RAMON S. CHING AND PO WING PROPERTIES, INC vs.

RODRIGUEZ
G.R. No. 192828 November 28, 2011
(Rule 72 Subject Matter and Applicability of General Rules; Rules 73-91 of the Rules of Court)

FACTS:
Respondents, who claim to be heirs (children and common law wives) of the deceased Lim San, also
known as Antonio Ching/Tiong Cheng/Ching Cheng Suy filed a Complaint against the petitioners and
Stronghold Insurance Company, Global Business Bank, Inc. (formerly PhilBank), Elena Tiu Del Pilar, Asia
Atlantic Resources Ventures, Inc., Registers of Deeds of Manila and Malabon, and all persons claiming
rights or titles from Ramon Ching and his successors-in-interest. In the Complaint, captioned as one for
"Disinheritance, Declaration of Nullity of Agreement and Waiver, Affidavit of Extra-Judicial Settlement,
Deed of Absolute Sale, Transfer Certificates of Title with Prayer for [the] Issuance of [a] Temporary
Restraining Order and [a] Writ of Preliminary Injunction," respondents prayed for the declaration of
Ramon Ching, who murdered his father Antonio, disqualified as heir and the nullity of the several
transactions entered into by Ramon involving the property of Antonio. A Motion to Dismiss was filed with
the RTC, alleging forum shopping, litis pendentia, res judicata and the respondents as not being the real
parties in interest but the same was denied. An Amended Complaint was later filed, impleading
Metrobank as the successor-in-interest of co-defendant Global Bank and adding another cause of
action relative to the existence of a Certificate of Premium Plus Acquisition (CPPA) in the amount
of P4,000,000 originally issued by PhilBank to Antonio. They also prayed that they be declared as the
rightful owners of the CPPA and that it be immediately released to them. Alternatively, they prayed for
the issuance of a hold order relative to the CPPA to preserve it during the pendency of the case. A motion
to dismiss the Amended Complaint was filed on the alleged ground of the RTC's lack of jurisdiction over
the subject matter of the Complaint. The petitioners argued that since it sought the release of the CPPA to
the respondents, the latter's declaration as heirs of Antonio, and the propriety of Ramon's disinheritance,
the suit partakes of the nature of a special proceeding and not an ordinary action for declaration of nullity
and the jurisdiction pertains to a probate or intestate court and not to the RTC acting as an ordinary court.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the subject matter of the Amended Complaint can only be resolved in a special
proceeding and not in an ordinary civil action.

HELD:
No. The Court held that although the respondents' Complaint and Amended Complaint sought, among
others, the disinheritance of Ramon and the release in favor of the respondents of the CPPA now under
Metrobank's custody, Civil Case No. 02-105251 remains to be an ordinary civil action, and not a special
proceeding pertaining to a settlement court. An action for reconveyance and annulment of title with
damages is a civil action, whereas matters relating to settlement of the estate of a deceased person such
as advancement of property made by the decedent, partake of the nature of a special proceeding, which
concomitantly requires the application of specific rules as provided for in the Rules of Court. A special
proceeding is a remedy by which a party seeks to establish a status, a right, or a particular fact. It is
distinguished from an ordinary civil action where a party sues another for the enforcement or protection
of a right, or the prevention or redress of a wrong. To initiate a special proceeding, a petition and not a
complaint should be filed. The Court agrees with the RTC and the CA that while the respondents in their
Complaint and Amended Complaint sought the disinheritance of Ramon, no will or any instrument
supposedly effecting the disposition of Antonio's estate was ever mentioned. Hence, despite the prayer
for Ramon's disinheritance, Civil Case No. 02-105251 does not partake of the nature of a special
proceeding and does not call for the probate court's exercise of its limited jurisdiction. Said civil case was
not instituted to conclusively resolve the issues relating to the administration, liquidation, and distribution
of Antonio's estate, hence, not the proper subject of a special proceeding for the settlement of the estate
of a deceased person under Rules 73-91 of the Rules of Court. The respondents' resort to an ordinary civil
action before the RTC may not be strategically sound, because a settlement proceeding should thereafter
still follow, if their intent is to recover from Ramon the properties alleged to have been illegally
transferred in his name. Be that as it may, the RTC, in the exercise of its general jurisdiction, cannot be
restrained from taking cognizance of respondents' Complaint and Amended Complaint as the issues raised
and the prayers indicated therein are matters which need not be threshed out in a special proceeding.

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 FERNANDEZ vs. MARAVILLA
G.R. No. L-18799 March 31, 1964
(Rule 73 Settlement of Estate of Deceased Persons Venue and Process;
Rule 72 Subject Matter and Applicability of General Rules; Rule 75 of the Rules of Court)

FACTS:
Respondent Herminio Maravilla filed with the Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental a petition for
probate of the will of his deceased wife Digna Maravilla. In the will, he was named as the universal heir
and executor. The brother and sisters of the deceased, however, filed an opposition to the probate of said
will. The court rendered a decision denying probate of the will, as it was not duly signed on each page by
the testatrix in the presence of the attesting witnesses and of one another. The petitioners then filed a
petition for the appointment of Eliezar Lopez, son of one of the sisters of the deceased, as special co-
administrator to protect their interests, on the ground that the will, having been denied probate, they are
the legal heirs of the decedent. A petition for the removal of respondent as special administrator was also
filed by the petitioners, as he, accordingly, failed to file an inventory within 3 months from his
appointment and qualification as special administrator, as provided for in Section 1, Rule 84, of the Rules
of Court. To this petition, respondent filed an opposition, on the ground that said provision of the Rules of
Court does not apply to a special administrator, and an inventory had already been submitted by him. The
court appointed Lopez as special co-administrator. From this order, respondent filed with the Court of
Appeals a petition for certiorari and prohibition (with prayer for preliminary injunction) to annul the order
appointing Lopez as special co-administrator and prohibit the probate court from further proceeding with
the petition for his removal as special administrator. The Court of Appeals issued a writ of preliminary
injunction. The petitioners then filed with the Court of Appeals a petition to certify the case to the
Supreme Court, on the grounds that the principal amount in controversy in this case exceeds P200,000
and the writs prayed for are not in aid of its appellate jurisdiction since the probate case is not on appeal
before it. The Court of Appeals rendered a decision in favor of the respondent and declared null and void
the appointment of Lopez as special co-administrator.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the Court of Appeals had no jurisdiction to issue the writs of certiorari and prohibition
prayed for by respondent, the same not being in aid of its appellate jurisdiction.

HELD:
Yes. The Court of Appeals has no appellate jurisdiction over said testate proceedings considering that the
properties therein involved are valued at P362,424,90 as per inventory of the special administrator. Under
Section 2, Rule 75, of the Rules of Court, the property to be administered and liquidated in testate or
intestate proceedings of the deceased spouse is, not only that part of the conjugal estate pertaining to the
deceased spouse, but the entire conjugal estate. This Court has already held that even if the deceased had
left no debts, upon the dissolution of the marriage by the death of the husband or wife, the community
property shall be inventoried, administered, and liquidated in the testate or intestate proceedings of the
deceased spouse. Not having appellate jurisdiction over the proceedings in probate considering that the
amount involved therein is more than P200,000, the Court of Appeals cannot also have original
jurisdiction to grant the writs of certiorari and prohibition prayed for by respondent in the instant case,
which are merely incidental thereto. The appeal taken in the proceedings in the case at bar falls within the
exclusive jurisdiction of the Supreme Court and should, therefore, be certified to it pursuant to Section 17
of the Judiciary Act of 1948, as amended.

Moreover, Section 2, Rule 72, of the Rules of Court provides that the rules on ordinary civil actions are
applicable in special proceedings where they are not inconsistent with, or when they may serve to
supplement the provisions relating to special proceedings. Consequently, the procedure of appeal is the
same in civil actions as in special proceedings.

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 RUFINA LUY LIM vs. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 124715 January 24, 2000
(Rule 73 Settlement of Estate of Deceased Persons Venue and Process;
Rules 81, 83, 84, and 87 of the Rules of Court)

FACTS:
Petitioner Rufina Luy Lim is the surviving spouse of late Pastor Y. Lim whose estate is the subject of
probate proceedings in Special Proceedings Q-95-23334, entitled, "In Re: Intestate Estate of Pastor Y. Lim
Rufina Luy Lim, represented by George Luy, Petitioner". Private respondents are corporations formed,
organized and existing under Philippine laws and which owned real properties covered under the Torrens
system. Petitioner, as surviving spouse and duly represented by her nephew George Luy, filed a joint
petition for the administration of the estate. Private respondent corporations, whose properties were
included in the inventory of the estate then filed a motion for the lifting of lis pendens and motion for
exclusion of certain properties from the estate of the decedent. The RTC granted the private respondents'
twin motions. Subsequently, Rufina Luy Lim filed a verified amended petition, which averred that although
the corporations dealt and engaged in business with the public, all their capital, assets and equity were
however, personally owned by the late Pastor Y. Lim. Hence, the alleged stockholders and officers
appearing in the respective articles of incorporation of these business entities were mere dummies of the
decedent and they were listed therein only for purposes of registration with the Securities and Exchange
Commission. The Regional Trial Court acting on the petitioner's motion issued an order to set aside its
previous order and ordered the Registry of Deeds to reinstate the annotation of lis pendens. Private
respondent then filed a special civil action for certiorari with an urgent prayer for a restraining order or
writ of preliminary injunction before the Court of Appeals, which granted its prayer.

ISSUE:
Whether or not respondent Court of Appeals erred in reversing the orders of the lower court which
merely allowed the preliminary or provisional inclusion of the private respondents as part of the estate,
with the respondent Court of Appeals arrogating unto itself the power to repeal, to disobey or to ignore
the clear and explicit provisions of Rules 81, 83, 84, and 87 of the Rules of Court.

HELD:
No. The Court held that the Court of Appeals correctly observed that the Regional Trial Court acted
without jurisdiction in issuing the questioned order.

