Ichong vs Hernandez

G.R. No. L-7995 May 31, 1957

Principle: Police power cannot be bargained away through the medium of a treaty or a
contract.

Facts: Petitioner, for and in his own behalf and on behalf of other alien residents corporations
and partnerships adversely affected by the provisions of Republic Act. No. 1180, An Act to
Regulate the Retail Business, filed to obtain a judicial declaration that said Act is
unconstitutional contending that: (1) it denies to alien residents the equal protection of the laws
and deprives of their liberty and property without due process of law ; (2) the subject of the Act
is not expressed or comprehended in the title thereof; (3) the Act violates international and treaty
obligations of the Republic of the Philippines; (4) the provisions of the Act against the
transmission by aliens of their retail business thru hereditary succession, and those requiring
100% Filipino capitalization for a corporation or entity to entitle it to engage in the retail
business, violate the spirit of Sections 1 and 5, Article XIII and Section 8 of Article XIV of the
Constitution.

Issue: Whether RA 1180 denies to alien residents the equal protection of the laws and deprives
of their liberty and property without due process of law

Held: No. The equal protection of the law clause is against undue favor and individual or class
privilege, as well as hostile discrimination or the oppression of inequality. It is not intended to
prohibit legislation, which is limited either in the object to which it is directed or by territory
within which is to operate. It does not demand absolute equality among residents; it merely
requires that all persons shall be treated alike, under like circumstances and conditions both as to
privileges conferred and liabilities enforced. The equal protection clause is not infringed by
legislation which applies only to those persons falling within a specified class, if it applies alike
to all persons within such class, and reasonable grounds exists for making a distinction between
those who fall within such class and those who do not. (2 Cooley, Constitutional Limitations,
824-825.)

The due process clause has to do with the reasonableness of legislation enacted in pursuance of
the police power. Is there public interest, a public purpose; is public welfare involved? Is the Act
reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the legislatures purpose; is it not unreasonable,
arbitrary or oppressive? Is there sufficient foundation or reason in connection with the matter
involved; or has there not been a capricious use of the legislative power? Can the aims conceived
be achieved by the means used, or is it not merely an unjustified interference with private
interest? These are the questions that we ask when the due process test is applied.

The conflict, therefore, between police power and the guarantees of due process and equal
protection of the laws is more apparent than real. Properly related, the power and the guarantees
are supposed to coexist. The balancing is the essence or, shall it be said, the indispensable means
for the attainment of legitimate aspirations of any democratic society. There can be no absolute
power, whoever exercise it, for that would be tyranny. Yet there can neither be absolute liberty,
for that would mean license and anarchy. So the State can deprive persons of life, liberty and
property, provided there is due process of law; and persons may be classified into classes and
groups, provided everyone is given the equal protection of the law. The test or standard, as
always, is reason. The police power legislation must be firmly grounded on public interest and
welfare, and a reasonable relation must exist between purposes and means. And if distinction and
classification has been made, there must be a reasonable basis for said distinction.

The law does not violate the equal protection clause of the Constitution because sufficient
grounds exist for the distinction between alien and citizen in the exercise of the occupation
regulated, nor the due process of law clause, because the law is prospective in operation and
recognizes the privilege of aliens already engaged in the occupation and reasonably protects their
privilege; that the wisdom and efficacy of the law to carry out its objectives appear to us to be
plainly evident as a matter of fact it seems not only appropriate but actually necessary and
that in any case such matter falls within the prerogative of the Legislature, with whose power and
discretion the Judicial department of the Government may not interfere; that the provisions of the
law are clearly embraced in the title, and this suffers from no duplicity and has not misled the
legislators or the segment of the population affected; and that it cannot be said to be void for
supposed conflict with treaty obligations because no treaty has actually been entered into on the
subject and the police power may not be curtailed or surrendered by any treaty or any other
conventional agreement.
Tio vs Videogram Regulatory Commission

(G.R. No. 75697)

Principle: The taxing power may be used as an implement of police power.

Facts: The case is a petition filed by petitioner on behalf of videogram operators adversely
affected by Presidential Decree No. 1987, An Act Creating the Videogram Regulatory Board
with broad powers to regulate and supervise the videogram industry.

