SECOND DIVISION

March 22, 2017

G.R. No. 227398

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee

vs
ANASTACIO HEMENTIZA y DELA CRUZ, Accused-Appellant

DECISION

MENDOZA, J.:

This is an appeal from the October 16, 2015 Decision1 of the Court of
Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 06847, which affirmed the January
29, 2014 Decision2 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 73, Antipolo
City (RTC) in Criminal Case Nos. 03-25726 and 03-25727, finding
Anastacio Hementiza y Dela Cruz (accused-appellant) guilty of violation of
Sections 5 and 11, Article II of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9165, otherwise
known as the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002.

The Antecedents

On May 27, 2003, accused-appellant was charged in two (2) separate

Informations before the RTC. In Criminal Case No. 03-25726, accused-
appellant was charged with possession of shabu in violation of Section 11,
Article II of R.A. No. 9165. The Informations read:

That on or about the 25th day of May 2003, in the City of Antipolo,
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-
named accused, without having been lawfully authorized by law, did, then
and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously have in his possession,
custody and control two (2) heat sealed transparent plastic sachets
containing 0.03 and 0.06 gram of white crystalline substance or with total
weight of 0.09 gram, which after the corresponding laboratory examination
conducted thereon by the PNP Crime Laboratory both gave positive results
to the test for Methylamphetamine Hydrochloride, also known as "shabu,"
a dangerous drug, in violation of the above-cited law.

CONTRARY TO LAW.3

In Criminal Case No. 03-25727, accused-appellant was charged with

violation of Section 5, Article II of R.A. No. 9165 for the sale of shabu. The
Information states:

That on or about the 25th day of May 2003, in the City of Anti polo,
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-
named accused, not having been authorized by law to sell or otherwise
dispose of any dangerous drug, did, then and there wilfully, unlawfully and
feloniously sell, deliver and give away to P02 Rache E. Palconit, who acted
as a poseur-buyer, one (1) heat sealed transparent plastic sachet containing
0.05 gram of white crystalline substance, for and in consideration of the
sum of P200.oo, which after the corresponding laboratory examination
conducted by the PNP Crime Laboratory gave a positive result to the test
for Methylamphetamine Hydrochloride, also known as "shabu," a
dangerous drug, in violation of the above-cited law.

CONTRARY TO LAW.4

On July 22, 2003, accused-appellant was arraigned and he pleaded not

guilty. Thereafter, trial ensued with the prosecution presenting Forensic
Chemist P/Insp. Sharon Lontoc Fabros (Fabros), P02 Rache E.
Palconit (Palconit) and Barangay Captain, Dr. Rina Gabuna Junia (Dr.
Junio),as its witnesses.

Version of the Prosecution

On May 25, 2003, at around 1:15 o'clock in the morning, Palconit, SP02
Gerry Abalos (Abalos), P02 Manuel Bayeng (Bayeng), and P03 Russel
Medina (Medina), conducted a buy-bust operation at Sitio Lower Sto. Nifio,
Barangay Sta. Cruz, Antipolo City. A confidential informant (CI) told them
that a certain Anastacio was peddling drugs in the area. A buy-bust team
was formed with Abalos as the team leader and Palconit as the poseur-
buyer. Abalos marked two (2) 100.00 bills for the operation. After briefing
and coordination with the local police, the team was dispatched to
Barangay Sta. Cruz. Upon arrival, the CI pointed to their target person.
Palconit approached accused-appellant and asked if he could buy shabu.
After receiving the marked money, accused-appellant handed to Palconit
one (1) small heat-sealed plastic sachet containing shabu. At that point,
Palconit scratched his head to signal that the sale was consummated, and
the rest of the team rushed to the scene. Abalos introduced themselves as
police officers and immediately frisked accused-appellant. Abalos recovered
the marked money and two (2) other plastic sachets containing shabu from
the left pocket of accused-appellant's pants. Thereafter, accused-appellant
and the seized items were brought to the Philippine Drug Enforcement
Agency (PDEA) Office in Barangay San Roque, Antipolo City. The seized
items were turned over to the case investigator who prepared the
corresponding request for laboratory examination. Thereafter, Palconit
brought the seized items to the crime laboratory. After examination, Fabros
issued a report confirming that the crystalline substance in the sachets were
positive for methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu.

Version of the Defense

In his defense, accused-appellant alleged that on May 25, 2003 at around

1:15 o'clock in the morning, he was playing billiards at Sitio Lower Sto. Nio
when three (3) armed men suddenly arrived and pointed a gun at him.
Without saying anything, the men frisked and handcuffed him but found
nothing illegal on him. He was arrested and brought to an office in Lores
where he was detained, interrogated, and forced to admit a wrongdoing. He
was also asked to point to other persons so that he could be released.

The RTC Ruling

In its January 29, 2014 decision, the RTC found accused-appellant guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crimes of violation of Sections 5 and 11,
Article II of R.A. No. 9165. Accordingly, the trial court sentenced him to
suffer the penalty of life imprisonment and to pay a fine of 500,000.00 for
violation of Section 5 of R.A. No. 9165. It also sentenced him to suffer the
penalty of imprisonment for a period of twelve (12) years and one (1) day to
twenty (20) years and to pay a fine of 300,000.00 for violation of Section
11 of R.A. No. 9165.

The R TC held that the failure of the prosecution to show that the police
officers conducted the required physical inventory and photograph of the
evidence confiscated did not automatically render accused-appellant's
arrest illegal or the items seized from him as inadmissible for it was shown
that the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items were preserved
by the apprehending officers. It opined that the witnesses presented by the
prosecution successfully established the chain of custody of the seized
illegal drugs. The fallo reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, accused Anastacio Hementiza y Dela

Cruz is hereby found guilty beyond any shadow of a doubt of the offense
charged in the Informations and is sentenced to the penalty of Life
Imprisonment in Criminal Case No. 03-25727 with a fine of Php
500,000.00 and in Criminal Case No. 03-25726, the same accused is
hereby sentenced to suffer an Imprisonment of Twelve (12) years and one
(1) day to twenty (20) years with a fine of Php300,000.00 as provided for
under Sec. 11 Par. (3) of RA 9165, as amended.

Anastacio Hementiza y Dela Cruz is to be promptly committed to the

National Bilibid Prisons for immediate service of his sentence.

The seized specimens subject of the instant cases are ordered destroyed in
the manner provided by law.

SO ORDERED.5

Aggrieved, accused-appellant appealed before the CA.

The CA Ruling

In its October 16, 2015 decision, the CA affirmed the conviction of accused-
appellant. It explained that the police witnesses had adequately established
the conduct of the buy-bust operation which resulted in the consummated
sale of the illegal drugs and the recovery of two (2) sachets and the marked
money in his possession. The CA added that prior surveillance of the
suspected offender was not a prerequisite for the validity of a buy-bust
operation and that failure to strictly comply with the provisions of Section
21 (1), Article II of R.A. No. 9165, on the handling of confiscated illegal
drugs, as well as its IRR, was not fatal and would not render accused-
appellant' s arrest illegal or the items seized from him inadmissible. The CA
disposed the appeal in this wise:
WHEREFORE, finding no reversible error, the appeal is DENIED. The
Decision dated 29 January 2014 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 73,
Antipolo City is AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.6

Hence, this appeal.

ISSUE

WHETHER THE GUILT OF THE ACCUSED FOR THE CRIMES

CHARGED HAS BEEN PROVEN BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.

In a Resolution,7 dated December 7, 2016, the Court required the parties to

submit their respective supplemental briefs, if they so desired. In his
Manifestation in lieu of Supplemental Brief,8 dated February 28, 2017,
accused-appellant manifested that he was adopting his Appellant's Brief
filed before the CA as his supplemental brief for the same had adequately
discussed all the matters pertinent to his defense. In its
Manifestation,9 dated February 6, 2017, the Office of the Solicitor
General (OSG) stated that all matters and issues raised by accused-
appellant had already been discussed in its Brief before the CA and asked
that it be excused from filing its supplemental brief.

The Court's Ruling

The Court grants the appeal.

The elements necessary in every prosecution for the illegal sale of

dangerous drugs are: (1) the identity of the buyer and the seller, the object
and the consideration; and (2) the delivery of the thing sold and the
payment. Similarly, it is essential that the transaction or sale be proved to
have actually taken place coupled with the presentation in court of evidence
of corpus delicti which means the actual commission by someone of the
particular crime charged.10

On the other hand, to successfully prosecute a case of illegal possession of

dangerous drugs, the following elements must be established: (1) the
accused is in possession of an item or object which is identified to be a
prohibited drug; (2) such possession is not authorized by law; and (3) the
accused freely and consciously possessed the drug. 11
The corpus delicti in cases involving dangerous drugs is the presentation of
the dangerous drug itself. In People v. Alcuizar,12 the Court held:

The dangerous drug itself, the shabu in this case, constitutes the
very corpus delicti of the offense and in sustaining a conviction under
Republic Act No. 9165, the identity and integrity of the corpus delicti must
definitely be shown to have been preserved. This requirement necessarily
arises from the illegal drugs unique characteristic that renders it indistinct,
not readily identifiable, and easily open to tampering, alteration or
substitution either by accident or otherwise. Thus, to remove any doubt or
uncertainty on the identity and integrity of the seized drug, evidence must
definitely show that the illegal drug presented in court is the same illegal
drug actually recovered from the accused-appellant; otherwise, the
prosecution for possession under Republic Act No. 9165 fails.13

Thus, the chain of custody over the dangerous drug must be shown to
establish the corpus delicti.

Section 1 (b) of Dangerous Drugs Board Regulation No. 1, Series of

2002,14 which implements R.A. No. 9165, defines chain of custody as
follows:

Chain of Custody means the duly recorded authorized movements and

custody of seized drugs or controlled chemicals or plant sources of
dangerous drugs or laboratory equipment of each stage, from the time of
seizure/ confiscation to receipt in the forensic laboratory to safekeeping to
presentation in court for destruction. Such record of movements and
custody of seized item shall include the identity and signature of the person
who held temporary custody of the seized item, the date and time when
such transfer of custody were made in the course of safekeeping and use in
court as evidence, and the final disposition.

In Mallillin v. People,15 the Court explained the importance of the chain of

custody:

As a method of authenticating evidence, the chain of custody rule requires

that the admission of an exhibit be preceded by evidence sufficient to
support a finding that the matter in question is what the proponent claims
it to be. It would include testimony about every link in the chain, from the
moment the item was picked up to the time it is offered in evidence, in such
a way that every person who touched the exhibit would describe how and
from whom it was, received, where it was and what happened to it while in
the witness possession, the condition in which it was received and the
condition in which it was delivered to the next link in the chain. These
witnesses would then describe the precautions taken to ensure that there
had been no change in the condition of the item and no opportunity for
someone not in the chain to have possession of the same.

While testimony about a perfect chain is not always the standard because it
is almost always impossible to obtain, an unbroken chain of custody
becomes indispensable and essential when the item of real evidence is not
distinctive and is not readily identifiable, or when its condition at the time
of testing or trial is critical, or when a witness has failed to observe its
uniqueness. The same standard likewise obtains in case the evidence is
susceptible to alteration, tampering, contamination, and even substitution
and exchange. In other words, the exhibits level of susceptibility to
fungibility, alteration or tampering without regard to whether the same is
advertent or otherwise not dictates the level of strictness in the application
of the chain of custody rule.

Indeed, the likelihood of tampering, loss or mistake with respect to an

exhibit is greatest when the exhibit is small and is one that has physical
characteristics fungible in nature and similar in form to substances familiar
to people in their daily lives. Graham v. State positively acknowledged this
danger. In that case where a substance was later analyzed as heroin was
handled by two police officers prior to examination who however did not
testify in court on the condition and whereabouts of the exhibit at the time
it was in their possession was excluded from the prosecution evidence, the
court pointing out that the white powder seized could have been indeed
heroin or it could have been sugar or baking powder. It ruled that unless
the state can show by records or testimony, the continuous whereabouts of
the exhibit at least between the time it came into the posession of the police
officers until it was tested in the laboratory to determine its composition,
testimony of the state as to the laboratory's findings is inadmissible.

A unique characteristic of narcotic substances is that they are not readily

identifiable as in fact they are subject to scientific analysis to determine
their composition and nature. The Court cannot reluctantly close its eyes to
the likelihood or at least the possibility, that at any of the links in the chain
of custody over the same there could have been tampering, alteration or
substitution of substances from other cases by accident or otherwise in
which similar evidence was seized or in which similar evidence was
submitted for laboratory testing. Hence, in authenticating the same, a
standard more stringent than that applied to cases involving objects which
are readily identifiable must be applied, a more exacting standard that
entails a chain of custody of the item with sufficient completeness if only to
render it improbable that the original item has either been exchanged with
another or been contaminated or tampered with.16

In connection thereto, Section 21 of R.A. No. 9165 provides for the manner
by which law enforcement officers should handle seized items in dangerous
drugs cases:

SEC. 21. Custody and Disposition of Confiscated, Seized, and/or

Surrendered Dangerous Drugs, Plant Sources of Dangerous Drugs,
Controlled Precursors and Essential Chemicals,
Instruments/Paraphernalia and/or Laboratory Equipment. -The PDEA
shall take charge and have custody of all dangerous drugs, plant sources of
dangerous drugs, controlled precursors and essential chemicals, as well as
instruments/paraphernalia and/ or laboratory equipment so confiscated,
seized and/ or surrendered, for proper disposition in the following manner:

1. The apprehending team having initial custody and control of the drugs
shall, immediately after seizure and confiscation, physically inventory and
photograph the same in the presence of the accused or the person/ s from
whom such items were confiscated and/ or seized, or his/her representative
or counsel, a representative from the media and the Department of Justice
(DOJ), and any elected public official who shall be required to sign the
copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof;

2. Within twenty-four (24) hours upon confiscation/seizure of dangerous

drugs, plant sources of dangerous drugs, controlled precursors and
essential chemicals, as well as instruments/paraphernalia and/ or
laboratory equipment, the same shall be submitted to the PDEA Forensic
Laboratory for a qualitative and quantitative examination;

3. A certification of the forensic laboratory examination results, which shall

be done under oath by the forensic laboratory examiner, shall be issued
within twenty-four (24) hours after the receipt of the subject
item/s: Provided, That when the volume of the dangerous drugs, plant
sources of dangerous drugs, and controlled precursors and essential
chemicals does not allow the completion of testing within the time frame, a
partial laboratory examination report shall be provisionally issued stating
therein the quantities of dangerous drugs still to be examined by the
forensic laboratory: Provided, however, That a final certification shall be
issued on the completed forensic laboratory examination on the same
within the next twenty-four (24) hours[.]

