Master in Public Administration

MPA506

CASES IN THE CIVIL SERVICE

Dr. Edwin T. Caoleng, DPA

By: Gerard Kevin M. Cayabyab

Cases in the Civil Service

By: Gerard Kevin M. Cayabyab
 1. On Election Ban on Appointment

CAUSING v. COMELEC, EN BANG, G.R NO.199139, September 9,

2014

The only personnel movements prohibited by COMELEC Resolution No.

8737 were transfer and detail.
Transfer is defined in the Resolution as any personnel movement from
one government agency to another or from one department, division,
geographical unit or subdivision of a government agency to another with
or without the issuance of an appointment.

Detail us defined in the Administrative Code of 1987 as the movement of

an employee from one agency to another without the issuance of an
appointment.

Having acquired technical and legal meanings, transfer detail must be

construed as such. Obviously, the movement involving causing did not
equate to either a transfer or a detail within the contemplation of the law if
Mayor Biron only thereby physically transferred her office area from its
old location to the Office of the Mayor some little steps away. We cannot
accept the petitioners argument, therefore, that the phrase any transfer or
details whatsoever encompassed any and all kinds and manner of
personnel movement, including the mere changer in office location

The personnel action that actually took place, albeit a reassignment, was
a valid reassignment, viz: In the instant case, Causing is not stripped
of her functions as Municipal Civil Registrar (MCR). She was merely
required to physically report to the Mayors Office and perform her
functions as Municipal Civil Registrar therein. Definitely, she is still the
MCR, albeit doing her work physically outside of her usual work station.
She is also not deprived of her supervisory function over the staff as she
continues to review their work and signs documents they prepared. While
she may encounter difficulty in performing her duties as a supervisor as
she is not physically near her staff that by itself, however, does not mean
that she has lost supervision over them.
 2. G.R. No. 191644, February 19, 2013

DENNIS A.B. FUNA, PETITIONER,

VS.
ACTING SECRETARY OF JUSTICE ALBERTO C. AGRA, IN HIS
OFFICIAL CONCURRENT CAPACITIES AS ACTING SECRETARY
OF THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE AND AS ACTING SOLICITOR
GENERAL, EXECUTIVE SECRETARY LEANDRO R. MENDOZA,
OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, RESPONDENTS

Section 13, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution expressly prohibits the
President, Vice-President, the Members of the Cabinet, and their deputies
or assistants from holding any other office or employment during their
tenure unless otherwise provided in the Constitution. Complementing the
prohibition is Section 7, Article IX-B of the 1987 Constitution, which bans
any appointive official from holding any other office or employment in the
Government or any subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof,
including government-owned or controlled corporations or their
subsidiaries, unless otherwise allowed by law or the primary functions of
his position.

He represents that on January 12, 2010, he was then the Government

Corporate Counsel when President Arroyo designated him as the Acting
Solicitor General in place of Solicitor General Devanadera who had been
appointed as the Secretary of Justice; that on March 5, 2010, President
Arroyo designated him also as the Acting Secretary of Justice vice
Secretary Devanadera who had meanwhile tendered her resignation in
order to run for Congress representing a district in Quezon Province in the
May 2010 elections; that he then relinquished his position as the
Government Corporate Counsel; and that pending the appointment of his
successor, Agra continued to perform his duties as the Acting Solicitor
General.

Notwithstanding the conflict in the versions of the parties, the fact that
Agra has admitted to holding the two offices concurrently in acting
capacities is settled, which is sufficient for purposes of resolving the
constitutional question that petitioner raises herein.

Issue
 Did the designation of Agra as the Acting Secretary of Justice, concurrently
with his position of Acting Solicitor General, violate the constitutional
prohibition against dual or multiple offices for the Members of the Cabinet
and their deputies and assistants?
Ruling
The petition is meritorious.
The designation of Agra as Acting Secretary of Justice concurrently with
his position of Acting Solicitor General was unconstitutional and void for
being in violation of the constitutional prohibition under Section 13,
Article VII of the 1987 Constitution.

In order to be clear, therefore, the Court holds that all official actions of
Agra as a de facto Acting Secretary of Justice, assuming that was his later
designation, were presumed valid, binding and effective as if he was the
officer legally appointed and qualified for the office. This clarification is
necessary in order to protect the sanctity of the dealings by the public with
persons whose ostensible authority emanates from the State. Agras official
actions covered by this clarification extend to but are not limited to the
promulgation of resolutions on petitions for review filed in the Department
of Justice, and the issuance of department orders, memoranda and circulars
relative to the prosecution of criminal cases.

