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G.R. No. L-60219 June 29, 1984 Commented [5]:
BIENVENIDO AMISTOSO, petitioner,
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vs.
SENECIO ONG, EPIFANIA NERI & HON. PRESIDING JUDGE, ESTEBAN M. LISING OF THE Commented [7]:
COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF CAMARINES SUR, BRANCH VI, respondents. Commented [8]:
Resales and Associates Law Office for petitioner.
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Gil P. Pacamarra for respondents.
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CUEVAS, J.: Commented [11]:
This is a Petition for Review on certiorari of the Order of the defunct Court of First Instance of Camarines
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Sur, Branch VI dated January 14, 1981, dismissing its Civil Case No. P-153, for lack of jurisdiction.
The pertinent antecedents are as follows: Commented [13]:
On July 27, 1981, petitioner as plaintiff, filed before the then Court of First Instance of Camarines Sur, a Commented [14]:
complaint for Recognition of Basement with Preliminary Injunction and Damages. The complaint which
was docketed in the a resaid Court as Civil Case No. P-153 among others alleged, that plaintiff (now Commented [15]:
petitioner) and defendant Epifania Neri, (one of the herein private respondents) are the owners of adjoining Commented [16]:
parcels of agricultural land situated in Cauayanan, Tinambac, Camarines Sur; that an irrigation canal Commented [17]:
traverses the land of defendant Neri through which irrigation water from the Silmod River passes and flows
to the land of the petitioner for the latter's beneficial use and that respondent Neri, owner of the land on Commented [18]:
which said irrigatrion canal exists and Senecio Ong, the cultivator of the said property, despite repeated Commented [19]:
demands refused to recognize the rights and title of the petitioner to the beneficial use of the water passing
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through the aforesaid irrigation canal and to have petitioner's rights and/or claims annotated on the
Certificate of Title of respondent Neri . . . . Hence, the filing of the said complaint. Commented [21]:
In their Answer, private respondents denied the existence of any right on the part of the petitioner to the Commented [22]:
use of the canal mentioned in the complaint nor any contract, much less any deed or encumbrance on their
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property and assert that they have not performed any act prejudicial to the petitioner that will warrant the
filing of the complaint against them. By way of affirmative and special defenses, private respondents Commented [24]:
alleged that petitioner's complaint states no cause of action and that the Court has no jurisdiction over the Commented [25]:
same.
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Issues having been joined, trial was held. After petitioner has rested his case by a formal offer of his
testimonial and documentary evidences, private respondents instead of presenting their evidence, filed a Commented [27]:
motion to dismiss. In the said motion, respondents contend that the instant case, involving as it does Commented [28]:
development, exploitation, conservation and utilization of water resources falls within the exclusive
jurisdiction of the National Water Resources Council pursuant to P.D. NO. 424, Section 2(b) and Section Commented [29]:
88 thereof. Acting on private respondent's motion, respondent Judge dismissed petitioner's complaint for Commented [30]:
lack of jurisdiction in an Order dated January 14, 1981. The pertinent portion of that Order reads as follows: Commented [31]:
... The basis of the motion to dismiss are the provisions of Presidential Decree No. 424 and the Water Code
known as Presidential Decree No. 1067. In opposing the motion to dismiss, plaintiff contends that the Commented [32]:
present action does not involve water dispute and that since the present action was filed before the court Commented [33]:
prior to the effectivity of the Presidential Decree No. 424, it is the old law on the matter that should be
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applied. These contentions of the plaintiff are without merit. The complaint belies the plaintiff's contention.
Allegations in the complaint are explicit regarding the claim of the right of plaintiff over the water passing Commented [35]:
through his land. The right over irrigation water not having been shown as established or vested or that said Commented [36]:
vested right, if any, has not been alleged to be registered in accordance with the water code, the provisions
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of Presidential Decrees 424 and 1067 shall govern. As stated by the Supreme Court in the case of Abe-Abe
vs. Manta, No. L-4827, May 31, 1979, 90 SCRA 523, to wit: 4 Commented [38]:
It is incontestable that the petitioner's immediate recourse is to ventilate their grievance with the National Commented [39]:
Water Resources Council which, as already noted, is the administrative agency exclusively vested with
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original jurisdiction to settle water rights disputes under the water code under Presidential Decree No. 4 24.
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The code assumes that it is more expeditious and pragmatic to entrust to an administrative agency the
settlement of water rights disputes rather than require the claimants to go directly to the court where the
proceedings are subject to unavoidable delays which are detrimental to the parties ...
That jurisdiction of the Council under Section 2(b) of Presidential Decree No. 424 is reaffirmed in Sec. 88
of the Water Code and in Section 3rd thereof which provides that 'the utilization, exploitation, development,
conservation and protection of water resources shall be subject to the control and regulation of the
government through Council. Commented [52]:
Failing to obtain a favorable reconsideration of the Order of dismissal, petitioner now comes before Us
through the instant petition contending:
(1) That the case at bar is not to settle any water dispute between the parties but a complaint which calls Commented [53]:
purely for a determination of the right of the plaintiff to have an established right amounting to an easement
annotated on the certificate of title of the defendant, hence the question is judicial which may be taken Commented [54]:
cognizance of by the respondent court;
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(2) That since the case was filed on July 26, 1972. Which was before the effectivity of PD NO. 424,
therefore, even if defendant's contention is correct that the case involved water rights dispute the old Commented [56]:
law on water applies and not the present water code otherwise the Court shall lose jurisdiction contrary to Commented [57]:
the well-settled rule that once be lost;
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(3) That the herein defendant can no longer raise the question of plaintiff's right to the beneficial use of
irrigation water since the right to use had already been determined, decided and laid to rest when the Commented [59]:
Department of Public Works, Transportation and Communications awarded petitioner Water Rights Grant Commented [60]:
after complying with all the legal requirements such as publication, payment of fees, survey, investigation,
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etc.; and
(4) That the issue in the case at bar which was erroneously overlooked by the respondent Judge does not Commented [62]:
involve a determination of the right of the parties to the utilization conservation and protection of the parties' Commented [63]:
respective water rights, hence it does not fan within the competence nor jurisdiction of the National Water
Resources Council. Commented [64]:
In a Resolution promulgated on August 11, 1982, we required the respondents to comment on the petition. Commented [65]:
Private respondents' COMMENT was filed on March 2, 1984. Petitioner's REPLY thereto on the other hand Commented [66]:
was filed on May 10, 1984.
We considered the COMMENT as an Answer and gave due course to the petition. Commented [67]:
Private respondents contend that the assailed order of dismissal was in order since a mere cursory reading Commented [68]:
of the complaint shows that petitioner claims for the right to use water coming from the Silmod River and
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prays that his right to the utilization thereof be respected and not be disturbed and/or obstructed by the
respondents. On its face then, the dispute is on the use, conservation and protection of the right to water Commented [70]:
either by the petitioner or by the private respondents. The annotation of the alleged encumbrance on the Commented [71]:
title of the private respondent is merely the relief prayed for on the basis of the claim to the use and
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protection of water passing through the land of the respondents. And since the controversy hinges on the
right to use and protect the water from the Silmod River that passes on the land of the private respondents Commented [73]:
to the petitioner's property, the proper authority to determine such a controversy is the National Water Commented [74]:
Resources Council which is vested with exclusive jurisdiction over such question pursuant to P.D. NOS.
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424 and 1067.
We find the petition impressed with merit. Commented [76]:
Private respondents' insistence that what is involved in the instant case is the right to use, exploit and convey Commented [77]:
water is controverted by the "STIPULATION OF FACTS" entered into between them and the petitioner in
the court below which was approved in an Order dated February 20, 1975, the pertinent portion of which
reads as follows:
1. That there exists an irrigation canal for the use of the defendants diverting water coming from the Silmod Commented [78]:
River, Tinambac, Camarines Sur, passing on the ricelands of the latter to the plaintiff's land irrigating the
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land of the latter, although plaintiff claims it existed since 1952 up to the present, but disputed by the
defendants.
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2. That the plaintiff has an approved water rights Grant issued by the Department of Public Works, Commented [84]:
Transportation and Communications, which plaintiff claims it for beneficial use to irrigate their land from
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the Silmod River and defendants dispute said claim
3. That as of now, defendants have no approved Water Rights Grant issued by the proper authorities for the Commented [86]:
use of the water for irrigation purposes from the Silmod River. However, defendants have a pending Commented [87]:
application for Water Rights, the water of which shall pass thru a different irrigation canal.
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4. That one of the defendants' predecessors-in-interest, Abundio Barallas had a written contract with the
plaintiff, which defendants claim easement of aqueduct Defendants are questioning the legality, Commented [89]:
enforceability and validity of such contract. Commented [90]:
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6. That zity, legality and therefore they are not bound by the same.
From the foregoing stipulations, private respondents admit that petitioner, then plaintiff, has an approved Commented [92]:
Water Rights Grant issued by the Department of Public Works, Transportation and Communications. Commented [93]:
Private respondents, however, contend that the said grant does not pertain to the beneficial use of irrigation
water from Silmod River. The records, however, do not show any other irrigation water going to petitioner's Commented [94]:
property passing thru respondents' lot aside from that coming from the Silmod River. Respondents' Commented [95]:
controversion of petitioner's right to irrigation water specifically from Silmod River is undoubtedly a lame Commented [96]:
denial.
Aside from this admission, the record clearly discloses an approved Water Rights Grant in favor of Commented [97]:
petitioner. Dr. Bienvenido V. Amistoso, which was approved on November 13, the Acting Secretary of Commented [98]:
Public Works and Commission David M. Consunji. (Exh. 1) The grant was made three (3) years before the
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promulgation of P.D. 1067 on December 31, 1976, known as the Water Code of the Philippines, which
revised and consolidated the laws governing ownership, appropriation, option exploitation, development, Commented [100]:
conservation and protection of water resources thereby repealing among others, the provisions of the Commented [101]:
Spanish Law of Water of August 3, 1866, the Civil Code of Spain of 1889, and the Civil Code of the
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Philippines on ownership of water, easement relating to water and of public water and acquisitive
prescription on the use of water which are inconsistent with the provisions of said Code (Art. 10, P.D. Commented [103]:
1067).lwphl@it Commented [104]:
The water rights grant partakes the nature of a document known as a water permit recognized under Article
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13 of P.D. 1067, which provides:
Article 13. Except as otherwise herein provided, no person, including Government instrumentalities or Commented [106]:
government-owned or controlled corporations, shall appropriate water without a water right, which shall be Commented [107]:
evidenced by a document known as a water permit.
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Water right is the 7 granted by the government to appropriate and use water. Commented [109]:
As to the validity of the WATER RIGHTS GRANT of Amistoso upon the promulgation of P.D. 1067 on Commented [110]:
December 31, 1976, the governing provision of law is found in the Transitory and Final Provisions of P.D.
1067. It fans under "acts and contracts under the regime of old laws". Article 97 provides, thus: Commented [111]:
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Article 97. Acts and contracts under the regime of old laws, ff they are valid in accordance therewith, shall
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be respected, subject to the stations established in this Code. Any modification or extension of these acts
and contracts after the promulgation of this Code, shall be subject to the provisions hereof. Commented [114]:
It may be observed that the WATER RIGHTS GRANT of Amistoso does not fall under "claims for a right Commented [115]:
to use water existing on or before December 31, 1974" which under P.D. 1067 are required to be registered
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with the National Water Resources Council within two (2) years from promulgation of P.D. 1067, otherwise
it is deemed waived and the use thereof deemed abandoned. It is no longer a mere "claim" inasmuch as Commented [117]:
there was already a GRANT by the Secretary of Public Works, Transportation and Communications (the Commented [118]:
official then authorized to issue said grant) on November 13, 1973 after complying with all the requirements
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then prescribed by law for such grant.
The grant contradicts the erroneous findings of the respondent Judge, and incontrovertibly entitles petitioner Commented [120]:
to the beneficial use of water from Silmod River. That right is now a. vested one and may no longer be Commented [121]:
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litigated as to bring petitioner's case within the jurisdiction of the National Water Resources Council. To Commented [131]:
resurrect that issue right to the use of investigation water from Silmod River will be violative of the
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rule on res judicata which also applies with equal vigor and effect to quasi judicial tribunal (Brillantes vs.
Castro, 99 Phils. 497, Ipekdjian Merchandising, Inc. vs. Court of Tax Appeals, 9 SCRA 72, September
30,1963).
As correctly postulated by the petitioner, the court a quo is not being asked to grant petitioner the right to
use but to compel private respondents to recognize that right and have the same annotated on respondent
Neri's Torrens Certificate of Title. Resort to judicial intervention becomes necessary because of the closure Commented [133]:
made by the respondents of the irrigation canal thus depriving the petitioner to continue enjoying irrigation
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water coming from Silmod River through respondents' property. The interruption of the free flow of water
caused by the refusal to re-open the closed irrigation canal constituted petitioner's cause of action in the Commented [135]:
court below, which decidedly do not fall within the domain of the authority of the National Water Resources Commented [136]:
Council
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Respondents, however, rely very heavily on the dictum laid down in the Abe-Abe vs. Manta, No. L-4827,
May 31, 1979, 90 SCRA 524, wherein it was held that Commented [138]:
It is incontestable that the petitioner's immediate recourse is to ventilate their grievance with the National
Water Resources Council which, as already noted, is the administrative agency exclusively vested with
original jurisdiction to settle water rights disputes under the water code and under Presidential Decree No.
424.
The Code assumes that it is more expeditious and pragmatic to entrust to an administrative agency the
settlement of water rights disputes rather than require the claimants to go directly to the court where the
proceedings are subject to unavoidable delays which are detrimental to the parties ...
That jurisdiction of the Council under Section 2(b) of Presidential Decree No. 424 is reaffirmed in Section
88 of the Water Code and in Section 3rd thereof which provides that 'the utlization exploitation,
development, conservation and protection of water resources shall be subject to the control and regulation
of the government through the Council
The said pronouncement, however, finds no application to the instant case for in there, both petitioners and Commented [139]:
respondent have no established right emanating from any grant by any governmental agency to the use,
appropriation and exploitation of water. In the case at bar, however, a grant indubitably exists in favor of Commented [140]:
the petitioner. It is the enjoyment of the right emanating from that grant that is in litigation. Violation of the
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grantee's right, who in this case is the petitioner, by the closure of the irrigation canal, does not bring the
case anew within the jurisdiction of the National Water Resources Council. Commented [142]:
WHEREFORE, the Order of the Honorable respondent Judge of January 14, 1981, is hereby SET ASIDE.
Private respondents are hereby ordered to RECOGNIZE petitioner's BASEMENT of water and to surrender
to the Register of Deeds of Camarines Sur the owner's duplicate Transfer Certificate of Title No. 14216
covering respondent Epifania Neri's property so that petitioner's right to the beneficial use of said irrigation
canal and water passing through the same may be annotated thereon. Commented [143]:
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. L-13298 November 19, 1918

CORNELIO RAMOS, petitioner-appellant,
vs.
THE DIRECTOR OF LANDS, objector-appellee.
MALCOLM, J.:
This is an appeal by the applicant and appellant from a judgment of the Court of First Instance of Nueva
Ecija, denying the registration of the larger portion of parcel No. 1 (Exhibit A of the petitioner), marked by
the letters A, B, and C on the plan, Exhibit 1, of the Government.
One Restituto Romero y Ponce apparently gained possession of a considerable tract of land located in the
municipality of San Jose, Province of Nueva Ecija, in the year 1882. He took advantage of the Royal Decree Commented [144]:
of February 13, 1894, to obtain a possessory information title to the land, registered as such on February 8,
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1896. Parcel No. 1, included within the limits of the possessory information title of Restituto Romero, was
sold in February, 1907, to Cornelio Ramos, the instant petitioner, and his wife Ambrosia Salamanca. Commented [146]:
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Ramos instituted appropriate proceedings to have his title registered. Opposition was entered by the
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Director of Lands on the ground that Ramos had not acquired a good title from the Spanish government
and by the Director of Forestry on the ground that the first parcel was forest land. The trial court agreed Commented [149]:
with the objectors and excluded parcel No. 1 from registration. So much for the facts. Commented [150]:
As to the law, the principal argument of the Solicitor-General is based on the provisions of the Spanish
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Mortgage Law and of the Royal Decree of February 13, 1894, commonly known as the Maura Law. The
Solicitor-General would emphasize that for land to come under the protective gis of the Maura Law, it Commented [152]:
must have been shown that the land was cultivated for six years previously, and that it was not land which Commented [153]:
pertained to the "zonas forestales." As proof that the land was, even as long ago as the years 1894 to 1896,
forestal and not agricultural in nature is the fact that there are yet found thereon trees from 50 to 80 years Commented [154]:
of age. Commented [155]:
We do not stop to decide this contention, although it might be possible, following the doctrine laid down Commented [156]:
by the United States Supreme Court with reference to Mexican and Spanish grantees within the United
States, where some recital is claimed to be false, to say that the possessory information, apparently having Commented [157]:
taken cognizance of the requisites for title, should not now be disturbed. (Hancock vs. McKinney [1851], 7 Commented [158]:
Tex., 192; Hornsby and Roland vs.United States [1869], 10 Wall., 224.) It is sufficient, as will later appear,
merely to notice that the predecessor in interest to the petitioner at least held this tract of land under color
of title.

Subsection 6 of section 54, of Act No. 926, entitled The Public Land Law, as amended by Act No. 1908, Commented [159]:
reads as follows:
6. All persons who by themselves or their predecessors and interest have been in the open, continuous,
exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of agricultural public lands, as defined by said Act of
Congress of July first, nineteen hundred and two, under a bona fide claim of ownership except as against
the Government, for a period of ten years next preceding the twenty-sixth day of July, nineteen hundred
and four, except when prevented by war or force majeure, shall be conclusively presumed to have
performed all the conditions essential to a government grant and to have received the same, and shall be
entitled to a certificate of title to such land under the provisions of this chapter.
There are two parts to the above quoted subsection which must be discussed. The first relates to the open,
continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of what, for present purposes, can be
conceded to be agricultural public land, under a bona fide claim of ownership. Commented [160]:
Actual possession of land consists in the manifestation of acts of dominion over it of such a nature as a
party would naturally exercise over his own property. Relative to actuality of possession, it is admitted that
the petitioner has cultivated only about one fourth of the entire tract. This is graphically portrayed by Exhibit Commented [161]:
1 of the Government, following:
The question at once arises: Is that actual occupancy of a part of the land described in the instrument giving
color of title sufficient to give title to the entire tract of land?lawphil.net Commented [162]:
The doctrine of constructive possession indicates the answer. The general rule is that the possession and
cultivation of a portion of a tract under claim of ownership of all is a constructive possession of all, if the
remainder is not in the adverse possession of another. (Barr vs. Gratz's Heirs [1819], 4 Wheat., 213; Commented [163]:
Ellicott vs. Pearl [1836], 10 Pet., 412; Smith vs. Gale [1892], 144 U. S., 509.) Of course, there are a number
of qualifications to the rule, one particularly relating to the size of the tract in controversy with reference to
the portion actually in possession of the claimant. It is here only necessary to apply the general rule.

