Ch.

Jonathan Culler points out that to apostrophize is to will a state of affairs, to attempt to bring
into being by asking inanimate objects to bend themselves to your desireto posit a potentially
responsive or at least attentive universe, to which one has a relation (215-16).

It comes from a line in Archibald Macleishs Ars Poetica: A poem should be palpable and
mute / As a globed fruit. I think a thing, as a poem, too, does not need to speak to be
expressible. It impinges its flow of influence upon the surroundings, regardless of humans
sensibility and consciousness, with its own self-sustaining energeticvitality inside itself
(Bennett, Vibrant Matter 5).

Maria Konnikova, in her article on neurogastronomy, This Man will Transform how you Eat,
captures distinctively a dish of truffle served in one of the Englands best renowned modernist
restaurants, Fat Duck:

A plate was silently placed in front of me, or rather, a dark brown platform of
what looked at first to be sod (actually a mixture of beetroot and mushroom
powder with truffle), adorned with bursts of yellow pollen (a compact butter with
truffle, root vegetables, and salt), anchored by a crinkled log (potato-starch paper
covered in smoked salt, powdered mushroom, and porcini)...

How does the food taste points to a more honest question What does the food taste like?

The environment lingers between the human and the more-than-human. Emily Dickinson asks,
Does the use of the term surrender, for example, actually help us to explain, or even describe,
the behaviour of a rodent? (qtd. in Shackleford 47). How can we as humans know that the
sleeping, preening, and perfuming of the vegetables are the same as those physically and
psychologically experienced by us?
Paul de Man states, anthropomorphism is not just a trope but an identification on the level of
substance. It takes one entity or another and thus implies the constitution of specific entities prior
to their confusion, the taking of something for something else that can then be assumed to be
given (Anthropomorphism and Trope in Lyric 241). Barbara Johnson elaborates de Mans
taking to be given as being presupposed without the need to be defined (Anthropomorphism
in Lyric and Law 160). Neruda treats the artichoke as a secretive human being, without making
it explicit that the artichoke as a human being is created by the poet.

COMMENTS ON ARTICHOKE
-state of mind, habit of mind, landscape, an air of anonymous, the ribbon of travel, enters a fresh
level of awareness through, Nerudian vein, evocations of, supernatural tinge, the terrestrial roam,
loses its strata, repercussions, downward and subterranean axis, contextualization, configuration,
construction of meaning, pulse,
-love, seduction, enchantment, erotic discourse, its drive towards specificity, for someone,
reframeability (Pindar's Eyes: Visual and Material Culture in Epinician Poetry By David Fearn
93)
-translators: not political, but more drawn to Nerudas surrealist image (Hays, Bly, Belitt)
-ritual poetics and fictional poetics ; ritual premise and fictional imperatives // transpose,
transform, transcribe, revalorize // choral and characterlogical dimensions // lyric impulse and
fictional strategy
-Ritual: the devotional experience of lyric, not a coherent representation, the image is dissolved
rather than reassembled, binding of instants, without succession, timeless present, electric sense
of times openness and availability (R. Greene, Two Ritual Sequences 27), synchrony and
collectivity, indefinitely recoverable and indefinitely repeatable, repetition / re-uttered / re-
performed / ceremonious / to help give us a world to inhabit / feel it like home as Bachelard
says (Culler 123, 131) / ritual elements of lyric (Culler 125) // the process of naming / repetition
179
-Fictive: serial representation,
 (R. Greene,
Spatiality 2) ; fictional speaker and a situation of utterance
-horizonal and vertical movements (horizontal: daily routine, development, biographical:
reductionist; vertical: from outside to the inside, from the exterior to the interior, anti-biopic:
ramifying) (R. Greene, Spatiality 2) --- inhabited space transcends geometric space [geometry
confers sense on the notion of horizon and object (R. Greene, Spatiality 8)
-Nerudas materialism:

(R. Greene, Spatiality 12) ; the plane of existence: the physical, the spatial poetics (R. Greene,
Spatiality 14)
-Proper name / anthropomorphism / essence more than tropes or figures:

(Chase 11)
-The Wild Card of Reading: On Paul de Man By Rodolphe Gasch [Anthropomorphism] 193,
204, 205 (make language alive / performative)
-Cold War Criticism and the Politics of Skepticism By Tobin Siebers [Anthropomorphism] 96
(good reading of de Mans reading of Correspondences and Obsessions)
COMMENTS ON SALT
-Puttingham 324:

- Figuring Jasper Johns By Fred Orton 183 (Prosopopoeia)

-Prosopopoeia of de Man takes essence away, essence can only be mediated and can only be
understood from the positing act of language --- a critique of anthropomorphism --- destabilize
the subject-object binary
-true authority of figural significance, the figural given, perennial awareness, non-verbal
equivalent, burgeoning, the salt is elusive as much as it is substantial, ontological priority of
reality, the carrier of meaning, shifts from the objective descriptive to the subjectivizing
prosopopoeiea, makes sensory perception an exercise in domination, metamorphosis / engaged /
take part in the act of sensing and viewing and organizing and structuring, ontological rigor of
factivity (Ngai 7), ontological priority, conspicuously strained concept/figure/metaphor, the
ontological status is changed, in a full ontological sense of the term/concept
-susceptibility to things, leaving intact its resonances with the inhuman and inanimate orders,
figural corporeality, new sensitivity, new expressivity, new subjectivity

The salt sings. It keeps singing. Singing appears to be the only way for it to justify and to sustain
its existential being. The sonority of its beingits singingconcentrates the repercussions of the
salts singularity and density. The poetic image of the salt urges on a feeling of fullness
perhaps, a complete and consummate presence. The salt asks, through its persistence to sing, to
be considered not as an object and even less as the substitute for an object but to have its
specificity seized (Bachelard xix). Neruda seizes the specificity of the salt by giving it a face
through giving it a voice. The salt has skin (la piel) and mouth (boca). It is more
prosopopoeia than personification.
One that intoxicates most is in his famous Sonnet XVII from 100 Love Sonnets: I dont love
you as if you were a rose of salt, topaz, / or arrow of carnations that propagate fire: / I love you
as one loves certain obscure things, / secretly, between the shadow and the soul (39.1-4). The
ineffable intervenes and sustains the love. The elegantly-twirled rose of salt cannot contain the
obscurities of love, which can hardly be framed or explained. The excellence of
The salt in Sonnet XVII indicates a solidified presence.

The spaciousness or spacelessnessthe uncontainable thing-ness of saltis Nerudas love, as he

sings in Marine Night of Canto General: Love me with Space (370.24).

Space is an abstraction.

Paul de Man translates prosopopoeia as a giving of face. In Autobiography as De-Facement, de

Man says that the figure of prosopopoeia is the fiction of an apostrophe to an absent, deceased,
or voiceless entity, which posits the possibility of the latters reply and confers upon it the power
of speech. Voice assumes mouth, eye, and finally face, a chain that is manifest in the etymology
of the tropes name, prosopon poien, to confer a mask or a face (prosopon) (75-76).

Michael Riffaterre cites Pierre Fontaniers Les Figures du discours that prosopopoeia should not
be confused with personification, apostrophe or dialogism, which can be removed in the
existence of prosopopoeia (107-08). Riffaterre explains, It is not necessary that the fictitious
embodiment of the animated entity be physical enough to demand verisimilitude; prosopopoeia
only presupposes animation without presupposing the image of a person, as personification.
Giving animate qualities to the inanimate, prosopopoeia proffers a mask (that might not even be
a face) to give free play to the viewers imagination.

Then, speech does not necessarily, as Heidegger claims, lead to a clear-cut differentiation
between humans and non-humans, because speech, through the rhetoric of calling, exposes the
indeterminacies in the totalitarian categorization of humans and non-humans.
That Nerudas being there with the salt, without action, intrusion or interruption, elicits the other
side of prosopopoeia: reification. Through letting the salt call, Neruda is called. He is called to
listen, to observe, to be inspired, as an entity to be acted upon. Neruda gestures that he is ripped
off the figural speech inception, which now belongs to the salt. The reification operates on
another level.

