DACLAG VS MACAHILIG

FACTS:
To repeat, records show that Maxima entered into a Deed of Extra-
judicial Partition with the heirs of her two deceased brothers, namely: Mario
and Eusebio, over seven parcels of land owned
by Candido and Gregoria Macahilig. One of these lands was the
irrigated riceland with an area of 1,896 sq. meters which, per the Deed of
Partition, was divided between the heirs of Mario and Eusebio; and the
former got the one half southern portion, while the latter got the one half
northern portion. Maxima affixed her thumbmark to the Deed. This parcel
of riceland was sold by Maxima to petitioners. However, Maxima, at the
time of the execution of the Deed of Sale over this parcel of land in favor of
petitioner on May 23, 1984, had no right to sell the same as she was not
the owner thereof.
In fact, Maxima, with the conformity of her husband Pedro, had even
executed a Statement of Conformity, in which she affirmed the execution of
the Deed of Extra-judicial Partition and conformed to the manner of the
partition of shares therein. She attested to the fact that the five parcels of
land subject of the Deed of Extra-judicial Partition, which were declared in
her name under different tax declarations, were actually properties of her
deceased parents; and that she waived all her rights over the lands or
portions thereof adjudicated to all her co-heirs.
Neither Maxima nor any of her heirs ever questioned the validity of
these two above-mentioned documents to which she affixed
her thumbmarks. Notably, when the instant complaint was filed by
respondents against Maxima and petitioners in 1991, in which respondents
claimed as basis of their ownership of the one half northern portion of
the riceland was the Deed of Extra-judicial Partition, Maxima, while still
living at that time, as she died in 1993, never denied the same. As already
stated, she failed to file an answer and was declared in default.
ISSUE:
WON reconveyance is the proper remedy.
RULING:
 We find that reconveyance of the subject land to respondents is
proper. The essence of an action for reconveyance is that the free patent
and certificate of title are respected as incontrovertible. What is sought is
the transfer of the property, which has been wrongfully or erroneously
registered in another person's name, to its rightful owner or to one with a
better right.[24]
Respondents have specifically prayed that petitioners be ordered to
restore and reconvey to them the subject land. In an action
for reconveyance, the issue involved is one of ownership; and for this
purpose, evidence of title may be introduced. Respondents had sufficiently
established that Parcel One, covered by OCT No. P-13873, of which
respondents' northern one half portion formed a part, was not owned by
Maxima at the time she sold the land to petitioners. We have earlier
discussed the evidence presented by respondents establishing that
Maxima had no claim of ownership over the land sold by her to petitioners.
An action for reconveyance prescribes in 10 years, the point of
reference being the date of registration of the deed or the date of issuance
of the certificate of title over the property.[25]Records show that while the
land was registered in the name of petitioner Rogelia in 1984, the instant
complaint for reconveyance was filed by the respondents in 1991, and was
thus still within the ten-year prescriptive period.

REPUBLIC VS CA
FACTS:
Both Republic and respondents Alfredo V. de Ocampo and Oscar Anglo
claim ownership over the same lots, i.e,, Nos. 817 and 2509 of the Sagay-
Escalante Cadastre, Negros Occidental, subject matter of this litigation.
The basis of Republic's claim is that said lots were bequeathed to the
Bureau of Education (now Bureau of Public Schools) on September 21,
1926 by the late Esteban Jalandoni through his will. 3 Republic further
alleged that the said parcels of land were already registered under the
Torrens System "before 1919 in a cadastral case in the name of Meerkamp
and Company" in whose favor Original Certificate of Title (OCT, for short)
No. 370 was issued, that said company sold the lots to Esteban Jalandoni
who was issued Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT, for short) No. 1251: that
TCT No. 6014 was issued to the Bureau of Education when the subject
property was bequeathed to it; and that as a matter of fact, a sugar quota
(Plantation Audit No. 24-10) was issued for the lots under the name of the
Bureau of Education. 4 The lots have a total area of 289.47 hectares. 5
Respondent de Ocampo, upon the other hand, predicates his claim on an
application for registration of the same Lots Nos. 817 and 2509 in Land
Registration Case No. N-4, LRC Rec. No. N-19196, wherein a decree of
registration No. 105538 was issued over the lots, followed by the issuance
in his name of OCT No. 576, on October 1, 1965. 6 He averred that the lots
were unregistered lands belonging to and possessed by him, by virtue of a
donation dated November 10, 1911 from one Luis Mosquera. 7
Respondent Anglo intervened in the case on February 21, 1966, having
allegedly bought the same lots from respondent de Ocampo on January 6,
1966. TCT No. 42217 was issued to him (Anglo) on January 12, 1966. 8

