Ideological influences and patterns of jihadism in Europe

(working paper)

Paper to be presented at
ISA Annual Convention 2009 in New York on 17 February

[DRAFT: Do not quote or attribute without the author’s explicit permission]

Researcher Petter Nesser

The Norwegian Defense Research Est. (FFI)
P O Box 25, N-2027 Kjeller, Norway
Telephone (office): +47 63 80 77 54
Cellphone: +47 90 63 23 04
Telefax: +47 63 80 77 15
Email: Petter.nesser@ffi.no
Internet: www.ffi.no\TERRA

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Introduction

"Bisher, if I was asked about 11 September, shall we do it or not, I would have said no."

Statement by al-Qaida’s “spiritual ambassador” to Europe, Abu Qatada to his assistant Bisher al-
Rawi. 1

Since the 1980s Europe has functioned as a sanctuary and support base for militant Sunni
Islamists (jihadis) of various ideological shades. From the mid-1990s and increasingly after 9/11
and the subsequent invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq, there has been a shift to terrorist violence
inside Europe by Islamist radicals residing in the region, or coming from abroad. Between 1994
and 1996 terrorists linked to the Algerian Armed Islamic Group (GIA) staged a series of bomb
attacks in France killing 8 people and injuring more than 200. 2 Between 1998 and the invasion of
Iraq, European security services intercepted several al-Qaida linked terrorist cells preparing
attacks against US, Israeli, French and Russian targets. 3 After the invasion of Iraq, European
nations that joined the Bush Administration’s War on Terror became targets for terrorist cells
composed of people with varying ties to al-Qaida, many of whom were Europeans by
citizenship, or ethnicity. 4 What were the ideological influences and patterns 5 of jihadi terrorism
in Europe?

Jihadism may be defined as ideologies and movements calling for armed struggle aiming to
defend Muslims and Muslim territories, to establish and expand Islamic states, and spread
Islamic faith. The most important ideological questions for the militant ideology of jihadism are:
who are the most important enemies to be defeated, and how can they be defeated? Various jihadi
actors answer these questions differently. For example, jihadis pursuing al-Qaida’s global jihad
perceive the US as being the main enemy, whereas jihadis in Muslim countries may prioritize the
battle against their authorities. Jihadis in Europe differ greatly from their Muslim world
counterparts. First, apart from a few semi-organized groups focused on propaganda and support
activities, there exist no clearly defined jihadi organizations in Europe equivalent to, for example,
Al-Qaida in Iraq, or Al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), etc., presenting ideological
programs and coherent strategies for jihadism in European countries. 6 Secondly, jihadis in
Europe live in peaceful societies far away from jihad battlefields in the Muslim world, societies in
which there are poor prospects for establishing Islamic states, or causing widespread
Islamization. As will be illustrated in this study, organizational disparity and distance to
battlefields have complicated the enemy perceptions and strategic visions of jihadism in Europe.

The study argues that ideologically, from the early 1990s, Europe’s jihadis went from relative
agreement about prioritizing the battle against un-Islamic regimes in the Muslim world and
Western occupation of Muslim territories, into a period of ideological disarray disagreeing on
whether to prioritize the “near enemy”, or the “far enemy”. After the invasion of Iraq they
appear to have increasingly united behind the global jihadi rationale. While in the past, European
countries had a marginal place in al-Qaida’s enemy perceptions, in recent years the US’s
European allies have received increased attention from the leaders of global jihad, framing

1 Jamil El-Banna Et Al Vs George W Bush President of the United States Et Al, (2004).
2 Brynjar Lia and Åshild Kjøk, Islamist Insurgencies, Diasporic Support Networks, and Their Host States: The Case of the Algerian
GIA in Europe 1993-2000 (Kjeller: FFI, 2001).
3 Petter Nesser, "Jihad in Europe," (Kjeller: FFI, 2004).
4 Alison Pargeter, The New Frontiers of Jihad Radical Islam in Europe (London: I.B.Tauris & Co. Ltd, 2008).
5 In this study I define ideology as systematic, normative thinking about societal change. Ideologies typically contain

descriptions of societal problems, specifying their causes (diagnosis); the reasons why the problems should be solved;
who should solve them (rationale); as well as prescriptions on how to solve the problems and the consequences of
solving them (prognosis), consult John Wilson, Introduction to Social Movements (New York: Basic Books, 1973).
6 There have been communiqués on the Internet in the names of al-Qaida in Northern Europe, al-Qaida in Britain, al-

Qaida in Sweden etc, calling for attacks on the US’s European allies, but they have not been traced to operational cells,
consult e.g. "Scepticism Greets "Al Qaeda in Britain" Founding," Reuters, 16 January 2008.

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persecution of Islamist activists and insults against the Prophet and European contributions in
Iraq and Afghanistan as two sides of the same coin.

Methodological challenges
The absence of clearly identifiable organizations and ideological templates for a “European
jihad” makes it methodologically difficult to study ideological influences and patterns. Having no
single document or statement agreed upon by the different actors, specifying the causes, aims
and strategic vision of jihadism in Europe, I have to combine analyses of the actor, ideological
messages and influences they were exposed to, and the context.

Ideally, we would have complete information about what kind of ideological material different
jihadi operatives in Europe consumed and how it influenced them. In reality information about
terrorists’ radicalization processes and ideological indoctrination is very limited. Jihadis in Europe
constitute complex and changing actors, and also, their access to ideology and the framing of
ideological tenets has changes with time and context. Before we move on to analyzing
ideological influences across time, we have to identify Europe’s jihadis, and determine what
ideological influence they have been exposed to.

Who are Europe’s jihadis?

When I talk about Europe’s jihadis I refer to militant Sunni Islamists who have been involved in
concrete terrorist acts inside Europe, and secondarily to a broader network, or subculture of
jihadi activists centred in London, but stretching across several European countries. Europe’s
jihadis constitute complex actors involving many different individuals, groups, cells, gangs and
networks with varying organizational and ideological ties to Islamist militants in the Muslim
world. At the basic level, jihadis in Europe adhere to the religious-political ideology of jihadism,
or salafi-jihadism. Jihadism is the violent expression of Islamism (ideologies and movements
calling for Islamic states governed by Islamic law, al-Shariah, and return of the Caliphate).

Jihadism originated in the torture chambers of Egypt’s prisons and the writings of the radicalized
Muslim Brother Sayyid Qutb in the 1960s. 7 Jihadism consolidated as a more internationally
oriented movement during the 1980s amongst the “Arab Afghans” taking part in jihad against
the Soviets in Afghanistan. In Afghanistan, Egyptian jihadism mixed with Saudi orthodoxy
(salafism) and evolved into the salafi-jihadi movement (i.e. the movement of orthodox militants).
Salafism implies strict adherence to the Quran and the Prophet’s Traditions (al-Sunnah), and
emulation of the first Muslims (al-salaf al-salih). Salafis seek to anchor behaviour and beliefs in
the practices of the first Muslims. 8 Because jihadi-salafism implies emulating the warrior
traditions of the first Muslims, there is a strong strategic-tactical element to it. However, salafism
is primarily a principle of religious interpretation and practice and tells us little about the political
rationale of contemporary jihadism. 9

Focusing on political rationale, jihadism may be divided into three main categories: local jihad,
international jihad, and global jihad. Local jihad is the armed struggle to overthrow Muslim world
regimes and establish Islamic states. International jihad is the armed struggle to defend Muslims
and Muslim territories being attacked, or invaded by non-Muslims. Global jihad is the armed
struggle against all enemies of Islam and Muslims, anywhere, and with all available means, aiming

7 Qutb called on a vanguard of true believers to excommunicate the ignorant (jahili), un-Islamic Egyptian rulers and

declare jihad on them based on the Prophet’s re-capturing of Mecca. Qutb wrote primarily about the situation in
Egypt, but emphasized that the principle applied to the whole world, consult Sayyid Qutb, Milestones (Revised Translation
1990) (Indianapolis: American Trust Publications, 1964).
8 Most Islamists seek to be as salafi as possible, and use the term to distinguish between themselves and the non-pious,

the deviants, the apostates, the hypocrites and the unbelievers. In practice, the term salafi is used about Islamists who
go to lengths to emulate the Prophet and his Companions, by way of how they dress, pray, eat, etc.
9 The main salafi principles endorsed by jihadis are uncompromising monotheism (tawhid), being loyal to Islam and

disavowing everything un-Islamic (wala wa’l bara), violently correcting un-Islamic behaviour through the principle of
enjoining the good and forbidding the evil (hisba), always trying to convert and Islamize people (dawa), and of course
jihad fi sabil Allah (jihad in the cause of God), in the meaning of armed struggle.

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to deter Western social, political, economic and cultural interference in the Muslim world (mainly
military and economic interference). Jihadis divide the world into two spheres, the land of Islam
(dar al-Islam) governed by Islamic law (al-Shariah) and the land of unbelief (dar al-kufr), which
may transform into the land of war (dar al-harb or dar al-jihad) under given conditions. In the
land of war every able-bodied Muslim has to perform jihad (Holy War). For jihadis, Western
countries are lands of kufr. Identifying themselves with the Prophet and his Companions living
amongst unbelievers in the early days of Islam, Europe’s jihadis portray themselves as a vanguard
of true believers in an “ocean of unbelief”. 10

Jihadism came to Europe during the 1980s and early 1990s with a critical mass of activists,
leaders and ideologues involved in the local jihadi “projects” in the Maghreb and the Levant,
and/or the international jihad in Afghanistan. As noted above, London emerged as the main
centre for Islamist militancy referred to as Londonistan by European security officials (because it
served as a base and transit place for Islamists going to Afghanistan for training and
indoctrination). Because of the concentration of hardliner Islamists and jihadis in London, the
capital was a popular destination for jihadis from all over Europe and the Muslim world. Radical
Islamists travelled to the UK to interact with militant groups, attend the sermons of radical
preachers, and make the contacts necessary to attend training camps and religious schools in the
Muslim world. Terrorism investigations revealed that the majority of jihadi terrorists in Europe
had attended sermons by radical preachers in London (in addition to training camps). There were
militant subcultures, radical mosques and ideological mentors in other European countries as
well (Milan, Madrid, Paris, Hamburg etc), but the jihadi community in London stood out as the
most vigorous and influential.

