual
defense clause may also help to overcome the wide array of national
caveats on the use of military forces inside the EU, and signals that
solely nationalistic approaches in defense planning of its members are
no longer feasible.36
In light of these reasons, the mutual defense clause is not directed to
duplicate NATOs role and will certainly not promote competition
between NATO and the EU. The legal and secondary implications of
the clause could actually encourage EU Member States to focus on
streamlining capability planning under the head of the EU. As long as
this is in line with NATO capability planning, this could have positive
effects for the Alliance as well. In this sense, the mutual defense
clause could even promote a complementary partnership between
both organizations, if the EU does not decide to decouple military
defense planning from NATOs procedures and if the organization
translates the political goal of common defense in operational terms.
This emphasizes the need for NATO and the EU to strengthen
cooperation through regular consultation, highlights that political
consensus within the EU is required to shape CSDP more
progressively in the future, and raises the question of how
cooperation with NATO should be institutionalized.37
The Extended Petersberg Tasks
In adopting the extended Petersberg Tasks for CSDP, the EU partly
took over tasks, such as providing military advice, military assistance,
and conflict prevention. Since 1994, these tasks were already fulfilled
by NATOs Partnership for Peace program. This creates an overlap
in tasks between NATO and the EU, but does not necessarily lead to
competition between both organizations. The credo of Berlin Plus
to launch EU-led operations only where NATO as a whole is not
engaged still determines whether the EU can actually fulfill these
tasks. 38 EU-led operations such as
35 European Union, Consolidated Version of the Treaty on European Union, 26.36
Alyson J. K. Bailes, Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP)/European
Security and Defence Policy (ESDP): Challenges and
Prospects (Hamburg: IFSH, 2005), 3-4. 37 Sturm, 1, 3.

38He, 59. European Security and Defense Assembly, The EU-NATO Berlin Plus
Agreements, Assembly Factsheet No. 14 (November 2009): 1,
http://www.assembly-
weu.org/en/documents/Fact%20sheets/14E_Fact_Sheet_Berlin_Plus.pdf (accessed
12 October 2010).
CONCORDIA in Macedonia (completed on 15 December 2003) and

EUFOR ALTHEA in Bosnia (still ongoing) have shown that the
agreement can be successfully achieved, enabling the EU to act. In
both operations, NATOs Deputy Supreme Allied Commander
Europe acted as Operational Commander for the EU and the Union
launched its missions following a terminated NATO mission (e.g.,
ALLIED HARMONY and SFOR).39 In contrast, the duplication of
tasks can also lead to negative examples, such as, the beauty
contest between NATO and the EU over West Sudan. Both
organizations were divided due to a US-French argument about the
question of whether NATO or the EU was supposed to lead
management of the crisis. Another example is Operation ARTEMIS,
launched in 2003 to stabilize conflict areas in the Democratic
Republic of Congo. The EU was able to deploy military forces
without NATO support utilizing Berlin Plus. This was an important
accomplishment for the EU, but simultaneously raised annoyance
among some NATO Members because of the EU's lack of
consultation with the Alliance.40
Adopting the extended Petersberg Tasks neither promotes a
complementary relationship between both organizations nor does it
increase competition. Like the mutual defense clause, the actual
utilization of a task and its perception will depend upon
communication and consultation between NATO and the EU. This
underlines how important it is for NATO and the EU to agree upon
a standard protocol in this regard and to institutionalize their
cooperation.
Adapted Institutions and their Effects for a Strategic Partnership
The officially introduced European Council, the widely adapted tasks
and responsibilities of the HR, and the newly introduced EEAS are
remarkable amendments in the EUs institutional framing and
exercising of CSDP. With the introduction of CMPD and the
streamlining of its civilian crisis management institutions, these
changes will have significant effects for the future of the EU and its
relations with NATO.
The European Council as a Intergovernmental Institution
Officially introducing the European Council and its new presidency
as the main body responsible for developing general guidelines and
strategic lines for CSDP strengthens the intergovernmental character
of CSDP.41 The Lisbon Treaty underlines that the principle of
unanimity as a cornerstone of security and defense cooperation in the
EU will remain, although qualified majority voting applies for some
areas of CSDP. This has positive and negative aspects for CSDP. On
the one hand, decisions that require consensus among the EUs
members send a strong and firm internal and external message
demonstrating the EUs determination to act. On the other hand,
unanimity gives member states the power to block decisions that a
vast majority might want to take. This hampers
CONCORDIA and EUFOR ALTHEA were actually the only missions conducted
39
under Berlin Plus. Ibid., 1.

40Stephen F. Larrabee, The United States and the Evolution of ESDP, What
Ambitions for European Defense in 2020? (Paris: Rand Cooperation, 2009): 50,
http://www.rand.org/pubs/reprints/2010/RAND_RP1404.pdf (accessed 21 August
2010). LTC (GS) Peter Fischer, European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP)
After Ten years-Current Situation and Perspectives (Monograph, School of
Advanced Military Studies, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 2010):, 27-28.
41 Gurot, 41.
the EU in carrying out CSDP more progressively.42 There is,

nevertheless, a good chance that political issues between the Member
States could be mitigated through the HR, the EEAS, and the EDA
and that CSDP will be more capable in the future.43 However,
progress in this field will continue to be slow and will remain
dependent on bottom-up initiatives.
Inter-governmentalism for CSDP neither fosters nor hampers a
complementary relationship between NATO and the EU.
Nevertheless, there are risks that existing political issues between EU
Members as well as between EU and non-EU Members may become
institutionalized, which will prevent a strategic partnership. On the
one hand, the EUs definition of national security as the sole
responsibility of individual Members also undermines the
organizations attempt to create common security. This reduces the
power of its adapted institutions and creates obstacles to aligning
military and civilian capabilities as well as in creating a competitively
viable European industrial defense base. On the other hand, the
Treaty explicitly provides possibilities to delegate specific defense
policy tasks and functions to a group of states. This mitigates the
risks of internal issues for the conduct of CSDP and can lead to
multinational cooperation between willing and more capable EU
Member States. In view of capability development and a strategic
partnership with NATO, this can only be appreciated.
The New HR and the EEAS as Foreign Ministry of the EU
The most prominent and probably most important institutional
amendments by the Lisbon Treaty are the new HR and the
introduction of a diplomatic service for the Union. The office of the
HR was clearly strengthened and can in tandem with the EEAS
function as a transmission belt for national foreign policy goals,
which the smaller member states in particular stand to profit from,
while the EEAS could benefit from the nations experiences,
networks, and traditions.44 Both the HR and the EEAS as a single
structure have great potential to bring external actions and foreign
policies of the EU together. Due to the diversity of national interests
of its Members, this will probably not lead to a unified face in foreign
policy for the Union in the intermediate term. However, by merging
formerly divided responsibilities and fragmented competencies, the
HR will ensure much more consistency and coherence within the EU
regarding foreign policy and will have the formal right to initiate
proposals regarding CSDP.
Of critical importance is the HRs central role between the European
Commission, the Council, the European Council, and the EDA.
These links provide the HR the possibility of exercising CSDP more
consistently and coherently from initiating political objectives down
to promoting multinational cooperation in capability development.
The EEAS, directly supporting the HR, will facilitate its work and
further consolidate the ties to the main decision making bodies of the
EU. With this, the HR and EEAS can significantly affect and
effectively conduct CSDP within the framework of the other EU
institutions.
42Center For Security Studies, ESDP after Lisbon: More Coherent and Capable?
CSS Analyses in Security Policy Vol. 3, No. 28 (ETH Zurich, February 2008): 2-4,
http://se2.isn.ch/serviceengine/Files/ESDP/46839/ipublicationdocument_singledo
cument/9BDF5F23-3BC5-49A6- 9DDA-F9CB1414FBC0/en/28e.pdf (accessed 8
October 2010).
43 Major, 5.44 Gurot, 43.
In view of a complementary relationship with NATO, the HR and

