EN BANC

[A.C. No. 2387. September 10, 1998]

CLETO DOCENA, complainant, vs. ATTY. DOMINADOR Q. LIMON, respondent.

DECISION
PER CURIAM

On April 15, 1982, a complaint for disbarment was filed by Cleto Docena against Atty.
Dominador Q. Limon, Sr., on grounds of malpractice, gross misconduct, and violation of
attorney's oath.
It appears that respondent Atty. Limon was complainant's lawyers on appeal in Civil Case
No. 425 for Forcible Entry. While the appeal was pending before the then Court of First Instance
of Eartern Samar, Branch I, respondent required therein defendants-appellants Docena spouses to
post a supersedeas bond in the amount of P10,000.00 allegedly to stay the execution of the
appealed decision.
To raise the required, complainant Cleto Docena obtained a loan of P3,000.00 from the
Borongan, Eastern Samar Branch of the Development Bank of the Philippines;
borrowed P2,140.00 from a private individual; and applied for an agricultural loan of P4,860.00
from the Borongan, Samar Branch of the Philippine National Bank, wherein respondent himself
acted as guarantor (tsn, Session of July 8, 1983, pp. 33-34). The amount of P4,860.00 was
produced by complainant in response to respondent's letter dated September 2, 1979 (Exh. "C",
tsn, p. 26, ibid.) demanding delivery of the aforesaid amount, thus:
Dear Mr. and Mrs. Docena:
I wish to remind you that today is the last day for the deposit of the balance of P4,860.00.
Atty. Batica was in court yesterday verifying whether you have deposited the said balance
and the Honorable Judge informed him that you have until today to deposit the said amount.
I wish to inform you that the Honorable Judge will be in Sta. Fe tomorrow for rural service.
We will be waiting for you tomorrow September 22, 1979, at Sta. Fe as you promised.
Very truly yours,
(Signed)
On November 14, 1980, the Court of First Instance of Eastern Samar rendered a decision on
the appealed case in favor of the Docena spouses.
After receipt of said decision, complainant went to the CFI to withdraw the supersedeas
bond of P10,000.00 but he thereupon discovered that no such bond was ever posted by
respondent.
 When confronted, respondent promised to restitute the amount, but he never complied with
such undertaking despite repeated demands from the Docena spouses.
In his answer the herein complaint, respondent claimed that the P10,000.00 was his
attorney's fees for representing the Docena spouses in their appeal. But this self-serving
allegation is belied by the letter (quoted above) of respondent himself demanding from the
Docena spouses the balance of P4,860.00 supposedly to be deposited in court to stay the
execution of the appealed decision of the MTC. Moreover, the fact that he had promised to return
the P10,000.00 to the Docena spouses is also an admission that the money was never his, and
that it was only entrusted to him for deposit.
After due investigation and hearing, the Intergrated Bar of the Philippines recommended that
respondent be suspended from the practice of law for one year and ordered to return the amount
of P8,500.00 (he had earlier paid complainant P1,500.00, but nothing more) within 1 month from
notice, and should he fail to do so, he shall be suspended indefinitely.
The Court finds the recommended penalty too light. Truly, the amount involved may be
small, but the nature of the transgression calls for a heavier sanction. The Code of Professional
Responsibility mandates that:

Canon 1. x x x

Rule 1.01 - A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.

Canon 16. x x x

Canon 16.01 - A lawyer shall account for all money or property collected or received from the
client.

Respondent infringed and breached these rules. Verily, good moral character is not a
condition precedent to admission to the legal profession, but it must also be possessed at all
times in order to maintain one's good standing in the exclusive and honored fraternity
(Villanueva vs. Atty. Teresita Sta. Ana, 245 SCRA 707 [1995]).
It has been said time and again, and this cannot overemphasize, that the law is not a trade
nor a craft but a profession (Agpalo, Legal Ethics, 1983, p. 1). Its basic ideal is to render public
service and to secure justice for those who seek its aid. [Mayer vs. State Bar, 2 Call2d 71, 39 P2d
206 (1934), cited in Agpalo, id.] If it has to remain an honorable profession and attain its basic
ideal, those enrolled in its ranks should not only master its tenets and principles but should also,
by their live, accord continuing fidelity to them. (Agpalo, id) By extorting money from his client
through deceit and misrepresentation, respondent Limon has reduced the law profession to a
level so base, so low and dishonorable, and most contemptible. He has sullied the integrity of his
brethren in the law and has, indirectly, eroded the peoples' confidence in the judicial system. By
his reprehensible conduct, which is reflective of his depraved character, respondent has made
himself unworthy to remain in the Roll of Attorneys. He should be disbarred.
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Dominador Q. Limon, Sr. is hereby DISBARRED. The
Office of the Clerk of Court is directed to strike out his name from the Roll of Attorneys.
Respondent is likewise ordered to return the amount of P8,500.00, the balance of the money
entrusted to him by complainant Docena, within one (1) month from the finality of this Decision.
SO ORDERED.
 SECOND DIVISION

[A.C No. 4749. January 20, 2000]

SOLIMAN M. SANTOS, JR., complainant, vs. ATTY. FRANCISCO R.

LLAMAS, respondent.

DECISION

MENDOZA, J.:

This is a complaint for misrepresentation and non-payment of bar membership dues filed against
respondent Atty. Francisco R. Llamas.

In a letter-complaint to this Court dated February 8, 1997, complainant Soliman M. Santos, Jr.,
himself a member of the bar, alleged that:

On my oath as an attorney, I wish to bring to your attention and appropriate

sanction the matter of Atty. Francisco R. Llamas who, for a number of years now,
has not indicated the proper PTR and IBP O.R. Nos. and data (date & place of
issuance) in his pleadings. If at all, he only indicates "IBP Rizal 259060" but he
has been using this for at least three years already, as shown by the following
attached sample pleadings in various courts in 1995, 1996 and 1997: (originals
available)

Annex "Ex-Parte Manifestation and Submission" dated

A.......- December 1, 1995 in Civil Case No. Q-95-25253, RTC,
Br. 224, QC

Annex "Urgent Ex-Parte Manifestation Motion" dated November

B.......- 13, 1996 in Sp. Proc. No. 95-030, RTC Br. 259 (not 257),
Paraaque, MM

Annex "An Urgent and Respectful Plea for extension of Time to

C.......- File Required Comment and Opposition" dated January
17, 1997 in CA-G.R. SP (not Civil Case) No. 42286, CA
6th Div.

This matter is being brought in the context of Rule 138, Section 1 which qualifies
that only a duly admitted member of the bar "who is in good and regular standing,
is entitled to practice law". There is also Rule 139-A, Section 10 which provides
that "default in the payment of annual dues for six months shall warrant
suspension of membership in the Integrated Bar, and default in such payment for
one year shall be a ground for the removal of the name of the delinquent member
from the Roll of Attorneys."
 Among others, I seek clarification (e.g. a certification) and appropriate action on
the bar standing of Atty. Francisco R. Llamas both with the Bar Confidant and
with the IBP, especially its Rizal Chapter of which Atty. Llamas purports to be a
member. Jksm

Please note that while Atty. Llamas indicates "IBP Rizal 259060" sometimes, he
does not indicate any PTR for payment of professional tax.

Under the Rules, particularly Rule 138, Sections 27 and 28, suspension of an
attorney may be done not only by the Supreme Court but also by the Court of
Appeals or a Regional Trial Court (thus, we are also copy furnishing some of
these courts).

Finally, it is relevant to note the track record of Atty. Francisco R. Llamas, as

shown by:

1........his dismissal as Pasay City Judge per Supreme Court Admin. Matter No.
1037-CJ En Banc Decision on October 28, 1981 ( in SCRA )

2........his conviction for estafa per Decision dated June 30, 1994 in Crim. Case
No. 11787, RTC Br. 66, Makati, MM (see attached copy of the Order dated
February 14, 1995 denying the motion for reconsideration of the conviction which
is purportedly on appeal in the Court of Appeals).

Attached to the letter-complaint were the pleadings dated December 1, 1995, November 13,
1996, and January 17, 1997 referred to by complainant, bearing, at the end thereof, what appears
to be respondents signature above his name, address and the receipt number "IBP Rizal
259060."[1] Also attached was a copy of the order,[2] dated February 14, 1995, issued by Judge
Eriberto U. Rosario, Jr. of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 66, Makati, denying respondents
motion for reconsideration of his conviction, in Criminal Case No. 11787, for violation of Art.
316, par. 2 of the Revised Penal Code.

On April 18, 1997, complainant filed a certification[3] dated March 18, 1997, by the then
president of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, Atty. Ida R. Macalinao-Javier, that respondents
"last payment of his IBP dues was in 1991. Since then he has not paid or remitted any amount to
cover his membership fees up to the present."

On July 7, 1997, respondent was required to comment on the complaint within ten days from
receipt of notice, after which the case was referred to the IBP for investigation, report and
recommendation. In his comment-memorandum,[4] dated June 3, 1998, respondent alleged:[5]

3. That with respect to the complainants absurd claim that for using in 1995, 1996
and 1997 the same O.R. No. 259060 of the Rizal IBP, respondent is automatically
no longer a member in good standing.
Precisely, as cited under the context of Rule 138, only an admitted member of the
bar who is in good standing is entitled to practice law.

The complainants basis in claiming that the undersigned was no longer in good
standing, were as above cited, the October 28, 1981 Supreme Court decision of
dismissal and the February 14, 1995 conviction for Violation of Article 316 RPC,
concealment of encumbrances. Chief

As above pointed out also, the Supreme Court dismissal decision was set aside
and reversed and respondent was even promoted from City Judge of Pasay City to
Regional Trial Court Judge of Makati, Br. 150.

Also as pointed out, the February 14, 1995 decision in Crim. Case No. 11787 was
appealed to the Court of Appeals and is still pending.

Complainant need not even file this complaint if indeed the decision of dismissal
as a Judge was never set aside and reversed, and also had the decision of
conviction for a light felony, been affirmed by the Court of Appeals. Undersigned
himself would surrender his right or privilege to practice law.

4. That complainant capitalizes on the fact that respondent had been delinquent in
his dues.

Undersigned since 1992 have publicly made it clear per his Income Tax Return,
up to the present, that he had only a limited practice of law. In fact, in his Income
Tax Return, his principal occupation is a farmer of which he is. His 30 hectares
orchard and pineapple farm is located at Calauan, Laguna.

Moreover, and more than anything else, respondent being a Senior Citizen since
1992, is legally exempt under Section 4 of Rep. Act 7432 which took effect in
1992, in the payment of taxes, income taxes as an example. Being thus exempt, he
honestly believe in view of his detachment from a total practice of law, but only
in a limited practice, the subsequent payment by him of dues with the Integrated
Bar is covered by such exemption. In fact, he never exercised his rights as an IBP
member to vote and be voted upon.

Nonetheless, if despite such honest belief of being covered by the exemption and
if only to show that he never in any manner wilfully and deliberately failed and
refused compliance with such dues, he is willing at any time to fulfill and pay all
past dues even with interests, charges and surcharges and penalties. He is ready to
tender such fulfillment or payment, not for allegedly saving his skin as again
irrelevantly and frustratingly insinuated for vindictive purposes by the
complainant, but as an honest act of accepting reality if indeed it is reality for him
to pay such dues despite his candor and honest belief in all food faith, to the
contrary. Esmsc
On December 4, 1998, the IBP Board of Governors passed a resolution[6] adopting and approving
the report and recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner which found respondent
guilty, and recommended his suspension from the practice of law for three months and until he
pays his IBP dues. Respondent moved for a reconsideration of the decision, but this was denied
by the IBP in a resolution,[7] dated April 22, 1999. Hence, pursuant to Rule 139-B, 12(b) of the
Rules of Court, this case is here for final action on the decision of the IBP ordering respondents
suspension for three months.

The findings of IBP Commissioner Alfredo Sanz are as follows:

On the first issue, Complainant has shown "respondents non-indication of the

proper IBP O.R. and PTR numbers in his pleadings (Annexes "A", "B" and "C" of
the letter complaint, more particularly his use of "IBP Rizal 259060 for at least
three years."

The records also show a "Certification dated March 24, 1997 from IBP Rizal
Chapter President Ida R. Makahinud Javier that respondents last payment of his
IBP dues was in 1991."

While these allegations are neither denied nor categorically admitted by

respondent, he has invoked and cited that "being a Senior Citizen since 1992, he
is legally exempt under Section 4 of Republic Act No. 7432 which took effect in
1992 in the payment of taxes, income taxes as an example."

....

The above cited provision of law is not applicable in the present case. In fact,
respondent admitted that he is still in the practice of law when he alleged that the
"undersigned since 1992 have publicly made it clear per his Income tax Return up
to the present time that he had only a limited practice of law." (par. 4 of
Respondents Memorandum).

Therefore respondent is not exempt from paying his yearly dues to the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines. Esmmis

On the second issue, complainant claims that respondent has misled the court
about his standing in the IBP by using the same IBP O.R. number in his pleadings
of at least six years and therefore liable for his actions. Respondent in his
memorandum did not discuss this issue.

First. Indeed, respondent admits that since 1992, he has engaged in law practice without having
paid his IBP dues. He likewise admits that, as appearing in the pleadings submitted by
complainant to this Court, he indicated "IBP-Rizal 259060" in the pleadings he filed in court, at
least for the years 1995, 1996, and 1997, thus misrepresenting that such was his IBP chapter
membership and receipt number for the years in which those pleadings were filed. He claims,
however, that he is only engaged in a "limited" practice and that he believes in good faith that he
is exempt from the payment of taxes, such as income tax, under R.A. No. 7432, 4 as a senior
citizen since 1992.