Prominent London based activists who played important roles in setting up and expanding a
jihadi networks in Europe include, amongst others, the Palestinian Abu Qatada, the Egyptian
Abu Hamza, the Syrian Omar Bakri Mohammed, the Syrian Abu Musab al-Suri and others
(consult appendix). 11 Qatada acted as religious mentor for a number of jihadi combat groups
formed by Arab Afghans (GIA, Libyan Islamic Fighting Group (LIFG), Tawhid wa’l Jihad etc).
Bakri headed the semi-jihadi al-Muhajiroun 12 group from localities in Tottenham, whereas Abu
Hamza was the leader of a militant group called Supporters of Shariah centred on the Finsbury
Park mosque (the largest radical mosque in Europe). Abu Musab al-Suri was a more independent
activist and thinker with ties to multiple jihadi groups. These jihadi activists and others
contributed much to the recruitment, radicalization and training of two generations of jihadis in
Europe.

The 1st generation of jihadis in Europe was dominated by Maghrebian jihad veterans aiming to
ignite Islamic revolutions in their home countries and function as an ‘ambulance guerrilla’
protecting Muslims under attack from non-Muslims. Abu Qatada was the leading activist and
ideologue for the 1st generation (Abu Musab al-Suri was another important figure amongst
Afghan veterans in London). The 1st generation of jihadis in turn recruited, radicalized and
trained a 2nd generation of jihadis consisting of activists who were born and raised in European
countries, and who had no personal experience of jihad in the Muslim world. Abu Hamza and
Omar Bakri Mohammed were the charismatic leaders of the 2nd generation of jihadis in Europe
within the frameworks of al-Muhajiroun and Supporters of Shariah, and likeminded groups in

10 Qutb, Milestones (Revised Translation 1990).

11 Qatada, Hamza and Bakri are generally assumed to have had a particularly strong ideological influence on Europe’s
jihadis. From the early 1990s until quite recently they interacted with a substantial number of militant Islamists
convicted of terrorism in Europe and abroad. Leading figures of well-known terrorist cells in Europe, e.g. the
London-bombers, attended sermons and study circles of the Londonistan preachers, and as we shall see, members of
terrorist cells accessed ideological texts and propaganda material produced by these jihadi pundits.
12 The al-Muhajiroun organization was formed in 1996, and focused primarily on supporting jihad in Kashmir. Despite

strong circumstantial evidence, however, none of its members have been convicted for direct involvement in terrorist
acts in Europe (see below). Members of the group were rarely involved in terrorist acts before the early 2000s. After
the invasion of Iraq, several people involved in terrorism in Europe (including the London bombers) had links to al-
Muhajiroun.

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other European countries. Recruits from Europe were commonly sent to al-Qaida associated
training camps in Pakistan/Afghanistan for indoctrination and paramilitary training. First hand
accounts from the camps report that recruits were given special courses in the theorizing of the
Egyptian jihadi Sayyid Qutb and other ideologues. 13

Many activists of Europe’s 2nd generation jihadis came from Pakistani backgrounds and thus
constituted the Pakistani-European axis of jihadism in Europe. Others came from multiple
ethnic backgrounds (including European backgrounds). The 2nd generation jihadis linked to, or
inspired by the global jihadi al-Qaida, constitute today’s main terrorism threat to Europe.
Activists of the 2nd generation, some of whom have received training in al-Qaida linked training
camps in the badlands on the Afghan-Pakistani border, were behind the killing of Theo Van
Gogh in Holland, the London bombings, and several high-profile attempted attacks in the UK,
Spain, Denmark, Germany and other European countries that contributed to the War on Terror.
After 9/11, the main radical mosques and centres in Europe were closed down, and jihadi
preachers went in and out of prisons for supporting terrorism. In the post 9/11 security climate
the 2nd generation of jihadis in Europe oriented themselves more towards the Internet as a
source of ideology. Online, the activists obtained free and direct access to a wide spectrum of
ideological material, translated into multiple languages, something that enabled them to “shop
around” for messages resonating with their beliefs and objectives.

What ideological material did Europe’s jihadis access?

Information from terrorism investigations (judicial documents, press reporting and
correspondence with one expert witness) and secondary literature, suggests Europe’s jihadis
accessed three main categories of ideological sources: classical jihadi theorists, leaders and
ideologues of jihadi networks internationally, and leaders and ideologues of jihadi networks in
Europe (mainly in London). 14 They accessed these sources via three main platforms: religious
schools and training camps in Pakistan/Afghanistan, radical mosques and study circles in Europe
(primarily in London), and the jihadi Internet (websites and discussion forums). The main topics
of interest appear to have been general historical justifications for jihad against the unbelievers,
contemporary enemy perceptions and calls for global jihad against the US, Israel and their allies,
and religious rulings (fatwas) concerning conduct of jihadism (e.g. the use of martyrdom
operations, targeting of Muslims (takfir), the use of weapons of mass destruction, etc).

The GIA-linked terrorists attacking France in 1995 left little evidence of ideological drivers.
Leading figures of the network escaped prosecution, or were shot dead by French gendarmeries,
and those who went on trial were elusive about their motivations. Moreover, the GIA produced
relatively little ideological material of its own. 15

Judicial documents from trials of al-Qaida linked terrorist cells operating in Europe around the
millennium contained only general references to ideological training in radical mosques and study
circles in London, and in training camps in Afghanistan, based on the ideology of al-Qaida and
associated groups (e.g. the Jordanian al-Tawhid movement). 16 Judicial documents rarely
referenced concrete ideological texts and statements, although in the verdict against the so-called
Frankfurt cell operating in 2000, jihad hymns from Afghanistan (anashid) were quoted. 17 The
main indicators of ideological influences were the terrorists’ target selection and attack methods,
statements or texts by leaders and ideologues of groups they belonged to (e.g. al-Tawhid), and

13 Omar Nasiri, Inside the Jihad; My Life with Al Qaeda a Spy's Story (New York: Basic Books, 2006).
14 Apart from Europe based leaders and ideologues the sources correspond to material available on the Internet
Library Minbar al-Tawhid wa’l Jihad analyzed by the acknowledged Combating Terrorism Centre, consult "Militant
Ideology Atlas, Executive Report," ed. William McCants (New York: Combating Terrorism Center, Wet Point, 2006)
and "Militant Ideology Atlas, Research Compendium, ," ed. William McCants (New York: Combating terrorism
Center, West Point, 2006).
15 Kamil al-Tawil, The Armed Islamic Movement in Algeria (Al-Haraka Al-Islamiyya Al-Musallah Fi'l-Jasai'r): From "The

Salvation" To "The Group" [in Arabic] (Beirut: Dar al-Nahar, 1998).

16 Indictment of the Unemployed Hairdresser and Asylum Applicant Shadi Moh'd Mustafa Abdalla Alias Emad Abdelhadie (2003).
17 Verdict in the Criminal Case against Mr Djilali Benali ("Aeurobui Beandali") Et Al (in German), (2003).

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communications by the terrorists themselves (testimonies from trials, transcripts from
surveillance material, etc).

When Spanish investigators recovered files from the computers belonging to members of the
Madrid cell they retrieved much ideological material (primarily downloaded from jihadi websites),
which included classical theorists (e.g. medieval scholar Ibn Taymiyyah, the founder of Saudi
salafism (wahhabism), Mohammed Ibn Abd al-Wahhab, the author of the manifest for modern
jihadism, ”Milestones”, the Egyptian radicalized Muslim Brother Sayyid Qutb, the main
ideologue for the internationalist Arab Afghan movement, Abdullah Azzam, etc), as well as
contemporary theorists and activists (e.g. the al-Qaida leadership (Bin Laden and al-Zawahiri),
the Jordanian Abu Mohammed al-Maqdisi, and a number of ideologues and strategists from
Saudi Arabia, Morocco, Syria, Kuwait, etc. Saudi ideologues appear to have been particularly
popular amongst operative terrorist cells, because they were very concrete in terms of justifying
operational strategies and tactics (weapons, target selection, etc). 18 Notably the material also
included texts and audiovisual speeches by the main jihadi theorist in London, Abu Qatada and
another salafi preacher named Abu Basir al-Tartousi (consult appendix). 19 Investigations revealed
that members of the network maintained close relations with Qatada. The Madrid cell accessed
texts concerning the reasons for jihad, and the practical conduct (strategic and tactical advice).

The killer of Theo Van Gogh, Mohammed Bouyeri, downloaded English translations of Ibn
Taymiyyah and Sayyid Qutb and translated them into Dutch. In addition he downloaded a
number of works by the London based preacher Abu Hamza, and translated excerpts. According
to the expert witness, because of Bouyeri’s poor Arabic, Hamza’s writings functioned as an
entrance into the jihadi ideological universe. According to the expert witness, Taymiyyah’s
writings on ahadith justifying individual punishment of people mocking the Prophet were
important drivers for the murder of Van Gogh (see below). The writings of Abu Hamza were
retrieved from the belongings of several terrorist suspects in the UK and abroad 20 , and several
British-Pakistanis convicted for terrorism in the UK attended his sermons at the Finsbury Park
mosque, (see below). Other members of Bouyeri’s jihadi cell, the Hofstad group, accessed jihadi
texts and propaganda produced in London and uploaded material on the Internet. 21 Bouyeri and
his accomplices consulted texts concerning the rejection of un-Islamic societal systems
(democracy) and laws, and clarification about the legitimacy of conducting operations in
Holland. 22

The terrorist cell attempting to execute car bomb attacks in central London in 2007 and at the
airport terminal in Glasgow also accessed ideological texts and jihadi propaganda on the Internet.
One of the terrorists spent time in Iraq the year before the operation and allegedly met the late
leader of al-Qaida in Iraq, Abu Musab al-Zarqawi. On a computer retrieved from the burning car
in Glasgow, experts retrieved ideological and strategic texts and audio-visual material by al-
Qaida’s leaders Bin Laden and al-Zawahiri, head of Iraqi branch at the time, the late Abu Musab
al-Zarqawi, and several texts by al-Qaida associated preachers and activists in Saudi Arabia (e.g.
Sulayman Ibn Nasir Al-Ulwan, Husayn ibn Mahmud, Hamud Bin Uqla al-Shuaybi). Several of
the texts had been downloaded from al-Tibyan Productions, a jihadi website specialising in
translating ideological and strategic texts into English. 23 The ideological material dealt with the

18 Consult e.g. Verdict regarding the permissibility of martyrdom operations by Sulayman Ibn Nasir Al-‘Ulwān and
The Clarification of what happened in America by Hamud Bin Uqla al-Shuaybi at http://tibyan.wordpress.com/
19 A member of the Madrid network, al-Mallah, said that Abu Qatada had the same position in Europe as al-Qaida had

in the world; that he was the person in Europe calling for Jihad, recruiting members, giving them missions to fulfil,
consult Proceedings 20/2004, Indictment of April 10 2006, Court of First Instance Number 6 of the Audencia National (Translation
of the Indictment of the Madrid Bombers by Tine Gade), (2006).(p. 1217).
20 Consult e.g. Helen Carter, "Beheading Plot Trial Told of Abu Hamza Material," Guardian, 31 January 2008.
21 Albert Benschop, "Chronicle of a Political Murder Foretold: Jihad in the Netherlands" (Amsterdam: University of

Amsterdam, 2005).
22 Rudolph Peters, "Dutch Extremist Islamism: Van Gogh's Murderer and His Ideas," in Jihadi Terrorism and the

Radicalization Challenge in Europe, ed. Rik Coolsaet (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2008).