Strict compliance with the chain of custody requirement, however, is not

always the case. Hence, the IRR of R.A. No. 9165 provides:

SECTION 21.(a) The apprehending officer/team having initial custody and

control of the drugs shall, immediately after seizure and confiscation,
physically inventory and photograph the same in the presence of the
accused or the person/ s from whom such items were confiscated and/ or
seized, or his/her representative or counsel, a representative from the
media and the Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected public official
who shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a
copy thereof: Provided, that the physical inventory and photograph shall be
conducted at the place where the search warrant is served; or at the nearest
police station or at the nearest office of the apprehending officer /team,
whichever is practicable, in case of warrantless seizures; Provided, further,
that non-compliance with these requirements under justifiable grounds, as
long as the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items are
properly preserved by the apprehending officer/team, shall not render void
and invalid such seizures of and custody over said items. [Emphasis
supplied]

In the case at bench, the prosecution failed to demonstrate substantial

compliance by the apprehending officers with the safeguards provided by
R.A. No. 9165 as regards the rule on chain of custody. To begin with, the
records are bereft of any showing that an inventory of the seized items was
made. Neither does it appear on record that the apprehending team
photographed the contraband in accordance with law.

Further, People v. Dahil17 restated the links that the prosecution must
establish in the chain of custody in a buy-bust situation to be as
follows: first, the seizure and marking, if practicable, of the illegal drug
recovered from the accused by the apprehending officer; second, the
turnover of the illegal drug seized by the apprehending officer to the
investigating officer; third, the turnover by the investigating officer of the
illegal drug to the forensic chemist for laboratory examination;
and fourth, the turnover and submission of the marked illegal drug seized
by the forensic chemist to the court.
First Link: Marking of the Drugs
Recovered from the Accused by the
Apprehending Officer

Crucial in proving the chain of custody is the marking of the seized drugs or
other related items immediately after they have been seized from the
accused. "Marking" means the placing by the apprehending officer or the
poseur-buyer of his/her initials and signature on the items seized. Marking
after seizure is the starting point in the custodial link; hence, it is vital that
the seized contraband be immediately marked because the succeeding
handlers of the specimens will use the markings as reference. The marking
of the evidence serves to separate the marked evidence from the corpus of
all other similar or related evidence from the time they are seized from the
accused until they are disposed of at the end of the criminal proceedings,
thus, preventing switching, planting or contamination of evidence.18

Still, there are cases when the chain of custody rule is relaxed such as when
the marking of the seized items is allowed to be undertaken at the police
station rather than at the place of arrest for as long as it is done in the
presence of the accused in illegal drugs cases.19

In this case, Palconit claimed that he had placed his initials on the seized
items. Based on his testimony, it is clear that the marking was not
immediately done at the place of seizure; instead, the markings were only
placed at the PDEA office, for which the prosecution did not offer any
justifiable reason. Even if the Court glosses over this lapse, still, it could not
be said that the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items were
preserved. For one, neither in the direct examination nor in the cross-
examination of Palconit was it mentioned that the markings were made in
the presence of accused-appellant or his representatives. He merely
testified that he placed the markings at the PDEA office, without any
allusion to the identities of the persons who were present when he did the
markings.

Moreover, in the Incident Report20 as well as in the Affidavit of Arrest,21 the

specific markings made on the seized items were not mentioned. The same
documents merely specified that three (3) small heatsealed transparent
plastic bags containing suspected methamphetamine hydrochloride of
undetermined quantity were found in accused-appellant's possession.
Considering that the apprehending officers did not mark the sachets of
illegal drugs at the place of seizure, then, it logically follows that the
marking should have been their foremost priority and should have been
made prior to writing the incident report and executing the affidavit of
arrest. It, therefore, behooves the Court how Palconit could have said that
he placed the markings at the PDEA office, but no mention of the same
whatsoever was made in both the incident report and in the affidavit of
arrest. If the sachets of illegal drugs were already marked, then there would
have been no reason for its non-inclusion in the aforecited documents.
Thus, the Court can only guess the time when the markings were made and
whether they were placed before the preparation of the incident report and
the affidavit of arrest.

To make matters worse, from the place of seizure to the PDEA office, the
seized items were not marked. It could not, therefore, be determined how
the unmarked drugs were transported and who took custody of them while
in transit.

Unfortunately, the direct examination of Palconit left much to be desired

for it offered no explanation and justification for these lapses. At most,
what can be gleaned is the prosecution's lack of zealousness and interest in
ensuring the conviction of accused-appellant despite the time and resources
at its disposal, viz:

Prosecutor Sampayo: When the marked money was recovered and two
other sachets were recovered, what did you do?

Palconit: The suspect was brought to the PDEA office.

Prosecutor Sampayo: What did you do at the PDEA office?

Palconit: We turned over the confiscated evidence to the investigator and

we informed our CO that the operation was positive.

Prosecutor Sampayo: What were the confiscated items which were turned
over?

Palconit: Buy bust money, one sachet which I bought and two other sachets
which were recovered from the suspect.

Prosecutor Sampayo: What was done with the confiscated sachets, the one
that was bought and the two others which were recovered from the target
person?
Palconit: When we arrived at the office, we made a request for laboratory
examination.

Prosecutor Sampayo: What did you do with the items?

Palconit: We placed markings on the confiscated items.

Prosecutor Sampayo: Do you remember what marking was placed?

Palconit: Yes, ma'm, REP-1, REP-2, REP-3.

Prosecutor Sampayo: What are these markings about?

Palconit: Those are my initials, Rache E. Palconit.

Prosecutor Sampayo: Where did you put the markings?

Palconit: At the sachets.

Prosecutor Sampayo: What sachets are you talking about?

Palconit: The sachet that I bought and the sachets that were recovered.

Prosecutor Sampayo: What marking was placed on the specimen found on

his possession?

Palconit: REP-2 and REP-3.

Prosecutor Sampayo: After putting the markings, what did you do?

Palconit: We brought it to the crime laboratory.

Prosecutor Sampayo: Who personally brought it?

Palconit: Me.22

In People v. De La Cruz,23 where the marking of the seized items was made
at the police station, and without any showing that the same had been done
in the presence of the accused or his representatives, the Court concluded
that the apprehending team's omission to observe the procedure outlined
by R.A. No. 9165 in the custody and disposition of the seized drugs
significantly impaired the prosecution's case.
The prosecution's sweeping guarantees as to the identity and integrity of
seized drugs and drug paraphernalia will not secure a conviction.24 While
law enforcers enjoy the presumption of regularity in the performance of
their duties, this presumption cannot prevail over the constitutional right of
the accused to be presumed innocent and it cannot by itself constitute proof
of guilt beyond reasonable doubt. The presumption of regularity is merely
just that - a mere presumption disputable by contrary proof and which
when challenged by evidence cannot be regarded as binding truth.25

Second Link: Turnover of

the Seized Drugs by the
Apprehending Officer to
the Investigating Officer

The second link in the chain of custody is the transfer of the seized drugs by
the apprehending officer to the investigating officer. Usually, the police
officer who seizes the suspected substance turns it over to a supervising
officer, who will then send it by courier to the police crime laboratory for
testing. This is a necessary step in the chain of custody because it will be the
investigating officer who shall conduct the proper investigation and prepare
the necessary documents for the developing criminal case. Certainly, the
investigating officer must have possession of the illegal drugs to properly
prepare the required documents.26

Here, the identity of the investigating officer was unknown.

Prosecutor Sampayo: What did you do at the PDEA office?

Palconit: We turned over the confiscated evidence to the investigator and

we informed our CO that the operation was positive.

Prosecutor Sampayo: What were the confiscated items which were turned
over?

Palconit: Buy bust money, one sachet which I bought and two other sachets
which were recovered from the suspect.27

It is unlikely that Palconit did not know the officer to whom he supposedly
turned over the seized drugs. Surely, this investigating officer worked with
him in the same office. Indeed, the apprehending officer and investigating
officer might be one and the same person. If that was the case, however,
then there would have been no need to say that Palconit turned over the
seized items to the investigator. He could have simply said that he was the
one who conducted the investigation and prepared the necessary
documents for the filing of a criminal case against accused-appellant.

Similarly, in People v. Nandi,28 where the apprehending officer was unable

to identify the investigating officer to whom he turned over the seized
items, the Court held that such circumstance, when taken in light of the
several other lapses in the chain of custody that attend the case, raises
doubts as to whether the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized illegal
drugs had been preserved.

Third Link: Turnover by the

Investigating Officer of the Illegal
Drugs to the Forensic Chemist

From the investigating officer, the illegal drug is delivered to the forensic
chemist. Once the seized drugs arrive at the forensic laboratory, it will be
the laboratory technician who will test and verify the nature of the
substance.29 In this case, it was uncertain who received the seized items
when it was brought to the forensic laboratory, to wit:

Prosecutor Sampayo: When the marked money was recovered and two
other sachets were recovered, what did you do?

Palconit: The suspect was brought to the PDEA office.

Prosecutor Sampayo: What did you do at the PDEA office?

Palconit: We turned over the confiscated evidence to the investigator and

we informed our CO that the operation was positive.

Prosecutor Sampayo: What were the confiscated items which were turned
over?

Palconit: Buy bust money, one sachet which I bought and two other sachets
which were recovered from the suspect.

Prosecutor Sampayo: What was done with the confiscated sachets, the one
that was bought and the two others which were recovered from the target
person?
Palconit: When we arrived at the office, we made a request for laboratory
examination.

Prosecutor Sampayo: What did you do with the items?

Palconit: We placed markings on the confiscated items.30

xxx

Prosecutor Sampayo: After putting the markings, what did you do?

Palconit: We brought it to the crime laboratory.

Prosecutor Sampayo: Who personally brought it?

Palconit: Me.

Prosecutor Sampayo: Why did you bring it to the crime laboratory.

Palconit: or a oratory exammation.31

There are several unexplained and doubtful points in this step.

First, Palconit testified that he placed the markings on the sachets upon
arrival at the office. Then, he turned over the seized items to the
investigator. In the latter part of his testimony, however, he said that after
placing the markings, he brought the illegal drugs to the crime laboratory.
The circumstances surrounding the custody of the illegal drugs, from the
time they were brought to the PDEA office up to their turnover to the
forensic laboratory, are all muddled. Moreover, it is unclear whether
another officer intervened in the handling of the illegal drugs or it was only
Palconit himself who placed the markings and delivered the illegal drugs to
the forensic chemist.

Further, a perusal of the records shows that the request for laboratory
examination32 was prepared and signed by a certain Police Chief Inspector
Raul Loy Bargamento (Bargamento), who had necessarily taken custody of
the seized items at some point in order to execute the request for laboratory
examination. Yet, Palconit did not even bother to mention Bargamento in
his testimony. The prosecution would have the Court guess (1) whether
Bargamento was the same person to whom Palconit turned over the seized
items and (2) whether Bargamento was the one who handed Palconit the
seized items for delivery to the forensic laboratory. Hence, the identities of
the officers who had custody of the illegal drugs, even for momentary
periods, are open to question.

Finally, Fabros testified that their office received the request for laboratory
examination on May 25, 2003 at three (3) o'clock in the afternoon. The
request for laboratory examination33 indicated that the same was received
by Fabros. It is worthy to note, however, that she did not affix her signature
thereon. Moreover, in their testimonies, neither Palconit nor Fabros
identified each other as the person who delivered and received the seized
drugs respectively. Hence, for failure of Fabros to mention before the court
that she indeed received the seized drugs from Palconit, her name,
appearing on the request for laboratory examination, remained to be
hearsay.

In People v. Beran,34 the investigator of the case claimed that he personally

took the drug to the laboratory for testing, but there was no showing who
was the laboratory technician who received the drug from him. The Court
noted that there was serious doubt that the integrity and evidentiary value
of the seized item had not been fatally compromised.

Fourth Link: Turnover of the Marked

Illegal Drug Seized by the Forensic
Chemist to the Court

The last link involves the submission of the seized drugs by the forensic
chemist to the court when presented as evidence in the criminal case.35

In this case, the records are bereft of any evidence as to how the illegal
drugs were brought to court. Fabros merely testified that she made a report
confirming that the substance contained in the sachets brought to her was
positive for shabu.

The saving clause in Section 21, IRR of R.A. No. 9165 fails to remedy the
lapses and save the prosecution's case. In People v. Garcia,36 the Court
stated that "the saving clause applies only where the prosecution recognized
the procedural lapses, and thereafter cited justifiable grounds." Failure to
follow the procedure mandated under R.A. No. 9165 and its IRR must be
adequately explained.37
In both illegal sale and illegal possession of prohibited drugs, conviction
cannot be sustained if there is a persistent doubt on the identity of the
drug.1wphi1 The identity of the prohibited drug must be established with
moral certainty. Apart from showing that the elements of possession or sale
are present, the fact that the substance illegally possessed and sold in the
first place is the same substance offered in court as exhibit must likewise be
established with the same degree of certitude as that needed to sustain a
guilty verdict.38

In fine, the Court holds that the totality of the evidence presented does not
support a finding of guilt with the certainty that criminal cases require. The
procedural lapses committed by the apprehending team show glaring gaps
in the chain of custody, creating a reasonable doubt on whether
the shabu seized from accused-appellant was the same shabu that were
brought to the crime laboratory for chemical analysis, and eventually
offered in court as evidence. Hence, the corpus delicti has not been
adequately proven.

It could be that the accused was really involved in the sale of shabu, but
considering the doubts engendered by the paucity of the prosecution's
evidence, the Court has no recourse but to give him the benefit thereof. Law
enforcers should not only be mindful of the procedures required in the
seizure, handling and safekeeping of confiscated drugs, but the prosecution
should also prove every material detail in court. Observance of these is
necessary to avoid wasting the efforts and the resources in the
apprehension and prosecution of violators of our drug laws.39

WHEREFORE, the appeal is GRANTED. The October 16, 2015 Decision

of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR. H.C. No. 0684 7
is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Accused-appellant Anastacio
Hementiza y Dela Cruz is hereby ACQUITTED of the crimes charged
against him and ordered immediately RELEASED from custody, unless he
is confined for some other lawful cause.

The Director of the Bureau of Corrections is ORDERED to immediately

implement this decision and to inform this Court of the date of the actual
release from confinement of the accused within five (5) days from receipt of
a copy of this decision.

SO ORDERED.
 THIRD DIVISION

June 7, 2017

G.R. No. 225743

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee

vs.
SANDY DOMINGO y LABIS, Accused-Appellant

DECISION

BERSAMIN, J.:

There is no complex crime of forcible abduction with rape if the primary

objective of the accused is to commit rape.

The Case

The accused appeals the affirmance by the Court of Appeals (CA) of his
conviction for forcible abduction with rape under the decision promulgated
on September 24, 2015,1 viz.:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Appeal is DENIED.

