OFFICE OF THE COURT AMINISTRATOR vs.

JUDGE ALAN FLORES

A.M. No. RTJ-12-2325. 14 April 2015. En Banc

Topic: Sec 4, A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC

(Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and
Annulment of Voidable Marriages)

Facts
Pursuant to the two (2) anonymous letters alleging certain irregularities being committed by Judge Flores,
an investigation was conducted by the Office of the Court Administrator; and an administrative case was
subsequently filed against Judge Flores. The letters alleged that Judge Flores render favorable judgements
in exchange for monetary consideration; and take cognizance of, and decide cases on annulment of marriage
even if the same were beyond the territorial jurisdiction of the courts he presided.
OCA Investigation Report showed that several active/pending cases for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage
apparently disregard A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC. It appears from the record that Judge Flores acted and took
cognizance of nullity of marriage cases wherein the petitioners used the abbreviation c/o (care of) in their
addresses in their petitions; that petitioners lacked the requisite six (6) months residency at the time the case
was filed; and even if there are documentary and/or testimonial evidence that attest to the fact that the
petitioners are actually residents of places outside the territorial jurisdiction of his courts, Judge Flores
failed to dismissed he said petitions on ground of lack of jurisdiction. Consequently, OCA recommended
that Judge Flores be found guilty of gross ignorance of the law and gross misconduct.

ISSUE
WON Judge Flores is liable for gross ignorance of the law and gross misconduct.

Ruling

Yes, Judge Flores is liable.

In petitions for declaration of nullity of void marriages, the applicable rule is A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC, as
amended. In particular, Section 4 categorically states the venue where a petition shall be filed, to wit:

SEC. 4. Venue. - The petition shall be filed in the Family Court of the province or city where
the petitioner or the respondent has been residing for at least six months prior to the date of
the filling, or in case of a non-resident respondent, where he may be found in the Philippines,
at the election of the petitioner. x x x

In this case, the OCA report is replete with findings showing that Judge Flores deliberately disregarded the
foregoing rule. He continued to try and resolve cases despite glaring circumstances, which should have
created doubt as to the veracity of the residential addresses declared in the petitions. Prosecutor Cabrera
even actually brought these to the attention of Judge Flores but he was merely brushed aside. Worse, there
were even instances when Judge Flores, during clarificatory questioning, knowingly led a party into curing
the defect.

Corollary to A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC, as amended, is Re: Report on the Judicial Audit Conducted in the
RTC, Branch 60, Barili, Cebu, where the Court sustained the findings of the Court's audit team and
concurred that the use of "c/o" (care of) addresses in petitions for nullity of marriage raises doubt as to the
veracity of their actual residence.

The undisputed OCA Investigation Report in the present consolidated cases showed an alarming number
of pending and decided cases where the actual residence of the parties are obviously not within the territorial
jurisdiction of the courts presided by Judge Flores but he nevertheless took cognizance of these cases
without even making an inquiry as to their veracity. Judge Flores' incompetence became even more manifest
when he curtailed the efforts of the public prosecutors in ensuring that the rule on proper venue will not be
circumvented. As observed by the OCA team, Judge Flores almost always rejects the public prosecutors'
recommendation of dismissal in their investigation report on the alleged reason that the role of the
prosecutor is only to determine if collusion exists between the parties or if the evidence is being suppressed.
OFFICE OF THE COURT ADMINISTRATOR vs. JUDGE ANATALIO NECESSARIO, ET AL.
A.M. No. MTJ-07-1691. 2 April 2013. En Banc (Perlas, Bernabe)