23 Consult http://tibyan.wordpress.com/

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whys and hows of jihad, rulings on the conduct of suicide bombings and weapons of mass
destruction, ruling on the killing of Americans outside Iraq, etc.

Apart from what was found on the computers of known terrorists, we have to rely on other
indicators of ideological influence, such as organizational ties (the ideology of a specific group),
social networks (social interaction with activists and preachers with a known ideological profile),
target selection and methods (e.g. Maghrebian terrorists tend to target France, al-Qaida tends to
execute martyrdom operations), or statements, or testimonies by terrorists justifying their
actions.

Europe as a support base

“I knew that this game would be dangerous, and that it would be beneficial to us to push the jihadi current
forward in a new phase after the Afghanistan-period if we exploited this opening correctly. If we erred in this, it
would have fatal consequences. It was almost like a mission by special commandos operating behind the enemy
lines, but of a political-security-media [not military] character.” 24

During the 1980s, following the ideological template of Sayyid Qutb 25 , local jihadis from Syria,
Egypt, Libya, etc, emigrated (committed hijra) to Europe in order to escape persecution by their
regimes. In Europe they mixed with activists shuttling between the Arab world and Afghanistan,
engaging in support activities for the anti-Soviet jihad. Ideologically, during the 1990s, before al-
Qaida declared global jihad in 1998, Europe’s jihadis seem to have agreed on the legality and
utility of supporting jihad from “behind enemy lines”. However, conflicts did emerge over the
conduct of local jihadism, especially concerning the excommunication (takfir) and killing of
fellow Muslims, as well as over the allocation of resources (which jihadi groups and projects
should benefit from fundraising efforts). Moreover, there were fierce conflicts between Europe’s
jihadis and political Islamists such as the European branches of the Islamic Salvation Front (FIS)
and the international Muslim Brotherhood movement. At the forefront of the jihadi mocking of
political Islamists was Abu Qatada, who considered the Muslim Brotherhood deviant for
“throwing itself on the threshold of the Taghut [tyranny]”. 26 The main project and mobilizing
cause after the consolidation of the European jihadi networks was to support the emerging jihad
in Algeria and the GIA.

The GIA was formed by Algerian Afghan veterans in concert with local jihadi groups operating
in Algeria from the late 1970s. 27 At first, the GIA adopted the Arab Afghan version of jihadism,
educating its recruits on the classical jihadism of Qutb and the theorizing of al-Qaida associated
thinkers such and Abu Musab al-Suri and Ayman al-Zawahiri. 28 The first leaders of the GIA, e.g.
Qari Said and al-Sharif Qusumi had close ties to al-Qaida and the Arab Afghans in Europe. 29
However, when the jihad in Algeria got out of hand under the leaderships of Emirs Jamal al-
Zaytuni 30 and Antar Zuwabri, and the GIA excommunicated the Algerian people and declared

24 Umar Abd al-Hakim, "A Summary of My Testimony on the Holy Struggle in Algeria, 1988-1996” (2004): 27.
25 In the manifest for jihadism “Milestones”, Qutb, called on Muslims to leave Muslim societies not governed by
Islamic law (undertake hijra) and establish bases in which Muslims can prepare for war (fard ayn jihad) against their
governments (like the Prophet and his Companions in Medina). Ideologically, many jihads perceive Europe to be the
modern day Medina (for a vanguard of true believers aiming to restore the Caliphate), a base in which to prepare for
violent Islamization (see below).
26 Abu Qatada, "Between the Two Methods (Translated Excerpts Courtesy Will Mccants)," (Minbar al-Tawhid wa'l

Jihad).
27 The main groups were the MIA guerrillas, headed by Mustafa Bouyali, and youth gangs from Algiers’ suburbs under

the leadership of Mohammed Alal.

28 al-Hakim, "A Summary of My Testimony on the Holy Struggle in Algeria, 1988-1996". (translation from Arabic

courtesy of Brynjar Lia).

29 Indeed, Qari Said sat on al-Qaida’s Advisory Council (majlis al-shura) in the organization’s formative period, consult

Kamil al-Tawil, Al-Qaida and Her Sisters, the Story of the Arab Jihadis (in Arabic) (Beirut: Dar al-Saqi, 2008).
30 According to Abu Musab al-Suri, Zaytuni rejected the salafi-jihadism of the Arab Afghans and burnt books by

Qutb, al-Zawahiri and al-Suri, Umar Abd al-Hakim, "Summary of My Testimony on the Holy Struggle in Algeria,
1988-1996 (in Arabic), Courtesy of Brynjar Lia," (2004). Zaytuni pursued his own ideology close to the madkhali
school of Islamic thought.

7
war on fellow Islamists, the group clashed ideologically with al-Qaida and the support network in
Europe Abu Qatada was an ardent supporter of the Algerian jihad, and he theologically justified
strategies and tactics used by the GIA in the war against the “Tyrants”. 31 He even wrote a fatwa
defending the killing of the wives and children of the “apostates” (representatives of the Algerian
regime). 32 After Zaytuni loyalists killed FIS and Jazara leaders Mohammed Said and Abd al-
Rasaq Rajam, and emissaries of the Libyan Islamic Fighting group during 1995 (accusing them of
collaborating with the regime and propagating political Islamism), the GIA’s main supporters in
Europe (London), Abu Qatada, Abu Musab al-Suri, as well as representatives of the Egyptian
Islamic Jihad and the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group, withdrew their support for the group on
the grounds that the GIA failed to provide evidence that the FIS leaders had been collaborating
with the government. 33 Qatada, who had built his reputation and following around supporting
the Algerian jihad, was reluctant to denounce the GIA, but had no choice when the group
exceeded the limits of extremism and lost popular support,.

A protagonist of local jihadism, Qatada refocused on jihadism in the Levant, in addition to

supporting the mujahidin in Chechnya (international jihad). After 9/11 Qatada supported the
attacks publicly 34 , but criticized the attacks in front of his personal assistant. 35 In his most
popular texts written during the 1990s Qatada stresses that fighting “the groups of apostasy that
govern the lands of the Mulims….takes precedence over others besides them from the
polytheists and the hypocrites and the people of the book”. 36 Abu Qatada’s “best pupil”, the
Egyptian Abu Hamza took over the editing of al-Ansar and continued to support the GIA until
the famous communiqué by GIA Emir Antar Zuwabri excommunicating the Algerian people in
1998. Between 1996 and 1999 (when Hamza finally had been presented with the proof he
needed to reject the GIA), he gathered a substantial following of North African GIA
sympathizers, who previously belonged to the crowd of Qatada. During the 1990s, the main
jihadi voices in Europe, Qatada, Hamza and Bakri, competed for resources and followers. The
main conflict was over who should control the main radical mosque, Finsbury Park. While
Qatada “preached to the congregation” (Maghrebian Afghans mainly) in Arabic, Hamza and
Bakri preached in English targeting second-generation immigrants from North Africa and Asian
countries (Pakistan, Bangladesh).

Local jihad in Europe

“The un-Islamic regime’s oppressive practices which are backed by France were never seen except during the French
occupation over 132 years and which is still continuing today. France is now a full partner in Genocide by paying
mercenaries and rewarding its agents and financing arms deals.” 37

The GIA’s bombings in France during 1995 were ordered by GIA Emir Jamal Zaytuni and the
group’s Chief of External Affairs Radwan Abu Basir against the advice of the group’s Advisory
Council. 38 The ideological driver for the GIA’s attacks in France was the enemy perception of
the GIA’s Emir, seeing the Algerian regime as the main enemy, but France as a “full partner” in
the regime’s war against the Islamists. As for the use of terrorism tactics, they had been justified
by the GIA in Algeria and by ideologues in Europe (see above). The campaign in France was

31 al-Ansar issues 1 through 158 with FFI’s Terrorism Research Group.

32 Qatada defended this fatwa in a televised debate in November 2000 and in an interview with CNN in November
2001, consult e.g. "Abu Qatada Vs Secretary of State for the Home Department," (Special Immigration Appeals
Commission 2007).
33 Consult al-Tawil, Al-Qaida and Her Sisters, the Story of the Arab Jihadis (in Arabic).
34 Consult e.g. Abu Qatada, "Globalization and the Troops of the Jihad (Al-'Awlama Wa Siriyyiyyat Al-Jihad),"

(Minbar al-Tawhid wa'l Jihad: 2001).

35 Jamil El-Banna Et Al Vs George W Bush President of the United States Et Al.
36 ———, Characteristics of the Victorious Party in the Foundation of the State of the Believers (the Land of Ash-Sham) (At-Tibyan

Publications).
37 Abu Abdulrahman Amin, "Open Letter to All Muslims (English Translation)," in Islam Report (American Islamic

Group, 1995).
38 The majority of the Council, especially the Jazairis, opposed Zaytuni’s plan, on the grounds that it would divert

resources from the war in Algeria and jeopardize the international support network, al-Tawil, Al-Qaida and Her Sisters,
the Story of the Arab Jihadis (in Arabic), 201.

8
considered an integrated part of and necessary condition for success on the Algerian battlefield.
An off-shoot of the Arab Afghan salafi-jihadi movement, the GIA was always fiercely anti-
Western, and violently opposed to French interference in Algerian affairs. GIA’s “anti-
Westernism” was expressed through hateful characterizations of the former colonial power and
the US, and accusations that these powers covertly supported the apostate regime in killing
Algeria’s Muslims.