Accordingly, the Decision dated 6 September 2013 of the Regional Trial
Court, Fourth Judicial Region, Branch 17, Cavite City in Criminal Case No.
39-04 is hereby AFFIRMED. Appellant is hereby ordered to pay the private
offended party interest on all damages awarded at the legal rate of 6% per
annum from the date of finality of this judgment until fully paid. SO
ORDERED. 2
 Antecedents

The factual and procedural antecedents as summarized by the CA follow:

On 26 January 2004, an Information was filed charging appellant with the

crime of Forcible Abduction with Rape in this wise: That on or about the
period between January 24 and 25, 2004, in the Municipality of Rosario,
Province of Cavite, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, motivated by lust and with
lewd designs, and by means of force, violence and intimidation, did then
and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, abduct and take away one
AAA, against her will and consent, and thereafter, by means of force,
violence and intimidation, with the use of [a] bladed weapon and actuated
by lust and lewd designs, have carnal knowledge of said victim, against her
will and consent, to the damage and prejudice of said AAA.

CONTRARY TO LAW.

Upon arraignment on 2 March 2004, appellant, assisted by counsel entered

a plea of NOT GUILTY.

Thereafter, trial ensued. The Prosecution presented AAA, SP03 Felipe

Gomez, Jr., and Elmer Marquez. The defense on the other hand presented
Sandy Domingo and Jocelyn Mariano as witnesses.

xxxx

People's Version

AAA is a saleslady in a public market in Rosario, Cavite. On 24 January

2004, at around 8:00 in the evening, private complainant was waiting for
her cousin to fetch her, when appellant, who worked in a fish stall in the
market, approached her. Appellant asked if he could accompany private
complainant to her aunt's home, where she resided. Since AAA's cousin was
not around to fetch her, she agreed for appellant to accompany her home.

The two boarded a tricycle. As they were about to leave, appellant brought
out a bladed weapon and poked the same on AAA's right waist. Struck with
fear, AAA was unable to ask for help. Along the way, AAA realized that they
were no longer proceeding to her aunt's house because the tricycle made a
different turn. They stopped at a place that was not familiar to her.
Thereafter, the two of them alighted after appellant paid the tricycle driver.
The entire time, however, appellant was holding the knife and poking it
against AAA's side.

With appellant still holding the knife and poking it against AAA's waist, the
two walked toward a house, appellant knocked on the door, and a man
came out. Appellant and AAA were allowed entry inside the house. The man
did not say anything and immediately went inside a room.

Appellant ordered AAA to enter another room. Once inside, appellant who
was still holding the knife, undressed himself. Appellant ordered AAA to
undress next, but AAA did not obey. Appellant, still holding the knife,
forcibly undressed AAA until the latter was completely naked.

Appellant ordered AAA to lie down on the wooden bed. While still holding
the knife, appellant inserted his penis into private complainant's vagina.
AAA felt pain in her private part. Appellant also kissed AAA's neck and lips.
Appellant made a pumping motion while his penis was inserted in AAA's
vagina. Afterwards, appellant pulled out his penis, kissed AAA, and played
with the knife on the latter's face. They did not sleep. After a while,
appellant again inserted his penis inside her vagina and kissed her. After
removing his penis, he inserted it again for the fourth time. Thereafter,
appellant dressed up and ordered her to put on her clothes. While he was
helping her put on her clothes, she told him that she wants to go home. He
answered that he will let her go home if she will not tell anybody what
happened. At around 3:00 in the morning, they went out of the house and
headed towards the tricycle terminal. She went home and told her Aunt
what happened. Thereafter, they went to the police station to report the
incident.

Defense's Version:

AAA was appellant's girlfriend. On 24 January 2004 at around 10:00

o'clock in the evening, he and AAA eloped and went to the house of his
brother-in-law in Sapa II, Cavite. They spent the night there and agreed
that they will go to her Aunt's house and get her things and will proceed to
Bicol. When they reached her aunt's house, AAA went inside while he
waited. After a few minutes, a man came out and chased him with a bolo
which prompted him to run. At around 7:00 o'clock in the morning, he was
at his sister's house when the policemen arrived and informed him that
there was a complaint filed against him. He went with them to the police
station. 3

On September 6, 2013, the RTC rendered judgment finding the accused-

appellant guilty as charged, decreeing thusly:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered finding

accused Sandy Domingo y Labis @ Bitoy GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt
of the crime of forcible abduction with rape, defined and penalized under
Article 342, in relation to Article 266-A (as amended by R.A. 8353) and
Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code, and hereby sentences him to suffer
the penalty of reclusion perpetua. Further, accused Sandy Domingo is
hereby ordered to pay AAA: (1) the amount of 50,000.00, as civil
indemnity ex delicto, and (2) the amount of 50,000.00, as moral damages;
and to pay the costs.

SO ORDERED.4

Judgment of the CA

On September 24, 2015, the CA affirmed the RTC, holding that AAA's
testimony categorically describing how the appellant had abducted and
ravaged her was credible; that her failure to shout for help or to offer
tenacious resistance did not make her submission to him voluntary; that his
use of the knife was sufficient to compel her to submit to his demands; that
the presentation of the examining physician as a witness was not
indispensible in proving the rape; that his "sweetheart theory" could not be
given weight as a defense because he did not thereby establish that such
relationship had really existed.1wphi1

Issue

In his appeal, the appellant submits that:

THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THE ACCUSED-

APPELLANT GUILTY OF THE CRIME CHARGED DESPITE THE
PROSECUTION'S FAILURE TO PROVE HIS GUILT BEYOND
REASONABLE DOUBT5

The appellant contends that AAA's testimony was incomplete and

incredible, and as such did not substantiate the charges against him; that
she had not thereby elaborated how she was forced, coerced or intimidated
into submitting to him; that she had voluntarily gone with him, and had
consented to the sexual congress;6 that her conduct before, during and
immediately following the crime belied her allegations against him; that her
testimony was uncorroborated because the Prosecution did not present the
examining physician; and that on the other hand his own witness, Jocelyn
Mariano, corroborated his having a romantic relationship with AAA. 7

In other words, the appellant submits that the CA committed serious

reversible errors in finding him guilty of forcible abduction with rape
despite (a) the incredible testimony of AAA; (b) the failure of the
Prosecution to present the examining physician to explain the findings; and
(c) the "sweetheart theory" advanced by him.

Ruling of the Court

We affirm the CA's decision with modification of the characterization of the

crime committed.

We note at the outset that the RTC and the CA both found AAA's testimony
to be credible. Consequently, it became incumbent upon the appellant to
present clear and persuasive reasons to persuade the Court to reverse their
unanimous determination of her credibility as a witness in order to resolve
the appeal his way. Alas, he did not discharge his burden, and,
consequently, we declare that the CA aptly held that:

Our review of the records reveals that AAA's testimony was candid and
straightforward. During cross-examination, she remained steadfast,
consistent and unwavering in her testimony. She categorically described
how appellant took advantage of her. She narrated that appellant offered to
accompany her home. However, when they boarded the tricycle, appellant
poked a bladed weapon on her right waist. Paralyzed with fear, she was
unable to shout or ask for help. x x x x [W]hile it appears that AAA initially
agreed for appellant to accompany her home, her willingness ceased when
appellant pointed a bladed weapon at her right waist. Overcome by fear, she
was not able to react when the tricycle proceeded to an unfamiliar place.
Considering the foregoing circumstances, AAA's failure to shout for help
does not give less credit to her testimony. Time and again, it has been held
that physical resistance is not an element in the crime of rape and need not
be established when intimidation is exercised upon the victim. The victim's
failure to shout or offer tenacious resistance did not make voluntary her
submission to the criminal acts of her aggressor. Appellant's use of a knife
was enough for AAA to submit to his demands. Not every victim can be
expected to act with reason or in conformity with the usual expectations of
everyone. The workings of a human mind placed under emotional stress are
unpredictable; people react differently.8

We remind the appellant that the trial court's evaluation and conclusion on
the credibility of witnesses in rape cases are generally accorded great
weight and respect, and at times even finality, especially after the CA as the
intermediate reviewing tribunals has affirmed the findings, unless there is a
clear showing that the findings were reached arbitrarily, or that certain
facts or circumstances of weight, substance or value were overlooked,
misapprehended or misappreciated that, if properly considered, would alter
the result of the case. In this case, the appellant has not made such
showing. Indeed, we have no reason to reverse the well-considered findings
and observations of the lower courts.

We do not find the non-presentation of the physician who had examined

AAA to affect in any significant manner the credibility of the victim's
testimony. After all, the medical findings have never been considered
indispensable in supporting convictions for rape. In contrast, we reiterate
that the rape victim's testimony, standing alone, can be made the basis of
the successful prosecution of the culprit provided such testimony meets the
test of credibility.9

Anent the sweetheart defense of the appellant, the CA and the trial court
justly rejected it. Such defense, being uncorroborated and self-serving,
deserved scant consideration. Nonetheless, that the appellant and the
victim had been sweethearts was no excuse in the eyes of the law for him to
employ force and intimidation in gratifying his carnal desires. 10

Was the complex crime of forcible abduction with rape committed?

Under Article 342 of the Revised Penal Code, the elements of forcible
abduction are: (1) the taking of a woman against her will; and (2) with lewd
designs. The crime of forcible abduction with rape is a complex crime that
occurs when the abductor has carnal knowledge of the abducted woman
under the following circumstances: (1) by using force or intimidation; (2)
when the woman is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious; and (3)
when the woman is under 12 years of age or is demented.
Although the elements of forcible abduction obtained, the appellant should
be convicted only of rape. His forcible abduction of AAA was absorbed by
the rape considering that his real objective in abducting her was to commit
the rape. Where the main objective of the culprit for the abduction of the
victim of rape was to have carnal knowledge of her, he could be convicted
only of rape. 11

The penalty of reclusion perpetua was properly imposed pursuant to

Article 266(B)12 of the Revised Penal Code. 13

To accord with jurisprudence, 14 the awards of damages are increased as

follows: (1) 75,000.00 as civil indemnity; (2) P75,000.00 as moral
damages; and (3) 75,000.00 as exemplary damages. Moreover, the CA
correctly imposed interest of 6% per annum on all such items of civil
liability reckoned from the finality of judgment until fully paid.15

WHEREFORE, we AFFIRM the decision promulgated on September

24, 2015, with the MODIFICATION that accused SANDY
DOMINGO y LABIS is: (a) DECLARED GUILTY BEYOND
REASONABLE DOUBT of SIMPLE RAPE as defined under Article
266- A of the Revised Penal Code and penalized with reclusion
perpetua; and (b) ORDERED TO PAY to AAA 75,000.00 as civil
indemnity, 75,000.00 as moral damages, and 75,000.00 as exemplary
damages, plus interest of 6o/o per annum on all the items of civil liability
reckoned from the finality of judgment until fully paid. The accused shall
pay the costs of suit.

SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 190632 February 26, 2014

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,

vs.
MANOLITO LUCENA y VELASQUEZ, alias "Machete," Accused-
Appellant.

DECISION

PEREZ, J.:

The subject of this appeal is the Decision1 dated 24 August 2009 of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 03371 affirming the
Decision2 dated 30 April 2008 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Paraaque City, Branch 260, in Criminal Cases Nos. 03-0763 to 03-0765,
finding herein appellant Manolito Lucena y Velasquez alias "Machete"
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of three counts of rape, thereby sentencing
him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua for each count and ordering
him to pay AAA3 the amount of 50,000.00 as moral damages and
50,000.00 as civil indemnity also for each count.

Three (3) similarly worded Informations,4 all dated 24 June 2003 allege:

That on or about the 28th day of April 2003, in the City of Paraaque,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-
named [appellant], a Barangay Tanod Volunteer, who took advantage of his
position to facilitate the commission of the crime, by means of force, threat
or intimidation and with the use of a gun did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge of the complainant AAA,
a minor, 17 years of age, against her will and consent. (Emphasis and italics
supplied).

The appellant, assisted by counsel de oficio, pleaded NOT GUILTY to all the
charges against him.5 Thereafter, the cases were jointly tried.

The prosecution presented AAA, the victim herself; and Dr. Merle Tan (Dr.
Tan) of the Child Protection Unit, University of the Philippines Philippine
General Hospital (UP-PGH), who examined the victim.

The testimonies of the above-named prosecution witnesses established that

on 28 April 2003, at around 11:30 p.m., while AAA, who was then 17 years
old, having been born on 10 July 1986, was walking and chatting with her
friends along one of the streets of San Dionisio, Paraaque City, two (2)
barangay tanods, one of whom is the appellant, approached and informed
them that they were being arrested for violating a city ordinance imposing
curfew against minors. AAAs companions, however, managed to escape,
thus, she alone was apprehended.6 AAA was then ordered by the barangay
tanods to board the tricycle. Afraid that she might spend the night in jail,
AAA pleaded with them and protested that she did not commit any offense
as she was just chatting with her friends. AAAs plea, however, remained
unheeded.7

AAA was then brought by the two (2) barangay tanods within the vicinity of
the San Dionisio Barangay Hall. Afterwards, one of them alighted from the
tricycle and went inside the barangay hall. The appellant, on the other
hand, stayed in the tricycle to guard AAA. After a while, the barangay
tanod, the one who went inside the barangay hall, returned. But, the
appellant told the former that he will just be the one to bring AAA back to
her house.8

But, instead of escorting AAA back to her house, the appellant brought her
to Kabuboy Bridge in San Dionisio, Paraaque City. While on their way, the
appellant threatened AAA that he would kill her once she resists or jumps
off the tricycle. Upon arrival, the appellant ordered AAA to alight from the
tricycle. AAA asked the appellant what he would do with her but the former
did not respond. The appellant then took out the backseat of the tricycle
and positioned it in a grassy area. He subsequently pointed a gun at AAA
and commanded her to lie down and to take off her clothes. The appellant
later put the gun down on the ground and inserted his penis into AAAs
vagina despite the latters plea not to rape her. Satisfied, the appellant
stopped. But, after a short while, or after about five (5) minutes, the
appellant, once again, inserted his penis into AAAs vagina. Thereafter, he
stopped. On the third time, the appellant inserted again his penis into
AAAs vagina. Fulfilling his bestial desire, the appellant stopped and finally
ordered AAA to dress up. The appellant even threatened AAA that he would
kill her should she tell anyone about what happened between them.9

The appellant, thereafter, directed AAA to board the tricycle. He then

brought AAA in front of a school in Paraaque City. But, before allowing
AAA to get off, the appellant repeated his threat to kill her should she tell
anyone about the incident.10

The following day, AAA took the courage to seek the assistance of their
barangay kagawad, who simply advised her to just proceed to the barangay
hall to lodge her complaint against the appellant. AAA and her mother
subsequently went to PGH, where she was subjected to physical
examination by Dr. Tan,11 which resulted in the following findings:

HYMEN Tanner Stage 3, healing laceration[s] 3 and 5 oclock area with

petechiae, fresh laceration at 9 oclock area with eccymosi at 8-10 oclock
area, Type of Hymen: Crescentic

xxxx

ANAL EXAMINATION Perianal Skin: fresh laceration[s] at 12 and 1 oclock

area. No evident injury at the time of examination.

xxxx

IMPRESSIONS
Disclosure of sexual abuse.