Rule 139-A provides:

Sec. 9. Membership dues. - Every member of the Integrated Bar shall pay such
annual dues as the Board of Governors shall determine with the approval of the
Supreme Court. A fixed sum equivalent to ten percent (10%) of the collections
from each Chapter shall be set aside as a Welfare Fund for disabled members of
the Chapter and the compulsory heirs of deceased members thereof.

Sec. 10. Effect of non-payment of dues. - Subject to the provisions of Section 12

of this Rule, default in the payment of annual dues for six months shall warrant
suspension of membership in the Integrated Bar, and default in such payment for
one year shall be a ground for the removal of the name of the delinquent member
from the Roll of Attorneys.

In accordance with these provisions, respondent can engage in the practice of law only by paying
his dues, and it does not matter that his practice is "limited." While it is true that R.A. No. 7432,
4 grants senior citizens "exemption from the payment of individual income taxes: provided, that
their annual taxable income does not exceed the poverty level as determined by the National
Economic and Development Authority (NEDA) for that year," the exemption does not include
payment of membership or association dues.

Second. By indicating "IBP-Rizal 259060" in his pleadings and thereby misrepresenting to the
public and the courts that he had paid his IBP dues to the Rizal Chapter, respondent is guilty of
violating the Code of Professional Responsibility which provides:

Rule 1.01 - A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful
conduct.

CANON 7 - A LAWYER SHALL AT ALL TIMES UPHOLD THE INTEGRITY

AND DIGNITY OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION, AND SUPPORT THE
ACTIVITIES OF THE INTEGRATED BAR. Esmso

CANON 10 - A LAWYER OWES CANDOR, FAIRNESS AND GOOD FAITH

TO THE COURT.

Rule 10.01 - A lawyer shall not do any falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any
court; nor shall he mislead or allow the court to be misled by any artifice.

Respondents failure to pay his IBP dues and his misrepresentation in the pleadings he filed in
court indeed merit the most severe penalty. However, in view of respondents advanced age, his
express willingness to pay his dues and plea for a more temperate application of the law,[8] we
believe the penalty of one year suspension from the practice of law or until he has paid his IBP
dues, whichever is later, is appropriate.
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Francisco R. Llamas is SUSPENDED from the practice of
law for ONE (1) YEAR, or until he has paid his IBP dues, whichever is later. Let a copy of this
decision be attached to Atty. Llamas personal record in the Office of the Bar Confidant and
copies be furnished to all chapters of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and to all courts in the
land.

SO ORDERED.
 EN BANC

[B.M. No. 1370. May 9, 2005]

LETTER OF ATTY. CECILIO Y. AREVALO, JR., REQUESTING EXEMPTION FROM

PAYMENT OF IBP DUES.

DECISION
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:

This is a request for exemption from payment of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP)
dues filed by petitioner Atty. Cecilio Y. Arevalo, Jr.
In his letter,[1] dated 22 September 2004, petitioner sought exemption from payment of IBP
dues in the amount of P12,035.00 as alleged unpaid accountability for the years 1977-2005. He
alleged that after being admitted to the Philippine Bar in 1961, he became part of the Philippine
Civil Service from July 1962 until 1986, then migrated to, and worked in, the USA in December
1986 until his retirement in the year 2003. He maintained that he cannot be assessed IBP dues for
the years that he was working in the Philippine Civil Service since the Civil Service law
prohibits the practice of ones profession while in government service, and neither can he be
assessed for the years when he was working in the USA.
On 05 October 2004, the letter was referred to the IBP for comment.[2]
On 16 November 2004, the IBP submitted its comment[3] stating inter alia: that membership
in the IBP is not based on the actual practice of law; that a lawyer continues to be included in the
Roll of Attorneys as long as he continues to be a member of the IBP; that one of the obligations
of a member is the payment of annual dues as determined by the IBP Board of Governors and
duly approved by the Supreme Court as provided for in Sections 9 and 10, Rule 139-A of the
Rules of Court; that the validity of imposing dues on the IBP members has been upheld as
necessary to defray the cost of an Integrated Bar Program; and that the policy of the IBP Board
of Governors of no exemption from payment of dues is but an implementation of the Courts
directives for all members of the IBP to help in defraying the cost of integration of the bar. It
maintained that there is no rule allowing the exemption of payment of annual dues as requested
by respondent, that what is allowed is voluntary termination and reinstatement of membership. It
asserted that what petitioner could have done was to inform the secretary of the IBP of his
intention to stay abroad, so that his membership in the IBP could have been terminated, thus, his
obligation to pay dues could have been stopped. It also alleged that the IBP Board of Governors
is in the process of discussing proposals for the creation of an inactive status for its members,
which if approved by the Board of Governors and by this Court, will exempt inactive IBP
members from payment of the annual dues.
In his reply[4] dated 22 February 2005, petitioner contends that what he is questioning is the
IBP Board of Governors Policy of Non-Exemption in the payment of annual membership dues of
lawyers regardless of whether or not they are engaged in active or inactive practice. He
asseverates that the Policy of Non-Exemption in the payment of annual membership dues suffers
from constitutional infirmities, such as equal protection clause and the due process clause. He
also posits that compulsory payment of the IBP annual membership dues would indubitably be
oppressive to him considering that he has been in an inactive status and is without income
derived from his law practice. He adds that his removal from nonpayment of annual membership
dues would constitute deprivation of property right without due process of law. Lastly, he claims
that non-practice of law by a lawyer-member in inactive status is neither injurious to active law
practitioners, to fellow lawyers in inactive status, nor to the community where the inactive
lawyers-members reside.
Plainly, the issue here is: whether or nor petitioner is entitled to exemption from payment of
his dues during the time that he was inactive in the practice of law that is, when he was in the
Civil Service from 1962-1986 and he was working abroad from 1986-2003?
We rule in the negative.
An Integrated Bar is a State-organized Bar, to which every lawyer must belong, as
distinguished from bar association organized by individual lawyers themselves, membership in
which is voluntary. Integration of the Bar is essentially a process by which every member of the
Bar is afforded an opportunity to do his shares in carrying out the objectives of the Bar as well as
obliged to bear his portion of its responsibilities. Organized by or under the direction of the State,
an Integrated Bar is an official national body of which all lawyers are required to be members.
They are, therefore, subject to all the rules prescribed for the governance of the Bar, including
the requirement of payment of a reasonable annual fee for the effective discharge of the purposes
of the Bar, and adherence to a code of professional ethics or professional responsibility, breach
of which constitutes sufficient reason for investigation by the Bar and, upon proper cause
appearing, a recommendation for discipline or disbarment of the offending member.[5]
The integration of the Philippine Bar means the official unification of the entire lawyer
population. This requires membership and financial support of every attorney as condition sine
qua non to the practice of law and the retention of his name in the Roll of Attorneys of the
Supreme Court.[6]
Bar integration does not compel the lawyer to associate with anyone. He is free to attend or
not to attend the meetings of his Integrated Bar Chapter or vote or refuse to vote in its elections
as he chooses. The only compulsion to which he is subjected is the payment of his annual dues.
The Supreme Court, in order to foster the States legitimate interest in elevating the quality of
professional legal services, may require that the cost of improving the profession in this fashion
be shared by the subjects and beneficiaries of the regulatory program the lawyers.[7]
Moreover, there is nothing in the Constitution that prohibits the Court, under its
constitutional power and duty to promulgate rules concerning the admission to the practice of
law and in the integration of the Philippine Bar[8] - which power required members of a
privileged class, such as lawyers are, to pay a reasonable fee toward defraying the expenses of
regulation of the profession to which they belong. It is quite apparent that the fee is, indeed,
imposed as a regulatory measure, designed to raise funds for carrying out the noble objectives
and purposes of integration.
The rationale for prescribing dues has been explained in the Integration of the Philippine
[9]
Bar, thus:
For the court to prescribe dues to be paid by the members does not mean that the Court is
attempting to levy a tax.

A membership fee in the Bar association is an exaction for regulation, while tax purpose of a tax
is a revenue. If the judiciary has inherent power to regulate the Bar, it follows that as an incident
to regulation, it may impose a membership fee for that purpose. It would not be possible to put
on an integrated Bar program without means to defray the expenses. The doctrine of implied
powers necessarily carries with it the power to impose such exaction.

The only limitation upon the States power to regulate the privilege of law is that the regulation
does not impose an unconstitutional burden. The public interest promoted by the integration of
the Bar far outweighs the slight inconvenience to a member resulting from his required payment
of the annual dues.

Thus, payment of dues is a necessary consequence of membership in the IBP, of which no

one is exempt. This means that the compulsory nature of payment of dues subsists for as long as
ones membership in the IBP remains regardless of the lack of practice of, or the type of practice,
the member is engaged in.
There is nothing in the law or rules which allows exemption from payment of membership
dues. At most, as correctly observed by the IBP, he could have informed the Secretary of the
Integrated Bar of his intention to stay abroad before he left. In such case, his membership in the
IBP could have been terminated and his obligation to pay dues could have been discontinued.
As abovementioned, the IBP in its comment stated that the IBP Board of Governors is in the
process of discussing the situation of members under inactive status and the nonpayment of their
dues during such inactivity. In the meantime, petitioner is duty bound to comply with his
obligation to pay membership dues to the IBP.
Petitioner also contends that the enforcement of the penalty of removal would amount to a
deprivation of property without due process and hence infringes on one of his constitutional
rights.
This question has been settled in the case of In re Atty. Marcial Edillon,[10] in this wise:

. . . Whether the practice of law is a property right, in the sense of its being one that entitles the
holder of a license to practice a profession, we do not here pause to consider at length, as it [is]
clear that under the police power of the State, and under the necessary powers granted to the
Court to perpetuate its existence, the respondents right to practice law before the courts of this
country should be and is a matter subject to regulation and inquiry. And, if the power to impose
the fee as a regulatory measure is recognize[d], then a penalty designed to enforce its payment,
which penalty may be avoided altogether by payment, is not void as unreasonable or arbitrary.

But we must here emphasize that the practice of law is not a property right but a mere privilege,
and as such must bow to the inherent regulatory power of the Court to exact compliance with the
lawyers public responsibilities.
 As a final note, it must be borne in mind that membership in the bar is a privilege burdened
with conditions,[11] one of which is the payment of membership dues. Failure to abide by any of
them entails the loss of such privilege if the gravity thereof warrants such drastic move.
WHEREFORE, petitioners request for exemption from payment of IBP dues is DENIED.
He is ordered to pay P12,035.00, the amount assessed by the IBP as membership fees for the
years 1977-2005, within a non-extendible period of ten (10) days from receipt of this decision,
with a warning that failure to do so will merit his suspension from the practice of law.
SO ORDERED.
 SECOND DIVISION

[A.C. No. 5737. October 25, 2004]

FERDINAND A. CRUZ, complainant, vs. ATTY. STANLEY CABRERA, respondent.

RESOLUTION
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:

In an administrative complaint dated July 7, 2002, Ferdinand A. Cruz charges Atty. Stanley
Cabrera with misconduct in violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
Complainant alleges that he is a fourth year law student; since the latter part of 2001, he
instituted several actions against his neighbors; he appeared for and in his behalf in his own
cases; he met respondent who acted as the counsel of his neighbors; during a hearing on January
14, 2002, in one case before the Regional Trial Court, Branch 112, Pasay City, presided by Judge
Caridad Cuerdo, the following exchange transpired:

xxx xxx So, may we know your honor, if he is a lawyer or not?

The Court having been inhibited by the respondent from hearing the case, replied:

You are asking for my inhibition and yet you want me to rule on his appearance xxx
xxx.

Thereafter, the respondent said:

Because your honor, he (pertaining to the complainant) is misrepresenting himself to be

a lawyer!

To this the complainant remarked:

Your Honor, Im not xxx xxx.

Respondent, this time engulfed with anger in a raising voice said:

Appear ka ng appear, pumasa ka muna; x x x.