ISSUE:
WON land registration court is with jurisdiction to decree again the
registration of land already registered in an earlier registration case
RULING:
Authorities are in agreement that a land registration court is without
jurisdiction to decree again the registration of land already registered in an
earlier registration case, and that the second decree entered for the same
land is null and void. 73 If there is no valid and final judgment by the land
registration court to speak of, then the filing of an admittedly late appeal
from the decision denying the Amended Petition would be immaterial and
of no moment, in so far as these proceedings are concerned in view of the
congenitally fatal infirmity that attaches to the main decision. decreeing for
the second time the registration of the same Lots Nos. 817 and 2509 in
favor of respondent de Ocampo, despite an earlier registration in the name
of Meerkamp and Company. Jurisprudence holds that the appellant's
failure to perfect an appeal on time, "although ordinarily decisive, carries no
persuasive force" and may be completely disregarded if the trial court acted
without jurisdiction. 74 As held in United States v. Jayme, 75 lack of
jurisdiction. la jurisdiction over the subject matter is fatal and may be raised
at any stage of the proceedings. Jurisdiction is conferred by the sovereign
authority which organizes the court; it is given only by law, and in the
manner prescribed by law and an objection on the lack of such jurisdiction
cannot be waived by the parties. The infirmity cannot be cured by silence,
acquiescence, or even by express consent, 76 or by win of the parties.

TIRO VS PES

FACTS:
Guillerma Tiro et al. filed before the RTC a Complaint for Quieting of
Title against PES. Petitioners alleged that they are the children of the
late Julian Tiro. They averred that they and their predecessors-in-interest
had been in actual possession of the disputed land since time immemorial
until they were prevented from entering the same by persons claiming to be
the new owners sometime in 1995. But they discovered that OCT No. RO-
1121 had already been cancelled as early as 1969 and was presently
registered in the name of respondent. The petitioners prayed that all the
transactions emanating from the "Extrajudicial Declaration of Heirs and
Confirmation of Sale," executed by Maxima Ochea, be declared void,
including the transfer made in favor of the respondent; that the title which
was issued in the name of respondent be cancelled; and that the property
be restored and registered in the name of the petitioners.
Respondent claimed that its predecessor-in-interest Pacific Rehouse
Corporation acquired the subject land from the Spouses Velayo, the
registered owners of the property who were also in possession of the same
at the time of the sale. Respondent argued that petitioners action for
quieting of title was barred by laches and prescription. The RTC issued a
decision dismissing petitioners complaint. The RTC ruled that respondent
was an innocent purchaser for value who relied on the correctness of the
certificate of title in the name of the vendor. The petitioners filed with the
CA an appeal and MR but were denied.
ISSUE:

RULING:
A person is considered in law as an innocent purchaser for value
when he buys the property of another, without notice that some other
person has a right or an interest in such property, and pays a full price for
the same at the time of such purchase, or before he has notice of the
claims or interest of some other person in the property. A person dealing
with registered land may safely rely on the correctness of the certificate of
title of the vendor/transferor, and the law will in no way oblige him to go
behind the certificate to determine the condition of the property. The courts
cannot disregard the rights of innocent third persons, for that would impair
or erode public confidence in the torrens system of land registration. Thus,
a title procured by fraud or misrepresentation can still be the source of a
completely legal and valid title if the same is in the hands of an innocent
purchaser for value.