In the ode, the salt is a strong voice pursuing attention and acknowledgment, to the extent that
the skin surfaces and a mouth surges. It is asking for a form. Perhaps, clothing in a form, as it
desires, can make its presence felt. The human form is still waiting to be attained. Now, the salt
is yet to be personified. It is given a voice: a possibility to speak; further, a possibility to use
language to turn itself into a person, or more specificallynot a person

Still, it is different from speaking. Speech is recognized as a significant possession of humans as

compared with non-humans. Heidegger says, Man speaks. We speak when we are awake and
we speak in our dreamsIt is held that man, in distinction from plant and animal, is the living
being capable of speech (214). But the interesting thing is that animation can blur the
boundaries between humans and non-humans. Johnson recognizes that to animate the inanimate,
for instance, through the rhetoric of calling such as apostrophe, makes it difficult to differentiate
between the animate and the inanimate. She states, the rhetoric of calling makes it difficult to
tell the difference between the animate and the inanimate, as anyone with a telephone answering
machine can attest (Apostrophe, Animation, and Abortion 34).

Prosopopoeia, carrying the ability to animate the animate, is implicitly an apostrophe, an

invocation, an attempt to bring back something that was presumably present but no longer is
present (qtd. in Paxon 65). So, prosopopoeia, in a way more effectual than personification,
confers ambiguity on the humans/non-humans differentiation. Consider lines 15-27 in the ode

Neruda, in an interview by Rita Guibert, enunciates that his vision of the Elemental Odes is to
seek out all possible sounds, pursue every colour, and look for life forces wherever they may
bein creation or in destruction from the humbler subjects and things (38).
 The voice of the salt is absent. Yet, the face of the salt is maintained. The condition for
the salt being a person is retained because of its animated face, although its personified image is
never fully realized. Here, the voice is not as much important as the face. The salt does not speak
but shows. It salts. Chase asserts that de Mans translation of prosopopoeia into a giving of face
instead of into a traditional presentation of an imaginary person is a reading. De Mans
translation implies that a face is the conditionnot the equivalentof the existence of a
person (Chase 83). The faces conditionality engenders potentials and possibilities of becoming
human, different from the anthropomorphism which substantializes and defines humans. When
de Man in Wordsworth and the Victorians sees the face as the locus of speech, the
necessary condition for the existence of articulated language in William Wordsworths line in
Prelude,1 he actually sees the face as the recognition of an entity or agency that bridges the
distinction between mind and world by allowing them to exist in the proximity, in the dialogue
of this distinction (89).

the beyond that keeps close to nature of things, the sensuousness of materialism VS pathetic
fallacy, Chases prosopopoeia is only a figure, de Mans prosopopoeia as tropes [difference
between anthropomorphism and prosopopoeia], Puttenhams prospopoeia as fiction

but a salt that salts, as Barbara Johnson says of Martin Heideggers The thing thingsthat a
noun being a verb, with the thing becoming an act, can let the thing tell us what it is (Persons
and Things 62-63).

The salt-ness is not only about the salt; or, the salt is actually beyond our imaginable salt-ness.
The salt-ness is the union of the earth and the sea through the enactment of Eros manifested in
tongue, kiss, and taste. It goes out of any possible framing. It is a drift, coming out from the
shake of the saltshaker, carrying sensible or insensible momentum for being the least wave. It
flows, and keeps flowing, as lingering as an essential flavour of something inhering within the
figural space of human intelligibilitythe infinite.

1
Hitherto / In progress through this Verse, my mind hath lookd / Upon the speaking face of
earth and heaven / As her prime Teacher (qtd. in de Man 89).
Conclusion:
-scale
-It is as if something between the shadow and the soul (entre la sombra y el alma), as stated
in the Sonnet XVII of Nerudas 100 Love Sonnets (39.4). // In a way, all of Nerudas poems are
love poems. He loved being alive and recorded his moments of joy and sorrow, beauty and
despair, love in its many manifestations. To him love is an essential life-giving spark. In a word,
intimacy. (Mary Heebner's website)
-The salt-ness of salt that salts is not a penetrable substance. Margaret Sayers Peden, one of the
most respectable translators of Latin American literature, and also one of the translators of the
Ode to Salt and Nerudas other odes, says that when she translates Nerudas works, she has a
rich experience of finding Nerudas words as fluid grace. She describes, Nerudas words as like
amoebae. She says, they have a perceptible core, which once was probably very firm and
specific, but now is surrounded with this translucent, fluctuating, what?skirt? Aura? Matter of
some kindand its rare to hit the word in that core. The right meaning or equivalent is much
more likely to be found in its gelatinous fringe (Hoggard).
Ch.2