Genital findings show clear Evidence Of Blunt Force Or Penetrating

Trauma.12 (Emphasis supplied).

AAA also went to the Coastal Road Police Headquarters, where she
executed her sworn statement accusing the appellant of rape. AAA was able
to identify the appellant as her assailant because the former was wearing a
jacket emblazoned with "Barangay Police," as well as a Barangay
Identification Card, at the time of the incident.13

The appellant and Rodel Corpuz (Corpuz) took the witness stand for the
defense.

In the course of Corpuzs direct examination, however, the parties made the
following stipulations: (1) that the [herein appellant] was the assigned
barangay radio operator on that date, [28 April 2003], and he stayed at the
barangay hall from 12:00 midnight to 5:00 a.m.; (2) that the witness was
there up to 12:00 midnight, but at about past 12:00, he left and returned
after two (2) hours, at 2:00 oclock a.m.; and (3) that when he woke up at
5:00 oclock in the morning, the [appellant] was still there. With these
stipulations, Corpuzs testimony was dispensed with.14

The appellant, for his part, could only muster the defenses of denial and
alibi. He, thus, offered a different version of the story.
On 28 April 2003, the appellant claimed that he was on duty as a radio
operator at the barangay hall. His task as such was to receive complaints
from the residents of the barangay, as well as to receive calls from fellow
barangay officials who are in need of assistance. On the same day, he
received a call from his companion, who is also a barangay tanod. He
cannot, however, recall any unusual incident that transpired on that day.15

The appellant admitted that he knew AAA as the one who lodged a
complaint against him but he denied that he knew her personally. He also
vehemently denied the following: (1) that he raped AAA; (2) that he was one
of those barangay tanods who apprehended AAA for violating the curfew
ordinance of their barangay; and (3) that he was the one driving the tricycle
in going to the barangay hall. Instead, the appellant claimed that after
12:00 midnight of 28 April 2003, he went home already. In fact, he was
shocked when he was arrested on 25 September 2003 as he did not commit
any crime.16

In its Decision dated 30 April 2008, the trial court, giving credence to the
categorical, straightforward and positive testimony of AAA, coupled with
the medical findings of sexual abuse, convicted the appellant of three (3)
counts of rape as defined and penalized under paragraph 1(a) of Article
266-A, in relation to Article 266-B, of the Revised Penal Code of the
Philippines, as amended. The trial court, thus, decreed:

WHEREFORE, the Court finds the [herein appellant] MANOLITO

LUCENA y VELASQUEZ alias MACHETE, GUILTY beyond reasonable
doubt of three (3) counts of Rape (under Art. 266-a par. 1(a) in relation to
Art. 266-B of the RPC as amended by RA 8353) and is hereby sentenced to
suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua for each count of Rape. In addition,
the [appellant] is ordered to pay [AAA] the amount of 50,000.00 as moral
damages and 50,000.00 as civil indemnity for each count.17 (Emphasis
and italics theirs).

The appellant appealed18 the trial courts Decision to the Court of Appeals
with the following assignment of errors:

I.

THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING THE

[HEREIN APPELLANT] OF RAPE DESPITE THE PROSECUTIONS
 FAILURE TO PROVE THE ELEMENT OF FORCE AND
INTIMIDATION.

II.

GRANTING, ARGUENDO, THAT THE [APPELLANT] COMMITTED

THE CRIME CHARGED, THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN
CONVICTING HIM OF THREE (3) COUNTS OF RAPE.19

After a thorough study of the records, the Court of Appeals rendered its
now assailed Decision dated 24 August 2009 sustaining appellants
conviction for three (3) counts of rape, as well as the damages awarded to
AAA. In doing so, the Court of Appeals explained that the facts revealed
that the appellant succeeded thrice in inserting his penis into AAAs vagina.
The said three (3) penetrations happened one after another at an interval of
five (5) minutes, wherein the appellant would take a rest after satiating his
lust and after regaining his strength would again rape AAA. Undoubtedly,
the appellant decided to commit those separate and distinct acts of sexual
assault on AAA. Thus, his conviction for three (3) counts of rape is
irrefutable.20

Hence, this appeal.21

Both parties in their manifestations22 before this Court adopted their

respective appeal briefs23 filed with the Court of Appeals in lieu of
Supplemental Briefs.

In his Brief, the appellant contends that the prosecution failed to prove that
force or intimidation attended the commission of rape. Records revealed
that AAA did not even attempt to resist his alleged sexual advances over her
person. Instead, AAA opted to remain passive throughout her ordeal
despite the fact that during the three (3) episodes of their sexual
intercourse he was unarmed and she, thus, had all the opportunity to
escape, which she never did. These reactions of AAA were contrary to
human experience, thus, cast serious doubts on the veracity of her
testimony and on her credibility as a witness.

The appellant similarly argues that the result of AAAs medical examination
is quite disturbing as it appears that her anal orifice was also penetrated by
a hard object though nothing was said to this effect in her testimony.
The appellant likewise avers that he cannot be convicted of three counts of
rape. The intervening period of five (5) minutes between each penetration
does not necessarily prove that he decided to commit three separate acts of
rape. He maintains that what is of prime importance is that he was
motivated by a single criminal intent.

With the foregoing, the appellant believes that his guilt was not proven
beyond reasonable doubt; hence, his acquittal is inevitable.

This Court holds otherwise. The conviction of the appellant, thus, stands
but the damages awarded in favor AAA must be modified.

Primarily, in reviewing rape cases, this Court is guided with three settled
principles: (1) an accusation of rape can be made with facility and while the
accusation is difficult to prove, it is even more difficult for the person
accused, although innocent, to disprove; (2) considering the intrinsic
nature of the crime, only two persons being usually involved, the testimony
of the complainant should be scrutinized with great caution; and (3) the
evidence for the prosecution must stand or fall on its own merit, and cannot
be allowed to draw strength from the weakness of the evidence for the
defense.24

Rape is a serious transgression with grave consequences both for the

accused and the complainant. Following the above principles, this Court is
duty-bound to conduct a thorough and exhaustive evaluation of a judgment
of conviction for rape.25

After a careful scrutiny of the entire records, however, this Court finds no
justifiable reason to reverse the rulings of the lower courts.

All the Informations in this case charged the appellant with rape under
paragraph 1(a), Article 266-A, in relation to paragraph 2, Article 266-B, of
the Revised Penal Code, as amended. These provisions specifically state:

ART. 266-A. Rape; When and How Committed. - Rape is committed -

1) By a man who shall have carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the
following circumstances:

a) Through force, threat or intimidation;

 b) When the offended party is deprived of reason or otherwise
unconscious;

c) By means of fraudulent machination or grave abuse of authority;

and

d) When the offended party is under twelve (12) years of age or is

demented, even though none of the circumstances mentioned above
be present.

xxxx

ART. 266-B. Penalties. Rape under paragraph 1 of the next preceding

article shall be punished by reclusion perpetua.

Whenever the rape is committed with the use of a deadly weapon or by two
or more persons, the penalty shall be reclusion perpetua to death.
(Emphasis supplied).

Certainly, carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the following

instances constitutes rape: (1) when force or intimidation is used; (2) when
the woman is deprived of reason or is otherwise unconscious; and (3) when
she is under twelve (12) years of age.26

The force and violence required in rape cases is relative and need not be
overpowering or irresistible when applied. For rape to exist, it is not
necessary that the force or intimidation be so great or be of such character
as could not be resisted it is only necessary that the force or intimidation
be sufficient to consummate the purpose which the accused had in
mind.27 Further, it should be viewed from the perception and judgment of
the victim at the time of the commission of the crime. What is vital is that
the force or intimidation be of such degree as to cow the unprotected and
vulnerable victim into submission. Force is sufficient if it produces fear in
the victim, such as when the latter is threatened with death.28

In the case at bench, as can be gleaned from the transcript of stenographic

notes and as observed by the trial court, which the Court of Appeals
sustained, AAAs categorical, straightforward and positive testimony
revealed that the appellant was armed with a gun and the same was pointed
at her while she was ordered to lie down and to take off her clothes, to
which she acceded because of fear for her life and personal safety. The
appellant then put the gun down on the ground and successfully inserted
his penis into AAAs vagina, not only once but thrice. This happened despite
AAAs plea not to rape her. And, after satisfying his lust, the appellant
threatened AAA that he would kill her should she tell anyone about the
incident. This same threat of killing AAA was first made by the appellant
while the former was still inside the tricycle on their way to Kabuboy
Bridge.29 It cannot be denied, therefore, that force and intimidation were
employed by the appellant upon AAA in order to achieve his depraved
desires.

While it is true that the appellant had already put the gun down on the
ground the moment he inserted his penis into AAAs vagina and was
actually unarmed on those three (3) episodes of sexual intercourse, the
same does not necessarily take away the fear of being killed that had
already been instilled in the mind of AAA. Emphasis must be given to the
fact that the gun was still within appellants reach, therefore, he could still
make good of his threat on AAA at anytime the latter would show any
resistance to his evil desires. AAAs lack of physical resistance, therefore, is
understandable and would not in any way discredit her testimony.

It must be borne in mind that when a rape victim becomes paralyzed with
fear, she cannot be expected to think and act coherently. Further, as has
been consistently held by this Court, physical resistance is not an essential
element of rape and need not be established when intimidation is exercised
upon the victim, and, the latter submits herself, against her will, to the
rapists embrace because of fear for her life and personal safety. The
victims failure to shout or offer tenacious resistance did not make
voluntary her submission to the criminal acts of her aggressor. It bears
stressing that not every rape victim can be expected to act with reason or in
conformity with the usual expectations of everyone. The workings of a
human mind placed under emotional stress are unpredictable; people react
differently. Some may shout, some may faint, while others may be shocked
into insensibility.30

In his attempt to ruin AAAs credibility in order to exculpate himself from

all the charges, the appellant puts stress on the portion of the result of
AAAs medical examination disclosing that even her anal orifice was also
penetrated by a hard object, which she never mentioned in her testimony.

To the mind of this Court, such argument is flimsy and totally misplaced. It
would not even work to appellants advantage and would not in any way
cast doubt on the veracity of AAAs testimony. As this Court has previously
stated, a medical examination and a medical certificate, albeit corroborative
of the commission of rape, are not indispensable to a successful prosecution
for rape.31 Moreover, even though AAA made no mention of any anal
penetration, such omission would not change the fact that she was, indeed,
raped by the appellant. As succinctly found by both lower courts, AAA
categorically, straightforwardly, clearly and positively narrated her
harrowing experience in the hands of the appellant. She recounted in detail
how the appellant took advantage of her by bringing her to Kabuboy Bridge,
where nobody was present; commanding her to lie down and undress
herself at a point of a gun; and successfully inserting his penis into her
vagina, not only once but thrice. AAA stated that after the first penetration
the appellant stopped. After about five minutes, however, the appellant,
once again, inserted his penis into her vagina. Thereafter, the appellant
stopped. For the third and last time, the appellant again inserted his penis
into her vagina. This narration was consistent with the rest of the medical
findings showing fresh hymenal lacerations on AAAs vagina, which
according to Dr. Tan is a clear evidence of "blunt force or penetrating
trauma" - a disclosure of sexual abuse.

For his ultimate defense, the appellant puts forward denial and
alibi.1wphi1 Notably, these defenses are totally inconsistent with his line
of argument that the rape was committed without force or intimidation
thereby implying that the sexual intercourse between him and AAA was
consensual.

Time and again, this Court has viewed denial and alibi as inherently weak
defenses, unless supported by clear and convincing evidence, the same
cannot prevail over the positive declarations of the victim who, in a simple
and straightforward manner, convincingly identified the appellant as the
defiler of her chastity.32 Simply put, the positive assertions of AAA that he
raped her are entitled to greater weight. While denial and alibi are
legitimate defenses in rape cases, bare assertions to this effect cannot
overcome the categorical testimony of the victim,33 as in this case.

Also, appellants alibi that on the night the rape incident happened, he was
at the barangay hall doing his job as radio operator and at 12:00 midnight
he already went home, failed to sufficiently establish that it was physically
impossible for him to be at the scene of the crime when it was committed.
Moreover, the corroborating testimony of defense witness Corpuz that the
appellant left at about past 12:00 midnight, almost the same time the rape
incident happened, and then returned after two (2) hours, even bolster the
possibility of the appellants presence at the scene of the crime.

This Court also notes that the appellant failed to show any ill-motive on the
part of AAA to testify falsely against him. This bolsters the veracity of AAAs
accusation since no woman would concoct a tale that would tarnish her
reputation, bring humiliation and disgrace to herself and her family, and
submit herself to the rigors, shame, and stigma attendant to the
prosecution of rape, unless she is motivated by her quest to seek justice for
the crime committed against her.34

In light of the foregoing, it is beyond any cavil of doubt that the appellants
guilt for the crime of rape has been proven beyond reasonable doubt.

As to the number of rapes committed. The appellant, citing People v. Aaron

(Aaron Case),35 insists that he cannot be convicted of three (3) counts of
rape despite the three (3) penetrations because he was motivated by a
single criminal intent. This Court finds this contention fallacious.

In the Aaron Case, the accused inserted his penis into the victims vagina;
he then withdrew it and ordered the latter to lie down on the floor and, for
the second time, he inserted again his penis into the victims vagina; the
accused, thereafter, stood up and commanded the victim to lie near the
headboard of the makeshift bed and, for the third time, he inserted again
his penis into the victims vagina and continued making pumping motions.
From these sets of facts, this Court convicted the accused therein for only
one count of rape despite the three successful penetrations because there is
no indication in the records from which it can be inferred that the accused
decided to commit those separate and distinct acts of sexual assault other
than his lustful desire to change positions inside the room where the crime
was committed. This Court, thus, viewed that the three penetrations
occurred during one continuing act of rape in which the accused was
obviously motivated by a single criminal intent.

The circumstances in the present case, however, are far different from the
Aaron Case. Here, we quote with approval the observations of the Court of
Appeals, which affirmed that of the trial court, to wit:

We agree with the trial court that the [herein appellant] should be
convicted of three (3) counts of rape.1wphi1 It appears from the facts that
the [appellant] thrice succeeded in inserting his penis into the private part
of [AAA]. The three (3) penetrations occurred one after the other at an
interval of five (5) minutes wherein the [appellant] would rest after
satiating his lust upon his victim and, after he has regained his strength, he
would again rape [AAA]. Hence, it can be clearly inferred from the
foregoing that when the [appellant] decided to commit those separate and
distinct acts of sexual assault upon [AAA], he was not motivated by a single
impulse[,] but rather by several criminal intent. Hence, his conviction for
three (3) counts of rape is indubitable.36 (Emphasis supplied).

This Court sustains the findings of both lower courts that, indeed, the three
insertions into AAA were in satiation of successive but distinct criminal
carnality. Therefore, the appellants conviction for three counts of rape is
proper.