Topic: Void Ab Initio Marraiges

Facts
The Judicial Audit Team created by the Office of the Court Administrator reported alleged irregularities in
the solemnization of marriages in several branches of MTCC and RTC in Cebu City. Certain package fees
were offered to interested parties by fixers or facilitators for instant marriages. A formal administrative
complaint directed against Judge Anatalio Necessario, Judge Gil Acosta, Judge Rosabella Tormis and Judge
Edgemelo Rosales were filed.
Judge Necessario, Judge Acosta, Judge Tormis and Judge Rosales argued that the law only requires
marriage license and that they are not required inquire whether the license was obtained from a location
where one of the parties actually resides, and to verify the signature on thereon to determine its authenticity;
they rely heavily on the presumption of regularity accorded to the documents presented to him by the
parties. Further, marriages solemnized under Art. 34 of the Family Code had the required Affidavit of
Cohabitation; and that the pro forma of these affidavits have been used by other judges even before they
became a judge.
OCA ruled otherwise, and held that (1) Judge Necessario and Judge Acosta are guilty of gross
inefficiency/neglect of duty for solemnizing marriages with questionable documents and wherein one of
the contracting parties is a foreigner who submitted a mere Affidavit of his Capacity to Marry, in lieu of
the required Certificate from his Embassy; and for gross ignorance of the law for solemnizing marriages
under Art. 34 of the Family Code wherein one or both of the contracting parties were minors during the
cohabitation. (2) Judge Rosales and Judge Tormis Acosta are guilty of gross inefficiency/neglect of duty
for solemnizing marriages with questionable documents and wherein one of the contracting parties is a
foreigner who submitted a mere Affidavit of his Capacity to Marry, in lieu of the required Certificate from
his Embassy; and for solemnizing a marriage without the requisite marriage license, and with an expired
marriage license respectively.

ISSUE
WON Judges of the MTCC and RTC in Cebu City are guilty of gross ignorance of the law, gross neglect
of duty or gross inefficiency and gross misconduct.

RULING
Yes. Respondents are liable for the abovementioned charges.

The Family Code provides the requisites for a valid marriage, to wit: the formal requisites of marriage are
(1) Authority of the solemnizing officer; (2) A valid marriage license except in the cases provided for in
Chapter 2 of this Title; and (3) A Marriage ceremony which takes place with the appearance of the
contracting parties before the solemnizing officer and their personal declaration that they take each other
as husband and wife in the presence of not less than two witnesses of legal age (Art. 3, FC).
The absence of any of the essential or formal requisites shall render the marriage void ab initio, except as
stated in Article 35 (2). A defect in any of the essential requisites shall not affect the validity of the marriage
but the party or parties responsible for the irregularity shall be civilly, criminally and administratively
liable.(Art. 4, FC).

The absence of a marriage license will clearly render a marriage void ab initio. The actions of the judges
have raised a very alarming issue regarding the validity of the marriages they solemnized since they did not
follow the proper procedure or check the required documents and qualifications.

In this case, the liabilities of the judges are the following:

First, Judges Necessario, Tormis and Rosales solemnized marriages even if the requirements submitted by
the couples were incomplete and of questionable character. Most of these documents showed visible signs
of tampering, erasures, corrections or superimpositions of entries related to the parties place of
residence. These included indistinguishable features such as the font, font size, and ink of the computer-
printed entries in the marriage certificate and marriage license. These actions of the respondent judges
constitute gross inefficiency. In Vega v. Asdala, the Court held that inefficiency implies negligence,
incompetence, ignorance, and carelessness.

Second, the judges were also found guilty of neglect of duty regarding the payment of solemnization fees.
The marriage documents examined by the audit team show that corresponding official receipts for the
solemnization fee were missing or payment by batches was made for marriages performed on different
dates. OCA emphasizes that the payment of the solemnization fee starts off the whole marriage application
process and even puts a "stamp of regularity" on the process.

Third, Judges Necessario, Tormis, and Rosales also solemnized marriages where a contracting party is a
foreigner who did not submit a certificate of legal capacity to marry from his or her embassy. What the
foreigners submitted were mere affidavits stating their capacity to marry. The irregularity in the certificates
of legal capacity that are required under Article 21 of the Family Code displayed the gross neglect of duty
of the judges. They should have been diligent in scrutinizing the documents required for the marriage
license issuance. Any irregularities would have been prevented in the qualifications of parties to contract
marriage.

Fourth, Judges Necessario, Acosta, and Tormis are likewise guilty of gross ignorance of the law under
Article 34 of the Family Code with respect to the marriages they solemnized where legal impediments
existed during cohabitation such as the minority status of one party. The audit team cites in their
Supplemental Report that there were parties whose ages ranged from eighteen (18) to twenty-two (22) years
old who were married by mere submission of a pro forma joint affidavit of cohabitation. These affidavits
were notarized by the solemnizing judge himself or herself.