Notes
[Why Deleuze?]
Deleuzes War Machine in TP
-not only speak of but offer ; its way of being / a style of being ; lingering ; the thawing of
the world (Alonso) ; fluidity and solidity --- at once antithetical and complementary,
distributes binary oppositions, and forms a milieu of interiority (Deleuze, TP 373),
irreducible, outside, prior, from elsewhere (TP 374) ; Neruda is similar to the war machine:
sees [Nerudas EYES, surrealism] all things in relations of becoming rather than implementing
binary distributions between states ---- against capitalism --- Michel de Certeau, Henri Lefebre
(TP 374) ; an affect in which no subjective interiority remains (TP 378) // AFFECT // at once
intimate and impersonal (on affect, Gregg 2) --- the in-betweenness (Gregg 10), forces of
encounter, perpetual becoming, this-ness, yet-ness, passages of intensity, not just impersonal
but sub-personal and pre-personal (Gregg 3), become less decidedly sure and more
nonsequential, makes our mode of inquiry begin with movement rather than stasis, with process
always underway rather than a position taken (Gregg 4) ; shimmers (Gregg 11) ; relationality
(Gregg 13) ; the angle of arrival, the feel of an atmosphere (Gregg 19) ; rhizome VS arborescent
(TP 380) ; clinamen: meaning between a straight line and a curve (TP 383) ; smooth space and
striated space (TP 384, 385, 392, 393, 403, 404, 406), from striated to smooth space (TP 392),
smooth space is a space of contact (TP 393) ; an event more than an essence (TP 384), no points,
paths, or land (TP 403) ; the sea is a smooth space (TP 385, 409) ; the form-matter in favour
of material-forces, continuous variations, seize or determine singularities in the matter (TP 386,
391, 393, 428, 430, 431 [fixed matter-form model, splitting wood, add haecceities and
affects, material traits of expression], 431 [matter-flow, artisan is the one who follows the flow
of matter], 433 [overspills] ) --- not as good forms that organize matter, but forces of thrust by
the material (TP 387) ; operative logic of movement: one does not represent, one engenders
and traverses (TP 386) ; aptitude (TP 388) ; noology: the study of the images of thought and its
historicity (TP 398) --- no method, but only relays, intermezzos, resurgences (TP 399), thought
is a double-becoming (TP 402) ; not having control over language (TP 400) ; the in-between,
always a relay, a path is always between two points (TP 402) ; nomad (TP 402) ; movement and
speed (TP 403): vortical or swirling movement thats significant to smooth space (TP 403) ;
deterritorization (TP 403) ; order of displacement (sounds and rhythms) (TP 412) ; projection
(TP 417) ; affects and feelings (TP 422) ; metallurgy (TP 427) ; assemblage (TP 428) ;
corporeality/materiality (TP 429) / events-affects (TP 430) / roundness (TP 430) ; stretching (TP
430) ; rhizome (TP 437) ; something real and nonactual (TP 442)

-Affect: Sara Ahmeds Happy Objects (The Affect Theory Reader): loving orientation 32 ;
we are moved by things, and in being moved, we make things 33 ; habit, work 35 ; how we
enter that room will affect what impressions we receive, to receive an impression is to make an
impression 37 ; passing: transform objects by a sleight of hand 38 ; embracing the future 50

-words --- goose bumps

-Lawler, Celestial Pantomime: Poetic Structures of Transcendence: patterns, meaning of

patterns, ultimacy, that something, hermeneutic of structures 8 ; words as content and words
as summons 9 ; enumeration 12

ONION

-poetic transformation of the onion ; poetic intervention ; poetic surpassing ; poetic