As to penalty. The second paragraph of Art. 266-B of the Revised Penal

Code, as amended, provides that "[w]henever the rape is committed with
the use of a deadly weapon x x x the penalty shall be reclusion perpetua to
death." As it was properly alleged and proved that the appellant used a gun
in order to consummate his evil desires, thus, both lower courts correctly
imposed upon him the penalty of reclusion perpetua for each count of rape.

As to damages. Civil indemnity, which is mandatory in a finding of rape is

distinct from and should not be denominated as moral damages which are
based on different jural foundations and assessed by the court in the
exercise of sound discretion.37 The award of moral damages, on the other
hand, is automatically granted in rape cases without need of further proof
other than the commission of the crime because it is assumed that a rape
victim has actually suffered moral injuries entitling her to such
award.38 Hence, this Court upholds the 50,000.00 civil indemnity and
50,000.00 moral damages, for each count of rape, that were awarded by
both lower courts in favor of AAA.

In addition, this Court deems it proper to award exemplary damages in

favor of AAA. The award of exemplary damages is justified under Article
2230 of the Civil Code if there is an aggravating circumstance, whether
ordinary or qualifying.39 In this case, since the qualifying circumstance of
the use of a deadly weapon was present in the commission of the crime,
exemplary damages in the amount of 30,000.00, for each count of rape, is
awarded in favor of AAA. Moreover, in line with recent jurisprudence, the
interest at the rate of 6% per annum shall be imposed on all damages
awarded from the date of the finality of this judgment until fully paid.40
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Decision of the Court of Appeals
in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 03371 dated 24 August 2009 finding herein
appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of three counts of rape is hereby
AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATIONS that: (1) the exemplary damages in
the amount of 30,000.00, for each count of rape, is awarded in favor of
AAA; and (2) the appellant is ordered to pay AAA the interest on all
damages at the legal rate of 6% per annum from the date of finality of this
judgment.

SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. 200233 JULY 15, 2015

LEONILA G. SANTIAGO, Petitioner,

vs.
PEOPLEOF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

DECISION

SERENO, CJ:

We resolve the Petition for Review on Certiorari filed by petitioner Leonila

G. Santiago from the Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals (CA)
in CA-G.R. CR No. 33566.1 The CA affirmed the Decision and Order of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Criminal Case No. 7232 2 convicting her of
bigamy.

THE FACTS

Four months after the solemnization of their marriage on 29 July

1997, 3 Leonila G. Santiago and Nicanor F. Santos faced an
Information 4 for bigamy. Petitioner pleaded "not guilty," while her putative
husband escaped the criminal suit. 5
The prosecution adduced evidence that Santos, who had been married to
Estela Galang since 2 June 1974, 6asked petitioner to marry him. Petitioner,
who 'was a 43-year-old widow then, married Santos on 29 July 1997 despite
the advice of her brother-in-law and parents-in-law that if she wanted to
remarry, she should choose someone who was "without responsibility." 7

Petitioner asserted her affirmative defense that she could not be included as
an accused in the crime of bigamy, because she had been under the belief
that Santos was still single when they got married. She also averred that for
there to be a conviction for bigamy, his second marriage to her should be
proven valid by the prosecution; but in this case, she argued that their
marriage was void due to the lack of a marriage license.

Eleven years after the inception of this criminal case, the first wife, Estela
Galang, testified for the prosecution.1wphi1She alleged that she had met
petitioner as early as March and April 1997, on which occasions the former
introduced herself as the legal wife of Santos. Petitioner denied this
allegation and averred that she met Galang only in August and September
1997, or after she had already married Santos.

THE RTC RULING

The RTC appreciated the undisputed fact that petitioner married Santos
during the subsistence of his marriage to Galang. Based on the more
credible account of Galang that she had already introduced herself as the
legal wife of Santos in March and April 1997, the trial court rejected the
affirmative defense of petitioner that she had not known of the first
marriage. It also held that it was incredible for a learned person like
petitioner to be easily duped by a person like Santos. 8

The RTC declared that as indicated in the Certificate of Marriage, "her

marriage was celebrated without a need for a marriage license in
accordance with Article 34 of the Family Code, which is an admission that
she cohabited with Santos long before the celebration of their
marriage." 9Thus, the trial court convicted petitioner as follows: 10

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the court finds the accused Leonila G.

Santiago GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Bigamy, defined
and penalized under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code and imposes
against her the indeterminate penalty of six ( 6) months and one (1) day of
Prision Correctional as minimum to six ( 6) years and one (1) day of Prision
Mayor as maximum.

No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

Petitioner moved for reconsideration. She contended that her marriage to

Santos was void ab initio for having been celebrated without complying
with Article 34 of the Family Code, which provides an exemption from the
requirement of a marriage license if the parties have actually lived together
as husband and wife for at least five years prior to the celebration of their
marriage. In her case, petitioner asserted that she and Santos had not lived
together as husband and wife for five years prior to their marriage. Hence,
she argued that the absence of a marriage license effectively rendered their
marriage null and void, justifying her acquittal from bigamy.

The RTC refused to reverse her conviction and held thus: 11

Accused Santiago submits that it is her marriage to her co-accused that is

null and void as it was celebrated without a valid marriage license x x x. In
advancing that theory, accused wants this court to pass judgment on the
validity of her marriage to accused Santos, something this court cannot do.
The best support to her argument would have been the submission of a
judicial decree of annulment of their marriage. Absent such proof, this
court cannot declare their marriage null and void in these proceedings.

THE CA RULING

On appeal before the CA, petitioner claimed that her conviction was not
based on proof beyond reasonable doubt. She attacked the credibility of
Galang and insisted that the former had not known of the previous
marriage of Santos.

Similar to the RTC, the CA gave more weight to the prosecution witnesses'
narration. It likewise disbelieved the testimony of Santos. Anent the lack of
a marriage license, the appellate court simply stated that the claim was a
vain attempt to put the validity of her marriage to Santos in question.
Consequently, the CA affirmed her conviction for bigamy. 12

THE ISSUES
Before this Court, petitioner reiterates that she cannot be a co-accused in
the instant case, because she was not aware of Santos's previous marriage.
But in the main, she argues that for there to be a conviction for bigamy, a
valid second marriage must be proven by the prosecution beyond
reasonable doubt.

Citing People v. De Lara, 13 she contends that her marriage to Santos is void
because of the absence of a marriage license. She elaborates that their
marriage does not fall under any of those marriages exempt from a
marriage license, because they have not previously lived together
exclusively as husband and wife for at least five years. She alleges that it is
extant in the records that she married Santos in 1997, or only four years
since she met him in 1993. Without completing the five-year requirement,
she posits that their marriage without a license is void.

In the Comment 14 filed by the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG),

respondent advances the argument that the instant Rule 45 petition should
be denied for raising factual issues as regards her husband's subsequent
marriage. As regards petitioner's denial of any knowledge of Santos' s first
marriage, respondent reiterates that credible testimonial evidence supports
the conclusion of the courts a quo that petitioner knew about the subsisting
marriage.

The crime of bigamy under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code provides:

The penalty of prision mayor shall be imposed upon any person who shall
contract a second or subsequent marriage before the former marriage has
been legally dissolved, or before the absent spouse has been declared
presumptively dead by means of a judgment rendered in the proper
proceedings.

In Montanez v. Cipriano, 15 this Court enumerated the elements of bigamy

as follows:

The elements of the crime of bigamy are: (a) the offender has been legally
married; (b) the marriage has not been legally dissolved x x x; (c) that he
contracts a second or subsequent marriage; and (d) the second or
subsequent marriage has all the essential requisites for validity. The felony
is consummated on the celebration of the second marriage or subsequent
marriage. It is essential in the prosecution for bigamy that the alleged
second marriage, having all the essential requirements, would be valid were
it not for the subsistence of the first marriage. (Emphasis supplied)

For the second spouse to be indicted as a co-accused in the crime, People v.

Nepomuceno, Jr. 16 instructs that she should have had knowledge of the
previous subsisting marriage. People v. Archilla 17 likewise states that the
knowledge of the second wife of the fact of her spouse's existing prior
marriage constitutes an indispensable cooperation in the commission of
bigamy, which makes her responsible as an accomplice.

THE RULING OF THE COURT

The penalty for bigamy and petitioner's knowledge of Santos's first

marriage

The crime of bigamy does not necessary entail the joint liability of two
persons who marry each other while the previous marriage of one of them
is valid and subsisting. As explained in Nepomuceno: 18

In the crime of bigamy, both the first and second spouses may be the
offended parties depending on the circumstances, as when the second
spouse married the accused without being aware of his previous marriage.
Only if the second spouse had knowledge of the previous undissolved
marriage of the accused could she be included in the information as a co-
accused. (Emphasis supplied)

Therefore, the lower courts correctly ascertained petitioner's knowledge of

Santos's marriage to Galang. Both courts consistently found that she knew
of the first marriage as shown by the totality of the following
circumstances: 19 (1) when Santos was courting and visiting petitioner in the
house of her in-laws, they openly showed their disapproval of him; (2) it
was incredible for a learned person like petitioner to not know of his true
civil status; and (3) Galang, who was the more credible witness compared
with petitioner who had various inconsistent testimonies, straightforwardly
testified that she had already told petitioner on two occasions that the
former was the legal wife of Santos.

After a careful review of the records, we see no reason to reverse or modify

the factual findings of the R TC, less so in the present case in which its
findings were affirmed by the CA. Indeed, the trial court's assessment of the
credibility of witnesses deserves great respect, since it had the important
opportunity to observe firsthand the expression and demeanor of the
witnesses during the trial. 20

Given that petitioner knew of the first marriage, this Court concurs with the
ruling that she was validly charged with bigamy. However, we disagree with
the lower courts' imposition of the principal penalty on her. To recall, the
RTC, which the CA affirmed, meted out to her the penalty within the range
of prision correctional as minimum to prision mayor as maximum.

Her punishment as a principal to the crime is wrong. Archilla 21 holds that

the second spouse, if indicted in the crime of bigamy, is liable only as an
accomplice. In referring to Viada, Justice Luis B. Reyes, an eminent
authority in criminal law, writes that "a person, whether man or woman,
who knowingly consents or agrees to be married to another already bound
in lawful wedlock is guilty as an accomplice in the crime of
bigamy." 22 Therefore, her conviction should only be that for an accomplice
to the crime.

Under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, the penalty for a
principal in the crime of bigamy is prision mayor, which has a duration of
six years and one day to twelve years. Since the criminal participation of
petitioner is that of an accomplice, the sentence imposable on her is the
penalty next lower in degree, 23 prision correctional, which has a duration
of six months and one day to six years. There being neither aggravating nor
mitigating circumstance, this penalty shall be imposed in its medium
period consisting of two years, four months and one day to four years and
two months of imprisonment. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence
Law, 24 petitioner shall be entitled to a minimum term, to be taken from the
penalty next lower in degree, arresto mayor, which has a duration of one
month and one day to six months imprisonment.

The criminal liability of petitioner resulting from her marriage to Santos

Jurisprudence clearly requires that for the accused to be convicted of

bigamy, the second or subsequent marriage must have all the essential
requisites for validity. 25 If the accused wants to raise the nullity of the
marriage, he or she can do it as a matter of defense during the presentation
of evidence in the trial proper of the criminal case. 26In this case, petitioner
has consistently27 questioned below the validity of her marriage to Santos
on the ground that marriages celebrated without the essential requisite of a
marriage license are void ab initio. 28
Unfortunately, the lower courts merely brushed aside the issue. The RTC
stated that it could not pass judgment on the validity of the
marriage.1wphi1 The CA held that the attempt of petitioner to attack her
union with Santos was in vain.

On the basis that the lower courts have manifestly overlooked certain issues
and facts, 29 and given that an appeal in a criminal case throws the whole
case open for review, 30 this Court now resolves to correct the error of the
courts a quo.

After a perusal of the records, it is clear that the marriage between

petitioner and Santos took place without a marriage license. The absence of
this requirement is purportedly explained in their Certificate of Marriage,
which reveals that their union was celebrated under Article 34 of the Family
Code. The provision reads as follows:

No license shall be necessary for the marriage of a man and a woman who
have lived together as husband and wife for at least five years and without
any legal impediment to marry each other. The contracting parties shall
state the foregoing facts in an affidavit before any person authorized by law
to administer oaths. The solemnizing officer shall also state under oath that
he ascertained the qualifications of the contracting parties are found no
legal impediment to the marriage.31

Here, respondent did not dispute that petitioner knew Santos in more or
less in February 1996 32 and that after six months of courtship,33 she
married him on 29 July 1997. Without any objection from the prosecution,
petitioner testified that Santos had frequently visited her in Castellano,
Nueva Ecija, prior to their marriage. However, he never cohabited with her,
as she was residing in the house of her in-laws,34 and her children from her
previous marriage disliked him.35 On cross examination, respondent did
not question the claim of petitioner that sometime in 1993, she first met
Santos as an agent who sold her piglets.36

All told, the evidence on record shows that petitioner and Santos had only
known each other for only less than four years. Thus, it follows that the two
of them could not have cohabited for at least five years prior to their
marriage.

Santiago and Santos, however, reflected the exact opposite of this

demonstrable fact. Although the records do not show that they submitted
an affidavit of cohabitation as required by Article 34 of the Family Code, it
appears that the two of them lied before the solemnizing officer and
misrepresented that they had actually cohabited for at least five years
before they married each other. Unfortunately, subsequent to this lie was
the issuance of the Certificate of Marriage, 37 in which the solemnizing
officer stated under oath that no marriage license was necessary, because
the marriage was solemnized under Article 34 of the Family Code.

The legal effects in a criminal case of a deliberate act to put a flaw in the
marriage

The Certificate of Marriage, signed by Santos and Santiago, contained the

misrepresentation perpetrated by them that they were eligible to contract
marriage without a license. We thus face an anomalous situation wherein
petitioner seeks to be acquitted of bigamy based on her illegal actions of (1)
marrying Santos without a marriage license despite knowing that they had
not satisfied the cohabitation requirement under the law; and (2) falsely
making claims in no less than her marriage contract.

We chastise this deceptive scheme that hides what is basically a bigamous

and illicit marriage in an effort to escape criminal prosecution. Our penal
laws on marriage, such as bigamy, punish an individual's deliberate
disregard of the permanent and sacrosanct character of this special bond
between spouses.38 In Tenebro v. Court of Appeals,39 we had the occasion to
emphasize that the State's penal laws on bigamy should not be rendered
nugatory by allowing individuals "to deliberately ensure that each marital
contract be flawed in some manner, and to thus escape the consequences of
contracting multiple marriages, while beguiling throngs of hapless women
with the promise of futurity and commitment."