Respondents imputations were uncalled for and the latters act of compelling the court to ask
complainant whether he is a lawyer or not was intended to malign him before the public,
inasmuch as respondent knew that complainant is not a lawyer, having appeared for and in his
behalf as a party litigant in prior cases; respondents imputations of complainants
misrepresentation as a lawyer was patently with malice to discredit his honor, with the intention
to threaten him not to appear anymore in cases respondent was handling; the manner, substance,
tone of voice and how the words appear ka ng appear, pumasa ka muna! were uttered were
totally with the intention to annoy, vex and humiliate, malign, ridicule, incriminate and discredit
complainant before the public.
Complainant claims that respondents display of improper attitude, arrogance, misbehavior,
misconduct in the performance of his duties both as a lawyer and officer of the court, before the
public and the court, was a patent transgression of the very ethics that lawyers are sworn to
uphold in their dealings with society and corresponding appropriate penalty or sanctions for the
said administrative violations should be imposed on the respondent.
In his Comment, respondent contends that the complaint filed against him is a vicious
scheme to dissuade him from appearing as counsel for the Mina family against whom
complainant had filed several civil and criminal cases including him to further complainants
illegal practice of law; complainants complaint occurred during a judicial proceeding wherein
complainant was able to represent himself considering that he was appearing in barong
tagalog thus the presiding judge was misled when she issued an order stating [i]n todays hearing
both lawyers appeared; because of which, respondent stated: Your honor I would like to manifest
that this counsel (referring to complainant) who represents the plaintiff in this case is not a
lawyer, to which complainant replied: The counsel very well know that I am not yet a lawyer; the
reason he informed the court that complainant is not a lawyer was because the presiding judge
did not know that complainant is not a lawyer and complainant did not inform the presiding
judge that he is not a lawyer when he stated: for the plaintiff your honor; he stated pumasa ka
muna out of indignation because of complainants temerity in misrepresenting himself as lawyer;
it is surprising that the City Prosecutor of Pasay City filed a complaint for oral defamation
against him considering that in a precedent case the Supreme Court stated: It is a settled principle
in this jurisdiction that statements made in the course of judicial proceedings are absolutely
privileged (Navarrete vs. Court of Appeals, 325 SCRA 540); in another malicious prosecution
being perpetuated by the complainant against the Mina family pending before Judge Priscilla
Mijares of RTC Branch 108, Pasay City, they were able to prohibit the appearance of
complainant as counsel for himself as authenticated by an Order of Judge Priscilla Mijares which
allegedly stated among other; to wit:

In connection with Ferdinand A. Cruzs motion to appear as counsel, the motion is likewise
denied, movant not having satisfied the requirements and conditions under Rule 138-A, Sections
1 and 2.

Respondent alleges that when complainant filed an administrative case against Judge
Priscilla Mijares when said Judge stated in Tagalog in open court Hay naku masama yung
marunong pa sa Huwes! OK? the same was dismissed by the Honorable Courts Third Division
which stated among others: That the questioned remarks of respondent were uttered more out of
frustration and in reaction to complainants actuations and taking into account that complainant is
not yet a lawyer but was already lecturing the court on a matter which is not even a point of
discussion was sheer arrogance on the part of the complainant. Respondent prays that the
complaint against him be dismissed for lack of merit.
The administrative case was referred to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for
investigation, report and recommendation.
 In a report, dated March 4, 2004, IBP Commissioner Lydia A. Navarro recommended
respondents suspension from the practice of law for a period of three months for violating Rule
8.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which provides:

A lawyer shall not, in his professional dealings, use language which is abusive, offensive or
otherwise improper.

In her report, Commissioner Navarro stated:

After going over the evidence submitted by the parties, the undersigned noted that respondents
averment that the utterances he made in open court is (sic) privileged communication does not
hold water for the same was (sic) not relevant to the issue of the case in question under trial
before the said court.

Respondent did not refute the fact that the same utterances he made in open court against the
complainant had been the basis for his indictment of Oral Defamation and later Unjust Vexation
under Criminal Cases Nos. 02-1031 and No. 02-2136 respectively, pending trial before MTC
Branch 45, Pasay City.

Likewise respondent did not refute complainants allegation that in 1979 he was held in contempt
and was not allowed to practice law for seven years by the Supreme Court in the administrative
case filed against him by Emilia E. Andres on December 14, 1979 docketed as A.M. L-585 for
his fondness in using contumacious language in his dealing with others.

From the facts obtaining, it is apparent that the utterance hurled by the respondent in the manner,
substance and tone of his voice which was not refuted by him that appear ka ng appear, pumasa
ka muna in whatever manner it was uttered are in itself not only abusive but insulting specially
on the part of law students who have not yet taken nor passed the bar examination required of
them.

Respondent should have been more discreet and cautious in informing the court if it was his
purpose relative to complainants appearance in court; although the latter appeared only in his
behalf but not for others if he had complied with the requirements of Rule 138 (Sections 1 and 3)
of the Rules of Court.

Respondent should have been more temperate in making utterances in his professional dealings
so as not to offend the sensitivities of the other party as in this case.

On April 16, 2004, the IBP Board of Governors passed a Resolution to annul and set aside
the recommendation of the investigating commissioner and to approve the dismissal of the case
for lack of merit.
Prefatorily, we note that the IBP Board of Governors failed to observe the procedural
requirements of Sec. 12 of Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court on review and decision by the
Board of Governors which states:
SEC. 12. Review and decision by the Board of Governors. (a) Every case heard by an
investigator shall be reviewed by the IBP Board of Governors upon the record and evidence
transmitted to it by the Investigator with his report. The decision of the Board upon such
review shall be in writing and shall clearly and distinctly state the facts and the reasons on
which it is based. It shall be promulgated within a period not exceeding thirty (30) days from the
next meeting of the Board following the submittal of the Investigators report. (Emphasis
supplied)

In Teodosio vs. Nava,[1] the Court stressed the important function of the requirement that the
decision of the Board of Governors state the facts and the reasons on which it is based, which is
akin to what is required of the decisions of courts of record, thus:

For aside from informing the parties the reason for the decision to enable them to point out to the
appellate court the findings with which they are not in agreement, in case any of them decides to
appeal the decision, it is also an assurance that the judge, or the Board of Governors in this case,
reached his judgment through the process of legal reasoning.[2]

In this case, the Board of Governors resolution absolving respondent of any misconduct
does not contain any findings of facts or law upon which it based its ruling. Ordinarily, non-
compliance with the rule would result in the remand of the case. Nonetheless, where the
controversy has been pending resolution for quite sometime and the issues involved could be
resolved on the basis of the records on appeal, the Court has opted to resolve the case in the
interest of justice and speedy disposition of cases.[3] This case falls within the exception.
We hold that respondents outburst of appear ka ng appear, pumasa ka muna does not
amount to a violation of Rule 8.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
Based on the facts of this case, such outburst came about when respondent pointed out to the
trial court that complainant is not a lawyer to correct the judges impression of complainants
appearance, inasmuch as the judge, in her Order of January 14, 2002, noted that complainant is a
lawyer.[4] Such single outburst, though uncalled for, is not of such magnitude as to warrant
respondents suspension or reproof. It is but a product of impulsiveness or the heat of the moment
in the course of an argument between them. It has been said that lawyers should not be held to
too strict an account for words said in the heat of the moment, because of chagrin at losing cases,
and that the big way is for the court to condone even contemptuous language.[5]
Nonetheless, we remind respondent that complainant is not precluded from litigating
personally his cases. A partys right to conduct litigation personally is recognized by Section 34
of Rule 138 of the Rules of Court:

SEC. 34. By whom litigation conducted. -- In the court of a justice of the peace a party may
conduct his litigation in person, with the aid of an agent or friend appointed by him for that
purpose, or with the aid of an attorney. In any other court, a party may conduct his litigation
personally or by aid of an attorney, and his appearance must be either personal or by a duly
authorized member of the bar.

In Maderada vs. Mediodea,[6] this Court expounded on the foregoing provision, thus:
This provision means that in a litigation, parties may personally do everything during its progress
-- from its commencement to its termination. When they, however, act as their own attorneys,
they are restricted to the same rules of evidence and procedure as those qualified to practice law;
otherwise, ignorance would be unjustifiably rewarded. Individuals have long been permitted to
manage, prosecute and defend their own actions; and when they do so, they are not considered to
be in the practice of law. One does not practice law by acting for himself any more than he
practices medicine by rendering first aid to himself.

The practice of law, though impossible to define exactly, involves the exercise of a profession or
vocation usually for gain, mainly as attorney by acting in a representative capacity and as
counsel by rendering legal advise to others. Private practice has been defined by this Court as
follows:

x x x. Practice is more than an isolated appearance, for it consists in frequent or customary

action, a succession of acts of the same kind. In other words, it is frequent habitual exercise.
Practice of law to fall within the prohibition of statute [referring to the prohibition for judges and
other officials or employees of the superior courts or of the Office of the Solicitor General from
engaging in private practice] has been interpreted as customarily or habitually holding one's self
out to the public, as a lawyer and demanding payment for such services. x x x.

Clearly, in appearing for herself, complainant was not customarily or habitually holding herself
out to the public as a lawyer. Neither was she demanding payment for such services. Hence, she
cannot be said to be in the practice of law.[7]

On the other hand, all lawyers should take heed that lawyers are licensed officers of the
courts who are empowered to appear, prosecute and defend; and upon whom peculiar duties,
responsibilities and liabilities are devolved by law as a consequence. Membership in the bar
imposes upon them certain obligations. Mandated to maintain the dignity of the legal profession,
they must conduct themselves honorably and fairly.[8] Though a lawyers language may be
forceful and emphatic, it should always be dignified and respectful, befitting the dignity of the
legal profession. The use of intemperate language and unkind ascriptions has no place in the
dignity of judicial forum.[9]
WHEREFORE, the complaint against respondent Atty. Stanley Cabrera for misconduct in
violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility is DISMISSED for lack of merit. He is,
however, admonished to be more circumspect in the performance of his duties as an officer of
the court.
SO ORDERED.
 Republic of the Philippines
Supreme Court
Manila

THIRD DIVISION

ATTY. EVELYN J. MAGNO, A.C. No. 6296

Complainant,
Present:

PANGANIBAN, J., Chairman

- versus - SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ,
CORONA,
CARPIO MORALES and
GARCIA, JJ.

ATTY. OLIVIA VELASCO-JACOBA, Promulgated:

Respondent. November 22, 2005
x----------------------------------------x

RESOLUTION

GARCIA, J.:

In her sworn complaint, as endorsed by the President of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP), Nueva Ecija Chapter, Atty. Evelyn J. Magno charged Atty. Olivia Velasco-
Jacoba, a member of the same IBP provincial chapter, with willful violation of (a) Section 415 of
the Local Government Code (LGC) of 1991 and (b) Canon 4 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility.

This disciplinary case arose out of a disagreement that complainant had with her uncle,
Lorenzo Inos, over a landscaping contract they had entered into. In a bid to have the stand-off
between them settled, complainant addressed a letter, styled Sumbong,[1] to Bonifacio Alcantara,
barangay captain of Brgy. San Pascual, Talavera, Nueva Ecija. At the barangay
conciliation/confrontation proceedings conducted on January 5, 2003, respondent, on the
strength of a Special Power of Attorney signed by Lorenzo Inos, appeared for the latter,
accompanied by his son, Lorenzito. Complainants objection to respondents appearance elicited
the response that Lorenzo Inos is entitled to be represented by a lawyer inasmuch as complainant
is herself a lawyer. And as to complainants retort that her being a lawyer is merely coincidental,
respondent countered that she is appearing as an attorney-in-fact, not as counsel, of Lorenzo
Inos.

Complainant enumerated specific instances, with supporting documentation, tending to

prove that respondent had, in the course of the conciliation proceedings before the Punong
Barangay, acted as Inos Lorenzos counsel instead of as his attorney-in-fact. This is what
complainant said in her complaint: [2]

5. xxx Atty. Olivia Jacoba asked for an ocular inspection of the subject
matter of the complaint. A heated argument took place because Lorencito Inos
said that [complainants brother] Melencio Magno, Jr. made alterations in the
lagoon . Afterwards Atty. Olivia Jacoba . . . returned to the barangay hall to have
the incident recorded in the barangay blotter.... attached as Annex A

6. That on January 12, 2003, Lorenzo Inos appeared before the hearing
also with the assistance of [respondent]. When the minutes of the proceeding
(sic) was read, [respondent] averred that the minutes is partial in favor of the
complainant because only her statements were recorded for which reason,
marginal insertions were made to include what [respondent] wanted to be put on
record. She also signed as saksi in the minutes .

7. xxx In a letter (answer to the "sumbong) sent to the Punong Barangay

dated December 22, 2002, she signed representing herself as Family Legal
Counsel of Inos Family, a copy of the letter is attached as Annex C . . . . (Words
in bracket added.)

In an Order dated February 17, 2003, Atty. Victor C. Fernandez, IBP Director for Bar
Discipline, directed the respondent to submit, within fifteen (15) days from notice, her answer to
the complaint, otherwise she will be considered as in default.[3]

The case, docketed as CBD No. 03-1061, was assigned to Commissioner Rebecca
Villanueva-Maala, who admitted respondents answer notwithstanding her earlier order of July
15, 2003, declaring respondent in default for failure to file an answer in due time.[4]
 In her Answer, respondent alleged that the administrative complaint was filed with the
Office of the Punong Barangay, instead of before the Lupong Tagapamayapa, and heard
by Punong Barangay Bonifacio Alcantara alone, instead of the collegial Lupon or a conciliation
panel known as pangkat. Prescinding from this premise, respondent submits that the prohibition
against a lawyer appearing to assist a client in katarungan pambarangay proceedings does not
apply. Further, she argued that her appearance was not as a lawyer, but only as an attorney-in-
fact.

In her report dated October 6, 2003,[5] Commissioner Maala stated that the charge of
complainant has been established by clear preponderance of evidence and, on that basis,
recommended that respondent be suspended from the practice of her profession for a period of
six (6) months. On the other hand, the Board of Governors, IBP Commission on Bar Discipline,
while agreeing with the inculpatory finding of the investigating commissioner, recommended in
its Resolution No. XVI-2003-235,[6] a lighter penalty, to wit:

RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED and

APPROVED, the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating
Commissioner of the above-entitled case, herein made part of this
Resolution/Decision as Annex "A"; and, finding the recommendation fully
supported by the evidence on record and the applicable laws and rules, with
modification, and considering respondent's actuations was in violation of Section
415 which expressly prohibits the presence and representation by lawyers in the
Katarungan Pambarangay, Atty. Olivia Velasco-Jacoba is
hereby ADMONISHED.