the EEAS are likely to play a significant role as well. Unifying
responsibilities in the two offices will contribute significantly to more
coherence and transparency in all fields of CSDP. Thus, the
modifications are likely to have a positive effect creating greater
transparency and establishing closer cooperation between both
organizations two of NATO Members main goals in CSDP.
However, to what extent the new Foreign Minister of the EU will
actually shape CSDP will depend mainly on the personalities
exercising the adapted post. In this regard, the grotesque dispute
over personnel 45 in appointing the first HR for the EU dampens
hope that the Member States fully recognize the importance and the
chances the HR and the EEAS create for the EU and NATO.
Integrating and Streamlining Civilian Crisis Management Planning
With the introduction of CMPD, the EU reduces the fragmentation
of civilian-military crisis management planning capacities at the
political level, provides a more coherent and efficient capability for
the HR and the EEAS to exercise their responsibilities, and
institutionalizes the comprehensive approach to strategic level
planning. The creation of CMPD is a result of the suboptimal civil-
military planning cell in the European Union Military Staff, which
failed to act as a
system integrator that would unify the civilian and
the military strand of [CSDP]. 46 In conjunction with the Civilian
Planning and Conduct Capability, CMPD is the attempt to increase
effectiveness, coherence, and efficiency of planning and execution
procedures for civilian crisis management operations and to establish
a civilian counterpart to the strategic military chain of command
within CSDP.
Streamlining its civilian crisis management institutions enables the
EU to apply a comprehensive approach at the strategic level and will
contribute to more efficiency and coherence in CSDP. This capability
has the potential to benefit a complementary relationship between
NATO and the EU, if both organizations link their strategic planning
capabilities. Yet again, this calls for institutionalized coordination and
cooperation between both organizations.
Berlin Plus as a Framework for a Successful Comprehensive
Approach?
At this point, it does make sense to briefly reflect on the EUs
existing procedures to apply its means in a comprehensive approach
as introduced earlier. As shown, the provisions of the Lisbon Treaty
integrate permanent military and civilian planning capabilities on the
strategic level of CSDP. However, the EU does not possess the
capabilities to actually plan and lead a military operation on the
highest military level. For its civilian operations, the Union can rely
on ad hoc structures to form an Operational and Force
Headquarters. However, to utilize a comprehensive approach in crisis
management, the EU relies on the Berlin Plus agreements for
operating military command structures.
The Lisbon Treaty does not provide specific provisions for accessing
non-inherent capabilities and using them in a comprehensive
approach in crisis management operations. The EU still depends on
Nations circulated second rate candidates and prominent candidates were refused
45
nomination in order not to jeopardize their national careers. Ibid., 40.

46 Gebhard, 12.
Berlin Plus, which has been successfully utilized in the past.

However, cooperation under Berlin Plus is continuously
overshadowed by the Turkey-Cyprus-Greece conflict and their
competing national interests and objects on how to shape CSDP.
Thus, a strategic and complementary relationship between NATO
and the EU is unachievable under Berlin Plus.
The effects of the Lisbon Treaty on Capability Development
Permanent Structured Cooperation in Defense for a More Flexible
and Capable CSDP
The Lisbon Treaty's most important, innovative, and ambitious
amendment is certainly the introduction of PSCD as a tool to deepen
the cooperation of its Member States in various areas of CSDP.
PSCD seems indeed to be the Unions solution for this issue.47 Key
provisions of the PSCD are the prerequisites it demands of a nation
to join, as well as the measures to assess progress and the ability to
suspend a participating country that fails to meet these standards.
Although initially high standards were set, proposed prerequisites to
join a PSCD were soon lowered on behalf of smaller countries during
the Treaty text negotiations, which virtually eliminated any
discriminator to join.48 However, this will not likely have any serious
consequence, because PSCD must be inclusive in order to avoid a
division of the EU concerning defense cooperation, and to increase
political coherence in security matters. On the other hand, too many
participants would pose the risk of slowing down the pace of
planning and executing a PSCD. Thus, only the right balance of a
critical mass of member states will make PSCD an effective tool.49
EDA will have to play a major role in creating future concrete criteria
to assess the progress of a PSCD. Assessment criteria will also have
to include proposals on how to suspend a country from cooperation.
The Lisbon Treaty does provide the theoretical conditions to do this;
whether the EU will be able to achieve this in practice remains
uncertain. This also applies to the question of whether a PSCD can
be established if it violates particular interests of another EU Member
State.50 PSCD does have the potential to generate a top-down
approach in CSDP and to accelerate capability development for the
Union. However, it is not the silver bullet for solving the EUs
problems.51
47Once established, only members participating in the PSCD are eligible to vote and
to determine ends, ways, and means of their cooperation. Christian Mlling,
Stndige strukturierte Zusammenarbeit in der EU-Sicherheitspolitik: Auswirkungen
des Lissabon-Vertrags auf die Entwicklung von Fhigkeiten und die
Rstungskooperation in der Europischen Union, SWP Aktuell Vol 13 (Berlin:
Stiftung Wissenschaft und PolitikGerman Institute for International and Security
Affairs, February 2010), 3. European Union, Treaty of Lisbon, 49.
48 Major, 3.
49Pierre Hougardy, Permanent Structured Cooperation , in: Sven Biscop and
Franco Algieri (eds.), The Lisbon Treaty and ESDP: Transformation and
Integration, Egmont Paper No. 24 (Brussels: EgmontRoyal Institute for
International Relations, June 2008): 12,
http://www.egmontinstitute.be/paperegm/ep24.pdf (accessed 10 October 2010).
50 Mlling, 3.
51Hougardy, 11-12. Sven Biscop, Permanent Structured Cooperation and the Future
of ESDP: Transformation and Integration, Egmont Paper No. 20 (Brussels:
EgmontRoyal Institute for International Relations, 18-19 September 2008): 16,
http://www.egmontinstitute.be/paperegm/ep20.pdf (accessed 22 June 2010).
The introduction of PSCD clearly favors NATO Members interests

in achieving higher efficiency in capability development and thus
promotes a complementary relationship between both organizations.
The Protocol explicitly aims at increasing the deployability of
European forces and at reducing military capability redundancies
among EU countries. With this aim, the Lisbon Treaty implements a
concept that could open new possibilities in strategic NATO-EU
cooperation, particularly in armament cooperation.
EDA as an Official Organization of the EU
Introducing EDA as an official organization of the EU has the
potential to be the most significant change resulting from the Lisbon
Treaty. Although at first glance unimposing, associating the EDA
with the HR and integrating it in CSDP will offer a significant
number of possibilities in three interacting areas: harmonizing,
specializing and pooling of European military forces, overcoming the
fragmented European defense market, and the proactive framing of
multinational armament cooperation.
In the first area, the range of possibilities is certainly immense but at
the same time hindered by the most significant political obstacles.
Abandoning certain military capabilities to focus on niche capabilities
and specialization does increase political interdependence among
collaborating nations and can lead in the worst case to an inability
to employ viable military force. This narrows the scope of
cooperation mainly to pooling of non-expeditionary forces, the
alignment of military doctrine and concepts, and the standardization
of equipment and logistics. A first positive example of successful
harmonization and pooling of capabilities is the European Air
Transportation Command. With, continuously decreasing military
budgets and constant high political ambitions, such harmonization,
specialization, and pooling of military forces are likely to increase.52
At the strategic level, EDA will play a central role in this regard.
In the second and third areas, EDA has a great chance of
accomplishing short-term objectives, although significant political
obstacles exist in these areas as well. The major reason for the
increasing capability gap between European and US forces lies in the
relatively high costs European countries have to bear for research,
experimentation, and development, and not primarily in a lack of
budgets and spending.53 The disproportional costs result from highly
fragmented national defense programs, which also diminish military
interoperability and further consolidate the already fragmented
industrial base for defense equipment in Europe.54 Here, the primary
political obstacles are various degrees of government-industry
relations among EU countries and unresolved questions of the
ownership of intellectual property rights of developed technology.55
With a high redundancy of industrial skills on the national level,
countries seek to run their own research and development programs.
Elevated to Treaty level and under the direct lead of the HR, the
EDA is in the right position to address those issues and to overcome
protectionism among member states defense
52 Olshausen, 9.
53Franois Heisboug, cited in: David S. Yost, The NATO Capabilities Gap and the
European Union, Survival Vol. 42, Issue 4 (UK: Oxford University Press, 2001),
99.
54 Darnis et. al., 18. 55 Darnies, 23-24.
markets.56 As such, the EDA will probably perform first the