Thus, in the case at bar, we cannot countenance petitioner's illegal acts of

feigning a marriage and, in the same breath, adjudge her innocent of the
crime. For us, to do so would only make a mockery of the sanctity of
marriage. 40

Furthermore, it is a basic concept of justice that no court will "lend its aid to
x x x one who has consciously and voluntarily become a party to an illegal
act upon which the cause of action is founded." 41 If the cause of action
appears to arise ex turpi causa or that which involves a transgression of
positive law, parties shall be left unassisted by the courts. 42 As a result,
litigants shall be denied relief on the ground that their conduct has been
inequitable, unfair and dishonest or fraudulent, or deceitful as to the
controversy in issue. 43

Here, the cause of action of petitioner, meaning her affirmative defense in

this criminal case of bigamy, is that her marriage with Santos was void for
having been secured without a marriage license. But as elucidated earlier,
they themselves perpetrated a false Certificate of Marriage by
misrepresenting that they were exempted from the license requirement
based on their fabricated claim that they had already cohabited as husband
and wife for at least five years prior their marriage. In violation of our law
against illegal marriages,44 petitioner married Santos while knowing full
well that they had not yet complied with the five-year cohabitation
requirement under Article 34 of the Family Code. Consequently, it will be
the height of absurdity for this Court to allow petitioner to use her illegal
act to escape criminal conviction.

The applicability of People v. De Lara

Petitioner cites De Lara as the relevant jurisprudence involving an acquittal

for bigamy on the ground that the second marriage lacked the requisite
marriage license. In that case, the Court found that when Domingo de Lara
married his second wife, Josefa Rosales, on 18 August 1951, the local Civil
Registrar had yet to issue their marriage license on 19 August 1951. Thus,
since the marriage was celebrated one day before the issuance of the
marriage license, the Court acquitted him of bigamy.

Noticeably, Domingo de Lara did not cause the falsification of public

documents in order to contract a second marriage. In contrast, petitioner
and Santos fraudulently secured a Certificate of Marriage, and petitioner
later used this blatantly illicit act as basis for seeking her exculpation.
Therefore, unlike our treatment of the accused in De Lara, this Court
cannot regard petitioner herein as innocent of the crime.

No less than the present Constitution provides that "marriage, as an

inviolable social institution, is the foundation of the family and shall be
protected by the State." 45 It must be safeguarded from the whims and
caprices of the contracting parties. 46 in keeping therefore with this
fundamental policy, this Court affirms the conviction of petitioner for
bigamy
WHEREFORE, the Petition for Review on Certiorari filed by petitioner
Leonila G. Santiago is DENIED. The Decision and Resolution of the Court
of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 33566 is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION.
As modified, petitioner Leonila G. Santiago is hereby found guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of bigamy as an accomplice. She is sentenced
to suffer the indeterminate penalty of six months of arresto mayor as
minimum to four years of prision correctional as maximum plus accessory
penalties provided by law.

SO ORDERED.

SECOND DIVISION

[G.R. No. 145226. February 06, 2004]

LUCIO MORIGO y CACHO, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE

PHILIPPINES, respondent.

DECISION
QUISUMBING, J.:

This petition for review on certiorari seeks to reverse the

decision[1] dated October 21, 1999 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR
No. 20700, which affirmed the judgment[2] dated August 5, 1996 of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Bohol, Branch 4, in Criminal Case No. 8688.
The trial court found herein petitioner Lucio Morigo y Cacho guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of bigamy and sentenced him to a prison term of seven
(7) months of prision correccional as minimum to six (6) years and one (1)
day of prision mayor as maximum. Also assailed in this petition is the
resolution[3] of the appellate court, dated September 25, 2000, denying
Morigos motion for reconsideration.
The facts of this case, as found by the court a quo, are as follows:

Appellant Lucio Morigo and Lucia Barrete were boardmates at the house of
Catalina Tortor at Tagbilaran City, Province of Bohol, for a period of four
(4) years (from 1974-1978).
After school year 1977-78, Lucio Morigo and Lucia Barrete lost contact with
each other.

In 1984, Lucio Morigo was surprised to receive a card from Lucia Barrete
from Singapore. The former replied and after an exchange of letters, they
became sweethearts.

In 1986, Lucia returned to the Philippines but left again for Canada to work
there. While in Canada, they maintained constant communication.

In 1990, Lucia came back to the Philippines and proposed to petition

appellant to join her in Canada. Both agreed to get married, thus they were
married on August 30, 1990 at the Iglesia de Filipina Nacional at
Catagdaan, Pilar, Bohol.

On September 8, 1990, Lucia reported back to her work in Canada leaving

appellant Lucio behind.

On August 19, 1991, Lucia filed with the Ontario Court (General Division) a
petition for divorce against appellant which was granted by the court on
January 17, 1992 and to take effect on February 17, 1992.

On October 4, 1992, appellant Lucio Morigo married Maria Jececha

Lumbago[4] at the Virgen sa Barangay Parish, Tagbilaran City, Bohol.

On September 21, 1993, accused filed a complaint for judicial declaration of

nullity of marriage in the Regional Trial Court of Bohol, docketed as Civil
Case No. 6020. The complaint seek (sic) among others, the declaration of
nullity of accuseds marriage with Lucia, on the ground that no marriage
ceremony actually took place.

On October 19, 1993, appellant was charged with Bigamy in an

Information[5] filed by the City Prosecutor of Tagbilaran [City], with the
Regional Trial Court of Bohol.[6]

The petitioner moved for suspension of the arraignment on the ground

that the civil case for judicial nullification of his marriage with Lucia posed
a prejudicial question in the bigamy case. His motion was granted, but
subsequently denied upon motion for reconsideration by the prosecution.
When arraigned in the bigamy case, which was docketed as Criminal Case
No. 8688, herein petitioner pleaded not guilty to the charge. Trial
thereafter ensued.
On August 5, 1996, the RTC of Bohol handed down its judgment in
Criminal Case No. 8688, as follows:

WHEREFORE, foregoing premises considered, the Court finds accused

Lucio Morigo y Cacho guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
Bigamy and sentences him to suffer the penalty of imprisonment ranging
from Seven (7) Months of Prision Correccional as minimum to Six (6)
Years and One (1) Day of Prision Mayor as maximum.

SO ORDERED.[7]

In convicting herein petitioner, the trial court discounted petitioners

claim that his first marriage to Lucia was null and void ab initio.
Following Domingo v. Court of Appeals,[8] the trial court ruled that want of
a valid marriage ceremony is not a defense in a charge of bigamy. The
parties to a marriage should not be allowed to assume that their marriage is
void even if such be the fact but must first secure a judicial declaration of
the nullity of their marriage before they can be allowed to marry again.
Anent the Canadian divorce obtained by Lucia, the trial court
cited Ramirez v. Gmur,[9] which held that the court of a country in which
neither of the spouses is domiciled and in which one or both spouses may
resort merely for the purpose of obtaining a divorce, has no jurisdiction to
determine the matrimonial status of the parties. As such, a divorce granted
by said court is not entitled to recognition anywhere. Debunking Lucios
defense of good faith in contracting the second marriage, the trial court
stressed that following People v. Bitdu,[10] everyone is presumed to know
the law, and the fact that one does not know that his act constitutes a
violation of the law does not exempt him from the consequences thereof.
Seasonably, petitioner filed an appeal with the Court of Appeals,
docketed as CA-G.R. CR No. 20700.
Meanwhile, on October 23, 1997, or while CA-G.R. CR No. 20700 was
pending before the appellate court, the trial court rendered a decision in
Civil Case No. 6020 declaring the marriage between Lucio and Lucia
void ab initio since no marriage ceremony actually took place. No appeal
was taken from this decision, which then became final and executory.
 On October 21, 1999, the appellate court decided CA-G.R. CR No. 20700
as follows:

WHEREFORE, finding no error in the appealed decision, the same is

hereby AFFIRMED in toto.

SO ORDERED.[11]

In affirming the assailed judgment of conviction, the appellate court

stressed that the subsequent declaration of nullity of Lucios marriage to
Lucia in Civil Case No. 6020 could not acquit Lucio. The reason is that what
is sought to be punished by Article 349[12] of the Revised Penal Code is the
act of contracting a second marriage before the first marriage had been
dissolved. Hence, the CA held, the fact that the first marriage was void from
the beginning is not a valid defense in a bigamy case.
The Court of Appeals also pointed out that the divorce decree obtained
by Lucia from the Canadian court could not be accorded validity in the
Philippines, pursuant to Article 15[13] of the Civil Code and given the fact
that it is contrary to public policy in this jurisdiction. Under Article 17[14] of
the Civil Code, a declaration of public policy cannot be rendered ineffectual
by a judgment promulgated in a foreign jurisdiction.
Petitioner moved for reconsideration of the appellate courts decision,
contending that the doctrine in Mendiola v. People,[15] allows mistake upon
a difficult question of law (such as the effect of a foreign divorce decree) to
be a basis for good faith.
On September 25, 2000, the appellate court denied the motion for lack
of merit.[16] However, the denial was by a split vote. The ponente of the
appellate courts original decision in CA-G.R. CR No. 20700, Justice
Eugenio S. Labitoria, joined in the opinion prepared by Justice Bernardo P.
Abesamis. The dissent observed that as the first marriage was validly
declared void ab initio, then there was no first marriage to speak of. Since
the date of the nullity retroacts to the date of the first marriage and since
herein petitioner was, in the eyes of the law, never married, he cannot be
convicted beyond reasonable doubt of bigamy.
The present petition raises the following issues for our resolution:

A.
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN FAILING TO
APPLY THE RULE THAT IN CRIMES PENALIZED UNDER THE
REVISED PENAL CODE, CRIMINAL INTENT IS AN INDISPENSABLE
REQUISITE. COROLLARILY, WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF
APPEALS ERRED IN FAILING TO APPRECIATE [THE] PETITIONERS
LACK OF CRIMINAL INTENT WHEN HE CONTRACTED THE SECOND
MARRIAGE.

B.

WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING

THAT THE RULING IN PEOPLE VS. BITDU (58 PHIL. 817) IS
APPLICABLE TO THE CASE AT BAR.

C.

WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN FAILING TO

APPLY THE RULE THAT EACH AND EVERY CIRCUMSTANCE
FAVORING THE INNOCENCE OF THE ACCUSED MUST BE TAKEN
INTO ACCOUNT.[17]

To our mind, the primordial issue should be whether or not petitioner

committed bigamy and if so, whether his defense of good faith is valid.
The petitioner submits that he should not be faulted for relying in good
faith upon the divorce decree of the Ontario court. He highlights the fact
that he contracted the second marriage openly and publicly, which a person
intent upon bigamy would not be doing. The petitioner further argues that
his lack of criminal intent is material to a conviction or acquittal in the
instant case. The crime of bigamy, just like other felonies punished under
the Revised Penal Code, is mala in se, and hence, good faith and lack of
criminal intent are allowed as a complete defense. He stresses that there is
a difference between the intent to commit the crime and the intent to
perpetrate the act. Hence, it does not necessarily follow that his intention to
contract a second marriage is tantamount to an intent to commit bigamy.
For the respondent, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) submits
that good faith in the instant case is a convenient but flimsy excuse. The
Solicitor General relies upon our ruling in Marbella-Bobis v.
Bobis,[18] which held that bigamy can be successfully prosecuted provided
all the elements concur, stressing that under Article 40[19] of the Family
Code, a judicial declaration of nullity is a must before a party may re-marry.
Whether or not the petitioner was aware of said Article 40 is of no account
as everyone is presumed to know the law. The OSG counters that
petitioners contention that he was in good faith because he relied on the
divorce decree of the Ontario court is negated by his act of filing Civil Case
No. 6020, seeking a judicial declaration of nullity of his marriage to Lucia.
Before we delve into petitioners defense of good faith and lack of
criminal intent, we must first determine whether all the elements of bigamy
are present in this case. In Marbella-Bobis v. Bobis,[20] we laid down the
elements of bigamy thus:
(1) the offender has been legally married;
(2) the first marriage has not been legally dissolved, or in case his or
her spouse is absent, the absent spouse has not been judicially
declared presumptively dead;
(3) he contracts a subsequent marriage; and
(4) the subsequent marriage would have been valid had it not been for
the existence of the first.
Applying the foregoing test to the instant case, we note that during the
pendency of CA-G.R. CR No. 20700, the RTC of Bohol Branch 1, handed
down the following decision in Civil Case No. 6020, to wit:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered

decreeing the annulment of the marriage entered into by petitioner Lucio
Morigo and Lucia Barrete on August 23, 1990 in Pilar, Bohol and further
directing the Local Civil Registrar of Pilar, Bohol to effect the cancellation
of the marriage contract.

SO ORDERED.[21]

The trial court found that there was no actual marriage ceremony
performed between Lucio and Lucia by a solemnizing officer. Instead, what
transpired was a mere signing of the marriage contract by the two, without
the presence of a solemnizing officer. The trial court thus held that the
marriage is void ab initio, in accordance with Articles 3[22] and 4[23] of the
Family Code. As the dissenting opinion in CA-G.R. CR No. 20700, correctly
puts it, This simply means that there was no marriage to begin with; and
that such declaration of nullity retroacts to the date of the first marriage. In
other words, for all intents and purposes, reckoned from the date of the
declaration of the first marriage as void ab initio to the date of the
celebration of the first marriage, the accused was, under the eyes of the law,
never married.[24] The records show that no appeal was taken from the
decision of the trial court in Civil Case No. 6020, hence, the decision had
long become final and executory.
The first element of bigamy as a crime requires that the accused must
have been legally married. But in this case, legally speaking, the petitioner
was never married to Lucia Barrete. Thus, there is no first marriage to
speak of. Under the principle of retroactivity of a marriage being declared
void ab initio, the two were never married from the beginning. The contract
of marriage is null; it bears no legal effect. Taking this argument to its
logical conclusion, for legal purposes, petitioner was not married to Lucia at
the time he contracted the marriage with Maria Jececha. The existence and
the validity of the first marriage being an essential element of the crime of
bigamy, it is but logical that a conviction for said offense cannot be
sustained where there is no first marriage to speak of. The petitioner, must,
perforce be acquitted of the instant charge.
The present case is analogous to, but must be distinguished
from Mercado v. Tan.[25] In the latter case, the judicial declaration of nullity
of the first marriage was likewise obtained after the second marriage was
already celebrated. We held therein that:

A judicial declaration of nullity of a previous marriage is necessary before a

subsequent one can be legally contracted. One who enters into a
subsequent marriage without first obtaining such judicial declaration is
guilty of bigamy. This principle applies even if the earlier union is
characterized by statutes as void.[26]

It bears stressing though that in Mercado, the first marriage was

actually solemnized not just once, but twice: first before a judge where a
marriage certificate was duly issued and then again six months later before
a priest in religious rites. Ostensibly, at least, the first marriage appeared to
have transpired, although later declared void ab initio.
In the instant case, however, no marriage ceremony at all was
performed by a duly authorized solemnizing officer. Petitioner and Lucia
Barrete merely signed a marriage contract on their own. The mere private
act of signing a marriage contract bears no semblance to a valid marriage
and thus, needs no judicial declaration of nullity. Such act alone, without
more, cannot be deemed to constitute an ostensibly valid marriage for
which petitioner might be held liable for bigamy unless he first secures a
judicial declaration of nullity before he contracts a subsequent marriage.
The law abhors an injustice and the Court is mandated to liberally
construe a penal statute in favor of an accused and weigh every
circumstance in favor of the presumption of innocence to ensure that
justice is done. Under the circumstances of the present case, we held that
petitioner has not committed bigamy. Further, we also find that we need
not tarry on the issue of the validity of his defense of good faith or lack of
criminal intent, which is now moot and academic.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. The assailed
decision, dated October 21, 1999 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No.
20700, as well as the resolution of the appellate court dated September 25,
2000, denying herein petitioners motion for reconsideration, is
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The petitioner Lucio Morigo y Cacho is
ACQUITTED from the charge of BIGAMY on the ground that his guilt has
not been proven with moral certainty.
SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. 194390 August 13, 2014

VENANCIO M. SEVILLA, Petitioner,

vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

DECISION

REYES, J.:

Before this Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari1 under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court seeking to annul and set aside the Decision2 dated February
26, 2009 and the Resolution3 dated October 22, 2010 of the Sandiganbayan
in Criminal Case No. 27925, finding Venancio M. Sevilla (Sevilla) guilty of
falsification of public documents through reckless imprudence punished
under Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC).