This resolution is now before us for confirmation.

Section 415 of the LGC of 1991[7], on the subject Katarungang Pambarangay, provides:

Section 415. Appearance of Parties in Person. - In all katarungang

pambarangay proceedings, the parties must appear in person without the
assistance of the counsel or representative, except for minors and incompetents
who may be assisted by their next of kin who are not lawyers.

The above-quoted provision clearly requires the personal appearance of the parties
in katarungan pambarangay conciliation proceedings, unassisted by counsel or representative.
The rationale behind the personal appearance requirement is to enable the lupon to secure first
hand and direct information about the facts and issues,[8] the exception being in cases where
minors or incompetents are parties. There can be no quibbling that laymen of goodwill can easily
agree to conciliate and settle their disputes between themselves without what sometimes is the
unsettling assistance of lawyers whose presence could sometimes obfuscate and confuse
issues.[9] Worse still, the participation of lawyers with their penchant to use their analytical skills
and legal knowledge tend to prolong instead of expedite settlement of the case.

The prohibition against the presence of a lawyer in a barangay conciliation proceedings was
not, to be sure, lost on respondent. Her defense that the aforequoted Section 415 of the LGC does
not apply since complainant addressed her Sumbong to the barangay captain of Brgy. San
Pascual who thereafter proceeded to hear the same is specious at best. In this regard, suffice it to
state that complainant wrote her Sumbong with the end in view of availing herself of the benefits
of barangay justice. That she addressed her Sumbong to the barangay captain is really of little
moment since the latter chairs the Lupong Tagapamayapa.[10]

Lest it be overlooked, the prohibition in question applies to all katarungan

barangay proceedings. Section 412(a)[11] the LGC of 1991 clearly provides that, as a
precondition to filing a complaint in court, the parties shall go through the conciliation process
either before the lupon chairman or the lupon or pangkat. As what happened in this case,
the punong barangay, as chairman of the Lupon Tagapamayapa, conducted the conciliation
proceedings to resolve the disputes between the two parties.

Given the above perspective, we join the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline in its
determination that respondent transgressed the prohibition prescribed in Section 415 of the LGC.
However, its recommended penalty of mere admonition must have to be modified. Doubtless,
respondents conduct tended to undermine the laudable purpose of the katarungan pambarangay
system. What compounded matters was when respondent repeatedly ignored complainants
protestation against her continued appearance in the barangay conciliation proceedings.

WHEREFORE, Atty. Olivia Velasco-Jacoba is hereby FINED in the amount of Five

Thousand Pesos (P5,000.00) for willful violation of Section 415 of the Local Government Code
of 1991 with WARNING that commission of similar acts of impropriety on her part in the future
will be dealt with more severely.
SO ORDERED.
SECOND DIVISION

[A.M. No. MTJ-99-1203. June 10, 2003]

NELIA A. ZIGA, complainant, vs. JUDGE RAMON A. AREJOLA, respondent.

DECISION
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:

This is a complaint filed by Nelia A. Ziga against Judge Ramon A. Arejola of the Municipal
Trial Court (MTC), Daet, Camarines Norte, for appearing as counsel in a land registration case
without permission from the Supreme Court and asking for attorneys fees for his legal services.
Nelia Arejola-Ziga and Judge Ramon Arejola are two of the heirs of Fabiana Arejola. By
virtue of inheritance, they and eight others became owners in fee simple of a 19,664 sq. m. land
in Calauag, Naga City owned by Fabiana. On January 23, 1995, while respondent was employed
as an attorney in the Public Attorneys Office (PAO) of Naga City, he filed in behalf of his co-
heirs, an application for registration of title of the lot, docketed as Land Registration Case No.
95-142.[1]
In its decision dated October 25, 1996, the Regional Trial Court, Branch 23, Naga City,
granted the petition and ordered the imperfect title of the heirs to the property confirmed and
registered in the name of the heirs of Fabiana Arejola, flee from liens and encumbrances of any
kind whatsoever.[2] Subsequently, a substantial portion of the lot, or 17,894 sq. m., has been
agreed to be sold in favor of the City of Naga, as evidenced by a Deed of Conditional Sale.[3] The
remaining portion of 1,770 sq. m. is subject of a dispute between the heirs of Fabiana Arejola
and Josefina Vda. De Segarra.[4]
On June 9, 1997, respondent was appointed judge of the MTC of Daet, Camarines Norte. He
took his oath on August 1, 1997.
Despite his appointment, respondent Judge continued to appear in the land registration case.
On October 31, 1997, he was requested by the court hearing the land registration case to submit
his written authority from the Supreme Court to appear as counsel in the said case. [5] This order
was reiterated on June 15, 1998.[6]
On April 6, 1998, respondent Judge wrote the City Mayor of Naga City, insisting (1) that the
amounts due under the contract of sale of the property of the heirs of Fabiana Arejola should be
paid by individual checks drawn out in equal proportionate amounts in favor of each heir, and (2)
that his claim for contingent attorneys fees and agents fees be segregated and paid to him in an
amount equivalent to 30% of the gross selling price before any payment is made to the heirs. He
further added that unless his demands are met, no contract for the absolute sale of the property
would be finalized.[7]
 In the present complaint, Nelia Arejola Ziga alleges that respondent should be disciplined
for appearing before a court as counsel without securing the permission of the Supreme Court
and for asking contingent attorneys fees and agents commission amounting to 30% of the gross
selling price of the property subject of the land registration case.
In his Comment dated August 24, 1998, respondent argues: He does not need to ask
permission from the Public Attorneys Office (PAO) or from the Supreme Court since he has
every right to appear before the lower court as co-heir. According to him, he has been appearing
in the land registration case as representative of the heirs of Fabiana Arejola and not as counsel.
Respondent explained that being one of the heirs of the late Fabiana Arejola, he is a party-litigant
and therefore a party-in-interest in the land registration case. He filed the application for the
confirmation of land title in his own behalf and in representation of his co-heirs. Hence, he had
every right to appear and prosecute the case. The permission of the PAO was not required.
Respondent further explains that since he alone actively participated in the case, he has every
right to demand contribution from the other heirs who benefited from his work, to be taken from
the proceeds of the sale of the property. He believes that this case was filed to harass him
because of the misspelled name of the complainant in the RTC decision on the registration of
land title.[8] He further claims that complainant is shown to have a disturbed mind and to be
suffering from manic depression.[9]
Pursuant to the Courts Resolution on June 30, 1999, the complainant and respondent
manifested their willingness to submit the case for resolution based on the pleadings.[10]
On October 2, 2000, the Court referred the case to the Executive Judge of the Regional Trial
Court of Daet, Camarines Norte, for investigation, report and recommendation.
On August 13, 2001, Executive Judge Jose G. Dy submitted his report recommending that
respondent be warned for using intemperate and unkind language towards complainant. Anent
the alleged unauthorized practice of law, Executive Judge Dy opines that the same is without any
basis. He finds that since the complainant did not question the act before the Department of
Justice where PAO is a line agency, and considering that the RTC trying the case did not insist
on the inhibition of respondent, the actions of the latter in appearing on his own behalf and that
of his co-heirs in the land registration case is not malicious.
After the investigation report of Executive Judge Dy was noted, the Court, in a Resolution
dated May 29, 2002, referred the case to the Office of the Court Administrator for evaluation,
report and recommendation.
In its Memorandum dated August 20, 2002, the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA)
disagreed with the findings of the Executive Judge and recommended that respondent judge be
found guilty of violating the Code of Judicial Conduct and accordingly be suspended for a period
of three months without pay.
The report of OCA reads:

We do not agree with the findings and recommendation of the investigating judge. It must be
pointed out that Judge Dy arrived at his findings and recommendation on the basis only of the
records at hand. He did not conduct any investigation but merely evaluated the pleadings and
evidence submitted by the parties.
Section 35, Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court categorically provides that: No judge or
other official or employee of the superior courts or of the Office of the Solicitor General, shall
engage in private practice as a member of the bar or give professional advice to clients. Further,
Canon 5, Rule 5.07 of the Code of Judicial Conduct states that: A judge shall not engage in the
private practice of law.

....

Contrary to the findings of the investigating judge, the facts of this case clearly show that
respondent Judge Arejola violated the foregoing rules prohibiting judges from engaging in
private law practice.

Records disclose that respondent was appointed to the Judiciary on 9 June 1997. He assumed
office on 1 August 1997. Yet, he still submitted, on 9 June 1998, a Motion for Reconsideration
dated 5 June 1998 of an Order of the court in subject land registration case. Again, on 28 July
1998, Judge Arejola filed a Manifestation dated 24 July 1998 in the aforesaid case. Further, he
appeared as counsel in the hearing conducted on 12 August 1998. All this he did without the
required permit from the Supreme Court and despite having been required, in at least two (2)
occasions, by then Judge Ernesto A. Miguel, RTC, Br. 23, Naga City, before whom the case was
pending, to secure the necessary permission to appear as counsel.

No less than respondent himself admitted in his comment that he indeed appeared as counsel in
the land registration case but sought to justify his act by alleging that he did so to protect his
rights as one of the heirs to the disputed land. He went as far as saying that as such, he need not
request permission from the Supreme Court and that it was incorrect for Judge Miguel to require
him to secure a permit to appear as counsel.

Time and again, the Court has imposed sanctions on judges who engage in the practice of law
without first securing a permit therefor. In the case of Judge Arejola, his offense is aggravated by
the fact that he stubbornly continued to appear as counsel in the land registration case despite
having been twice required by the court to first apply for permission to do so.

Under Sec. 22, Rule XIV of the Civil Service Rules and Regulations, the offense of engaging in
the private practice of a civil servants profession without the necessary authorization is
punishable by suspension for six (6) months to one (1) year, for the first offense.

Also, under Sec. 3, Rule 140 of the Rules of Court, violations of the Code of Judicial Conduct
are serious offenses which, under Sec. 10 of the said Rule, are punishable by, among others,
suspension for three (3) to six (6) months without salary and benefits.

PREMISES CONSIDERED, the undersigned most respectfully recommends that Judge Ramon
A. Arejola, MTC, Daet, Camarines Norte, be FOUND GUILTY of violating the Code of Judicial
Conduct and accordingly SUSPENDED for a period of three (3) months without pay.

The findings and recommendations of the Office of the Court Administrator are on the main
well taken except for the recommended penalty.
 First. As the OCA correctly observed, no hearing was conducted by the Executive Judge
when the instant case was referred to him for investigation, report and recommendation.
However, we find that the requirements of due process have been met. Due process does not
mean or require a hearing, but simply an opportunity or right to be heard. A trial-type hearing is
not always de rigueur in administrative proceedings.[11] One may be heard not solely through
oral presentation but also, and perhaps many times more creditably and practicable than oral
arguments, through pleadings,[12] for as long as the element of fairness is not ignored.[13] In this
case, respondent was afforded ample opportunity to be heard.
Based on the records of this case, he filed his comment to the complaint filed against him
and he filed a manifestation stating that he is willing to submit the instant case for resolution on
the basis of the pleadings filed. In his comment, he justified his claim for payment from his co-
heirs for his fruitful work. That what he was asking is attorneys fees can be clearly gleaned from
the Notice of Attorneys Lien,[14] dated March 31, 1997, which he filed before the court hearing
the land registration case, wherein he admitted to being the attorney of the applicants and their
lawful representative.[15] Although the notice was filed before he was appointed municipal trial
judge, he continued his practice of law after his appointment without prior permission from this
Court. In his letter, dated April 6, 1998, respondent Judge insisted on his claim for attorneys
fees.[16]
Also, respondent failed to refute the documents submitted by complainant stating that he
signed as counsel for the heirs.[17] Against these documentary evidence, the defense of
respondent, that he merely participated in the land registration case as a party-litigant and a co-
heir, fails.
Second. The term practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases in court or
participation in court proceedings but also includes preparation of pleadings or papers in
anticipation of a litigation, giving advice to clients or persons needing the same,[18] the
preparation of legal instruments and contracts by which legal rights are secured, and the
preparation of papers incident to actions and special proceedings.[19]
Based on the records of the instant case, the practice of law exercised by the respondent
from the time he was appointed MTC Judge on June 9, 1997 and took his oath on August 1, 1997
can be enumerated thus:
1. October 21, 1997 - Respondent signed an answer to the petition for relief from
judgment filed by Josefina De Segarra.[20]
2. October 31, 1997 - Respondent appeared for the applicants in the land registration
case. He was ordered by RTC Judge Ernesto Miguel to file his
written authority from the Supreme Court to appear as counsel
in the said case.[21]
3. April 6, 1998 - Respondent wrote a letter to Naga City Mayor Jesse Robredo, asking
for the issuance of individual checks to the heirs of Fabiana
Arejola, and insisting on his claim for attorneys fees.[22]
4.June 5, 1998 - Respondent filed a motion to reconsider the order of the RTC directing
the suspension of the registration of the certificate of title in
 view of the filing by an oppositor of a petition for relief from
judgment.[23]
5.June 15, 1998 Respondent appeared in the land registration case, filing the motion for
reconsideration.[24]
6. July 1, 1998 Respondent requested permission from the Supreme Court, through the
Court Administrator, to appear as counsel in the Land
Registration Case No. 95-142 in connection with the Petition
for Relief from judgment filed by an oppositor in said case.[25]
7. August 12, 1998 - Respondent appeared in the land registration case hearing on the
petition for relief from judgment and on his motion for
reconsideration.[26]
8. January 25, 1999 Respondent wrote Naga City Mayor Sulpicio Roco, requesting that
he be paid partial advance payment of the balance on the sale
of the lot. He also admitted in his letter that he is the counsel of
the heirs of Fabiana Arejola in the Deed of Conditional Sale
and the Petition for Relief from Judgment filed by Josefina
Segarra.[27]
9. February 8, 1999 Respondent signed as authorized representative and as counsel of
the heirs of Fabiana Arejola in a partial compromise agreement
with the oppositor, Josefina Cedo Vda. De Segarra, and the
City of Naga.[28]
10. May 20, 1999 Respondent appeared in the land registration case, agreeing to submit
pre-trial brief in support of the motion to treat the petition for
relief from judgment as an ordinary action for reconveyance.
He was ordered by the court, through RTC Judge Corazon
Tordilla, to submit his permit to appear as counsel in the
case.[29]
11. July 27, 1999 - He signed a pre-trial brief for the heirs of Fabiana Arejola.[30]
12.October 19, 1999 - RTC Judge Corazon Tordilla ordered respondent disqualified
from appearing in the land registration case in view of the
latters failure to submit to the court a permit to appear as
counsel. All pleadings submitted by him were not acted upon
by the said court by reason of such disqualification.[31]
His rationalization that he represented the heirs as a co-heir and not as counsel is hair-
splitting. The respondents act of writing pleadings and defending the rights of his co-heirs
amounts to private practice of law. The tenor of the letters and pleadings, taken with his acts of
appearing, representing and defending the rights of the heirs over the property, show that
respondent, as representative of the heirs, was defending the latters rights over the disputed
property, and these constituted private practice of law.
It should be clarified that prohibited private practice of a profession is more than an isolated
court appearance, for it consists in frequent or customary action, a succession of acts of the same
nature habitually or customarily holding ones self to the public as a lawyer.[32] It is evident that
the instances when respondent appeared and represented his co-heirs are not isolated, thus,
constituting the private practice of the law profession as contemplated by law.
Under Rule 138, Section 35 of the Revised Rules of Court, judges are prohibited from
engaging in the private practice of law or giving professional advice to clients. This is reiterated
in Canon 5 of the Code of Judicial Conduct which enjoins members of the bench to regulate their
extra-judicial activities to minimize the risk of conflict with their judicial duties. Rule 5.07 of the
Code in particular states:

A judge shall not engage in the private practice of law. Unless prohibited by the Constitution or
law, a judge may engage in the practice of any other profession provided that such practice will
not conflict or tend to conflict with judicial functions.

These provisions are based on public policy for there is no question that the rights, duties,
privileges and functions of the office of an attorney-at-law are inherently incompatible with the
high official functions, duties, powers, discretion and privileges of a judge. It also aims to ensure
that judges give their full time and attention to their judicial duties, prevent them from extending
special favors to their own private interests and assure the public of their impartiality in the
performance of their functions. These objectives are dictated by a sense of moral decency and
desire to promote the public interest.[33]
Third. Respondent failed to obtain a written permission to appear as counsel in the land
registration case from the head of the Department, which is this Court, as required by Rule
XVIII, Section 12 of the Revised Civil Service Rules,[34] thus:

Sec. 12. No officer or employee shall engage directly in any private business, vocation,
or profession or be connected with any commercial, credit, agricultural, or industrial
undertaking without a written permission from the head of the Department: Provided, That this
prohibition will be absolute in the case of those officers and employees whose duties and
responsibilities require that their entire time be at the disposal of the Government; Provided,
further, That if an employee is granted permission to engage in outside activities, time so
devoted outside of office hours should be fixed by the agency to the end that it will not impair in
any way the efficiency of the officer or employee: And provided, finally, that no permission is
necessary in the case of investments, made by an officer or employee, which do not involve real
or apparent conflict between his private interests and public duties, or in any way influence him
in the discharge of his duties, and he shall not take part in the management of the enterprise or
become an officer of the board of directors. (Emphasis ours)

As a Civil Service employee, he cannot engage in private practice without the written
permission from this Court. The public expects him to devote full time to his judicial work. As a
general rule, the appointment or election of an attorney to a government office disqualifies him
from engaging in the private practice of law. The reason for the disqualification is that a public
office is a public trust, and a public officer or employee is obliged not only to perform his duties
with the highest degree of responsibility, integrity, loyalty, and efficiency but also with exclusive
fidelity. The disqualification is intended to preserve the public trust in a public office, avoid
conflict of interests or a possibility thereof, assure the people of impartiality in the performance
of public functions and thereby promote the public welfare.[35]
Also, Section 7 of the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and
Employees (R.A. No. 6713) prohibits a public officer from undertaking certain business
transactions or doing certain acts which may compromise his position as a public official. This
provision applies to judges. The said section reads in part:

Sec. 7. Prohibited Acts and Transactions. - In addition to acts and omissions of public officials
and employees now prescribed in the Constitution and existing laws, the following shall
constitute prohibited acts and transactions of any public official and employee and are hereby
declared to be unlawful.

(a). . . .

(b) Outside employment and other activities related thereto. - Public officials and employees
during their incumbency shall not:

....

(2) Engage in the private practice of their profession unless authorized by the Constitution
or by law, Provided, that such practice will not conflict or tend to conflict with their
official functions;. . .

There is no dispute that when respondent agreed to file the complaint in behalf of the heirs
of Fabiana Arejola, he was not yet a member of the judiciary. He was a lawyer of the Public
Attorneys Office (PAO) in Naga City. He claimed that he was authorized to engage in practice in
behalf of his relatives but presented no documentary authority. The Court takes judicial notice of
PAO Memorandum Circular No. 1, Series of 1998, amending Sec. 5, Art. II of the Memorandum
Circular No. 5, Series of 1997. It states thus:

Sec. 5-A. Other Persons Qualified for Assistance. -Immediate members of the family and
relatives within the 4th civil degree of consanguinity or affinity of PAO lawyers may avail of his
services regardless of qualification under the indigency test, with the approval of the Regional
Director, if the case is within his region or the Chief Public Attorney, if the case is outside of his
region and provided further that the lawyer files a leave of absence on the day of the hearing.

Hence, while PAO lawyers may represent their family and relatives, they are required to get
the approval of either the Regional Director or the Chief Public Attorney. However, considering
that respondent filed the application for registration of title in behalf of his co-heirs in 1995
before he was appointed to the Bench, said circular does not apply to him. Despite this,
respondent is not exculpated from liability.
While respondent insists that he performed the alleged acts of private practice before he
joined the judiciary, he failed to mention that even after he assumed office as a municipal judge
on August 1, 1997, he continued to act as counsel for the heirs.
 Respondent was twice required by the RTC judge presiding over the land registration
[36]
case to submit his written authority from the Supreme Court to appear as counsel, to which he
did not comply.
On July 1, 1998, respondent requested the Court Administrator for authority to appear as
counsel of his co-heirs, in LRC Case No. 95-142.[37] On July 15, 1998, he was required by then
Court Administrator Alfredo Benipayo to furnish the Court with copy of the pleadings he filed,
and to state the date of filing of each, the stage of the proceedings and the background of the
case.[38] Unfortunately, however, he did not comply.
The fact that respondent made a request for authority to appear as counsel in the said case is
an admission not only that he was appearing as counsel but also that he was aware that he needed
the permission of this Court to do so.
The Court always emphasizes the importance of the role played by judges in the judicial
system, thus:

The integrity of the Judiciary rests not only upon the fact that it is able to administer justice but
also upon the perception and confidence of the community that the people who run the system
have done justice. At times, the strict manner by which we apply the law may, in fact, do justice
but may not necessarily create confidence among the people that justice, indeed, is served.
Hence, in order to create such confidence, the people who run the judiciary, particularly judges
and justices, must not only be proficient in both the substantive and procedural aspects of the
law, but more importantly, they must possess the highest integrity, probity, and unquestionable
moral uprightness, both in their public and private lives. Only then can the people be reassured
that the wheels of justice in this country run with fairness and equity, thus creating confidence in
the judicial system.[39]

Under Section 9 (3) of the amended Rule 140 of the Rules of Court, which took effect on
October 1, 2001, an unauthorized practice of law of a judge constitutes a less serious charge.
Under Section 11, if a judge is guilty of a less serious charge, he may be imposed either (a)
suspension from office without salary and other benefits for not less than one (1) nor more than
three (3) months, or (b) a fine of more than P10,000.00 but not exceeding P20,000.00.
The OCA recommended that respondent should be suspended for a period of 3 months
without pay. Considering that Rule 140 as amended took effect only in 2001 and this is
respondents first offense[40], in lieu of suspension, we find the imposition of fine amounting to
P10,000.00, just and reasonable.
WHEREFORE, the Court finds Judge Ramon A. Arejola of the Municipal Trial Court,
Daet, Camarines Norte LIABLE for illegal practice of law, in violation of the Code of Judicial
Conduct, the Revised Rules of Court, the Revised Civil Service Rules, and Code of Conduct and
Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees. He is ordered to pay a FINE in the amount
of Ten Thousand Pesos (P10,000.00) and WARNED that a repetition of the same or similar acts
or omissions will be dealt with more severely.
SO ORDERED.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

BAR MATTER No. 914 October 1, 1999

RE: APPLICATION FOR ADMISSION TO THE PHILIPPINE BAR,

vs.

VICENTE D. CHING, applicant.

RESOLUTION

KAPUNAN, J.:

Can a legitimate child born under the 1935 Constitution of a Filipino mother and an alien father
validly elect Philippine citizenship fourteen (14) years after he has reached the age of majority?
This is the question sought to be resolved in the present case involving the application for
admission to the Philippine Bar of Vicente D. Ching.

The facts of this case are as follows:

Vicente D. Ching, the legitimate son of the spouses Tat Ching, a Chinese citizen, and Prescila A.
Dulay, a Filipino, was born in Francia West, Tubao, La Union on 11 April 1964. Since his birth,
Ching has resided in the Philippines.

On 17 July 1998, Ching, after having completed a Bachelor of Laws course at the St. Louis
University in Baguio City, filed an application to take the 1998 Bar Examinations. In a
Resolution of this Court, dated 1 September 1998, he was allowed to take the Bar Examinations,
subject to the condition that he must submit to the Court proof of his Philippine citizenship.

In compliance with the above resolution, Ching submitted on 18 November 1998, the following
documents:

1. Certification, dated 9 June 1986, issued by the Board of Accountancy of the

Professional Regulations Commission showing that Ching is a certified public
accountant;
 2. Voter Certification, dated 14 June 1997, issued by Elizabeth B. Cerezo,
Election Officer of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) in Tubao La
Union showing that Ching is a registered voter of the said place; and

3. Certification, dated 12 October 1998, also issued by Elizabeth B. Cerezo,

showing that Ching was elected as a member of the Sangguniang Bayan of Tubao,
La Union during the 12 May 1992 synchronized elections.

On 5 April 1999, the results of the 1998 Bar Examinations were released and Ching was one of
the successful Bar examinees. The oath-taking of the successful Bar examinees was scheduled on
5 May 1999. However, because of the questionable status of Ching's citizenship, he was not
allowed to take his oath. Pursuant to the resolution of this Court, dated 20 April 1999, he was
required to submit further proof of his citizenship. In the same resolution, the Office of the
Solicitor General (OSG) was required to file a comment on Ching's petition for admission to the
bar and on the documents evidencing his Philippine citizenship.

The OSG filed its comment on 8 July 1999, stating that Ching, being the "legitimate child of a
Chinese father and a Filipino mother born under the 1935 Constitution was a Chinese citizen and
continued to be so, unless upon reaching the age of majority he elected Philippine
citizenship" 1 in strict compliance with the provisions of Commonwealth Act No. 625 entitled
"An Act Providing for the Manner in which the Option to Elect Philippine Citizenship shall be
Declared by a Person Whose Mother is a Filipino Citizen." The OSG adds that "(w)hat he
acquired at best was only an inchoate Philippine citizenship which he could perfect by election
upon reaching the age of majority." 2 In this regard, the OSG clarifies that "two (2) conditions
must concur in order that the election of Philippine citizenship may be effective, namely: (a) the
mother of the person making the election must be a citizen of the Philippines; and (b) said
election must be made upon reaching the age of majority." 3 The OSG then explains the meaning
of the phrase "upon reaching the age of majority:"

The clause "upon reaching the age of majority" has been construed to mean a
reasonable time after reaching the age of majority which had been interpreted by
the Secretary of Justice to be three (3) years (VELAYO, supra at p. 51 citing Op.,
Sec. of Justice No. 70, s. 1940, Feb. 27, 1940). Said period may be extended
under certain circumstances, as when a (sic) person concerned has always
considered himself a Filipino (ibid., citing Op. Nos. 355 and 422, s. 1955; 3, 12,
46, 86 and 97, s. 1953). But in Cuenco, it was held that an election done after over
seven (7) years was not made within a reasonable time.