AFPMBAI VS SANTIAGO
FACTS:
On September 14, 1994, the Notice of Levy was presented for
registration in the Registry of Deeds of Pasig City. The Notice was entered
in the Primary Entry Book under Entry No. PT-1305. However, it was not
annotated on TCT No. PT-79252 because the original copy of said title on
file in the Registry of Deeds was not available at that time.
6 days after the presentation of the Notice of Levy, a Deed of
Absolute Sale dated February 24, [1994], executed by EBR Realty
Corporation in favor of Ines B. Santiago involving the same parcel of land
covered by TCT No. PT-79252 was presented for registration and entered
under Entry No. PT-1653. The deed of sale was examined by the same
employee who examined the notice of levy, but she failed to notice that the
title subject of the sale was the same title which was the subject of the
notice of levy earlier presented. Unaware of the previous presentation of
the notice of levy, the Register of Deeds issued TCT No. PT-94912 in the
name of vendee Ines B. Santiago on the basis of the deed of sale. It was
only after the Register of Deeds had already acted on the said deed of sale
that the same employee informed him of the presentation of the notice of
levy.
The LRA ruled that the subject Notice of Levy cannot be annotated
on TCT No. PT-94912, except by order of the court.
ISSUE:
Whether a declaration from the court that respondent is a purchaser in bad
faith is necessary before the notice of levy on attachment may be
annotated
RULING:
Respondent cannot be considered an innocent purchaser for value.
Under the rule of notice, it is presumed that the purchaser has examined
every instrument of record affecting the title. Such presumption is
irrebuttable. He is charged with notice of every fact shown by the record
and is presumed to know every fact shown by the record and to know every
fact which an examination of the record would have disclosed. This
presumption cannot be overcome by proof of innocence or good faith.
Otherwise, the very purpose and object of the law requiring a record would
be destroyed. Such presumption cannot be defeated by proof of want of
knowledge of what the record contains any more than one may be
permitted to show that he was ignorant of the provisions of the law. The
rule that all persons must take notice of the facts which the public record
contains is a rule of law. The rule must be absolute; any variation would
lead to endless confusion and useless litigation.12 For these reasons, a
declaration from the court that respondent was in bad faith is not necessary
in order that the notice of levy on attachment may be annotated on TCT
No. PT-94912.
The fact that the notice of levy on attachment was not annotated on
the original title on file in the Registry of Deeds, which resulted in its non-
annotation on TCT No. PT-94912, should not prejudice petitioner. As long
as the requisites required by law in order to effect attachment are complied
with and the appropriate fees duly paid, attachment is duly perfected. The
attachment already binds the land. This is because what remains to be
done lies not within the petitioners power to perform but is a duty
incumbent solely on the Register of Deeds.

PNB VS IAC july 1991

FACTS:
For failure of the Balingit spouses to settle their loan obligation with
PNB, the latter extrajudicially foreclosed the sixteen (16) parcels of land
covered by the real estate mortgages executed by the said spouses in
favor of PNB.
Upon the expiration of the one-year legal redemption period,
petitioner consolidated in its name the ownership of all the foregoing
mortgaged properties for which new transfer certificates of title were issued
in its name. However, the annotation of the notice of levy in favor of private
respondent was carried over to and now appears as the sole annotated
encumbrance in the new titles of petitioner.
Petitioner filed with the Regional Trial Court of Alaminos, Pangasinan
and docketed therein as LRC No. A-229, Record No. N-33399, a petition
for the cancellation of a memorandum of encumbrance annotated upon its
sixteen (16) transfer certificates of title.

ISSUE:
WON PROPER FORECLOSURE WILL LIKEWISE FORECLOSE THE
SUBORDINATE LIENS

RULING:
The rule is that upon a proper foreclosure of a prior mortgage, all
liens subordinate to the mortgage are likewise foreclosed, and the
purchaser at public auction held pursuant thereto acquires title free from
the subordinate liens. Ordinarily, thereafter the Register of Deeds is
authorized to issue the new titles without carrying over the annotation of
subordinate liens.15 In a case with similar features, we had earlier held that
the failure of the subsequent attaching creditor to redeem, within the time
allowed by Section 6 of Act 3136, the land which was sold extrajudicially to
satisfy the first mortgage, gives the purchaser a perfect right to secure the
cancellation of the annotation of said creditor's attachment lien on the
certificates of title of said land.16
It has likewise been declared in Bank of the Philippine Islands, etc., et al.
vs. Noblejas, etc., et al.,17 that "(a)ny subsequent lien or encumbrance
annotated at the back of the certificates of title cannot in any way prejudice
the mortgage previously registered, and the lots subject thereto pass to the
purchaser at the public auction sale free from any lien or encumbrance.
Otherwise, the value of the mortgage could be easily destroyed by a
subsequent record of an adverse claim, for no one would purchase at a
foreclosure sale if bound by the posterior claim. . . . This alone is sufficient
justification for the dropping of the adverse claim from the new certificates
of title to be issued to her, as directed by respondent Commissioner in his
opinion subject of this appeal."