The claimant has color of title; he acted in good faith; and he has had open, peaceable, and notorious
possession of a portion of the property, sufficient to apprise the community and the world that the land was
for his enjoyment. (See arts. 446, 448, Civil Code.) Possession in the eyes of the law does not mean that a Commented [164]:
man has to have his feet on every square meter of ground before it can be said that he is in possession.
Ramos and his predecessor in interest fulfilled the requirements of the law on the supposition that he
premises consisted of agricultural public land. Commented [165]:
The second division of the law requires consideration of the term "agricultural public land." The law affirms
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that the phrase is denied by the Act of Congress of July 1st, 1902, known as the Philippine bill. Turning to
the Philippine Bill, we find in sections 13 to 18 thereof that three classes of land are mentioned. The first is Commented [167]:
variously denominated "public land" or "public domain," the second "mineral land," and the third "timber
land." Section 18 of the Act of Congress comes nearest to a precise definition, when it makes the
determination of whether the land is more valuable for agricultural or for forest uses the test of its character.
Although these sections of the Philippine Bill have come before the courts on numerous occasions, what
was said in the case of Jones vs. Insular Government ([1906], 6 Phil., 122), is still true, namely: "The
meaning of these sections is not clear and it is difficult to give to them a construction that will be entirely
free from objection." In the case which gave most serious consideration to the subject (Mapa vs. Insular
Government [1908], 10 Phil., 175), it was found that there does exist in the Act of Congress a definition of
the phrase "agricultural public lands." It was said that the phrase "agricultural public lands" as used in Act
No. 926 means "those public lands acquired from Spain which are not timber or mineral lands." Commented [168]:
The idea would appear to be to determine, by exclusion, if the land is forestal or mineral in nature and, if
not so found, to consider it to be agricultural land. Here, again, Philippine law is not very helpful. For Commented [169]:
instance, section 1820 of the Administrative Code of 1917 provides: "For the purposes of this chapter,
'public forest' includes, except as otherwise specially indicated, all unreserved public land, including nipa
and mangrove swamps, and all forest reserves of whatever character." This definition of "public forest," it Commented [170]:
will be noted, is merely "for the purposes of this chapter." A little further on, section 1827 provides: "Lands
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in public forests, not including forest reserves, upon the certification of the Director of Forestry that said
lands are better adapted and more valuable for agricultural than for forest purposes and not required by the
public interests to be kept under forest, shall be declared by the Department Head to be agricultural lands." Commented [172]:
With reference to the last section, there is no certification of the Director of Forestry in the record, as to
whether this land is better adapted and more valuable for agricultural than for forest purposes. Commented [173]:
The lexicographers define "forest" as "a large tract of land covered with a natural growth of trees and
underbrush; a large wood." The authorities say that the word "forest" has a significant, not an insignificant Commented [174]:
meaning, and that it does not embrace land only partly woodland. It is a tract of land covered with trees,
usually of considerable extent. (Higgins vs. Long Island R. Co. [1908], 114 N. Y. Supp., 262;
People vs. Long Island R. Co. [1908], 110 N. Y. Supp., 512.)
The foresters say that no legal definition of "forest" is practicable or useful. B. H. Baden-Powell, in his
work on Forest Law of India, states as follows:
Every definition of a forest that can be framed for legal purposes will be found either to exclude some cases
to which the law ought to apply, or on the other hand, to include some with which the law ought not to
interfere. It may be necessary, for example, to take under the law a tract of perfectly barren land which at Commented [175]:
present has neither trees, brushwood, nor grass on it, but which in the course of time it is hoped will be
"reboise;" but any definition wide enough to take in all such lands, would also take in much that was not
wanted. On the other hand, the definition, if framed with reference to tree-growth, might (and indeed would
be almost sure to) include a garden, shrubbery, orchard, or vineyard, which it was not designed to deal with.
B. E. Fernow, in his work on the Economics of Forestry, states as follows:
A forest in the sense in which we use the term, as an economic factor, is by no means a mere collection of
trees, but an organic whole in which all parts, although apparently heterogeneous, jumbled together by
accident as it were and apparently unrelated, bear a close relation to each other and are as interdependent
as any other beings and conditions in nature.
The Director of Forestry of the Philippine Islands has said:
During the time of the passage of the Act of Congress of July 1, 1902, this question of forest and agricultural
lands was beginning to receive some attention and it is clearly shown in section 18 of the above mentioned
Act; it leaves to the Bureau of Forestry the certification as to what lands are for agricultural or forest uses.
Although the Act states timber lands, the Bureau has in its administration since the passage of this act
construed this term to mean forest lands in the sense of what was necessary to protect, for the public good;
waste lands without a tree have been declared more suitable for forestry in many instances in the past. The
term 'timber' as used in England and in the United States in the past has been applied to wood suitable for
construction purposes but with the increase in civilization and the application of new methods every plant
producing wood has some useful purpose and the term timber lands is generally though of as synonymous
with forest lands or lands producing wood, or able to produce wood, if agricultural crops on the same land
will not bring the financial return that timber will or if the same land is needed for protection purposes.
xxx xxx xxx
The laws in the United States recognize the necessity of technical advice of duly appointed boards and leave
it in the hands of these boards to decide what lands are more valuable for forestry purposes or for
agricultural purposes.
In the Philippine Islands this policy is follows to as great an extent as allowable under the law. In many
cases, in the opinion of the Bureau of Forestry, lands without a single tree on them are considered as true
forest land. For instance, mountain sides which are too steep for cultivation under ordinary practice and
which, if cultivated, under ordinary practice would destroy the big natural resource of the soil, by washing,
is considered by this bureau as forest land and in time would be reforested. Of course, examples exist in the
Mountain Province where steep hillsides have been terraced and intensive cultivation practiced but even
then the mountain people are very careful not to destroy forests or other vegetative cover which they from
experience have found protect their water supply. Certain chiefs have lodged protests with the Government
against other tribes on the opposite side of the mountain cultivated by them, in order to prevent other tribes
from cutting timber or destroy cover guarding their source of water for irrigation.
Dr. M. S. Shaler, formerly Dean of the Lawrence Scientific School, remarked that if mankind could not
devise and enforce ways dealing with the earth, which will preserve this source of like "we must look
forward to the time, remote it may be, yet equally discernible, when out kin having wasted its great
inheritance will fade from the earth because of the ruin it has accomplished."
The method employed by the bureau of Forestry in making inspection of lands, in order to determine
whether they are more adapted for agricultural or forest purposes by a technical and duly trained personnel
on the different phases of the conservation of natural resources, is based upon a previously prepared set of
questions in which the different characters of the land under inspection are discussed, namely:
Slope of land: Level; moderate; steep; very steep.
Exposure: North; South; East; West.
Soil: Clay; sandy loam; sand; rocky; very rocky.
Character of soil cover: Cultivated, grass land, brush land, brush land and timber mixed, dense forest.
If cultivated, state crops being grown and approximate number of hectares under cultivation. (Indicate on
sketch.)
For growth of what agricultural products is this land suitable?
State what portion of the tract is wooded, name of important timber species and estimate of stand in cubic
meters per hectare, diameter and percentage of each species.
If the land is covered with timber, state whether there is public land suitable for agriculture in vicinity,
which is not covered with timber.
Is this land more valuable for agricultural than for forest purposes? (State reasons in full.)
Is this land included or adjoining any proposed or established forest reserve or communal forest?
Description and ownership of improvements.
If the land is claimed under private ownership, give the name of the claimant, his place of residence, and
state briefly (if necessary on a separate sheet) the grounds upon which he bases his claim.
When the inspection is made on a parcel of public land which has been applied for, the corresponding
certificate is forwarded to the Director of Lands; if it is made on a privately claimed parcel for which the
issuance of a title is requested from the Court of Land Registration, and the inspection shows the land to be
more adapted for forest purposes, then the Director of Forestry requests the Attorney-General to file an
opposition, sending him all data collected during the inspection and offering him the forest officer as a
witness.
It should be kept in mind that the lack of personnel of this Bureau, the limited time intervening between the
notice for the trial on an expediente of land and the day of the trial, and the difficulties in communications
as well as the distance of the land in question greatly hinder the handling of this work.
In the case of lands claimed as private property, the Director of Forestry, by means of his delegate the
examining officer, submits before the court all evidence referring to the present forest condition of the land,
so that the court may compare them with the alleged right by the claimant. Undoubtedly, when the claimant
presents a title issued by the proper authority or evidence of his right to the land showing that he complied
with the requirements of the law, the forest certificate does not affect him in the least as such land should
not be considered as a part of the public domain; but when the alleged right is merely that of possession,
then the public or private character of the parcel is open to discussion and this character should be
established not simply on the alleged right of the claimant but on the sylvical condition and soil
characteristics of the land, and by comparison between this area, or different previously occupied areas,
and those areas which still preserve their primitive character. Commented [176]:
Either way we look at this question we encounter difficulty. Indubitably, there should be conservation of
the natural resources of the Philippines. The prodigality of the spendthrift who squanders his substance for
the pleasure of the fleeting moment must be restrained for the less spectacular but surer policy which
protects Nature's wealth for future generations. Such is the wise stand of our Government as represented by
the Director of Forestry who, with the Forester for the Government of the United States, believes in "the
control of nature's powers by man for his own good." On the other hand, the presumption should be, in lieu
of contrary proof, that land is agricultural in nature. One very apparent reason is that it is for the good of
the Philippine Islands to have the large public domain come under private ownership. Such is the natural
attitude of the sagacious citizen.
If in this instance, we give judicial sanction to a private claim, let it be noted that the Government, in the
long run of cases, has its remedy. Forest reserves of public land can be established as provided by law.
When the claim of the citizen and the claim of the Government as to a particular piece of property collide,
if the Government desires to demonstrate that the land is in reality a forest, the Director of Forestry should
submit to the court convincing proof that the land is not more valuable for agricultural than for forest
purposes. Great consideration, it may be stated, should, and undoubtedly will be, paid by the courts to the
opinion of the technical expert who speaks with authority on forestry matters. But a mere formal opposition
on the part of the Attorney-General for the Director of Forestry, unsupported by satisfactory evidence will
not stop the courts from giving title to the claimant.
We hold that the petitioner and appellant has proved a title to the entire tract of land for which he asked
registration, under the provisions of subsection 6, of section 54, of Act No. 926, as amended by Act No.
1908, with reference to the Philippine Bill and the Royal Decree of February 13, 1894, and his possessory Commented [177]:
information.
Commented [178]:
Judgment is reversed and the lower court shall register in the name of the applicant the entire tract in parcel
No. 1, as described in plan Exhibit A, without special finding as to costs. So ordered. Commented [179]:

G.R. No. L-25723 June 29, 1984

THE DIRECTOR OF LANDS and HEIRS OF THE DECEASED HOMESTEADERS, namely, IGNACIO
BANGUG, PASCUAL BANGUG, EUSEBIO GUMIRAN, SANTIAGO AGGABAO and ANTONIO
DERAY, petitioners-appellants,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and HEIRS OF BRUNO CABAUATAN, respondents-appellees.
Primitivo P. Cammayo, Magbayad, Macutay & Cendea, Melanio T. Singson and Silvestre Br. Bello and
Alejandro Mina for petitioners-appellants.
The Solicitor General and Arnulfo Tamayo for respondents-appellees.

AQUINO, J.:
This is a land registration case involving 128 hectares of land located in Cabagan, Isabela. On page 125 of Commented [180]:
the Gaceta de Manila dated January 30, 1884, it was published that the land applied Or by Bruno
Commented [181]:
Cabanatan (sic) "en la jurisdiction de Cabagan de la de Isabela de Luzon" was declared "enagenables" Commented [182]:
(Exh. P).
On page 142 of the Gaceta de Manila dated August 2, 1885, this entry was published: "Adjudicando a ...
D. Bruno Cabanatan (sic) la extension de 138 hectareas, 91 areas y 50 centiareas de terreno situado en el
pueblo de Cabagan, en Isabela de Luzon, en la cantidad de pfs. 188'71 6/81" (Exh. Q. The name is
"Cabauatan" in Exh. M).
"Bruno Cabanatan "of Cabagan, Isabela appears as No. 322 in a handwritten list of "Expedientes
Remitidos A Terrenos Publicos" (terminated cases) dated November 30, 1901 in the files the Division of
Archives (Exh. L and O).
However, the applicants have not produced in evidence any composition title, the basis of their application. Commented [183]:
It was allegedly burned in the house of Pepe Buraga during the war (34 tsn June 26, 1956). So, we do not
Commented [184]:
know the boundaries of the 138 hectares land allegedly adjudicated to Bruno Cabanatan, granting that he
was the same as Bruno Cabauatan, the ancestor of the applicants; in what barrio or sitio of Cabagan it is Commented [185]:
located; why in 1932 the 138 hectares had been increased to 154 hectares. and why in 1921 the same land Commented [186]:
was declared for tax purposes in the name of Honofre Cabauatan, Bruno's nephew, and not in the names
Commented [187]:
of Bruno s heirs.
As correctly contended by the Solicitor General, the land applied for must be Identified. The claim of Commented [188]:
possession or having a composition title is inutile if the land is not Identified. Commented [189]:
Bruno died during the Spanish regime. The year when he died is not known. He is survived by seven
Commented [190]:
children with the following descendants:
1. Candida, survived by Lucio Guingab and Jose Buraga. Commented [191]:
2. Paulina, survived by Maria, Jose Gregorio and Epifania, surnamed Samus (children of the first marriage) Commented [192]:
and by Eugenia and Vicente Uanan children of her second marriage.
3. Francisco, survived by Manuel, Faustina, Juan and Remedios. Commented [193]:
4. Bruno 2nd, survived by Purisima, Francisco, Cristeta, Benjamin and Respicio. Commented [194]:
5. Salvador, survived by Paz, Lucio, Lourdes and Pilar, who is dead and is in turn survived by her children
Celso Mesa and Ruben, Mesa.
6. Heculina, survived by Faustino, Maria, Alejandra, Genoveva, Amada and Francisco, all surnamed Cauan.
Genoveva Cauan is dead and is survived by her child, Josefina Balmaceda.
7. Guillermo, survived by his son, Pedro Cabauatan.

Bruno had a brother named Leon, who had a son named Honofre (Onofre) who, curiously enough, obtained
in 1921 a tax declaration for the 138 hectares at P5,200. In that tax declaration, it was stated that the land Commented [195]:
is located at Malasi, Cabagan, bounded on the north, east and south by public land (P.D.) and on the west
by a mountain. How Onofre came to have a tax declaration for that land has not been adequately explained. Commented [196]:

Emilio Cabauatan, a son of Onofre, in his opposition and testimony claimed that lawyer Miguel Binag, in
behalf of Bruno's heirs, in 1937 proposed to use the said declaration in the land registration proceeding. He Commented [197]:
promised to give the heirs of Onofre Cabauatan one-third of the land. However, lawyer Binag denied that
Commented [198]:
he ever made such a proposition.

Emilio also claimed that the land of Bruno is in Sitio Malini, three kilometers from Sitio Malasi. The trial Commented [199]:
court and Binag denied that there was a sitio in Cabagan called Malini. It was not found in the list of sitios
Commented [200]:
in the governor's office.
On March 5,1934 Judge Mariano Rosauro issued Decree No. 536561 for the registration of a parcel of land,
plan 95520, with an area of 25 hectares located at the "sitio of Malisi, Barrio of Aggub," Cabagan. It was Commented [201]:
registered in the names of the following heirs of Bruno as proindiviso co-owners without regard to the right
Commented [202]:
of representation (Exh. J)
1. Candida Cabauatan Commented [203]:
16. Rufina Cabauatan Commented [204]:
2. Maria Samus
17. Paz Cabauatan
3. Jose Samus
18. Lucio Cabauatan
4. Gregorio Samus
19. Lourdes Cabauatan
5. Epifanio Samus
20. Cervex Mesa
6. Eugenia Uanan
21. Ruben Mesa
7. Vicente Uanan
22. Faustino Cauan
8. Manuel Cabauatan
23. Maria Cauan
9. Faustino Cabauatan
24. Alejandra Cauan
10. Juan Cabauatan
25. Genoveva Cauan
11. Remedios Cabauatan
26. Amada Cauan
12. Purisima Cabauatan
27. Francisco Cauan
13. Francisco Cabauatan
28. Josefina Balmaceda
14. Cristeta Cabauatan
and
15. Benjamin Cabauatan
29. Pedro Cabauatan
The 25 hectares land already registered has as boundaries parts of the land under controversy. Thus, the
decree states that the 25 hectares are bounded on the northeast and south by public lands; on the east by
property of Tomas Vinarao vs. heirs of Bruno Cabauatan; on the west by property of Lucas Pagulayan vs.
heirs of Bruno Cabauatan and on the northwest by the Lagoon Malasi Grande and public land.
It may be asked: why did not that 1934 registration case embrace the whole 138 hectares allegedly covered
by Bruno's composition title and why did Bruno's heirs have to resort to a second or another registration
case in 1937? The applicants have not offered any satisfactory explanation.
In 1934, the year the 25 hectares of land located at Malasi, Cabagan, was registered in the names of Bruno's
heirs, they produced a survey plan Psu-95458, for his land which had an area of 154 hectares, much larger
than the 138 hectares adjudicated to Bruno in 1885. Clearly, the area was inflated by 16 hectares. The land
consisted of seven contiguous lots located in Barrio Aggub, Cabagan. It included the 25 hectares of plan
Psu-95520 which was already registered and which was designated as Lot No. 6.
The plan was based on a 1932 survey. The surveyor in 1934 indicated in the plan Psu-95458 the following
claimants of the seven lots (Exh. F)
Lot No. 1 Claimed by Pascual Bangug.
Lot No. 2 Claimed by Heirs of Antonio Deray.
Lot No. 3 Claimed by Heirs of Ignacio Bangug.
Lot No. 4 Claimed by Eusebio Gumiran.
Lot No. 5 Uncultivated.
Lot No. 6 Claimed by Ramon Guingab (already registered,).
Lot No. 7 Claimed by Vicente Ramos and Casiano Magbayad.
The provincial fiscal, in representation of the Director of Lands, alleged in his opposition that the land
claimed by Bruno's heirs was covered by the approved and subsisting homestead applications of (1)
Santiago Aggabao, deceased, now heirs represented by Simplicio Aggabao; (2) Ignacio Bangug, deceased,
now his heirs represented by Anacleto Bangug; (3) Eusebio Gumiran, deceased, now his heirs represented
by Luis Gumiran; (4) Antonio Deray, deceased, now his heirs represented by Pablo Deray; (5) Casiano
Magbayad, transferor, now Rodolfo Albano, transferee, and (6) Gaudencio Flores (p. 23, RA).
As already stated, the instant second registration case was filed in 1937 based on an expanded survey. The
applicants are the very same heirs of Bruno who were the applicants in the first registration case.
They claim the land without taking into account the rule on representation. The record does not disclose
why the case was not finished before liberation. The trial commenced in 1956 or almost twenty years after
the application was filed. That is an unusual feature of the case.
Evidence for the applicants, Bruno's heirs. From the testimonies of Candida Cabauatan, Jose Buraga,
Gabriel Zipagan and Placido Angoluan, the trial court found that the land in question (128.8 plus 25.4 or
154 hectares) was administered by Bruno's son, Salvador. There were allegedly forty tenants during the
Spanish regime working in the middle portion of the land.
Some of the tenants were still on the land during the American regime. They have been cultivating the land
under the overseers, Zipagan and Angoluan. During the Spanish regime, Bruno's children received 1/3 of
the products, such as corn and palay, as the owner's share. The tenants also planted kapok, acacia trees and
some oranges.
They allegedly constructed rice paddies and built dwelling houses. Bruno's heirs have possessed the land
openly, peacefully, continuously and in the concept of owner since the Spanish regime up to the present
time.
In 1916, about 50 hectares of the land were under cultivation, the greater portion of which is included in
Lot No. 6, which, as already mentioned, was registered in 1934 in the names of Bruno's heirs, the same
applicants in this 1937 case. The land taxes were paid since 1921 in the name of Honofre, not an heir of
Bruno.
Evidence for the Director of Lands and homesteaders. As oppositor, the Director of Lands presented the
following documentary evidence:
(1) The 1924 homestead application of Eusebio Gumiran and his intention to make final proof dated July
22, 1930 for 24 hectares of land located at Sitio Malasi, Barrio Aggub, Cabagan (Exh- 1-3).
(2) The order dated August 28, 1931 for the issuance of a patent to Pascual Bangug for 24 hectares covered
by his 1911 application (Exh. 5 and 6-DL).
(3) The approval dated November 23, 1931 of Ignacio Bangug's homestead application for 10 hectares
(Exh. 7 and 8-DL).
(4) The approval dated March 23, 1932 of Casiano Mabbayad's homestead application for 24 hectares
(Exh. 10 and 11-DL)
(5) The approval dated August 12, 1950 of Gaudencio Flores' homestead application for 24 hectares (Exh.
12 and 13-DL).
(6) The approval dated August 24, 1932 of Santiago Agabao's 1926 homestead application for 24 hectares
(Exh. 14 and 16-DL).
(7) The approval dated May 15, 1928 of Antonio Deray's homestead application for 24 hectares (Exh. 17-
DL).
As noted by the Solicitor General, the Court of Appeals failed to mention in its decision the evidence for
the homesteaders. The following is a summary of that evidence by the Solicitor General and the trial court.
Ignacio Bangug in 1917 occupied about ten hectares of the land in Sitio Malasi. He planted it to rice, corn,
tobacco and beans. He applied in 1926 for a homestead over that parcel of land (Exh. 11). He paid the land
taxes as early as 1922 (Exh. 1 to 10). His application was approved in 1931. After his death in 1931, his
son Jose continued to occupy the homestead. Jose Bangug did not know that the land was included in the
survey made for Bruno's heirs.
Pascual Bangug, who died in 1950, had cultivated a portion of the disputed land since 1910 and in 1911 he
filed his homestead application (Exh. F). He declared it for tax purposes and paid the land taxes since 1916
(Exh. 2 to 24). The homestead patent was issued in 1931 (Exh. 25). He built his house on the land. His heirs
continued his possession after his death. Pascual planted the land to rice, corn, mongo, peanuts, oranges,
lemon, acacia and bamboos.
Eusebio Gumiran occupied in 1924 a portion of Lots Nos. 4 and 5 (Exh. K). He filed his homestead
application in that same year. He planted the land to rice and other staple crops. He made a final proof in
1930. After his death in 1942, his children and widow continued to possess the homestead.
Santiago Aggabao started occupying the land in Sitio Malasi in 1927. It has an area of 24 hectares. His
homestead application was approved in 1932 (Exh. 16). His children have possessed the homestead after
his death. They planted it to rice, corn and vegetables.
Antonio Deray filed in 1924 his homestead application for 24 hectares in what is now Lot No. 2 of the
survey plan. It was approved in 1928 (Exh. 17 and 18-DL). His heirs have been in possession of the
homestead.
Gaudencio Flores and the heirs of Honofre Cabauatan also presented evidence as oppositors but they did
not appeal to this Court.
Ruling. The trial court granted the application for registration of the six lots with an area of 128 hectares,
in addition to the often mentioned 25 hectares already registered. It reasoned out that if Bruno's heirs had
possession of the said 25 hectares, they could be deemed to have "constructive possession" of the remaining
part of the land provided that the same is not in the adverse possession of another person (Ramos vs.
Director of Lands, 39 Phil. 175).lwphl@it
We hold that the rule on constructive possession does not apply to this case because the major portion of
the disputed 128 hectares has been in the adverse possession of homesteaders and their heirs and is still part
of the public domain until the patents are issued.
The area claimed is in excess of that mentioned in the committed position title. The alleged lost composition
title cannot be given any probative value. Its contents were not proven by secondary evidence. The precise
location of the land and the possession thereof were not proven by the applicants. The alleged possession
of Bruno's heirs may refer to the 25 hectares already registered in their names. Inexplicably, the registration
of the 154 hectares was made in two installments.
WHEREFORE, the decisions of the Court of Appeals and the trial court are reversed and set aside. The
application for registration is dismissed. The Director of Lands should issue to appellant heirs of the
deceased homesteaders their patents in accordance with the Public Land Law. Costs against the applicants.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 57092 January 21, 1993

EDGARDO DE JESUS, REMEDIOS DE JESUS, JUANITO DE JESUS, JULIANA DE JESUS,
JOSE DE JESUS, FLORDELIZA DE JESUS, REYNALDO DE JESUS, ERNESTO DE JESUS,
PRISCILO DE JESUS, CORAZON DE JESUS, petitioners,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and PRIMITIVA FELIPE DE JESUS, respondents.
Jose B. Soriano for petitioners.
Jose A. Aguiling and Paquito C. Ochoa for private respondent.