In conclusion, the OSG points out that Ching has not formally elected Philippine citizenship and,
if ever he does, it would already be beyond the "reasonable time" allowed by present
jurisprudence. However, due to the peculiar circumstances surrounding Ching's case, the OSG
recommends the relaxation of the standing rule on the construction of the phrase "reasonable
period" and the allowance of Ching to elect Philippine citizenship in accordance with C.A. No.
625 prior to taking his oath as a member of the Philippine Bar.
On 27 July 1999, Ching filed a Manifestation, attaching therewith his Affidavit of Election of
Philippine Citizenship and his Oath of Allegiance, both dated 15 July 1999. In his Manifestation,
Ching states:

1. I have always considered myself as a Filipino;

2. I was registered as a Filipino and consistently declared myself as one in my

school records and other official documents;

3. I am practicing a profession (Certified Public Accountant) reserved for Filipino

citizens;

4. I participated in electoral process[es] since the time I was eligible to vote;

5. I had served the people of Tubao, La Union as a member of the Sangguniang

Bayan from 1992 to 1995;

6. I elected Philippine citizenship on July 15, 1999 in accordance with

Commonwealth Act No. 625;

7. My election was expressed in a statement signed and sworn to by me before a

notary public;

8. I accompanied my election of Philippine citizenship with the oath of allegiance

to the Constitution and the Government of the Philippines;

9. I filed my election of Philippine citizenship and my oath of allegiance to (sic)

the Civil Registrar of Tubao La Union, and

10. I paid the amount of TEN PESOS (Ps. 10.00) as filing fees.

Since Ching has already elected Philippine citizenship on 15 July 1999, the question raised is
whether he has elected Philippine citizenship within a "reasonable time." In the affirmative,
whether his citizenship by election retroacted to the time he took the bar examination.

When Ching was born in 1964, the governing charter was the 1935 Constitution. Under Article
IV, Section 1(3) of the 1935 Constitution, the citizenship of a legitimate child born of a Filipino
mother and an alien father followed the citizenship of the father, unless, upon reaching the age of
majority, the child elected Philippine citizenship. 4 This right to elect Philippine citizenship was
recognized in the 1973 Constitution when it provided that "(t)hose who elect Philippine
citizenship pursuant to the provisions of the Constitution of nineteen hundred and thirty-five" are
citizens of the Philippines. 5 Likewise, this recognition by the 1973 Constitution was carried over
to the 1987 Constitution which states that "(t)hose born before January 17, 1973 of Filipino
mothers, who elect Philippine citizenship upon reaching the age of majority" are Philippine
citizens. 6 It should be noted, however, that the 1973 and 1987 Constitutional provisions on the
election of Philippine citizenship should not be understood as having a curative effect on any
irregularity in the acquisition of citizenship for those covered by the 1935 Constitution. 7 If the
citizenship of a person was subject to challenge under the old charter, it remains subject to
challenge under the new charter even if the judicial challenge had not been commenced before
the effectivity of the new Constitution. 8

C.A. No. 625 which was enacted pursuant to Section 1(3), Article IV of the 1935 Constitution,
prescribes the procedure that should be followed in order to make a valid election of Philippine
citizenship. Under Section 1 thereof, legitimate children born of Filipino mothers may elect
Philippine citizenship by expressing such intention "in a statement to be signed and sworn to by
the party concerned before any officer authorized to administer oaths, and shall be filed with the
nearest civil registry. The said party shall accompany the aforesaid statement with the oath of
allegiance to the Constitution and the Government of the Philippines."

However, the 1935 Constitution and C.A. No. 625 did not prescribe a time period within which
the election of Philippine citizenship should be made. The 1935 Charter only provides that the
election should be made "upon reaching the age of majority." The age of majority then
commenced upon reaching twenty-one (21) years. 9 In the opinions of the Secretary of Justice on
cases involving the validity of election of Philippine citizenship, this dilemma was resolved by
basing the time period on the decisions of this Court prior to the effectivity of the 1935
Constitution. In these decisions, the proper period for electing Philippine citizenship was, in turn,
based on the pronouncements of the Department of State of the United States Government to the
effect that the election should be made within a "reasonable time" after attaining the age of
majority. 10 The phrase "reasonable time" has been interpreted to mean that the election should
be made within three (3) years from reaching the age of
majority. 11 However, we held in Cuenco vs. Secretary of Justice, 12 that the three (3) year period
is not an inflexible rule. We said:

It is true that this clause has been construed to mean a reasonable period after
reaching the age of majority, and that the Secretary of Justice has ruled that three
(3) years is the reasonable time to elect Philippine citizenship under the
constitutional provision adverted to above, which period may be extended under
certain circumstances, as when the person concerned has always considered
himself a Filipino. 13

However, we cautioned in Cuenco that the extension of the option to elect Philippine citizenship
is not indefinite:

Regardless of the foregoing, petitioner was born on February 16, 1923. He

became of age on February 16, 1944. His election of citizenship was made on
May 15, 1951, when he was over twenty-eight (28) years of age, or over seven (7)
years after he had reached the age of majority. It is clear that said election has not
been made "upon reaching the age of majority." 14

In the present case, Ching, having been born on 11 April 1964, was already thirty-five (35) years
old when he complied with the requirements of C.A. No. 625 on 15 June 1999, or over fourteen
(14) years after he had reached the age of majority. Based on the interpretation of the phrase
"upon reaching the age of majority," Ching's election was clearly beyond, by any reasonable
yardstick, the allowable period within which to exercise the privilege. It should be stated, in this
connection, that the special circumstances invoked by Ching, i.e., his continuous and
uninterrupted stay in the Philippines and his being a certified public accountant, a registered
voter and a former elected public official, cannot vest in him Philippine citizenship as the law
specifically lays down the requirements for acquisition of Philippine citizenship by election.

Definitely, the so-called special circumstances cannot constitute what Ching erroneously labels
as informal election of citizenship. Ching cannot find a refuge in the case of In re: Florencio
Mallare, 15 the pertinent portion of which reads:

And even assuming arguendo that Ana Mallare were (sic) legally married to an
alien, Esteban's exercise of the right of suffrage when he came of age, constitutes
a positive act of election of Philippine citizenship. It has been established that
Esteban Mallare was a registered voter as of April 14, 1928, and that as early as
1925 (when he was about 22 years old), Esteban was already participating in the
elections and campaigning for certain candidate[s]. These acts are sufficient to
show his preference for Philippine citizenship. 16

Ching's reliance on Mallare is misplaced. The facts and circumstances obtaining therein are very
different from those in the present case, thus, negating its applicability. First,
Esteban Mallare was born before the effectivity of the 1935 Constitution and the enactment of
C.A. No. 625. Hence, the requirements and procedures prescribed under the 1935 Constitution
and C.A. No. 625 for electing Philippine citizenship would not be applicable to him. Second, the
ruling in Mallare was an obiter since, as correctly pointed out by the OSG, it was not necessary
for Esteban Mallare to elect Philippine citizenship because he was already a Filipino, he being a
natural child of a Filipino mother. In this regard, the Court stated:

Esteban Mallare, natural child of Ana Mallare, a Filipina, is therefore himself a

Filipino, and no other act would be necessary to confer on him all the rights and
privileges attached to Philippine citizenship (U.S. vs. Ong Tianse, 29 Phil. 332;
Santos Co vs. Government of the Philippine Islands, 42 Phil. 543, Serra vs.
Republic, L-4223, May 12, 1952, Sy Quimsuan vs. Republic, L-4693, Feb. 16,
1953; Pitallano vs. Republic, L-5111, June 28, 1954). Neither could any act be
taken on the erroneous belief that he is a non-filipino divest him of the citizenship
privileges to which he is rightfully entitled. 17

The ruling in Mallare was reiterated and further elaborated in Co vs. Electoral Tribunal of the
House of Representatives, 18 where we held:

We have jurisprudence that defines "election" as both a formal and an informal

process.

In the case of In re: Florencio Mallare (59 SCRA 45 [1974]), the Court held that
the exercise of the right of suffrage and the participation in election exercises
 constitute a positive act of election of Philippine citizenship. In the exact
pronouncement of the Court, we held:

Esteban's exercise of the right of suffrage when he came of age

constitutes a positive act of Philippine citizenship. (p. 52: emphasis
supplied)

The private respondent did more than merely exercise his right of suffrage. He has established
his life here in the Philippines.

For those in the peculiar situation of the respondent who cannot be excepted to
have elected Philippine citizenship as they were already citizens, we apply the In
Re Mallare rule.

xxx xxx xxx

The filing of sworn statement or formal declaration is a requirement for those

who still have to elect citizenship. For those already Filipinos when the time to
elect came up, there are acts of deliberate choice which cannot be less binding.
Entering a profession open only to Filipinos, serving in public office where
citizenship is a qualification, voting during election time, running for public
office, and other categorical acts of similar nature are themselves formal
manifestations for these persons.

An election of Philippine citizenship presupposes that the person electing is an

alien. Or his status is doubtful because he is a national of two countries. There is
no doubt in this case about Mr. Ong's being a Filipino when he turned twenty-one
(21).

We repeat that any election of Philippine citizenship on the part of the private
respondent would not only have been superfluous but it would also have resulted
in an absurdity. How can a Filipino citizen elect Philippine citizenship? 19

The Court, like the OSG, is sympathetic with the plight of Ching. However, even if we consider
the special circumstances in the life of Ching like his having lived in the Philippines all his life
and his consistent belief that he is a Filipino, controlling statutes and jurisprudence constrain us
to disagree with the recommendation of the OSG. Consequently, we hold that Ching failed to
validly elect Philippine citizenship. The span of fourteen (14) years that lapsed from the time he
reached the age of majority until he finally expressed his intention to elect Philippine citizenship
is clearly way beyond the contemplation of the requirement of electing "upon reaching the age of
majority." Moreover, Ching has offered no reason why he delayed his election of Philippine
citizenship. The prescribed procedure in electing Philippine citizenship is certainly not a tedious
and painstaking process. All that is required of the elector is to execute an affidavit of election of
Philippine citizenship and, thereafter, file the same with the nearest civil registry. Ching's
unreasonable and unexplained delay in making his election cannot be simply glossed over.
Philippine citizenship can never be treated like a commodity that can be claimed when needed
and suppressed when convenient. 20 One who is privileged to elect Philippine citizenship has
only an inchoate right to such citizenship. As such, he should avail of the right with fervor,
enthusiasm and promptitude. Sadly, in this case, Ching slept on his opportunity to elect
Philippine citizenship and, as a result. this golden privilege slipped away from his grasp.

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the Court Resolves to DENY Vicente D. Ching's application
for admission to the Philippine Bar.

SO ORDERED.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

B.M. No. 1678 December 17, 2007

PETITION FOR LEAVE TO RESUME PRACTICE OF LAW,

BENJAMIN M. DACANAY, petitioner.

RESOLUTION

CORONA, J.:

This bar matter concerns the petition of petitioner Benjamin M. Dacanay for leave to resume the
practice of law.

Petitioner was admitted to the Philippine bar in March 1960. He practiced law until he migrated
to Canada in December 1998 to seek medical attention for his ailments. He subsequently applied
for Canadian citizenship to avail of Canadas free medical aid program. His application was
approved and he became a Canadian citizen in May 2004.

On July 14, 2006, pursuant to Republic Act (RA) 9225 (Citizenship Retention and Re-
Acquisition Act of 2003), petitioner reacquired his Philippine citizenship.1 On that day, he took
his oath of allegiance as a Filipino citizen before the Philippine Consulate General in Toronto,
Canada. Thereafter, he returned to the Philippines and now intends to resume his law practice.
There is a question, however, whether petitioner Benjamin M. Dacanay lost his membership in
the Philippine bar when he gave up his Philippine citizenship in May 2004. Thus, this petition.

In a report dated October 16, 2007, the Office of the Bar Confidant cites Section 2, Rule 138
(Attorneys and Admission to Bar) of the Rules of Court:

SECTION 2. Requirements for all applicants for admission to the bar. Every applicant
for admission as a member of the bar must be a citizen of the Philippines, at least
twenty-one years of age, of good moral character, and a resident of the Philippines; and
must produce before the Supreme Court satisfactory evidence of good moral character,
and that no charges against him, involving moral turpitude, have been filed or are
pending in any court in the Philippines.

Applying the provision, the Office of the Bar Confidant opines that, by virtue of his reacquisition
of Philippine citizenship, in 2006, petitioner has again met all the qualifications and has none of
the disqualifications for membership in the bar. It recommends that he be allowed to resume the
practice of law in the Philippines, conditioned on his retaking the lawyers oath to remind him of
his duties and responsibilities as a member of the Philippine bar.
We approve the recommendation of the Office of the Bar Confidant with certain modifications.

The practice of law is a privilege burdened with conditions.2 It is so delicately affected with
public interest that it is both a power and a duty of the State (through this Court) to control and
regulate it in order to protect and promote the public welfare.3

Adherence to rigid standards of mental fitness, maintenance of the highest degree of morality,
faithful observance of the rules of the legal profession, compliance with the mandatory
continuing legal education requirement and payment of membership fees to the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines (IBP) are the conditions required for membership in good standing in the bar and
for enjoying the privilege to practice law. Any breach by a lawyer of any of these conditions
makes him unworthy of the trust and confidence which the courts and clients repose in him for
the continued exercise of his professional privilege.4

Section 1, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court provides:

SECTION 1. Who may practice law. Any person heretofore duly admitted as a member
of the bar, or thereafter admitted as such in accordance with the provisions of this Rule,
and who is in good and regular standing, is entitled to practice law.

Pursuant thereto, any person admitted as a member of the Philippine bar in accordance with the
statutory requirements and who is in good and regular standing is entitled to practice law.