Finally, positive testimonies were also given regarding the solemnization of marriages of some couples
where no marriage license was previously issued.
OFFICE OF THE COURT ADMINISTRATOR vs. HON. LIBERTY O. CASTANEDA, ET AL.
A.M. No. RTJ-12-2316. 09 October 2012. En Banc

Facts
On the basis of the reports that RTC Branch 67 is becoming a haven for couples who want their marriages
to be judicially declared null and void or annulled, or those who merely to be legally separated, the Audit
Team gave special attention to cases for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage, Annulment of Marriage and
Legal Separation pending thereon. Further investigation of said cases revealed various irregularities in the
proceedings, consisting of blatant violations of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC (Rule on Declaration of Absolute
Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages) and A.M. No. 02-11-11-sc (Rule on
Legal Separation).
Reports showed that, (1) Judge Castaneda failed to observe provisions of the abovementioned rules, which
includes, among others: allowance of the petitions for nullity of marriage or annulment to prosper despite
the impropriety of venue; most of the parties in said petitions are not actual residents of the place under the
territorial jurisdiction of Branch 67; and (2) failure to furnish copies of petitions to the OSG and the Office
of the Public Prosecutor, which under the rules must be done within five (5) days from the date of its filling,
and proof of service must be submitted to the court within the same period, otherwise, petition may be out
rightly dismissed.
Judge Castaneda, on the other hand, denied the said allegations, and averred that since the petitions filed
before her were all verified, it was no longer incumbent upon her to confirm the veracity of the contents
thereof, including the parties addresses; and it is not the duty of the court to order the petitioner to furnish
the OSG and OPP the copies of the said petitions.
OCA considered the irregularities and procedural lapses in the manner in which Judge Castaneda handled
cases for nullity, annulment of marriage and legal separation, as she completely disregarded the basic
provisions of A.M. Nos. 02-11-10-SC and 02-11-11-SC. For these infractions, OCA found her guilty of
gross ignorance of the law ad procedure, and held her unjustifiable zeal and readiness in granting petitions
for nullity, annulment and legal separation to be so gross, patent and deliberate that it reeks of utter bad
faith.

Issue
WON Judge Castaneda is liable for gross ignorance of the law and procedure

Ruling
Yes. Judge Castaneda is liable
The Audits showed that Judge Castaneda acted on these petitions despite the fact that it was not verified;
that OSG and OPP were not furnished a copy of the petition within five (5) days from its filling; that the
petition did not recite the true residence of the parties which should be within the territorial jurisdiction of
RTC Branch 67 for at least six (6) months prior to the filing of the petition; or that the docket fees have not
been fully paid and jurisdiction over the person of the respondents have not been acquired.
The Court takes special exception to a case which Judge Castaneda granted notwithstanding the following
irregularities: (1) petitioner-husband appeared to be a resident of Quezon, contrary to the information
reflected on the petition that he was a resident of Tarlac; (2) respondent-wife is not a resident of Pampanga,
but of Quezon; and (3) Wife was neither interviewed nor investigated by the Public Prosecutor in arriving
at the conclusion that no collusion between her and her husband.
Hence, the blatant disregard by Judge Castaneda of the provision of A.M. Nos. 02-11-10-SC and 02-11-11-
SC, the Court finds the latter guilty of gross ignorance of the law and procedure.
OFFICE OF THE COURT ADMINISTRATOR vs. JUDGE CADER P. INDAR
A.M. No. RTJ-10-2232. 10 April 2012. En Banc

Topic: Void/Voidable Marriages

Facts
An administrative complaint for gross misconduct and dishonesty against respondent Judge Indar was
instituted, on the basis of reports made by the Local Civil Registers of Manila and Quezon City to the Office
of the Court Administrator that they have received an alarming number of decisions, resolutions, and orders
on annulment of marriage cases allegedly issued by Judge Indar. To verify the allegations thereof, OCA
conducted a judicial audit in the RTC-Shariff Aguak, where the Audit Team found that the loss of cases
submitted by the LCR of Manila and Quezon City do not appear in the records of cases received, pending
or disposed by RTC-Shariff Aguak.

The records of the said RTC are bereft of evidence to show that regular and true proceedings were had on
these cases.

Issue
WON Judge Indar is liable for gross misconduct and dishonesty.

Ruling

Judge Indar is liable.