management and coordination tasks. Linked by the HR to the EUs
main decision bodies, EDA can play a central role initiating such
cooperation and utilizing PSCD as a tool to facilitate progress and to
overcome political obstacles.
EDA is likely to play a crucial role in the strategic partnership
between NATO and the EU, particularly in the field of capability
development. Embedding EDA in CSDP under the HR, the EU has
taken significant steps clearly directed towards a more capable and
deployable European force. More harmonized, specialized and
pooled European military forces, a competitive defense market, and
more multinational cooperation will most certainly lead to an increase
of deployable military capabilities in Europe. Furthermore, EDA
provides NATO with a single point of contact to discuss and to align
military capability development programs. This is in the Alliance
Members best interests. However, limiting EDA to EUs Members
does exclude non-EU countries, such as Turkey, from participation.
With a view on the Cyprus conflict, this appears counterproductive
to efforts to resolve strategic issues between NATO and the EU.
Conclusion
In implementing the Lisbon Treaty, the EU is undertaking the
necessary steps to strengthen CSDP. The treaty aligns and
harmonizes the institutions and procedures in CSDP and provides a
fertile framework for future military capability development. That
does not mean that the Treaty resolves every shortcoming in CSDP
and that all provisions are directed towards a complementary
relationship with NATO. This would be beyond rational
expectations.
On the strategic level, the main political obstacle for a true strategic
partnership between NATO and the EU remains the unresolved
Turkey-Greece-Cyprus conflict. The resulting strategic stalemate
denies the EU the ability to develop a more coherent CSDP, prevents
effective NATO-EU cooperation, and hampers military capability
development through EDA. Furthermore, the strengthening of the
intergovernmental character of CSDP dampens the hopes for the
development of an inherent strategic culture, which would allow the
EU to operationalize the EU Security Strategy into a civil-military
strategy for CSDP. The limited political coherence yet denies the EU
developing a strategic frame that explains the rationale behind the
Lisbon Treatys amendments and raises questions of how integration
in foreign relations and the defense sector should go forward.
Despite those limitations, one must acknowledge that Lisbon Treatys
mutual defense clause and the extended Petersberg Tasks do not aim
at replacing the Alliances role and have rather a high potential to
promote a strategic partnership between NATO and the EU through
its significantly adapted institutional structures. The most significant
effects of the Treaty are its provisions regarding the EUs institutions
that deal with CSDP. These provisions will enable the Union to
establish a strategic partnership with NATO. However, the changes
also have the potential to reinforce already existing political obstacles
within the EU as well as the NATO-EU relationship. First, by
introducing the European Council as an official institution the EU
strengthens the intergovernmental character of CSDP and provides
an anchor for its Members to oppose further integration as well as
block important decisions. This decreases the chances for
establishing a supranational CSDP and continues to limit EUs
capabilities to the least common denominator. However, by
introducing the
56European Defence Agency, Steering Board Decision in NADS Formation on
EDA Input to the Commissions Consultation Process on the Green Paper
(Brussels, 2 March 2005): http://uu212-190-205-
2.unknown.uunet.be/genericitem.aspx?area=Reference&id=142 (accessed 8 October
2010).
HR, the EEAS, the CMPD, and the PSCD, the EU is undertaking
innovative and ambitious steps to increase transparency, coherence,
and efficiency of CSDP. The HR and the EEAS have the potential to
be the driving forces in CSDP and to strengthen the interconnection
with NATO towards a complementary partnership.
The introduction of the PSCD provides the EU an appropriate tool
to overcome member state dissention over CSDP and clearly
facilitates military capability development through multinational
cooperation of those Members who are willing and capable to do so.
Streamlined strategic planning, operational capability, and the EUs
ability to apply a comprehensive approach in strategic crisis
management planning, offer opportunities for future cooperation
with NATO. All these changes are in the best interests of NATO and
EU Members, if the EU takes appropriate steps to link its
institutions, procedures, and planning capabilities to NATO. It will
require significant political effort of major state players of both
organizations to mitigate the inertia caused by the unresolved Turkey-
Greece-Cyprus conflict.
With regard to military capability development, the Treaty introduces
EDA as an official institution and embeds the Agency in CSDP
appropriately. The agency has the potential of being a cornerstone in
future NATO-EU relations and cooperation between both
organizations in capability development. This is in the best interests
of NATO Members, particularly the US. However, limiting EDA for
EU Member States institutionalizes existing political issues and
hampers progress. Overall, the Lisbon Treaty creates the necessary
institutional prerequisites for successful capability development
among EU Member States and promotes a complementary
relationship between NATO and the EU.
About the Authors
Major Andreas C. Winter is from Germany. He serves now as a staff
operations officer at the German Army Command in Koblenz,
Germany. Major Winter gained experience in various command and
staff assignments in the German Army, before he graduated at the
Fhrungsakademie of the Bundeswehr in Hamburg, Germany in
2009. In 2010/2011, he also graduated as an international student at
the U.S. Army Command and General Staff Course and the
Advanced Military Studies Program in Fort Leavenworth, Kansas.
Dr. David A. Anderson is a retired U.S. Marine Corps officer. He is
now a professor of Strategic Studies and Odom Chair of Joint,
Interagency, and Multinational Operations at the U.S. Army
Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas,
where he teaches strategic and operational studies, as well as
economics. He is also an adjunct professor for Webster University,
where he teaches various international relations courses including
International Political Economy, and Globalization. He has published
numerous articles on military, economics, and international relations
related topics.
Concerns Government will have to commit to annual

3bn defence bill if they join PESCO
Thursday, December 07, 2017
There are concerns the Government will have to commit to an annual 3
billion euro defence bill if they join PESCO.
The deal would see EU states pool their defence forces and raises issues
surrounding Ireland's neutral stance.
The Peace and Neutrality Alliance says the extra military costs involved will
hamper the housing recovery.
Executive Member, Carol Fox, thinks its scandalous to spend more money
on militarism and says the Government hasn't released details on how they
intend to pay for the deal.
She said: "It could require quite a big increase in our defence spending if we
are supposed to bring our capabilities up to certain levels then also we will
be committed to proming the arms industry through the European
Defence Agency and through other group agencies aswell.
http://www.irishexaminer.com/breakingnews/ireland/concerns-government-will-
have-to-commit-to-annual-3bn-defence-bill-if-they-join-pesco-817557.html
Dil votes to join EU's defence organisation
Thursday, December 07, 2017
The Dil has voted by 75 votes to 42 to join a new EU defence network.
The European Union's Permanent Structured Co-operation Agreement

(PESCO) is seen by some as the first step towards an EU army.
It will see countries taking part in sharing information and co-operating on

issues of defence.
The Taoiseach Leo Varadkar has said it is necessary to ensure the security
of the State, and it will not affect our neutrality.
Opposition TD Richard Boyd Barrett is staunchly against the idea.

He said: "This is what Tusk said about PESCO, its purpose is to protect the
bloc from the affects of the migrant crisis and hostile bordering states.
"Affects of the migrant crisis... that's 35,000 people drowned in the

Mediterranean thanks to 'fortress Europe', and they want to militarise the
wall that Donald Trump dreams of building to keep those desperate people
out."
http://www.irishexaminer.com/breakingnews/ireland/dail-votes-to-join-
eus-defence-organisation-817682.html
Consolidated versions of the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty on the
Functioning of the European Union and the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the
European Union 2015
http://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-6655-2008-REV-8/en/pdf
THE NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION (NATO) AND THE ...
www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc...amp;doc=GetTRDoc.pdf
the lisbon treaty and its implications for the common security defense policy in the light of the emerging
strategic partnership between nato and the eu
The Lisbon Treaty Key elements After six years of discussions on institutional ways and means to
make the EU of now ... Lisbon Treaty brief
The Lisbon Treaty and ESDP:
Transformation and integration.
Egmont Papers No. 24, June 2008
Biscop, Sven, and Algieri, Franco. (2008) The Lisbon Treaty and ESDP: Transformation and
integration. Egmont Papers No. 24, June 2008
http://aei.pitt.edu/8966/1/ep24.pdf
Europe after the Lisbon Treaty: are EU member states still sovereign? The European Union in 2013
https://www.iwp.edu/docLib/20131211_EuropeaftertheLisbonTreaty.pdf
The EU's mutual assistance clause First ever activation of Article 42(7) TEU The
EU's mutual assistance clause ... Included in EU primary law in 2009 by the Lisbon
Treaty, ... As concerns relations with NATO, the EU Treaty's mutual assistance .
2015
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/BRIE/2015/572799/EPRS_BRI(2
015)572799_EN.pdf
The EU's mutual assistance clause