WHEREFORE, the Court GRANTS the petition for certiorari and

prohibition; ANNULS AND VOIDS the designation of Hon. Alberto C.
Agra as the Acting Secretary of Justice in a concurrent capacity with his
position as the Acting Solicitor General for being unconstitutional and
violative of Section 13, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution; and
DECLARES that Hon. Alberto C. Agra was a de facto officer during his
tenure as Acting Secretary of Justice.
No pronouncement on costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.

3. On Election Ban on Appointment

AQUINO V. COMELEC, En Banc, G>R Nos 211789-90,

Facts: On January 8, 2010, Aquino, as President and Chief Executive Officer
of the Philippine Health Insurance Corporation (PHIC), issued PhilHealth
Special Order No.16, Series of 2010 (reassignment order) directing the
reassignment of several PHIC officers and employees.
 Aquino wrote the COMELEC a letter dated January 11, 2010, 8 asking for
a categorical declaration that the issuance of and transition to the
respective office designations of concerned officers is beyond the purview
COMELEC Resolution No. 8737. He posited that the reassignment order
is beyond the coverage of this COMELEC resolution as he issued it on
January 8, 2010, or prior to the start of the election period that began on
January 11,2010. Aquino reiterated this request in his letter dated February
26, 2010.
The COMELEC declared that Aquino violated Section 261 of BP 881
when he directed the transfer /reassignment of the PHIC officers and
employees within the declared election period without prior approval.
SC: In Resolution No.8737, the COMELEC defined the phrase transfer or
detail whatever found in Section 261(h) of BP 881 as including any
personnel action, i.e., reassignment
The Court agreed with the questioned COMELEC interpretation of the
phrase transfer or detail whatever.
In Regalado, Jr. v. Court of Appeals, the Court already clarified the
interpretation of the term whatever as used in Section 261(h) of BP 881 in
relation to the terms transfer and detail. In agreeing with the Solicitor
Generals position, this Court declared that the terms transfer and detail are
modified by the term whatever such that any movement of personnel from
one station to another, whether or not in the same office or agency, during
the election period is covered by the prohibition.
Any personnel action, when caused or made during the election period, can
be used for electioneering or to harass subordinates with different political
persuasions.
This possibility - of being used for electioneering purposes or to harass
subordinates created by any movement of personnel during the election
period is precisely that the transfer ban seeks to prevent.

The interpretation that includes any form of personnel action, such as

reassignment, within the coverage of the phrase precisely guards against
any such electioneering and political harassment situations. This
interpretation also more vigorously enforces the aim not only of BP 881,
but more importantly of the Constitutions to secure free, orderly, honest,
peaceful and credible elections.
 4. RESOLUTION NO. 02-0012

GATO, Vicente S. Re: Query; Hiring of Non-winning Election Candidates on

Job Order Basis
Honorable Vicente S. Gato, Province of Batanes, requests clarification on the
issue of whether a non-winning candidate in an election may be subsequently
hired on job order bases
. Section 4. A person who lost in an election (except Barangay election) shall
reemployment to any office in the government or any government owned or
controlled corporation within one year following such election.

This is to seek the legal opinion of the Civil Service Commission if the
Provincial Government of Batanes is allowed to hire, on Job Order Basis,
the services of candidates who lost in the recent elections. It is embodied
in the Compendium on Local Autonomy and Local Government that the
prohibition on the hiring of losing candidates does not cover casual or
consultancy employment per DILG Opinion No. 69-1993, however, this
query is being forwarded to obtain you opinion/advise in aid of policy
decision-making in view of the fact that the above-cited DILG opinion can
not be considered for audit.

