Académique Documents
Professionnel Documents
Culture Documents
KEY WORDS: Arab Spring, Syrian Military, Sunni Ofcers, Grievances, Sectarian
Stacking, Defection
2
An exception is Yezid Sayigh, Above the State: The Ofcers Republic in
Egypt (Washington DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace Aug.
2012), 138.
3
Nikolaos Van Dam, The Struggle for Power in Syria. Politics and Society Under Asad
and The Bath Party (New York: I.B.Tauris 1996).
4
Hanna Batatu, Syrias Peasantry, the Descendants of its Lesser Rural Notables and
Their Politics (Princeton, NJ: Princeton UP 1999), 21526.
628 Hicham Bou Nassif
7
McLauchlin, Ibid., 339.
8
Timothy Colton, Commissars, Commanders, and Civilian Authority: The Structure of
Soviet Military Politics (Cambridge, MA: Harvard UP 1979); Eric A. Nordlinger,
Soldiers In Politics. Military Coups And Governments (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice
Hall 1977); Roman Kolkowitz, The Soviet Military and the Communist Party
(Princeton UP 1967).
9
Samuel Decalo, Coups and Army Rule in Africa: Studies in Military Style (New Haven,
CT: Yale UP1976).
10
William Thompson, The Grievances of Military Coup-Makers (Beverly Hills, CA:
Sage Publications 1973).
630 Hicham Bou Nassif
full.
Research Design
This study builds on a series of in-depth interviews conducted in May,
June, and July 2014, with Syrian Sunni ofcers who had defected from
the military in 2012 and 2013. Except for one retired brigadier-general,
all my interviewees had been active-duty ofcers until they decided to
break with the Syrian regime. I conducted my interviews in two Turkish
towns situated on the borders with Syria, Antakya and Al Rihanle, both
of which have become major asylum centers for Syrian refugees since
the beginning of the uprising in 2011. Of the 24 ofcers I interviewed,
three were Brigadiers, ve Colonels, four Lieutenant-Colonels, four
Majors, ve Captains and three Second-Lieutenants. The preponder-
ance of ofcers serving in the teaching staff of Syrias military
academies, the Signal Corps, and Air Defense, reects the fact that
few Sunni ofcers are assigned to army positions within the military,
and even less are allowed to join the militarys elite troops such as the
4th Armored Division or the Special Forces Division.
The interviews I conducted in Turkey all followed a semi-structured,
open-ended format and lasted between two to ve hours each. There
was little variation among my interviewees in terms of age and rank as
most were middle and junior ofcers. The uniformity of my sample in
that regard reects the fact that few Sunni ofcers are promoted to the
higher ranks in the Syrian armed forces; most retire prior to becoming
brigadier (Aamid), and only a handful reaches the coveted rank of
major-general (Liwa). In addition, of those Sunni ofcers who did reach
the upper echelons in the armed forces few defected. Consequently, the
sample of Sunni ofcers available to be interviewed was relatively
homogenous in terms of age (late 20s; till late 30s/mid-40s) and position
in the military hierarchy. The rural background, common among the
overwhelming majority of my interviewees, added to the homogeneity
of the sample. The urban/rural divide line, central to Syrian politics, is
inconsequential within the ofcer corps, whose members hail
The Grievances of Sunni Ofcers in the Syrian Armed Forces 631
even more so, in the wake of the Hama massacre.12 Since the early
1980s, Alawis have made up 8085 percent of every new cohort
graduating from the military academy.13 Syria has a Sunni majority,
but the recruitment policies of the Asad regime have prevented the
demographic order from reproducing itself in the ofcer corps. The
fundamental complaint of Sunni ofcers is straightforward: Sectarian
stacking largely keeps them outside the military academy and the few of
them who are actually recruited into the ofcer corps see their careers
evolve in an institution heavily dominated by Alawis. The consequences
of the sectarian imbalance structure the ofcers careers throughout the
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12
Interview with Lieutenant-Colonel Ahmad Hakim (Asad Academy for Military
Engineering), 8 May, 2014, Antakya, Turkey.
13
This gure was given to me by all of my interviewees; I asked each of them about the
sectarian distribution in his cohort.
14
The other departments include the schools of administration; military technology;
electronic warfare; mining engineering; air defense; military transportation; armament;
and signal corps.
15
Interview with Second-Lieutenant Mamoun Nassar (Signal Corps), 12 May 2014,
Antakya, Turkey
16
Ibid.