According to the GIA, France committed “disgusting crimes” against the Algerian Muslim
community (ummah), and pressured the tyrannical (taghut) Algerian regime to “slaughter”
innocent and unarmed civilians. 39 Emir Zaytuni blamed French colonialism for the “oppressive
practices” of the “un-Islamic regime”, and characterized France as “a full partner in genocide” by
supporting the Algerian government. 40 The GIA gradually stepped up operations against French
interests and citizens in Algeria before the group internationalized the conflict. 41 The al-Qaida
associated jihadi theorist and strategist Abu Musab al-Suri may have planted the seeds of ideas to
transfer the battle to French soil. He claimed he advised the third Emir of the GIA Sharif
Qusumi that attacks in France,

“…would be beneficial to draw France into an openly declared support for the Algerian regime, a support which
existed, but only in secrecy. This will unify the Islamic Nation around the jihad in Algeria as it unified the
Islamic Nation in Afghanistan against the Soviets”. 42

The GIA campaign in France was controversial and disputed ideologically and strategically
amongst jihadis in Algeria (opposed by the GIA’s Advisory Council) and certainly, the attacks in
France caused problems for the group’s supporters in Europe. The campaign jeopardized the
GIA’s support cells in France, Belgium, the UK and other countries, and thus stole resources
from a GIA with its back against the wall locally, in fierce conflict with GIA defector groups, FIS
and its armed wing AIS, in addition to taking military defeats in the war against the Algerian
army and security forces. To what extent the perpetrators of the attacks were committed to the
ideology of Zaytuni’s GIA leadership remains unknown. Members of the terrorist networks had
been indoctrinated and received training in Algerian camps in Afghanistan, but the network also
included marginalized immigrant youths from French suburbs recruited, socialized and trained
by recruiters targeting vulnerable environments. Although GIA’s terrorist campaign in France
had strong strategic elements to it 43 , and was consistent with the strategic thinking of al-Qaida
linked ideologues (Abu Musab al-Suri), the extreme beliefs, ambitions and recklessness of one
man, Zaytuni, and loyal members of his Green Battalion, probably had a greater impact on the
operational network than classical and contemporary jihadi theorists.

39 ———, The Armed Islamic Movement in Algeria, 162.

40 Abdulrahman Amin, "Open Letter to All Muslims (English Translation)."
41 Under GIA’s first Emir, Abd al-Haq Layada, the group operated as a “classical” anti-state insurgent group, targeting

mainly representatives and symbols of the regime. After Layada, leadership was transferred to Aish Bin Amar, who
was killed shortly afterwards by security forces, in August 1993. The next leader of the GIA, Saif Allah Jafar al-Afghani
(Saif Allah) opened new fronts for the GIA. He announced that “he who fights us with the pen, we will fight with the
sword”, and urged his fighters to attack secularist intellectuals and journalists critical of the mujahidin. Saif Allah was
also the first GIA leader to suggest the expulsion of French citizens from Algeria. During the fall of 1993 Saif Allah
declared war on all foreigners in the country. In a communiqué he gave the foreigners one month to leave the country
before the GIA would attack them. Saif Allah was killed in February 1994 and replaced by the Afghanistan veteran
Sharif Qusumi (Abu Abdullah Ahmad). Qusumi continued the brutalization of the GIA and the aggression against
foreigners, especially the French (during his reign the GIA killed several French teachers and workers for oil
companies).
42 Brynjar Lia, Architect of Global Jihad: The Life of Al-Qaida Strategist Abu Mus'ab Al-Suri (New York: Columbia University

Press, 2007), 156.

43 Lia and Kjøk, Islamist Insurgencies, Diasporic Support Networks, and Their Host States: The Case of the Algerian GIA in Europe

1993-2000.

9
“Global” jihad in Europe
Around the millennium Europe was exposed to terrorism by jihadis seemingly lacking a unified
enemy perception and strategic vision. 44 Torn between local and global jihadism, ideologues and
activists within Europe’s jihadi networks disagreed on the questions of who constituted the most
important and prioritized enemies and how to combat them. Moreover, because of the massive
crackdown on Algerian support networks in the wake of the GIA’s terrorist campaign in France,
the strategic value of Europe as a support base had decreased substantially. When jihadis in
Europe received more attention from the security services it became problematic for them,
ideologically, to justify living in the land of the unbelievers.

Striking Jews and Crusaders?

After al-Qaida declared jihad against Jews and Crusaders in 1998, European and US intelligence
services received information that North African terrorists linked to al Qaida planned attacks
against US and Israeli interests in Europe. In December 1998 al-Qaida struck a deal with an ex-
GIA member going by the alias Abu Doha. Abu Doha acted as a facilitator and recruiter for
Algerian guesthouses and training camps in Pakistan and Afghanistan, and oversaw the shuttling
of Maghrebian jihadis between their home countries, Europe and Afghan training camps. In
exchange for funding and support, Doha’s network in Europe was to execute terrorist attacks
within the framework of global jihad in Europe. 45 Little is known about the ideological profile of
the al-Qaida linked Maghrebian terrorist networks, apart from that their members attended the
sermons and study circles of Abu Qatada and Abu Hamza in London, and that they were
indoctrinated with classical jihadism and the ideology of al-Qaida in training camps and religious
schools in Pakistan and Afghanistan. 46

Members of the network were linked to salafi defector groups from the GIA in Algeria (such as
the GSPC and Protectors of the Salafi Call) pursuing local jihad, al-Qaida in Afghanistan
pursuing global jihad, and the jihadi subculture of Londonistan engaging in the different variants
of jihadism (local, international and global). The operational patterns and communication (e.g.
target selection and justifications) of the terrorists suggested that their multiple allegiances had
caused ideological disarray and confusion.

For example, a cell planning to bomb revellers at a Christmas marketplace in Strasbourg on New
Years Eve 2000 disagreed among themselves and the central leadership over enemy perceptions
and target selection. Whereas the original mission of the cell was to bomb US or Israeli targets
for al-Qaida, they decided instead to bomb French civilians in line with the Maghrebian
perception of France as enemy number one. Moreover, although recruits at al-Qaida camps in
Afghanistan were taught about the virtues of martyrdom, the militants planned remote control
attacks and planned to escape to Algeria after the operation (consistent with Algerian jihadi
traditions of not using suicide bombers). 47 Another cell linked to the Abu Doha network
planning operations against the US embassy in Paris and an American airbase in Belgium
prepared suicide bombings. 48 Justifying their actions, members of the cell referred mainly to
Israeli injustices in Palestine 49 , but they also complained about French interference in Algeria and
persecution of Algerians in France. 50 Another Abu Doha linked cell in France appeared to be
44 For an analysis of diverging organizational allegiances and motivational patterns, consult Nesser, "Jihad in Europe."
45 John Hooper and Nick Hopkins, "Al-Qaida Cell in UK 'Planned Attack'," Guardian, 26 October 2001.
46 Verdict in the Criminal Case against Mr Djilali Benali ("Aeurobui Beandali") Et Al (in German). p 14 ff.
47 Hanna Rogan, "Violent Trends in Algeria since 9/11," CTC Sentinel 1, no. 12 (2008). Algerian jihadis, GSPC/AQIM

did not start to utilize suicide bombers as a tactic before 11 April 2007, after joining al-Qaida. It is believed, however,
that the GIA planned to blow up, or crash an aircraft over Paris in December 1994, consult al-Tawil, The Armed Islamic
Movement in Algeria.
48 Nesser, "Jihad in Europe."
49 Claiming first they wanted to strike a Jewish synagogue, during interrogations they argued they were interested in a

“media-effective” operation aiming to “help the Palestinian people”.

50 Verdict in the Criminal Case against Mr Djilali Benali ("Aeurobui Beandali") Et Al (in German). Consult also Peter Taylor,

"Inside Story, a Jihad Warrior in London," Guardian, 9 February 2004, and BBC, The Third World War: Al-Qaida, the
Breeding Ground (BBC, Peter Taylor, 2004).

10
even more complicated in terms of organizational and ideological allegiances. Like the
Strasbourg plotters, the terrorists had been commissioned by al-Qaida to strike US and Israeli
targets. The terrorists were former members of GIA defector groups in Algeria who had trained
in al-Qaida associated camps in Afghanistan and the Caucasus. Identifying with and supporting
Chechen mujahidin they decided to attack the Russian embassy in Paris, indirectly hurting the
French arch enemy. In addition to receiving projects from al-Qaida, Abu Doha’s networks
engaged extensively in support activities for Algerian insurgents, something that made them
vulnerable to counter-terrorism. Several terrorist cells were brought to the attention of European
security services because of weapons smuggling and fundraising for jihad in Algeria. 51

Another example of the tension between local and global jihadism is the plan by a terrorist cell
linked to the Levantine jihadi organization al-Tawhid wa’l Jihad (al-Tawhid) to execute terrorist
attacks against Jewish targets in Germany. Al Tawhid was headed by the Jordanian terrorist Abu
Musab al-Zarqawi and mentored ideologically by Abu Qatada. Al-Zarqawi was a militant
member of the Jordanian jihad movement founded by Abu Mohammed al-Maqdisi and Abu
Qatada around 1990, who was involved in terrorist attacks against Jordanian authorities and Jews
in Jordan during the 1990s. When he was released from a Jordanian prison in 1999 al-Zarqawi
sat down with al-Qaida in Afghanistan discussing possible membership in the organization. Al-
Qaida rejected him as a member on the ground that he was too extreme. 52 Al-Zarqawi was too
inclined to excommunicate fellow Muslims and too focused on jihad against “apostates” and
Jews in the Levant for al-Qaida’s taste at that time. Al Qaida kept al-Zarqawi as an ally and
helped him establish a camp in Herat on the Iranian border especially for Levantine jihadis.
During the US-led invasion of Afghanistan, al-Zarqawi escaped to Iraq via Iran and eventually
became the leader of al-Qaida in Iraq. Al-Zarqawi remained mainly focused on jihad in the
Levant, as illustrated by his statement “we fight in Iraq while our eyes are upon Jerusalem which
will be restored only by a guiding book and a supporting sword”. 53 The fact that the cell
controlled by al-Zarqawi in Germany planned attacks against Jewish targets in Berlin and
Dusseldorf rather than German targets (although Germany had deployed forces to Afghanistan)
also suggested a preference for local jihadism (although the Germans would be hurt indirectly). 54

Should we stay, or should we go?