First ever activation of Article 42(7) TEU
SUMMARY
On 17 November 2015, Article 42(7), or the mutual assistance clause of the Treaty on
European Union (TEU), was invoked for the first time, when France asked for aid and
assistance from the other European Union (EU) Member States in the aftermath of the
deadly terrorist attacks in Paris on 13 November 2015.
Included in EU primary law in 2009 by the Lisbon Treaty, under the specific provisions on
the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP), the EU mutual assistance clause (or
the EU mutual defence clause as it is called by many), had never previously been used.
As there is no precedent, many questions have arisen with regard to its scope,
implementation and the role of the EU institutions, as well as to the relationship with
other provisions in EU law which refer to the expression of solidarity between EU
Member States, in particular the EU solidarity clause contained in Article 222 of the
Treaty on the Functioning of the EU (TFEU).
France's decision to request assistance from the other Member States under Article
42(7) TEU, rather than following other possible approaches, has been explained in
various ways, not least through the preference of dealing bilaterally with the other EU
governments, without involving the EU institutions. All EU Member States have
unanimously promised their full aid and support for France, but the process of defining
the substance of their commitments is still ongoing.
In this briefing:
The EUs mutual assistance clause: the provisions of Article 42(7) TEU
Member States' bilateral commitments
The EU solidarity clause and its
relationship with CSDP and Article 42(7)
Explaining France's choice

Main references
EPRS | European Parliamentary Research Service Author: Carmen-Cristina Ci rlig

Members' Research Service
PE 572.799
EN
EPRS
The EUs mutual assistance clause: the provisions of Article 42(7) TEU
Article 42(7) of the Treaty on European Union (TEU) part of the Treaty's specific
provisions on the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) contains the mutual
assistance clause of the EU (also considered as the EUs mutual defence clause). Inspired
by Article V of the 1954 modified Brussels Treaty establishing the Western European
1
Lisbon Treaty in 2009. Until then, no such provision had been agreed to complement the
EU's crisis management powers in the context of defence cooperation under the CSDP.
Origins
During the debates in the Convention that led to the

drafting of the Constitutional Treaty, the question arose
whether the EU should have a mutual defence clause
similar to that of NATO and the WEU, as well as on the
future role of the WEU. In this context, proposals on the
principle of solidarity in light of new threats such as
terrorism and weapons of mass destruction were also
discussed. In this regard, a Franco-German proposal
aimed to incorporate the WEU mutual defence clause into
the EU, through the mechanism of enhanced cooperation
since an automatic defence obligation in the Treaty would
have been opposed by the neutral Member States. A
subsequent Franco-German idea was to have a 'general
clause on solidarity and security, binding all member
states in the European Union, and allowing for a response
to risks of any sort that threaten the Union', therefore
combining in one clause both a mutual assistance
obligation on the model of the WEU (addressing traditional threats such as aggression
by another state) and a solidarity obligation to respond to new threats, such as terrorist
attacks. In the end, the draft Constitutional Treaty included two separate provisions.
First, a solidarity clause in event of terrorist attacks and natural or man-made disasters
was included, and later incorporated in Article 222 of the Treaty on the Functioning of
the EU (TFEU). And second, there was the mutual assistance/defence clause which
constituted the fruit of a compromise and therefore contains weaker language than the
WEU's mutual defence clause. This provision was incorporated by the Lisbon Treaty in
Article 42(7) TEU. The compromise was meant to bring closer the positions of three
groups of states: those seeking a mutual defence commitment; those aiming to protect
their traditional neutral status (such as Austria, Finland, Ireland and Sweden ) and those
wanting to ensure that the article would not undermine NATO. The introduction of the
mutual assistance clause in the TEU also allowed for the dissolution of the WEU,
officially announced in 2010.
Scope and reservations
Unlike the 'civilian' solidarity clause of Article 222 TFEU (see below), the mutual
assistance provision covered by Article 42(7) TEU clearly has defence implications
covering collective defence, as suggested by the reference to Article 51 of the UN
5
Article 42(7) TEU
If a Member State is the victim of armed aggression on its territory, the other Member States shall
have towards it an obligation of aid and assistance by all the means in their power, in accordance
with Article 51 of the United Nations Charter. This shall not prejudice the specific character of
the security and defence policy of certain Member States. Commitments and cooperation in this
area shall be consistent with commitments under the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, which,
for those States which are members of it, remains the foundation of their collective defence and
the forum for its implementation.
Members' Research Service Page 2 of 9

The EU's mutual assistance clause (Article 42(7) TEU)
NATO, to the clause being located within the chapter on CSDP, as well as by the origins
of the clause as outlined above.
A series of elements should therefore be underlined in this context.
Firstly, the different formulations of the mutual assistance/defence clauses contained in

the TEU, the WEU Treaty and NATO's Washington Treaty lead to the idea of differing
obligations and to the conclusion that the WEU's Article V was more exigent than Article
42(7) TEU and NATO's Article 5. Article 42(7) TEU renounces the automatism implied by
the WEU clause the Member States 'will afford the Party so attacked all the military
and other aid and assistance in their power' and provides instead that 'Member States
shall have ... an obligation of aid and assistance by all the means in their power'; which
is then subject to other conditions (see below) which alleviate to some extent this duty.
Moreover, Article 42(7) TEU gives leeway to the Member States to decide with what
means they fulfil the aid and assistance obligation (e.g. diplomatic, financial, military,
police cooperation, etc.), just like Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty also leaves it to
the individual member state to decide what action it deems necessary and does not
automatically assume military response by all members. In this respect, Article 42(7)
TEU does not expressly mention military means so as to accommodate those EU
members with a neutral status and Denmark which has an opt-out from the adoption
and implementation of decisions with military and defence implications. But the article
does not exclude such military assistance, which would be contrary to the meaning of
7
On the other hand, the Article 42(7) TEU clause is said to be more extensive from a
geographical point of view than the equivalent WEU and NATO provisions: while
assistance under those is limited to 'Europe' for the WEU and 'Europe and North
America' for NATO, the TEU covers all armed aggression against a Member State 'on its
territory' which is said also to cover those extra-European territories to which EU law
applies (e.g. France's overseas departements) but not to the Overseas Countries and
8
Secondly, in the context of the reference to Article 51 of the UN Charter, while the
Charter speaks of a right to self-defence in the event of an 'armed attack', the TEU uses
the term 'armed aggression'. However this distinction has been explained as a linguistic
9
debate on whether Article 51 of the UN Charter could also be invoked in relation to non-
state armed groups. However, the predominant view is that Article 51 applies only to
armed attack/aggression committed by a state, and that it cannot be invoked in relation
to armed aggression, including terrorist attacks, perpetrated by non-state actors. In any
case, the link to Article 51 in the EU's mutual assistance provision can be understood to
mean that any military action in self-defence by EU Member States under Article 42(7)
10
Thirdly, the duty of assistance under Article 42(7) TEU is subsumed to two
considerations: the relationship with NATO and the 'specific character of the security
and defence policy of certain Member States'.
As concerns relations with NATO, the EU Treaty's mutual assistance obligation is

understood as not having precedence over the collective defence obligation contained
in NATOs Article 5. In this respect, it is considered that the EU's mutual assistance
clause is secondary to NATO's and could not be invoked if NATO's Article 5 had already