Settled is the rule that a Regional Trial Court, acting as a probate court, exercises but limited jurisdiction,
and thus has no power to take cognizance of and determine the issue of title to property claimed by a
third person adversely to the decedent, unless the claimant and all other parties having legal interest in
the property consent, expressly or impliedly, to the submission of the question to the probate court for
adjudgment, or the interests of third persons are not thereby prejudiced, the reason for the exception
being that the question of whether or not a particular matter should be resolved by the court in the
exercise of its general jurisdiction or of its limited jurisdiction as a special court (e.g. probate, land
registration, etc.), is in reality not a jurisdictional but in essence of procedural one, involving a mode of
practice which may be waived.

As a rule, the question of ownership is an extraneous matter which the probate court cannot resolve with
finality. Thus, for the purpose of determining whether a certain property should or should not be included
in the inventory of estate properties, the Probate Court may pass upon the title thereto, but such
determination is provisional, not conclusive, and is subject to the final decision in a separate action to
resolve title.

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 SAN LUIS vs. SAN LUIS
G.R. No. 133743 February 6, 2007
(Rule 73 Settlement of Estate of Deceased Persons Venue and Process; Rule 78 Letters Testamentary
and of Administration, When and to Whom Issued; and Rule 79 - Opposing Issuance Of Letters
Testamentary. Petition And Contest For Letters Of Administration)

FACTS:
This case involves the settlement of the estate of Felicisimo T. San Luis, who was the former governor of
the Province of Laguna. During his lifetime, he contracted three marriages. His first marriage was with
Virginia Sulit, out of which were born six children. The second was with an American citizen, Merry Lee
Corwin, with whom he had a son. Merry Lee, however, divorced him. Subsequently, he married
respondent Felicidad San Luis, then surnamed Sagalongos. He had no children with respondent but lived
with her for 18 years from the time of their marriage up to his death. Thereafter, respondent sought the
dissolution of their conjugal partnership assets and the settlement of Felicisimos estate. She filed a
petition for letters of administration. Respondent alleged that she is the widow of Felicisimo; that, at the
time of his death, the decedent was residing at 100 San Juanico Street, New Alabang Village, Alabang,
Metro Manila; that the decedents surviving heirs are respondent as legal spouse, his six children by his
first marriage, and son by his second marriage; that the decedent left real properties, both conjugal and
exclusive, valued at P30,304,178.00 more or less; that the decedent does not have any unpaid debts.
Respondent prayed that the conjugal partnership assets be liquidated and that letters of administration be
issued to her. Petitioner Rodolfo San Luis, one of the children of Felicisimo by his first marriage, filed a
motion to dismiss on the grounds of improper venue and failure to state a cause of action. Rodolfo
claimed that the petition for letters of administration should have been filed in the Province of Laguna
because this was Felicisimos place of residence prior to his death. He further claimed that respondent has
no legal personality to file the petition because she was only a mistress of Felicisimo since the latter, at the
time of his death, was still legally married to Merry Lee.

ISSUES:
Whether or not venue was properly laid; and whether or not respondent has legal capacity to file the
petition for letters of administration.

HELD:
Yes, venue was properly laid. Pursuant to Section 1, Rule 73 of the Rules of Court, the petition for letters
of administration of the estate of Felicisimo should be filed in the Regional Trial Court of the province "in
which he resides at the time of his death." Residence should be viewed or understood in its popular sense
meaning, the personal, actual or physical habitation of a person, actual residence or place of abode. It
signifies physical presence in a place and actual stay thereat. In this popular sense, the term means merely
residence, that is, personal residence, not legal residence or domicile. Residence simply requires bodily
presence as an inhabitant in a given place, while domicile requires bodily presence in that place and also
an intention to make it ones domicile. No particular length of time of residence is required though;
however, the residence must be more than temporary. In the instant case, while petitioners established
that Felicisimo was domiciled in Sta. Cruz, Laguna, respondent proved that he also maintained a residence
in Alabang, Muntinlupa from 1982 up to the time of his death. The Court held that Felicisimo was a
resident of Alabang, Muntinlupa for purposes of fixing the venue of the settlement of his estate.

Respondent has legal personality to file the petition despite validity or non-validity of her marriage with
Felicisimo as she may be considered as a co-owner of Felicisimo as regards the property that were
acquired through their joint effort during their cohabitation. Section 6, Rule 78 of the Rules of Court states
that letters of administration may be granted to the surviving spouse of the decedent and Section 2, Rule
79 thereof also provides in part: SEC. 2. Contents of petition for letters of administration. A petition for
letters of administration must be filed by an interested person and must show, as far as known to the
petitioner: x x x.

An "interested person" has been defined as one who would be benefited by the estate, such as an heir, or
one who has a claim against the estate, such as a creditor. The interest must be material and direct, and
not merely indirect or contingent.

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 GRIMM ROBERTS vs. LEONIDAS
G.R. No. L-55509 April 27, 1984
(Rule 75 Production of Will. Allowance of Will Necessary)

FACTS:
Edward M. Grimm, an American resident of Manila, died at the age of 78 and was survived by his second
wife, Maxine Tate Grimm and their two children, named Edward Miller Grimm II (Pete) and Linda Grimm
and by Juanita Grimm Morris and Ethel Grimm Roberts, his two children by a first marriage which ended in
divorce. He executed two wills and a codicil, which were presented for probate by Maxine Grimm in Utah
on March 7, 1978. However, there was already an earlier intestate petition filed in Manila by Ethel in
January 1978. The wills and codicil were later admitted to probate. However, on April 25, 1978, the parties
entered into a compromise agreement regarding the estate. Ethel later filed a motion for accounting so
that the estate can be partitioned among the heirs and the present intestate estate be closed. The
petitioners alleged that they were defraud due to the machinations of the Roberts spouses; that the 1978
Utah compromise agreement was illegal; that the intestate proceeding is void because Grimm died
testate; and that the partition was contrary to the decedent's wills. Ethel filed a motion to dismiss the
petition, which Judge Leonidas denied for lack of merit. Ethel then filed a petition for certiorari and
prohibition before the Court, praying that the testate proceeding be dismissed, or alternatively, that the
two proceedings be consolidated and heard in Branch 20 and that the matter of the annulment of the
Utah compromise agreement be heard prior to the petition for probate.

ISSUE:
Whether or not a petition for the allowance of wills and to annul a partition, approved in an
intestate proceeding by Branch 20 of the Manila Court of First Instance, can be entertained by its Branch
38 after a probate in the Utah district court.

HELD:
Yes, a petition for the allowance of wills and to annul a partition, approved in an intestate proceeding by a
court branch, can be entertained by the courts other branch.

A testate proceeding is proper in this case because Grimm died with two wills and "no will shall pass either
real or personal property unless it is proved and allowed" (Art. 838, Civil Code; sec. 1, Rule 75, Rules of
Court). The probate of the will is mandatory. It is anomalous that the estate of a person who
died testate should be settled in an intestate proceeding. Therefore, the intestate case should be
consolidated with the testate proceeding and the judge assigned to the testate proceeding should
continue hearing the two cases.

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 CUENCO vs. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. L-24742 October 26, 1973
(Rule 73 Settlement of Estate of Deceased Persons; Venue and Process)

FACTS:
Senator Mariano Jesus Cuenco died in Manila. He was survived by his widow and two minor sons, residing
in Quezon City, and children of the first marriage, residing in Cebu. Lourdes, one of the children from the
first marriage, filed a Petition for Letters of Administration with the Court of First Instance (CFI) Cebu,
alleging that the senator died intestate in Manila but a resident of Cebu with properties in Cebu and
Quezon City.

The petition still pending with CFI Cebu, Rosa Cayetano Cuenco, the second wife, filed a petition with CFI
Rizal for the probate of the last will and testament, where she was named executrix. Rosa also filed an
opposition and motion to dismiss in CFI Cebu but this court held in abeyance resolution over the
opposition until CFI Quezon shall have acted on the probate proceedings.

Lourdes filed an opposition and motion to dismiss in CFI Quezon, on ground of lack of jurisdiction and/or
improper venue, considering that CFI Cebu already acquired exclusive jurisdiction over the case. The
opposition and motion to dismiss were denied. Upon appeal CA ruled in favor of Lourdes and issued a writ
of prohibition to CFI Quezon.

ISSUES:
Whether or not CA erred in issuing the writ of prohibition.

Whether or not CFI Quezon acted without jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion in taking cognizance
and assuming exclusive jurisdiction over the probate proceedings in pursuance to CFI Cebu's order
expressly consenting in deference to the precedence of probate over intestate proceedings.

HELD:
The Supreme Court found that CA erred in law in issuing the writ of prohibition against the Quezon City
court from proceeding with the testate proceedings and annulling and setting aside all its orders and
actions, particularly its admission to probate of the last will and testament of the deceased and appointing
petitioner-widow as executrix thereof without bond pursuant to the deceased testator's wish.

On Venue and Jurisdiction:

Under Rule 73, the court first taking cognizance of the settlement of the estate of a decent, shall exercise
jurisdiction to the exclusion of all other courts.

The residence of the decent or the location of his estate is not an element of jurisdiction over the subject
matter but merely of venue. If this were otherwise, it would affect the prompt administration of justice.

The court with whom the petition is first filed must also first take cognizance of the settlement of the
estate in order to exercise jurisdiction over it to the exclusion of all other courts.

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 URIARTE vs. CFI - NEGROS
G.R. No. L-21938-39 May 29, 1970
(Rule 73 Settlement of Estate of Deceased Persons; Venue and Process)

FACTS:
On November 6, 1961, petitioner Vicente Uriarte filed a petition for the settlement of the estate of Don
Juan Uriarte in the Negros Court, alleging that he is the natural son of Don Juan and the sole heir. That
during the lifetime of Don Juan, petitioner had filed a petition, Civil Case 6143, in the Negros Court to be
acknowledged as his natural child.

(Intestate Proceeding)
On December, 1961, Higinio Uriarte, one of the respondents, filed an opposition to the petition
alleging that he was a nephew of the deceased Juan Uriarte y Goite who had "executed a Last Will and
Testament in Spain, and also questioned petitioner's capacity and interest to commence the intestate
proceeding. On August 28, 1962, Juan Uriarte Zamacona, the other respondent commenced in the Manila
Court for the probate of a document (SP 513896) alleged to be the last will of the deceased Juan Uriarte
y Goite.