In this case, Judge Indar issued decisions on numerous annulment of marriage cases which do not exist in
the records of RTC-Shariff Aguak, Branch 15 or the Office of the Clerk of Court of the Regional Trial
Court, Cotabato City. There is nothing to show that (1) proceedings were had on the questioned cases; (2)
docket fees had been paid; (3) the parties were notified of a scheduled hearing as calendared; (4) hearings
had been conducted; or (5) the cases were submitted for decision. As found by the Audit Team, the list of
case titles submitted by the Local Civil Registrars of Manila and Quezon City are not found in the list of
cases filed, pending or decided in RTC, Branch 15, Shariff Aguak, nor in the records of the Office of the
Clerk of Court of the Regional Trial Court, Cotabato City. In other words, Judge Indar, who had sworn to
faithfully uphold the law, issued decisions on the questioned annulment of marriage cases, without any
showing that such cases underwent trial and complied with the statutory and jurisprudential requisites for
voiding marriages. Such act undoubtedly constitutes gross misconduct.

The Court condemns Judge Indars reprehensible act of issuing Decisions that voided marital union, without
conducting any judicial proceedings. Such malfeasance not only makes a mockery of marriage and its life-
changing consequences, but likewise grossly violates the basic norms of truth, justice and due process.
PHILIP YU vs. VIVECA LIM YU
G.R. No. 200072, 20 June 2016. Third Division (Peralta, J.)

Topic: Legal Separation

Facts
Petitioner Philip Yu and respondent Viveca Yu were married on November 18, 1984. However, Viveca left
the conjugal home with their four (4) children and filed a Petition for Legal Separation against Philip, for
repeated violence grossly abusive conduct against her and the children, sexual infidelity, and attempt on
her life. Pursuant thereto, she prayed for distribution of their conjugal partnership valued at approximately
Php 5,000,000.00.
Philip, on the other hand, denied the accusations against him, claiming that it was Viveca who attacked him
few times. After the marriage, he discovered Vivecas excessively jealous, cynical and insecure behavior.
Philip prayed in his Counterclaim for the declaration of nullity of their marriage due to Vivecas
psychological incapacity, rendering her incapable of complying with her marital obligations. Thereafter,
Philip filed a Motion to Withdraw Counterclaim for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage.

Issue
WON Petition for Legal Separation will be granted.

Ruling
No. The trial court dismissed the Petition for Legal Separation on ground that the parties are in pari delicto.
In this case, respondents illicit relationship with Linda Daet and his repeated verbal and physical abuses
towards petitioner come within the purview of pars. 8 and 1 of Art. 55 of the Family Code of the Philippines;
whereas petitioners unjustifiable abandonment bringing with their children without the knowledge and
consent of respondent and her assaulting respondent with a 10-inch knife are those contemplated in pars.
10 and 9 of the same code.
Notwithstanding the forgoing, the same becomes moot with the declaration of nullity of the marriage of the
parties, on the ground of the psychological incapacity of Viveca Yu. Since the marriage of the parties was
declared a nullity, there is, therefore, no legal basis to issue a decree of legal separation to the spouses
whose marriage has already been declared as no force and effect.

***The Decision granting the Petition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage filed by Philip Yu was subsequently nullified by the
Supreme Court, on ground that Viveca was deprived of her opportunity to be informed and to participate in the said proceedings,
due to deceitful scheme employed by Philip Yu in the service of summons to the latter.
VIRGINIA D. CALIMAG vs. HEIRS OF SILVESTRA N. MACAPAZ, as represented by
Anastacio Macapaz Jr.
G.R. No. 191936. 01 June 2016. Third Division (Reyes, J.)