MELO, J.:
This has reference to a petition for review on certiorari seeking the reversal of the decision of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. No. 59613 (December 24, 1980, Sison, P.V., Cenzon. Asuncion [P], JJ) which reversed
the decision dated September 7, 1975 of the then Court of First Instance of Bulacan. In consequence, the
appellate court dismissed herein petitioners' complaint and declared private respondent Primitive Felipe de
Jesus to be the absolute owner entitled to the possession of the land in question to the exclusion of
petitioners.
The property in dispute is a parcel of residential land situated in Dampol 2nd, Pulilan, Bulacan, bounded Commented [205]:
on the North by a Vereda: on the South, by the Provincial Road; on the East, by Catalino Tayag (Tayao);
on the West, by Macario de Leon, containing an area of 2565 square meters (Brief for the Petitioners, p. 3), Commented [206]:
and covered by Tax Declaration No. 2383 of the Office of the Provincial Assessor of Bulacan, in the name
Commented [207]:
of Victoriano Felipe (Exh. "5-C").
Commented [208]:
Respondent appellate court found the above-described parcel of land to be the same parcel of land which
was Commented [209]:
. . . the subject of the Kasulatang-Biling-Mabibiling-Muli (Exh. 1) executed on November 25, 1932, by
Commented [210]:
Emilia Camacho (surviving widow of Catalino Esguerra), Jose C. Esguerra and Socorro Esguerra,
conveying or selling this land to the spouses, Victoriano Felipe and Guillerma de la Cruz, with right to Commented [211]:
repurchase the same within a period of five years, but that the vendors-a-retro failed to repurchase the land. Commented [212]:
The vendors-a-retro were the heirs of the deceased Catalino Esguerra. Since the date of the sale the spouses
Commented [213]:
Victoriano Felipe and Guillerma de la Cruz, possessed and lived on this land. The appellant [herein private
respondent] was living with her parents on the land, and upon their deaths, she continued to live on and Commented [214]:
possess the same. (pp. 33-34, Rollo.) Commented [215]:
On November 29, 1961 private respondent executed a sworn statement declaring herself the only heir of
Commented [216]:
the deceased Victoriano Felipe and adjudicating to herself the ownership of the land in question (Exh. "4").
More than twelve years later or on April 27, 1973, petitioners herein filed in the Court of First Instance of Commented [217]:
Bulacan, an action for recovery of ownership and possession and quieting of title to the abovementioned Commented [218]:
piece of land covered by Tax Declaration No. 2383, alleging among others: "that their grandfather, Santiago
de Jesus during his lifetime owned the residential lot; that Santiago de Jesus died before the outbreak of Commented [219]:
World War II, leaving three (3) sons, namely: Mariano, Exequiel, and Jose, all surnamed de Jesus; that Commented [220]:
Mariano de Jesus died on September 3, 1956 leaving eight (8) surviving children, namely: Edgardo, Commented [221]:
Remedios, Juanita, Juliano, Jose, Flordeliza, Reynaldo, and Ernesto, all surnamed de Jesus and all of them
plaintiffs; that Exequiel de Jesus died on April 3, 1948, survived by two (2) children Priscilo and Commented [222]:
Corazon, both surnamed de Jesus, also plaintiffs in this case; while Jose de Jesus died before the outbreak Commented [223]:
of World War II without any issue . . . "(p. 35, Record on Appeal).
Commented [224]:
The trial court found for the plaintiffs, petitioners herein. The dispositive portion of the decision dated
September 7, 1975 reads: Commented [225]:
FOR ALL OF THE FOREGOING, judgment is hereby rendered: Commented [226]:
(1) Declaring the plaintiffs as having the better right to ownership and possession of the residential lot in
Commented [227]:
question by virtue of hereditary succession;
(2) Ordering the defendant to surrender the ownership and possession of the said property to the herein Commented [228]:
plaintiffs; Commented [229]:
(3) Ordering the defendant to pay to the plaintiffs the sum of P500.00 for and as attorney's fees, and the
Commented [230]:
costs of suit.
SO ORDERED. (pp. 56-57, Record, on Appeal.)
As earlier intimated, on appeal, the Court of Appeals set aside the judgment of the trial court in a decision
promulgated on December 24, 1980
(pp. 32-38, Rollo), the dispositive portion of which reads:
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING CONSIDERATION, finding serious errors to have been committed by
the trial court in its judgment, the same is hereby set aside and another one entered, dismissing the
complaint, and declaring the appellant to be the absolute owner, and entitled to the possession of this land
in question, to the exclusion of plaintiffs-appellees. (p. 38, Rollo.)
Thus, the instant petition for review on certiorari which was filed with this Court on August 13, 1981 (p.
9, Rollo) with the following assigned errors:
I
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN SETTING ASIDE THE JUDGMENT OF THE TRIAL COURT
WHICH AWARDED THE RESIDENTIAL LOT IN QUESTION TO THE PETITIONERS BY VIRTUE
OF HEREDITARY SUCCESSION AND ORDERED THE PRIVATE RESPONDENT TO SURRENDER
THE OWNERSHIP AND POSSESSION OF THE SAME TO THEM.
II
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN RULING THAT THE LAND DESCRIBED IN THE
PETITIONERS' COMPLAINT IS THE SAME LAND WHICH IS THE SUBJECT OF THE SALE WITH
RIGHT TO REPURCHASE (Exh. 1) EXECUTED ON NOVEMBER 5, 1932 BY THE ESGUERRAS IN
FAVOR OF THE PARENTS OF THE PRIVATE RESPONDENT.
III
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN DECLARING THE PRIVATE RESPONDENT TO BE THE
ABSOLUTE OWNER AND ENTITLED TO THE POSSESSION OF THE LAND IN QUESTION TO
THE EXCLUSION OF THE PETITIONERS.
IV
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THIS LAND WAS PURCHASED BY THE
PARENTS OF THE PRIVATE RESPONDENT FROM THE HEIRS OF THE LATE CATALINO
ESGUERRA ON NOVEMBER 5, 1932 AND THE PRIVATE RESPONDENT AND HER PARENTS
HAD BEEN IN OPEN, CONTINUOUS, ADVERSE, PUBLIC AND NOTORIOUS POSSESSION OF
THE SAME SINCE 1932 UP TO THE PRESENT, IN THE CONCEPT OF OWNER.
In effect, the sole issue in this petition boils down to this question: Who has the right to the ownership and
possession of the residential lot subject matter of the case, petitioners by virtue of hereditary succession, or
private respondent who claims ownership through purchase of the property by her parents?
According to the trial court, petitioners have the better right but according to the appellate court, the
property rightly belongs to private respondent. In view of the fact that the findings of the trial court and the
appellate court are contrary to each other, this Court shall exercise its authority of reviewing the evidence
in order to arrive at the correct facts based on the record (Director of Lands vs. Court of Appeals, 117 SCRA
346 [1982]; Quality Tobacco Corporation vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, 187 SCRA 210 [1990];
Valenzuela vs. Court of Appeals, 191 SCRA 1 [1990]; Shauf vs. Court of Appeals, 191 SCRA 713 [1990]
; Bustamante vs. Court of Appeals, 194 SCRA 645 [1991).
It is not disputed that petitioners are the heirs of their late grandfather, Santiago de Jesus; what is in dispute
is their claim that the residential lot in question belonged to their grandfather and therefore theirs by
hereditary succession (Brief for the Respondent, pp. 8-9). Neither is it contradicted that Santiago de Jesus
was married to Maria Reyes, a widow with three children by a prior marriage, namely: Basilio, Violeta, and
Guillerma, the last having been the mother of herein private respondent (tsn, August 15, 1974, pp. 14-15;
September 16, 1974, pp. 14-15, 39-41).
The only documentary evidence of Santiago de Jesus' alleged ownership of the residential lot in question is
Tax Declaration No. 2384 (Exh. "A") in the name of Victoriano Felipe. Therein, Felipe claimed ownership
for tax purposes of a house of mixed materials and a nipa roof, valued at P190.00 and constructed on the
lot or "solar" belonging to Santiago de Jesus. The statement therein regarding Santiago de Jesus' ownership
of the lot is supported by the testimony of petitioners Edgardo de Jesus and Corazon de Jesus-Masiglat, and
three other witnesses. They asserted personal knowledge of said fact which, they swore, was also common
knowledge in Dampol 2nd, Pulilan, Bulacan (tsn, August 15, 1974, p. 16; September 16, 1974, pp. 18, 39).
As a child, for instance, witness Antonio Roxas was frequently in the house of his aunt, Maria Reyes, a
sister of his mother. When his aunt was still alive, she told him and his mother, in the presence of Victoriano
Felipe, that she had no right at all over the property, including the old house, as it really belonged to Santiago
de Jesus (tsn, September 16, 1974, pp. 39, 46-49).
On the other hand, private respondent presented a contract of sale with right of repurchase, "Kasulatang-
Biling-Mabibiling-Muli" (Exh. "1"), entered into in 1932 between her parents, Victoriano Felipe and
Guillerma de la Cruz, and the vendors-a-retro Emilia Camacho, Socorro Esguerra, and Jose Esguerra; a
"Sinumpaang Salaysay"; or an affidavit of adjudication which private respondent executed in 1961 (Exh.
"4"); and tax declarations and official receipts.
On the evidentiary value of these documents, it should be recalled that the notarization of a private
document converts it into a public one and renders it admissible in court without further proof of its
authenticity (Joson vs. Baltazar, 194 SCRA 114 [1991]). This is so because a public document duly
executed and entered in the proper registry is presumed to be Valid and genuine until the contrary is shown
by clear and convincing proof (Asido vs. Guzman, 37 Phil. 652 [1918]; U.S. vs. Enriquez, 1 Phil. 241
[1902]; Favor vs. Court of Appeals, 194 SCRA 308 [1991]). As such, the party challenging the recital of
the document must prove his claim with clear and convincing evidence (Diaz vs. Court of Appeals, 145
SCRA 346 [1986]).
There is no doubt that the pacto de retro deed of sale has assumed the character of a public document,
having been notarized by then Justice of the Peace Francisco Makapugay, Jr. in his capacity as Notary
Public Ex-Oficio. Hence, it is presumed valid and authentic until proven otherwise. Petitioners, however,
challenge this presumption of validity and authenticity. They contend that private respondent's non-
production of Tax Declaration No. 5096, specifically mentioned in Exh. "1" as containing the description
of the piece of land subject of the "Kasulatang-Biling-Mabibiling-Muli" shattered such presumption and
rendered suspect the latter document (Brief for the Petitioners, pp. 9, 19-22).
While both Socorro Olarte, a signatory to the "Kasulatang-Biling-Mabibiling-Muli" as one of the vendors-
a-retro, and private respondent testified that the land subject of the sale was covered by Tax Declaration
No. 5096 in the name of the original owner Catalino Esguerra (tsn, October 21, 1974, p. 6 and December
18, 1974, pp. 3-5), they could not produce a copy of said tax declaration. Capitalizing on said omission,
petitioners presented a certified true copy of said Tax Declaration No. 5096 (Exh. "G") covering the year
1948 and which, however, concerns a piece of lot owned by a certain Teodoro Sinson. Further, petitioners
also produced certified true copies of Tax Declarations Nos. 2214 (Exh. "H"), 2215 (Exh "I") and 2216
(Exh. "J"), all in the name of Catalino Esguerra as owner, and all for the year 1967.
Pablo H. Domingo, Senior Deputy Assessor, who was subpoenaed to present in court Tax Declaration No.
5096 in the name of Catalino Esguerra identified the above-mentioned certified true copies of tax
declarations as having been issued by the Office of the Provincial Assessor of Bulacan (tsn, March 12,
1975, pp. 13-14). However, he said he could not bring with him a copy of Tax Declaration No. 5096 in the
name of Catalino Esguerra as the records of the Office of the Provincial Assessor only started with the year
1948 because the old Assessor's Office was burned down during the early part of the liberation (Transcript,
March 12, 1975, pp. 5-6, 12).
It is significant to note that the land covered by Tax Declaration No. 5096 (Exh. "G") described therein as
bamboo land, was previously covered by Tax Declaration No. 233 for the same owner, while Tax
Declaration No. 2383 (Exh. "5-C") beginning with the year 1948 and covering the residential lot in question
declared in the name of Victoriano Felipe, cancelled Tax Declaration No. 5326 (Exh. "5-C-1"). An
uncertified copy of said Tax Declaration No. 5326 for Victoriano Felipe purporting to commence with the
year 1939 allegedly superseded Tax Declaration No. 252 in the name of Catalino Esguerra
(Exh. "3").
In other words, the piece of residential lot covered by Tax Declaration No. 2383 (Exh. "5"), or by Tax
Declaration No. 252 (Exh. "3") at around the time of the alleged sale, until superseded by Tax Declaration
No. 5326 (Exh. "5-C-1") beginning with the year 1939, is not the piece of land covered by Tax Declaration
No. 5096 specifically referred to in Exh. "1" as the subject of the "Kasulatang-Biling-Mabibiling-Muli". Commented [231]:
Thus, the fact that Guillerma de la Cruz, mother of private respondent, made real property tax payments
purportedly on Tax Declaration No. 5096 for the years 1935 (Exh. "2-d" and "2-e") and 1936 (Exh. "2-b")
and probably for the years 1933, 1934, 1937 and 1938, in the name of Catalino Esguerra neither alters the
fact that the piece of land covered by Tax Declaration No. 2383 (Exh. "5") is not the subject of the
"Kasulatang-Biling-Mabibiling-Muli" (Exh. "1") nor demonstrates that the payments were made for the
residential lot under litigation. Commented [232]:
It is, therefore, evident that Tax Declaration No. 5096 was inexistent at the time of the alleged sale. By a
Commented [233]:
simply analysis of the different tax declarations presented as evidence in this case, it is likewise clear that
when by virtue of the alleged sale, a new tax declaration numbered 5326, was made in 1938 in the name of
Victoriano Felipe (Exh. "5-C-1"), what was cancelled was Tax Declaration No. 252 (Exh. "3"), not Tax Commented [234]:
Declaration No. 5096 which supposedly covered the property subject of the "Kasulatang-Biling-
Commented [235]:
Mabibiling-Muli". It should be noted that the property under Tax Declaration No. 5326 bears an identical
description to the property under litigation. Thus, the inevitable conclusion is that, without any legal basis, Commented [236]:
Victoriano Felipe had declared himself the owner of the disputed property for tax purposes. Tax Declaration
No. 5326 thereafter became the basis for Tax Declaration Commented [237]:
No. 2383 in 1948 (Exh. "5-C") until it was cancelled and new tax declarations were made in the name of
private respondent, viz., Tax Declaration No. 9453 in 1962 (Exh. "5-b"), then Tax Declaration No. 2657 in
1967 (Exh. "5") and finally Tax Declaration No. 2962 in 1974 (Exh. "5-A").
As earlier stated, Guillerma de la Cruz had also been paying real property tax on the house described as Commented [238]:
located in Dampol 2nd in the name of Victoriano Felipe under Tax Declaration No. 14984 since 1933 (Exh.
"2-C"), and then under Tax Declaration No. 3975 since 1941 (Exh. "2-4") until 1947, and under Tax
Declaration No. 2384 in 1948. By a twist of fate, however, Tax Declaration No. 2384 describes the house, Commented [239]:
among others, as located in the residential lot belonging to Santiago de Jesus or "solar de Santiago de Jesus"
Commented [240]:
(Exh. "A-1"). While real property tax continued to be paid under the latter declaration until 1958 (Exh. "2-
y"), by stating in said tax declaration that his house was located in the land of Santiago de Jesus. Victoriano
Felipe recognized and admitted the ownership of Santiago de Jesus over the residential lot involved herein. Commented [241]:
Such admission puts to naught the claim of private respondent for when one derives title to property from
another, the act, declaration or omission of the latter in relation to the property is evidence against the
former (Rolleza vs. Court of Appeals, 174 SCRA 354 (1989]).
The authenticity of the signature of Victoriano Felipe in the deed of sale with right to repurchase is also in
question. Both Moises de Jesus and Antonio Roxas testified that Victoriano Felipe could not even vote as
he did not know how to read and write (tsn, September 16, 1974, pp. 30, 42). Although Socorro Esguerra
Olarte identified the signature of Victoriano Felipe on the "Kasulatang-Biling-Mabibiling-Muli" as his (tsn,
October 21, 1974, p. 13), she also testified that Victoriano Felipe has a brother who looked exactly like
Victoriano (tsn, October 21, 1974, p. 36). On the issue, all that private respondent could say was that her
father studied the cartilla (tsn, January 24, 1975, p. 8).
Under the circumstances, there is strong, convincing, and conclusive proof of the nullity and falsity of
Exhibit "1". Its evidentiary nature cannot, therefore, be sustained (Legaspi vs. Court of Appeals, 142 SCRA
82 [1986]). Even if the document were to be considered simply as a private document, it would still need
evidence of its due execution and authenticity even if it is already more than 30 years old as it cannot be
considered unblemished by any circumstance of suspicion (Heirs of Demetria Lacsa vs. Court of Appeals,
197 SCRA 234 [1991]).
Consequently, the affidavit of adjudication executed by private respondent on May 21, 1961 (Exh. "4"),
has no evidentiary value as it has become baseless. Furthermore, private respondent falsely stated therein
that she is the only heir of Victoriano Felipe for, at the time of its execution, her mother, Guillerma de la
Cruz, was still living. Guillerma de la Cruz died on April 23, 1964 (Exh. "B"), three years after the
"Sinumpaang Salaysay" (Exh. "4") was executed. Moreover, the tax receipts and declarations of ownership
for tax purposes upon which private respondent basically anchors her claim, are not incontrovertible
evidence of ownership; they only become evidence of ownership acquired by prescription when
accompanied by proof of actual possession of the property (Tabuena vs. Court of Appeals, 196 SCRA 650 Commented [242]:
[1991]; Rojas vs. Court of Appeals, 192 SCRA 709 [1992]).
On the issue of ownership by acquisitive prescription, private respondent contends: "Granting that it was
formerly owned by their late grandfather, they (petitioners) have lost whatever right they may have over
the land by extinctive prescription" for the reason that she, private respondent has acquired the same by
acquisitive prescription (Brief for the Respondents, p. 9), citing Section 41 of the old Code of Civil Commented [243]:
Procedure which states:

Sec. 41. Title to Land by Prescription. Ten years of actual adverse possession by any person claiming to Commented [244]:
be the owner for that time of any land or interest in land, uninterruptedly, continuously for ten years by
occupancy, descent, grants, or otherwise, in whatever way such occupancy may have commenced or
continued, shall vest in every actual possessor of such land, a full and complete title . . . .
Corazon de Jesus Masiglat testified that from 1930 to 1952, the period of time she was living in the house
her grandfather erected on the contested property, her grandmother, Victoriano Felipe, Guillerma de la
Cruz, and private respondent also lived there (tsn, July 16, 1974, p. 23). She was corroborated by petitioner
Edgardo de Jesus who also testified that in 1932 up to the time of his death in 1948, Exequiel de Jesus was
taking charge of the property and that while the parents of private respondent were the ones paying the real
property taxes the money therefor came from Exequiel (tsn, July 16, 1974, pp. 11-14). Witness Salvador
Esguerra testified that Victoriano Felipe began to reside in the house when he married Guillerma de la Cruz
and that Corazon and her father, Exequiel, also resided there after the death of Santiago de Jesus (tsn,
August 15, 1974, pp. 14, 21, 22). Moises de Jesus, for his part, testified that while Victoriano Felipe started
staying in the property only when the children of Santiago de Jesus had died, Corazon de Jesus continued
to reside there (tsn, September 16, 1974, p. 27).
In her own defense private respondent first testified that Corazon de Jesus never lived with them and that
Exequiel de Jesus never went to their place (tsn., October 11, 1974, pp. 35-36). She did not contradict,
however, the testimony of Edgardo de Jesus on rebuttal that he himself at the age of 12 used to stay in the
house and was witness to the occasion when Corazon fell in a ditch going towards their place, that as a
result of such accident, Corazon sustained a permanent deformity on one hand; and that Corazon left the
place only in 1952 when she got married (tsn, April 23, 1975, pp. 23-24). Neither did private respondent or
her witnesses traverse the testimony of Corazon de
Jesus-Masiglat, also on rebuttal, that since childhood she had been residing in the house owned by her
grandfather Santiago de Jesus, together with private respondent and the latter's parents, and actually left the
place only in 1952: that her parents as well as her child died in that house; and that private respondent was,
in fact, the one who caused the registration of her child's death (tsn, April 23, 1975, p. 25). Even Socorro
Esguerra Olarte, witness for private respondent, testified that she remembers Exequiel de Jesus as he was
always around whenever she visited the place and he was the one who got santol fruits for her sometimes
(tsn, September 23, 1974, p. 17).
It thus appears that Victoriano Felipe was residing in the house of Santiago de Jesus simply because he was
married to Guillerma de la Cruz, daughter of Maria Reyes by a first marriage, who, obviously, was living
with her mother who had taken Santiago de Jesus for her second husband. In effect, their possession of the Commented [245]:
contested lot was neither exclusive nor in the concept of owner. Possession, to constitute the foundation of
a prescriptive right, must be possession under a claim of title or it must be adverse or in the concept of
owner or concepto de dueo(Ordoez vs. Court of Appeals, 188 SCRA 109 [1990]; Coronado vs. Court of Commented [246]:
Appeals, 191 SCRA 814 [1990]; Manila Electric Company vs. Intermediate Appelate Court, 174 SCRA
313 [1989]).
In this case, Victoriano Felipe and his family were residing in the land by mere tolerance. There is no way Commented [247]:
of knowing how the house on the lot was described in Tax Declaration Nos. 14984 and 3975, but, to repeat,
in Tax Declaration No. 2384 which commenced with the year 1948 (Exh. "A"), the house was described as
constructed on the lot or solar of Santiago de Jesus up to the year 1961 when private respondent was still Commented [248]:
paying property tax (Exh.
"2-x").
Significantly, the "Kasulatang-Biling-Mabibiling-Muli" was not even given to private respondent by her
parents; she admitted having found it in the house although they mentioned its existence to her when they
were still alive (tsn, December 18, 1974, pp. 18-19). Under the circumstances, the prescriptive period cannot Commented [249]:
be considered to have accrued during the lifetime of Victoriano Felipe.
It is interesting to note that when private respondent executed her "Sinumpaang Salaysay" (Exh. "4")
adjudicating the disputed lot to herself on the basis of the contract of sale as no repurchase had been made
by the vendors of retro, Exequiel de Jesus was already dead and Corazon de Jesus-Masiglat was no longer
residing in the property in question. As she was in possession of the property, private respondent then had
it declared in her name for real property tax purposes under Tax Declaration No. 9453 (Exh. "5-b") thereby
cancelling Tax Declaration No. 2383 (Exh. "5-b-1") which was in the name of Victoriano Felipe. Commented [250]:
As to Tax Declaration No. 2384, the last vestige of Santiago de Jesus' ownership of the property in question,
there is no evidence on record as to whether private respondent had it cancelled, had a new declaration
made on the property in her name, or whether she continued paying tax after her payment for the year 1961.
It was established, however, through the testimony of Salvador Esguerra, that the old house was demolished Commented [251]:
and a new bungalow was constructed on the lot (tsn, August 15, 1974, pp. 23-24).
Commented [252]:
To create a fundamental basis for her claim of ownership by acquisitive prescription, private respondent
mortgaged the questioned property to the Rural Bank of Pulilan (Exh. "5-b") not as a mere possessor but as
an owner thereof. She also registered both the mortgage and the "Sinumpaang Salaysay" (tsn, December Commented [253]:
18, 1974, p. 23). However, she never attempted to obtain a certificate of title over the property. This
omission indicates, to say the least, that private respondent realizes her lack of any lawful claim of
ownership over the property for while registration is not a mode of acquiring ownership, it is evidence of
such title over the particular property (Avila v. Tapucar, 201 SCRA 148 [1991]). Commented [254]:
Private respondent's pretensions to acquisitive prescription may not succeed even under Act No. 190, the
Code of Civil Procedure. Under Section 41 thereof, good faith and just title are not required for purposes
of acquisitive prescription; adverse possession in either character ripens into ownership after the lapse of
ten years (Cruz vs. Court of Appeals, 93 SCRA 619 [1979]; Quilisado vs, Court of Appeals, 182 SCRA
401 [1990]; Ongsiaco vs. Dallo, 27 SCRA 161 [1969]; Miraflor vs. Court of Appeals, 142 SCRA 18
[1986]). The just title required for acquisitive prescription to set in is not "titulo verdadero y valido" Commented [255]:
such title which by itself is sufficient to transfer ownership without the necessity of letting the prescriptive
period elapse, but only "titulo
colorado" or such title where, although there was a mode of transferring ownership, still something is
wrong because the grantor is not the owner (Doliendo vs. Biannesa, 7 Phil. 232 [1906] cited in Solis vs.
Court of Appeals, 176 SCRA 678 [1989]), and incidentally, it may perhaps be mentioned that prescription
running even after the effectivity of the New Civil Code on August 30, 1950, continued to be governed by
Section 41 of the Old Civil Code (Solis vs. Court of Appeals, supra).
Under the present Civil Code, the prescriptive period required for acquisition of immovable property is ten
years if the possession is in good faith, and thirty years if in bad faith (South City Homes, Inc. vs. Republic, Commented [256]:
185 SCRA 693 [1990]). Such open, continuous, exclusive and notorious occupation of the disputed property
for thirty years must be conclusively established (San Miguel Corporation vs. Court of Appeals, 185 SCRA Commented [257]:
722 [1990]).
Reckoned from the time she executed the affidavit of adjudication in 1961, eleven years after the New Civil
Code had taken effect, private respondent's possession of the contested lot is far too short of the prescriptive
period of thirty years considering that her possession is in bad faith. The filing of the petition for recovery Commented [258]:
of ownership and possession and quieting of title by petitioners on April 27, 1973 was well below the
acquisitive prescriptive period for private respondent, which is thirty years under Article 1141 of the present Commented [259]:
Civil Code. In this case, the statutory period of prescription is deemed to have commenced when petitioners
were made aware of a claim adverse to them (Coronel vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, 155 SCRA 270
[1987]), that is, when the affidavit of adjudication was duly registered with the Registry of Deeds which, at
the earliest may be considered to be in 1974, when private respondent was able to secure a tax declaration
in her name. Commented [260]:
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals under review is hereby SET ASIDE and the decision
of the trial court, dated September 7, 1975, REINSTATED.
SO ORDERED.
[G.R. No. 79688. February 1, 1996]
PLEASANTVILLE DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS,
WILSON KEE, C.T. TORRES ENTERPRISES, INC. and ELDRED JARDINICO, respondents.
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:

Is a lot buyer who constructs improvements on the wrong property erroneously delivered by the owners
agent, a builder in good faith?This is the main issue resolved in this petition for review on certiorari to Commented [261]:
reverse the Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals[2] in CA-G.R. SP No. 11040, promulgated on August 20,
1987.
By resolution dated November 13, 1995, the First Division of this Court resolved to transfer this case (along
with several others) to the Third Division. After due deliberation and consultation, the Court assigned the
writing of this Decision to the undersigned ponente.
The Facts Commented [262]:
The facts, as found by respondent Court, are as follows:
Commented [263]:
Edith Robillo purchased from petitioner a parcel of land designated as Lot 9, Phase II and located Commented [264]:
at Taculing Road, Pleasantville Subdivision, Bacolod City. In 1975, respondent Eldred Jardinico bought
Commented [265]:
the rights to the lot from Robillo. At that time, Lot 9 was vacant.
Upon completing all payments, Jardinico secured from the Register of Deeds of Bacolod City on December Commented [266]:
19, 1978 Transfer Certificate of Title No. 106367 in his name. It was then that he discovered that Commented [267]:
improvements had been introduced on Lot 9 by respondent Wilson Kee, who had taken possession thereof.
Commented [268]:
It appears that on March 26, 1974, Kee bought on installment Lot 8 of the same subdivision from C.T.
Torres Enterprises, Inc. (CTTEI), the exclusive real estate agent of petitioner. Under the Contract to Sell Commented [269]:
on Installment, Kee could possess the lot even before the completion of all installment Commented [270]:
payments. On January 20, 1975, Kee paid CTTEI the relocation fee of P50.00 and another P50.00
Commented [271]:
on January 27, 1975, for the preparation of the lot plan. These amounts were paid prior to Kees taking actual
possession of Lot 8. After the preparation of the lot plan and a copy thereof given to Kee, CTTEI through Commented [272]:
its employee, Zenaida Octaviano, accompanied Kees wife, Donabelle Kee, to inspect Lot 8. Unfortunately, Commented [273]:
the parcel of land pointed by Octaviano was Lot 9. Thereafter, Kee proceeded to construct his residence, a
store, an auto repair shop and other improvements on the lot. Commented [274]:
After discovering that Lot 9 was occupied by Kee, Jardinico confronted him. The parties tried to reach an Commented [275]:
amicable settlement, but failed. Commented [276]:
On January 30, 1981, Jardinicos lawyer wrote Kee, demanding that the latter remove all improvements and
vacate Lot 9. When Kee refused to vacate Lot 9, Jardinico filed with the Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Commented [277]:
Branch 3, Bacolod City (MTCC), a complaint for ejectment with damages against Kee. Commented [278]:
Commented [279]:
Kee, in turn, filed a third-party complaint against petitioner and CTTEI.
The MTCC held that the erroneous delivery of Lot 9 to Kee was attributable to CTTEI. It further ruled that Commented [280]:
petitioner and CTTEI could not successfully invoke as a defense the failure of Kee to give notice of his Commented [281]:
intention to begin construction required under paragraph 22 of the Contract to Sell on Installment and his
Commented [282]:
having built a sari-sari store without. the prior approval of petitioner required under paragraph 26 of said
contract, saying that the purpose of these requirements was merely to regulate the type of improvements to Commented [283]:
be constructed on the lot[3]. Commented [284]:
However, the MTCC found that petitioner had already rescinded its contract with Kee over Lot 8 for the Commented [285]:
latters failure to pay the installments due, and that Kee had not contested the rescission. The rescission was
effected in 1979, before the complaint was instituted.The MTCC concluded that Kee no longer had any Commented [286]:
right over the lot subject of the contract between him and petitioner. Consequently, Kee must pay
reasonable rentals for the use of Lot 9, and, furthermore, he cannot claim reimbursement for the
improvements he introduced on said lot.
The MTCC thus disposed:
IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, judgment is hereby rendered as follows:
1. Defendant Wilson Kee is ordered to vacate tithe premises of Lot 9, covered by TCT No. 106367 and to
remove all structures and improvements he introduced thereon;
2. Defendant Wilson Kee is ordered to pay to the plaintiff rentals at the rate of P 15.00 a day computed
from the time this suit was filed on March 12, 1981until he actually vacates the premises. This amount shall
bear interests (sic) at the rate of 12 per cent (sic) per annum.
3. Third-Party Defendant CT. Torres Enterprises, Inc. and Pleasantville Subdivision are ordered to pay the
plaintiff jointly and severally the sum of P3,000.00 as attorneys fees and P700.00 as cost and litigation
expenses.[4]
On appeal, the Regional Trial Court, Branch 48, Bacolod City (RTC) ruled that petitioner and CTTEI were
not at fault or were not negligent, there being no preponderant evidence to show that they directly
participated in the delivery of Lot 9 to Kee.[5] It found Kee a builder in bad faith. It further ruled that even Commented [287]:
assuming arguendo that Kee was acting in good faith, he was, nonetheless, guilty of unlawfully usurping
Commented [288]:
the possessory right of Jardinico over Lot 9 from the time he was served with notice to vacate said lot, and
thus was liable for rental.
The RTC thus disposed:
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is affirmed with respect to the order against the defendant to
vacate the premises of Lot No. 9 covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-106367 of the land records
of Bacolod City; the removal of all structures and improvements introduced thereon at his expense and the
payment to plaintiff (sic) the sum of Fifteen (P 15.00) Pesos a day as reasonable rental to be computed from
January 30, 1981, the date of the demand, and not from the date of the filing of the complaint, until he had
vacated (sic) the premises, with interest thereon at 12% per annum. This Court further renders judgment
against the defendant to pay the plaintiff the sum of Three Thousand (P3,000.00) Pesos as attorneys fees,
plus costs of litigation.
The third-party complaint against Third-Party Defendants Pleasantville Development Corporation and C.T.
Torres Enterprises, Inc. is dismissed. The order against Third-Party Defendants to pay attorneys fees to
plaintiff and costs of litigation is reversed.[6]
Following the denial of his motion for reconsideration on October 20, 1986, Kee appealed directly to the
Supreme Court, which referred the matter to the Court of Appeals.
The appellate court ruled that Kee was a builder in good faith, as he was unaware of the mix-up when he
began construction of the improvements on Lot 8. It further ruled that the erroneous delivery was due to
the negligence of CTTEI, and that such wrong delivery was likewise imputable to its principal, petitioner
herein. The appellate court also ruled that the award of rentals was without basis.
Thus, the Court of Appeals disposed:
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED, the appealed decision is REVERSED, and judgment is rendered
as follows:
1. Wilson Kee is declared a builder in good faith with respect to the improvements he introduced on Lot 9,
and is entitled to the rights granted him under Articles 448, 546 and 548 of the New Civil Code.
2. Third-party defendants C.T. Torres Enterprises, Inc. and Pleasantville Development Corporation are
solidarily liable under the following circumstances:
a. If Eldred Jardinico decides to appropriate the improvements and, thereafter, remove these structures, the
third-party defendants shall answer for all demolition expenses and the value of the improvements thus
destroyed or rendered useless;
b. If Jardinico prefers that Kee buy the land, the third-party defendants shall answer for the amount
representing the value of Lot 9 that Kee should pay to Jardinico.
3. Third-party defendants C.T. Torres Enterprises, Inc. and Pleasantville Development Corporation are
ordered to pay in solidum the amount of P3,000.00 to Jardinico as attorneys fees, as well as litigation
expenses.
4. The award of rentals to Jardinico is dispensed with.
Furthermore, the case is REMANDED to the court of origin for the determination of the actual value of the
improvements and the property (Lot 9), as well as for further proceedings in conformity with Article 448
of the New Civil Code.[7]

Petitioner then filed the instant petition against Kee, Jardinico and CTTEI. Commented [289]:
The Issues
The petition submitted the following grounds to justify a review of the respondent Courts Decision, as
follows:
1. The Court of Appeals has decided the case in a way probably not in accord with law or the the (sic)
applicable decisions of the Supreme Court on third-party complaints, by ordering third-party defendants to
pay the demolition expenses and/or price of the land;
2. The Court of Appeals has so far departed from the accepted course of judicial proceedings, by granting
to private respondent-Kee the rights of a builder in good faith in excess of what the law provides, thus
enriching private respondent Kee at the expense of the petitioner;
3. In the light of the subsequent events or circumstances which changed the rights of the parties, it becomes
imperative to set aside or at least modify the judgment of the Court of Appeals to harmonize with justice
and the facts;
4. Private respondent-Kee in accordance with the findings of facts of the lower court is clearly a builder in
bad faith, having violated several provisions of the contract to sell on installments;
5. The decision of the Court of Appeals, holding the principal, Pleasantville Development Corporation
(liable) for the acts made by the agent in excess of its authority is clearly in violation of the provision of the
law;
6. The award of attorneys fees is clearly without basis and is equivalent to putting a premium in (sic) court
litigation.
From these grounds, the issues could be re-stated as follows:
(1) Was Kee a builder in good faith?
(2) What is the liability, if any, of petitioner and its agent, C.T. Torres Enterprises, Inc.? and
(3) Is the award of attorneys fees proper?
The First Issue: Good Faith
Petitioner contends that the Court of Appeals erred in reversing the RTCs ruling that Kee was a builder in
bad faith.
Petitioner fails to persuade this Court to abandon the findings and conclusions of the Court of Appeals that
Kee was a builder in good faith. We agree with the following observation of the Court of Appeals:
The roots of the controversy can be traced directly to the errors committed by CTTEI, when it pointed the
wrong property to Wilson Kee and his wife. It is highly improbable that a purchaser of a lot would
knowingly and willingly build his residence on a lot owned by another, deliberately exposing himself and
his family to the risk of being ejected from the land and losing all improvements thereon, not to mention
the social humiliation that would follow.
Under the circumstances, Kee had acted in the manner of a prudent man in ascertaining the identity of his
property. Lot 8 is covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-69561, while Lot 9 is identified in Transfer
Certificate of Title No. T-106367. Hence, under the Torrens system of land registration, Kee is presumed
to have knowledge of the metes and bounds of the property with which he is dealing. x x x
xxx xxx xxx
But as Kee is a layman not versed in the technical description of his property, he had to find a way to
ascertain that what was described in TCT No. 69561 matched Lot 8. Thus, he went to the subdivision
developers agent and applied and paid for the relocation of the lot, as well as for the production of a lot plan
by CTTEIs geodetic engineer. Upon Kees receipt of the map, his wife went to the subdivision site
accompanied by CTTEIs employee, Octaviano, who authoritatively declared that the land she was pointing
to was indeed Lot 8. Having full faith and confidence in the reputation of CTTEI, and because of the
companys positive identification of the property, Kee saw no reason to suspect that there had been a
misdelivery. The steps Kee had taken to protect his interests were reasonable. There was no need for him
to have acted ex-abundantia cautela, such as being present during the geodetic engineers relocation survey
or hiring an independent geodetic engineer to countercheck for errors, for the final delivery of subdivision
lots to their owners is part of the regular course of everyday business of CTTEI. Because of CTTEIs
blunder, what Kee had hoped to forestall did in fact transpire. Kees efforts all went to naught.[8]
Good faith consists in the belief of the builder that the land he is building on is his and his ignorance of any
defect or flaw in his title.[9]And as good faith is presumed, petitioner has the burden of proving bad faith
on the part of Kee.[10]
At the time he built improvements on Lot 8, Kee believed that said lot was what he bought from
petitioner. He was not aware that the lot delivered to him was not Lot 8. Thus, Kees good faith. Petitioner
failed to prove otherwise.
To demonstrate Kees bad faith, petitioner points to Kees violation of paragraphs 22 and 26 of the Contract
of Sale on Installment.
We disagree. Such violations have no bearing whatsoever on whether Kee was a builder in good faith, that
is, on his state of mind at the time he built the improvements on Lot 9. These alleged violations may give
rise to petitioners cause of action against Kee under the said contract (contractual breach), but may not be
bases to negate the presumption that Kee was a builder in good faith.
Petitioner also points out that, as found by the trial court, the Contract of Sale on Installment covering Lot
8 between it and Kee was rescinded long before the present action was instituted. This has no relevance on
the liability of petitioner, as such fact does not negate the negligence of its agent in pointing out the wrong
lot to Kee. Such circumstance is relevant only as it gives Jardinico a cause of action for unlawful detainer
against Kee.
Petitioner next contends that Kee cannot claim that another lot was erroneously pointed out to him because
the latter agreed to the following provision in the Contract of Sale on Installment, to wit:
13. The Vendee hereby declares that prior to the execution of his contract he/she has personally examined
or inspected the property made subject-matter hereof, as to its location, contours, as well as the natural
condition of the lots and from the date hereof whatever consequential change therein made due to erosion,
the said Vendee shall bear the expenses of the necessary fillings, when the same is so desired by
him/her.[11]
The subject matter of this provision of the contract is the change of the location, contour and condition of
the lot due to erosion. It merely provides that the vendee, having examined the property prior to the
execution of the contract, agrees to shoulder the expenses resulting from such change.
We do not agree with the interpretation of petitioner that Kee contracted away his right to recover damages
resulting from petitioners negligence. Such waiver would be contrary to public policy and cannot be
allowed. Rights may be waived, unless the waiver is contrary to law, public order, public policy, morals, or
good customs, or prejudicial to a third person with a right recognized by law.[12]
The Second Issue: Petitioners Liability
Kee filed a third-party complaint against petitioner and CTTEI, which was dismissed by the RTC after
ruling that there was no evidence from which fault or negligence on the part of petitioner and CTTEI can
be inferred. The Court of Appeals disagreed and found CTTEI negligent for the erroneous delivery of the
lot by Octaviano, its employee.
Petitioner does not dispute the fact that CTTEI was its agent. But it contends that the erroneous delivery
of Lot 9 to Kee was an act which was clearly outside the scope of its authority, and consequently, CTTEI
alone should be liable. It asserts that while [CTTEI] was authorized to sell the lot belonging to the herein
petitioner, it was never authorized to deliver the wrong lot to Kee.[13]
Petitioners contention is without merit.
The rule is that the principal is responsible for the acts of the agent, done within the scope of his authority,
and should bear the damage caused to third persons.[14] On the other hand, the agent who exceeds his
authority is personally liable for the damage.[15]
CTTEI was acting within its authority as the sole real estate representative of petitioner when it made the
delivery to Kee. In acting within its scope of authority, it was, however, negligent. It is this negligence that
is the basis of petitioners liability, as principal of CTTEI, per Articles 1909 and 1910 of the Civil Code.
Pending resolution of the case before the Court of Appeals, Jardinico and Kee on July 24, 1987 entered into
a deed of sale, wherein the former sold Lot 9 to Kee. Jardinico and Kee did not inform the Court of Appeals
of such deal.
The deed of sale contained the following provision:
1. That Civil Case No. 3815 entitled Jardinico vs. Kee which is now pending appeal with the Court of
Appeals, regardless of the outcome of the decision shall be mutually disregarded and shall not be pursued
by the parties herein and shall be considered dismissed and without effect whatsoever;[16]
Kee asserts though that the terms and conditions in said deed of sale are strictly for the parties thereto and
that (t)here is no waiver made by either of the parties in said deed of whatever favorable judgment or award
the honorable respondent Court of Appeals may make in their favor against herein petitioner Pleasantville
Development Corporation and/or private respondent C.T. Torres Enterprises, Inc.[17]
Obviously, the deed of sale can have no effect on the liability of petitioner. As we have earlier stated,
petitioners liability is grounded on the negligence of its agent. On the other hand, what the deed of sale
regulates are the reciprocal rights of Kee and Jardinico; it stressed that they had reached an agreement
independent of the outcome of the case.
Petitioner further assails the following holding of the Court of Appeals:
2. Third-party defendants C.T. Torres Enterprises, Inc. and Pleasantville Development Corporation are
solidarily liable under the following circumstances:
a. If Eldred Jardinico decides to appropriate the improvements and, thereafter, remove these structures, the
third-party defendants shall answer for all demolition expenses and the value of the improvements thus
destroyed or rendered useless;
b. If Jardinico prefers that Kee buy the land, the third-party defendants shall answer for the amount
representing the value of Lot 9 that Kee should pay to Jardinico.[18]
Petitioner contends that if the above holding would be carried out, Kee would be unjustly enriched at its
expense. In other words, Kee would be -able to own the lot, as buyer, without having to pay anything on it,
because the aforequoted portion of respondent Courts Decision would require petitioner and CTTEI jointly
and solidarily to answer or reimburse Kee there for.
We agree with petitioner.
Petitioners liability lies in the negligence of its agent CTTEI. For such negligence, the petitioner should be
held liable for damages. Now, the extent and/or amount of damages to be awarded is a factual issue which
should be determined after evidence is adduced. However, there is no showing that such evidence was
actually presented in the trial court; hence no damages could now be awarded.
The rights of Kee and Jardinico vis-a-vis each other, as builder in good faith and owner in good faith,
respectively, are regulated by law (i.e., Arts. 448, 546 and 548 of the Civil Code). It was error for the Court
of Appeals to make a slight modification in the application of such law, on the ground of equity. At any
rate, as it stands now, Kee and Jardinico have amicably settled through their deed of sale their rights and
obligations with regards to Lot 9. Thus, we delete items 2 (a) and (b) of the dispositive portion of the Court
of Appeals Decision [as reproduced above] holding petitioner and CTTEI solidarily liable.
The Third Issue: Attorneys Fees
The MTCC awarded Jardinico attorneys fees and costs in the amount of P3,000.00 and P700.00,
respectively, as prayed for in his complaint. The RTC deleted the award, consistent with its ruling that
petitioner was without fault or negligence. The Court of Appeals, however, reinstated the award of attorneys
fees after ruling that petitioner was liable for its agents negligence.
The award of attorneys fees lies within the discretion of the court and depends upon the circumstances of
each case.[19] We shall not interfere with the discretion of the Court of Appeals. Jardinico was compelled
to litigate for the protection of his interests and for the recovery of damages sustained as a result of the
negligence of petitioners agent.[20]
In sum, we rule that Kee is a builder in good faith. The disposition of the Court of Appeals that Kee is
entitled to the rights granted him under Articles 448, 546 and 548 of the New Civil Code is deleted, in view
of the deed of sale entered into by Kee and Jardinico, which deed now governs the rights of Jardinico and
Kee as to each other. There is also no further need, as ruled by the appellate Court, to remand the case to
the court of origin for determination of the actual value of the improvements and the property (Lot 9), as
well as for further proceedings in conformity with Article 448 of the New Civil Code.
WHEREFORE, the petition is partially GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby
MODIFIED as follows:
(1) Wilson Kee is declared a builder in good faith;
(2) Petitioner Pleasantville Development Corporation and respondent C.T. Tones Enterprises, Inc. are
declared solidarily liable for damages due to negligence; however, since the amount and/or extent of such
damages was not proven during the trial, the same cannot now be quantified and awarded;
(3) Petitioner Pleasantville Develpment Corporation and respondent C.T. Torres Enterprises, Inc. are
ordered to pay in solidum the amount of P3,000.00 to Jardinico as attorneys fees, as well as litigation
expenses; and
(4) The award of rentals to Jardinico is dispensed with.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 3088 February 6, 1907