contemplation ; poetically perceived ; poetic-phenomenological study ; ontologically
performative utterances
-Deleuze: derives from Spinozas stoicism, battling against Platonic and Christian
transcendence (Transcendence, Immanence, and Intercultural Philosophy, edited by Nahum
Brown, William Franke ix) ; representational transcendence VS apophatic transcendence
which opens the way for a relationship of non-opposition between the concepts of
transcendence and immanence (xiv) ; no beginning nor end (xiv) ; the verb to be (xv) ;
non-representational thinking as source of creation and origin (xvii)
-immanent orientation
-Burke: transcendence upwards, transcendence downwards, and transcendence between the
two 6
-Farancei: not above or beyond the earthly realm, but an immanent transcendence 8, VS
Rilke and Stevens --- Neruda is from below (Bly) 3 ; seeing is imaging 5 ; changes from
substance to subtlety 6, 7 ; a completing of the truth 7 ; crossing/dynamic 7, 10 ;
undecidability 9 ; not a subjective experience but a new form of objectivity 11 ; horizontal
transcendence 11 ; self-reflecting flitter and ontological vacancy 12 ; Stevens jar 13
-Desmonds The Intimate Universal: a gap, never a complete presence, intimated 71,
difficult to separate the subject and the object (this is intimacy) 72, 75, 79, the between 73,
the gap is the chaos 74, 76, porosity 75, prior to projecting and producing, there is the
more intimate universal 75, the more primordial porosity (outside us, inside us, above us,
down under us) 76, 80, 82, neither imitation nor self-creation 76, speaks from a height
when something speaks to us deeply 76, silence 77, the crossing 77, the power that passes
between them 77, transcendence and the betweenness and immanence 85, 86 ; let come
on its terms 78 (longing, wooing, waiting), evokes the dunamis coming to form 78,
ontologically deep 79, metaxological character of imagination 80 ; mania/muse/Eros/techne
81 ; elsewhere 82 ; patience and striving (seizure) / speed and slowness 82 [watermelon] ;
techne (imposes form on matter) 83 ; artworks are always between happenings 83 ; intimacy
and universality is not a division but a doubleness 86 ; fineness (intimacy) 83, 87 ;

-Ch.9 Practice Via Deleuze, in Transcendence, Immanence, and Intercultural Philosophy:

practice, Deleuze: paradoxes allow us to be present at genesis 212 ; no real object nor real agent
(no separation between subject and object) 215 ; attention and concentration 216 ; suspending
216 ; thinking not-thinking (beyond thinking) 218 ; Deleuzes ?-being is a problematic field
220 ; a space that precedes all qualities 222 ; Deleuzes virtual 223, 231, Practice as the
unthinkable/and opens the virtual 231

-Ch.1 Getting Past Transcendence in Transcendence, Immanence, and Intercultural

Philosophy: strict transcendence 3 ; Frankes A Philosophy of the Unsayable 5 ; Dao: immanent
(consistent) and transcendent (other/nameless) 13, the unsayable/the unnamable/the
unthinkable/the non-representational 13 --- the determinate and the indeterminate aspects 13 ;
architecture / nothingness / shape / jar / container 14 ; without reference to fixed rules and
precepts 15 ; human becomings rather than human beings? 15 ; genealogical rather than
metaphysical 16 ; the meanings of nothing and something 23 ; to be 24, what something is is
not essence 25 ; Creatio Ex Nihilo and Creatio in Situ 25 ; situation and context are always prior
to agency 26 ; part and whole VS foci and field / radical monist VS vibrantly pluralistic / being
VS becoming / agency VS situation and context / appeal to beginnings or metaphysical or
transcendent apophatism VS genealogical transformation between persistence and a fecund
receptivity

- Ch.7 Intimate Universal in Transcendence, Immanence, and Intercultural Philosophy:

mindfulness of the between 153 ; definition of intimate universal 154 // other works of Desmond
that would be useful: Philosophy and Its Others: Ways of Being and Mind ; The Intimate
Universal: The Hidden Porosity among Religion, Art, Philosophy and Politics ; Intimate
Strangeness of Being ; meta: in the midst and also over and above/ beyond154 (tense
togetherness of immanence and transcendence 155 --- metaphysics of the between ---
metaxological philosophy); passing between / passing 155 ; exceeds and precedes 155 ; four
basic senses of being 155 ; con-stance and sub-stance 156 ; to stand at all is to embody an
equipoise of energy 156 ; a feel for the flow 157 ; pre-subjective and pre-objective 158 / the
before 163, not to be but born with 165 [immanent: the a priori (Kim 5) ; in a field of
participation in a primal ethos that is a charged field of ontological worth 159 ; examples about
the porosity of being: music, blush 162 ; more elemental 163, 176 (the pre-objective and pre-
subjective and being togetherness of human beings) [Elemental: the givenness / the
uniqueness (God and Between 30, 89 ; Being and the Between 270-78) --- porosity of being ---
metaxological --- passing between --- Ryan 13] ; site of communication ; the integrity of creation
is first a promise (Being and Between 270)
Desmonds Being and Between:

274
not the transcendence as the dualistic opposite 167 / immanent transcendence 167 ; laughter 176