(Testate Proceeding)
He also filed a Motion to Dismiss on the grounds that: 1) as the deceased Juan Uriarte y Goite had left a
last will, there was no legal basis to proceed with said intestate proceedings, and 2) petitioner had no legal
personality and interest to initiate said intestate proceedings, he not being an acknowledged natural son
of the decedent. Petitioner opposed the motion to dismiss on the grounds that the Negros Court was the
first to take cognizance of the proceedings in accordance with Rule 75 Sec 1.Negros court dismissed SP
6344. The motion for reconsideration filed by Uriarte was denied. The petitioner then filed a record on
appeal. Soon afterwards he also filed a petition for certiorari directly to the SC. For this reason the Negros
Court dismissed his notice of appeal regarding SP 6344. He then filed for a petition for Mandamus to
compel the Negros Court to approve his record on appeal and give due course to his appeal. He also filed
an Omnibus motion to intervene on SP 513896 to annul the proceedings but this was denied by the
Manila Court.

ISSUES:
Which court, between Negros and Manila, should take cognizance of the case?

HELD:
On the basis of hierarchy of proceedings between testate and intestate, it should have been the Manila
Court. However, inconsideration of public policy, it should have been filed in the Negros Court (Venue).
Nevertheless, Venue is waiveable and thus Manila Court has jurisdiction. Under the Judiciary Act of 1948
[Section 44, paragraph (e)], Courts of First Instance have original exclusive jurisdiction over "all matters of
probate," that is, over special proceedings for the settlement of the estate of deceased persons whether
they died testate or intestate. Moreover, Rule 75 Sec 1 also provides that as regards inhabitants of a
foreign country, the CFI of any province in which he had estate shall be the venue for the action. Don Juan,
a non-resident alien had considerable properties, both in Negros and Manila. However, between
testate and intestate proceedings, it must be noted that testate proceedings take precedence over
intestate proceedings. Thus it has been held repeatedly that, if in the course of intestate proceedings
pending before a CFI if it is found it that the decedent had left a last will, proceedings for the probate of
the latter should replace the intestate proceedings even if at that stage an administrator had already been
appointed, the latter being required to render final account and turn over the estate in his possession to
the executor subsequently appointed. If the alleged last will is later disapproved or rejected, then the
intestacy proceedings will continue.

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 SOLIVIO vs. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 83484 February 12, 1990
(Rule 73 Settlement of Estate of Deceased Persons; Venue and Process)

FACTS:
This case involves the estate of the late novelist, Esteban Javellana, Jr," who died a bachelor, without
descendants, ascendants, brothers, sisters, nephews or nieces. His only surviving relatives are: (1) his
maternal aunt, petitioner Celedonia Solivio, the spinster half-sister of his mother, Salustia Solivio; and (2)
the private respondent, Concordia Javellana-Villanueva, sister of his deceased father, Esteban Javellana,
Sr. During his lifetime, Esteban, Jr. had, more than once, expressed to his aunt Celedonia and some close
friends his plan to place his estate in a foundation to honor his mother and to help poor but deserving
students obtain a college education. Unfortunately, he died of a heart attack without having set up the
foundation. Two weeks after his funeral, Concordia and Celedonia talked about what to do with Esteban's
properties. Pursuant to their agreement that Celedonia would take care of the proceedings leading to the
formation of the foundation, Celedonia in good faith and upon the advice of her counsel, filed a Spl.
Proceeding No. 2540 for her appointment as special administratrix of the estate of Esteban Javellana, Jr..
Later, she filed an amended petition praying that letters of administration be issued to her; that she be
declared sole heir of the deceased; and that after payment of all claims and rendition of inventory and
accounting, the estate be adjudicated to her. After due publication and hearing of her petition, as well as
her amended petition, she was declared sole heir of the estate of Esteban Javellana, Jr. Thereafter, she
sold properties of the estate to pay the taxes and other obligations of the deceased and proceeded to set
up the "SALUSTIA SOLIVIO VDA. DE JAVELLANA FOUNDATION" which she caused to be registered in the
Securities and Exchange Commission on July 17,1981 under Reg. No. 0100027. Four months later,
Concordia Javellana Villanueva filed a motion for reconsideration of the court's order declaring Celedonia
as "sole heir" of Esteban, Jr., because she too was an heir of the deceased. Her motion was denied by the
court for tardiness. Instead of appealing the denial, Concordia filed a civil case in the RTC of Iloilo for
partition, recovery of possession, ownership and damages.

ISSUES:
Whether the RTC of Iloilo had jurisdiction to entertain Civil Case No. 13207 for partition and recovery of
Concordia Villanueva's share of the estate of Esteban Javellana, Jr. even while the probate proceedings
were still pending in the same court;
HELD:

The Regional Trial Court, lacked jurisdiction to entertain Concordia Villanueva's action for partition and
recovery of her share of the estate of Esteban Javellana, Jr. while the probate proceedings (Spl, Proc. No.
2540) for the settlement of said estate are still pending in the same court, there being as yet no orders for
the submission and approval of the administratix's inventory and accounting, distributing the residue of
the estate to the heir, and terminating the proceedings.

It is the order of distribution directing the delivery of the residue of the estate to the persons entitled
thereto that brings to a close the intestate proceedings, puts an end to the administration and thus far
relieves the administrator from his duties.

The probate court loses jurisdiction of an estate under administration only after the payment of all the
debts and the remaining estate delivered to the heirs entitled to receive the same. The finality of the
approval of the project of The probate court, in the exercise of its jurisdiction to make distribution, has
power to determine the proportion or parts to which each distributed is entitled. The power to determine
the legality or illegality of the testamentary provision is inherent in the jurisdiction of the court making a
just and legal distribution of the inheritance. ... To hold that a separate and independent action is
necessary to that effect, would be contrary to the general tendency of the jurisprudence of avoiding
multiplicity of suits; and is further, expensive, dilatory, and impractical.

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 UTULO vs. VDA. DE GARCIA
G.R. No. 48904 September 30, 1938
(Rule 74 Summary Settlement of Estate)

FACTS:
Juan Sanchez died intestate leaving his widow and 3 children as heirs. His widow, Vda. de Garcia was
appointed administratix. One of their children Luz, died leaving her spouse Pablo Utulo and her mother as
forced heirs. Utulo commenced the judicial administration of her properties where Vda. de Garcia
opposed arguing that there is no need for judicial administration and in case it should be granted by court
that she be appointed administratix. The CFI appointed Utulo as judicial administrator hence this appeal.

ISSUES:
Whether or not there was need of judicial administration

HELD:
NO. The general rule as provided for in Sec. 642 of the Code of Civil Procedure is that if no executor is
named in the will, or if a person dies intestate, administration shall be granted. However this is subject to
2 exceptions provided by Secs. 596 and 597 of the same Code. Sec. 596 provides that when all the heirs
are of lawful age, and there are no debts due from the estate, they may agree in writing to partition the
property without instituting the judicial administration or applying for the appointment of an
administrator. Sec. 597 provides that if the property left does not exceed P6,000, the heirs may apply to
the competent court to proceed with the summary partition without instituting the judicial administration
and the appointment of an administrator.

When a person dies without leaving pending obligations to be paid, his heirs, whether of age or not, are
not bound to submit the property to a judicial administration, which is always long and costly or to apply
for the appointment of an administrator by the court. Rights to the succession of a person are transmitted
from the moment of death hence his heirs succeed immediately to all the property of the deceased. It is at
their option if they want to enter upon the administration of the property or if they want to partition it.
When there are no debts existing against the estate, there is no need for the intervention of an
administrator.

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 VDA. DE REYES vs. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 92436 July 26,1991
(Rule 74 Summary Settlement of Estate)

FACTS:
During his lifetime, one Gavino Reyes owned a parcel of land of approximately 70 hectares, more or less,
located at Sangayad, Ulong-Tubig, Carmona, Cavite. He sought to bring said land under the operation of
the Torrens System of registration of property. Unfortunately, he died in 1921 without the title having
been issued to him. The application was prosecuted by his son, Marcelo Reyes, who was the administrator
of his property.

In 1936 the above property was surveyed and subdivided by Gavino's heirs. In the subdivision plan, each
resultant lot was earmarked, indicated for and assigned to a specific heir. It appears therein that two lots,
one of which is Lot No. 1A-14 (Exh. "6-A"), were allotted to Rafael Reyes, Sr., one of Gavino's children. Per
testimony of Juan Poblete, the children thereafter secured tax declarations for the irrespective shares.
In 1941, or about twenty (20) years after the death of Gavino, the original certificate of title for the whole
property-OCT No. 255-was issued. It was, however, kept by Juan Poblete, son-in-law of Marcelo Reyes,
who was by then already deceased. The heirs of Gavino were not aware of this fact.

On 3 December 1943, Rafael Reyes, Sr. sold a parcel of land with an area of 23,431 square meters, more or
less, to private respondent Dalmacio Gardiola (Exh. "5"). According to the vendee, this parcel corresponds
to Lot No.1-A-14 of the subdivision plan aforestated. The deed of sale, however, did not specifically
mention Lot No. I-A-14. The vendee immediately took possession of the property and started paying the
land taxes therein.

In 1967, the surviving heirs gave effect to the subdivision plan created on 1936. They formally partitioned
the property. Therefore, the heirs received their share of this land. Including Rafael Reyes, Jr. Son of Rafael
Sr. TCTs were issued to him representing the land which should have been received by his father.
Now, the heirs of Rafael Jr. sued Gardiola, saying that they are the true owners of the land, as shown by
the torrens title over the land.

Gardiolas defense was that he bought the land from Rafael Sr. and that Rafael Jr. could not have inherited
this land for it was disposed of by his father way before he inherited it.
The trial court ruled in favor of Rafael Jr.s heirs. Stating that there was no evidence that the Gavinos
children had a written partition agreement. CA reversed

ISSUES:
Whether or not the CA IS correct in reversing the trial court?