Antecedent Facts

Sevilla, a former councilor of Malabon City, was charged with the felony of
falsification of public document, penalized under Article 171(4) of the RPC,
in an Information,4 which reads:

That on or about 02 July 2001, or for sometime prior or subsequent

thereto, in the City of Malabon, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of
this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, Venancio M. Sevilla, a
public officer, being then a memberof the [S]angguniang [P]anlunsod of
Malabon City, having been elected a [c]ouncilor thereof, taking advantage
of his official position and committing the offense in relation to duty, did
then and there wilfully, unlawfully, and feloniously make a false statement
in a narration of facts, the truth of which he is legally bound to disclose, by
stating in his C.S. Form 212, dated 02 July 2001 or Personal Data Sheet, an
official document, which he submitted to the Office of the Secretariat,
Malabon City Council and, in answer to Question No. 25 therein, he stated
that no criminal case is pending against him, when in fact, as the accused
fully well knew, he is an accused in Criminal Case No. 6718-97, entitled
"People of the Philippines versus Venancio Sevilla and Artemio Sevilla", for
Assault Upon AnAgent Of A Person In Authority, pending before the
Metropolitan Trial Court of Malabon City, Branch 55, thereby perverting
the truth.

CONTRARY TO LAW.5

Upon arraignment, Sevillaentered a plea of not guilty. Trial on the merits

ensued thereafter.

The prosecution alleged that on July 2, 2001, the first day of his term as
councilor of the City of Malabon, Sevilla made a false narration in his
Personal Data Sheet (PDS).6 That in answer to the question of whether
there is a pending criminalcase against him, Sevilla marked the box
corresponding to the "no" answer despite the pendency of a criminal case
against him for assault upon an agent ofa person in authority before the
Metropolitan Trial Court ofMalabon City, Branch 55.
Based on the same set of facts, anadministrative complaint, docketed as
OMB-ADM-0-01-1520, was likewise filed against Sevilla. In its Decision
dated March 26, 2002, the Office of the Ombudsman found Sevilla
administratively liable for dishonesty and falsification of official document
and dismissed him from the service. In Sevilla v. Gervacio,7 the Court, in
the Resolution dated June 23, 2003, affirmed the findings of the Office of
the Ombudsman as regards Sevillas administrative liability.

On the other hand, Sevilla admitted that he indeed marked the box
corresponding to the "no" answer vis--visthe question on whether he has
any pending criminal case. However, heaverred that he did not intend to
falsify his PDS. He claimed that it was Editha Mendoza (Mendoza), a
member of his staff, who actually prepared his PDS.

According to Sevilla, on July 2, 2001,since he did not have an office yet, he

just stayed in his house. Ataround two oclock in the afternoon, he was
informed by Mendoza that he needs to accomplish his PDS and submit the
same to the personnel office of the City of Malabon before five oclock that
afternoon. He then instructedMendoza to copy the entries in the previous
copy of his PDS which he filed with the personnel office. After the PDS was
filled up and delivered to him by Mendoza, Sevilla claims that he just
signed the same without checking the veracity of the entries therein. That
he failed to notice that, in answer to the question of whether he has any
pending criminal case, Mendoza checked the box corresponding to the "no"
answer.

The defense likewise presented the testimony of Edilberto G. Torres

(Torres), a former City Councilor. Torres testified that Sevilla was not yet
given an office space in the Malabon City Hall on July 2, 2001; that when
the members of Sevillas staff would then need to use the typewriter, they
would just use the typewriter inside Torres office. Torres further claimed
that he saw Mendoza preparing the PDS of Sevilla, the latter having used
the typewriter in his office.

Ruling of the Sandiganbayan

On February 26, 2009, the Sandiganbayan rendered a Decision,8 the

decretal portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, accused VENANCIO M. SEVILLA is found GUILTY of

Falsification of Public Documents Through Reckless Imprudence and
pursuant to Art. 365 of the Revised Penal Code hereby imposes upon him in
the absence ofany modifying circumstances the penalty of four (4) months
of arresto mayoras minimum to two (2) years ten (10) months and twenty
one (21) days of prision correccional as maximum, and to pay the costs.

There is no pronouncement as to civil liability as the facts from which it

could arise do[es] not appear to be indubitable.

SO ORDERED.9

The Sandiganbayan found that Sevilla made an untruthful statement in his

PDS, which is a public document,and that, in so doing, he took advantage of
his official position since he would not have accomplished the PDS if not for
his position as a City Councilor. That being the signatory of the PDS, Sevilla
had the responsibility to prepare, accomplish and submit the same.
Further, the Sandiganbayan pointed out that there was a legal obligation on
the part of Sevilla to disclose in his PDS that there was a pending case
against him. Accordingly, the Sandiganbayan ruled that the prosecution
was able to establish all the elements of the felony of falsification of public
documents.

Nevertheless, the Sandiganbayan opined that Sevilla cannot be convicted of

falsification of public document under Article 171(4)10 of the RPC since he
did not act with maliciousintent to falsify the aforementioned entry in his
PDS. However, considering that Sevillas PDS was haphazardly and
recklessly done, which resulted in the false entry therein, the
Sandiganbayan convicted Sevilla of falsification of public document
through reckless imprudence under Article 36511 of the RPC. Thus:

Moreover, the marking of the "no" box to the question on whether there
was a pending criminal case against him was not the only defect in his PDS.
As found by the Office of the Honorable Ombudsman in its Resolution, in
answer to question 29 inthe PDS, accused answered that he had not been a
candidate in any localelection (except barangay election), when in fact he
ran and served ascouncilor of Malabon from 1992 to 1998. Notwithstanding
the negative answer in question 29, in the same PDS, in answer to question
21, he revealed that he was a councilor from 1992 to 1998. Not to give
premium to a negligent act, this nonetheless shows that the preparation of
the PDS was haphazardly and recklessly done.
Taking together these circumstances, this Court is persuaded that accused
did not act with malicious intent to falsify the document in question but
merely failed to ascertain for himself the veracity of narrations in his PDS
before affixing his signature thereon. The reckless signing of the PDS
without verifying the data therein makes him criminally liable for his act.
Accused is a government officer, who prior to his election as councilor in
2001, had already served as a councilor of the same city. Thus, he should
have been more mindful of the importance of the PDS and should have
treated the said public document with due respect.

Consequently, accused is convictedof Falsification of Public Document

through Reckless Imprudence, as defined and penalized in Article 171,
paragraph 4, in relation to Article 365, paragraph 1, of the Revised Penal
Code. x x x.12

Sevillas motion for reconsideration was denied by the Sandiganbayan in its

Resolution13 dated October 22, 2010.

Hence, this appeal.

In the instant petition, Sevilla asserts that the Sandiganbayan erred in

finding him guilty of the felony of falsification of public documents through
reckless imprudence. He claims that the Information that was filed against
him specifically charged him with the commission of an intentional felony,
i.e.falsification of public documents under Article 171(4) of the RPC. Thus,
he could not be convicted of falsification of public document through
reckless imprudence under Article 365 of the RPC, which is a culpable
felony, lest his constitutional right to be informed of the nature and cause
of the accusation against him be violated.

Issue

Essentially, the issue for the Courts resolution is whether Sevilla can be
convicted of the felony of falsification of public document through reckless
imprudence notwithstanding that the charge against him in the
Information was for the intentional felony of falsification of public
document under Article 171(4) of the RPC.

Ruling of the Court

The appeal is dismissed for lack of merit.

At the outset, it bears stressing that the Sandiganbayans designation of the
felony supposedly committed by Sevilla is inaccurate. The Sandiganbayan
convicted Sevilla of reckless imprudence, punished under Article 365 of the
RPC, which resulted into the falsification of a public document. However,
the Sandiganbayan designated the felony committed as "falsification of
public document through reckless imprudence." The foregoing designation
implies that reckless imprudence is not a crime in itself but simply a
modality of committing it. Quasi-offenses under Article 365 of the RPC are
distinct and separatecrimes and not a mere modality in the commission of a
crime.

In Ivler v. Modesto-San Pedro,14 the Court explained that:

Indeed, the notion that quasi-offenses, whether reckless or simple, are

distinct species of crime, separately defined and penalized under the
framework of our penal laws, is nothing new. As early as the middle of the
last century, we already sought to bring clarity to this field by rejecting in
Quizon v. Justice of the Peace of Pampangathe proposition that "reckless
imprudence is not a crime in itself but simply a way of committing it x x x"
on three points of analysis: (1) the object of punishment in quasi-crimes (as
opposed to intentional crimes); (2) the legislative intent to treat quasi
crimes as distinct offenses (as opposed to subsuming them under the
mitigating circumstance of minimal intent) and; (3) the different penalty
structures for quasi-crimes and intentional crimes:

The proposition (inferred from Art. 3 of the Revised Penal Code) that
"reckless imprudence" is not a crime in itself but simply a way of
committing it and merely determines a lower degree of criminal liability is
too broad to deserve unqualified assent. There are crimes that by their
structure cannot be committed through imprudence: murder, treason,
robbery, maliciousmischief, etc. In truth, criminal negligence in our
Revised Penal Code is treated as a mere quasi offense, and dealt with
separately from willful offenses. It is not a mere question of classification or
terminology. In intentional crimes, the act itself is punished; in negligence
or imprudence, what isprincipally penalized is the mental attitude or
condition behind the act, the dangerous recklessness, lack of care or
foresight, the imprudencia punible.x x x

Were criminal negligence but a modality in the commission of felonies,

operating only to reduce the penalty therefor, then it would be absorbed in
the mitigating circumstances of Art. 13, specially the lack of intent to
commit so grave a wrong as the one actually committed. Furthermore, the
theory would require that the corresponding penalty should befixed in
proportion to the penalty prescribed for each crime when committed
willfully. For each penalty for the willful offense, there would then be a
corresponding penalty for the negligent variety. But instead, our Revised
Penal Code (Art. 365) fixes the penalty for reckless imprudence at arresto
mayor maximum, to prision correccional[medium], if the willful act would
constitute a grave felony, notwithstanding that the penalty for the latter
could range all the way from prision mayor to death, according to the case.
It can be seen that the actual penalty for criminal negligence bears no
relation to the individual willful crime, but is set in relation to a whole class,
or series, of crimes.(Emphasis supplied)

This explains why the technically correct way to allege quasicrimes is to

state that their commission results in damage, either to person or
property.15 (Citations omitted and emphasis ours)

Further, in Rafael Reyes Trucking Corporation v. People,16 the Court

clarified that:

Under Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code, criminal negligence "is
treated as a mere quasi offense, and dealt with separately from willful
offenses. It is not a question ofclassification or terminology. In intentional
crimes, the act itselfis punished; in negligence or imprudence, what is
principally penalized is the mental attitude or condition behind the act, the
dangerousrecklessness, lack of care or foresight, the imprudencia punible.
Much of the confusion has arisen from the common use of such descriptive
phrase as homicide through reckless imprudence, and the like; when the
strict technical sense is, more accurately, reckless imprudence resulting in
homicide; or simple imprudence causing damages to property."

There is need, therefore, to rectify the designation of the offense without

disturbing the imposed penaltyfor the guidance of bench and bar in strict
adherence to precedent.17 (Emphasis ours) Thus, the proper designation
ofthe felony should be reckless imprudence resulting to falsification of
public documents and not falsification of public documentsthrough reckless
imprudence.

Having threshed out the proper designation of the felony committed by

Sevilla, the Court now weighs the merit of the instant appeal. Sevillas
appeal is anchored mainly on the variance between the offense charged in
the Information that was filed against him and that proved by the
prosecution. The rules on variance between allegation and proof are laid
down under Sections 4 and 5, Rule 120 of the Rules of Court, viz:

Sec. 4. Judgment in case of variance between allegation and proof. When

there is variance between the offense charged in the complaint or
information and that proved, and the offense as charged is included in or
necessarily includes the offense proved, the accused shall be convicted of
the offense proved which is included in the offense charged, or of the
offense charged which isincluded in the offense proved.

Sec. 5. When an offense includes or is included in another. An offense

charged necessarily includes the offense proved when some of the essential
elements or ingredients of the former, as alleged in the complaint or
information, constitute the latter. And an offense charged is necessarily
included in the offense proved, when the essential ingredients of the former
constitute or form part of those constituting the latter.

Accordingly, in case of variance between the allegation and proof, a

defendant may be convictedof the offense proved when the offense charged
is included in or necessarily includes the offense proved.

There is no dispute that a variance exists between the offense alleged

against Sevilla and that proved by the prosecution the Information
charged him with the intentional felony of falsification of public document
under Article 171(4) of the RPC while the prosecution was able to prove
reckless imprudence resulting to falsification ofpublic documents.
Parenthetically, the question that has to be resolved then is whether
reckless imprudence resulting to falsification of public document is
necessarily included in the intentional felony of falsification ofpublic
document under Article 171(4) of the RPC.