A month after the promulgation of the said Presidential Decree, the amended the National
Internal Revenue Code provided that:

SEC. 134. Video Tapes. There shall be collected on each processed video-tape cassette,
ready for playback, regardless of length, an annual tax of five pesos; Provided, That locally
manufactured or imported blank video tapes shall be subject to sales tax.

Section 10. Tax on Sale, Lease or Disposition of Videograms. Notwithstanding any

provision of law to the contrary, the province shall collect a tax of thirty percent (30%) of the
purchase price or rental rate, as the case may be, for every sale, lease or disposition of a
videogram containing a reproduction of any motion picture or audiovisual program.

Fifty percent (50%) of the proceeds of the tax collected shall accrue to the province, and the
other fifty percent (50%) shall accrue to the municipality where the tax is collected;
PROVIDED, That in Metropolitan Manila, the tax shall be shared equally by the
City/Municipality and the Metropolitan Manila Commission.

The rationale behind the tax provision is to curb the proliferation and unregulated circulation of
videograms including, among others, videotapes, discs, cassettes or any technical improvement
or variation thereof, have greatly prejudiced the operations of movie houses and theaters. Such
unregulated circulation have caused a sharp decline in theatrical attendance by at least forty
percent (40%) and a tremendous drop in the collection of sales, contractors specific, amusement
and other taxes, thereby resulting in substantial losses estimated at P450 Million annually in
government revenues.

Videogram(s) establishments collectively earn around P600 Million per annum from rentals,
sales and disposition of videograms, and these earnings have not been subjected to tax, thereby
depriving the Government of approximately P180 Million in taxes each year.

The unregulated activities of videogram establishments have also affected the viability of the
movie industry.
Issues:

(1) Whether or not tax imposed by the DECREE is a valid exercise of police power.

(2) Whether or nor the DECREE is constitutional.

Held:

Yes.

Police power is the power of promoting public welfare by restraining and regulating the use of
liberty and property. Taxation has been made the implement of the states police power. The levy
of the 30% tax is for a public purpose. It was imposed primarily to answer the need for
regulating the video industry, particularly because of the rampant film piracy, the flagrant
violation of intellectual property rights, and the proliferation of pornographic video tapes. And
while it was also an objective of the DECREE to protect the movie industry, the tax remains a
valid imposition.

It is constitutional.

We find no clear violation of the Constitution which would justify us in pronouncing Presidential
Decree No. 1987 as unconstitutional and void. While the underlying objective of the DECREE is
to protect the moribund movie industry, there is no question that public welfare is at bottom of its
enactment, considering the unfair competition posed by rampant film piracy; the erosion of the
moral fiber of the viewing public brought about by the availability of unclassified and
unreviewed video tapes containing pornographic films and films with brutally violent sequences;
and losses in government revenues due to the drop in theatrical attendance, not to mention the
fact that the activities of video establishments are virtually untaxed since mere payment of
Mayors permit and municipal license fees are required to engage in business.

WHEREFORE, the instant Petition is hereby dismissed. No costs.

ASSOC. OF SMALL LANDOWNERS V DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM

G.R No. 78742 JULY 14, 1989

PRINCIPLE: Eminent domain may be used as an implement to attain the police objective.

FACTS:

These are consolidated cases involving common legal questions including serious challenges to
the constitutionality of R.A. No. 6657 also known as the "Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law
of 1988"

In G.R. No. 79777, the petitioners are questioning the P.D No. 27 and E.O Nos. 228 and 229 on
the grounds inter alia of separation of powers, due process, equal protection and the
constitutional limitation that no private property shall be taken for public use without just
compensation.

In G.R. No. 79310, the petitioners in this case claim that the power to provide for a
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program as decreed by the Constitution belongs to the
Congress and not to the President, the also allege that Proclamation No. 131 and E.O No. 229
should be annulled for violation of the constitutional provisions on just compensation, due
process and equal protection. They contended that the taking must be simultaneous with payment
of just compensation which such payment is not contemplated in Section 5 of the E.O No. 229.

In G.R. No. 79744, the petitioner argues that E.O Nos. 228 and 229 were invalidly issued by the
President and that the said executive orders violate the constitutional provision that no private
property shall be taken without due process or just compensation which was denied to the
petitioners.