Topic: Valid Marriage

Facts
Virginia Calimag co-owned a property with Silvestra Macapaz. The said property was allegedly sold by
Silvestra to Virginia prior to her death; hence, a new Certificate of Title was issued in the name Viginia.
Pursuant thereto, the heirs of Silvestra, as represented by Anastacio, one of the children of Silvestras
brother, instituted a criminal complaint for two counts of falsification of public documents under Arts. 171
and 172 of the RPC against Virgina,; and an action for Annulment of the Deed of Sale and Cancellation of
TCT No. 221466.
However, Virginia, in her Answer, averred that respondents have no legal capacity to institute the said
action on ground that they are illegitimate children of Anastacio Sr. As such, they have no right over
Silvestras estate pursuant to Art. 992 of the Civil Code which prohibits illegitimate children from inheriting
intestate from the legitimate children and relatives of their father or mother. Further, the marriage contract
presented by the respondents was a mere fax copy/photocopy, which was not even authenticated by the
concerned Local Civil Register, hence, inadmissible under the Best Evidence Rule; the Certificate of
Canonical Marriage presented is not the same as the marriage license required under Arts. 3 and 4 of the
Family Code; and the certificates of live birth of the respondents do not conclusively prove that ther are
legitimate children of Anastacio, Sr.
Issue
WON the respondents are legal heirs of Silvestra Macapaz.
Ruling
Yes. Respondents are legal heirs of Silvestra Macapaz.
It is well-settled that other proofs can be offered to establish the fact of a solemnized marriage. The fact of
marriage may be proven by relevant evidence other than the marriage certificate.
Jurisprudence provides that, persons dwelling together in apparent matrimony are presumed in the absence
of any counter presumption or evidence special to the case, to be in fact married. A presumption established
by our Code of Civil Procedure is that a man and a woman deporting themselves as husband and wife have
entered into a lawful contract of marriage. (Semper praesumitur pro matrimonio - - - always presume
marriage)
In this case, the established period of cohabitation of Anastacio, Sr. and Fidela transpired wasy before the
effectivity of the Family Code, the strong presumption accorded by then Art. 220 of the Civil Code in favor
of the validity of marriage cannot be disregarded.
*** In addition, Supreme Court anchored their decision in upholding the legitimate filiation of the respondents on their respective
Certificates of Live Birth, duly executed consistent with the provision of the law respecting the registration of birth of legitimate
children.
RENATO A. CASTILLO vs. LEA P. DE LEON CASTILLO
G.R. No. 189607. 18 April 2016. First Division (Sereno, C.J.)

Topic: Valid Marriage

Facts
Respondent married Benjamin Bautista in 1972; she also married petitioner in 1979. Renato filed a Petition
for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage, praying that his marriage to Lea be declared void due to her
subsisting marriage to Bautista. Respondent, on the other hand, contended that her marriage with Bautista
was null and void as they had not secured any license, and neither of them was a member of the
denomination to which the solemnizing officer belonged.
The trial court declared the marriage between petitioner and respondent null and void ab initio on ground
that it was bigamous marriage under Art. 41 of the Family Code; Lea failed to obtain a judicial decree of
nullity for her first marriage to Bautista before contracting her second marriage with Renato. However, CA
upheld the validity of the second marriage, anchored on ground that Leas marriages were solemnized in
1972 and in 1979, or prior to the effectivity of the Family Code on August 3, 1988.

Issue
WON the second marriage is valid.

Ruling
Yes. The marriage between petitioner and respondent herein is valid.

Under the Civil Code, a void marriage differs from a voidable marriage in the following ways: (1) a void
marriage is nonexistent, while in a voidable marriage, the marriage is valid until annulled by a competent
court; (2) a void marriage cannot be ratified, while a voidable marriage can be ratified by cohabitation; (3)
being nonexistent, a void marriage can be collaterally attacked, while a voidable marriage cannot be
collaterally attacked; (4) in a void marriage, there is no conjugal partnership and the offspring are natural
children by legal fiction, while in voidable marriage there is conjugal partnership and the children conceived
before the decree of annulment are considered legitimate; and (5) in a void marriage no judicial decree
to establish the invalidity is necessary, while in a voidable marriage there must be a judicial decree.

Emphasizing the fifth difference, the Court held that the Civil Code contains no express provision on the
necessity of a judicial declaration of nullity of a void marriage. The validity of a marriage and all its
incident must be determined in accordance with the law in effect at the time of its celebration. In this case,
the law applicable is the Civil Code, and the requirement of a judicial decree of nullity does not apply to
marriages that were celebrated before the effectivity of the Family Code.
DR. ELMAR O. PEREZ vs. ATTY. TRISTAN A. CATINDIG and ATTY. KAREN E. BAYDO
A.C. No. 5816. 10 March 2015. En Banc

Topic: Subsequent Marriage is void ab initio on ground that the Divorce Decree was issued by a foreign
court.

Facts
Atty. Catindig was married to Lily Gomez, that notwithstanding, he court Dr. Perez and told her that he
was in the process of obtaining a divorce in a foreign country to dissolve his marriage to Gomez. In 1984,
Atty. Catindig and Gomez obtained a divorce decree from the Dominican Republic, where neither of them
are citizens no residents/domiciled. Thereafter, Atty. Catindig married Dr. Perez in the state of Viriginia,
USA. In 2001, Atty. Catindig allegedly had an amorous relationship with Atty. Baylo, and pursuant thereto,
he filed a Petition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage with Gomez. Atty. Catindig abandoned Dr. Perez
and their children.