Strengthening the impression of ideological disarray and identity crisis amongst Europe’s
mujahidin, in 1999 Abu Hamza addressed the dilemmas of living in the land of the unbelievers in
a speech 55 before his followers in London and foreign guests from Sweden and France. The
speech was packed with contradictory and confusing statements about the role of jihadis in
Europe. Hamza opened the speech by explaining it was forbidden to stay amongst the
unbelievers, and that they had to constantly plan and prepare for leaving. 56 Whereas in interviews
with the media Hamza spoke about the concept of the Covenant of Security, implying that
Muslims enjoying protection in a country (e.g. political asylum) were not permitted to harm that

51 In his strategic theorizing Abu Musab al-Suri advised a strict division of different functionalities within decentralized

jihadi networks, consult Lia, Architect of Global Jihad : The Life of Al-Qaida Strategist Abu Mus'ab Al-Suri.
52 Saif al-'Adel, "The Jihad Biography of the Leader of Slaughter Abu Mus'ab Al-Zarqawi (in Arabic),” (Global Islamic

Media Front, 2005).

53 Consult XXX, Osama Bin Laden and Ayman al-Zawahiri have expressed similar views.
54 Verbal Argument for Verdict: Part 1 Verdict against Abu Dhess (in German), (2005).
55 Abu Hamza’s biographer Sean O’Neill argues texts and books by Abu Hamza had limited impact on his followers

compared to audiovisual material. O’Neill also stresses the social contact between Hamza and young recruits, the
former appearing as the “father figure” "E-Mail Correspondence with Sean O’Neill, author of Suicide Factory "
(2008).
56 “...because we are studying now our existence in Europe, then this is Dar al-Harb, Dar al-Kufr, it implies many-

many things. One of those things is that we have to enjoin the good and forbid the evil and make sure it is Dar al-
Islam somehow, or we have to plan to leave. Otherwise we are doing a very, very great haram...What is Dar al-Kufr, it
is haram to stay in Dar al-Kufr, cause basically you have to compromise with your religion”, consult Abu Hamza,
"How to Live Islamically in the Land of the Kuffar," (1999).

11
The main project of militants in Europe (that were not allowed to stay there in the first place)
was to safeguard themselves and their families, engage in dawa (calling) to Islam, prepare for
jihad and travel to jihadi battlefields. However, while focusing on dawa, they also had an
obligation to engage in jihad, and were permitted to kill unbelievers for any reasons. 58 In other
speeches, Hamza also talked about how to conduct jihad and the permissibility of using any
means available. 59 Although Abu Hamza justified jihad in the West he remained focused on
supporting jihadism in the Muslim world (mainly Yemen, Chechnya and Kashmir) until he was
arrested in 2004.

Global jihad against Europe

In the present abnormal situation, where there is no application of the Shari’ah laws upon the earth, the Muslims
worldwide find themselves scattered living beneath the laws of Kufr from the East of the East’s and the West of
West’s. Since there is no Daar ul-Islaam for the Muslims to make Hijrah to, each individual Muslim has a
specific relationship pertaining to his own security with the country he is residing in. It is important to emphasise
that a Muslim either has a contract of security with the nation he is residing in or not. If a person has a contract
or covenant of safety (‘Aqd Amaan) with the United Kingdom, this does not mean that individual also has a
covenant with the United States or with any other Kufr allied country. 60

Europe as enemy
Between the invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq, jihadi ideologues and opinion makers in Europe
and internationally focused more on European nations as enemies and called for operations in
Europe. As rationale for targeting European interests the jihadis did not only point to European
warfare in Afghanistan and Iraq, but increasingly to the persecution of Muslims in Europe. At
the operational level, cells erupting from the 2nd generation of jihadi networks in Europe
planned, prepared and executed attacks against the US’s European allies. The justifications of the
terrorists in threat communiqués, martyrdom testaments, or during interrogations and trial
hearings echoed recent speeches by the al-Qaida leadership, accusing Europeans of leading a
crusade against Islam. 61

Although many European countries contributed to the invasion of Afghanistan after 9/11,
Europe had a marginal place in al-Qaida’s enemy perceptions until 2002. 62 Before 2002 Osama
Bin Laden and Ayman al-Zawahiri spoke in general terms about the Europeans’ role in the
historical crusades and European colonialism (focusing mainly on France, UK and Italy). In
addition they condemned the UK and France for contemporary foreign policies in the Muslim
world (e.g. France’s role in Algeria and the UK’s role in the first Gulf War). After European
countries joined the War on Terror, al-Qaida increasingly began to mention and threaten specific
European countries in statements. For example, in October 2002 al-Zawahiri threatened

57 “it gives the people the impression that it is halal for them to stay there and it is okay for them to stay there as long

as they have mosques, the more mosques they have, the more Islamic the state it is, and that is why we start listening
to this crap that this is dar al-aman, the dar of safety and of security”, consult Ibid.
58 “If he doesn't respect Dawa, kill him......You have to understand that Dawa is good but it doesn't survive alone.

There are many prophets before Muhammad ... they were killed because they did not have the sword with them”,
consult Ibid.
59 "The Preachings of Abu Hamza," Guardian, 7 February 2006.
60 Omar Bakri Mohammed, “the World Is Divided into Two Camps…” Daar Ul-Kufr and Daar Ul-Islaam (London: Ad-

Da’wah Publications, 2004), 66.

61 Consult e.g. the martyrdom testaments of the London bombers Mohammed Siddique Khan and Shehzad Tanweer,

Wasiya Fursan Ghaswat London [Testaments of the Knights of the London Attacks] (al-Sahab Media Production 2006)., and the
letters Mohammed Bouyeri pinned to the body of Theo Van Gogh. Petter Nesser, "The Slaying of the Dutch
Filmmaker: Religiously Motivated Violence or Islamist Terrorism in the Name of Global Jihad?" (Kjeller: FFI, 2005),
29.
62 An overview of al-Qaida communiqués between 1990 and 2002 by Hegghammer (2003) contains very few

references to Europe, consult Thomas Hegghammer, "Documentation on Al-Qa'ida : Interviews, Communiqués and
Other Primary Sources 1990-2002 (in Norwegian)," (FFI, 2002).

12
Germany and France (France did not contribute troops in Iraq, but is generally perceived as an
enemy by jihadis). 63 In November 2002, Bin Laden threatened “the US allies”. 64 In May 2003 al-
Zawahiri threatened the US, UK, Australia and Norway for military contributions in
Afghanistan. In a statement from Bin Laden in October 2003, he threatened Spain, the UK,
Australia, Poland, Japan and Italy, and said that al-Qaida would attack the US’s allies at the
“suitable time and place”. 65 However, overall Europe as a collective term was almost non-
existent in al-Qaida’s ideological communication before “The first letter to Europe’s people”,
which was released in April 2004 (nearly one month after the Madrid bombings). 66

Bin Laden offered a truce to “our neighbours north of the Mediterranean”, saying the attacks in
Madrid were consequences of European contributions to the invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq.
Semi-diplomatically, al-Qaida’s Emir appealed to “The European people” to pressure their
authorities to accept the truce offer within a three-month deadline. The truce would begin the
moment the last European soldier left Muslim territories. 67 After the April speech there has
been a clear tendency towards al-Qaida (especially Bin Laden) talking to the Europeans as one
entity (although al-Qaida still threatens specific countries in the communiqués). In their
communications, the terrorists that launched the attacks in Madrid and London identified
themselves with al-Qaida and echoed al-Qaida statements. 68 The Madrid bombers called
themselves The Military Wing of The Supporters of al-Qaida in Europe, or The Supporters of
God (ansar allah). The London bombers called themselves soldiers of God and praised al-
Qaida. 69

Global crusades, persecution and insults in Europe

There has also been a tendency for the al-Qaida leadership increasingly to portray local European
politics as a manifestation of the global crusade against Islam and Muslims. In February 2004 al-
Zawahiri portrayed the banning of veils in French schools as “a new sign of the enmity of the
Western crusaders against Muslims even while boasting of freedom, democracy and human
rights...”, equivalent to “the burning of villages in Afghanistan, the destruction of houses over
the heads of their inhabitants in Palestine, the massacre of children and the theft of oil in Iraq”. 70

In April 2006 al-Qaida’s media company al-Sahab released an audiotape in which Bin Laden
condemned the caricatures of Prophet Mohammed and instigated the ”youths of Islam” to kill
the cartoonists and punish Danish authorities for allowing the publication. During 2006, 2007
and 2008 al-Zawahiri and Bin Laden repeatedly threatened European countries because of the
cartoons. In November 2007 Bin Laden again appealed to Europeans to pressure their
governments to withdraw forces from Muslim lands (specifying Blair, Brown, Berlusconi, Asnar
and Sarkozy), or face the consequences. In March 2008 Bin Laden warned the EU and
portrayed the publication of the “insulting drawings” of the Prophet as “within the framework of
new crusade” demanding ”punishment”, and claiming that ”The Pope and the Vatican” had

63 Ibid., 184.
64 "The Complete Archive of Speeches and Sermons by the Imam of the Mujahidin Usama Bin Muhammad Bin Laden
(in Arabic)," (Shabakat al-Buraq al-Islamiyya, 2007).
65 Ibid.
66 A search for the word Europe in a complete collection of Bin Laden’s speeches between 2001 and 2006 returned

four hits, consult Ibid.

67 Similar communiqués were issued by the GIA leadership in connection with the terrorist attacks in France in 1995-

The GIA’s Emir Zaytuni said operations would stop if France withdrew its support for the Algerian regime. Zaytuni
also “invited” French president Chirac to Islam, according to the Prophet’s traditions.
68 One letter linked to the Madrid bombers stated “We regard whoever supports the American occupation as our

enemy, and see the Spanish government as responsible for the killing of each element of its forces in Iraq or outside of
Iraq, consult Proceedings 20/2004, Indictment of April 10 2006, Court of First Instance Number 6 of the Audencia National
(Translation of the Indictment of the Madrid Bombers by Tine Gade). pp 542-544.
69 “Your democratically elected governments continuously perpetuate atrocities against my people all over the world.

And your support of them makes you directly responsible, just as I am directly responsible for protecting and avenging
my Muslim brothers and sisters. Until we feel security, you will be our targets. And until you stop the bombing,
gassing, imprisonment and torture of my people we will not stop this fight. We are at war and I am a soldier”, consult
"London Bomber: Text in Full," BBC News, 2 September 2005.
70 "Headscarf Ban May Cause Attack on France," Daily Times, 26 February 2004.

13
been involved in the crime. He added that the cartoons represented a worse crime than
bombings of “villages that collapsed over our women and children”. 71 Addressing insults against
Islam in Europe al-Qaida referred to Ibn Taymiyyah’s sunnah based rulings on individual
punishment (killing) of whoever insults the Prophet.