This is to seek the legal opinion of the Civil Service Commission if the
Provincial Government of Batanes is allowed to hire, on Job Order Basis,
the services of candidates who lost in the recent elections. It is embodied
in the Compendium on Local Autonomy and Local Government that the
prohibition on the hiring of losing candidates does not cover casual or
consultancy employment per DILG Opinion No. 69-1993, however, this
query is being forwarded to obtain you opinion/advise in aid of policy
decision-making in view of the fact that the above-cited DILG opinion can
not be considered for audit.
Section 4. A person who lost in an election (except Barangay election)
shall reemployment to any office in the government or any government
owned or controlled corporation within one year following such election.
 This same prohibition is clearly spelled out in the 1987 Constitution, as
well as in the Local Government Code of 1991, as follows:

SEC. 6. No candidate who has lost in any election shall, within one year
after such election, be appointed to any office in the Government or any
government-owned or controlled corporation or in any of its subsidiaries.
(Section 6, Article IX-B, 1987 Constitution) Section 94. Appointment of
Elective and Appointive Local Officials; Candidates Who Lost in an
Election.
(b) Except for losing candidates in barangay elections no candidate who
lost in any election shall, within one (1) year after such election, be
appointed to any office in the Government or any government-owned or
controlled corporations or in a any of their subsidiaries. (Section 94. Local
Government Code of 1991)

5. Employees who have reached the Compulsary retirement Age of

65

To a coterminous/primarily confidential position in the government

Ma. Rosario M. Demigillo, Senior Vice President of the Legal and

Corporate Services Group, Trade and Investment Development
Corporation of the Philippines (TIDCORP), Makati City, requests
clarification/reconsideration of the opinion dated April 26, 2001 of this
Commission declaring that the service of Victor C. Macalincag, President
of the Trade and Investment Development Corporation of the Philippines
(TIDCORP), beyond the compulsory age of sixty-five (65) years shall be
considered as service extension, and therefore, not to be credited as
government service for purposes of retirement.
Republic Act No. 8494 (TIDCORP Charter) specifically provides for a
fixed term of office of six (6) years for its President. Thus, Macalincag
shall serve as President of TIDCORP for a period of six (6) years even if it
would mean rendering service beyond the compulsory retirement age of
sixty-five (65) years. He may be removed therefrom only for cause or by
reason of incapacity, or voluntary retirement or resignation. Said law,
 which is a special law, shall prevail over other laws of general application
should inconsistency arise.
As a rule, extended service is no longer considered part of government
service. Thus, it necessarily follows that such service is not to be included
in the computation of retirement benefits. In this regard, the service which
Macalincag will render beyond the compulsory retirement age of sixty-five
(65) within the fixed term of six (6) years shall not be credited as part of
government service and, therefore, it will not be included in the
computation of his retirement benefits.
With due respect, it is, our view that service pursuant to a fixed term of
office is not the extended service as contemplated by law. The extended
service being referred to in the case of Maleficio is that service rendered
by a government official or employee beyond the compulsory retirement
age of 65 years and who is without a fixed term of office. Such service in
government is severed on the officers or employees 65th birthday. Thus,
even if an official or employee is qualified for retirement but his service is
still needed under exceptional circumstances, his appointing authority may
request authority from the CSC for the extension of said officials or
employees services for a definite period. This is the kind of extended
service which Assistant Commissioner Caberoy could have contemplated
as not creditable government service that would not entitle the official or
employee concerned to earn leave credits for the period of extended
service.
On the other hand, the service of an official and employee beyond the
compulsory retirement age of 65 years pursuant to a fixed term of office,
such as in the case of Mr. Macalincag, cannot be considered extended
service. Mr. Macalincag continues in office because of a fix term of office
and not because of an extension service. Assistant Commissioner Caberoy
correctly opined that Mr. Macalincag may therefore serve as President of
TIDCORP for a period of six (6) years even if it would mean rendering
service beyond the compulsory retirement age of sixty-five (65) years
unless he is removed for cause or by reason of incapacity, or voluntary
retirement or resignation. This is primarily so, he continued, since the
TIDCORP Charter is a special law which shall prevail over other laws of
general application should conflict arise.
 This being the case, the service of Mr. Macalincag beyond 65 years but
within his fixed term of six (6) years cannot be considered as extended
service. The same should therefore be credited as government service for
purposes of retirement and for which service he shall be accorded with all
the privilege and emoluments, including leave benefits.

. As such, Macalincags service as TIDCORP President, which includes

that service rendered beyond his sixty-fifth birthday, until his resignation
effective September 1, 2001, shall be credited as government service. He
is likewise entitled to all the benefits attached to his position including
leave benefits during his tenure. WHEREFORE, this Commission hereby
rules that in view of the fixed term of office of six (6) years as TIDCORP
PRO version President, the service rendered by Victor C. Macalincag,
including that rendered after reaching the compulsory retirement age, shall
be credited as government service for purposes of retirement. During the
said period, he is likewise declared entitled to all the benefits attached to
the position. Quezon City, October 12, 2001