Issue
WON Atty. Catindig is liable for gross immorality and violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility.

Ruling
Atty. Catindig is liable.
The facts gathered from the evidence adduced by the parties and, ironically, from Atty. Catindigs own
admission, indeed establish a pattern of conduct that is grossly immoral; it is not only corrupt and
unprincipled, but reprehensible to a high degree.

A year after pursuing Dr. Perez, Atty. Catindig had a de facto separation from Gomez, dissolved their
conjugal partnership of gains, obtained a divorce decree from a court in the Dominican Republic, and
married Dr. Perez in the USA all in the same year. From his own admission, Atty. Catindig knew that the
divorce decree he obtained from the court in the Dominican Republic was not recognized in our jurisdiction
as he and Gomez were both Filipino citizens at that time. He knew that he was still validly married to
Gomez; that he cannot marry anew unless his previous marriage be properly declared a nullity. Otherwise,
his subsequent marriage would be void. This notwithstanding, he still married Dr. Perez. The foregoing
circumstances seriously taint Atty. Catindigs sense of social propriety and moral values. It is a blatant and
purposeful disregard of our laws on marriage.

It has also not escaped the attention of the Court that Atty. Catindig married Dr. Perez in the USA.
Considering that Atty. Catindig knew that his previous marriage remained valid, the logical conclusion is
that he wanted to marry Dr. Perez in the USA for the added security of avoiding any charge of bigamy by
entering into the subsequent marriage outside Philippine jurisdiction.

Moreover, assuming arguendo that Atty. Catindigs claim is true, it matters not that Dr. Perez knew that
their marriage is a nullity. The fact still remains that he resorted to various legal strategies in order to render
a faade of validity to his otherwise invalid marriage to Dr. Perez. Such act is, at the very least, so
unprincipled that it is reprehensible to the highest degree.

Further, after 17 years of cohabiting with Dr. Perez, and despite the various legal actions he resorted to in
order to give their union a semblance of validity, Atty. Catindig left her and their son. It was only at that
time that he finally decided to properly seek the nullity of his first marriage to Gomez. Apparently, he was
then already entranced with the much younger Atty. Baydo, an associate lawyer employed by his firm.

While the fact that Atty. Catindig decided to separate from Dr. Perez to pursue Atty. Baydo, in itself, cannot
be considered a grossly immoral conduct, such fact forms part of the pattern showing his propensity towards
immoral conduct. Lest it be misunderstood, the Courts finding of gross immoral conduct is hinged not on
Atty. Catindigs desertion of Dr. Perez, but on his contracting of a subsequent marriage during the
subsistence of his previous marriage to Gomez.
CAGAYAN II ELECTRIC COOPERATIVE, INC. vs. ALLAN RAPANAN and MARY GINE
TANGONAN
G.R. No. 199886. 3 December 2014. Third Division (Villarama, Jr., J.)

Topic: Common law wife is not a legal heir of the common law husband.

Facts
A m otorcycle with three (3) passengers figured in a mishap; while they were traversing the national
highway, they were struck and electrocuted by a live tension wire from one of the electric posts owned by
petitioner Cagayan II Electric Coooperativ, Inc. The said motorcycle was driven by its owner Camillo
Tangonan, who died from the accident, while his companions Allan Rapanan and Erwin Coloma suffered
injuries. Pursuant thereto, Rapanan and Camilo;s common law wife, respondent Mary Gine, filed a
complaint for damages against petitioner. During the trial, respondents and Mary Gine testified. On the
latters testimony, she admitted that she is not married to Camilo, but they are living together and they have
one child. The trial court rendered a decision in favor of the petitioner Electric Complany and dismissed
the said complaint on ground that the proximate cause of the incident is the negligence and imprudence of
Camilo in driving the motorcycle; and that respondent Mary Gine has no legal personality to institute the
action.

Issue
WON respondent Mary Gine has legal personality to institute the action for damages against herein
petitioner.

Ruling
No.
In this case, Mary Gene, as a mere common law wife of Camilo, she is not considered a legal heir of the
latter, and hence, has no legal personality to institute the action for damages due to Camilos death.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. EDGAR JUMAWAN
G.R. No. 187495. 21 April 2014. First Division (Reyes, J.)