-Ch.11 The Fate of Transcendence in Post-Secular Societies in Transcendence, Immanence,

and Intercultural Philosophy: from out (beyond) to in (inner world) 262 / from the without to the
within 262; Transcendence from within (Herbamas) and immanent transcendence (Simmel,
Weber) 269 ; in China theres no dichotomies as transcendence / immanence 270 ; self-critical
conception of transcendence ; melodies of transcendence (musicality) 274 ; detranscendentalize
and desingularize the beyond 278, 279 ; descending transcendence 279, concrete and multiple
practices of descent 280
The Plane of Immanence:

Deleuze, What is Philosophy 35

[flask / roundness / globe --- Johnson: A work of art, too, is formed around something missing,
but the void is its vanishing point, not its essence (They Urn it 64) ; language as materiality
is very different from the empiricism we tend to think of in connection with things. Perhaps that
is what a thought about a jug allows one to bring together: the arbitrariness of the sign and the
empiricism of things as both being a form of materiality with which man has to cope (71) ---
the Deleuzian transcendental --- The Plane of immanence --- immanent transcendence ---
Desmond: meta means in the midst and beyond --- the virtual / the sign / the being of the sensible
/ object = x / (see also Philosophy and Language) --- onions crocheting: profusion and
diffusion of space / shape / form / void to hold / architecture / passing / Desmonds mindfulness
of the between (Johnsons They Urn it) --- the given / the feel for the givenness --- Bly: less
like a container and more like an arm (The Image as a Form of Intelligence 108) ]

[The poetics of light --- sensation and figuration / lack and excesses / appearance and essence ---
Johnson, Goldstein, Lucretius, Louise Klan]

[Rising and falling --- magnitude --- distributing the multiplicity of senses (roundness,
brightness, taste, moistness, piquant) throughout the in-between --- the being of the sensible ---
touch --- Cooke: curves, breathing, not by variation but the degree of variation --- Deleuzes
curve / rate of change / pure potentiality of the curve / Deleuzes aliquid
Cut Parts

The existential burden of seeking the beyond, encapsulated in the idea of the transcendent in the
history of western philosophy, is hardly confined to philosophers. It is no less a burden to poets.
Seamus Heaney affirms poetrys transcending potentials by saying that poetry inclines to violate
the laws of gravity, to go beyond the conventional determinations, and to rise above social
conventions to offer a world to which we turn incessantly and without knowing it (2-4). The
weight of the transcendent world comes from the fact that it is imagined in actual circumstances
and therefore holds a force to balance out against the historical scenario (3-4), and so the
imagined world is real in a sense that it is generated in the conditions of the reality and poses a
possibility to counter the reality. Poetry, Heaney says, is tilting the scales of reality towards
some transcendent equilibrium (3). Heaney, however, never renders the transcendent as an
elsewhere static realm. He delineates the transcendent as a momentum: It is to know and
celebrate it not only as a matter of proffered argument and edifying content, but as a matter of
angelic potential, a motion of the soul. And this is why I have tried to profess the pleasure and
surprise of poetry, its rightness and thereness, the way it is at one moment unforeseeable and at
the next indispensable (193). The transcendent is not there to be observed, contemplated and
experienced. It is a permeating dynamic, like George Herberts pulley, according to Heaney,
forever balancing and exchanging forces, continuously pursuing the moment of equilibrium,

My first response after reading Nerudas food odes is: What is a tomato? What is an
onion? What is a watermelon? The What is? question directs me to ontology: the study of
the nature of being. The What is? question also elicits certain philosophical presuppositions:
first, it presumes presence. There is certainly something called tomato here; second, it expects
the presence to be affirmed regardless of the possibility of affirmation. There is something called
tomato here which requests a definition or valorisation as an affirmation of its presence. My
second response is: am I really given a sufficient capacity to know what a tomato, an onion, and
a watermelon are? This knowing question leads me to epistemology: the means to get a
knowledge of the world and the study of the theory of knowledge. It also indicates several
philosophical foundations of Western thinking: first, it indicates a logic of binary oppositions,
such as subject/object, essence/appearance, and self/other, so there is a perceiver who perceives
the food which is the perceived; second, in the binary pair one category is seen as superior to the
other in terms of the implication that one is the constituting power and the other the constituted
(May 29). For example, in the perceiver/perceived pair, the perceiver is usually conceived to
play a superior role to the perceived which is there to be acted upon.