EL BANCO ESPAOL-FILIPINO, plaintiff-appellant,
vs.
JAMES PETERSON, sheriff of the city of Manila, ET AL., defendants-appellees.
Del-Pan, Ortigas & Fisher for appellant.
Hartigan, Marple, Rohde, & Gutierrez for appellees.
TORRES, J.:
On the 24th of October, 1905, the Spanish-Filipino Bank, a corporation, through its attorneys, Del-Pan,
Ortigas and Fisher, filed a complaint against the sheriff of the city of Manila and the other defendant, Juan
Garcia, praying that judgment be rendered against the said sheriff, declaring that the execution levied upon
the property referred to in the complaint, to wit, wines, liquors, canned goods, and other similar
merchandise, was illegal, and directing the defendants to return the said goods to the plaintiff corporation,
and in case that he had disposed of the same, to pay the value thereof, amounting to P30,000, Philippine
currency, and further that it be declared that the said plaintiff corporation, under the contract of pledge
referred to in the complaint had the right to apply the proceeds of the sale of the said goods to the payment
of the debt of P40,000, Philippine currency, for the security of which the said merchandise was pledged,
with preference over the claim of the other defendant, Juan Garcia and that both defendants be held jointly
liable to the plaintiff for the sum of P500, Philippine currency, as damages, and the said defendants to pay
the costs of the proceedings, and for such other and further relief as the plaintiff might be entitled to under
the law. Plaintiff alleges in its complaint that under the contract entered into on the 4th of March, 1905, by
and between the Spanish-Filipino Bank and Francisco Reyes, the former, loaned to the latter the sum of
P141,702, Philippine currency; that on the same date Francisco Reyes was already indebted to the bank in
the sum of P84,415.38, Philippine currency, which, added to the amount of the loan, made a total of
P226,117.38, Philippine currency, received by the said Reyes as a loan from the plaintiff bank, the entire
sum at an annual interest of 8 per cent; that to secure the payment of these two sums and the interest thereon,
the debtor, Francisco Reyes, by a public instrument executed before a notary on the aforesaid date
mortgaged in favor of the plaintiff bank several pieces of property belonging to him, and pledged to the
said bank part of his personal property, specifying the proportion on which the said real and personal
property thus mortgaged and pledged in favor of the plaintiff corporation would be respectively liable for
the payment of the debt; that the property pledged by the debtor to the bank included a stock or merchandise,
consisting of wines, liquors, canned goods, and other similar articles valued at P90,591.75, Philippine
currency, then stored in the warehouses of the debtor, Reyes, No. 12 Plaza Moraga, in the city of Manila,
which said goods and merchandise were liable for the payment of the said sum of P90,591.75, Philippine
currency; that in the aforesaid deed of pledge it was agreed by and between the bank and the debtor, Reyes,
that the goods should be delivered to Ramon Garcia y Planas for safe-keeping, the debtor having actually
turned over to the said Garcia y Planas the goods in question by delivering to him the keys of the warehouse
in which they were kept; that in a subsequent contract entered into by and between the debtor, Reyes, and
the plaintiff bank on the 29th of September, 1905, the said contract executed on the 4th of March was
modified so as to provide that the goods then (September 29) in possession the depositary should only be
liable for the sum of P40,000, Philippine currency, the said contract of the 4th of March remaining in all
other respects in full force and effect, Luis M.a Sierra having been subsequently appointed by agreement
between the bank and the debtor as depositary of the goods thus pledged in substitution for the said Ramon
Garcia y Planas.
On the 19th of October, 1905, in an action brought in the Court of First Instance of the city of Manila by
Juan Garcia y Planas against Francisco Reyes and Ramon Agtarat, judgment was rendered against the last-
mentioned two for the sum of P15,000, Philippine currency, to be paid by them severally or jointly, upon
which judgment execution was issued against the property of the defendants, Reyes and Agtarap. On the
aforesaid 19th day of October, for the purpose of levying upon the property of the defendants, the sheriff at
the request of Garcia, the plaintiff in that case, entered the warehouse where the goods pledged to the
plaintiff bank were stored under the custody of the depositary, Sierra, and levied upon them as per list
attached to the complaint marked "Exhibit A." The sheriff seized the goods which had been pledged to the
bank, depriving the latter of the possession of the same, to which said contract executed on the 4th of March,
1905. Without the authority of the bank, Reyes could not dispose of the said goods. The value of the goods
seized by the sheriff was P30,000, Philippine currency, the said sheriff, having refused, and still refusing,
to return to the same to the bank, notwithstanding repeated demands made upon him to this effect, and it
being alleged in the complaint that unless prohibited by the court the sheriff would proceed to sell the said
goods at public auction and apply the proceeds to the satisfaction of the judgment rendered in favor of the
Juan Garcia y Planas, while the other debtor Reyes had not paid to the bank the P40,000, Philippine
currency, to secure the payment of which the goods mentioned in Exhibit A had been pledged to the bank,
that is, to secure the payment of a sum in excess of the actual value of the goods in the hands of the sheriff.
The defendant sheriff, James J. Peterson, and Juan Garcia, his codefendant, through their attorneys,
Hartigan, Marple, Rohde and Gutierrez, answering the complaint, stated that they admitted the allegations
contained in paragraphs 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 12, and 17 of the complaint, but denied the allegations contained in
paragraphs 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 14, 16, and 18. They further denied the allegations contained in paragraph 12,
with the exception that the defendant sheriff levied upon the goods mentioned in Exhibit A attached to the
complaint for the purpose of satisfying the judgment referred to therein; and also the allegations contained
in paragraph 13 of the complaint, with the exception that the sheriff seized the property mentioned in Exhibit
A under the execution referred to therein; and finally defendants denied the allegation contained in
paragraph 15 of the complaint, with the exception of the allegation that the value of the property seized is
P30,000. They accordingly asked that the action be dismissed and that it be adjudged that the plaintiff had
no interest whatever in the property described in the complaint, and that the plaintiff be taxed with the costs
of these proceedings.
The testimony introduced by the parties having been received, and the exhibits having been attached to the
record, the court below entered judgment on the 4th of January, 1906, dismissing plaintiff's action and
directing that the defendant recover from the Spanish-Filipino Bank the costs of this action, for which
execution was duly issued. To this judgment counsel for plaintiff excepted and announced his intention of
prosecuting a bill of exceptions, and further made a motion for a new trial on the ground that the judgment
of the court below was contrary to law and that the findings of fact were plainly and manifestly contrary to
the weight of the evidence.
The decision of this case depends mainly upon the question as to whether the contract of pledge entered
into by and between the Spanish-Filipino Bank and Francisco Reyes to secure a loan made by the former
to the latter was valid, all the requisites prescribed by the Civil Code having been complied with.
If so, the bank's claim had preference over the claim of a third person not secured, as was the bank's, by a
pledge, with reference to the property pledged to the extent of its value, and therefore such property could
not have been legally levied upon by the sheriff at the request of the defendant, Juan Garcia. (Arts. 1921,
1922, Civil Code.)
The contract in question complies with all the requisites provided in article 1857 of the Civil Code, such as
that the property was pledged to secure a debt, the date of the execution, the terms of the pledge, and the
property pledged, all of which appears in a public document, and the property pledged was placed in the
hands of a third person by common consent of the debtor and creditor, under the supervision of an agent of
the bank. (Arts. 1863, 1865, 1866, 1869, 1871, Civil Code.) The defect alleged to exist in the said contract
is that the debtor, Reyes, continued in possession of the property pledged; that he never parted with the said
property, and that neither the creditor nor the depositary appointed by common consent of the parties were
ever in possession of the property pledged, and for this reason, and upon the further ground that the contract
was fraudulent, the court below dismissed the complaint with the costs against the plaintiff.
In the motion for a new trial it was alleged by the plaintiff that the judgment of the court below was contrary
to law, and that the findings of fact contained therein were plainly and manifestly against the weight of the
evidence. If plaintiffs contention is correct, then the judgment of the court below should be reversed.
From the evidence introduced at the trial, both oral and documentary, it appears that a third person,
appointed by the common consent of the debtor and creditor, was in possession of the goods pledged in
favor of the bank under the direct supervision of an agent of the bank expressly appointed for this purpose,
and it has not been shown that the said Reyes continued in the possession of the goods after they had been
pledged to the plaintiff bank.
Exhibit C and the testimony of Francisco Reyes, Luis M.a Sierra, and Mariano Rodriguez corroborate the
existence and authenticity of the contract of pledge recorded in a public instrument and conclusively and
satisfactorily show that the debtor, after the pledge of the property, parted with the possession of the same,
and that it was delivered to a third person designated by common consent of the parties. For the purpose of
giving this possession greater effect, the pledgee appointed a person to examine daily the property in the
warehouse where the same was kept.
The witness Matias Garcia also testified as to the status of these goods, and informed Juan Garcia of such
status before the same were levied upon.
The sheriff's testimony supports the allegation that the depositary, Sierra, was present at the place where
the goods were kept, as well as the representative of the bank, Rodriguez, when he, the sheriff, went there
for the purpose of levying upon the said property. He further testified that Rodriguez, the representative of
the bank, then protested and notified him that the property in question was pledged to the Spanish-Filipino
Bank.
The contract in question was, therefore, a perfect contract of pledge under articles 1857 and 1863 of the
Civil Code, it having been conclusively shown that the pledgee took charge and possession of the goods
pledged through a depository and a special agent appointed by it, each of whom had a duplicate key to the
warehouse wherein the said goods were stored, and that the pledgee, itself, received and collected the
proceeds of the goods as they were sold.
The fact that the said goods continued in the warehouse which was formerly rented by the pledgor, Reyes,
does not affect the validity and legality of the pledge, it having been demonstrated that after the pledge had
been agreed upon, and after the depository appointed with the common consent of the parties had taken
possession of the said property, the owner, the pledgor, could no longer dispose of the same, the pledgee
being the only one authorized to do so through the depositary and special agent who represented it, the
symbolical transfer of the goods by means of the delivery of the keys to the warehouse where the goods
were stored being sufficient to show that the depositary appointed by the common consent of the parties
was legally placed in possession of the goods. (Articles 438, 1463, Civil Code.)
The fact that the debtor, Reyes, procured purchasers and made arrangements for the sale of the goods
pledged and that the bills for the goods thus sold were signed by him does not affect the validity of the
contract, for the pledgor, Reyes, continued to be the owner of the goods, (art. 1869, Civil Code), he being
the one principally interested in the sale of the property on the best possible terms.
As to the reservation stipulated in paragraph 13 of the contract executed on the 4th of March, 1905, it could
not affect the contract in question for the reason that reservation referred to the rent from the property
mortgaged, to the bank and the dividends from the shares of stock also pledged to the bank, and not the
merchandise so pledged, and such reservation could not have rendered the contract of pledge null.
If the case is to be decided in accordance with the facts alleged and established, the defendant not having
introduced any evidence to show that the said contract of pledge was fraudulent as to other creditors, there
was no legal ground upon which the court below could have held that the contract evidenced by the
instrument in question was entered into to defraud other creditors of the pledgor.
For the reason hereinbefore set out, and the judgment of the court below being contrary to the evidence, the
said judgment is hereby reversed, and it is hereby adjudged that the plaintiff corporation, under and by
virtue of the contract of pledge in question, had a preferential right over that of the defendant, Juan Garcia,
to the goods pledged or the value thereof, the value to be applied to the payment of the debt of P40,000,
Philippine currency, for the security of which the said property was pledged, and the defendants are
accordingly hereby ordered to return to the plaintiff corporation the property improperly levied upon, or to
pay its value, amounting to P30,000, Philippine currency, without special provision as to costs. After the
expiration of twenty days let judgment be entered in accordance herewith, and ten days thereafter the case
be remanded to the court below for execution. So ordered.
G.R. No. L-9989 March 13, 1918
EDUARDO CUAYCONG, ET AL., plaintiffs-appellees,
vs.
RAMONA BENEDICTO, ET AL., defendants-appellants.
Ruperto Montinola and Aurelio Montinola for appellants.
No appearance for appellees.
FISHER, J.:
The issues in this case relate to the right of plaintiffs to make use of two roads existing on the Hacienda
Toreno, a tract of land in the municipality of Victorias, Negros Occidental, the property of the defendants,
Blasa Benedicto and Ramona Benedicto. One of these roads is referred to in the proceedings as the Nanca-
Victorias road and the other as the Dacuman Toreno road. The Court of First Instance held that those of
the plaintiffs who claimed to be entitled to make use of the Dacuman Toreno road had failed to establish
the asserted right, and dismissed the action as to them. From this decision they appealed to this court but,
their brief not having been filed within the time prescribed by the rules, their appeal was dismissed, on
motion of defendants, by resolution dated February 14, 1916. Consequently, the issues presented on this
appeal are limited to those which relate to the rights of the parties with respect to the Nanca-Victorias road,
and the determination of the correctness of the decision of the court concerning that part of the controversy
submitted to its decision.
The allegations in the complaint with respect to the Nanca-Victorias road are that the appellees, Eduardo
Cuaycong, Lino Cuaycong, and Eulalio Dolor, are the owners of a group of haciendas situated between the
southern boundary of the Hacienda Toreno and the barrio of Nanca, of the municipality of Seravia, and that
the appellees Silverio Ginoo, Gervasio Ascalon, and Juan Ledesma, are the lessees of part of said haciendas;
that more than twenty years the appellees and their predecessors in interest have made use of the Nanca-
Victorias road, which crosses the Hacienda Toreno, openly, publicly, and continiously, with the knowledge
of the owners of the said hacienda, for the purpose of conveying the products of their haciendas to the town
of Victorias and to the landing place there situated, and for the purpose of transporting supplies from those
points to their haciendas, making use of the said road by means of carts, carabaos, and other usual means
of transportation; that there is no outlet to a public road from the hacienda occupied by these plaintiffs, the
only road and way by which the products of the plaintiffs' property can be taken to the town of Victorias
and to the landing place there being across the Hacienda Toreno by the road marked on the plan attached
to the complaint; that on the fifteenth day of November, 1912, the defendants closed the road in question at
the point at which it crosses the Hacienda Toreno, and refused to permit plaintiffs to continue using it; that
plaintiffs were about to commence to grind their crop of sugar cane, and that, if prevented from transporting
their sugar across the Hacienda Toreno to their point of embarkation, would suffer damages difficult to
estimate. Upon these averments of fact the plaintiffs prayed for a judgment that they are entitled to use the
road in question as they have been using it in the past, and that a perpetual injunction be issued against
plaintiffs restraining them from impending such use. Upon the filing of the complaint, plaintiffs moved the
court to issue a preliminary injunction restraining defendants from interfering with the use of the road
during the pendency of the suit, which motion was granted by the court.
Defendants in their answer put in issue all the special averments of the complaint, as above set forth, and
by way of counterclaim and special defense, averred that the road crossing the Hacienda Toreno, over which
plaintiffs claim the right of passage, is the private property of defendants; and, further, that they have not
refused plaintiffs permission to pass over this road but have required them to pay toll for the privilege of
doing so. Defendants also claimed damages for the use of the road by plaintiffs during the pendency of the
suit, alleging that the preliminary injunction had been improvidently issued upon false statements contained
in the verified complaint filed by plaintiffs.
The case was tried in July, 1913. The court on December 8, 1913, rendered judgment, dismissing the
complaint with respect to the plaintiffs Felix Suarez, Probo Jereza, Enrique Azcona, and Melecio Pido,
these being the plaintiffs who claimed the right to use the Dacuman Toreno road. With respect to the
Nanca-Victorias road, the court held that it was a public highway over which the public had acquired a right
of use by immemorial prescription, and ordered the issuance of a perpetual injunction against plaintiffs,
restraining them from interfering in any manner with the use of the said road.
The conclusion of the court with respect to the facts affecting the Nanca-Victorias road are as follows:
Turning to a consideration of the evidence relative to the Nanca-Victorias road we find incontestable proof
that it has been in existence for at least forty years. That the hacenderos located in the southwestern section
of Victorias and the public generally passed over it freely and that it was used for all purposes of
transportation of farm produce, animals, etc. and by pedestrians as well as carromatas and other
conveyances without break or interruption until two or three years ago when the defendants announced that
the road was private and that those who wished to pass over it with sugar carts would be obliged to pay a
toll of ten centavos all other vehicles, it appears, were permitted to pass free charge. This arrangement
seems to have existed during the years of 1911 and 1912 and part of 1913, the money being collected
apparently from some hacenderos and not from others. There is some reason to believe from the evidence
presented by defendants themselves that the practice of making these payments to hacienda 'Toreno'
originated in an attempt to raise a fund for the repair of the road. There is no evidence that any other
hacenderos between Nanca and Victorias or any other person made any attempt to close the road or to
collect toll. On the contrary the road appears to have been repaired by the hacenderos when it needed
repairing and everyone used it on equal terms until the defendants in 1910 or 1911 interposed the objection
that the road in dispute was private. This we think is a fair deduction from the evidence and although it is
asserted that toll was collected at an earlier date by the late Leon Montinola, brother of the defendant
Ruperto Montinola, there is no tangible evidence that this was so and that toll has been paid only during the
years of 1911, 1912, and part of 1913.
The question presented by the assignment of error are in effect:
(a) Is the Nanca-Victorias road at the point at which it traverses the Hacienda Toreno a public highway or
not?
(b) If it be held that the road in question is not a public highway, have plaintiffs proven their acquisition of
an easement of way over the Hacienda Toreno at the point traversed by the road in question?
The trial judge, in holding that the road in question is public, bases in conclusion upon the fact, which he
deems to have been proven, that the road has been in existence "from time immemorial," and had been
"continiously used as a public road . . . and open to public as such for thirty or forty years . . . until . . . the
defendants undertook to claim it as private and to collect toll for the passage of carts." (Bill of Exceptions,
p. 56.) There is no doubt that for the past thirty or forty years a road has existed between the former site of
the town of Victorias and the barrio of Nanca, of the municipality of Seravia, and that this road crosses
defendants' hacienda. It is also true that during this period the plaintiffs and their predecessors in the
ownership of the hacienda now held by them have made use of this road for the purpose of going and
coming from their haciendas to the town of Victorias; but the question is whether this use was limited to
the plaintiffs, and their tenants and employees, or whether it was, as held by the lower court, a use enjoyed
by the public in general. Plaintiffs produced only two witnesses, Segundo de Leon (stet. notes, pp. 21-22)
and Eduardo Cuaycong, (stet. notes, pp. 27-33) to testify as regards the use of the Nanca-Victorias road.
Several other witnesses testified on behalf of plaintiffs, but their testimony relates to the Dacuman