HELD:
The Court of Appeals correctly held that the partition made by the children of Gavino Reyes in 1936,
although oral, was valid and binding. There is no law that requires partition among heirs to be in writing to
be valid. In Hernandez vs. Andal, supra, this Court, interpreting Section 1 of Rule 74 of the Rules of Court,
held that the requirement that a partition be put in a public document and registered has for its purpose
the protection of creditors and at the same time the protection of the heirs themselves against tardy
claims. The object of registration is to serve as constructive notice to others. It follows then that the
intrinsic validity of partition not executed with the prescribed formalities does not come into play when
there are no creditors or the rights of creditors are not affected. Where no such rights are involved, it is
competent for the heirs of an estate to enter into an agreement for distribution in a manner and upon a
plan different from those provided by law. There is nothing in said section from which it can be inferred
that a writing or other formality is an essential requisite to the validity of the partition. Accordingly, an
oral partition is valid. Barcelona, et al. vs. Barcelona, et al., supra, provides the reason why oral partition is
valid and why it is not covered by the Statute of Frauds: partition among heirs or renunciation of an
inheritance by some of them is not exactly a conveyance of real property for the reason that it does not
involve transfer of property from one to the other, but rather a confirmation or ratification of title or right
of property by the heir renouncing in favor of another heir accepting and receiving the inheritance.

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Additionally, the validity of such oral partition in 1936 has been expressly sustained by this Court in the
Resolution of 20 August 1990 in G.R. No. 92811.25

But even if We are to assume arguendo that the oral partitio executed in 1936 was not valid for some
reason or another, we would still arrive at the same conclusion for upon the death of Gavino Reyes in
1921, his heirs automatically became co-own, era of his 70-hectare parcel of land. The rights to the
succession. are transmitted horn the moment of death of the decedent, The estate of the decedent would
then be held in co-ownership by the heirs. The co-heir or co-owner may validly dispose of his share or
interest in the property subject to the condition that the portion disposed of is eventually allotted to him
in the division upon termination of the co-ownership.

In the case at bar, the lot sold by Rafael Reyes, Sr. to private respondent Dalmacio Gardiola is his share in
the estate of his deceased father, Gavino Reyes. It is the same property which was eventually adjudicated
to his son and heir, Rafael Reyes, Jr., represented in turn by his heirs-petitioners herein-in the extrajudicial
settlement of 1967.

The same did not operate to divest the vendee of the share of Rafael Reyes, Sr. in the estate of Gavino.
Petitioners, as mere successors-in-interest of Rafael Reyes, Jr., son of Rafael Reyes, Sr., can only acquire
that which Rafael, Jr. could transmit to them upon his death. The latter never became the owner of Lot
No. 1-A-14 because it was sold by his father in 1943. The issuance of TCT No. T-27257 in the name of
Rafael Reyes, Jr., in so far as Lot No. 1-14-A is concerned, was clearly erroneous because he never became
its owner. An extrajudicial settlement does not create a right in favor of an heir. As this Court stated in the
Barcelona case, it is but a confirmation or ratification of title or right to property. Thus, since he never had
any title of right to Lot No. 1-14-A, the mere execution of the settlement did not improve his condition,
and the subsequent registration of the deed did not create any right or vest any title over the property in
favor of the petitioners as heirs of Rafael Reyes, Jr, The latter cannot give them what he never had before.
Nemo dare potest quod non habet.

There is one more point that should be stressed here. Petitioners' immediate predecessor-in-interest,
Rafael Reyes, Jr., never took any action against private respondents from the time his father sold the lot to
the latter. Neither did petitioners bring any action to recover from private respondents the owner. Ship
and possession of the lot from the time Rafael Reyes, Jr. died. As categorically admitted by petitioners in
their complaint and amended complaint, it was only in or about September 1969 when, after the delivery
of TCT No. 27257 by Candido Hebron to them, that they definitely discovered that they were the owners
of the property in question. And yet, despite full knowledge that private respondents were in actual
physical possession of the property, it was only about thirteen and one half (13 1/2) years later that they
decided to file an action for recovery of possession. As stated earlier, the original complaint was filed in
the trial court on 14 March 1983. There was then absolutely no basis for the trial court to place the
burden on private respondents to bring an action for reconveyance within four (4) years from their
discovery of the issuance of the transfer certificate of title in the name of Rafael Reyes, Jr.

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BENNY SAMPILO and HONORATO SALACUP vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS and FELISA SINOPERA
GR No. L-10474 February 28, 1958
(Rule 74 Summary Settlement of Estate)

FACTS:
Teodoro Tolete died intestate in January 1945. He left parcel of lands in San Miguel, Pangasinan.
He left his heirs his wife (Leoncia de Leon) and nephews and nieces who are children of his
deceased brothers and sisters.
On July 25, 1946, His wife executed an affidavit of self-adjudicating saying that Teodoro had no
children or dependents, neither ascendants or acknowledged natural children, neither brothers,
sisters, nephews and nieces.
The said affidavit was registered in the Office of the Register of Deeds of Pangasisan then, his
wife sold the property to Sampilo, then Sampilo sold it to Salacup and also registered with the
same Office of the Register of Deeds.
In March 1950, Felisa Sinopera instituted estate proceedings asking for letters of administration.
She alleged that Teodoros wife, Leonicia de Leon has no right to execute the affidavit of self-
adjudication for there are other heirs aside from her. That Salacup acquired no rights to the lands
sold to him.
Sampilo and Salacop alleged that the complaint states no cause of action; that if such cause exists
the same is barred by the statute of limitations.

ISSUES:
Whether or not the right of action of the administratrix has prescribed and lapsed because the same was
not brought within the period of two years as prescribed in Section 4 of Rule 74 of the Rules of Court?

HELD:
No. The said rule applies only to persons who participated in the said proceedings and does not prejudice
those who did not have the chance to participate.

Following the case of Ramirez vs. Gmur, the provisions of Section 4 of Rule 74, barring distributees or
heirs from objecting to an extrajudicial partition after the expiration of two years from such extrajudicial
partition, is applicable only (1) to persons who have participated or taken part or had notice of the
extrajudicial partition, and, in addition, (2) when the provisions of Section 1 of Rule 74 have been strictly
complied with, i.e., that all the persons or heirs of the decedent have taken part in the extrajudicial
settlement or are represented by themselves or through guardians. The case at bar fails to comply with
both requirements because not all the heirs interested have participated in the extrajudicial settlement,
the Court of Appeals having found that the decedent left aside from his widow, nephews and nieces living
at the time of his death.

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 JOSEPH CUA vs. GLORIA A. VARGAS, AURORA VARGAS, RAMON VARGAS,
MARITES VARGAS, EDELINA VARGAS AND GEMMA VARGAS
G.R. No. 156536 October 31, 2006
(Rule 74 Summary Settlement of Estate)

FACTS:
A parcel of residential land with an area of 99 square meters located in San Juan, Virac,
Catanduanes was left behind by the late Paulina Vargas.

On February 4, 1994, a notarized Extra Judicial Settlement among Heirs was executed by and
among Paulina Vargas' heirs, partitioning and adjudicating unto themselves the lot in question,
each heirs getting a share of 11square meters. Florentino, Andres, Antonina and Gloria,
however, did not sign the document. Only Ester, and four others signed it. The Extra Judicial
Settlement among Heirs was published in the Catanduanes Tribune for three consecutive weeks.

On November 15, 1994, an Extra Judicial Settlement among Heirs with Sale was again executed
by and among the same heirs over the same property and also with the same sharings. Once
more, the same persons signed the document and their respective shares were sold to Joseph
Cua, petitioner herein.

Respondents argue that said Extra Judicial Settlement cannot bind them for it was executed
without their consent and participation.

ISSUE:
Whether or not heirs were deemed constructively notified of and bound by an extra-judicial settlement
and partition of the estate, regardless of their failure to participate therein, when the extra-judicial
settlement and partition has been duly published.

HELD:
No, the procedure outlined in Section 1 of Rule 74 is an ex parte proceeding. The rule plainly states,
however, that persons who do not participate or had no notice of an extrajudicial settlement will not be
bound thereby. It contemplates a notice that has been sent out or issued before any deed of settlement
and/or partition is agreed upon (i.e., a notice calling all interested parties to participate in the said deed of
extrajudicial settlement and partition), and not after such an agreement has already been executed as
what happened in the instant case with the publication of the first deed of extrajudicial settlement among
heirs.

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 SPOUSES GORGONIO BENATIRO vs. HEIRS OF EVARISTO CUYOS
G.R. No. 161220 July 30, 2008
(Rule 74 Summary Settlement of Estate)

FACTS:
On July 13, 1971, Gloria Cuyos-Talian represented by Atty. Victor Elliot Lepiten, filed before the Court of
First Instance (CFI), Cebu, Branch XI, a petition for Letters of Administration, docketed as Special
Proceeding (SP) No. 24-BN entitled "In the Matter of the Intestate Estate of Evaristo Cuyos, Gloria Cuyos-
Talian, petitioner." The petition was opposed by Glorias brother, Francisco, who was represented by Atty.
Jesus Yray.

In the hearing held on January 30, 1973, both parties together with their respective counsels appeared.
Both counsels manifested that the parties had come to an agreement to settle their case. The trial court
on even date issued an Order appointing Gloria as administratrix of the estate.

Subsequently, the respondents questioned the said Compromise Agreement for they did not give their
consent and participation.

The petitioners claimed that they were constructively notified through publication.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the said compromise agreement is binding to the heirs who did not consent to the
Agreement.

Held:
No. Said agreement is not binding upon those heirs who did not give their consent to the said agreement.

Applying the case of Cua vs Vargas by analogy, what matters is whether the heirs were indeed notified
before the compromise agreement was arrived at, which was not established, and not whether they were
notified of the Commissioner's Report embodying the alleged agreement afterwards.

We also find nothing in the records that would show that the heirs were called to a hearing to validate the
Report. The CFI adopted and approved the Report despite the absence of the signatures of all the heirs
showing conformity thereto. The CFI adopted the Report despite the statement therein that only six out of
the nine heirs attended the conference, thus, effectively depriving the other heirs of their chance to be
heard. The CFI's action was tantamount to a violation of the constitutional guarantee that no person shall
be deprived of property without due process of law. We find that the assailed Order dated December 16,
1976, which approved a void Commissioner's Report, is a void judgment for lack of due process.

