The assignment that follows has been written by, and is solely the work of, Joe Hague

Why did Hume think that we cannot have any experience of Causation?

Section 1 defines Hume’s view of causation. Section 2 examines what experience of causation is possible.

1. What is causation for Hume?

For Hume causation is clearly and absolutely empirically grounded in experience. His approach saw him
radically rejecting rationalist claims for logically necessary a priori causation as well as the dogmatic
claims of the scholastics.

What comprises causation for Hume? In Hume’s example of billiard balls, we see the object ball move
following the movement and impact of the cue ball. Hume considers this as two distinct events:

event e1: the movement of the cue ball

event e2: the movement of the object ball

From observation we can conclude that:

1) e1 and e2 are contiguous in space at the point of impact of the balls,

2) e2 follows e1 in time.

By themselves these criteria are not sufficient to establish that a causal link exists between e1 and e2. The
events “seem conjoined but never connected”, “loose and separate”, and it “seems to be that we have no
idea of connexion” between events. However, if the observations of the events are repeated, a necessary
connexion “arises from a number of similar instances”, which yields the final requirement:

3) a constant and regular conjunction of e1 and e2.

Observed regularity reduces the possibility of accidental or coincidental linkage between events. Principles
1, 2 and 3 together form the core of Hume’s first definition of cause (C1). So that:

4) given an occurrence e1, e2 occurs contingently as a result

Hume’s second definition of cause (C2) is based on C1, but also includes reference to the way events are
represented in our minds “the idea of the one determines the mind to form an idea of the other….”. In other
words:

5) given an occurrence e1, e2 occurs as an expected consequence

The second definition is a psychological definition of what a belief in causation consists of, which includes
the impression or idea of a connection that indicates the way our minds work in applying expectations to
objects in the external world. In fact a ‘necessary connexion’ on this thesis is like a secondary quality, and
should not necessarily be attributed directly to objects. If we look for necessary connexions in objects all
we find are constant conjunctions.

C1 and C2 both have in common the fact that cause and effect are grounded in experience in a contingent
relationship which is not logically necessitated in any way. However, there are some deficiencies with
Hume’s account of causation, which I will return to in section 2. Given these definitions of C1 and C2,
what do we experience in causation?

2. Is there an Experience of Causation?

We can distinguish between those elements of causation that are directly experienced, and those elements
that are not open to direct experience. I will cover these separately below.
The assignment that follows has been written by, and is solely the work of, Joe Hague

2.1 Directly Experienced Elements of Causation.

Contiguity, temporal precedence, and constant conjunction are experienced as part of the experience of real
world objects, in direct and unambiguous ways. The C1 definition of cause suggests a straightforward
account of causal realism in the natural world. But although component events are directly experienced we
can never experience the causal power of an object, nor any supposed metaphysical connection between
events.

2.2 Elements of Causation not Available in Direct Experience .

I will discuss in more detail below why some elements of causation cannot be experienced.

2.2.1 Something-in-the-object

Hume admits that there may be “some power in the one” ball that actually does causal work. But he adds
that if it was possible to conceive of such a power in an object, it would surely be measurable. Because we
can’t measure or even define power, we have to conclude that our idea of what a causal power could be is
very unclear indeed.

2.2.2 Necessary Connexion

In definition C2 Hume is at pains to say that having an experience of a necessary connexion is not the same
as observing a sequence of events because there may be justified as well as unjustified attributions of
causality. This is made clear by three different cases:

a) An impression of necessary connexion is just a belief if there is no causal sequence

b) An impression of necessary connexion is just a belief if there is a singular causal occurrence
c) An impression of necessary connexion is a justified causal belief if there is a repeated causal
sequence

Firstly note that there is no difference in the status of necessary connexion between a) and b), it is only
when there is a repeated regularity in c) that the necessary connexion is considered a valid one. Because
there is no change between b) and c) apart from an increase in the number of observations this evidences
Hume’s view that there is nothing in the objects themselves that supports a necessary connexion.

2.3 Conclusion.

Hume therefore denies that either powers in the object or necessary connexions themselves are directly
available in experience, and therefore not available to explanations of causality.

Should this be taken to mean that Hume’s theory of causality was limited in its explanatory power, and
destined to give circular explanations of the form “e2 occurred because it happened before”?

I don’t believe this necessarily holds. Hume held the line of maintaining that if something was not
empirically derivable, it should not be relied on in causal explanation. So, if for example, we can measure
what is apparently a hidden (or ‘secret’) aspect of an object, such a measurement is empirically based, and
therefore can be used in causal explanation. For example, the measurement of forces, vectors, angles, and
velocities for e1 and e2 can create a very detailed and accurate causal explanation of why e2 presents as it
does. Although these calculated quantities are not available in direct experience, they are empirically
derived, measurable and knowable, and do create a detailed account of causation. So, the fact that such
quantities are not directly experienced, but rather derived from experience, does not mean that they have no
role in a Humean explanation of causality.