Toreno road, which is not involved in this appeal. We have carefully read the testimony of the witnesses
Leon and Cuaycong, given upon their direct and cross examination, but we have been unable to find that
either of them has testified that the road in question was ever used by the public in general. These witnesses
testified with regard to the use of the road by the present and former owners and occupants of the estates of
Bacayan, Esperanza, Alcaigan, Pusot, and Dolores for the transportation of the products of these estates to
the town of Victorias, and of supplies and agricultural implements from Victorias to the haciendas, but
neither of them testified expressly that any other use had been made of said road. Nevertheless, it may be
reasonably inferred from the testimony of these witnesses that all persons having occasion to travel between
Victorias and the haciendas of Bacayan, Esperanza, Alacaigan, Pusot, and Dolores, whether or not they
were owners, tenants, or employees of said estates, made use of the road now in dispute, crossing the
Hacienda Toreno, and to this limited extent it may be said that the public made use of the road, but there is
nothing in the evidence to indicate that the so called public use extended beyond this.
Apart from the fact that there is no direct evidence to support the finding of the court concerning the general
public use of the road in dispute, the record contains data strongly tending to show that when the complaint
was filed plaintiffs did not contend that the road was a public highway, but merely contended that they had
acquired by prescription an easement of way across the Hacienda Toreno. For example, the action is entitled
an "action concerning a right of away." (Bill of Exceptions, pp. 64 and 65.) It is not averred in the complaint
that the road in question was used by the public. On the contrary, it is averred that it was used by the
plaintiffs and their predecessors. The averment in paragraph 8 of the complaint that the plaintiffs have no
other "outlet to a public road" than that which they have been accustomed to used by going across the
defendants' hacienda for the purpose of going to the town of Victorias also shows that when they
commenced this action they had in mind the provisions of articles 564, et seq. of the Civil Code, which
relate to the method of establishing the compulsory easement of way. The owners of an existing easement,
as well as those whose properties are adjacent with a public road, have no occasion to invoke these
provisions of the Code, which relate to the creation of new rights, and not the enforcement of rights already
in existence.
It is true in the opening statement made to the court, counsel for plaintiffs, who was not the same attorney
by whom the complaint was signed, stated that plaintiffs contend that the road in question is public, but as
no evidence was introduced tending to establish this contention concerning the Nanca Victorias road,
counsel for defendants had no occasion to object upon the ground that such testimony was not relevant to
the averments of the complaint. No evidence was taken to indicate that at any time since the road in question
has been in existence any part of the expense of its upkeep has been defrayed by the general government,
the province, or the municipality. The trial judge said upon this subject:
It is true that whatever repairs were made on the road were made irregularly. The municipality of Victorias
had no funds to devote to the construction and repair of roads, and the upkeep of the road depending entirely
therefore on the initiative of the persons who used it, was attended to only at such times as repairs were
absolutely necessary. (Bill of Exceptions, p. 49.)
The court also held that it appears from the government grant issued in 1885 to the original owner of the
hacienda adjacent to the Hacienda Toreno on its western boundary, that the Nanca-Victorias road at that
time separated that estate from the Jalbuena Hacienda, and that these facts constitute "circumstantial
evidence that the road was in existence in 1885." We have examined the document to which the court refers,
and we agree that the road in question existed in 1885; but we do not believe that the document in question
proves that the road was public highway.
Another circumstance established by the evidence, and which is some importance in the determination of
this issue, is that although the defendants closed the Nanca-Victorias road in the month of February, 1911,
and since that time have collected toll from persons passing over it with carts loaded with sugar, including
those belonging to several of the plaintiffs, nothing was done by them to prevent the continuation of this
restriction until December, 1912, when this action was commenced. It is natural to assume that if plaintiffs
had considered that the road in question was public, they would have protested immediately against the
action of the defendants, and would have either commenced a civil action, as they subsequently did, or
would have brought about a prosecution under section 16 of Act No. 1511.
Upon the evidence taken and admissions contained in the pleadings and those made during the course of
the trial we consider that the following findings are warranted:
1. The town of Victorias has always been the shipping point of the products of the Hacienda Toreno, and
of the haciendas of appellees, as well as the place from which supplies were brought to those properties.
2. For thirty or forty years before the commencement of the suit a wagon road, herein called the Nanca-
Victorias road, has been in existence, connecting the haciendas of appellees with the town of Victorias, and
this road traverses the property of defendants. Since the removal of the town of Victorias to a new site the
Nanca-Victorias road has been used by appellees in travelling between their properties and the provincial
road which crosses the Hacienda Toreno from east to west.
3. No public funds have at any time been expended on the construction or upkeep of the Nanca-Victorias
road, but from time to time work has been done on it by the laborers employed by the present and former
owners of the Hacienda Toreno and the haciendas owned by the appellees and their predecessors in title.
4. The Nanca-Victorias wagon road, including that part of it which crosses the Hacienda Toreno, has for
thirty-five or forty years been used by the appellees and their predecessors in title for the transportation, by
the usual means, of the products of their estates to their shipping points in or near the town of Victorias,
and the transportation to their estates of all supplies required by them, and has been used by all persons
having occasion to travel to and from all or any of the estates now owned by the appellees.
5. The use of the Nanca-Victorias road in the manner and by the person above mentioned was permitted
without objection by the owners of the Hacienda Toreno until the year 1911, when they closed it, and began
charging a toll of 5 centavos for each cart which passed over the road, including carts belonging to the
appellants, until restrained from continuing to do so by the preliminary injunction granted in this case.
6. The Nanca-Victorias road constitutes the only outlet from the estates of appellants to the nearest public
road which is the provincial road which crosses the Hacienda Toreno from east to west.
Upon these facts the questions of law to be decided are:
(a) Is the Nanca-Victorias road a public highway?
(b) If the Nanca-Victoria road, or that part of it which crosses the Hacienda Toreno, is not a public highway,
is it subject to a private easement of way in favor of the appellees?
The defendants are the owners of the Hacienda Toreno under a Torrens title issued in accordance with the
Land Registration Act, conferring to them its absolute ownership, subject only to the limitations of
paragraph four of section 39 of said Act. It is admitted that there is no annotation on the certificate of title
regarding the road here in question, either as a "public road" or as a "private way established by law," and,
therefore, the questions presented by this appeal are to be determined precisely as they would be had the
Hacienda Toreno not been brought under the operation of the Land Registration Act. The plaintiffs being
the owners of the property in question, the presumption of law is that it is free from any lien or encumbrance
whatever, and the burden therefore rests upon plaintiffs to establish the contrary. As this court said in case
of Fabie vs. Lichauco and the children of Francisco L. Roxas (11 Phil. Rep., 14):
It is settled of law that a property is assumed to be free from all encumbrance unless the contrary is proved.
There is admittedly no evidence to show that the land occupied by the road here in question was any time
conveyed to the general government or any of its political subdivisions by the present or any of the former
owners of the Hacienda Toreno. There is no evidence, even remotely, tending to show that the road existed
prior to the time when the property now known as the Hacienda Toreno passed from the State into private
ownership. The record fails to disclose any evidence whatever tending to show that the Government has at
any time asserted any right or title in or to the land occupied by the road, or that it has incurred any expense
whatever in its upkeep or construction. The Civil Code defines as public roads those which are constructed
by the State (art. 339), and as provincial and town roads those "the expense of which is borne by such towns
or provinces." (Civil Code, art. 344.) While it is not contended that this definition is exclusive, it does show
that during the Spanish regime, under normal conditions, roads which were public were maintained at the
public expense, and that the fact that at no time was any expense incurred by the Government with respect
to the road here in question tends strongly to support the contention of the defendants that it is private way.
During the Spanish regime the law required each able to bodied citizen not within one of the exempted
classes to work a certain number of days in each year, his labor to be devoted to "services of general utility"
to the municipality of his residence. (Royal Decree of July 11, 1883, art. 5.) Under this Decree and the
Regulations for its enforcement (Berriz, vol. 11, 258) the greater part of the work on the public road of the
Islands was accomplished. Had the road here in question been a public way, it is reasonable to assume that
the polistas of the town of Victorias would have been employed in maintaining it. It is most significant that
no mention is made in the testimony of the plaintiffs' witnesses of any work of this character having been
done on the road at any time, particularly in view of the fact that their attention was drawn to this point.
(Stet. note, pp. 8, 10, 11, 12, 13 and 14.)
The evidence shows that the repairs were made by the owners of the estates benefited by the road, and by
their laborers, as a pure voluntary act for their own convenience and interest. There being no evidence of a
direct grant to the government of the land occupied by the road in question or that any Government funds
or labor were expended upon it, the question presents itself whether the use to which the road has been put
was such as to justify the conclusion of the lower court that it has become public property. There being no
evidence that the original use of the road by plaintiffs' predecessors was based upon any grant of the fee to
the road or of an easement of way, or that it began under the assertion of a right on their part, the
presumption must be that the origin of the use was the mere tolerance or license of the owners of the estates
affected.
This being so, has that merely permissive use been converted into a title vested in the public at large, or in
the plaintiffs by reason of their ownership of the land beneficially affected by the use?
Had it been shown that the road had been maintained at the public expense, with the acquiescence of the
owners of the estates crossed by it, this would indicate such adverse possession by the government as in
course of time would ripen into title or warrant the presumption of a grant or of a dedication. But in this
case there is no such evidence, and the claims of plaintiffs, whether regarded as members of the public
asserting a right to use the road as such, or as persons claiming a private easement of way over the land of
another must be regarded as resting upon the mere fact of user.
If the owner of a tract of land, to accommodate his neighbors or the public in general, permits them to cross
his property, it is reasonable to suppose that it is not his intention, in so doing, to divest himself of the
ownership of the land so used, or to establish an easement upon it and that the persons to whom such
permission, tacit or express, is granted, do not regard their privilege of use as being based upon an
essentially revocable license. If the use continues for a long period of time, no change being made in the
relations of the parties by any express or implied agreement, does the owner of the property affected lose
his right of revocation? Or, putting the same question in another form, does the mere permissive use ripen
into title by prescription?
It is a fundamental principle of the law in this jurisdiction concerning the possession of real property that
such possession is not affected by acts of a possessory character which are "merely tolerated" by the
possessor, or which are due to his license (Civil Code, arts. 444 and 1942). This principle is applicable not
only with respect to the prescription of the dominium as a whole, but to the prescription of right in rem. In
the case of Cortes vs. Palanca Yu Tibo (2 Phil. Rep., 24, 38), the Court said:
The provision of article 1942 of the Civil Code to the effect that acts which are merely tolerated produce
no effect with respect to possession is applicable as much to the prescription of real rights as to the
prescription of the fee, it being a glaring and self-evident error to affirm the contrary, as does the appellant
in his motion papers. Possession is the fundamental basis of the prescription. Without it no kind of
prescription is possible, not even the extraordinary. Consequently, if acts of mere tolerance produce no
effect with respect to possession, as that article provides, in conformity with article 444 of the same Code,
it is evident that they can produce no effect with respect to prescription, whether ordinary or extraordinary.
This is true whether the prescriptive acquisition be of a fee or of real rights, for the same reason holds in
one and the other case; that is, that there has been no true possession in the legal sense of the word. (See
also Ayala de Roxas vs. Maglonso, 8 Phil Rep., 745; Municipality of Nueva Caceres vs. Director of Lands
and Roman Catholic Bishop of Nueva Caceres, 24 Phil. Rep., 485.)
Possession, under the Civil Code, to constitute the foundation of a prescriptive right, must be possession
under claim of title (en concepto de dueno), or use the common law equivalent of the term, it must be
adverse. Acts of a possessory character performed by one who holds by mere tolerance of the owner are
clearly not en concepto de dueo, and such possessory acts, no matter how long so continued, do not start
the running of the period of prescription.
A similar question was presented in the case of the Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila vs. Roxas (22
Phil. Rep., 450), in which case it appeared that Roxas, the owner of the Hacienda de San Pedro Macati,
claimed a right of way across the property of the church to Calle Tejeron, a public street of the town of San
Pedro Macati. The proof showed that the road in question had been used by the tenants of the Hacienda de
San Pedro Macati for the passage of carts in coming and leaving the hacienda "from time immemorial,"
and further that the road had been used for time out of mind, not only by the tenants of the hacienda but by
many other people in going and coming from a church half-way between the boundary line of the hacienda
and Calle Tejeron. The court held that the facts did not give rise to a prescriptive right of easement in favor
of the owner of the hacienda, upon the ground that such use "is to be regarded as permissive and under an
implied license, and not adverse. Such a use is not inconsistent with the only use which the proprietor
thought fit to make of the land, and until the appellee thinks proper to inclose it, such use is not adverse and
will not preclude it from enclosing the land when other views of its interest render it proper to do so. And
though an adjacent proprietor may make such use of the open land more frequently than another, yet the
same rule will apply unless there be some decisive act indicating a separate and exclusive use under a claim
of right. A different doctrine would have a tendency to destroy all neighborhood accommodations in the
way of travel; for if it were once understood that a man, by allowing his neighbor to pass through his farm
without objection over the pass-way which he used himself, would thereby, after the lapse of time, confer
a right on such neighbor to require the pass-way to be kept open for his benefit and enjoyment, a prohibition
against all such travel would immediately ensue."
The decisions of the supreme court of Louisiana, a State whose jurisdiction is based, as is our own, upon
the Roman Law, and whose Civil Code is taken, as is our own,. very largely from the Code of Napoleon,
are particularly persuasive in matters of this character. In the case of Torres vs. Fargoust (37 La. Ann., 497),
cited by appellants in their brief, in which the issues were very similar to those of the present case, the court
held that
The mere fact that for thirty or forty years the public was permitted to pass over this ground would not of
itself constitute the place a locus publicus . . . dedication must be shown by evidence so conclusive as to
exclude all idea of private ownership; . . . such dedication cannot be inferred from ere user alone; . . . no
one is presumed to give away his property. The burden is on him who avers a divestiture of ownership to
prove it clearly.
We are, therefore, of the opinion, and so hold, that upon the facts established by the evidence it does not
appear that the road in question is a public road or way. We are also of the opinion that plaintiffs have failed
to show that they have acquired by prescription a private right of passage over the lands of defendants. The
supreme court of Spain has decided that under the law in force before the enactment of the Civil Code, the
easement of way was discontinous, and that while such an easement might be acquired by prescription, it
must be used in good faith, in the belief of the existence of the right, and such user must have been
continuous from time immemorial. (Judgment of December 15, 1882.) In the appealed decision the court
below says that the plaintiffs and their predecessors made use of the road in question "from time
immemorial," but there is no evidence whatever in the record to sup[port this finding, although it is true
that the evidence shows the existence of the road and its use by the plaintiffs and their predecessors for
thirty-five or forty years. Speaking of the evidence required under the present Code of Civil Procedure to
show immemorial use of an easement, this court said in the case of Ayal de Roxas vs. Case (8 Phil. Rep.,
197, 198):
Third Partida in title 31, law 15 . . . says that discontinues servitudes . . . must be proved by usage or a term
so long that men can not remember its commencement. . . . In many judgments the supreme court of Spain
has refused to accept proof of any definite number of years as a satisfaction of this requirement of the law.
. . . We are of the opinion that in order to establish a right of prescription [title of prescription based upon
use from time immemorial] something more required than memory of living witnesses. Whether this
something should be the declaration of persons long dead, repeated by those who testify, as exacted by the
Spanish law, or should be the common reputation of ownership recognized by the Code of Procedure, it is
unnecessary for us to decide. On either theory the appellant has failed in his proof . . . .
The same thing may be said in this case. Witnesses have testified that they have known the road for a certain
period of years, beginning at a time prior to the enactment of the Civil Code, but no evidence has been made
to prove immemorial use by either of the means of proof mentioned in this decision cited, nor is immemorial
user averred in the complaint as the basis of the right. It is evident, therefore, that no vested right by user
from time immemorial had been acquired by plaintiffs at the time the Civil Code took effect. Under that
Code (art 539) no discontinuous easement could be acquired by prescription in any event. Assuming,
without deciding, that this rule has been changed by the provisions of the present Code of Civil Procedure
relating to prescription, and that since its enactment discontinuous easement may be required by
prescription, it is clear that this would not avail plaintiffs. The Code of Civil Procedure went into effect on
October 1, 1901. The term of prescription for the acquisition of rights in real estate is fixed by the Code
(sec. 41) at ten years. The evidence shows that in February, 1911, before the expiration of the term of ten
years since the time the Code of Civil Procedure took effect, the defendants interrupted the use of the road
by the plaintiffs by constructing and maintaining a toll gate on it and collecting toll from persons making
use of it with carts and continued to do so until they were enjoined by the granting of the preliminary
injunction by the trial court in December, 1912. Our conclusion is, therefore, that the plaintiffs have not
acquired by prescription a right to an easement of way over the defendant's property; that their use of the
Nanca-Victorias road across the Hacienda Toreno was due merely to the tacit license and tolerance of the
defendants and their predecessors in title; that license was essentially revokable; and that, therefore, the
defendants were within their rights when they closed the road in 1911.
While in the allegations from the plaintiffs' complaint it might be inferred that it was their purpose to seek
to impose upon the defendants the easement to which arts. 564 et seq. of the Civil Code relate, that purpose
was evidently abandoned, and the case was tried upon a wholly different theory. Proof was offered to show
that the right of passage across defendants' land is necessary to enable plaintiffs to get their products to
market, but there was no offer on their part to pay defendants the indemnity required by section 564.
For the reasons stated the judgment of the court below is reversed, the injunction issued against defendants
is allowed on this appeal. So ordered.