EPRS
been invoked. It is argued that, in accordance with the Vienna Convention on the Law of
Treaties, whereby 'when a treaty specifies that it is subject to, or that it is not to be
considered as incompatible with, an earlier or later treaty, the provisions of that other
treaty prevail', NATO's founding act takes precedence over the application of the TEU,
11
is no danger of legal inconsistencies unless the EU mutual defence clause is triggered
against a non-EU NATO member, which would be highly unlikely. The EU, in CSDP, and
NATO have been portrayed as organisations complementary to each other, and
problems could arise in the event of duplication. However with respect to the EU
conducting crisis management operations, there is in principle no such NATO
precedence. But the EU itself is constrained by primary law with regard to collective self-
defence under the CSDP: in principle, the EU cannot conduct self-defence operations
within the framework of the CSDP (only its Member States), unless the Treaty is
amended or the European Council decides unanimously on the establishment of
common defence in accordance with Article 42(2) TEU. In this sense also, NATO is the
12
Furthermore, the EU's collective assistance obligation must respect the specific
character of the security and defence policy of certain Member States. In conformity
with this provision and taking into account Declarations 13 and 14 annexed to the EU
Treaties, on the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), the Treaty guarantees
Member States' specific character in this field. In particular, it gives them the possibility
that their specific principled reservations with regard to the duty of aid and assistance
pursuant to Article 42(7) TEU be taken into account. This 'specific character' can entail
for example the policy of military neutrality of the four abovementioned EU Member
States, the reservation of the German Parliament, namely giving consent to the
deployment of German armed forces, or could even be taken to encompass the nuclear
armed EU Member States (France and the UK). The provision is assessed as not
exempting absolutely these Member States from their legal obligation to provide aid
and assistance, but as allowing these states to choose means of assistance which are not
13
Finally, Article 42(7) TEU could be also viewed in connection with Article 44 TEU (and
also Article 42(5) TEU), whereby the Council may entrust the implementation of a task,
i.e. a CSDP mission/operation, to a group of willing states or with Article 43(1) TEU,
whereby the EU's CSDP operations 'may contribute to the fight against terrorism,
including by supporting third countries in combatting terrorism in their territories'.
Implementation and role of the EU institutions
Procedure
Article 42(7) TEU does not set out any formal procedure. No Council decision or
conclusion is needed to implement Article 42(7) TEU, only the existence of the
facts/situation constituting the reason for invoking the article. If the Member State
affected makes a request for assistance, it ensues from Article 42(7) TEU there is a legal
obligation to assist incumbent on all the other Member States, through civilian or
military means. As concerns the provision of military assistance, most agree there is at
least a political obligation to assist. Subsequently, the other Member States must define
in concrete terms the scope of their support and the means they intend to put at the
requesting state's disposal.

EPRS
On 17 November 2015, France invoked for the first time the mutual assistance clause during the
Foreign Affairs Council meeting (in the format of Defence Ministers). France requested
assistance, following the terrorist attacks in Paris on 13 November 2015 that left 130 dead and
hundreds injured. Unanimously, the EU Defence Ministers promised their full aid and support.
As the article had never been triggered since 2009 there is no precedent. France has already
engaged in bilateral talks with the other Member States in order to specify their aid and
assistance. The bilateral nature of the support means that it will not be a uniform contribution
from the Member States, and will reflect the individual deals agreed between Paris and its
counterparts. It also does not mean that EU Member States are obliged to provide any military
assets to the campaign against ISIL/Da'esh.
EU High Representative and Vice-President of the Commission (HR/VP), Federica Mogherini,

clarified that France's invocation of the article does not mean a CSDP mission or operation.
What is the role of the EU institutions?
The invocation by France of Article 42(7) implies an intergovernmental process,

excluding the EU institutions from decision-making and the application of measures
taken. According to the HR/VP, Article 42(7) TEU is meant to activate bilateral aid and
assistance and the EU/EEAS role will be limited to coordination or facilitation of what
France and the other Member States decide ('the European Union can facilitate this and
coordinate this, whenever and however it is useful and necessary'). Already, the CFSP
and CSDP are intergovernmental policies in nature. As such the Union's 'communautaire'
institutions the Commission, the EP (according to Article 36 TEU) and the Court of
Justice of the EU play a limited role. The Court for example has no jurisdiction (with
two exceptions: monitoring respect for the powers of EU institutions (Article 40 TEU)
and reviewing the legality of CFSP decisions providing for restrictive measures against
natural or legal persons (Article 275(2) TFEU)).
In the particular case of Article 42(7) TEU, the implementing obligations deriving from it
belong rather to the Member States acting collectively or within NATO. As mentioned,
the CSDP framework does not currently allow for EU self-defence operations. Also the
invocation by France of the mutual assistance clause in the formal setting of the Council
has been considered purely incidental. Nevertheless, choosing the Council as the venue
can be interpreted as having political, institutional and practical implications, in
particular expressing solidarity and readiness to provide assistance according to the EU
Treaties.
The European Parliament
The EP adopted, in November 2012, a resolution on the EUs mutual defence and solidarity
clauses. With regard to the mutual defence clause, the EP underlined the necessity to be
prepared for situations 'involving non-NATO EU Member States or EU Member States territories
that are outside the North Atlantic area and are therefore not covered by the Washington
Treaty, or situations where no agreement on collective action has been reached within NATO'
and expressed the view that the clause could even cover non-armed attacks, such as cyber-
attacks against critical infrastructure, 'if the Member States security is significantly threatened
by its consequences.' Furthermore, the EP invited the VP/HR to 'propose practical arrangements
and guidelines' and an analysis of the role of the EU institutions in the event the mutual defence
clause was invoked. Finally, the EP made a plea for using the EU's crisis management structures
in this context, in particular activating the EU Operational Headquarters.
EPRS

Member States' bilateral commitments
In the context of its request for assistance, France has been pointing out the need for
assistance in meeting some of its foreign military commitments, including its
participation in UN peacekeeping operations in Africa and in EU CSDP missions and
operations. France currently contributes 939 uniformed personnel (military and police)
to UN peacekeeping missions, of which 845 are serving in UNIFIL, the UN peacekeeping
mission in Lebanon. In 2014, almost 8 000 French troops were engaged in French and
multinational (EU and UN) deployments outside France's territory. According to Europe
Diplomacy and Defence, the external operations of the French army could mean costs
of 1.128 billion in 2015 (similar to 2014), of which a large part was dedicated to
France's operations in the Sahel (Barkhane), in Iraq/Syria (Chammal) and in the Central
African Republic (Sangaris). France also called on the other Member States to take part
in air strikes in Syria. It is considered that another priority will be greater sharing of
intelligence between EU Member States and the reinforcement of the EU's borders.
The bilateral consultations are ongoing, but some commitments have already been
made public. The UK has offered France the use of its Akrotiri airbase in Cyprus for
French aviation and also given additional in-flight refuelling support. The UK
government is currently preparing to ask the UK Parliament for backing for air strikes in
Syria.
Germany had apparently already mentioned the possibility of increasing its contribution
to the EU training mission (EUTM) in Mali, where it already contributes around 200 staff,
while ruling out involvement in Syria. Ahead of President Francois Hollande's meeting
with Chancellor Angela Merkel on 25 November, Germany also announced it will
increase its contribution to the UN peacekeeping mission in Mali (MINUSMA) from 10 to
650 troops, subject to parliament's approval, so that French commitments in the
country could be reduced to some extent. Belgium and the other countries active in
the Sahel were requested by France to maintain their commitments in the region
Belgium had seemingly planned to end its military contribution of 80 troops to EUTM
Mali in January 2016. As concerns Italy, which has ruled out any military intervention in
Syria or Iraq, the possibility of increasing the country's presence in Lebanon is being
considered.
Many have wondered why France chose to invoke the mutual assistance clause of
Article 42(7) instead of the solidarity clause contained in Article 222 TFEU, which
specifically provides for assistance from the Union and its Member States for an EU
Member State victim of a terrorist attack, a natural or man-made disaster.
Article 222 TFEU, or the solidarity clause, provides for two levels of assistance:
by the EU jointly with its Member States to the Member State the object of a
terrorist attack or victim of a natural or man-made disaster (Article 222(1) TFEU);
by Member States, which have an obligation to assist the requesting Member
State in the abovementioned situations, in which case the Council becomes the
locus for coordination (Article 222(2)TFEU). Implementation by Member States
should be seen against the provisions of Declaration No 37 annexed to the
Treaties, whereby a Member State can choose the most appropriate means to
comply with its own solidarity obligation towards another Member State.
The EU solidarity clause (Article 222 TFEU) and its relationship with CSDP
and Article 42(7) TEU
EPRS