Violating the Covenant of Security

In a parallel development ideological discussions intensified amongst extremist and jihadi
opinion makers in the UK and other European countries about the concept of the Covenant of
Security (aqd aman). The leader of al-Muhajiroun, Omar Bakri Mohammed, was a proponent of
a theologically based security contract between British Muslims and British authorities. As
explained by Bakri, a Muslim living in a non-Muslim country enjoying protection for himself, his
family and being able to practice his religion, finds himself in dar al-aman (the land of safety). 72

According to the Covenant of Security the protected Muslim is forbidden to harm wealth and
lives in the country offering protection. However, Bakri explained that this does not hinder the
Muslim from participating in jihad in other countries (e.g. the 9/11 bombers coming from
Europe and Saudi Arabia to the US, and of course participating in jihad in the Muslim world). 73
Bakri focused on two specific factors disqualifying the Covenant of Security between non-
Muslim governments and individual Muslim citizens: arrests of Muslims 74 and acts of war against
Muslims 75 . By arresting and combating Muslims the protector state becomes dar al-fitnah, a
country in which Muslims no longer enjoy security and the contract is broken (justifying jihad).
Omar Bakri portrayed himself and the Covenant of Security as a constraint on terrorism by
British Islamists. Reportedly, a group of British-Pakistanis convicted for planning attacks in the
UK during the spring of 2004 (linked to the London bombers) left al-Muhajiroun because they
disagreed with Bakri over the Covenant, and oriented themselves towards Abu Hamza and al-
Qaida associates in Pakistan instead. 76 After the invasion of Iraq and police crackdowns of jihadi
cells and networks in the UK, Bakri could no longer justify a Covenant of Security and in
January 2005, he annulled the pact from exile in Lebanon on the Internet service PalTalk. 77
From 2004 Omar Bakri’s al-Muhajiroun adopted a more militant position. Members of the group
voiced threatening statements to the public. In April 2004 members of the Luton branch claimed
they looked forward to and prayed for an attack in London. They added that an attack would
occur “because Bin Laden has said that it would happen, like in Bali, Turkey and Madrid”. One
of the activists stated that he would like to see,”mujahidin coming to London and killing
thousands, either with nuclear weapons or with germs...if they need a hiding place they can stay
with me, and if they need fertilizer (reference to the terrorist cell disrupted in March 2004
planning fertilizer bomb attacks) then I will tell them where to get it”. The leader of al-
Muhajiroun in Luton, the 24-year-old Ishtiaq Alamgir alias Saif al-Islam (The Sword of Islam),
said attacks against the UK were legitimate, as long as they were not executed by Muslims being
protected by UK authorities. He said he was radicalized by al-Muhajiroun, and inspired by al-
Qaida which he supported 100%. He added that the UK had violated the Covenant of Security

71 "May Our Mothers Be Bereaved If We Do Not Defend Our Prophet,” (al-Sahab, 2008).
72 Abu Hamza mocked the principle of dar al-Aman in the 1999 speech Hamza, "How to Live Islamically in the Land
of the Kuffar."
73 Mohammed, “the World Is Divided into Two Camps…” Daar Ul-Kufr and Daar Ul-Islaam.
74 Individual Muslims are no longer restricted by the Covenant “as soon as the state begins to arrest the Muslims on a

wide scale without charge, or publicly declares its animosity or hatred towards the Muslims and Islam”.
75 Non-Muslim lands of safety turned into lands of jihad when the countries declared their “physical, verbal and

financial support for many Western countries that have wasted the blood of Muslims, raped Muslim women and
stolen the resources of Muslims”. Although Bakri preached that the Covenant applied to UK Muslims he mentioned
the UK as one example of such violations, together with the US and Australia.
76 Rosie Cowan, Richard Norton-Taylor, and Audrey Gillian, "Police Search Emails for Trail to Pakistan Canadian

Accused of Aiding UK Suspects," Guardian, 1 April 2004.

77 On the Net Bakri said “I believe the whole of Britain has become Dar ul-Harb... the kuffar has no sanctity for their

own life or property...", and he urged his followers to join jihad "wherever you are". He added that "Al-Qaida and all
its branches and organisations of the world, that is the victorious group and they have the emir and you are obliged to
join. There is no need . . . to mess about”, consult Sean O’Neill and Yaakov Lappin, "Britain's Online Imam Declares
War as He Calls Young to Jihad," The Times 17 January 2005.

14
when the country sent troops to Iraq (he did not mention Afghanistan). In October 2004 al-
Muhajiroun was banned after UK authorities sanctioned new terrorism laws, and the group
became divided into al-Ghuraba (The Strangers) and The Savior Sect. Spokesmen for the groups
(and Bakri’s protégées), Anjem Choudary, Abu Izzadeen (Trevor Brookes), and Abu Uzair
voiced threatening statements to the British press in August 2005, in which they hailed the
London bombers and emphasized over and over again that the Covenant was history. All of
them have since been arrested for supporting terrorism. Abu Uzair said to the BBC,

”We don’t live in peace with you anymore, which means the covenant of security no longer exists. That is why those
four bombers attacked London. They believed there was no covenant of security and for them, their belief was they
were allowed to attack the UK... for them it was allowed, for them it was particularly allowed....Because me my
self my belief has not been attacked personally me myself. For them the banner has been raised for jihad in the
UK, which means for them it is allowed for them to attack, and they probably have many other cells in the UK”.

Abu Izzedin, said the Europeans and the Brits had to expect attacks after they rejected Bin
Laden’s truce offer in April 2004; “Osama Bin Laden, excuse me, Sheik Osama Bin Laden, he
offered to the British public and the European people at large an offer of ceasefire. He said that
if they roared up against their governments……brought their troops back home...he promised
not to attack them”. Izzedin added that suicide operations should be considered legitimate
“mujahidin activity” and “completely praiseworthy”. Like al-Qaida, Bakri’s followers’ focus
linked European (British) foreign policy to persecution of Muslims in the West. 78

A popular topic in Islamist extremist websites and discussion forums 79 , the Covenant of Security
was commented on by al-Qaida. In an open Q&A session with al-Zawahiri on the Internet he
received the question whether Muslims who have obtained visas in”infidel countries” should
consider themselves obligated by the Covenant of Security. Al-Zawahiri said he didn’t “believe
that the entry visa of the infidels is a security contract, and I explained this opinion in detail in
the seventh chapter of the second part of The Exoneration. At the end of that chapter, I said
that this is what my brothers and I have chosen, so whoever is at ease with it, let him apply it,
and whoever is not at ease with it, let him look for other means with which to fight the
Crusaders and Jews. But beware; beware of the third way, which is to refrain from the obligatory
Jihad against them”. 80 In The Exoneration, written as an answer to a critique by former al-Jihad
leader Sayyid Imam Sharif (Dr. Fadl), al-Zawahiri presented a series of examples aiming to show
that having a visa to a Western country does not imply safety and security for a Muslim,
highlighting that Western countries allowed the US to arrest Muslims on their territories (the
practice of extraordinary rendition), and that Muslims in the West have been forced to pay taxes
that finance warfare in the Muslim world. Also, he emphasized the inability of Muslims in the
West to offer their children proper Islamic education, cited that they were prevented from
practising their faith, and that Western authorities allowed insults against Islam and Muslims,
such as the Mohammed drawings. 81 Al-Zawahiri’s extensive discussion suggested that the
Covenant is too important to be ignored by al-Qaida, and that the organization certainly saw the
opportunity to make visible violations of the security pact aiming to radicalize Muslims in the
West.

According to Peters (2008), the Covenant of Security rationale seemed to function as a constraint
on Mohammed Bouyeri and the Hofstad Group searching for theological justifications for
terrorism in the Netherlands. Bouyeri found the solution on Taymiyyah’s ruling on individual
punishment for people insulting the Prophet, while other members of the network went

78 In a propaganda document Bakri’s pupils addressed UK foreign policy, the judicial system, secularism in schools,

discrimination and racism against Muslims, Islam’s ”internal enemies” (Muslims and Islamists cooperating the with the
UK government and spying on the true believers, e.g. the Metropolitan Police’s Muslim Contact Unit), etc, consult
"The British Plans for Islam & Muslims a Continuation of the Crusader Wars," (Ad-Da’wah Publications, 2004).
79 Consult e.g. Islamic Awakening http://forums.islamicawakening.com/ .
80 "The Open Meeting with Shaykh Ayman Al-Zawahiri Part One," (Al-Sahab Media Production (in English), 2008).
81 Ayman al-Zawahiri, The Exoneration (al-Sahab Media, 2008).

15
“preacher shopping” amongst self-declared pundits such as the ethnic Dutchman Abdul Jabbar
Van de Ven seeking permission to use violence in Holland. 82

Although circumstantial evidence points to some importance of the concept of a Covenant of

Security in either constraining or radicalizing Islamists in Europe (based on their individual
interpretations of whether their countries have violated the Covenant, or not), it seems to be
generally accepted by pro-al-Qaida activists that European contributions to the War on Terror
violated security pacts between Europeans and Muslims immediately after 9/11. After European
security services cracked down on the jihadi infrastructure in London, other European cities and
the Internet appear to have taken over Londonistan’s functions. In Germany a jihadi community
linked to the Uzbek al-Qaida associated Islamic Jihad Union, socialized ethnic Germans and
Turks into jihadi worldviews and sent them to the Afghan-Pakistani border for training. 83 Some
of these youths appeared on propaganda films by al-Qaida’s media company al-Sahab urging
attacks against Germany at home and abroad, and appealed to Germans to vote for the
withdrawal of German troops in the Muslim world in upcoming elections. 84 A German-Turkish
terrorist cell linked to the IJU planned attacks against German or Uzbek targets in Germany
during the fall of 2007. 85 On the Internet, several commentators and opinion makers spread
radicalism via their Cyber aliases. 86 However, in terms of producing texts and ideological
templates for jihadism in Europe, no-one has managed to replace the Londonistan trinity
(Qatada, Hamza, Bakri), as of yet. The young pundits of Europe’s 2nd generation jihadis function
more as distributors than producers of dialogical material. Recent terrorist cells in Europe appear
to have been more inspired by classical jihadis and jihadi leaders abroad, than preachers of the
new generation.