PEREGRINA ASTUDILLO, petitioner-appellant,

vs.
THE BOARD OF DIRECTORS OF PEOPLE'S HOMESITE AND HOUSING CORPORATION,
RAMON P. MITRA, SALUD O. MITRA, and REGISTER OF DEEDS, QUEZON CITY, respondents-
appellees.
Jose Villa Agustin for petitioner-appellant.
San Juan, Africa, Gonzales & San Agustin for appellees Mitras.
Manuel L. Lazaro & Leonardo A. Reyes, Gov't. Corp. Counsel's Office for appellee Board of Director of
the PHHC.

AQUlNO, J.:t.hqw
Peregrina Astudillo appealed from the "resolution" dated April 18, 1967 of the Court of First Instance of
Rizal, Quezon City Branch V, granting the motion for summary judgment filed by Ramon P. Mitra and
dismissing her petition for certiorari and mandamus (Civil Case No. Q-8741).
According to the pleadings of respondents Mitra and the People's Homesite and Housing Corporation
(PHHC) *, Mitra on December 28, 1957 applied, in behalf of his minor son, Ramon Mitra Ocampo, for the
purchase of Lot 16, Block E-155 of the East Avenue Subdivision of the PHHC in Piahan, Quezon City.
His application was approved on January 3, 1958. He made a downpayment of P840, an amount equivalent
to ten percent of the price of the lot. On September 9, 1961 the PHHC and Mitra executed a contract of
conditional sale. After Mitra had paid in full the price, which totalled more than nine thousand pesos, a final
deed of sale was executed in his favor on February 18, 1965. Transfer Certificate of Title No. 89875 was
issued to him on March 1, 1965.
The lot in question is acqually in the possession of Peregrina Astudillo. She constructed thereon a residential
house (a shanty, according to Mitra). She admits that she has been squatting on the said lot "uninterruptedly
since 1957 up to the present" (p. 52, Record). She filed with the administrative investigating committee of
the PHHC a request dated February 24, 1963, praying for the cancellation of the award of Lot 16 to
Congressman Mitra and asking the committee to recommend that it be re-awarded to her. No action was
taken on that request.
On May 3, 1965 Peregrina filed in the lower court her aforementioned petition against the PHHC board of
directors, the register of deeds of Quezon City and the spouses Ramon P. Mitra and Salud O. Mitra. She
questioned the legality of the award of Lot 16 to Mitra. She asked that Lot 16 be sold to her.
After the respondents had filed their answers, the Mitra spouses filed a verified motion for summary
judgment. They assumed that there was no genuine issue as to any material fact. Peregrina Astudillo
opposed the motion. The parties submitted memoranda.
The lower court treated the motion for summary judgment as a motion to dismiss. It dismissed Peregrina's
petition on the grounds that she is a mala fide squatter and that the sale of Lot 16 to Mitra cannot be assailed
by means of certiorari and mandamus. Peregrina appealed to this Court.
Her four assignments of error raise questions of law. She contends that the lower court erred in holding that
certiorari and mandamus do not lie in this case and that she has no right to question the award to Mitra, and
in not holding that the award of Lot 16 to him was in contravention of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practice
Law and of the constitutional provision that a Senator or Representative should not directly or indirectly be
financially interested in any contract with the government of any subdivision or instrumentality thereof
during his term of office.
In the ultimate analysis the issue is whether Peregrina Astudillo has a cause of action to annul the sale of
Lot 16 to Mitra and to compel the PHHC board to award that lot to her.
We hold that she has no cause of action to impugn the award to Mitra and to require that she be allowed to
purchase the lot. As a squatter, she has no possessory rights over Lot 16. In the eyes of the law, the award
to Mitra did not prejudice her since she was bereft of any rights over the said lot which could have been
impaired by that award (Baez vs. Court of Appeals, L-30351, September 11, 1974, 59 SCRA 15, 22).
The record does not show, and Peregrina does not claim, that she is a member of the Piahan Homeowners
Association some of whose members are "deserving squatters" (Kempis vs. Gonzales, L-31701, October
31, 1974, 60 SCRA 439).
In the familiar language of procedure, she was not entitled to sue Mitra and the PHHC for the enforcement
or protection of a right, or the prevention of a wrong. Those respondents did not commit any delict or wrong
in violation of her rights because, in the first place, she has no right to the lot. Not being principally or
subsidiarily bound in the contract of sale between Mitra and the PHHC, she is not entitled to ask for its
annulment (Art. 1397, Civil Code).
Peregrina invokes the PHHC charter (erroneously referred to as section 11 of Commonwealth Act No. 648)
which provides that the PHHC should acquire buildings so as to provide "decent housing for those who
may be unable otherwise to provide themselves therewith" and that it should acquire large estates for their
resale to bona fide occupants.
Those provisions do not sustain her action in this case. They do not justify her act of squatting on a
government-owned lot and then demanding that the lot be sold her because she does not yet own a
residential lot and house. She is not a bona fide occupant of Lot 16.
The State is committed to promote social justice and to maintain adequate social services in the field of
housing (Secs. 6 and 7, Art. II, New Constitution). But the State's solicitude for the destitute and the have-
nots does not mean that it should tolerate usurpations of property, public or private.
"In carrying out its social readjustment policies, the government could not simply lay aside moral standards,
and aim to favor usurpers, squatters, and intruders, unmindful of the lawful and unlawful origin and
character of their occupancy. Such a Policy would perpetuate conflicts instead of attaining their just
solution" (Bernardo vs. Bernards, 96 Phil. 202, 206).
Indeed, the government has enunciated a militant policy against squatters. Thus, Letter of Instruction No.
19 dated October 2, 1972 orders city and district engineers "to remove all illegal constructions, including
buildings ... and those built without permits on public or private property" and provides for the relocation
of squatters (68 O.G. 7962. See Letter of Instruction No. 19-A). As noted by Justice Sanchez, "since the
last global war, squatting on another's property in this country has become a widespread vice" (City of
Manila vs. Garcia, L-26053, February 21, 1967, 19 SCRA 413, 418).
The lower court did not err in holding that Peregrina Astudillo cannot use the special civil actions of
certiorari and mandamus to secure a judicial review of the award of Lot 16 to Mitra. Rule 65 of the Rules
of Court provides: +.wph!1
SECTION 1. Petition for certiorari. When any tribunal, board, or officer exercising judicial functions,
has acted without or in excess of its or his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion and there is no
appeal, nor any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, a person aggrieved
thereby may file a verified petition in the proper court alleging the facts with certainty and praying that
judgment be rendered annulling or modifying the proceedings, as the law requires, of such tribunal, board
or officer.
The petition shall be accompanied by a certified true copy of the judgment or order subject thereof, together
with copies of all pleadings and documents relevant and pertinent thereto.
SEC. 3. Petition for mandamus. When any tribunal, corporation, board, or person unlawfully neglects
the performance of an act which the law specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust, or
station, or unlawfully excludes another from the use and enjoyment of a right or office to which such other
is entitled, and there is no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, the person
agrieved thereby may file a verified petition in the proper court alleging the facts with certainty and praying
that judgment be rendered commanding the defendant, immediately or at some other specified time, to do
the act required to be done to protect the rights of the petitioner, and to pay the damages sustained by the
petitioner by reason of the wrongful acts of the defendant.
Respondent PHHC board is not the board contemplated in section 1 of Rule 65. It does not exercise judicial
functions. The award being questioned was a routinary corporate act that was within the board's
competence. No jurisdictional issue was involved in that award. certiorari lies only for the correction of
jurisdictional errors (Gov't. of the P.I. vs. Judge of 1st Instance of Iloilo 34 Phil 157, 159).
Nor is the relief sought by Peregrina Astudillo, which is to compel the PHHC board to cancel the award of
Lot 16 to Mitra and to resell it to her, a right that can be enforced by mandamus. What she wants is to force
the PHHC to execute a contract of sale in her favor. That is not within the purview of the writ of mandamus.
Thus, it was held that "the writ of mandamus is not an appropriate or even admissible remedy to enforce,
the performance of a private contract which has not been fully performed by either party" (Quiogue vs.
Romualdez, 46 Phil. 337). In Jacinto vs. Director of Lands, 49 Phil. 853, a petition for a writ of mandamus
to compel the Director of Lands to execute a deed of conveyance for certain lots in favor of the petitioner
was denied. Generally, title to property cannot be litigated in a mandamus proceeding (City of Manila vs.
Posadas, 48 Phil. 309, 337).
It is not a ministerial duty of the PHHC board to award Lot 16 to Peregrina. Anyway, it has already been
shown that as a squatter she is not clothed with any right to Lot 16 that may be enforced in a court of justice.
The PHHC board completely ignored the alleged demands of Peregrina for the purchase of Lot 16. It did
not render any decision against her. Its inaction cannot be assailed by certiorari or mandamus.
Peregrina's other assignment of error is that the award of Lot 16 to Congressman Mitra was a violation of
section 3(h) of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Law and of section 17, Article VI of the 1935
Constitution, now section 11, Article VIII of the new Constitution.
On the other hand, Mitra contends that the PHHC performs proprietary functions. He observed that the
following high-ranking officials were awarded PHHC lots: Felixberto Serrano, Dominador Antonio,
Manuel Lim, Fernando Lopez, Pacita M. Gonzales, Genaro Magsaysay, Daniel Romualdez, Felipe A.
Abrigo, Bartolome Cabangbang, Juan Duran, Manuel Enverga, Angel Fernandez, Jose Nuguid, Antonio de
Pio, Lorenzo Teves, Faustino Tobia, Pedro Trono, Marcelino Veloso and Valeriano Yancha.
We are of the opinion that that assignment of error need not be resolved in this case. Having shown that
Peregrina has no cause of action to assail the award of Lot 16 to Mitra, it follows that in this particular case
she cannot assail that award by invoking the provisions of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Law and
the Constitution. This is not the proper forum for the ventilation of that question. (See Commonwealth Act
No. 626; Hernandez vs. Albano, 112 Phil. 506; Solidum and Concepcion, Jr. vs. Hernandez, 117 Phil. 335).
WHEREFORE, the lower court's order of dismissal is affirmed. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-57259 October 13, 1983
ANGEL P. PERAN, petitioner,
vs.
THE HONORABLE PRESIDING JUDGE, BRANCH II, COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF
SORSOGON, 10th JUDICIAL DISTRICT, RAMON ESPERA and ENCARNACION EVASCO, as
private-respondents, respondents.
Irene P. Escandor for petitioner.
Esteban Escalante, Jr. for private respondents.

MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.:
The decision of the then Court of First Instance of Sorsogon, Branch II, Gubat, Sorsogon, rendered in the
exercise of its appellate jurisdiction, dismissing Civil Case No. 1277, entitled "Angel P. Peran vs.
Encarnacion Evasco, et al.", for Forcible Entry and Illegal Detainer, is being assailed in this Petition for
Review on certiorari on a question of law. Said Decision reversed the judgment of the 2nd Municipal Circuit
Court of Bulusan-Barcelona, Sorsogon, for Forcible Entry & Illegal Detainer.
The antecedent facts follow:
The property in question, an unregistered residential land, with an area of 1,225 square meters more or less,
situated at Tagdon Barcelona, Sorsogon, was originally owned by Jose Evasco. On December 29, 1950,
Jose Evasco executed a "Reparticion Ex-trajudicial" whereby he partitioned his properties among his five
heirs. 1 Subject property was one of those alloted to his son, Alejandro Evasco, who had it surveyed in 1956
(Exhibits "I" and "I-1") who had it declared in his name under Tax Declaration No. 1900. The other heirs
received their own shares, one of them, the deceased Anacleto Evasco, one of whose children was listed as
Encarnacion, possibly, the principal private respondent herein.
Alejandro Evasco sold his property to Jose E. Torella on December 31, 1972, 2 who declared it for taxation
purposes under Tax Declaration No. 5157. 3 On July 10, 1977, Jose E. Torella, in turn, sold the land to Jose
Enriquez Sabater, 4 and the latter also declared the property in his name under Tax Declaration No.
7127. 5 Petitioner Angel P. Peran acquired the land by purchase from Jose Enriquez Sabater on December
27, 1978, 6 and subsequently declared it, too, in his name under Tax Declaration No. 7310.7 The sale was
duly recorded in the Register of Deeds' Office of the province of Sorsogon on January 3, 1979 in accordance
with the provisions of Sec. 194 of the Revised Administrative Code as amended by Act No. 3344.
Sometime in January 1979, petitioner personally asked private respondents, Encarnacion Evasco and her
common-law husband Ramon Espera, whose house is erected on a 440 square meter portion (44 sq, ms.
according to petitioner) of the lot in question, to remove the same and vacate the premises. Respondents
refused, and consequently, a confrontation between the parties was had before the, Municipal Mayor of
Barcelona and later before the Municipal Judge of Bulusan-Barcelona to settle the dispute, but to no avail.
On February 8, 1979, petitioner filed a complaint for Forcible Entry and Illegal Detainer against private
respondents before the 2nd Municipal Circuit Court of Bulusan-Barcelona, seeking the ejectment of the
latter from the portion in question contending that respondents are mere squatters thereon; that they had
prevented plaintiff from entering the property and deprived him of possession; and that they were tolerating
persons in getting soil and bringing about a gradual erosion of the land to his extreme prejudice.
Private respondents answered denying the material allegations of the Complaint, and alleging that they are
the lawful possessors for more than twenty (20) years of the said portion, which formerly belonged to Jose
Evasco, grandfather of Encarnacion Evasco and that petitioner has no right to eject them therefrom.
On September 1, 1979, the 2nd Municipal Circuit Court of Bulusan-Barcelona rendered its Decision
ordering private respondents to vacate the lot in question, return its possession to petitioner, reimburse him
attorney's fees of P300.00 and litigation expenses, and to pay the costs. Reconsideration of the said decision
filed by private respondents was denied by said Court on November 12, 1979. Private respondents appealed
to respondent Court of First Instance of Sorsogon, Branch II.
Respondent Court reversed the Municipal Circuit Court and dismissed the case on March 28, 1980, ruling
that said Court had no jurisdiction over the case as the same was filed only on February 4, (8), 1979, which
was well beyond the one-year-period of limitation, the cause of action having accrued from the sale of the
property by Alejandro Evasco to Jose E. Torella on December 31, 1972; and that since the only issue in an
illegal detainer case is physical possession, "whoever has prior possession, no matter in what character, is
protected by law."
Reconsideration of the said Decision sought by petitioner was denied by respondent Court.
Petitioner appealed said judgment directly to this Tribunal on a question of law, raising as the lone issue:
... whether the respondent court was in error when for purposes of determining the jurisdiction of the 2nd
Municipal Circuit Court of Bulusan-Barcelona, to try Civil Case No. 1227, for Illegal Detainer:
(a) it reckoned the counting of one-year period within which to file the action from the sale of the property
in question by Alejandro Evasco to Jose Torella on December 31, 1972 and not from the date of demand
made by the petitioner upon the respondents; and
(b) by assuming that "prior possession in whatever character is protected by law.
We rule for petitioner.
Private respondents admit that the land in question was originally owned by Jose Evasco. The tax
declarations covering their house clearly state "house built on land owned by Jose Evasco under Tax No.
1599". 8 Since the land had been partitioned to Alejandro Evasco by his father, Jose Evasco, respondent
Encarnacion can lay no claim to the property even as a grand-daughter of Jose Evasco. Respondents may
have been in possession of the portion they occupy prior to petitioner but they have not proved their title
thereto, nor their right to possess the same. As the 2nd Municipal Circuit Court of Bulusan-Barcelona found,
no concrete evidence was introduced by respondents on this point. Moreover, it is noteworthy that the
validity of the "Reparticion Extrajudicial" whereby said lot was adjudicated to Alejandro Evasco by his
father Jose Evasco, predecessors-in-interest of petitioner, had never been challenged.
If at all, private respondents' possession of their portion of the property was by mere tolerance of petitioner's
predecessors-in-interest, which, however, does not vest in them a right which they can assert against
petitioner. Possession by tolerance is lawful but this becomes illegal when, upon demand to vacate by the
owner, the possessor refuses to comply with such demand. 9 A possessor by tolerance is necessarily bound
by an implied promise to vacate upon demand, failing which a summary action for ejectment is the proper
remedy against him. 10It is not necessary that there be a formal agreement or contract of lease before an
unlawful detainer suit may be filed against a possessor by tolerance. 11 Neither is prior physical possession
of the property by petitioner an indispensable requisite. 12 The ruling of respondent Court, therefore, that
"since the only issue in forcible entry and illegal detainer action is the physical possession of real property
possession de facto and n t possession de jurewhoever has prior possession, no matter in what character,
is protected by law," is erroneous under the factual milieu herein,
A Forcible Entry and Unlawful Detainer action must be brought within one year from the unlawful
deprivation or withholding of possession. 13 The one-year-period of limitation commences from the time
of demand to vacate, and when several demands are made, the same is counted from the last letter of
demand. 14 Demand may either be personal or in writing. 15 The demand to vacate having been made by
petitioner in January 1979, and the ejectment suit having been instituted on February 8, 1979, the 2nd
Municipal Circuit Court of Bulusan-Barcelona acted well within its jurisdiction in taking cognizance of the
case.
WHEREFORE, the assailed Decision of respondent Court of First Instance of Sorsogon, Branch II, in Civil
Case No.1227, is SET ASIDE, and the Decision of the 2nd Municipal Circuit Court of Bulusan-Barcelona
is hereby reinstated,
Costs against private respondents.
[G.R. No. L-35833. June 29, 1984.]

SUSANA DE LA CERNA LAINGO, TEODORO DACUYAN, ELENA DACUYAN and SAMSON

DACUYAN, Petitioners, v. DAMIAN CAMILO and/or JUAN MAGALLANES, Respondents.

Isidro M. Ampig, for Petitioners.

Gonzalo G. Latorilla, Kimpo & Kimpo for Respondents.

SYLLABUS

1. REMEDIAL LAW; JUDGMENTS; EXECUTION THEREOF; MUST CONFORM TO FINAL

JUDGMENT; CASE AT BAR. A reading of the decision and its background facts shows that the
controversy litigated and passed upon by the Court of Appeals was confined to the ownership of seven (7)
hectares of land which form part of the twenty two (22) hectares parcel of land covered by a torrens title in
the name of the petitioners. The Court of Appeals ruled that the respondents are entitled to seven (7) hectares
of the property but not necessarily the seven (7) hectares possessed by them. They are entitled to co-
possession with appellees until the undivided seven (7) hectares are definitely segregated through partition.
We agree with the petitioners that the execution ordered by the Court of First Instance allowing respondents
to enjoy possession over the entire twenty-two (22) hectares with the petitioners, did not conform to the
final judgment being executed. We, therefore, rule that the co-possession mentioned in the Court of Appeals
judgment refers to the right of the respondents, already certain and vested but not yet specific, over the
seven (7) hectares of the property in effect ranging but not specific over the entire property. However, in
the meantime that the partition is not effected and the boundaries of the seven (7) hectares not spelled out,
the respondents shall continue to possess the seven (7) hectares they have held since the litigated sale and
enjoy all its fruits. They will have no share of the fruits of the other fifteen (15) hectares nor its enjoyment
but neither shall the petitioners have any share in the fruits or enjoyment of the seven (7) hectares held by
the respondents. It would be in the interests of all concerned if the partition of the property among the heirs
is effected immediately and the respondents are finally given their definite seven (7) hectares as provided
in the appellate judgment.

DECISION

GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:

The issue raised in this petition is whether or not the execution ordered by the respondent court conforms
to the final judgment embodied in the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. 43920-R.

The petitioners filed a complaint as plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 5438 of the Court of First Instance of Davao
to recover a seven hectare portion of a twenty-two hectare parcel of land in Malita, Davao. Commented [290]:

The disputed property is part of a homestead applied for by Gaudencio Dacuyan married to Susana de la Commented [291]:
Cerna and awarded in 1934 to the "heirs of Gaudencio Dacuyan" because the applicant had died in the
Commented [292]:
meantime. The title was registered in October, 1934. In 1942, the widow Susana de la Cerna describing
herself as "half owner of the conjugal property" sold seven (7) hectares of the land to Damian Camilo, Commented [293]:
respondent in this case. Camilo, in turn, sold the land in 1966 to the other respondent, Juan Magallanes. Commented [294]:
The dispositive portion of the decision in the reivindicacion case states:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"1. Dismissing the Complaint;

"2. Divesting the plaintiffs of ownership over seven hectares of the southern side of the land covered by
Original Certificate of Title No. 1175 of the Register of Deeds of Davao, more particularly, the portion
described in the deed of sale executed by Susana Cerna de Laingo on November 20, 1972, in the presence
of Jorge Agonias and Juan Magallanes and acknowledged before Atty. Ramon M. Kimpo, and the
accompanying sketch marked as Exhibits 1 and 1-A, respectively and vesting the same in Juan A.
Magallanes, Filipino, married to Fedilina Neri, Filipino, and residing at Malita, Davao;

"3. Directing the plaintiffs to allow Juan Magallanes to have the aforesaid land surveyed; and,

"4. Sentencing the plaintiffs jointly and severally to pay the defendants P3,000.00 as attorneys fees, with
costs."cralaw virtua1aw library

Upon appeal by the petitioners, however, the Court of Appeals modified the lower courts decision. The
dispositive portion of the appellate decision reads:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"IN VIEW WHEREOF, this Court is constrained to modify as it now modifies the judgment appealed from:
the sale to appellees is held to be valid only as to an undivided seven (7) hectares not of the specific portion
now litigated; appellants are entitled to co-possession thereof with appellees until the undivided seven (7) Commented [295]:
hectares to which appellees are entitled are definitely segregated thru partition; the adjudication of
Commented [296]:
attorneys fee is set aside; no more pronouncement as to cost."cralaw virtua1aw library

After the judgment of the Court of Appeals had become final and executory, the petitioners filed the Commented [297]:
necessary motion with the Court of First Instance of Davao to issue a writ of execution placing them in co-
possession with the private respondents of the seven (7) hectares being litigated. Commented [298]:

The private respondents filed a counter motion for the issuance of a writ of execution praying that the Commented [299]:
petitioners be ordered to execute a project of partition among the heirs and while doing so, segregate the
seven (7) hectares purchased and possessed by them from the date of the document of sale. The petitioners, Commented [300]:
however, opposed the counter motion emphasizing that the execution of judgment referred to an action for
recovery of possession of a specific seven (7) hectares of land and not to an action for partition of property. Commented [301]:

The respondents countered with a rejoinder which admitted that the judgment, while ambiguous, confirmed
their rights over seven (7) hectares of land sold to them. Since they have been in possession of a specific
seven (7) hectares of land on which they planted coconuts already bearing fruits, the most equitable
execution according to them was for those seven (7) hectares to be the seven hectares adjudged in the
decision. Commented [302]:

The Court of First Instance decided the matter by issuing a writ of execution allowing the respondents to
enjoy possession over the entire twenty-two (22) hectares with the petitioners. The questioned order, the Commented [303]:
second paragraph of which is assailed in this petition reads:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"On motion of the plaintiffs, through Atty. Ampig, and without objection of Atty. Latorilla, counsel for the
defendant, let a writ of possession issue with respect to the seven (7) hectares, subject matter of the suit, by
allowing the plaintiffs to enjoy with the defendants possession of the same.
"On oral motion of Atty. Latorilla, let a writ of possession issue with respect to the remainder of the twenty-
two (22) hectares by allowing the defendants to enjoy with the plaintiffs possession of the rest of the twenty-
two (22) hectares.

SO ORDERED."cralaw virtua1aw library

Two motions for reconsideration having been denied, the petitioners raised the case to us directly on a pure
legal issue which they state as follows:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

THE COURT A QUO OR THE RESPONDENT JUDGE ERRED IN ORDERING THE ISSUANCE OF
A WRIT OF POSSESSION WITH RESPECT TO THE REMAINDER OF THE TWENTY TWO (22)
HECTARES BY ALLOWING THE DEFENDANTS TO ENJOY WITH THE PLAINTIFFS
POSSESSION OF THE REST OF THE TWENTY TWO (22) HECTARES AND IN DENYING THE
TWO ((2) MOTIONS FOR RECONSIDERATION OF THE SAID ORDER. Commented [304]:

The reasons given by the Court of Appeals for not granting undisputed ownership of the seven (7) hectares
already possessed by the respondents are:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
x x x

"3. CONSIDERING: Now, as to this that while it is true that the Land Tax Declaration in the name of the
heirs of Gaudencio Dacuyan Exh. 3 was afterwards cancelled and reduced from its area of 22 hectares to
15 hectares under Exh. 3-A the remaining seven (7) hectares coming to be declared in the name of the buyer
Camilo Damian under Exh. 5-A, 5-B, 5-C and 5-D, yet a scrutiny of these documents would not show any
participation of the other children of Gaudencio and Susana namely Teodoro, Elena and Samson the co-
plaintiffs in this case not even any proof that they were informed of the sale; neither is there any evidence
present in the record positive in character that they had ever consented to a physical segregation of the
seven (7) hectare portion sold by Susana unto Camilo so that the point of laches is without any basis; it is
true that Camilo and afterwards in 1966 his successor-in-interest Juan Magallanes had been in possession
apparently exclusive since the sale to Camilo in 1942 under Exh. 1 but the trouble is that exclusive
possession by a co-owner cannot give rise to prescription; the law has always been to the effect that between
co-owners prescription cannot run, Cortez v. Oliva, 33 Phil. 480 and in order for prescription to run between
themselves the repudiation of co-ownership must be clearly manifested which is not at all the case here
bearing in mind the undisputed fact that Camilo Damian did not even attempt to register Exh. 1 nor notify
said other children of Gaudencio Dacuyan and tell them he was claiming the seven (7) hectare portion as
solely his own; and neither should it be overlooked that the title being a Torrens title it cannot be the subject
matter of prescription; this will mean that notwithstanding the possession apparently exclusive of Camilo
Damian for more than twenty (20) years over the seven (7) hectare portion, he cannot under the law be
permitted to claim absolute ownership therein; and as a corollary neither can his successor-in-interest Juan
Magallanes but since Susana was entitled to at least 11 hectares; therefore her sale of seven (7) hectares if
undivided would have been valid, but a sale by her of this specific portion litigated could not bind her co-
plaintiffs; and this being the final result the adjudication of attorneys fees must have to be discarded;

"x x x

The judgment of the Court of Appeals, with the foregoing reasons for a seemingly ambiguous judgment
calling for a future segregation of seven (7) hectares out of the twenty-two (22) hectares, has long become
final and executory.

We agree with the petitioners that the execution ordered by the court of first instance did not conform to
the final judgment being executed.

We stated in Phil-American Accident Insurance Co., Inc. (97 SCRA 811)

"The questioned Order cannot be sustained. The judgment which was sought to be executed ordered the
payment of simple `legal interest only. It said nothing about the payment of compound interest.
Accordingly, when the respondent judge ordered the payment of compound interest he went beyond the
confines of his own judgment which had been affirmed by the Court of Appeals and which had become
final. Fundamental is the rule that execution must conform to that ordained or decreed in the dispositive
part of the decision. Likewise, a court can not, except for clerical errors or omissions, amend & judgment
that has become final. (Jaob, Et. Al. v. Alo, et al, 91 Phil. 750 [1952]; Robles v. Timario, Et Al., 107 Phil.
809 [1960]; Collector of Internal Revenue v. Gutierrez, Et Al., 108 Phil. 215 [1960]; Ablaza v. Sycip, Et
Al., 110 Phil. 4 [1960].) (Emphasis supplied).