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 MARIA ELENA RODRIGUEZ PEDROSA vs. THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 118680 March 5, 2001
(Rule 74 Summary Settlement of Estate)

FACTS:
On April 8, 1946, the spouses Miguel Rodriguez and Rosalina J. de Rodriguez initiated
proceedings for the legal adoption of herein petitioner, Maria Elena Rodriguez Pedrosa and the
said petition for adoption was granted
On April 29, 1972, Miguel died intestate. Thereafter, petitioner and Rosalina entered into an
extrajudicial settlement of Miguels estate, adjudicating between themselves in equal proportion
the estate of Miguel.
On November 21, 1972, private respondents filed an action to annul the adoption of the
petitioner but CFI denied the petition and upheld the validity of the adoption. Thereafter, the
private respondents appealed said decision to the Court of Appeals.
On March 11, 1983, while said appeal was pending, the Rodriguezes entered into an
extrajudicial settlement with respondent Rosalina for the partition of the estate of Miguel and
of another sister, Pilar. Rosalina acted as the representative of the heirs of Miguel
Rodriguez. Pilar had no heirs except his brothers and sisters.
The Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement and Partition covered fourteen parcels of land that were
divided among Jose, Carmen, Mercedes, Ramon and the heirs of Miguel, represented solely by
Rosalina.
When the petitioner sent her daughter, Loreto Jocelyn, to claim their share of the properties
from the Rodriguezes. The latter refused saying that Maria Elena and Loreto were not heirs since
they were not their blood relatives.
Petitioner, then, filed a complaint to annul the 1983 partition. The said complaint was filed on
January 28, 1987. Said complaint was later amended on March 25, 1987 to include the
allegation that earnest efforts toward a compromise were made between the plaintiffs and the
defendants, but the same failed.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the complaint for annulment of the Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement and Partition had
already prescribed.

HELD:
The Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement and Partition executed by private respondents on March 11, 1983 did
not prescribe. Section 4, Rule 74 provides for a two year prescriptive period (1) to persons who have
participated or taken part or had notice of the extrajudicial partition, and in addition (2) when the
provisions of Section 1 of Rule 74 have been strictly complied with, i.e., that all the persons or heirs of the
decedent have taken part in the extrajudicial settlement or are represented by themselves or through
guardians.

Petitioner, as the records confirm, did not participate in the extrajudicial partition. Patently then, the two-
year prescriptive period is not applicable in her case. The applicable prescriptive period here is four (4)
years as provided in Gerona vs. De Guzman, 11 SCRA 153 (1964), which held that: [The action to annul] a
deed of extrajudicial settlement upon the ground of fraud...may be filed within four years from the
discovery of the fraud. Such discovery is deemed to have taken place when said instrument was filed with
the Register of Deeds and new certificates of title were issued in the name of respondents exclusively.

It is clear that Section 1 of Rule 74 does not apply to the partition in question which was null and void as
far as the plaintiffs were concerned. The rule covers only valid partitions. The partition in the present case
was invalid because it excluded six of the nine heirs who were entitled to equal shares in the partitioned
property. Under the rule, no extrajudicial settlement shall be binding upon any person who has not
participated therein or had no notice thereof. As the partition was a total nullity and did not affect the
excluded heirs, it was not correct for the trial court to hold that their right to challenge the partition had
prescribed after two years from its execution in 1941.

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 HEIRS OF DELGADO vs. HEIRS OF VDA DE DAMIAN
G.R. No. 155733 January 27, 2006
(Rule 78 Letters Testamentary and of Administration, When and to Whom Issued)

FACTS:
This case concerns the settlement of the intestate estates of Guillermo Rustia and Josefa Delgado. The
claimants to the estates of Guillermo heirs of Josefa Delgado, consisting of her half- and full-blood siblings,
nephews and nieces, and grandnephews and grandnieces, and (2) the alleged heirs of Guillermo Rustia,
particularly, his sisters, his nephews and nieces, his illegitimate child, and the de facto adopted child
(ampun-ampunan) of the decedents.

The alleged heirs of Josefa Delgado

The deceased Josefa Delgado was the daughter of Felisa Delgado by one Lucio Campo. Aside from Josefa,
five other children were born to the couple, all surnamed Delgado. Felisa Delgado was never married to
Lucio Campo, hence, Josefa and her full-blood siblings were all natural children of Felisa Delgado.
However, Lucio Campo was not the first and only man in Felisa Delgados life. Before him was Ramon
Osorio with whom Felisa had a son, Luis Delgado.

The marriage of Guillermo Rustia and Josefa Delgado

Guillermo Rustia proposed marriage to Josefa Delgado but whether a marriage in fact took place is
disputed. According to petitioners, the two eventually lived together as husband and wife but were never
married. They maintain that Guillermo Rustia and Josefa Delgado were married on June 3, 1919 and from
then on lived together as husband and wife for 50 years until the death of Josefa on September 8, 1972.
During this period, they were known among their relatives and friends to have in fact been married and
supported with pieces of evidence.

The alleged heirs of Guillermo Rustia

Guillermo Rustia and Josefa Delgado never had any children. With no children of their own, they took into
their home the youngsters Guillermina Rustia Rustia and Nanie Rustia. These children, never legally
adopted by the couple, were what was known in the local dialect as ampun-ampunan.

During his life with Josefa, however, Guillermo Rustia did manage to father an illegitimate child, the
intervenor-respondent Guillerma Rustia, with one Amparo Sagarbarria. According to Guillerma, Guillermo
Rustia treated her as his daughter, his own flesh and blood, and she enjoyed open and continuous
possession of that status from her birth in 1920 until her fathers demise.

The RTC appointed Carlota Delgado vda de de la Rosa as administratrix of both estates. Acting on the
appeal, the Court of Appeals partially set aside the trial courts decision.

ISSUE:
Who should be issued letters of administration.

HELD:
An administrator is a person appointed by the court to administer the intestate estate of the decedent.
Rule 78, Section 6 of the Rules of Court prescribes an order of preference in the appointment of an
administrator:
Sec. 6. When and to whom letters of administration granted. If no executor is named in the will,
or the executor or executors are incompetent, refuse the trust, or fail to give a bond, or a person dies
intestate, administration shall be granted:
(a) To the surviving husband or wife, as the case may be, or next of kin, or both, in the discretion
of the court, or to such person as such surviving husband or wife, or next of kin, requests to have
appointed, if competent and willing to serve;
(b) If such surviving husband or wife, as the case may be, or next of kin, or the person selected by
them, be incompetent or unwilling, or if the husband or widow or next of kin, neglects for thirty (30) days
after the death of the person to apply for administration or to request that the administration be granted

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to some other person, it may be granted to one or more of the principal creditors, if competent and
willing to serve;
(c) If there is no such creditor competent and willing to serve, it may be granted to such other
person as the court may select.

In the appointment of an administrator, the principal consideration is the interest in the estate of
the one to be appointed. The order of preference does not rule out the appointment of co-administrators,
specially in cases where justice and equity demand that opposing parties or factions be represented in the
management of the estates, a situation which obtains here.

It is in this light that we see fit to appoint joint administrators, in the persons of Carlota Delgado
vda. de de la Rosa and a nominee of the nephews and nieces of Guillermo Rustia. They are the next of kin
of the deceased spouses Josefa Delgado and Guillermo Rustia, respectively.

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 RICARDO F. MARQUEZ, AUREA M. CABEZAS, EXEQUIEL F. MARQUEZ, SALVADOR F.
MARQUEZ, ANTONIO F. MARQUEZ, and RAFAEL F. MARQUEZ, JR., vs. COURT OF
APPEALS, ALFREDO F. MARQUEZ and BELEN F. MARQUEZ
G.R. No. 125715 December 29, 1998
(Rule 74 Summary Settlement of Estate)

FACTS:
During their lifetime, the spouses Rafael Marquez, Sr. and Felicidad Marquez begot twelve children,
namely: (1) Natividad; (2) Aurea; (3) Herminigildo; (4) Filomena; (5) Exequel; (6) Salvador; (7) Guadencio;
(8) Rafael, Jr.; (9) Belen; (10) Alfredo; (11) Ricardo; and (12) Antonio. Sometime in 1945, the spouses
acquired a parcel of land with a lot area of 161 square meters in San Juan Del Monte, Rizal, more
particularly described in TCT No. 47572, wherein they constructed their conjugal home.

In 1952, Felicidad Marquez died intestate. Thirty years later or in 1982, Rafael Marquez, Sr. executed an
Affidavit of Adjudication vesting unto himself sole ownership to the property described in TCT No.
47572. Consequently, TCT No. 47572 was cancelled and TCT No. 33350 was issued in his name on June 16,
1982.

Thereafter, on December 29, 1983 Rafael Marquez, Jr. executed a Deed of Donation Inter Vivos covering
the land described in TCT No. 33350 as well as the house constructed thereon to three of his children,
namely: (1) petitioner Rafael Jr.; (2) Alfredo; and (3) Belen, both private respondents herein, to the
exclusion of his other children, petitioners herein. As a result of the donation, TCT No. 33350 was
cancelled and TCT No. 47572 was issued in private respondents name.

From 1983 to 1991, private respondents were in actual possession of the land. However, when
petitioners learned about the existence of TCT No. 47572 they immediately demanded that since they are
also the children of Rafael Marquez, Sr., they are entitled to their respective share over the land in
question. Unfortunately, efforts to settle the dispute proved unavailing since private respondents ignored
petitioners demands.

In view of the private respondents' indifference, petitioners, now joined by Rafael Jr., filed a complaint on
May 31, 1991 for Reconveyance and Partition with Damages before the trial court alleging that both the
Affidavit of Adjudication and Deed of Donation Inter Vivos were fraudulent since the private
respondents took advantage of the advanced age of their father in making him execute the said
documents.

Petitioners, in contending that the action had not yet prescribed, assert that by virtue of the fraudulent
Affidavit of Adjudication and Deed of Donation, wherein they were allegedly deprived of their just
share over the parcel of land, a constructive trust was created. Forthwith, they maintain that an action for
reconveyance based on implied or constructive trust prescribes in ten (10) years.