The Grievances of Sunni Ofcers in the Syrian Armed Forces 633
Division,17 the Special Forces, and the Airborne Special Forces (Firqat
14 Inzal Jawwi).18 These divisions are preferred destinations for three
reasons: First, especially in the intelligence agencies, the nancial
advantages are great. Politicians and businessmen give generous
rewards to the intelligence ofcers who grant them protection.19
Ofcers assigned to the mukhabarat also get access to new cars and
free housing. According to Lieutenant-Colonel Yasser Nasser, a former
instructor at the Asad Academy for Military Engineering:
The only place in the air force I know of where Sunnis match, and
maybe outnumber Alawis, is the Tayfour military airport, close to the
borders with Iraq. This base is 90 kilometers away from Homs, deep
in the desert. It is situated in one of the most desolate, godforsaken
regions in Syria. This is where Sunnis in the air force are sent to serve.
What is true about the air force is also true about the army, which is
more dangerous from a regime-security perspective.26
The least attractive service in the armed forces is the air defense
brigades. Air defense bases are scattered all over the national
territory, some in the desert, or in remote areas on the frontier. No
one wants to be assigned there. Furthermore, ofcers and soldiers
manning air defense are constantly on alert; they get fewer leaves
23
Interview with Captain Hussam Sabbagh, ibid.
24
Mahir al-Asad is the younger brother of Bashar al-Asad.
25
Ibid.
26
Ibid.
The Grievances of Sunni Ofcers in the Syrian Armed Forces 635
than everyone else. That the number of Sunnis serving in the Syrian
military is highest in air defense says a lot about our situation in the
armed forces. Sunnis form less than 15 per cent of the ofcer corps yet
they handle all the hard work because they constantly need to prove
themselves in order to keep their jobs and get promoted. Alawis, by
contrast, are admitted to the academy for regime-security purposes.
Alawis do not have to spend much effort in order to move up in the
hierarchy; their sectarian identity sufces. 27
27
Interview with Major Mahmoud Abboud (Asad Academy for Military Engineering),
15 May 2014. Antakya, Turkey.
28
Interview with Second-Lieutenant Mamoun Nassar, ibid.
29
Ibid.
30
Ibid.
636 Hicham Bou Nassif
31
The informal network of Alawi military barons surrounding Bashar al-Asad, whose
members are blamed for the increased sectarian bias against Sunni ofcers in the Syrian
armed forces, includes: Mahir al-Asad (4thh Armored Division); Asef Shawkat (Deputy
Minister of Defense until his death in 2012); General Adli Habib (Special Forces);
Major-General Izz al-Din Ismael (Air Force Intelligence); Major-General Jamil Hassan
(Air Force Intelligence); Major-General Raq Shehade, (Military Security); Major-
General Hisham Ikhtiyar, (National Security Bureau); Brigadier Zoul al-Himma Shalish
(General Intelligence). Interview with a Colonel in the Special Forces who wished to
remain anonymous. 26 May 2014, Antakya, Turkey.
32
Interview with Brigadier-General Yahiya Hajal (Air Force). 6 June 2014, Antakya,
Turkey.
The Grievances of Sunni Ofcers in the Syrian Armed Forces 637
tanks as piles of junk.33 Air defense ofcers say that their equipment is
greatly inferior to that of the Israelis, who have no trouble jamming
Syrian radars, and the whole air defense system, each time Israeli jets y
over Syria.34 The technological woes of the Syrian armed forces are
blamed on the regimes insensitivity to the militarys need. Sunni ofcers
also pinpoint the corruption of Alawi senior ofcers, whom they accuse
of reaping generous dividends from shadowy deals with providers of
decient weaponry, unhindered by the authorities.35 My interviewees
stated repeatedly that Alawi ofcers control the bureau of military
inspection in the Syrian armed forces, and use their positions there to
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The venality of senior ofcers is also cited as the main reason for the
notorious exploitation of the rank and le. Syrias is an army of
conscripts; the performance of the Syrian armed forces in war is
dependent on their morale and training. The draftees, however, suffer
from difcult conditions during their military service. They live in
overcrowded barracks lacking in basic hygiene, wear worn-out military
fatigues and boots, and are provided with often defective Russian ries.
Conscripts sometimes go hungry because senior ofcers transfer sums
33
Interview with Colonel in the army who did not wish to be named, 7 May 2014, Al
Rihanle, Turkey.
34
Interview with Major Issam Kallas (Air Defense),. 14 May 2014, Antakya, Turkey.
35
Go visit the Alawi hinterland and you will nd castles built all over the place in Kafroun,
Beit Yashout, Kadmous, and other towns. In very Alawi village you will nd fancy villas
built on the best plots of land available. Ask about the owners and you will hear the names
of ofcers from the Shalish, Makhlouf, Ismael, Douba and Haidar clans. How did these
ofcers get the money to build these castles? Even a General in the Syrian armed forces does
not make more than 800 dollars per month. They make the money, and we get the decient
equipment. Interview with Lieutenant-Colonel Ahmad Hakim, ibid.