The Court, in Samson v. Court of Appeals,18 has answered the foregoing

question in the affirmative. Thus:

It is however contended that appellant Samson cannot be convicted of the

crime of estafathrough falsification by imprudence for the reason that the
information filed against him charges only a willful act of falsification and
contains no reference to any act of imprudence on his part. Nor can it be
said, counsel argues, that the alleged imprudent act includes or is
necessarily includedin the offense charged in the information because a
deliberate intent to do an unlawful act is inconsistent with the idea of
negligence.

xxxx

While a criminal negligent act is nota simple modality of a wilful crime, as

we held in Quizon v. Justice of the Peace of Bacolor, x x x, but a distinct
crime in itself, designated asa quasi offense, in our Penal Code, it may
however be said that a conviction for the former can be had under an
information exclusively charging the commission of a wilful offense, upon
the theory that the greater includes the lesser offense. This is the situation
that obtains in the present case. Appellant was charged with willful
falsification but from the evidence submitted by the parties, the Court of
Appeals found thatin effecting the falsification which made possible the
cashing of checks inquestion, appellant did not act with criminal intent but
merely failed to take proper and adequate means to assure himself of the
identity of the real claimants as an ordinary prudent man would do. In
other words, the information alleges acts which charge willful falsification
but which turned out to be not willful but negligent. This is a case covered
by the rule when there is a variance between the allegation and proof, and is
similar to some of the cases decided by this Tribunal.19 (Emphasis ours)

Thus, Sevillas claim that his constitutional right to be informed of the

nature and cause of the accusation against him was violated when the
Sandiganbayan convicted him of reckless imprudence resulting to
falsification of public documents, when the Information only charged the
intentional felony of falsification of public documents, is untenable. To
stress, reckless imprudence resulting to falsification of public documents is
an offense that is necessarily included in the willful act of falsification of
public documents, the latter being the greater offense. As such, he can be
convicted of reckless imprudence resulting to falsification of public
documents notwithstanding that the Information only charged the willful
act of falsification of public documents.

In this regard, the Courts disposition in Sarep v. Sandiganbayan20 is

instructive.1wphi1 In Sarep, the petitioner therein falsified his
appointment paper which he filed with the CSC. An Information was then
filed against him for falsification of public document. Nevertheless, the
Court convicted the accused of reckless imprudence resulting to
falsification of public document upon a finding that the accused therein did
not maliciously pervert the truth with the wrongful intent of injuring some
person. The Court, quoting the Sandiganbayans disposition, held that:

We are inclined, however, to credit the accused herein with the benefit of
the circumstance that he did not maliciously pervert the truth with the
wrongful intent of injuring some person (People vs. Reyes, 1 Phil. 341).
Since he sincerely believed that his CSC eligibility based on his having
passed the Regional CulturalCommunity Officer (Unassembled)
Examination and educational attainment were sufficient to qualify him for
a permanent position, then he should only be held liable for falsification
through reckless imprudence (People vs. Leopando, 36 O.G. 2937; People
vs. Maleza, 14 Phil. 468; People vs. Pacheco, 18 Phil. 399).

Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code, which punishes criminal negligence
or quasi-offenses, furnishes the middle way between a wrongful act
committed with wrongful intent, which gives rise to a felony, and a
wrongful act committed without any intent which may entirely exempt the
doer from criminal liability. It is the duty of everyone to execute his own
acts with due care and diligence in order that no prejudicial or injurious
results may be suffered by others from acts that are otherwise offensive
(Aquino, R.P.C. Vol. III, 1976, Ed., p. 1884). What is penalized is the mental
attitude orcondition behind the acts of dangerous recklessness and lack of
care or foresight although such mental attitude might have produced
several effects or consequences (People vs. Cano, L 19660, May 24, 1966).21

Anent the imposable penalty, under Article 365 of the RPC, reckless
imprudence resulting in falsification of public document is punishable by
arresto mayor in its maximum period to prision correccional in its medium
period. In this case, taking into account the pertinent provisions of
Indeterminate Sentence Law, the Sandiganbayan correctly imposed upon
Sevilla the penalty of four ( 4) months of arresto mayor as minimum to two
(2) years ten ( 10) months and twenty one (21) days of prision correccional
as maximum.

WHEREFORE, in consideration of the foregoing disquisitions, the appeal is

DISMISSED. The Decision dated February 26, 2009 and the Resolution
dated October 22, 2010 of the Sandiganbayan in Criminal Case No. 27925
are hereby AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.
 FIRST DIVISION

PEOPLE OF G.R. No. 182061

THE PHILIPPINES,
Appellee, Present:

PUNO, C.J., Chairperson,

CARPIO MORALES,
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,
- versus - BERSAMIN, and
VILLARAMA, JR., JJ.

Promulgated:
March 15, 2010
FERDINAND T.
BALUNTONG,
Appellant.
x - - - - - - - - - - - -- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x

DECISION

CARPIO MORALES, J.:

Ferdinand T. Baluntong (appellant) appeals from the August 13,

2007 Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals to which the Court had earlier
referred the present case for intermediate review following People v.
Mateo.[2]

In its challenged Decision, the appellate court affirmed appellants

conviction by the Regional Trial Court of Roxas, Oriental Mindoro, Branch
43, of Double Murder with Frustrated Murder, following his indictment for
such offense in an Information reading:

That on or about the 31st day of July 1998, at about 10:30 in the
evening at Barangay Danggay, Municipality of Roxas, Province
of Oriental Mindoro, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of
 this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, did, then and
there, with malice aforethought and with deliberate intent to
kill, set on fire, the house of Celerina Solangon, causing the
complete destruction of the said house and the death of
Celerina Solangon and Alvin Savarez, and inflicting serious
physical injuries on Josua (sic) Savarez, thereby performing all
the acts of execution which would produce the crime of murder
as a consequance (sic) but which, nevertheless do not produce it
by reason of causes independent of the will of the
perpetrator.[3] x x x x (underscoring supplied)

Gathered from the records of the case is the following version of the
prosecution:

At around 10:30 p.m. of July 31, 1998, while then 12-year old Jovelyn
Santos (Jovelyn) was sleeping in the house of her grandmother Celerina
Solangon (Celerina) at Barangay Dangay, Roxas, Oriental Mindoro, she was
awakened by heat emanating from the walls of the house. She thus roused
her cousin Dorecyll and together they went out of the house.

Jovelyn saw appellant putting dry hay (dayami) around the house
near the terrace where the fire started, but appellant ran away when he saw
her and Dorecyll.

Appellants neighbor, Felicitas Sarzona (Felicitas), also saw appellant

near Celerinas house after it caught fire, following which, appellant fled on
seeing Jovelyn and Dorecyll stepping out of the house, as other neighbors
repaired to the scene to help contain the flames. Felicitas also saw Celerina,
who was at a neighbors house before the fire started, enter the burning
house and resurface with her grandsons Alvin and Joshua.

Celerina and Alvin sustained third degree burns which led to their
death. Joshua sustained second degree burns.

Upon the other hand, appellant, denying the charge, invoked alibi, claiming
that he, on his mother Rosalindas request, went to Caloocan City on July
15, 1998 (16 days before the incident) and stayed there until February
1999. Rosalinda corroborated appellants alibi.

By Decision of February 28, 2003, the trial court found appellant guilty as
charged, disposing as follows:

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered as follows:

(a) The court finds accused Ferdinand Baluntong GUILTY beyond

reasonable doubt of the complex crime of Double Murder with
Frustrated Murder punishable under Article 248 of the Revised
Penal Code as amended by Republic Act 7659 in relation to
Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code and is hereby sentenced to
suffer the supreme penalty of DEATH to be executed in
accordance with the existing law;

xxxx

(c) Accused Ferdinand Baluntong is also ordered to pay the heirs of

Celerina Suba Solangon the sum of P50,000.00
as compensatory damages and the heirs of Elvin [sic]
Savariz the following: (I) the sum
of P50,000.00 as compensatory damages (II) the sum
of P16,500.00 as actual damages; and (III) the sum
of P50,000.00 as moral damages.

SO ORDERED.[4] (emphasis in the original; italics and underscoring

supplied)

In affirming the trial courts conviction of appellant, the appellate court

brushed aside appellants claim that the prosecution failed to prove his guilt
beyond reasonable doubt. The appellate court, however, modified the trial
courts decision by reducing the penalty to reclusion perpetua in light of
the passage of Republic Act No. 9346,[5] and
by additionallyawarding exemplary damages to the heirs of the victims
(Celerina and Alvin), and temperate damages to Joshua representing his
hospitalization and recuperation. Thus the appellate court disposed:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the February 28, 2003 Decision
of the Regional Trial Court of Roxas, Oriental Mindoro, Branch
43, is MODIFIED as follows:

1. Accused-appellant FERDINAND BALUNTONG y

TALAGA is found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt
of the complex crime of Double Murder with
Frustrated Murder and is hereby sentenced to suffer
the penalty of reclusion perpetua.

2. Accused-appellant is further required to pay

the heirs of the victims the amount of
P25,000.00 as exemplary damages and the amount
of P25,000.00 as temperate damages for the
hospitalization and recuperation of Joshua
Savariz.

3. In all other respects, the February 28, 2003 Decision

of the regional trial court is
hereby AFFIRMED. (italics and emphasis in the
[6]

original; underscoring supplied)

In his Brief, appellant raises doubt on prosecution witness Felicitas claim

that she saw appellant fleeing away from the burning house, it being then
10:30 p.m. and, therefore, dark.He raises doubt too on Jovelyns claim that
she saw appellant, given her failure to ask him to stop putting dried hay
around the house if indeed her claim were true.

After combing through the records of the case, the Court finds that the trial
court, as well as the appellate court, did not err in finding that appellant
was the malefactor.

There should be no doubt on prosecution witnesses Felicitas and Jovelyns

positive identification of their neighbor-herein appellant as the person they
saw during the burning of the house, given, among other things, the
illumination generated by the fire. Consider the following testimonies of
Felicitas and Jovelyn:

FELICITAS:

Q: Which portion of the house was on fire when you saw Balentong
(sic) for the first time?

A: The fire was at the rear portion going up, sir.

Q: How far was Balentong (sic) from that burning portion of the
house?

A: He was just infront (sic) of the house, sir.

Q: How far from the burning portion of the house?

A: About two (2) meters away, sir.

Q: The two (2) meters from the front portion or two (2) meters from
the burning portion?

A: About two (2) meters, sir.

Q: From the burning portion?

A: Yes, sir.[7] (underscoring supplied)

JOVELYN:

Q: How big was the fire when according to you, you saw the back of
this Ferdinand Balontong (sic)?

A: It is already considerable size, Your Honor.

Q: What effect has this fire in the illumination in that vicinity,

regarding visibility of that vicinity?
A: The surrounding was illuminated by that fire, Your
Honor.[8] (underscoring supplied)

Appellants alibi must thus fail.

In determining the offense committed by appellant, People v.

Malngan[9] teaches:

[I]n cases where both burning and death occur, in order to

determine what crime/crimes was/were perpetrated whether
arson, murder or arson and homicide/murder, it is de
rigueur to ascertain the main objective of the malefactor: (a) if
the main objective is the burning of the building or edifice,
but death results by reason or on the occasion of arson, the
crime is simply arson, and the resulting homicide is absorbed;
(b) if, on the other hand, the main objective is to kill a
particular person who may be in a building or edifice, when fire
is resorted to as the means to accomplish such goal the crime
committed is murder only; lastly, (c) if the objective is,
likewise, to kill a particular person, and in fact the offender
has already done so, but fire is resorted to as a means to cover
up the killing, then there are two separate and distinct crimes
committed homicide/murder and arson. (emphasis and
underscoring partly in the original; emphasis partly supplied)

Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1613, Amending the Law on Arson, reads:

Section 3. Other Cases of Arson. The penalty of Reclusion Temporal

to Reclusion Perpetua shall be imposed if the property burned
is any of the following:

xxxx
2. Any inhabited house or dwelling;

The Court finds that there is no showing that appellants main

objective was to kill Celerina and her housemates and that the fire was
resorted to as the means to accomplish the goal.

In her Affidavit executed on August 11, 1998,[10] Felicitas stated that

what she knew is that Celerina wanted appellant, who was renting a house
near Celerinas, to move out.

How Felicitas acquired such knowledge was not probed into, however,
despite the fact that she was cross-examined thereon.[11]

Absent any concrete basis then to hold that the house was set on fire to kill
the occupants, appellant cannot be held liable for double murder with
frustrated murder. This is especially true with respect to the death of
Celerina, for even assuming arguendo that appellant wanted to kill her to
get even with her in light of her alleged desire to drive him out of the
neighboring house, Celerina was outside the house at the time it was set on
fire. She merely entered the burning house to save her grandsons.
While the above-quoted Information charged appellant with Double
Murder with Frustrated Murder, appellant may be convicted of Arson. For
the only difference between a charge for Murder under Article 248 (3) of
the Revised Penal Code and one for Arson under the Revised Penal Code, as
amended by Section 3 (2) of P.D. No. 1613, lies in the intent in pursuing the
act.

As reflected above, as it was not shown that the main motive was to kill the
occupants of the house, the crime would only be arson, the homicide being
a mere consequence thereof, hence, absorbed by arson.[12]

When there is variance between the offense charged in the complaint or

information and that proved, and the offense charged is included or
necessarily includes the offense proved, conviction shall be for the offense
proved which is included in the offense charged, or the offense charged
which is included in the offense proved.[13]

Under Section 5 of P.D. 1613, the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death is

imposed when death results. In the light of the passage of Republic Act No.
9346,[14] the penalty should be reclusion perpetua.
A word on the damages awarded.

The appellate court affirmed the award of compensatory damages to the

heirs of Celerina. But entitlement thereto was not proven.

The appellate court likewise affirmed the award of compensatory

damages, actual damages, and moral damages to the heirs
of Alvin. Compensatory damages and actual damages are the same,
however.[15] Since the trial court awarded the duly proven actual damages
of P16,500.00 representing burial expenses, the award of compensatory
damages of P50,000.00 does not lie. It is gathered from the evidence,
however, that Alvin was hospitalized for five days,[16] hence, an award
of P8,500.00 as temperate damages for the purpose would be reasonable.

As for the award to Alvin of moral damages, the records do not yield
any basis therefor.

More. The appellate court awarded exemplary damages to the heirs of

the victims, clearly referring to the deceased Celerina and Alvin. Absent
proof of the presence of any aggravating circumstances, however, the award
does not lie.[17]

When death occurs due to a crime, the grant of civil indemnity requires no
proof other than the death of the victim. The heirs of Celerina are thus
entitled to an award of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity ex delicto.[18] And so
are Alvins.

The appellate courts award of temperate damages of P25,000.00 to Joshua

is in order.
WHEREFORE, the assailed Court of Appeals Decision of August 13,
2007 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and a NEW one is
rendered as follows:

Appellant, Ferdinand T. Baluntong, is found GUILTY

beyond reasonable doubt of Simple Arson under Sec. 3(2) of
P.D. No. 1613 and is sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua with no eligibility for parole.

Appellant is ORDERED to pay the amount of P50,000.00 to

the heirs of Celerina Solangon, and the same amount to the
heirs of Alvin Savariz, representing civil indemnity.

Appellant is likewise ORDERED to pay the amount

of P16,500.00 to the heirs of Alvin as actual damages for burial
expenses, and P8,500.00 as temperate damages for
hospitalization expenses.

Appellant is further ORDERED to pay P25,000.00 as

temperate damages to the heirs of Celerina.

Finally, appellant is ORDERED to pay P25,000.00 as

temperate damages to Joshua Savariz.

SO ORDERED.