In June 2014, according to Article 222(3) TFEU, the Council adopted a Decision setting
out the modalities for implementation by the Union (but not by the Member States
Article 222(2) TFEU) of the solidarity clause (Council Decision 2014/415/EU) on the basis
of a joint proposal from the Commission and the High Representative.
The Council Decision specifically mentions that it has no defence implications, so it does
not fall within the remit of CSDP; although the means put at the disposal can be military
resources of Member States (e.g. one could envisage the European Gendarmerie Force
deployed for civilian protection). Therefore the Council Decision does not represent a
legal framework for action if military means are used for defence purposes. The Council
Decision states that it 'is without prejudice to Article 42(7) TEU' and also provides that,
'in the event that a crisis requires CFSP or CSDP action, a decision should be taken by the
Council in accordance with the relevant provisions of the Treaties.'
Although the EEAS and CSDP structures are involved under Article 222 TFEU the Union
will mobilise all instruments at its disposal such as police and judicial cooperation, the
EU civil protection mechanism, the structures developed in the framework of the CSDP
this role is defined by the abovementioned Council Decision and cannot be understood
as a CFSP/CSDP role. Both the primary law (Article 222(3) TEU) and the Council Decision
specifically mention that decisions with defence implications should be taken in
accordance with the specific procedures on CFSP/CSDP unanimity under Article 31(1)
TEU and the other relevant provisions of the Treaties.
It must also be pointed out that the implementation by the Union of the solidarity
clause is restricted to the Member State's 'territory', in line with Article 222(1) TFEU, as
regards the prevention of the terrorist threat and assistance in the event of a terrorist
attack (although the notion of territory as used in the Council Decision might be better
replaced by 'jurisdiction' according to some experts.) EU operational action under CSDP
as mentioned above cannot mean self-defence action on the Union's territory. Also
Article 42(7) does not have this territorial limitation when it comes to implementation,
except with regard to the armed aggression that must have happened on the Member
States territory.
Another detail to underline is the Council Decision's provision on the invocation of the
solidarity clause, according to which 'in the event of a disaster or a terrorist attack, the
affected Member State may invoke the solidarity clause if, after having exploited the
possibilities offered by existing means and tools at national and Union level, it considers
that the crisis clearly overwhelms the response capabilities available to it.' This has been
considered a contradictory provision also because the other Member States have no
means of assessing whether the affected Member State has indeed exploited all
possibilities and tools at its disposal before invoking Article 222. Also, Article 222 TFEU is
under the jurisdiction of the EU Court of Justice, therefore failure to assist a Member
State that has invoked the solidarity clause could be the object of judicial proceedings.
Although the added value of the solidarity clause has been called into question, as there
are already established cooperation and coordination mechanisms at EU level, experts
still consider it an important tool that must be viewed in a broader context, including
other Treaty provisions that pursue similar aims such as Article 42(7) TEU. Some
interpretations point to the existence of a certain overlap or grey areas between the
two clauses, which reaffirms the political discretion of the EU and its Member States as
to the means employed (political, military or other means) to fight old and new security

EPRS

threats. Finally, it could also be imagined that the two provisions might apply in parallel,
and in this case the different procedures for implementation should be reconciled.
Explaining France's choice
Neither the EU mutual defence clause nor the solidarity clause had been invoked so far,
therefore France's decision is a first. When asked why France invoked Article 42(7) TEU
and not Article 222 TFEU, the French Defence Minister, Jean-Yves Le Drian, (as well as
Mogherini) emphasised this was mainly a 'political act' that the French hope to see
translated into 'capability collaboration for French interventions in Syria and Iraq, either
by relief to or support of France in other operations.' Both Mogherini and Le Drian
seemed to downplay the operational significance of France's request under Article 42(7)
TEU putting the emphasis on the political nature of the act. They also underlined that it
needs to be seen as separate from NATO's similar Article 5 clause.
The Council in its Conclusions of 17 November 2015 specifies that 'offers may consist of
material assistance and of support in theatres of operation where France is engaged'.
Thus, some view France's invocation of Article 42(7) being not necessarily related to the
substance of the article, but as a lever to use during the bilateral consultations in order
to get something for which France has been asking for some time now: that other
Member States make a contribution to French efforts, either in Mali or CAR or in the
Middle East. This has been a longstanding French criticism of other EU Member States
as it had the perception of being left to deal alone with the situation in various crisis
theatres. In this context, it was also assessed that, as the EU's solidarity clause is
restricted to EU territory and France was actually trying to get support outside its
territory, opting for the mutual assistance clause was logical.
Moreover, it was pointed out that France opted deliberately for 'neither NATO nor
supranational assistance'. In the case of NATO, France's choice not to invoke Article 5
may be related to France's current diplomatic efforts, aimed at Russia and Arab
countries also, to rally a grand coalition to combat ISIL/Da'esh in Iraq and Syria, which
NATO involvement might jeopardise. Also, the limited role for EU institutions could
explain the choice of Article 42(7) by France over other possibilities, thus clearly
expressing a preference for the intergovernmental/bilateral framework.
Other views insist on the political symbolism of invoking the Article 42(7) TEU clause,
seen as a necessary and bold affirmation on the part of France of the need for a
common foreign policy towards the Middle East, therefore a 'common Middle East
strategy and an integrated police and intelligence effort', something NATO cannot do.
Also the choice of the EU's mutual assistance clause could be regarded in the light of
past French efforts to enhance the EU's security and defence policy, as well as of a
'certain conception of Europe's role in global affairs'.
Main references
The Treaty on European Union (TEU) a commentary, Blanke, H-J., Mangiameli, S., Heidelberg,
Springer, 2013 , 1813 p.
The 'Solidarity Clause' of the European Union dead letter or enabling act?, Martino, A-M,
SIAK-Journal Zeitschri fu r Polizeiwissenscha und polizeiliche Praxis (2), 2015, pp 65-76.
Endnotes
Article V of the WEU Treaty reads: 'If any of the High Contracting Parties should be the object of an armed attack in
1
Europe, the other High Contracting Parties will, in accordance with the provisions of Article 51 of the Charter of the
United Nations, afford the Party so attacked all the military and other aid and assistance in their power.' The
2
EPRS
provision is complemented by Article IV of the modified Brussels Treaty which emphasises NATO's role and gives it de
facto precedence to implement collective defence in case of aggression against one of the ten WEU members:
'In the execution of the Treaty, the High Contracting Parties and any Organs established by Them under the Treaty
shall work in close co-operation with the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation.
Recognising the undesirability of duplicating the military staffs of NATO, the Council and its Agency will rely on the
appropriate military authorities of NATO for information and advice on military matters.'
The Treaty on European Union (TEU) a commentary, Blanke, H-J., Mangiameli, S., Heidelberg, Springer, 2013, pp.
1201-1235.
3
4
5
2(4) of the UN Charter) and allows for the right of individual or collective self-defence in the event of an armed attack
against a state Member of the United Nations.
6
them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all and consequently they agree that, if
such an armed attack occurs, each of them, in exercise of the right of individual or collective self-defence recognised
by Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, will assist the Party or Parties so attacked by taking forthwith,
individually and in concert with the other Parties, such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force,
to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area. Any such armed attack and all measures taken as a
result thereof shall immediately be reported to the Security Council. Such measures shall be terminated when the
Security Council has taken the measures necessary to restore and maintain international peace and security.'
7
8
9
allowing for a right to self-defence at a lower threshold than armed attack), others point simply to the different
language versions of the EU Treaties (as well as the French version of the UN Charter) and the fact that the
negotiations for the Lisbon Treaty took place in French, thus the use of the English translation of 'aggression armee'.
10
11
1844 p.
12
13
decision meant to give concrete guarantees to Ireland (but not only) in the field of security and defence: 'It will be for
Member States including Ireland, acting in a spirit of solidarity and without prejudice to its traditional policy of
military neutrality to determine the nature of aid or assistance to be provided to a Member State which is the
object of a terrorist attack or the victim of armed aggression on its territory. ... It will be a matter for Ireland or any
other Member State, to decide, in accordance with any domestic legal requirements, whether or not to participate in
any military operation.'
14
The content of this document is the sole responsibility of the author and any opinions expressed therein
do not necessarily represent the official position of the European Parliament. It is addressed to the
Members and staff of the EP for their parliamentary work. Reproduction and translation for non-
commercial purposes are authorised, provided the source is acknowledged and the European Parliament
is given prior notice and sent a copy.
European Union, 2015.
Photo credits: somartin / Fotolia.
eprs@ep.europa.eu http://www.eprs.ep.parl.union.eu (intranet)

http://www.europarl.europa.eu/thinktank (internet) http://epthinktank.eu (blog)
The proposed Directive on Copyright in the Digital Single