36
Interview with Major Iyad Jabra (Air Defense), 7 May 2014, Al Rihanle, Turkey.
638 Hicham Bou Nassif
I have always been convinced that if there would ever be war with
Israel, soldiers on the front would run away, rather than actually
ght. Soldiers know that their tanks can barely move, that their
armament is inadequate, and that generals steal sums allocated for
food. You dont put a soldier in these conditions and then ask him to
ght and win a battle against a military like the Israeli armed forces.40
The neglect of the armed forces was made even more problematic in
light of the preferential treatment lavished on the all-Alawi special
combat units. Air defense ofcers have asked to be equipped with the
portable surface-to-air 9K38 Igla missile ever since its latest version was
elded by the Russian armed forces in 2004. When Syria purchased
these missiles from Russia in 2006, however, it was to the exclusive
benet of the Republican Guard.42 Similarly, T-90 and T-80 Russian
battle tanks, the most effective in Syrias arsenal, remain the sole
37
Ibid.
38
Ibid.
39
Interview with Major Issam Kallas, Ibid.
40
Interview with Major Mahmoud Abboud,. ibid.
41
Interview with a Brigadier from the Air Force who did not wish to reveal his name, 28
May 2014, Al Rihanle, Turkey.
42
Interview with Major Iyad Jabra, ibid.
The Grievances of Sunni Ofcers in the Syrian Armed Forces 639
43
Ibid.
44
Interview with Brigadier Yahiya Hajal, ibid.
45
Interview with Colonel Maher Nawwar (Air Force), 15 May 2014, Antakya, Turkey.
46
Interview with Lieutenant-Colonel Ahmad Abboud, ibid.
47
See James Quinlivan, ibid.
640 Hicham Bou Nassif
president and his family; another cousin, Haz Makhluf, who heads unit
251 in the General Intelligence and is widely considered to be the real
commander of that service; yet another cousin, Hilal al-Asad, was
commander of the Military Police in the 4th Armored Division; and
Asads brother-in-law, Asif Shawkat, the strong man in the intelligence
apparatus until his death in 2012.48 Sunni ofcers maintain that Haz and
Bashar al-Asad have transformed the military into an appendix of the
ruling elite, instead of being an institution on its own.49
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48
See Hazem Saghieh, Al-Baath al-Souri. Tarikh Moujaz (Beirut: Dar al-Saqi 2011);
and Sobhi Hadidi, Halakat al-Asad al-Amniya, Hatmyat al-Tafakouk. . . Bad Ikhtibar
al-Nar, Jadaliya, 31 July 2011, http://www.jadaliyya.com/pages/index/2280/%D8%
B5%D8%A8%D8%AD%D9%8A.
49
In the words of one of my interviewees: Until 1963, the Syrian armed forces were a
national institution. The Baathi coup that year transformed the military into a party
militia. Asads so-called corrective movement in 1970 then changed the militia into
family business. Interview with a Brigadier (army) who did not wish to be named, 28
June 2014,. Antakya, Turkey.
50
Interview with Second-Lieutenant Mamoun Nassar.Ibid.
The Grievances of Sunni Ofcers in the Syrian Armed Forces 641
51
Interview with Lieutenant-Colonel Ahmed Abdel-Qader (Asad Academy for Military
Engineering). 8 May, 2014. Antakya, Turkey.
52
Interview with Major Iyad Shamsy (Air Defense). Al Rihanle, Turkey, 7 May 2014.
642 Hicham Bou Nassif
maintain that they joined the military academy because it offered good
prospects for young men hailing from the rural lower middle classes,
not because they believed that the armed forces were being prepared to
defend Syria or to liberate Palestine. A combination of factors made the
regimes ideological claims appear even more dubious under Bashar al-
Asad, however: First, as mentioned above, the combat preparedness of
the armed forces deteriorated signicantly in the last decade. Israeli jets
ew repeatedly into Syrian airspace; the Syrian regime refrained from
reacting, even in the wake of the Israeli attack on the Kubar base, where
Syria was allegedly developing nuclear capacities, in 2007. Second, as
Irans prole grew in Middle East politics, Syria looked increasingly
overshadowed by Tehran. Syrias apparent subordination to Tehran,
just like its military weakness, corroded the credibility of the regimes
rhetorical bravado.53 The heightening of sectarian tension in the region
in the wake of the breakdown of Saddam Husseins regime in 2003, and
the assassination of the (Sunni) Lebanese Prime Minister Raq al-Hariri
in 2005, did little to endear the alliance with Iran to Sunni ofcers
hearts.54
The ofcers alienation was compounded by the unease stemming
from the need to remain constantly on their guard in interactions with
Alawi colleagues. Although some cross-sectarian friendships did
develop in the ofcer corps, they remained the exception rather than
the rule. In general, sectarian relations in the armed forces are marred
by mutual suspicion. Students in the military academy befriend
members of their own sect. Rooms in dormitories are informally
segregated by sect.55 Sunni ofcers know that informers are to be
found among Sunnis, too, but they tend to assume that all Alawi
ofcers write intelligence reports about their non-Alawi colleagues. Not
surprisingly, in an environment where mistrust is so high, the sense of
military camaraderie is low. My interviewees bemoaned what they
53
Interview with Colonel Maher Nawwar, ibid.
