ROSARIO P. TAN, vs. ARTEMIO G.

RAMIREZ, et al
GR. No. 158929 August 3, 2010

Facts:
Petitioner Rosario P. Tan, representing her parents (spouses Crispo and Nicomedesa P. Alumbro), filed a complaint
for the recovery of ownership and possession and/or quieting of title of a one-half portion of the subject property
against Roberto Ramirez, father and predecessor-in-interest of the respondents.

The petitioner alleged that her great-grandfather Catalino Jaca Valenzona was the owner of the subject property
under a 1915 Tax Declaration (TD) No. 2724. Catalino had four children; among them are Gliceria and Valentina,
mother of Nicomedesa Alumbro. When Catalino died Gliceria inherited the subject property. Subsequently, Gliceria
died, her spouse Gavino inherited the one-half portion of the said property, while the other half was acquired by
Nicomedesa through inheritance, in representation of her mother, Valentina and through purchase of the shares of
their other siblings.

In 1961, Nicomedesa constituted Roberto Ramirez as tenant of her half of the subject property. Nicomedesa also
bought Gavinos one-half portion to his heirs, Ronito and Wilfredo Oyao, and later on sold to Roberto the said one-
half portion, evidenced by a Deed of Absolute Sale of Agricultural Land. But in 1997, Nicomedesa discovered that
since 1974, Roberto had been reflecting the subject property solely in his name under TD No. 4193.

The respondents traced the ownership of the said property, when Roberto bought half of the property to Nicomedesa
in 1965 and the remaining half from Gavinos heirs in 1972. Furthermore, when the said property was part of the
subject property in pending litigation of a civil case, Roberto bought the subject property from Belacho in 1977
through a Deed of Absolute Sale of Land, Prior to the Compromise Agreement entered into by Roberto and
Nicomedesa with Belacho to settle the said case.

The appellate court ruled that the respondents are the true owners of the property, there being acquisitive
prescription. The deed of absolute sale and compromise agreement constitute just title, thus, their 24 years of
possession was more than enough to meet the 10-year possession required by law.

Issue: Whether or not the compromise agreement and deed of sale were enough bases for good faith and just title,
thus allowing ordinary acquisitive prescription to take place.

Ruling:
The Supreme Court ruled that Compromise agreement not a valid basis of possession in good faith and just title. The
main purpose of a compromise agreement is to put an end to litigation because of the uncertainty that may arise from
it. It does not create or transmit ownership rights over a property. Neither a deed of sale or contract of sale cannot
support claim of good faith and just title in cases of acquisitive prescription. Good faith, or the want of it, can be
ascertained only from the acts of the one claiming it, as it is a condition of mind that can only be judged by actual or
fancied token or signs.

The respondents in the case at bar were aware of the pending litigation over the property, as evidenced by the
compromise agreement. Thus, they cannot be considered to be in good faith in acquiring said property by
prescription. The respondents did not acquire the property through ordinary acquisitive prescription since they were
not in good faith. Likewise, they did not acquire such by extraordinary acquisitive prescription for holding it only for 24
years, short of the 30-year period mandated by law.

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EULOGIO RODRIGUEZ vs. SOFRONIO FRANCISCO as Administrator of the Estate of MAXIMO FRANCISCO
G.R. No. L-13343 December 29, 1962

Facts:
Plaintiff Rodriguez filed an action for judicial declaration of ownership, recovery of possession, and damages against
Maximo Francisco for a parcel land registered under Original Certificate of Title No. 2497. The said land was
registered under the name of Exequiel Ampil, who executed a deed of sale covering the said land in favor of
Francisco for the sum of P1,500 in 1924. Thereafter, Francisco took possession of the premises which, upon his
death, was continued by his heirs up to the present, publicly and in the concept of owner. The land taxes were also
religiously paid by Francisco up to 1955. However, the Torrens title continued to be in the name of the vendor
Exequiel Ampil until 1937, as showed in the owners duplicate copy of the land title presented by Francisco which
was delivered to him by Ampil.

Prior to October 21, 1933, Ampil was indebted to various creditors, wherein, Rodriguez guaranteed the payment of
his indebtedness by way of execution of deed of "Venta Condicional", duly registered in the Office of the Register of
Deeds. This deed conveyed the said land together with some other parcels to Rodriguez by a conditional sale, the
conveyance to be absolute upon the fulfillment of certain conditions specified therein. In 1934, Ampil made a partial
payment, Rodriguez then executed "Release of Part of the Conditionally Sold Premises for some of the parcel land.
However, the land in question was held and retained by Rodriguez as security for the money remaining due on the
conditional sale.

In 1936, Rodriguez filed an affidavit consolidating ownership over the land in question together with five other parcels
by virtue of the fact that the conditional sale had become absolute. However, as the Owner's Duplicate Certificate of
Title was unavailable, a petition was filed for the issuance of a new owner's duplicate. The Court then cancelled the
Original Certificate of Title No. 2497 and issued TCT No. 31204 in favor of Rodriguez.

The trial court ruled that Rodriguez was the rightful owner of the disputed land and ordered Francisco to deliver its
possession to him, but the latter found to be a possessor in good faith and hence free from liability for damages.