In their Answer, private respondents argued that petitioners action was already barred by the statute of
limitations, since the same should have been filed within four years from the date of discovery of the
alleged fraud.

ISSUE:
Whether or not their action for reconveyance had prescribed.

HELD:
YES. It must be noted that Felicidad Marquez died in 1952. Thus, succession to her estate is governed by
the present Civil Code. Under Art. 887 thereof, her compulsory heirs are her legitimate children, and her
spouse, Rafael Marquez, Sr. Now, in 1982, as such, when Rafael Marquez Sr., for one reason or another,
misrepresented in his unilateral affidavit that the only heir of his wife when in fact their children were still
alive, and managed to secure a transfer of certificate of title under his name, a constructive trust under
Art. 1456 was established.

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In this regard, it is settled that an action for reconveyance based on an implied or constructive trust
prescribes in ten (10) years from the issuance of the Torrens Title over the property. For the purpose of
this case, the prescriptive period shall start to run when TCT No. 33350 was issued, which was on June 16,
1982. Thus, considering that the action for reconveyance was filed on May 31, 1991, or approximately
nine (9) years later, it is evident that prescription had not yet barred the action.

Prescinding therefrom, can Rafael Marquez Sr., as trustee of his wifes share, validly donate portion to the
respondents? Obviously, he cannot, as expressly provided in the Civil Code, thus: Art. 736. Guardians and
trustees cannot donate the property entrusted to them. Moreover, nobody can dispose of that which
does not belong to him.

Whether this donation was inofficious or not is another matter which is not within the province of the
Court to determine inasmuch as it necessitates the production of evidence not before it.

Finally, while we rule in favor of petitioners, we cannot grant their plea for moral damages and attorneys
fees since they have not satisfactorily shown that they have suffered mental anguish as provided in
Art.2219 and Art.2290 of the Civil Code.

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 NITTSCHER VS NITTSCHER
GR. NO. 160530 20 NOV 2007
(Rule 73 Settlement of Estate of Deceased Persons; Venue and Process)

FACTS:
On January 31, 1990, Dr. Werner Karl Johann Nittscher filed with the RTC of Makati City a petition for the
probate of his holographic will and for the issuance of letters testamentary to herein respondent Atty.
Rogelio P. Nogales.

On September 26, 1994, Dr. Nittscher died. Hence, Atty. Nogales filed a petition for letters testamentary
for the administration of the estate of the deceased. Dr. Nittschers surviving spouse, herein petitioner
Cynthia V. Nittscher, moved for the dismissal of the said petition. However, the court in its September 29,
1995 Order denied petitioners motion to dismiss, and granted respondents petition for the issuance of
letters testamentary.Petitioner moved for reconsideration, but her motion was denied for lack of merit.
On May 9, 1996, Atty. Nogales was issued letters testamentary and was sworn in as executor.

Petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals alleging that respondents petition for the issuance of letters
testamentary should have been dismissed outright as the RTC had no jurisdiction over the subject matter
and that she was denied due process.

Petitioner contends that respondents petition for the issuance of letters testamentary lacked a
certification against forum-shopping. She adds that the RTC has no jurisdiction over the subject matter of
this case because Dr. Nittscher was allegedly not a resident of the Philippines; neither did he leave real
properties in the country. Petitioner claims that the properties listed for disposition in her husbands will
actually belong to her. She insists she was denied due process of law because she did not receive by
personal service the notices of the proceedings.

Respondent Atty. Nogales, however, counters that Dr. Nittscher did reside and own real properties in Las
Pias, Metro Manila. He stresses that petitioner was duly notified of the probate proceedings. Respondent
points out that petitioner even appeared in court to oppose the petition for the issuance of letters
testamentary and that she also filed a motion to dismiss the said petition. Respondent maintains that the
petition for the issuance of letters testamentary need not contain a certification against forum-shopping
as it is merely a continuation of the original proceeding for the probate of the will.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Dr. Nittscher is a resident of the Philippines.

HELD:
Section 1, Rule 73 of the Rules of Court provides:

SECTION 1. Where estate of deceased persons settled. If the decedent is an inhabitant of the
Philippines at the time of his death, whether a citizen or an alien, his will shall be proved, or
letters of administration granted, and his estate settled, in the Court of First Instance (now
Regional Trial Court) in the province in which he resides at the time of his death, and if he is an
inhabitant of a foreign country, the Court of First Instance (now Regional Trial Court) of any
province in which he had estate. (Emphasis supplied.)

In this case, the RTC and the Court of Appeals are one in their finding that Dr. Nittscher was a resident of
Las Pias, Metro Manila at the time of his death. Such factual finding, which we find supported by
evidence on record, should no longer be disturbed. Time and again we have said that reviews on certiorari
are limited to errors of law. Unless there is a showing that the findings of the lower court are totally
devoid of support or are glaringly erroneous, this Court will not analyze or weigh evidence all over again.10
Hence, applying the aforequoted rule, Dr. Nittscher correctly filed in the RTC of Makati City, which then
covered Las Pias, Metro Manila, the petition for the probate of his will and for the issuance of letters
testamentary to respondent.

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 MANINANG vs. COURT OF APPEALS
GR No. L57848 June 19, 1982
(Rule 76 - Allowance or Disallowance of Will)

FACTS:
Clemencia Aseneta, single, died at the Manila Sanitarium Hospital at the age of 81. She left a holographic
will, which provides that all her property sall be inherited by Dra. Maninang, with whose family she has
lived continuously for a period of 30 years. After she died, Soledad Maninang filed a petition with the
Court of First InstanceBranch IV, Quezon City for the probate of the holographic will of Clemencia. Then,
herein private respondent Bernardo Aseneta, claiming to be the adopted child of the deceased and her
sole heir, instituted intestate proceedings with the Court of First Instance of Rizal. The two cases were
consolidated with the latter court. Bernardo filed a motion to dismiss the testate case on the ground that
the will was null and void because he, being the only compulsory heir, was preterited; thus, intestacy
should ensue. In her opposition, Soledad averred that the Courts area of inquiry is limited to the
examination of and the resolution on the extrinsic validity of the will and that Bernardo was effectively
disinherited by the decedent. The motion was granted. The motion for reconsideration by Soledad
Maninang was denied for lack of merit. In the same order, the court appointed Bernardo as administrator
considering he is a forced heir and is not shown to be unfit to perform the trust. Soledad filed a petition
for certiorari with the Court of Appeals but the same was denied.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the dismissal of the court a quo of the testate case proper.

HELD:

No. The Supreme Court held that the court a quo acted in excess of its jurisdiction when it dismissed the
Testate Case. Generally, the probate of a Will is mandatory. No will shall pass either real or personal
property unless it is proved and allowed in accordance with the Rules of Court. The law enjoins the
probate of the Will and public policy requires it, because unless the Will is probated and notice thereof
given to the whole world, the right of a person to dispose of his property by Will may be rendered
nugatory. Normally, the probate of a Will does not look into its intrinsic validity.

The authentication of a will decides no other question than such as touch upon the capacity of the
testator and the compliance with those requisites or solemnities which the law prescribes for the validity
of wills. It does not determine nor even by implication prejudge the validity or efficiency of the provisions,
these may be impugned as being vicious or null, notwithstanding its authentication. The que0stions
relating to these points remain entirely unaffected, and may be raised even after the will has been
authenticated. Opposition to the intrinsic validity or legality of the provisions of the will cannot be
entertained in Probate proceeding because its only purpose is merely to determine if the will has been
executed in accordance with the requirements of the law.

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 NUGUID vs. NUGUID
GR No. L23445 June 23, 1966
(Rule 76 - Allowance or Disallowance of Will)

FACTS:
Rosario Nuguid, a resident of Quezon City, died on December 30, 1962, single, without descendants,
legitimate or illegitimate. Surviving her were her legitimate parents, Felix Nuguid and Paz Salonga Nuguid,
and six (6) brothers and sisters, namely: Alfredo, Federico, Remedios, Conrado, Lourdes and Alberto, all
surnamed Nuguid.

Remedios, one of the sister filed in court a holographic will allegedly executed by Rosario instituting the
former as the sole, universal heir of all her properties. She prayed that said will be admitted to probate
and that letter of administration be issued to her. Felix and Paz opposed to the probate of the will on the
ground that by the institution of Remedios as universal heir of the deceased, oppositors who are
compulsory heirs in the direct ascending line were illegally preterited and that in consequence, the
institution is void. Article 854 provides that preterition of one, some or all of the compulsory heirs in the
direct line, whether living at the time of the execution of the will or born after the death of the testator,
shall annul the institution of heir. Petitioners contention is that the present is a case of ineffective
disinheritance rather than one of preterition drawing the conclusion that Article 854 does not apply in the
case at bar.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the Court may rule on the validity of the will.

HELD:
The case is for the probate of a will. The courts area of inquiry is limited to an examination of and
resolution on the extrinsic validity of the will. The due execution thereof, the testatrixs testamentary
capacity, and the compliance with the requisites or solemnities by law prescribed, are the questions solely
to be presented, and to be acted upon, by the court. Said court at this stage of the proceedings is not
called upon to rule on the intrinsic validity or efficacy of the provisions of the will, the legality of any
devise or legacy therein.

However, if the case were to be remanded for probate of the will, nothing will be gained. On the contrary,
this litigation will be protracted. And for aught that appears in the record, in the event of probate or if the
court rejects the will, probability exists that the case will come up once again before us on the same issue
of the intrinsic validity or nullity of the will. Result: waste of time, effort, expense, plus added anxiety.
These are practical considerations that induce us to a belief that we might as well meet head-on the issue
of the validity of the provisions of the will in question. After all, there exists a justiciable controversy crying
for solution.