Preliminary Conclusions
The study has illustrated how Europe’s jihadis moved ideologically from relative harmony, via
disarray, towards a more unified global jihadish enemy perception and military strategy. Both
individual European states and Europe as a collective have become more prioritized enemies for
al-Qaida and likeminded groups in Europe and aboard. In terms of how to combat the enemy,
ideological material retrieved from investigations justified jihad in the West, and the
permissibility of using terrorism, weapons of mass destruction and martyrdom operations.
Combining analysis of ideological influences and operational trends we noted that there always
was a mismatch between ideological-strategic unity and operational capabilities when it came to
staging attacks in Europe. The GIA had operational capabilities and networks in Europe, but
was internally divided on the ideological and strategic justifications for the terrorist campaign. Al-
Qaida linked cells commissioned to launch attacks against US and Jewish targets all had a
minimum of training from crash-courses in terrorism and guerrilla warfare in Afghanistan.
Despite training and close ties to the global jihadi al-Qaida these terrorists could not decide
properly, it seems, on whether to prioritize local or global enemies. They also seemed ambivalent
as to whether to seek martyrdom or not. Moreover, these networks jeopardized their terrorism
plans by recklessly pursuing criminal activities and support activities for Muslim world
insurgents.

The new generation of jihadi networks in Europe seems more ideologically coherent, seeing
European countries as full partners, or integrated parts of the US-Israeli crusade. Moreover, after
consulting classical sources, al-Qaida’s propaganda and jihadi clerics and opinion makers in the
Muslim world via the Internet, they seem bent on using all necessary means in the struggle, even
suicide bombings. The weakness of the new generation is the limitations of the Net in terms of

82 "Chatting with Terrorists," (Dutchreport, 2005).

http://dutchreport.blogspot.com/2005_01_01_dutchreport_archive.html.
83 Guido Steinberg, "The Islamic Jihad Union," (SWP, 2008).
84 "Iju Releases Message from German-Speaking Militant" (NEFA, 2009).
85 Petter Nesser, "Lessons Learned from the September 2007 German Terrorist Plot," CTC Sentinel 1, no. 4 (2008).
86 James Brandon, "Virtual Caliphate; Islamic Extremists and Their Websites" (Centre for Social Cohesion, 2008).

16
obtaining sufficient terrorist training. 87 From a jihadi perspective, apart from the relative strategic
success of the Madrid attacks (the withdrawal of Spanish troops from Iraq followed by
redeployment to Afghanistan), jihadi terrorism in Europe has largely failed. Out of more than
seventy incidents registered by this author 88 , the great majority was intercepted or failed at the
operational level, while at the same time European countries remain part of the peacekeeping
operation and military efforts in Afghanistan, and have disrupted most of the jihad-infrastructure
in Europe by arresting radical preachers, propagandists, fundraisers, weapons smugglers and
terrorists. However, counter-terrorism arrests are a double-edged sword. The arrests of radical
clerics and high profile activists in Europe have forced the region’s jihadis to seek out clear-cut
global jihadi leaders and opinion makers abroad, and made room for the 2nd generation of more
globally oriented jihadi pundits on the World Wide Web.

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———. "Summary of My Testimony on the Holy Struggle in Algeria, 1988-1996 (in Arabic),
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"The Complete Archive of Speeches and Sermons by the Imam of the Mujahidin Usama Bin
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87 The new generation of jihadis has an urge to become full-blown mujahidin like their predecessors, and they travel

abroad to attend religious schools and training camps despite security risks, jeopardizing their operations, consult
Petter Nesser, "How Did Europe’s Global Jihadis Obtain Training for Their Militant Causes?," Terrorism and Political
Violence 20, no. 2 (2008).
88 ———, "Chronology of Jihadism in Western Europe 1994-2007: Planned, Prepared, and Executed Terrorist

Attacks " Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 31, no. 10 (2008).

17
Cowan, Rosie, Richard Norton-Taylor, and Audrey Gillian. "Police Search Emails for Trail to
Pakistan Canadian Accused of Aiding UK Suspects." Guardian, 1 April 2004.
E-Mail Correspondence with Dominique Thomas, March 2008.
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Hegghammer, Thomas. "Documentation on Al-Qa’ida: Interviews, Communiqués and Other
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Jamil El-Banna Et Al Vs George W Bush President of the United States Et Al, (2004).
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Columbia University Press, 2007.
Lia, Brynjar, and Åshild Kjøk. Islamist Insurgencies, Diasporic Support Networks, and Their Host States:
The Case of the Algerian GIA in Europe 1993-2000. Kjeller: FFI, 2001.
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"May Our Mothers Be Bereaved If We Do Not Defend Our Prophet." al-Sahab, 2008.
"Militant Ideology Atlas, Executive Report." edited by William McCants. New York: Combating
Terrorism Center, West Point, 2006.
"Militant Ideology Atlas, Research Compendium," edited by William McCants. New York:
Combating terrorism Center, West Point, 2006.
Mohammed, Omar Bakri. “The World Is Divided into Two Camps…” Daar Ul-Kufr and Daar Ul-
Islaam. London: Ad-Da’wah Publications, 2004.
Nasiri, Omar. Inside the Jihad; My Life with Al Qaeda a Spy's Story. New York: Basic Books, 2006.
Nesser, Petter. "Chronology of Jihadism in Western Europe 1994-2007: Planned, Prepared, and
Executed Terrorist Attacks " Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 31, no. 10 (2008).
———. "How Did Europe’s Global Jihadis Obtain Training for Their Militant Causes?"
Terrorism and Political Violence 20, no. 2 (2008): 1-23.
———. "Jihad in Europe." 101. Kjeller: FFI, 2004.
———. "Lessons Learned from the September 2007 German Terrorist Plot." CTC Sentinel 1, no.
4 (2008).
———. "The Slaying of the Dutch Filmmaker: Religiously Motivated Violence or Islamist
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O'Neill, Sean, and Daniel McGrory. The Suicide Factory, Abu Hamza and the Finsbury Park
Mosque. London: Harper Perennial, 2006.
"The Open Meeting with Shaykh Ayman Al-Zawahiri Part One." Al-Sahab Media Production (in
English), 2008.
O’Neill, Sean, and Yaakov Lappin. "Britain's Online Imam Declares War as He Calls Young to
Jihad." The Times 17 January 2005.
Pargeter, Alison. The New Frontiers of Jihad Radical Islam in Europe. London: I.B.Tauris & Co. Ltd,
2008.
Peters, Rudolph. "Dutch Extremist Islamism: Van Gogh's Murderer and His Ideas." In Jihadi
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"The Preachings of Abu Hamza." Guardian, 7 February 2006.
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Minbar al-Tawhid wa'l Jihad.

18
———. Characteristics of the Victorious Party in the Foundation of the State of the Believers (the Land of
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———. "Globalization and the Troops of the Jihad (Al-'Awlama Wa Siriyyiyyat Al-Jihad)."
Minbar al-Tawhid wa'l Jihad, 2001.
The Queen V Bilal Talal Abdul Samad Abdulla, Mohammed Jamil Abdelqader Asha - Opening Note,
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Qutb, Sayyid. Milestones (Revised Translation 1990). Indianapolis: American Trust Publications,
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Rogan, Hanna. "Violent Trends in Algeria since 9/11." CTC Sentinel 1, no. 12 (2008).
"Scepticism Greets "Al Qaeda in Britain" Founding." Reuters, 16 January 2008.
Steinberg, Guido. "The Islamic Jihad Union." SWP, 2008.
Taylor, Peter. "Inside Story, a Jihad Warrior in London." Guardian, 9 February 2004.
Verbal Argument for Verdict: Part 1 Verdict against Abu Dhess (in German), (2005).
Verdict in the Criminal Case against Mr Djilali Benali ("Aeurobui Beandali") Et Al (in German), (2003).
Wasiya Fursan Ghaswat London [Testaments of the Knights of the London Attacks]. al-Sahab Media
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Wilson, John. Introduction to Social Movements New York: Basic Books, 1973.

19
Appendix
Londonistan ideologues

Abu Qatada
Qatada (’Umar Abu ’Umar, or “The Palestinian”), was born in Palestine in 1960. As a youth he
joined the Tablighi movement. He obtained a bachelor in Islamic jurisprudence at the University
of Amman in 1984. Qatada and his ideological mentor Abu Mohammed al-Maqdisi (living in
Kuwait) founded the first Jordanian jihadi movement, which they called “The Sunni
Community” (ahl al-sunnah wa’l jama’a). 89 In 1991, Qatada travelled to Peshawar, Pakistan (via
Malaysia), where he finished an MA in Islamic Jurisprudence and (through his contacts with
Maqdisi) he obtained a post as a lecturer at “The Open Islamic University” set up for the
religious education of Arab Afghans. 90 In 1993 he applied for asylum in the UK for himself and
his family and started to preach at The Four Feathers Youth Club, known as the Baker Street
Mosque. Qatada also gave lectures at his home, a semi-detached apartment in Acton. Together
with the al-Qaida associated strategist and “pen jihadi” Abu Musab al-Suri, Qatada edited the
GIA’s mouthpiece al-Ansar. He also edited and distributed the magazine of the Libyan Islamic
Fighting Group’s (LIFG), al-Fajr. The magazines reported from the jihadi battlefields in Algeria,
Bosnia, etc (communiqués from the groups, fatwas from various jihadi ideologues, etc). 91 Qatada
himself wrote articles, commentaries and fatwas in al-Ansar until 1996, when he withdrew his
support for the GIA. 92

Abu Hamza
Abu Hamza al-Masri (The Egyptian) aka Mustafa Kamil Mustafa, was born into an Alexandrian
middle class family in 1958, and arrived in London as a student and adventurer in 1979. He
married and had a child with a British woman and obtained permanent permission to stay in the
UK in 1982. After a fight over infidelity ending in divorce, Hamza turned to religion, and took
up studying engineering at Luton University. He joined an Islamic study circle, and in 1987
Hamza travelled on Hajj in Mecca where he met Abdullah Azzam who educated him in jihadism.
Back in London Hamza mingled with jihadis and attended meetings with Omar Abd al-
Rahman. 93 After completing his studies in 1991, Hamza moved to Afghanistan with his new
Moroccan wife, where he ended up as a bomb maker in the Derunta camp in Jalalabad. Hamza
lost both his hands and an eye in an explosion in 1993 while he was preparing explosives. He was
subsequently forced by Pakistani intelligence (ISI) to return to the UK as part of a campaign to
expel foreign jihadis. 94 In London, Hamza became the pupil of Abu Qatada, before he
established himself as an independent preacher. In 1994 he formed the radical group Supporters
of Shariah (SoS). In 1995 Hamza travelled to Bosnia to join jihad against the Serbs. Back in the
UK he became imam at a radical mosque in Luton attended by pro-GIA jihad of the Bosnian
jihad. In 1997 (in competition with Abu Qatada) Hamza was elected khatib at the Finsbury Park
Mosque and made it the hub for jihadis in Europe. 95 The mosque had been dominated by Asian
moderates (Pakistanis and Bengalis), but with Hamza in charge it became a base for North
African jihadis. In March 2000, Hamza and SoS took total control of the mosque by force. 96
When the war ended in Bosnia, Hamza needed a new mobilizing cause. He aligned himself with

89 The movement later evolved into The Movement for Reform and Challenge, The Oneness of God, or The

Monotheism (al-Tawhid wa’l Jihad, the forerunner of Zarqwi’s al-Qaida in Iraq).