Issue: Whether or not the defendant Maximo Francisco is a possessor in good faith.

Ruling:
The Court ruled that Francisco was not necessarily a possessor in bad faith. The non-registration of the sale did not
make the vendee one in bad faith. It has not been shown that Francisco was notified or had actual knowledge of the
said proceeding for consolidation of ownership of Rodriguez.

Francisco was in possession of the land for a long time. Deed of sale was a good and sufficient title for such
possession since it was acquired without any flaw which would invalidate it. The possession having begun in good
faith, presumed that it continued to be enjoyed in the same character unless it was proven that the possessor was
not unaware that his possession was wrongful (Articles 528 and 529, Civil Code).

However, considering that Rodriguez was declared owner by final judgment, Franciscos possession in good faith
was interrupted and hence from that time he lost the right to the fruits. Thus, the Court ruled that Maximo Francisco
should be held liable for damages consisting of the fruits of the land in question, only from the year 1951 until the
restoration of the possession of the land to Rodriguez.

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FLORENTINO OCHOA, et al vs. MAURO APETA and APOLONIA ALMAZAN
G.R. No. 146259 September 13, 2007

Facts:
Since 1910, the above-named petitioners and their predecessors-in-interest have been occupying and built their
houses and apartment building in Lot No. 1580, covered by TCT No. T-40624 registered in the Registry of Deeds of
Laguna. However, in 1982, respondents Mauro Apeta and Apolonia Almazan found that they are the true owners of
Lot No. 1580, covered by Certificate of Title No. RT-599 (10731) issued by the Registry of Deeds of Laguna.

During the result of the resurvey conducted by Engr. Romulo Unciano of the Bureau of Lands of Region IV as
commissioned by the trial judge, it shows that Lot No. 1580, occupied by petitioners, was registered in the name of
Margarita Almada, respondents predecessor-in-interest; and that the lot covered by TCT No. T-40624 is not Lot No.
1580, but Lot No. 1581 registered in the name of Servillano Ochoa, petitioners predecessor-in-interest, which has
been occupied by Isidro Jasmin.

The trial court rendered a decision in favor of respondents. The CA also affirmed the judgment of the RTC.

Issue: Whether or not the petitioners and their predecessors-in-interest who have built their houses and apartment
building on Lot No. 1580, were builders in good faith.

Ruling:
Good faith is an intangible and abstract quality with no technical meaning or statutory definition, and it encompasses,
among other things, an honest belief, the absence of malice and the absence of design to defraud or to seek an
unconscionable advantage. It implies honesty of intention, and freedom from knowledge of circumstances which
ought to put the holder upon inquiry. The essence of good faith lies in an honest belief in the validity of ones right,
ignorance of a superior claim and absence of intention to overreach another. Applied to possession, one is
considered in good faith if he is not aware that there exists in his title or mode of acquisition any flaw which
invalidates it.

The Court is convinced that petitioners and their predecessors-in-interest were in good faith when they built their
houses and apartment building on Lot No. 1580, since they were convinced it was covered by their TCT No. T-
40624.

Thus, the Court ruled that the respondents have the option to pay for the houses and apartment building constructed
by petitioners and their predecessors-in-interest on Lot No. 1580; or to oblige petitioners to pay the price of the lot in
an amount not more than the value of the said improvements.

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Note: Prescription, as a mode of acquiring ownership and other real rights over immovable
property,[21] is concerned with lapse of time in the manner and under conditions laid down
by law, namely, that the possession should be in the concept of an owner, public, peaceful,
uninterrupted, and adverse.[22] The party who asserts ownership by adverse possession
must prove the presence of the essential elements of acquisitive prescription
Acquisitive prescription of real rights may be ordinary or extraordinary.[24] Ordinary
acquisitive prescription requires possession in good faith and with just title for ten
years.[25] In extraordinary prescription, ownership and other real rights over immovable
property are acquired through uninterrupted adverse possession for thirty years without
need of title or of good faith.
Possession in good faith consists in the reasonable belief that the person from whom the
thing is received has been the owner thereof, and could transmit his ownership. [27] There is
just title when the adverse claimant came into possession of the property through one of
the modes recognized by law for the acquisition of ownership or other real rights, but the
grantor was not the owner or could not transmit any right.

Note: In the case of Tacas vs. Tobon, 53 Phil. 356, 361, this court, citing Manresa (Vol. 4, 270, 271), stated:

"But to every possessor in good faith there comes a time when he is considered a possessor in bad faith.
When the owner possessor with a better right comes along, when he becomes aware that what he had taken
for granted is at least doubtful, and when he learns the grounds in support of the adverse contention, good faith
ceases.
. It is at this time that his possession is interrupted, according to article 1945, and that he ceases to receive the
fruits, according to the first paragraph of article 451. there is a great difference between requiring the possessor
in good faith to return the fruits he received from the time when his possession was legally interrupted, and
considering him a possessor in bad faith for all legal purposes from that time, the law had to establish a definite
rule in the matter, which is none other than that deducible from a combination of articles 452, 1945, and 435.

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