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 ALUAD vs. ALUAD
GR No. 176943 October 17, 2008
(Rule 76 - Allowance or Disallowance of Will)

FACTS:
Petitioners mother Maria Aluad and respondent Zenaido Aluad were raised by the childless spouses
Matilde and Crispin Aluad. Crispin was the owner of six lots at Capiz. After his death, Matilde adjudicated
the lots to herself and thereafter, she executed a Deed of Donation of Real Property inter vivos in favor of
Maria covering all the six lots. The Deed provided that such will become effective upon the death of the
Donor, but in the event that the Donee should die before the Donor, the present donation shall be
deemed rescinded. Provided, however, that anytime during the lifetime of the Donor or anyone of them
who should survive, they could use, encumber or even dispose of any or even all of the parcels of land.
Matilde sold one of the lots to Zenaido and subsequently, Matilde executed a last will and testament
devising four of the lots to Maria and the remaining lot to Zenaido. Maria died a few months after
Matildes death. Thereafter, Marias heirs (herein petitioners) filed before the RTC a complaint for
declaration and recovery of ownership and possession of the two lots conveyed and donated to Zenaido,
alleging that no rights have been transmitted to the latter because such lots have been previously
alienated to them to Maria via the Deed of Donation. The lower court decided in favor of the petitioners
however, CA reversed said decision upon appeal of Zenaido which held that the Deed of Donation was
actually a donation mortis causa, not inter vivos and as such, it had to, but did not, comply with the
formalities of a will. Due to the denial of the petitioners Motion for Reconsideration, the present Petition
for Review has been filed.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the Deed of Donation is a donation inter vivos and if such deed is valid. If so, whether or
not Matilde Aluad has the right to convey the lots to Zenaido Aluad.

HELD:
The Court held that the donation to Maria Aluad (petitioners mother) was one of mortis causa, it having
the following characteristics: (1.) It conveys no title or ownership to the transferee before the death of the
transferor; or what amounts to the same thing, that the transferor should retain the ownership (full or
naked) and control of the property while alive; (2.) That before the death of the transferor, the transfer
should be revocable by the transferor at will, ad nutum; but revocability may be provided for indirectly by
means of a reserved power in the donor to dispose of the properties conveyed; and (3.) That the transfer
should be void if the transferor should survive the transferee.

The phrase in the earlier quoted Deed of Donation to become effective upon the death of the Donor
admits of no other interpretation than to mean that Matilde did not intend to transfer the ownership of
the six lots to petitioners mother during the formers lifetime. Further, the statement anytime during the
lifetime of the Donor or anyone of them who should survive, Page 30 of 112 they could use, encumber or
even dispose of any or even all the parcels of land herein donated means that Matilde retained
ownership of the lots and reserved in her the right to dispose them. For the right to dispose of a thing
without other limitations than those established by law is an attribute of ownership. The phrase anyone
of them who should survive is out of sync. For the deed of donation clearly stated that it would take
effect upon the death of the donor, hence, said phrase could only have referred to the donor. The
donation being then mortis causa, the formalities of a will should have been observed but they were not,
as it was witnessed by only two, not three or more witnesses following Article 805 of the Civil Code. It is
void and transmitted no right to petitioners mother. But even assuming arguendo that the formalities
were observed, since it was not probated, no right to the two lots was transferred to Maria. Matilde thus
validly disposed the lot to Zenaido by her last will and testament, subject to the qualification that her will
must be probated. With respect to the conveyed lot, the same had been validly sold by Matilde to Zenaido

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 RALLA vs. UNTALAN
G.R. Nos. L-63253-54 April 27, 1989
(Rule 76 - Allowance or Disallowance of Will)

FACTS:
This petition seeks to nullify the Order of respondent Judge Romulo P. Untalan, excluding from the
probate proceedings 63 parcels of land, as well as the Orders issued by respondent Judge Domingo
Coronel Reyes, denying the petitioner's motions for reconsideration of the same Order of Judge Untalan.
On January 27, 1959, when Rosendo Ralla filed a petition for the probate of his own will in CFI of Albay
docketed as SP No. 564. In his will he left his entire estate to his son, Pablo leaving nothing to his other
son, Pedro. In the same year, Pedro filed an action for the partition of the estate of their mother, Paz
Escarella; docketed as Civil Case No. 2023. In the course of the hearing of the probate case (SP No. 564),
Pablo Ralla filed a motion to dismiss the petition for probate on the ground that he was no longer
interested in the allowance of the will of his late father, Rosendo for its probate would no longer be
beneficial and advantageous to him. The motion was denied, and the denial was denied by the Court of
Appeals. (The latter court agreed with the lower court's conclusion that, indeed, the petitioner stood to
gain if the testate proceedings were to be dismissed because then he would not be compelled to submit
for inclusion in the inventory of the estate of Rosendo 149 parcels of land from which he alone had been
collecting rentals and receiving income, to the exclusion and prejudice of his brother, Pedro who was
deprived of his successional rights over the said properties. The denial of this motion to dismiss was
likewise affirmed by SC (in G.R. No. L-26253). On November 3, 1966, the petitioner reiterated his lack of
interest in the probate of the subject will. Consequently, the court, through Judge Perfecto Quicho,
declared Pedro and Pablo Ralla the only heirs of Rosendo who should share equally upon the division of
the latter's estate, and thereupon converted the testate proceedings into one of intestacy. Meanwhile,
the brothers agreed to partition the 63 parcel of land forming the estate of their deceased mother, Paz
Escarella, which were amicably divided between the two of them. This project of partition was approved
by Judge Grageda. On November 3, 1966, the probate judge converted SP 564 into an intestate
proceeding. Eleven years later, On February 28, 1978, a creditor of the deceased filed a petition for the
probate of Rosendo's will in SP 1106, which was heard jointly with SP 564. On August 3, 1979, the order of
November 3, 1966, was set aside. On June 11, 1981, the private respondents filed a "Petition To Submit
Anew For Consideration Of The Court The Exclusion Of 63 Parcels of Land Subject Of The Project Of
Partition In Civil Case No. 2023." 5 In his Order of July 16,1981, Judge Untalan reconsidered his earlier
Order, to wit: The Project of Partition should, therefore, be respected and upheld. Hence, the sixty-three
(63) parcels referred to therein should be excluded from the probate proceedings and, likewise from the
administration of Special Administrator Teodorico Almine, Jr. Thereafter, the petitioner filed a motion for
reconsideration of the foregoing order but the same was denied by respondent Judge Reyes, to whose
sala Special Proceedings No. 564 and No. 1 1 06 were apparently transferred. Still, a second motion for
reconsideration was filed.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the extrajudicial partition of the 63 parcels made after the filing of the petition for the
probate of the Will, and before said Will was probated, is a NULL considering that such was already
decided by this Court in the case of Ernesto M. Guevara, vs. Rosario Guevara et al., Vol. 74 Phil. Reports,
there can be no valid partition among the heirs till after the Will had been probated.

HELD:
The above argument is obviously flawed and misleading for the simple reason that the aforementioned
partition was made in the civil case for partition of the estate of Paz Escarella, which is distinct from, and
independent of, the special proceedings for the probate of the will of Rosendo Ralla.

Verily, the rule is that there can be no valid partition among the heirs till after the will has been probated.
This, of course, presupposes that the properties to be partitioned are the same properties embraced in
the win. Thus the rule invoked is inapplicable in this instance where there are two separate cases (Civil
Case No. 2023 for partition, and Special Proceedings No. 564 originally for the probate of a will), each
involving the estate of a different person (Paz Escarella and Rosendo Ralla, respectively) comprising
dissimilar properties.

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 FERNANDEZ/REYES V. DIMAGIBA
G.R. Nos. L-23638 and L-23662 October 12, 1967
(Rule 76 - Allowance or Disallowance of Will; Rule 75 Production of Will. Allowance of Will Necessary;
Rule 109 Appeals in Special Proceedings )

FACTS:
Intestate heirs of late Benedicta delos Reyes petitioned for review of the decision of CA affirming the
decision of CFI Bulacan, whereas in special proceeding of said court in admitting to probate the last will
and testament of the deceased. The respondent Ismaela Dimagiba submitted to CFI petition for the
probate of alleged will of the Benedicta, wherein in the said will it instituted the petitioner as the sole heir
of the estate of the deceased.

The CFI found that the will was genuine, hence was properly executed, but with deferred resolution on the
questions of estoppel and revocation. Petitioners filed petition for reconsideration insisting that the issues
on estoppel and revocation be resolved. Where the court overruled that the claim for estoppel in asking
for probate of the will be reserved unto the parties the right to raise the issue of implied revocation at
opportune time.

The appellate court held that admitting the will to probate had become final for lack of opportune appeal
and same was appealable in the issue of implied revocation.

ISSUES:
Whether or not the decree of CFI allowing the will to probate had become final for lack of appeal.

Whether or not the order of the court of origin overruling the estoppel invoked by the petitioners is final.

Whether or not the 1930 will of late Benedicta delos Reyes had been impliedly revoked by her execution
of deeds of conveyance in favour of the proponent.

HELD:
The first issue regarding the allowing of probate of will, the court said it shall be considered interlocutory,
due to it fails to resolve the issues of estoppel and revocation. It is elementary that a probate decree
finally and definitely settle questions concerning capacity of the testator and the proper execution and
witnessing of his last will and testament, whether valid and enforceable. As such, the probate order is final
and appealable and it so recognized by express provisions sec 1 Rule 109, that any interested person may
appeal in special proceedings from an order or judgment.

As to the issue of estoppel, we have already ruled in Guevara vs. Guevara, 98 Phil. 249, that the
presentation and probate of a will are requirements of public policy, being primarily designed to protect
the testator's, expressed wishes, which are entitled to respect as a consequence of the decedent's
ownership and right of disposition within legal limits. Evidence of it is the duty imposed on a custodian of
a will to deliver the same to the Court, and the fine and imprisonment prescribed for its violation (Revised
Rule 75). It would be a non sequitur to allow public policy to be evaded on the pretext of estoppel.
Whether or not the order overruling the allegation of estoppel is still appealable or not, the defense is
patently unmeritorious and the Court of Appeals correctly so ruled.

The last issue of revocation, is predicated on paragraph 2 of Article 957 of the Civil Code of 1950 (Art. 869
of the Code of 1889), which recites: Art. 957. The legacy or devise shall be without effect: If the testator by
any title or for any cause alienates the thing bequeathed or any part thereof, it being understood that in
the latter case the legacy or devise shall be without effect only with respect to the part thus alienated. If
after the alienation the thing should again belong to the testator, even if it be by reason of nullity of the
contract, the legacy or devise shall not thereafter be valid, unless the reacquisition shall have been
effected by virtue of the exercise of the right of repurchase.