At the same time, the mode of execution desired by the petitioners would be unfair to the respondents and
not in keeping with the disposition really ordained by the Court of Appeals. As stated in Macabuhay v.
Manuel (101 SCRA 835) where we cited Padua v. Robles (66 SCRA 485):jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

". . . that the meaning, operation and consequences of a judgment must be ascertained like any other written
instrument and that a judgment rests on the intention of the Court as gathered from every part thereof
including the situation to which it applies and the attendant circumstances."cralaw virtua1aw library

A reading of the decision and its background facts shows that the controversy litigated and passed upon by
the Court of Appeals was confined to the ownership of seven (7) hectares of land which forms part of the
twenty two (22) hectares parcel of land covered by a torrens title in the name of the petitioners. Commented [305]:

The Court of Appeals ruled that the respondents are entitled to seven (7) hectares of the property but not Commented [306]:
necessarily the seven (7) hectares possessed by them. They are entitled to co-possession with appellees until
Commented [307]:
the undivided seven (7) hectares are definitely segregated through partition.
Commented [308]:
For us to now rule that the respondents will enjoy co-possession with the petitioners over seven (7) hectares
which belongs to the former would be inequitous even as actual co-possession over twenty two (22) hectares
would not conform to the final judgment. There is the other consideration that segregation of the definite
seven (7) hectares must await the partition among the heirs, a procedure outside the control of the
respondents.

We, therefore, rule that the co-possession mentioned in the Court of Appeals judgment refers to the right
of the respondents, already certain and vested but not yet specific, over any seven (7) hectares of the
property, in effect ranging but not specific over the entire property. However, in the meantime that the Commented [309]:
partition is not effected and the boundaries of the seven (7) hectares not spelled out, the respondents shall
continue to possess the seven (7) hectares they have held since the litigated sale and enjoy all its fruits. Commented [310]:
They will have no share of the fruits of the other fifteen (15) hectares nor its enjoyment but neither shall
the petitioners have any share in the fruits or enjoyment of the seven (7) hectares held by the respondents. Commented [311]:
It would be in the interests of all concerned if the partition of the property among the heirs is effected
immediately and the respondents are finally given their definite seven (7) hectares as provided in the
appellate judgment.

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The second paragraph of the questioned order is Commented [312]:
DELETED. The respondents shall continue to exclusively possess and enjoy the seven (7) hectares actually
held by them in accordance with the terms of this decision until a partition is effected and their share is
definitely segregated. Commented [313]:
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 77976 November 24, 1988

MAXIMO GABRITO, ROGER LIBUT, CARMELITA UY, LIZA DE VERA, thru her Attorney-in-
Fact, JESUS DE LOS SANTOS, petitioners,
vs.
THE HON. NINTH DIVISION, COURT OF APPEALS, THE HON. NICIAS O. MENDOZA,
Presiding Judge Branch 74, Regional Trial Court, Olongapo City, ET AL., respondents.
Cornelio C. Cardenas and Valeriano S. Peralta for petitioners.
Estanislao L. Cesa, Jr. for respondents.

BIDIN, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari with preliminary injunction and restraining order of the decision
of the Court of Appeals * dated March 4, 1987 in CA-G.R. No. SP No. 08710, "Maximo Gabrito et al. vs.
Hon. Nicias O. Mendoza and Roberto Tan et al.," affirming the April 2, 1986 decision of the Regional Trial
Court of Olongapo City ** which also affirmed the decision of MTCC, Branch V, Olongapo City, and the
Resolution of respondent court dated March 30, 1987 denying herein petitioners' motion for
reconsideration.
The appeal originated as an unlawful detainer complaint filed by herein private respondents with the
Municipal Trial Court, Branch V, Olongapo City. Commented [314]:
The antecedent facts as summarized by the Court of Appeals are as follows:
The spouses Roberto Tan and Benita Ching-Tan filed a complaint in the Municipal Trial Court against Commented [315]:
defendants Maximo Gabrito, et al., alleging that they are the possessors and legal owners of the property
Commented [316]:
situated at No. 107 Gordon Ave., New Kalalake, Olongapo City as evidenced by Tax Declaration No. 4-
2046. The defendants are leasing portions of this parcel of land, each paying the corresponding monthly Commented [317]:
rentals due thereon.
Commented [318]:
On the leased portion, the defendants constructed buildings and have allowed other persons to sublease the
same for commercial purposes. Commented [319]:
As the spouses Tan have no other property where they could construct their residential house, the spouses Commented [320]:
Tan notified the defendants (in January 1984) that they intend to personally use the land to build their house
Commented [321]:
thereon and gave defendants three (3) months to vacate the premises and remove the structures and
improvements which defendants had constructed thereon. Commented [322]:
In April 1984, defendants requested for an extension of time within which to vacate, which was granted by Commented [323]:
the spouses Tan. However, from that time on, defendants also stopped paying monthly rentals due on the
Commented [324]:
land they leased.
In view of this, in July 1984, defendants were told to leave the premises and to pay rentals in arrears. As Commented [325]:
defendants refused to comply with both demands, the matter was brought to the Barangay Council for Commented [326]:
settlement. As no agreement was reached, a certification to file action was issued to the spouses Tan. Hence,
the Tans filed an action for unlawful detainer with damages against Gabrito, et al. Commented [327]:
In answer to the complaint, defendants Gabrito, et al. denied the material allegations of the complaint and Commented [328]:
alleged that: they are builders in good faith over the land as provided in Article 448 of the Civil Code; the Commented [329]:
land where the houses of defendants were built is a public land, not yet awarded nor titled to anybody;
plaintiffs's alleged predecessor-in-interest not being the owner thereof could not have passed nor transferred Commented [330]:
ownership thereof to them (plaintiffs) considering that Gloria Carillo's Miscellaneous Sales Application Commented [331]:
No. (X-4-4320) has not yet been acted upon by the Bureau of Lands; plaintiffs and their predessors-in-
Commented [332]:
interest are absentee applicants over the land, hence, are disqualified to own the same; plaintiffs have never
been in possession of the land while the defendants are in actual physical possession thereof; the sale of Commented [333]:
plaintiffs' alleged predecessor-in-interest in favor of plaintiffs is null and void for being in violation of P.D.
No. 1517 as defendants being lessees of the land have the right of first refusal thereof.
Defendants brought a counterclaim for damages against the plaintiffs. (Rollo, Annex "C", pp. 39-40).
Respondent Municipal Trial Judge applied the rule on summary procedure in this case, rendered its decision
dated November 22, 1985, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered for all the defendants to vacate the parcel of land described in
par. 3 of the complaint, removing therefrom the buildings and any other improvements respectively owned
by them; and to pay plaintiffs the following as reasonable compensation for the use of the premises: Commented [334]:
Maximo Gabritoat
P250.00 per month from April 1984 until he vacates the premises;
Roger Libutat
P150.00 per month from May 1984 until he vacates the premises;
Liza de Veraat:
P150.00 per month from April 1984, until she vacates the premises; Carmelita Uyat
Pl 70.00 per month from April 1984, until she vacates the premises.
for all defendants to pay, in equal shares, damages by way of attorney's fees in the amount of ONE
THOUSAND PESOS ( P1,000.00 ) as well as costs.
SO ORDERED. (Rollo, p. 35).
On appeal to the Regional Trial Court (Civil Case No. 450-08-5), the decision of the Municipal Trial Court
was affirmed in its decision dated April 2, 1986, the dispositive portion of which reads: Commented [335]:
WHEREFORE, premised on all the foregoing consideration and finding no prejudicial and reversible error
was ever committed by the lower Court, the Court affirms in toto the decision being appealed, with costs
against the defendants-appellants.
SO ORDERED. (Rollo, Annex 'B' p. 38).
On review, herein respondent Court of Appeals sustained the decision rendered by the Regional Trial Court
Branch LXXIV, and ruled; Commented [336]:
WHEREFORE, the Petition for Review herein is DISMISSED for lack of merit. (Rollo, Annex "C", p. 44).
Commented [337]:
On March 16, 1987, the petitioner filed their "Motion for Reconsideration and Opposition to the Motion
for Immediate Execution Pending Further Proceedings" which was denied by the Ninth Division of
respondent Court of Appeals in its Resolution dated March 30, 1987 and granted the Motion for Immediate
Issuance of a Writ of Execution filed by private respondents (Annex "F", Rollo, pp. 57-58). Commented [338]:

Hence, this petition for review on certiorari filed on April 13, 1987. Commented [339]:
On April 21, 1987, Acting Chief Justice Andres Narvasa, authorized the grant of Temporary Restraining
Order in this case which was confirmed by the Second Division of this Court in its Resolution dated April
27, 1987 (Rollo, pp. 86, 87, 88).
In a Resolution dated June 8, 1987, petitioners were required to comment on the motion dated April 26,
1987 (Rollo, p. 94) of counsel for respondents, praying to set aside the temporary restraining order issued
on April 21, 1987 and to issue a writ of execution pending appeal or to allow the Court of Appeals to
proceed with the execution of the decision pending appeal (Rollo, p. 115), which was complied with by
petitioners on July 22, 1987 (Rollo, p. 143).
In the resolution of October 5, 1987 (Rollo, p. 187) the petition was given due course and the parties were
required to submit their respective memoranda within twenty (20) days from notice. Petitioners'
memorandum was submitted on December 3, 1987 (Rollo, p. 196). Respondents submitted their
memorandum on April 12, 1988 (Rollo, p. 235). Petitioners raised the following issues:
1. That a Municipal Trial Court has no jurisdiction to take cognizance of a case for Unlawful Detainer under
Sec. 1 of Rule 70 of the Rules of Court, where the plaintiffs are merely the legal possessors and recent
transferees of a public land, and the defendants are the absolute owners of the building existing on the same
land, for a number of years already.
2. That the respondent Regional Trial Court, Branch LXXIV, Olongapo City, ought to have dismissed the
action for Unlawful Detainer and as the same was also heard on appeal by the said Court on this
jurisdictional challenge.
3. The market value of the residential houses or buildings of the defendants on the said land is approximately
P170,000.00, and it was with plaintiffs' predecessor-in-interest, one Gloria Carillo-Potente that defendants
caused said structures to be erected on said land plaintiffs having only acquired from said predecessor, by
means of a Deed of Sale of such rights sometime on January 5, 1984.
4. Upon this frame of facts which are admitted in the Decision of both Courts, only a Court of General
Jurisdiction, a Regional Trial Court, can have the competence to try and decide the same: the Court of
Special Limited Jurisdiction, cannot take cognizance of such facts as an action for Unlawful Detainer.
5. Arguendo, that the Court of Origin has jurisdiction to take cognizance of the cause of action for Unlawful
Detainer, it should have not heard the case in accordance with the Rules of Summary Proceedings, and
based its Decision on an Affidavit hearing, as the question of ownership was being contested between
plaintiffs and defendants, with respect to whom was the preferred grantee to the same land, and which falls
under the complete administration and control of the Bureau of Lands.
6. In fact, the Court of Origin, Branch V, Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Olongapo, should have suspended
the proceedings, as there was an Administrative Protest being heard by the District Land Office of Olongapo
City.
7. On the question of suspension of proceedings denied by the Court of Origin, Municipal Trial Court in
Cities, Branch V, Olongapo City, an action for certiorari was filed before Branch LXXIII of Regional Trial
Court, Olongapo City, Civil Case No. 399-0-85, and although a Restraining Order against Municipal Trial
Court in Cities, Branch V, City of Olongapo, was issued, the same was already academic as by that time
said Municipal Trial Court, Branch V, Olongapo City, has already rendered its Decision in favor of private
respondent hereat, plaintiff therein.
8. Branch LXXIV, Regional Trial Court, Olongapo, in its Decision rendered on appeal, did not pass upon
such matters, specified supra, so as to reverse the Decision of the Court of Origin: the subject Decisions,
have not considered the due process rights of petitioners toward their residences and structures, the same
are facing the risk of condemnation and destruction without fair hearing, and such improvements have an
aggregate value of Pl70,000.00, more or less.
9. Respondent Honorable Judge Mendoza of Branch LXXIV, Regional Trial Court, Olongapo, may have
been misled by the citation of authority, case of Vda. de Bocaling vs. Laguna, et al., 54 SCRA, 243, relied
upon by appellees, said case being totally inapplicable to the facts of this case.
10. Respondent Deputy Sheriff Rogelio Lumanlan, without regard to the fif'teen (15) days period finality
of the Order and/or Writ of Demolition, harrassed herein petitioners, notwithstanding the pendency of
matters involved to their extreme discomfort and anxiety.
11. The Decision of the Honorable Court of Appeals, Annex "C", sustained the Decision of the Regional
Trial Court and ignored the vital issues posed for resolution: A Motion For Reconsideration, copy is hereto
attached as Annex "D", was presented, precisely to stress the same but, a pointed or precise ruling upon
such issues was avoided in the Resolution dated 30th of March, 1987, true copy attached herein as Annex
"E".
12. On the other (sic) upon Motion of private respondents, the Tans, despite Opposition thereto, Writ of
Execution pending appeal was issued and respondent Deputy Sheriff Lumanlan enforced the same, copy of
which is hereto attached as Annex "F": true copy of Notice to Vacate served by said respondent Deputy
Sheriff to petitioners is attached as Annex "G" herein.
13. Per Annex "D" Motion For Reconsideration a constitutional point, was reared forth, on first impression,
per proviso of Sec. 10, Art. XIII-new, 1986 Constitution, relevant to demolition and resettlement, and,
Resolution, dated 30th March, 1987, Annex "E", of the Honorable Appellate Authority, avoided said
constitutional question, without passing upon the same.
14. Of Jurisdictional matters: Decision dated March 4, 1987, of the Honorable Court of Appeals was,
received on March 6, 1987, Motion For Reconsideration was filed on March 16, 1987, and Resolution dated
30th of March, 1987, denying Motion for Reconsideration was received on April 1, 1987: thus, this Petition
is filed within the 15 day period. (Rollo, pp. 4-8).
All of which boil down to the main issue of whether or not an action for unlawful detainer is the proper
action to oust petitioners from their occupation of the land in dispute. Commented [340]:
There is no question as to the ownership of the land in litigation as both petitioners and private respondents
admit that the same is a public land and owned by the government. The bone of contention is, who has a Commented [341]:
better right to possess the land which definitely falls under the jurisdiction of the Municipal Trial Court and
the rule of summary procedure may properly be applied. Commented [342]:
In a preliminary conference held pursuant to Section 6 of the Rule on Summary Procedure, defendants
admitted that they entered the premises as lessees and had been paying rentals for the use of the land to
Gloria Carillo, private respondents' predecessor-in-interest (Order dated May 15, 1985 in Civil Case No.
2511, MTC, Olongapo City, Branch V; Rollo, pp. 72-73).<re||an1w> When requested to vacate the
premises, petitioners asked for an extension of time which request was granted. However, petitioners failed
to vacate the premises and also stopped paying rentals. In view of said admissions, petitioners had
unquestionably recognized private respondents' prior right of possession over the questioned property. Commented [343]:
Petitioners' allegation in their answer that they are builders in good faith over the land as provided for in
Article 448 of the Civil Code is untenable. As ruled by this Court, Article 448 of the Civil Code, applies
only where one builds on land in the belief that he is the owner of the land, but does not apply where one's
interest in the land is that of a lessee under a rental contract (Balucanag v. Francisco, 122 SCRA 498 Commented [344]:
[1983]). More than that, it has been settled that the mere fact that, in his answer, defendant claims to be the
exclusive owner of the property from which plaintiff seeks to eject him is not sufficient to divest the
Municipal Trial Court of jurisdiction (Vivar v. Vivar, 8 SCRA 847, 849 [1963]; De Santa vs. Court of Commented [345]:
Appeals, 140 SCRA 52 [1985]).
In addition, this Court held in Bocaling v. Laguna, et al (54 SCRA 243, 250 [1973]) that:
The rule is well-settled that lessees, like petitioner, are not possessors in good faith because he knew that
their occupancy of the premises continues only during Commented [346]:
the life of the lease, and they cannot as a matter of right, recover the value of their improvements from the
lessor, much less retain the premises until they are reimbursed. Their rights are governed by Article 1678
of the Civil Code which allows reimbursement of lessees up to one-half of the value of their improvements
if the lessor so elects. Commented [347]:
Petitioners contend that the above cited case is "completely inapplicable to the case at bar, because the
genesis case of Ejectment therein was subjected to a compromise Agreement" (Rollo, p. 18). Such
contention is, however, untenable. One of the issues raised in the above-cited case was whether or not
lessees are builders and/or possessors in good faith entitled to reimbursement for the value of their
improvements. The Court categorically resolved the issue in the negative without qualification nor even a
reference to the compromise agreement alluded to by the petitioner.
In a later development, petitioners filed a supplemental memorandum submitting the decision of the Bureau
of Lands dated June 7, 1987, the dispositive portion of which reads:
IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the Miscellaneous Sales Application No. 4320 of Benita Ching
Tan should be, as hereby as it is rejected forfeiting to the government whatever amount had been paid on
account thereof. The miscellaneous sales application of Maximo Gabrito, Carmelita Uy, Roger Libut and
Liza de Vera shall continue to be given due course after a subdivision survey of the portion occupied by
them shall have been made at their pro-rata expense. Commented [348]:
SO ORDERED.
In view thereof, petitioners maintain that they are the lawful owners of the buildings and the legal possessors
of subject land and that the records of the court proceedings show the pendency of the administrative protest Commented [349]:
before the Bureau of Lands between the same litigating parties (Rollo, pp. 166-167).
Respondents countered that the decision of the Bureau of Lands granting preferential right to the petitioners
to apply for the subject parcel of land is still on appeal before the Department of Natural
Resources.1 Hence, said decision which is not yet final, cannot affect the outcome of this case because the
authority given to the land department over the disposition of public land does not exclude the courts from
their jurisdiction over possessory actions, the character of the land notwithstanding (Rollo, pp. 246-247).
The contention of private respondents is well taken.
This issue has long been laid to rest by this Court. As early as the case of Pitarque v. Sorilla (92 Phil. 55
[1952]), this Court ruled that:
The vesting of the Lands Department with authority to administer, dispose of, and alienate public lands
must not be understood as depriving the other branches of the Government of the exercise of their respective
functions of powers thereon, such as the authority to stop disorders and quell breaches of peace by the
police and the authority on the part of the courts to take jurisdiction over possessory actions arising
therefrom not involving, directly or indirectly, alienation and disposition. Commented [350]:
Said ruling was reiterated in Bahayang v. Maceren, 96 Phil 390 (1955); in Molina v. De Bacud, 19 SCRA
56 (1967) and in Rallon v. Ruiz, Jr., 28 SCRA 331 (1969). In the latter case, the Court specifically ruled on
the jurisdictional question, as follows:

Courts have jurisdiction over possessory actions involving public lands to determine the issue of physical
possession (in forcible entry cases before the inferior court) on the better right of possession (in accion
publiciana cases before court of first instance). And this is because the issue of physical possession raised
before the courts is independent of the question of disposition and alienation of public lands which should
be threshed out in the Bureau of Lands. Commented [351]:
The above ruling was further reiterated in Francisco v. Secretary of Agriculture and Natural
Resources (121 SCRA 380 [1983]) and in a recent case of National Development Co., et al. v.
Hervilla, G.R. No. 65718, June 30, 1987 (151 SCRA 520), where it was held that:
It is now well settled that the administration and disposition of public lands are committed by law to the
Director of Lands primarily, and ultimately to the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources. The
jurisdiction of the Bureau of Lands is confined to the determination of the respective rights of rival
claimants of public lands or to cases which involve disposition and alienation of public lands. The
jurisdiction of courts is limited to the determination of who has the actual, physical possession or occupation
of the land in question (in forcible entry cases, before municipal courts) or, the better right of possession
(in accion publiciana, in cases before the Court of First Instance, now Regional Trial Court). Commented [352]:
And even more recently in the case of Guerrero v. Amores, et al., G.R. No.
L-34492 promulgated on March 28, 1988, the Court clearly stated that "pending final adjudication of
ownership by the Bureau of Lands, the Court has jurisdiction to determine in the meantime the right of
possession over the land." Corollary thereto, the power to order the sheriff to remove improvements and
turn over the possession of the land to the party adjudged entitled thereto, belongs only to the courts of
justice and not to the Bureau of Lands. Commented [353]:
In the same case, the application of the principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies with reference
Commented [354]:
to public lands, was further clarified by this Court as follows:
On the other hand, the application of the principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies as a condition
precedent to the filing of a juridical action is confined to controversies arising out of the disposition of
public lands (Geukoko vs. Araneta, 102 Phil. 706 (1957); Marukot vs. Jacinto, 98 Phil. 128 (1957), Commented [355]:
alienation of public lands (Rallos vs. Ruiz, Jr., supra) or to the determination of the respective rights of
Commented [356]:
rival claimants to public lands (Pitarque vs. Sorilla, supra) and not to possessory actions involving public
lands which are limited to the determination of who has the actual, physical possession or occupation of the Commented [357]:
land in question (Rallos vs. Ruiz, Jr., supra).<re||an1w> Commented [358]:
In fact, the Bureau of Lands in its decision of June 7, 1987, admitted the jurisdiction of the courts to decide
the case on the question of physical possession, although not on the question of ownership (Rollo, p. 179). Commented [359]:
Under the circumstances, a careful study of the records failed to show any cogent reason to disturb the
findings of the Municipal Trial Court in Cities and of the Regional Trial Court, both of Olongapo City, and
finally of the Court of Appeals.
WHEREFORE, the decision of respondent Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED and the temporary restraining
order is lifted. Costs against petitioners. Commented [360]:
SO ORDERED.