54
Interview with Lieutenant-Colonel Yasser Nasser, ibid.
55
Interview with Captain Issam Kallas, ibid.
The Grievances of Sunni Ofcers in the Syrian Armed Forces 643
Conclusion
As suggested in the preceding analysis, the reasons for Sunni ofcers
disaffection with the Asad regime were threefold: professional,
corporatist and ideational. Sectarian stacking was central to the
Syrian regimes survival strategy; consequently, the Syrian ofcer
corps remained skewed in favor of Alawis throughout the last
decades. This meant that Sunnis were severely under-represented at
all levels of the ofcer corps namely, in operational and intelligence
positions. Frustration over grim professional prospects was pervasive
among Sunni ofcers. The latters alienation from the regime was
compounded by what they perceived to be an intentional neglect of
56
The other two main intelligence agencies in Syria are the General Intelligence (al-
Moukhabarat al-Amma), and the Political Security (al-Amn al-Siassi). Both handle
non-military intelligence; the latter also is in charge of the Syrian Police.
57
Security Ofcers answer to regional intelligence headquarters, which report in turn to
central directorates in Damascus.
58
Interview with Captain Hussam Sabbagh, Ibid.
644 Hicham Bou Nassif
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Annex
Table 1. Ministers of Defense and Chiefs of Staff of the Syrian Armed Forces under
Bashar al-Asad by Sectarian Afliation59
59
I asked every one of my interviewees to help me collect the data in tables 1 to 8.
Particularly helpful in that regard was Colonel Abdel Aziz Kanan to whom I owe a
debt of gratitude. Lieutenant-Colonel Yasser Jaber, Brigadier-General Mohammad
Shahima, Lieutenant-Colonel Nashaat Haj Ahmad, and two other Brigadier-Generals
who did not wish to be named also helped me collect data that appear in tables 1 to 8,
and asked their colleagues to do the same. Note that the place of origin is the
fundamental identity-related marker that ofcers use to identify each others sectarian
afliation. Ofcers hailing from, say, al-Rastan, are likely to be Sunnis; their colleagues
from Latakia likely to be Alawis, whereas ofcers from Suweida, or the Valley of the
Christians region, likely to be Druze and Christians respectively. Names also matter:
An ofcer called Georges or Elias is clearly Christian, whereas Omar is Sunni,
and Ali or Hussein likely to be Alawi. Family names are an additional indicator: A
Makhlouf is Alawi whereas a Qabbani can only be Sunni. For ofcers to identity
each others sectarian afliation is a relatively easy task.
The Grievances of Sunni Ofcers in the Syrian Armed Forces 647
Table 2. Commanders of The Syrian Armed Forces on the Eve of the 2011 Uprising by
Sectarian Afliation60
Sectarian
Sectors Ofcers Afliation
60
Ibid.
61
Ibid.
648 Hicham Bou Nassif
Table 4. Commanders of the Republican Guard and the Fourth Armored Division
under Bashar al-Asad, by Sectarian Afliation62
Commanders of the
Republican Guard Sectarian Commanders of the Fourth Sectarian
(2000 2011) Afliation Armored Brigade (2000 2011) Afliation
Table 5. Commanders of the Special Forces and the Airborne Special Forces under
Bashar al-Asad by Sectarian Afliation63
Table 6. Commanders of the Air Force and the Air Defense under
Bashar al-Asad by Sectarian Afliation64
62
Ibid.
63
Ibid.
64
Ibid.
The Grievances of Sunni Ofcers in the Syrian Armed Forces 649
Table 7. Subcommanders of the Special Forces on the Eve of the 2011 Uprising by
Sectarian Afliation65
Table 8. Subcommanders of the Airborne Special Forces on the Eve of the 2011
Uprising by Sectarian Afliation66
65
Ibid.
66
Ibid.