Admission to the bar requires certain qualifications. The Rules of Court mandates that an
applicant for admission to the bar be a citizen of the Philippines, at least twenty-one years of age,
of good moral character and a resident of the Philippines.5 He must also produce before this
Court satisfactory evidence of good moral character and that no charges against him, involving
moral turpitude, have been filed or are pending in any court in the Philippines.6

Moreover, admission to the bar involves various phases such as furnishing satisfactory proof of
educational, moral and other qualifications;7 passing the bar examinations;8 taking the lawyers
oath9 and signing the roll of attorneys and receiving from the clerk of court of this Court a
certificate of the license to practice.10

The second requisite for the practice of law membership in good standing is a continuing
requirement. This means continued membership and, concomitantly, payment of annual
membership dues in the IBP;11 payment of the annual professional tax;12 compliance with the
mandatory continuing legal education requirement;13 faithful observance of the rules and ethics
of the legal profession and being continually subject to judicial disciplinary control.14

Given the foregoing, may a lawyer who has lost his Filipino citizenship still practice law in the
Philippines? No.

The Constitution provides that the practice of all professions in the Philippines shall be limited to
Filipino citizens save in cases prescribed by law.15 Since Filipino citizenship is a requirement for
admission to the bar, loss thereof terminates membership in the Philippine bar and, consequently,
the privilege to engage in the practice of law. In other words, the loss of Filipino citizenship ipso
jure terminates the privilege to practice law in the Philippines. The practice of law is a privilege
denied to foreigners.16

The exception is when Filipino citizenship is lost by reason of naturalization as a citizen of

another country but subsequently reacquired pursuant to RA 9225. This is because "all
Philippine citizens who become citizens of another country shall be deemed not to have lost their
Philippine citizenship under the conditions of [RA 9225]."17Therefore, a Filipino lawyer who
becomes a citizen of another country is deemed never to have lost his Philippine citizenship if he
reacquires it in accordance with RA 9225. Although he is also deemed never to have
terminated his membership in the Philippine bar, no automatic right to resume law practice
accrues.

Under RA 9225, if a person intends to practice the legal profession in the Philippines and he
reacquires his Filipino citizenship pursuant to its provisions "(he) shall apply with the proper
authority for a license or permit to engage in such practice."18 Stated otherwise, before a lawyer
who reacquires Filipino citizenship pursuant to RA 9225 can resume his law practice, he must
first secure from this Court the authority to do so, conditioned on:

(a) the updating and payment in full of the annual membership dues in the IBP;

(b) the payment of professional tax;

(c) the completion of at least 36 credit hours of mandatory continuing legal education;
this is specially significant to refresh the applicant/petitioners knowledge of Philippine
laws and update him of legal developments and

(d) the retaking of the lawyers oath which will not only remind him of his duties and
responsibilities as a lawyer and as an officer of the Court, but also renew his pledge to
maintain allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines.

Compliance with these conditions will restore his good standing as a member of the Philippine
bar.

WHEREFORE, the petition of Attorney Benjamin M. Dacanay is hereby GRANTED, subject

to compliance with the conditions stated above and submission of proof of such compliance to
the Bar Confidant, after which he may retake his oath as a member of the Philippine bar.

SO ORDERED.
[<="" span="">. June 14, 2005]

VILLA vs. AMA

EN BANC

Sirs/Mesdames:

Quoted hereunder, for your information, is a resolution of this Court dated JUN 14 2005.

Bar Matter No. 674 (ROMULO M. VILLA vs. JUNEL ANTHONY AMA, MICHAEL FREDERICK
MUSNGI and CRISANTO SARUCA, JR., Successful Bar Examinees.)

Before this Court is a Petition filed on April 13, 2005 by Junel Anthony D. Ama, a successful
1992 Bar Examinee, praying that he be admitted to the Philippine Bar, be allowed to take the
Lawyer's Oath and sign the Roll of Attorneys.

The petitioner, along with other members of the Aquila Legis Fraternity of the Ateneo de Manila
School of Law, was implicated and criminally charged for the death of Jose Leonardo "Lenny"
Villa. An Amended Information for serious physical injuries was filed with the Metropolitan
Trial Court (MTC) of Caloocan City, Branch 53, against the petitioner, docketed as Criminal
Case No. 155211. Another criminal Information for Homicide, in relation to the death of Villa,
was filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Caloocan City, docketed as Criminal Case No.
C-38340.

On April 16, 1993, Romulo Villa, the victim's father, filed a petition with the Court praying that
the petitioner be disallowed from taking the Lawyer's Oath and from signing the Roll of
Attorneys pending final judgment in the criminal cases filed against him.

Eventually, on February 28, 1996, the MTC rendered its decision and acquitted the petitioner. On
the other hand, the RTC, in its Decision dated November 27, 1993, found the petitioner guilty of
homicide through conspiracy.

The RTC Decision was appealed to the Court of Appeals, docketed as CA-G.R. CR No. 15520.
On January 10, 2002 the appellate court rendered its decision, setting aside the lower court's
finding of conspiracy and considered the individual actuation of the accused. As for herein
petitioner, the appellate court found him guilty of slight physical injuries under Article 266 of the
Revised Penal Code, and sentenced him to twenty (20) days of arresto menor. He, along with the
other accused, was likewise ordered to jointly pay the heirs of the victim the sum of P30,000.00
as indemnity.

Instead of serving the twenty (20) day imprisonment, the petitioner applied for
probation[1]cralaw which the RTC of Caloocan City, Branch 130 granted on October 11,
2002.[2]cralaw
After six (6) months, or on April 10, 2003, the RTC issued its Order[3]cralaw discharging the
petitioner on probation, and declared the case terminated.

Appended to the present petition are various certifications[4]cralaw attesting to the petitioner's
moral character.

On May 6, 2005, the petitioner manifested that he made a manifestation in the case
entitled People vs. Court of Appeals, et al, docketed as G.R. No. 154954, that he is willing to
deposit his share of P7,500.00 in the civil indemnity provided in the CA Decision.

In her Report dated May 10, 2005, Deputy Clerk of Court and Bar Confidant Atty. Ma. Cristina
B. Layusa recommended that petitioner be allowed to take the lawyer's oath and sign the Roll of
Attorneys, citing the cases of In Re: Al Argosino[5]cralaw and In Re: Arthur M. Cuevas,
Jr.,[6]cralaw both involving bar passers who were convicted of the crime reckless imprudence
resulting in homicide, but after serving their respective sentences, were nevertheless allowed by
the Court to take the Lawyer's Oath and sign the Roll of Attorneys. It was also pointed out that in
Bar Matter No. 832, the Court allowed Antonio M. Tuliao, convicted of reckless imprudence
resulting in homicide (which arose out of the same incident as that of Argosino and Cuevas, Jr.,)
to take the Lawyer's Oath and sign the Roll of Attorneys.

The Court agrees with the foregoing recommendation. The crime for which the petitioner was
convicted - slight physical injuries - is after all, a light offense, and cannot be considered a grave
violation of the moral sentiment of the community or done in the spirit of cruelty, hostility, or
revenge; certainly not a crime involving moral turpitude.[7]cralaw

The Court thus resolves to GRANT the petition of Junel Anthony D. Ama. He is hereby allowed
to take the Lawyer's Oath and sign the Roll of Attorneys upon a showing of proof of having
deposited his share in the civil indemnity stated in the Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. CR No. 15520, and upon payment of the required fees.

Tinga, J., no part.

Very truly yours,

LUZVIMINDA D. PUNO

Clerk of Court

(Sgd.) MA. LUISA D. VILLARAMA

Asst. Clerk of Court

 SECOND DIVISION

[A.C. No. 3967. September 3, 2003]

ARTEMIO ENDAYA, complainant, vs. ATTY. WILFREDO OCA, respondent.

DECISION
TINGA, J.:

The law is no brooding omnipresence in the sky, so spoke Justice Holmes. He must have
made the statement because invariably the legal system is encountered in human form, notably
through the lawyers. For practical purposes, the lawyers not only represent the law; they are the
law.[1] With their ubiquitous presence in the social milieu, lawyers have to be responsible. The
problems they create in lawyering become public difficulties. To keep lawyers responsible
underlies the worth of the ethics of lawyering. Indeed, legal ethics is simply the aesthetic term
for professional responsibility.
The case before us demonstrates once again that when a lawyer violates his duties to his
client, the courts, the legal profession and the public, he engages in conduct which is both
unethical and unprofessional.
This case unfolded with a verified Complaint[2] filed on January 12, 1993 by complainant
Artemio Endaya against respondent Atty. Wifredo Oca for violation of the lawyers oath and
what complainant termed as professional delinquency or infidelity.[3] The antecedents are:
On November 7, 1991, a complaint for unlawful detainer docketed as Civil Case No. 34-
MCTC-T was filed with the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Taysan-Lobo, Batangas by
Apolonia H. Hornilla, Pedro Hernandez, Santiago Hernandez and Dominador Hernandez against
complainant and his spouse Patrosenia Endaya.[4]
On December 13, 1991, the complainant and his wife as defendants in the case filed their
answer which was prepared by a certain Mr. Isaias Ramirez. A preliminary conference was
conducted on January 17, 1992, which complainant and his wife attended without counsel.
During the conference, complainant categorically admitted that plaintiffs were the declared
owners for taxation purposes of the land involved in the case. Continuation of the preliminary
conference was set on January 31, 1992. Thereafter, complainant sought the services of the
Public Attorneys Office in Batangas City and respondent was assigned to handle the case for the
complainant and his wife.[5]
At the continuation of the preliminary conference, respondent appeared as counsel for
complainant and his spouse. He moved for the amendment of the answer previously filed by
complainant and his wife, but his motion was denied.[6] Thereafter, the court, presided by Acting
Trial Court Judge Teodoro M. Baral, ordered the parties to submit their affidavits and position
papers within ten days from receipt of the order. The court also decreed that thirty days after
receipt of the last affidavit and position paper, or upon expiration of the period for filing the
same, judgment shall be rendered on the case.[7]
Respondent failed to submit the required affidavits and position paper, as may be gleaned
from the Decision dated March 19, 1992 of the MCTC where it was noted that only the plaintiffs
submitted their affidavits and position papers.[8]
Nonetheless, the court dismissed the complaint for unlawful detainer principally on the
ground that the plaintiffs are not the real parties-in-interest. The dispositive portion of
the Decisionreads:

WHEREFORE, this case is hereby dismissed on the ground that the plaintiffs have no legal
capacity to sue as they are not the real party (sic) in interest, in addition to the fact that there is no
privity of contract between the plaintiffs and the defendants as to the verbal lease agreement.

SO ORDERED.[9]

Plaintiffs appealed the Decision to the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Batangas City, Branch
1, where the case was docketed as Civil Case No. 3378. On April 10, 1992, the RTC directed the
parties to file their respective memoranda.[10] Once again, respondent failed the complainant and
his wife. As observed by the RTC in its Decision[11] dated September 7, 1992, respondent did not
file the memorandum for his clients, thereby prompting the court to consider the case as
submitted for decision.[12]
In its Decision, the RTC reversed the decision appealed from as it held that plaintiffs are the
co-owners of the property in dispute and as such are parties-in-interest.[13] It also found that the
verbal lease agreement was on a month-to-month basis and perforce terminable by the plaintiffs
at the end of any given month upon proper notice to the defendants.[14] It also made a finding that
defendants incurred rentals in arrears.[15] The decretal portion of the Decision reads, thus:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Decision of the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of
Taysan-Lobo dated March 19, 1992, is REVERSED and SET ASIDE and new one entered, to
wit:

Defendants ARTEMIO ENDAYA and PATROSENIA ENDAYA and all persons claiming under
them are hereby ordered to vacate and dismantle their house on the land subject of the verbal
lease agreement at their own expense. The defendants are likewise ordered to pay the monthly
rental of P25.00 from the month of January 1991 to November 1991 and ONE THOUSAND
(P1,000.00) PESOS monthly from December 1991 until the defendants finally vacate and
surrender possession of the subject property to the plaintiffs and to pay attorneys fee in the
amount of TEN THOUSAND (P10,000.00) PESOS.