Market (Articles 11, 14 and 16) Strengthening the Press Through
Copyright
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/BRIE/2017/596835/IPOL_BRI(2
017)596835_EN.pdf
Resources for the funding of the research fund for coal and steel 15-09-2017
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/BRIE/2017/603797/IPOL_BRI(2
017)603797_EN.pdf
Statute for Social and Solidarity-based Enterprises 06-12-2017
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/STUD/2017/611030/EPRS_STU(
2017)611030_EN.pdf
The Lisbon Treaty and the militarisation of the European Union

http://irishantiwar.org/files/Lisbon.pdf
I believe everyone deserves security and dignity in their work. That's why I'm standing up and
saying no to zero hour contracts
Best wishes to you in court today Joe, and your ongoing efforts to stand up to our massive
"IMPUNITY PROBLEM" in the Republic of Ireland, which enables the "ruling elites" to put
themselves above the law, and the members of the general public who try to expose their
wrongdoing beneath in.
Related Google Listing:
OUR MASSIVE IMPUNITY PROBLEM, Human Rights Ireland:
https://www.google.ie/search
=== === ===
ARISTOTLE
"Whoever controls the courts controls the state."
=== === ===
Related FACEBOOK Publications:
http://www.humanrightsireland.com/index.htm#26June2017
TWENTY-EIGHTH AMENDMENT OF THE CONSTITUTION (TREATY OF LISBON) BILL 2009 the State shall not
adopt a decision taken by the European Council to establish a common defence pursuant to Article 42 of the Treaty on
European Union
https://www.oireachtas.ie/.../2009/4909/B4909D.english.pdf
Positive Neutrality is Irelands best Defence - Oireachtas
PANA submission to government White paper on Defence 00 Positive Neutrality is Irelands bestDefence PANA
submission to government White paper on Defence
http://www.oireachtas.ie/.../PANA-White-Paper-on-Defence.pdf
The Government is attempting to rush through the Dil the most serious instrument with the
most serious implications. This is an insult to the people of Ireland. Hear Catherine's
contribution to the debate on Ireland's participation in Permanent Structured Cooperation
(PESCO) in the Dil this afternoon.
https://www.facebook.com/catherineconnollyTD/videos/1712415438779298/?hc
_ref=ARRnlOd_--
wBbTmyiEiTSFP4rP08cCIP3qk50qIaaovexTRqIG3v758nHf9hKNezwio&fref=nf
BOTH BILDERBERG ATTENDEES !
Here are the Irish attendees at Bilderberg 2017
Bilderberg, that infamously secretive annual meeting of some of the most influential people in global
politics and commerce, gets underway today and there will be a trio of Irish businessmen behind the
closed doors in Chantilly, Virginia.
While the discussions that go on at the gathering are never divulged, Bilderberg's official website
helpfully lists each year's attendees, as well as the key topics which will be broached top of the list
being "The Trump Administration: A progress report".
Making his third Bilderberg appearance will be Mullingar's own Michael O'Leary. The Ryanair boss has
attended the last two meetings and will be the only figure from the airline industry present.
Joining him will be Gene Murtagh, chief executive of Cavan-based insulation and building materials
giant Kingspan.
The group turned a profit of 341m last year, off the back of revenue leaping 12% and past the 3bn
mark for the first time.
Speaking to Newstalk last August, Murtagh outlined how its strong ties to the global tech sector was
benefitting business:
"We've been working in partnership with companies like Facebook, like Microsoft in other parts of the
world, and they're investing substantial amounts here.
"As, of course, will Apple be in the new data centre in Athenry. So we'd expect to be working with all of
those businesses."
Completing the trio is the youngest of the bunch.
Patrick Collison (pictured below, left), who runs soaring online payments platform Stripe with his
younger brother John, will be one of the few millennials in the conference room at the age of 28.
In March, the Limerick-born, San Francisco-based siblings joined the Forbes Rich List elite for the first
time.
The pair landed in joint 1,795th place out of 2,043 billionaires with an estimated fortune of $1.1bn
(1.02bn) each. The 26-year-old John was the youngest self-made billionaire on the list.
While John won't be accompanying him, Patrick will be able to enjoy the company of perennial attendee
Henry Kissinger, right-wing tech entrepreneur Peter Thiel, IMF head Christine Lagarde and more than
120 other movers and shakers from 21 countries across Europe and North America.
In previous years, Garret FitzGerald, Michael Noonan, Simon Coveney and Michael McDowell have all
flown the Irish flag (quietly) at the closed summit.
Ireland
Garret FitzGerald (1985), former Taoiseach (deceased)[62]

Paul Gallagher, Attorney General of Ireland[23][62]
Dermot Gleeson, former Attorney General of Ireland[53]
Charlie McCreevy[62]
Michael McDowell (2007), former Attorney General, former Minister for Justice, Equality and Law
Reform[1][62]
Michael Noonan, (2012, 2016), then Minister for Finance.[52][62][63]
Peter Sutherland, Director General of the WTO and former Attorney General of Ireland[62]
Simon Coveney, (2014), then Minister for Agriculture, Food and the Marine, shortly afterwards became
Minister for Defence.
Many people also attend these meetings covertly.
The global media narrative is controlled by six corporations with less than 200 executives. Varadkar,
Macron, Merkel and May are the candidates prescribed by the Bilderbergs. The media will intimidate
anyone from exposing what are known as inside jobs."
That's as glaringly obvious as the founder of the EU - Kalergis plan to cut the standard of living for
indigenous Europeans. "Typical sinner confused about everything " smear tactics by the media to
manufacture consent and prevent debate.
Read the founder of the EU KALERGI s proposal for Europe. His plan seems to be advancing rapidly
here in Ireland. In the expected attack on me don't revert to identity politics or smear tactics. This is
fascist behavior.
http://www.newstalk.com/Here-are-the-Irish-attendees-at-Bilderberg-2017
Dil ireann - 21/Nov/2017 EU Defence Issues (Continued)

remind this House that PESCO was comprehensively discussed in the context of the Lisbon
treaty and was approved by the Irish people when they voted for the treaty in October 2009. PESCO
was specifically referenced in the Lisbon treaty protocol to address the concerns of the Irish people and
Irelands declaration and that the legislation setting down Irelands approval process for PESCO was
published in advance of that vote and enacted in November 2009.
Tuesday, 21 November 2017
Deputy Paul Kehoe: Information on Paul Kehoe Zoom on Paul Kehoe] The participation criteria
expressly stipulate that PESCO will be undertaken in full compliance with the Treaty on European
Union and the associated protocols and will respect the member states' constitutional provisions.
Participation in each project is on an opt-in basis and is therefore entirely voluntary. Three other neutral
EU member states, Finland, Sweden and Austria, have already committed to joining PESCO.
It is important to remind this House that PESCO was comprehensively discussed in the context of the
Lisbon treaty and was approved by the Irish people when they voted for the treaty in October 2009.
PESCO was specifically referenced in the Lisbon treaty protocol to address the concerns of the Irish
people and Irelands declaration and that the legislation setting down Irelands approval process for
PESCO was published in advance of that vote and enacted in November 2009.
An Leas-Cheann Comhairle: Information on Pat the Cope Gallagher Zoom on Pat the Cope Gallagher
The Minister of State will have to try to incorporate the rest of his response into later comments. I gave
him five minutes.
Deputy Sen Crowe: Information on Sen Crowe Zoom on Sen Crowe It is an understatement to say
that I am disappointed. The Minister of State says that he is happy to announce this. I do not know if the
Government had any plan to announce it at all. Ireland's deeper integration into the EU's military system
is completely unacceptable and unwanted by the vast majority of Irish people.
Does the Minister of State accept that there are many people working within the EU structure who wish
to build a military structure to complement NATO and clean up its mess under the guise of peace
building? This is what PESCO is about. We are told there are no spare funds to go to positive social and
economic programmes in areas such as youth unemployment projects, community regeneration, and
improving public services such as health care, but it has already been announced that 1.5 billion will be
spent annually on aggressive military projects which ultimately will facilitate a standing EU army. Any
EU policy which aims to increase EU militarisation is a potential threat to Irish neutrality and the
Government should veto these plans. Today's announcement is hugely disappointing. There has been no
conversation or discussion in the House on the matter, just an off-the-cuff remark. It is lucky that we put
this question down for the Topical Issue debate or the Minister of State would have barrelled ahead
without any debate in the Dil whatever, just as he usually does.
Deputy Aengus Snodaigh: Information on Aengus Snodaigh Zoom on Aengus Snodaigh This is
an absolute scandal. So much for the supposed support of the Ministers of State, Deputies Finian
McGrath and Halligan, and the Minister, Deputy Ross, for Ireland's neutrality. It will be interesting to
see how their supporters react to this and how they can justify such a move. The Minister of State has
just said that the Government accepts this and that ties these three Ministers or Ministers of State, who
have given their support for neutrality in this Chamber, to this move. This is a scandal. The aim of
PESCO is to develop defence capabilities jointly and make them available for EU military operations.
That is at odds with Irish neutrality. Our capabilities should be available to the UN and the UN only. The
Minister of State should bear in mind that it also allows for the EU to act alone. It is not obliged to act
with UN support. It can also be used to support NATO operations. When we raised this during the
debate on the Lisbon treaty, we were told that we were scaremongering. Here we are a few years later
and we have been proven right. Ultimately, the Minister of State is talking about going to war.
Deputy Paul Kehoe: Information on Paul Kehoe Zoom on Paul Kehoe I want to tell this House, as I told
the Seanad earlier today, that there is no possibility of our position on neutrality being questioned in any
way as a consequence of PESCO. Contrary to Deputy Crowe's statement, this has not been hidden away.
It has been discussed in the open at EU level for years at every-----
Deputy Sen Crowe: Information on Sen Crowe Zoom on Sen Crowe Why did the Minister of State
not discuss it in the House?
Deputy Paul Kehoe: Information on Paul Kehoe Zoom on Paul Kehoe I have spoken about it here in
recent months in response to parliamentary questions and at committees. I have hidden nothing. I do not
want Deputies to leave the Chamber saying that our neutrality has been brought into question. The
situation could not be further from the truth. The final PESCO document reflects the position of neutral
countries, of which we are not the only one. Other neutral countries have already signed up to PESCO.
Deputy Aengus Snodaigh: Information on Aengus Snodaigh Zoom on Aengus Snodaigh The
Minister of State has to ask this neutral country.
Deputy Paul Kehoe: Information on Paul Kehoe Zoom on Paul Kehoe Yes, because I respect the triple
lock. I respect what I have to do here. I could have signed up to this last Monday without a problem but I
have respect for the Government and the need to have it passed by the Cabinet and then the Dil.
Deputy Aengus Snodaigh: Information on Aengus Snodaigh Zoom on Aengus Snodaigh The
Minister of State has no choice but to come here. He has no choice.
Deputy Snodaigh, please.
Deputy Paul Kehoe: Information on Paul Kehoe Zoom on Paul Kehoe Only then, if it is passed by the
Dil, will I sign up. I will sign up when it is the wish of the Parliament. This passed at Cabinet earlier. I
will bring it before the Oireachtas next week or the week after. If I secure a majority of this House to
vote for PESCO, I will sign up to it. If I do not get a majority of the Parliament to vote for it, then I will
not. It is the right thing to do.
The Minister of State will conclude his remarks.
Deputy Paul Kehoe: Information on Paul Kehoe Zoom on Paul Kehoe Projects such as this are
something our military people want to partake in. They see it as the right thing to do.
The Minister of State will conclude his remarks. I have been very lenient on time.
Deputy Paul Kehoe: Information on Paul Kehoe Zoom on Paul Kehoe I will bring it to the House within
the next two weeks to seek its approval.
Legal Metrology (Measuring Instruments) Bill 2017: From the Seanad
The Dil went into Committee to consider amendments from the Seanad.
Seanad amendment No. 1:
Section 1: In page 3, to delete line 15 and substitute the following:

Minister means the Minister for Business, Enterprise and Innovation;.
Seanad amendment agreed to.
Seanad amendment reported.
An Leas-Cheann Comhairle: Information on Pat the Cope Gallagher Zoom on Pat the Cope Gallagher A
message will be sent to the Seanad acquainting it accordingly.
Finance Bill 2017: Order for Report Stage

Minister of State at the Department of Finance (Deputy Michael D'Arcy): Information on Michael
D'Arcy Zoom on Michael D'Arcy I move: "That Report Stage be taken now."
Question put and agreed to.
Finance Bill 2017: Report Stage

Amendment No. 1 is out of order.
Amendment No. 1 not moved.
Deputy Richard Boyd Barrett: Information on Richard Boyd Barrett Zoom on Richard Boyd Barrett I
move amendment No. 2:
In page 8, between lines 16 and 17, to insert the following:
3. The Minister shall, within 6 months of the passing of this Act, bring a report on the cost and
implications of abolishing the Universal Social Charge for everyone earning less than 90,000 per
annum..
This amendment seeks a report on abolishing the universal social charge for everyone earning less than
90,000 annually. It is a policy which was in the Solidarity-People Before Profit pre-budget proposal. It
is coupled with amendment No. 3 which we will discuss in a moment which is to pay for the abolition of
the USC by imposing new tax bands on the highest incomes. There is often a debate over whether, as the
Government suggested, there ought to be some reductions in the tax burden on those who earn low and
middle incomes or more generally.
The second Lisbon Treaty should have had a protocol added to protect our neutrality as of September 2016 it
had not been added.
Traitors used to be shot

The E.U. have been Robbing us for years ,Fish, Bank and Bondholders bailouts etc., and now our Neutrality ,I
think its time we got to Hell out of it and asap .

Implications of The Lisbon Treaty On The European Union's Common Security Defense Policy and The Emerging Strategic Partnership Between NATO and The EU

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Implications of The Lisbon Treaty On The European Union's Common Security Defense Policy and The Emerging Strategic Partnership Between NATO and The EU

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Implications of the Lisbon Treaty on the European

Unions Common Security Defense Policy and the

Strategic Insights Winter 2011 Volume 10, Issue 3 67

Report Documentation Page

4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE

Implications of the Lisbon Treaty on the European Unions Common Security

U.S. Army Command and General Staff College,Fort Leavenworth,KS,66027

9. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)

12. DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILITY STATEMENT

Approved for public release; distribution unlimited

15. SUBJECT TERMS

16. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF: 17. LIMITATION OF

Prescribed by ANSI Std Z39-18

1980s. However, the Alliance has repeatedly proven its ability to

Strategic Insights Winter 2011 Volume 10, Issue 3 68

European Integration in Security and Defense

Strategic Insights Winter 2011 Volume 10, Issue 3 69

these peacekeeping missions, Blair referred to the Petersberg Tasks

Strategic Insights Winter 2011 Volume 10, Issue 3 70

transform European forces more rapidly. To avoid duplicating

Strategic Insights Winter 2011 Volume 10, Issue 3 71

NATO took various initiatives within the NATO-EU Capability

Strategic Insights Winter 2011 Volume 10, Issue 3 72

Affairs and Security Policy.

Strategic Insights Winter 2011 Volume 10, Issue 3 73

operational requirements and implements any measures needed to

Strategic Insights Winter 2011 Volume 10, Issue 3 74

another provider of collective defense is questionable for two

Prospects (Hamburg: IFSH, 2005), 3-4. 37 Sturm, 1, 3.

Strategic Insights Winter 2011 Volume 10, Issue 3 75

CONCORDIA in Macedonia (completed on 15 December 2003) and

under Berlin Plus. Ibid., 1.

the EU in carrying out CSDP more progressively.42 There is,

Strategic Insights Winter 2011 Volume 10, Issue 3 77

In view of a complementary relationship with NATO, the HR and

nomination in order not to jeopardize their national careers. Ibid., 40.

Strategic Insights Winter 2011 Volume 10, Issue 3 78

Berlin Plus, which has been successfully utilized in the past.

Strategic Insights Winter 2011 Volume 10, Issue 3 79

The introduction of PSCD clearly favors NATO Members interests

Strategic Insights Winter 2011 Volume 10, Issue 3 80

markets.56 As such, the EDA will probably perform first the

Strategic Insights Winter 2011 Volume 10, Issue 3 81

Concerns Government will have to commit to annual

The European Union's Permanent Structured Co-operation Agreement

It will see countries taking part in sharing information and co-operating on

Opposition TD Richard Boyd Barrett is staunchly against the idea.

"Affects of the migrant crisis... that's 35,000 people drowned in the

The EU's mutual assistance clause

relationship with CSDP and Article 42(7)

Explaining France's choice

EPRS | European Parliamentary Research Service Author: Carmen-Cristina Ci rlig

During the debates in the Convention that led to the

Scope and reservations

Members' Research Service Page 2 of 9

A series of elements should therefore be underlined in this context.

Firstly, the different formulations of the mutual assistance/defence clauses contained in

As concerns relations with NATO, the EU Treaty's mutual assistance obligation is

Members' Research Service Page 3 of 9

Implementation and role of the EU institutions

Members' Research Service Page 4 of 9

EU High Representative and Vice-President of the Commission (HR/VP), Federica Mogherini,

What is the role of the EU institutions?