Topic: Rights and Obligations between Spouses vis--vis Marital Rape/Marital Sexual Assault

Facts

Accused and his wife KKK were married in 1975; they lived together since then and raised four (4) children.
In 1999, KKK executed a Complaint-Affidavit, alleging that her husband raped her on two separate
occasions at their residence. The Office of the City Prosecutor found probable cause for grave threats, less
physical injuries and rape, and recommended that appropriate criminal information be filed against accused.
The Information states that accused boxed KKK when the latter refused to have sexual intercourse with
him, thereafter he succeed to have carnal knowledge against KKKs will. Pursuant thereto, Accused was
arrested upon a warrant. During the arraignment and re-arraignment, he maintained his not guilty plea on
both indictments and a joint trial of the two cases ensued.
The trial court sustained the version proffered by the prosecution by giving weight and credence to the
spontaneous and straightforward testimonies of the prosecutions witnesses, KKK, MMM and OOO, the
accused and KKKs children. CA affirmed in toto the RTCs ruling, and rejected the accuseds argument
that since he and KKK are husband and wife with mutual obligations of and right to sexual intercourse,
there must be convincing physical evidence of manifestation of the alleged force and intimidation used
upon KKK such as bruises. CA explained that physical showing of external injuries is not indispensable to
prosecute and convict a person for rape; what is necessary is that the victim was forced o have sexual
intercourse with the accused.

Issue
WON accused is liable for rape.

Ruling
Yes.
The old provisions of rape under Art. 335 of the Revised Penal Code, adhered to Hales irrevocable implied
consent theory, albeit in a limited form. According to Chief Justice Ramon C. Aquino, a husband may not
be guilty of rape under Art. 335 of Act No. 3815 but, in case there is legal separation, the husband should
be held guilty of rape if he forces his wife to submit to sexual intercourse.
The Philippines, however, in 1981, joined in ratifying the United Nations Conventions on the Elimination
of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (UNN-CEDAW), banning all forms of discrimination
against women. In compliance with the foregoing international commitments, Philippines enshrined the
principle of gender equality in the 1987 Constitution, specifically in Secs. 11 and 14 of Art. II THEREOF.
The Legislature then pursued the enactment of laws to propagate gender equality. In 1997, Republic Act
No. 8353 eradicated the stereotype concept of rape in Art. 335 of the RPC. The law reclassified rape as a
crime against person and removed it from the ambit of crimes against chastity. Par. 2 of Sec. 2 read in
conjunction with Sec. 1 of the law, unqualifiedly uses the term man in defining rape, it is unmistakably
that the said law penalizes the crime without regard to rapists legal relationship with his victim.
The paradigm shift on marital rape in the Philippine jurisdiction is further affirmed by Republic Act No.
9262, which regards rape within marriage as a form of sexual violence that may be committed by a man
against his wife within or outside the family abode.
Clearly, it is now acknowledged that rape, as a form of sexual violence, exists within marriage. A man who
penetrates her wife without her consent or against her will commits sexual violence upon her, and the
Philippines, as a State Party to CEDAW and its accompanying Declaration, defines and penalizes the act
as rape under Republic Act No. 8353.
It is true that the Family Code obligates the spouses to love one another but this rule sanctions
affection and sexual intimacy, as expressions of love, that are both spontaneous and mutual and not
the kind which is unilaterally exacted by force or coercion.

Further, the delicate and reverent nature of sexual intimacy between a husband and wife excludes cruelty
and coercion. Sexual intimacy brings spouses wholeness and oneness. It is a gift and a participation in the
mystery of creation. It is a deep sense of spiritual communion. It is a function which enlivens the hope of
procreation and ensures the continuation of family relations. It is an expressive interest in each other's
feelings at a time it is needed by the other and it can go a long way in deepening marital relationship. When
it is egoistically utilized to despoil marital union in order to advance a felonious urge for coitus by force,
violence or intimidation, the Court will step in to protect its lofty purpose, vindicate justice and protect our
laws and State policies. Besides, a husband who feels aggrieved by his indifferent or uninterested wife's
absolute refusal to engage in sexual intimacy may legally seek the court's intervention to declare her
psychologically incapacitated to fulfill an essential marital obligation. But he cannot and should not demand
sexual intimacy from her coercively or violently.