90 E-Mail Correspondence with Dominique Thomas, March 2008, March 2008.
91 And also other publications such as al-Minhaj and XXX
92 The reason Qatada, Abu Musab al-Suri, LIFG and JIE withdrew their support for the GIA in 1996 was that they

believed the group had unjustly killed several imams and leaders of the Islamic Salvation Front (FIS), and several
emissaries of the LIFG who had been sent to the country to monitor the actions of the GIA under its Emir at the
time, Jamal Zaytuni.
93 Omar Abd al-Rahman ”toured” Europe and the US at the time rallying support for the jihad in Afghanistan, consult

Sean O'Neill and Daniel McGrory, The Suicide Factory, Abu Hamza and the Finsbury Park Mosque (London: Harper
Perennial, 2006). XXX
94 Ibid.
95 Hamza and Qatada competed for the position, but Hamza managed to charm the mosque’s board.
96 O'Neill and McGrory, The Suicide Factory.

20
the GIA and in 1998 he took over the editing and publishing of al-Ansar. 97 When the GIA lost
the remaining support, Hamza shifted to focusing on local jihad in Yemen. He sent several SoS
cadre (including his son) to Yemen to train and assist Yemeni anti-state attacks. 98

Omar Bakri Mohammed

Born into a wealthy family in Aleppo, Syria, in 1958, Omar Bakri Mohammed enrolled in Islamic
boarding schools from the age of five. As a youth he joined the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood and
obtained a bachelor in Islamic jurisprudence in Damascus. Persecuted by Syrian security for his
affiliation with the Brotherhood, Bakri fled from Syria to Beirut, Lebanon, where he completed a
MA in Islamic jurisprudence and joined Hizb al-Tahrir (HT). 99 Bakri continued his studies at al-
Azhar in Cairo before travelling to Saudi Arabia in 1979, where he completed a doctoral thesis.
In Saudi Arabia he formed a HT cell against the advice of the organization’s global leadership in
Kuwait, which opposed the formation of a Saudi Branch. When HT’s leaders expelled Bakri he
formed his own organization al-Muhajiroun (AM), in Jeddah, in 1983. 100 In 1985, Bakri was
expelled from Saudi Arabia because the regime considered him a threat. Bakri wanted to go to
Pakistan, in his view the ideal base for Islamic activism. Because he had a multiple entry visa to
the UK from a former visit, he ended up in London instead. In the UK Bakri established a new
HT branch, again without approval of HT’s leaders. By 1986 Bakri had recruited 400 members.
In 1996 he cut all ties to HT and reactivated al-Muhajiroun (AM). By 2003 AM had 160
members, an estimated 700 followers and around 7000 “contact points” (sympathizers) across
the globe. 101 AM had sub-divisions in more than 30 UK cities, and international branches in
Lebanon, Ireland, Pakistan, and the US. In London, AM represented the “middle way” hardcore
jihadis and extreme political activists such as HT. 102 Al-Muhajiroun was banned by the UK
authorities in October 2004, and Omar Bakri went into exile in Lebanon in 2005 after the attacks
on the London underground (which involved people associated with al-Muhajiroun). From
Lebanon he continued to communicate with his followers via the Internet service PalTalk.

Abu Musab al-Suri

The radicalized Syrian Muslim Brother Abu Musab Al-Suri fled to Afghanistan via Spain in the
late 1980s after president al-Assad massacred the Syrian Muslim Brothers in Hama in 1982. Al-
Suri later became a propagandist and strategic thinker for al-Qaida and associated jihadi combat
groups (several of which maintained support networks in Europe, e.g. The Libyan Islamic
Fighting Group (LIFG)). After participating in the founding of al-Qaida, al-Suri acted as a
propagandist and strategic advisor for al-Qaida and the GIA in Madrid and London from 1991
and onwards. During Taliban rule in Afghanistan from the latter half of the 1990s, al-Suri acted
as a liaison between al-Qaida and the Taliban, and in the late 1990s, he was implicated in
organizing interviews with Bin Laden for the international press. A sophisticated strategic thinker
characterizing himself as a “pen jihadi”, Al-Suri developed the doctrine of decentralized jihad.
The doctrine recommends independent “home-grown” jihadi cells with no, or a minimum of
central leadership, i.e. the formula for jihadi terrorism in Europe. Al-Suri’s relationship with al-
Qaida was thorny, and in periods he operated independently from Bin Laden’s group as a
“freelance jihadi”, a trainer and advisor offering courses in Afghanistan. 103

97 The communiqué was issued in August 1997.

98 Among other things Hamza’s peers participated in a lethal kidnapping of Western tourists. Jihad in Yemen never
took off, although al-Qaida used the country as a base and launched some operations on the coastline.
99 Hizb al-Tahrir is a transnational Islamist organization founded in Palestine is calling for the re-establishment of the

Caliphate and global Islamization.

100 Consult e.g. Mahan Abedin, "Al-Muhajiroun in the UK: An Interview with Sheikh Omar Bakri Mohammed,"

Jamestown Foundation Terrorism Monitor 1, no. 7 (2004), and a biography in Mohammed, “The World Is Divided into Two
Camps…” Daar Ul-Kufr and Daar Ul-Islaam.
101 Quintan Wiktorowicz, Radical Islam Rising; Muslim Extremism in the West (Oxford: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers

inc, 2005).
102 Consult e.g. Abedin, "Al-Muhajiroun in the UK: An Interview with Sheikh Omar Bakri Mohammed." and

biography in Bakri’s book Mohammed, “The World Is Divided into Two Camps…” Daar Ul-Kufr and Daar Ul-Islaam.
103 Lia, Architect of Global Jihad: The Life of Al-Qaida Strategist Abu Mus'ab Al-Suri.

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Abu Basir al-Tartousi
The London based Syrian Abd-al Munim Mustafa Halima, or Abu Basir al-Tartousi, has been
described as an important “salafi opinion” maker, frequently quoted and discussed on extremist
websites. 104 Seemingly acting independently of specific militant groups, Tartousi was previously
well-regarded by militant groups for justifying jihadi operations internationally. However,
Tartousi lost “cred” when he criticized the London Bombers for violating the Covenant of
Security. In 2008 Tartousi issued a fatwa prohibiting suicide operations. 105

Abdullah al-Faisal
Born in St James, Jamaica, in 1963, Abdullah al-Faisal was raised a Christian, but converted to
Islam at the age of 16. Faisal studied Arabic and Islamic studies for one year in Guyana, South
America, before he travelled to Saudi Arabia and enrolled in religious studies at the Imam
Muhammad Ibn Saud University in Riyadh. Faisal graduated from his studies in 1991.
He settled in London in 1992, and married a British woman with whom he had children. Soon
al-Faisal established himself as a preacher at a radical mosque in Brixton and as a charismatic
figure within London’s extremist and militant networks, mocking political Islamists and
propagating jihad against Jews, Hindus and Americans. Faisal preached at a mosque in Beeston,
Leeds, West Yorkshire attended by several of the London Bombers. According to the official
account of the London attacks on 7 July 2005, he had a substantial impact on one of the
bombers, the Jamaican born Germaine Lindsay. Convicted and jailed in the UK for inciting
murder, al-Faisal was subsequently released and deported to his native Jamaica from which
continues his activism in a slightly more moderate fashion mainly via the media and the
Internet. 106

Some examples of ideological texts accessed by terrorists in Europe

Madrid Cell 107
Classical texts
Milestones by Sayyid Qutb
Texts by Ibn Taymiyyah
Contemporary jihadi ideologues internationally
Several texts by the Saudi jihadi ideologue Abd al-Aziz al-Jarbu
Several texts by the Saudi jihadi ideologue Nasir Bin Hamad al-Fahd
Texts by Abu Mohammed al-Maqdisi
Ideological communications by Osama Bin Laden and Ayman al-Zawahiri
Videotaped sermons by the Moroccan militant preacher Mohammed al-Fizazi
Texts by Abu Musab al-Suri
Europe based ideologues
Several texts by Abu Qatada
One text by Abu Basir al-Tartousi
Hofstad Group (Mohammed Bouyeri) 108
Classical jihadi texts
Milestones by Sayyid Qutb
Texts by Ibn Taymiyyah
Texts by the founder of the “Asian Muslim Brotherhood” Abu Ala Mawdudi
Contemporary jihadi ideologues internationally
To be added

104 Consult Brandon, "Virtual Caliphate; Islamic Extremists and Their Websites".
105 Consult http://forums.islamicawakening.com/showthread.php?t=20144&highlight=baseer , and Tartousi’s website
on http://forums.islamicawakening.com/showthread.php?t=20144&highlight=baseer .
106 Consult al-Faisal’s website on http://www.revolutionmuslim.com/ .
107 Proceedings 20/2004, Indictment of April 10 2006, Court of First Instance Number 6 of the Audencia National (Translation of the

Indictment of the Madrid Bombers by Tine Gade).

108 Peters, "Dutch Extremist Islamism: Van Gogh's Murderer and His Ideas.", "Inventory of Abu Hamza Texts on

Mohammed Bouyeri's Computer (Courtesy Rudolph Peters)."

22
Europe based ideologues
Several texts and books by Abu Hamza
Glasgow Cell 109
Classical jihadi texts
Contemporary jihadi ideologues internationally
Verdict regarding the permissibility of martyrdom operations by Sulayman Ibn Nasir Al-Ulwan
(Saudi)
The Clarification of what happened in America by Hamud Bin Uqla al-Shuaybi
The ruling about the use of weapons of mass destruction against unbelievers by Nasir Bin
Hamad al-Fahd
Close to the Clouds, a word by Sheikh Ayman al-Zawahiri
The war of the Enfeebled by Abu Musab al-Suri
Europe based ideologues
No texts or other material by Londonistan preachers, or other ideological mentors in the UK, or
other European countries.

109 The Queen V Bilal Talal Abdul Samad Abdulla, Mohammed Jamil Abdelqader Asha - Opening Note, (2008).

23