No pronouncement as to cost.[16]

Complainant received a copy of the Decision on October 7, 1992. Two days later, or on
October 9, 1992, complainant confronted respondent with the adverse decision but the latter
denied receipt of a copy thereof. Upon inquiry with the Branch Clerk of Court, however,
complainant found out that respondent received his copy back on September 14, 1992.[17]
 Having lost the unlawful detainer case, on January 12, 1993 complainant filed the present
administrative complaint against the respondent for professional delinquency consisting of his
failure to file the required pleadings in behalf of the complainant and his spouse. Complainant
contends that due to respondents inaction he lost the opportunity to present his cause and
ultimately the case itself.[18]
In his Comment[19] dated March 17, 1993, respondent denies that he committed professional
misconduct in violation of his oath, stressing that he was not the original counsel of complainant
and his spouse.[20] He further avers that when he agreed to represent complainant at the
continuation of the preliminary conference in the main case, it was for the sole purpose of asking
leave of court to file an amended answer because he was made to believe by the complainant that
the answer was prepared by a non-lawyer. Upon discovering that the answer was in fact the work
of a lawyer, forthwith he asked the court to relieve him as complainants counsel, but he was
denied. He adds that he agreed to file the position paper for the complainant upon the latters
undertaking to provide him with the documents which support the position that plaintiffs are not
the owners of the property in dispute. As complainant had reneged on his promise, he claims that
he deemed it more prudent not to file any position paper as it would be a repetition of the answer.
He offers the same reason for not filing the memorandum on appeal with the RTC. Finally,
respondent asserts that he fully explained his stand as regards Civil Case No. 34-MCTC-T to the
complainant.[21]
Pursuant to our Resolution[22] dated May 10, 1993, complainant filed his Reply[23] to
respondents Comment wherein he merely reiterated his allegations in the Complaint.
On July 28, 1993, this Court directed respondent to file his rejoinder within ten days from
notice of our Resolution.[24] But he failed to do so despite the lapse of a considerable period of
time. This prompted the Court to require respondent to show cause why he should not be
disciplinarily dealt with or held in contempt and to file his rejoinder, both within ten (10) days
from notice.[25]
In his Explanation[26] dated February 28, 1997, respondent admits having received a copy of
the resolution requiring him to file a rejoinder. However, he asserts that he purposely did not file
a rejoinder for he believed in good faith that a rejoinder to complainants reply is no longer
necessary.[27] He professes that in electing not to file a rejoinder he did not intend to cast
disrespect upon the Court.[28]
On June 16, 1997, we referred this case to the Office of the Bar Confidant for evaluation,
report and recommendation.[29]
In its Report[30] dated February 6, 2001, the Office of the Bar Confidant found respondent
negligent in handling the case of complainant and his wife and recommended that he be
suspended from the practice of law for one month. The pertinent portions of the Report read,
thus:

It is to be noted that after appearing at the preliminary conference before the Municipal Circuit
Trial Court, respondent was never heard from again. Respondents seeming indifference to the
cause of his client, specially when the case was on appeal, caused the defeat of herein
complainant. Respondent practically abandoned complainant in the midst of a storm. This is
even more made serious of the fact that respondent, at that time, was assigned at the Public
Attorneys Office- a government entity mandated to provide free and competent legal assistance.

A lawyers devotion to his clients cause not only requires but also entitles him to deploy every
honorable means to secure for the client what is justly due him or to present every defense
provided by law to enable the latters cause to succeed. (Miraflor vs. Hagad, 244 SCRA 106)

....

The facts, however, do not show that respondent employed every legal and honorable means to
advance the cause of his client. Had respondent tried his best, he could have found some other
defenses available to his client; but respondent was either too lazy or too convinced that his
client had a losing case.

....

For intentionally failing to submit the pleadings required by the court, respondent practically
closed the door to the possibility of putting up a fair fight for his client. As the Court once held,
A client is bound by the negligence of his lawyer. (Diaz-Duarte vs. Ong, 298 SCRA 388)[31]

However, the Bar Confidant did not find complainant entirely faultless. She observed, viz:

Respondents allegation that complainant failed in his promise to submit the documents to
support his claim was not denied by complainant; hence, it is deemed admitted. Complainant is
not without fault; for misrepresenting that he could prove his claim through supporting
documents, respondent was made to believe that he had a strong leg to stand on. A party cannot
blame his counsel for negligence when he himself was guilty of neglect. (Macapagal vs. Court of
Appeals, 271 SCRA 491)[32]

On April 18, 2001, we referred the case to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines for
investigation, report and recommendation.
Several hearings were set by the IBP but complainant did not appear even once. Respondent
attended five hearings, but he failed to present evidence in support of his defense, as required by
Investigating Commissioner Victor C. Fernandez. This compelled the latter to make his report on
the basis of the pleadings and evidence forwarded by the Office of the Bar Confidant.
On October 11, 2002, Commissioner Fernandez issued his Report[33] wherein he concurred
with the findings and recommendation of the Office of the Bar Confidant.
In a Resolution[34] dated April 26, 2003, the IBP Board of Governors adopted the Report of
Commissioner Fernandez.
The Court is convinced that respondent violated the lawyers oath not only once but a
number of times in regard to the handling of his clients cause. The repeated violations also
involve defilement of several Canons in the Code of Professional Responsibility.
Right off, the Court notes that respondent attributes his failure to file the required pleadings
for the complainant and his wife invariably to his strong personal belief that it was unnecessary
or futile to file the pleadings. This was true with respect to the affidavits and position paper at the
MCTC level, the appeal memorandum at the RTC level and the rejoinder at this Courts level. In
the last instance, it took respondent as long as three years, under compulsion of a show cause
order at that, only to manifest his predisposition not to file a rejoinder after all. In other words, at
the root of respondents transgressions is his seeming stubborn mindset against the acts required
of him by the courts. This intransigent attitude not only belies lack of diligence and commitment
but evinces absence of respect for the authority of this Court and the other courts involved.
The lawyers oath embodies the fundamental principles that guide every member of the legal
fraternity. From it springs the lawyers duties and responsibilities that any infringement thereof
can cause his disbarment, suspension or other disciplinary action.[35]
Found in the oath is the duty of a lawyer to protect and safeguard the interest of his client.
Specifically, it requires a lawyer to conduct himself to the best of his knowledge and discretion
with all good fidelity as well to the courts as to his clients.[36] This duty is further stressed
in Canon 18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which mandates that (A) lawyer shall
serve his client with competence and diligence.
In this case, evidence abound that respondent failed to demonstrate the required diligence in
handling the case of complainant and his spouse. As found by the Office of the Bar
Confidant,[37] after appearing at the second preliminary conference before the MCTC, respondent
had not been heard of again until he commented on the complaint in this case. Without disputing
this fact, respondent reasons out that his appearance at the conference was for the sole purpose of
obtaining leave of court to file an amended answer and that when he failed to obtain it because of
complainants fault he asked the court that he be relieved as counsel.[38] The explanation has
undertones of dishonesty for complainant had engaged respondent for the entire case and not for
just one incident. The alternative conclusion is that respondent did not know his procedure for
under the Rules on Summary Procedure[39] the amended answer is a prohibited pleading.
Even assuming respondent did in fact ask to be relieved, this could not mean that less was
expected from him. Once a lawyer takes the cudgels for a clients case, he owes it to his client to
see the case to the end. This, we pointed out in Legarda v. Court of Appeals,[40] thus:

It should be remembered that the moment a lawyer takes a clients cause, he covenants that he
will exert all effort for its prosecution until its final conclusion. A lawyer who fails to exercise
due diligence or abandons his clients cause make him unworthy of the trust reposed on him by
the latter.[41]

Also, we held in Santiago v. Fojas,[42] every case a lawyer accepts deserves his full
attention, diligence, skill, and competence, regardless of its importance and whether he accepts if
for a fee or for free. In other words, whatever the lawyers reason is for accepting a case, he is
duty bound to do his utmost in prosecuting or defending it.
Moreover, a lawyer continues to be a counsel of record until the lawyer-client relationship is
terminated either by the act of his client or his own act, with permission of the court. Until such
time, the lawyer is expected to do his best for the interest of his client [43]
Thus, when respondent was directed to file affidavits and position paper by the MCTC, and
appeal memorandum by the RTC, he had no choice but to comply. However, respondent did not
bother to do so, in total disregard of the court orders. This constitutes negligence and malpractice
proscribed by Rule 18.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which mandates that (A)
lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him and his negligence in connection
therewith shall render him liable.
Respondents failure to file the affidavits and position paper at the MCTC did not actually
prejudice his clients, for the court nevertheless rendered a decision favorable to them. However,
the failure is per se a violation of Rule 18.03.
It was respondents failure to file appeal memorandum before the RTC which made
complainant and his wife suffer as it resulted in their loss of the case. As found by the Office of
the Bar Confidant, to which we fully subscribe, in not filing the appeal memorandum respondent
denied complainant and his spouse the chance of putting up a fair fight in the dispute. Canon
19prescribes that (A) lawyer shall represent his client with zeal within the bounds of the law. He
should exert all efforts to avail of the remedies allowed under the law. Respondent did not do so,
thereby even putting to naught the advantage which his clients apparently gained by prevailing at
the MCTC level. Verily, respondent did not even bother to put up a fight for his clients. Clearly,
his conduct fell short of what Canon 19 requires and breached the trust reposed in him by his
clients.
We cannot sustain respondents excuse in not filing the affidavits and position paper with the
MCTC and the appeal memorandum with the RTC. He claims that he did not file the required
pleadings because complainant failed to furnish him with evidence that would substantiate
complainants allegations in the answer. He argues that absent the supporting documents, the
pleadings he could have filed would just be a repetition of the answer. However, respondent
admits in his comment that complainant furnished him with the affidavit of persons purporting to
be barangay officials attesting to an alleged admission by Felomino Hernandez, the brother of
the plaintiffs in the unlawful detainer case, that he had already bought the disputed
property.[44] This did not precipitate respondent into action despite the evidentiary value of the
affidavit, which was executed by disinterested persons. Said affidavit could have somehow
bolstered the claim of complainant and his wife which was upheld by the MCTC that plaintiffs
are not the real parties-in-interest. While respondent could have thought this affidavit to be
without probative value, he should have left it to the sound judgment of the court to determine
whether the affidavit supports the assertions of his clients. That could have happened had he filed
the required position paper and annexed the affidavit thereto.
Further, notwithstanding his belief that without the supporting documents filing the required
pleadings would be a futile exercise, still respondent should have formally and promptly
manifested in court his intent not to file the pleadings to prevent delay in the disposition of the
case.[45] Specifically, the RTC would not have waited as it did for the lapse of three months from
June 5,1992, the date when plaintiffs-appellants submitted their appeal memorandum, before it
rendered judgment. Had it known that respondent would not file the appeal memorandum, the
court could have decided the case much earlier.
For his failure to inform the court, respondent violated Canon 12, to wit:

Canon 12: A lawyer shall exert every effort and consider it his duty to assist in the speedy and
efficient administration of justice.
 Respondent likewise failed to demonstrate the candor he owed his client. Canon 17 provides
that (A) lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of his client and he shall be mindful of the trust and
confidence reposed in him. When complainant received the RTC decision, he talked to
respondent about it.[46] However, respondent denied knowledge of the decision despite his receipt
thereof as early as September 14, 1992. Obviously, he tried to evade responsibility for his
negligence. In doing so, respondent was untruthful to complainant and effectively betrayed the
trust placed in him by the latter.
On top of all these is respondents employment as a lawyer of the Public Attorneys Office
which is tasked to provide free legal assistance for indigents and low-income persons so as to
promote the rule of law in the protection of the rights of the citizenry and the efficient and
speedy administration of justice.[47] Against this backdrop, respondent should have been more
judicious in the performance of his professional obligations. As we held in Vitriola v.
Dasig[48] lawyers in the government are public servants who owe the utmost fidelity to the public
service. Furthermore, a lawyer from the government is not exempt from observing the degree of
diligence required in the Code of Professional Responsibility. Canon 6 of the Code provides that
the canons shall apply to lawyers in government service in the discharge of their official tasks.
At this juncture, it bears stressing that much is demanded from those who engage in the
practice of law because they have a duty not only to their clients, but also to the court, to the bar,
and to the public. The lawyers diligence and dedication to his work and profession not only
promote the interest of his client, it likewise help attain the ends of justice by contributing to the
proper and speedy administration of cases, bring prestige to the bar and maintain respect to the
legal profession.[49]
The determination of the appropriate penalty to be imposed on an errant attorney involves
the exercise of sound judicial discretion based on the facts of the case.[50] In cases of similar
nature, the penalty imposed by this Court consisted of reprimand,[51] fine of five hundred pesos
with warning,[52] suspension of three months,[53] six months,[54] and even disbarment in
aggravated cases.[55]
The facts and circumstances in this case indubitably show respondents failure to live up to
his duties as a lawyer in consonance with the strictures of the lawyers oath and the Code of
Professional Responsibility, thereby warranting his suspension from the practice of law. At
various stages of the unlawful detainer case, respondent was remiss in the performance of his
duty as counsel.
To reiterate, respondent did not submit the affidavits and position paper when required by
the MCTC. With his resolution not to file the pleadings already firmed up, he did not bother to
inform the MCTC of his resolution in mockery of the authority of the court. His stubbornness
continued at the RTC, for despite an order to file an appeal memorandum, respondent did not file
any. Neither did he manifest before the court that he would no longer file the pleading, thus
further delaying the proceedings. He had no misgivings about his deviant behavior, for despite
receipt of a copy of the adverse decision by the RTC he opted not to inform his clients
accordingly. Worse, he denied knowledge of the decision when confronted by the complainant
about it.
At this Courts level, respondents stubborn and uncaring demeanor surfaced again when he
did not file a rejoinder to complainants reply.
 Respondents story projects in vivid detail his appalling indifference to his clients cause,
deplorable lack of respect for the courts and a brazen disregard of his duties as a lawyer.
However, we are not unmindful of some facts which extenuate respondents misconduct.
First, when complainant sought the assistance of respondent as a PAO lawyer, he misrepresented
that his answer was prepared by someone who is not a lawyer. Second, when complainant
showed respondent a copy of their answer with the MCTC, he assured him that he had strong
evidence to support the defense in the answer that plaintiffs were no longer the owners of the
property in dispute. However, all that he could provide respondent was the affidavit of the
barangay officials. Last but not least, it is of public knowledge that the Public Attorneys Office is
burdened with a heavy caseload.
All things considered, we conclude that suspension for two (2) months from the practice of
law is the proper and just penalty.
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Wilfredo Oca is ordered SUSPENDED from the practice
of law for two (2) months from notice, with the warning that a similar misconduct will be dealt
with more severely. Let a copy of this decision be attached to respondents personal record in the
Office of the Bar Confidant and copies be furnished to all chapters of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP) and to all the courts in the land.
SO ORDERED.