In G.R. No 78742 the petitioners claim that they cannot eject their tenants and so are unable to
enjoy their right of retention because the Department of Agrarian Reform has so far
not issued the implementing rules of the decree. They therefore ask the Honorable Court for a
writ of mandamus to compel the respondents to issue the said rules.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the laws being challenged is a valid exercise of Police power or Power of
Eminent Domain.
RULING:

Yes.

Police Power through the Power of Eminent Domain, though there are traditional distinction
between the police power and the power of eminent domain, property condemned under police
power is noxious or intended for noxious purpose, the compensation for the taking of such
property is not subject to compensation, unlike the taking of the property in Eminent Domain or
the power of expropriation which requires the payment of just compensation to the owner of the
property expropriated.
MMDA Vs. Bel-Air Village

G.R. No. 135962 27Mar 2000

Principle: Where there is a traffic law or regulation validly enacted by the legislature or
those agencies to whom legislative power has been delegated MMDA is not precluded to
confiscate and suspend or revoke drivers license in the exercise of its mandate of transport
and traffic management

Facts: Metropolitan Manila Development Authority (MMDA), petitioner herein, is a

Government Agency tasked with the delivery of basic services in Metro Manila. Bel-Air Village
Association (BAVA), respondent herein, received a letter of request from the petitioner to open
Neptune Street of Bel-Air Village for the use of the public. The said opening of Neptune Street
will be for the safe and convenient movement of persons and to regulate the flow of traffic in
Makati City. This was pursuant to MMDA law or Republic Act No. 7924. On the same day, the
respondent was appraised that the perimeter wall separating the subdivision and Kalayaan
Avenue would be demolished.

The respondent, to stop the opening of the said street and demolition of the wall, filed a
preliminary injunction and a temporary restraining order. Respondent claimed that the MMDA
had no authority to do so and the lower court decided in favor of the Respondent. Petitioner
appealed the decision of the lower courts and claimed that it has the authority to open Neptune
Street to public traffic because it is an agent of the State that can practice police power in the
delivery of basic services in Metro Manila.

Issue: Whether or not the MMDA has the mandate to open Neptune Street to public traffic
pursuant to its regulatory and police powers.

Held: The Court held that the MMDA does not have the capacity to exercise police power.
Police power is primarily lodged in the National Legislature. However, police power may be
delegated to government units. Petitioner herein is a development authority and not a political
government unit. Therefore, the MMDA cannot exercise police power because it cannot be
delegated to them. It is not a legislative unit of the government. Republic Act No. 7924 does not
empower the MMDA to enact ordinances, approve resolutions and appropriate funds for the
general welfare of the inhabitants of Manila. There is no syllable in the said act that grants
MMDA police power.

It is an agency created for the purpose of laying down policies and coordinating with various
national government agencies, peoples organizations, non-governmental organizations and the
private sector for the efficient and expeditious delivery of basic services in the vast metropolitan
area.
FRANCISCO V FERNANDO

G.R. No. 166501 November 16, 2006

Principle:

FACTS:

Petitioner Ernesto B. Francisco, Jr, as member of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and
taxpayer, filed this original action for the issuance of the writs of Prohibition and Mandamus.
Petitioner prays for the Prohibition writ to enjoin respondents Bayani F. Fernando, Chairman of
the Metropolitan Manila Development Authority (MMDA) and the MMDA from further
implementing its "wet flag scheme.

Petitioner contends that the Flag Scheme: (1) has no legal basis because the MMDAs governing
body, the Metro Manila Council, did not authorize it; (2) violates the Due Process Clause
because it is a summary punishment for jaywalking; (3) disregards the Constitutional protection
against cruel, degrading, and inhuman punishment; and (4) violates "pedestrian rights" as it
exposes pedestrians to various potential hazards.

In their Comment, respondents sought the dismissal of the petition for petitioners lack of
standing to litigate and for violation of the doctrine of hierarchy of courts. Alternatively,
respondents contended that the Flag Scheme is a valid preventive measure against jaywalking.

ISSUE:

1. Whether or not MMDA can exercise its police powers by implementing the wet flag
scheme.

2. Whether or not the petitioners question of constitutionality is valid.

RULLING:

Yes.

This serves as sufficient basis for the respondents implementation of schemes to enforce the
anti-jaywalking ordinances and similar regulations. The MMDA is an administrative agency
tasked with the implementation of rules and regulations enacted by proper authorities. The
absence of an anti-jaywalking ordinance in Valenzuela City does not detract from this conclusion
absent any proof that respondents implemented the Flag Scheme in that city.