ARRAZOLA VS BERNAS 1978

FACTS:
Elviro Bernas disinherited his adopted daughter Teresita and when
he was 79 years old , he executed a notarized will instituting his brother
and sister as heirs to all his properties including the lots which he had
involuntary transferred to Teresita. In 1967, Elviro died. On December,
1967, Pedro A. Bernas filed with the register of deeds of Capiz a verified
notice of adverse claim. A copy of the will was attached to the adverse
claim.
After the register of deeds had annotated the adverse claim on the
transfer certificates of title, Teresita filed in the cadastral and probate
proceedings a motion for the cancellation of the annotation of adverse
claim. The motion was predicated on the grounds that she was not served
with prior notice" of the adverse claim and that there was "no petition for
approval or justification" filed with the court. Pedro A. Bernas and Soledad
Bernas Alivio opposed the motion. The lower court in its order of August
20, 1968 granted it and ordered the register of deeds to cancel the
annotation. The oppositors appealed.

ISSUE:
WON THE LOWER COURT WAS CORRECT IN CANCELLING THE
ADVERSE CLAIM
RULING:
NO. It is true that the will of Elviro Bernas has not yet been probated
but the fact is that there is a pending proceeding for its probate. Because of
that will, Teresita's title to the two lots have become controversial. To alert
third persons, or for that matter the whole world, to the fact that Pedro A.
Bernas and Soledad Bernas Alivio have an adverse claim on the two lots,
section 110 of Act No. 496 gives them the remedy of causing to be
annotated their adverse claim on the titles of the two lots. If that remedy is
not given to them, then the registered owner can transfer the lots to an
innocent purchaser for value and, in that event, the unregistered adverse
claim will be nullified or frustrated
The purpose of annotating the adverse claim on the title of the
disputed land is to apprise third persons that there is a controversy over the
ownership of the land and to preserve and protect the right of the adverse
claimant during the pendency of the controversy. It is a notice to third
persons that any transaction regarding the disputed land is subject to the
outcome of the dispute.

LOPEZ VS ESQUIVEL
FACTS:
Hermogenes Lopez (Hermogenes) was the father of the Lopez
siblings. During Hermogenes lifetime, he applied with the Bureau of Lands
for a homestead patent over a parcel of land, with an area of 19.4888
hectares, located in Barrio dela Paz, Antipolo, Rizal.
 Unaware that he had already been awarded a homestead patent over
the 19.4888-hectare land, Hermogenes sold[11] the same to Ambrocio
Aguilar (Aguilar) by virtue of a Deed of Absolute Sale[12] dated 31 July
1959.
Years later, it was allegedly discovered that the subject property, with
an area of 2.6950 hectares, was erroneously included in survey plan H-
138612 of Hermogenes property. The subject property supposedly formed
part of the land owned by Lauro Hizon (Hizon), which adjoined that of
Hermogenes. Resultantly, on 29 November 1965, Hermogenes executed a
Quitclaim[13] over his rights and interests to the subject property[14] in Hizons
favor. Hizon, in turn, sold the subject property to Esquivel and Talens, as
evidenced by a Deed of Absolute Sale of Unregistered Land[15] dated 26
August 1968.
On 4 April 1995 in LRC Case No. No. 93-1211, the RTC granted the
Application for Registration of the subject property filed by Esquivel and
Talens despite the opposition of the heirs of Hermogenes.

ISSUE:
WON lands erroneously included in a homestead patent must be returned
RULING:
Even assuming that the homestead patent awarding the 19.4888-
hectare land to Hermogenes did erroneously include the subject property,
Hermogenes could not simply convey said property to Hizon, nor could
Hizon easily recover the same, by virtue of a mere Quitclaim. Lands
acquired under homestead patents come from the public domain. If the
subject property was erroneously included in the homestead patent
awarded to Hermogenes, then the subject property must be returned to the
State and not to Hizon. Furthermore, the survey plan conducted and
homestead patent issued in Hermogenes name covered a 19.4888-hectare
land; to exclude therefrom the 2.6950-hectare subject property (since it
purportedly belonged to Hizon) would mean that Hermogenes actually
acquired land with an area less that what he was awarded under the
homestead patent. This complication reveals that any alleged mistake as
regards the subject property is not a simple and private matter between
Hermogenes and Hizon; but is primarily a problem between Hermogenes
and the State, the latter having awarded the 19.4888-hectare land to the
former by virtue of the homestead patent.