No.

A citizen can raise a constitutional question only when (1) he can show that he has personally
suffered some actual or threatened injury because of the allegedly illegal conduct of the
government; (2) the injury is fairly traceable to the challenged action; and (3) a favorable action
will likely redress the injury. On the other hand, a party suing as a taxpayer must specifically
show that he has a sufficient interest in preventing the illegal expenditure of money raised by
taxation and that he will sustain a direct injury as a result of the enforcement of the questioned
statute. Petitioner meets none of the requirements under either category.

Nor is there merit to petitioners claim that the Court should relax the standing requirement
because of the "transcendental importance" of the issues the petition raises. As an exception to
the standing requirement, the transcendental importance of the issues raised relates to the merits
of the petition. Thus, the party invoking it must show, among others, the presence of a clear
disregard of a constitutional or statutory prohibition. Petitioner has not shown such clear
constitutional or statutory violation.
Metropolitan Manila Development Authority v. Viron Transportation,
G.R. No. 170656, August 15, 2007].

FACTS:

GMA declared Executive Order (E.O.) No. 179 operational, thereby creating the MMDA in
2003. Due to traffic congestion, the MMDA recommended a plan to decongest traffic by
eliminating the bus terminals now located along major Metro Manila thoroughfares and
providing more and convenient access to the mass transport system. The MMC gave a go signal
for the project. Viron Transit, a bus company assailed the move. They alleged that the MMDA
didnt have the power to direct operators to abandon their terminals. In doing so they asked the
court to interpret the extent and scope of MMDAs power under RA 7924. They also asked if the
MMDA law contravened the Public Service Act.

Another bus operator, Mencorp, prayed for a TRO for the implementation in a trial court. In the
Pre-Trial Order17 issued by the trial court, the issues were narrowed down to whether 1) the
MMDAs power to regulate traffic in Metro Manila included the power to direct provincial bus
operators to abandon and close their duly established and existing bus terminals in order to
conduct business in a common terminal; (2) the E.O. is consistent with the Public Service Act
and the Constitution; and (3) provincial bus operators would be deprived of their real properties
without due process of law should they be required to use the common bus terminals. The trial
court sustained the constitutionality.

Both bus lines filed for a MFR in the trial court. It, on September 8, 2005, reversed its Decision,
this time holding that the E.O. was "an unreasonable exercise of police power"; that the authority
of the MMDA under Section (5)(e) of R.A. No. 7924 does not include the power to order the
closure of Virons and Mencorps existing bus terminals; and that the E.O. is inconsistent with
the provisions of the Public Service Act.

MMDA filed a petition in the Supreme Court. Petitioners contend that there is no justiciable
controversy in the cases for declaratory relief as nothing in the body of the E.O. mentions or
orders the closure and elimination of bus terminals along the major thoroughfares of Metro
Manila. To them, Viron and Mencorp failed to produce any letter or communication from the
Executive Department apprising them of an immediate plan to close down their bus terminals.

And petitioners maintain that the E.O. is only an administrative directive to government agencies
to coordinate with the MMDA and to make available for use government property along EDSA
and South Expressway corridors. They add that the only relation created by the E.O. is that
between the Chief Executive and the implementing officials, but not between third persons.
ISSUE:

Whether or not EO 179 and the delegation for the implementation to the MMDA is a valid
exercise of police power.

RULLING:

No.

The Court ruled that the authority of the President to order the implementation of the project
notwithstanding the designation of the MMDA as the implementing agency for the project may
not be sustained. It is ultra vires, there being no legal basis therefor. The MMDA is as termed in
the charter itself, a developmental authority, it is an agency created for the purpose of laying
down policies and coordinating with the various national government agencies, all its functions
are administrative in nature and are summed up in the charter itself. In the light of this
administrative nature of its powers and functions, the MMDA is devoid of authority to
implement the project as envisioned by EO179 hence it could not have been validly designated
by the President to undertake the project. It follows that the MMDA cannot validly order the
closure and elimination of respondents bus terminals.

The SC cited that the MMDA does not satisfy the two tests of a valid police power measure
being, one the interest of the public generally as distinguished that of a particular class and
second, the means employed are reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose
and not unduly oppressive upon individuals. The MMDA is not vested with police power.
Petition is denied.