REPUBLIC VS MINA L-60685

FACTS:
On July 7, 1967, defendant August Mina filed with the Bureau of
Lands a Free Patent Application for tract of land. Relying on the information
supplied and/or affirmations made, by defendant Mina in his aforesaid free
patent, and after routinary field investigation and processing, the Director of
Lands on approved said free patent application. Said patent was register
to the Register of Deeds and and Original Certificate of Title No. P-1382
was issue therefor in the name of defendant Augusto Mina;
Subsequently, however, Esguerra Jr. filed with the Bureau of Lands a
petition assailing the validity of the patient issued to defendant Augusto
Mina claiming that the latter obtained the same by means of fraud and
misrepresentation
Acting on the petition of Esguerra, Jr, an investigation was conducted
by the Bureau of Lands which revealed that neither defendant Augusto
Mina's free patient application aforesaid had been fraudulently obtained
hereby prompting the Director of Land to issue an order: the proper court
action be initialized for the cancellation of the patent and the corresponding
certificate title issued, and for the reversion of the covered thereby to the
state.

ISSUE:
Won failure of grantee to comply with conditions will nullify the patent
RULING:
 The alleged misrepresentation of the applicant that he had been
occupying and cultivating the land are sufficiently grounds to nullify the
patent and title under Section 91 of the Public Land Law.
A certificate of title that is void may be ordered canceled. And, a title
will be considered void if it is procured through fraud, as when a person
applies for registration of the land on the claim that he has been occupying
and cultivating it. In the case of disposable public lands, failure on the part
of the grantee to comply with the conditions imposed by law is a ground for
holding such title void. The lapse of the one (1) year period within which a
decree of title may be reopened for fraud would not prevent the
cancellation thereof for the hold that a little may become indefeasible by
registration, even if such title had been secured through fraud or in violation
of the law would be the height of absurdity. Registration should not be a
shield of fraud in securing. A title founded on fraud may be canceled,
notwithstanding the lapse of one year from the issuance thereof.
Thus, the right of reversion or reconveyance to the state is not barred
by prescription.

LAYOS VS FIL ESTATE GOLF GR 150470

FACTS: In a previous case, Fil-Estate Golf (FEGDI) was the developer of a
golf course in Laguna along with La Paz who provided the properties
registered in its name. Thereafter, Layos filed for injunction against FEGDI
and alleged that he is the legal owner of the lands in question, and further
alleged an intrusion on the part of FEGDI and La Paz. Layos filed two
different cases in two separate courts, praying for the same thing.
Complaint was dismissed for forum-shopping.
Only months after instituting the injunction cases, Layos filed a complaint
for quieting of title against La Paz. Layos alleges that La Paz grabbed his
land and entered it without his consent. His main proof was the Original
Certificate Title No. 239, issued in his name. La Paz argues that Layos
never owned or possessed the land in question an in fact, it got the lands
from the government and it was issued the assailed Transfer Certificate of
Titles. The court ruled in favor of La Paz and declared their titles to be
indefeasible and found the OCT of Layos to be spurious.
Layos filed an action to reconstitute his title and many others opposed. The
court again denied this, reiterating that OCT 239 of Layos is forged.

ISSUE: Whether or not Layos is entitled to reconstitution.

HELD:No. Layos did not have a valid title to the said property because the
RTC ruled that it was forged.
Reconstitution or reconstruction of a certificate of title literally and within the
meaning of Republic Act No. 26 denotes restoration of the instrument
which is supposed to have been lost or destroyed in its original form and
condition. For an order of reconstitution to issue, the following elements
must be present:
1) the certificate of title has been lost or destroyed;
2) the petitioner is the registered owner or has an interest therein; and
3) the certificate of title is in force at the time it was lost or destroyed.
Courts have no jurisdiction over petitions for reconstitution of allegedly lost
or destroyed titles over lands that are already covered by duly issued
subsisting titles in the name of their duly registered owners.
When the court relied on the previous judgment in the injunction cases that
the OCT of Layos was forged, it did NOT entertain a collateral attack when
it dismissed the reconstitution case.