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 SPOUSES AJERO vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 106720 September 15, 1994
(Rule 76 - Allowance or Disallowance of Will)

FACTS:
The holographic will of Annie Sand, who died on November 25, 1982, was submitted for probate in the
RTC of Quezon City. In the will, the following were named as devisees: petitioners Roberto and Thelma
Ajero, private respondent Clemente Sand, Meriam S. Arong, Leah Sand, Lilia Sand, Edgar Sand, Fe Sand,
Lisa S. Sand, and Dr. Jose Ajero, Sr., and their children. Petitioners filed for allowance of decedent's
holographic will, alleging that at the time of its execution, she was of sound and disposing mind, not acting
under duress, fraud or undue influence, and was in every respect capacitated to dispose of her estate by
will. Private respondent opposed the petition on the grounds that: neither the testament's body nor the
signature therein was in decedent's handwriting; it contained alterations and corrections which were not
duly signed by decedent; and, the will was procured by petitioners through improper pressure and undue
influence. The petition was likewise opposed by Dr. Jose Ajero. He contested the disposition in the will of a
house and lot located in Cabadbaran, Agusan Del Norte. He claimed that said property could not be
conveyed by decedent in its entirety, as she was not its sole owner. The trial court admitted the
decedent's holographic will to probate, finding that the question of identity of the will, its due execution
and the testamentary capacity of the testatrix to be resolved in favor of the allowance of probate of the
submitted will. On appeal, said Decision was reversed by the Court of Appeals which found that, "the
holographic will fails to meet the requirements for its validity." Thus, this appeal which is impressed with
merit.

ISSUE:
Whether the admission for probate of the holographic will in question is valid since probate proceedings
are limited to pass only upon the extrinsic validity of the will sought to be probated.

HELD:
Yes, the admission of the said holographic will is valid. As a general rule, courts in probate proceedings
are limited to pass only upon the extrinsic validity of the will sought to be probated. However, in
exceptional instances, courts are not powerless to do what the situation constrains them to do, and pass
upon certain provisions of the will. In the case at bench, decedent herself indubitably stated in her
holographic will that the Cabadbaran property is in the name of her late father, John H. Sand (which led
oppositor Dr. Jose Ajero to question her conveyance of the same in its entirety). Thus, as correctly held by
respondent court, she cannot validly dispose of the whole property, which she shares with her father's
other heirs.

Section 9, Rule 76 of the Rules of Court provides that a will shall be disallowed in any of the following
cases:
(a) If not executed and attested as required by law;
(b) If the testator was insane, or otherwise mentally incapable to make a will, at the time of its
execution;
(c) If it was executed under duress, or the influence of fear, or threats;
(d) If it was procured by undue and improper pressure and influence, on the part of the beneficiary,
or of some other person for his benefit;
(e) If the signature of the testator was procured by fraud or trick, and he did not intend that the
instrument should be his will at the time of fixing his signature thereto.

These lists are exclusive; no other grounds can serve to disallow a will. Thus, in a petition to admit a
holographic will to probate, the only issues to be resolved are: (1) whether the instrument submitted is,
indeed, the decedent's last will and testament; (2) whether said will was executed in accordance with the
formalities prescribed by law; (3) whether the decedent had the necessary testamentary capacity at the
time the will was executed; and, (4) whether the execution of the will and its signing were the voluntary
acts of the decedent.

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In the case of holographic wills, on the other hand, what assures authenticity is the requirement that they
be totally autographic or handwritten by the testator himself. Failure to strictly observe other formalities
will not result in the disallowance of a holographic will that is unquestionably handwritten by the testator.

DECISION:
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the instant petition is GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV
No. 22840, dated March 30, 1992, is REVERSED and SET ASIDE, except with respect to the invalidity of the
disposition of the entire house and lot in Cabadbaran, Agusan del Norte. The Decision of the Regional Trial
Court of Quezon City, Branch 94 in Sp. Proc. No. Q-37171, dated November 19, 1988, admitting to probate
the holographic will of decedent Annie Sand, is hereby REINSTATED, with the above qualification as
regards the Cabadbaran property. No costs. SO ORDERED.

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 DE ARANZ v. GALING
G.R. No. 77047 May 28, 1988
(Rule 76 - Allowance or Disallowance of Will)

FACTS:
Joaquin R-Infante filed with the RTC of Pasig a petition for probate and allowance of the last will and
testament of Monserrat RInfantey G-Pola. The petition specified the names and addresses of the
petitioners as legatees and devisees. The probate court then issued an order setting the petition for
hearing. This order was published in Nueva Era a newspaper of general circulation once a week for three
consecutive weeks. Joaquin was then allowed to present evidence ex-parte and was appointed executor.

The petitioners filed an MR alleging that as named legatees no notices were sent to them as required by
Section 4 of Rule 76 and they prayed that they be given time to file their opposition. This was denied.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the requirement under Section 4, Rule 76 is mandatory and the omission constitutes a
reversible error for being constitutive of grave abuse of discretion.

HELD:
Yes. It is clear for the Rule that notice in time and place of the hearing for the allowance of a will shall be
forwarded to the designated, or other known heirs, legatees and devisees residing in the Philippines at
their places of residence, if such place of residence be known.

In this case, there is no question that the places of residence of the petitioners are known to the probate
court. The requirement of the law for the allowance of the will was not satisfied by mere publication of
the notice of hearing for three consecutive weeks in a newspaper of general circulation.

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 TAN vs. THE HON. FRANCISCO C. GEDORIO, JR.
G.R. NO. 166520 March 14, 2008
(Rule 78 Letters Testamentary and of Administration, When and to Whom Issued)

FACTS:
Gerardo Tan (Gerardo) died leaving no will. Private respondents, who are claiming to be the children of
Gerardo Tan, filed with the RTC a Petition for the issuance of letters of administration. Herein Petitioners,
claiming to be legitimate heirs of Gerardo Tan, filed an Opposition to the Petition.

Private respondents then moved for the appointment of a special administrator. They prayed that their
attorney-in-fact, Romualdo D. Lim (Romualdo), be appointed as the special administrator, which was
opposed by Petitioners. Petitioners contend further that Romualdo does not have the same familiarity,
experience or competence as that of their co-petitioner Vilma C. Tan (Vilma) who was already acting as de
facto administratrix of his estate since his death.

For Vilmas failure to comply the courts directives in her capacity as de facto administratrix, the RTC Judge
consequently issued an Order appointing Romualdo as special administrator of Gerardos Estate.
Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the foregoing Order, claiming that petitioner Vilma
should be the one appointed as special administratix as she was allegedly next of kin of the deceased,
which was denied by respondent Judge Gedorio, the then RTC Executive Judge.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the CA erred in denying petitioners plea to be given primacy in the administration of their
fathers estate.

HELD:
No. The appeal is devoid of merit. The order of preference petitioners speak of is found in Section 6, Rule
78 of the Rules of Court. However, this Court has consistently ruled that the order of preference in the
appointment of a regular administrator as provided in the afore-quoted provision does not apply to the
selection of a special administrator. The preference under Section 6, Rule 78 of the Rules of Court for the
next of kin refers to the appointment of a regular administrator, and not of a special administrator, as
the appointment of the latter lies entirely in the discretion of the court, and is not appealable.

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 GERONA vs. DE GUZMAN
G.R. No. L-19060, May 29, 1964
(Rule 74 Summary Settlement of Estate)

FACTS:
Petitioners herein, alleged that they are the legitimate children of Domingo Gerona and Placida de
Guzman; that the latter, who died on August 9, 1941 was a legitimate daughter of Marcelo de Guzman
and his first wife, Teodora de la Cruz; that after the death of his first wife, Marcelo de Guzman married
Camila Ramos, who begot him several children.

That Marcelo de Guzman died on September 11, 1945 and on May 6, 1948, respondents executed a deed
of "extra-judicial settlement of the estate of the deceased, fraudulently misrepresenting therein that they
were the only surviving heirs of the deceased. Although they well knew that petitioners were, also, his
forced heirs respondents succeeded fraudulently in causing the transfer certificates of title to seven (7)
parcels of land, issued in the name of said deceased, to be cancelled and new transfer certificates of title
to be issued in their own name, in the proportion of 1/7th individual interest for each. Such fraud was
discovered by the petitioners only the year before the institution of the case. They demanded from
respondents their share in said properties, to the extent of 1/8th interest thereon.

The petitioners prayed that judgment be rendered nullifying said deed of extra- judicial settlement, insofar
as it deprives them of their participation of 1/18th of the properties in litigation; ordering the respondents
to reconvey to them their aforementioned share. The trial court rendered a decision finding that
petitioners' mother was a legitimate child, by first marriage, of Marcelo de Guzman; that the properties
described in the complaint belonged to the conjugal partnership of Marcelo de Guzman and his second
wife and that petitioners' action has already prescribed, Petitioners maintain that since they and
respondents are co-heirs of the deceased Marcelo de Guzman, the present action for partition of the
latter's estate is not subject to the statute of limitations of action.

ISSUES:
Whether or not the petitioner contention is tenable.

HELD:
Petitioners' contention is untenable. Although, as a general rule, an action for partition among co-heirs
does not prescribe, this is true only as long as the defendants do not hold the property in question under
an adverse title. The statute of limitations operates as in other cases; from the moment such adverse title
is asserted by the possessor of the property.

Inasmuch as petitioners seek to annul the aforementioned deed of "extra-judicial settlement" upon the
ground of fraud in the execution thereof, the action therefore may be filed within four (4) years from the
discovery of the fraud. Such discovery is deemed to have taken place, in the case at bar, on June 25, 1948,
when said instrument was filed with the Register of Deeds and new certificates of title were issued in the
name of respondents exclusively, for the registration of the deed of extra-judicial settlement constitute
constructive notice to the whole world.

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 BARREDO vs. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. L-17863 November 28, 1962
(Rule 86 Claims against Estate)

FACTS:
On 23 and 30 August and 6 September 1945, a notice to creditors requiring them their claims with the
clerk of court previously fixed within 6 months reckoned from the date of its first publication and expiring
February 23, 1946, was published by the administrator of the intestate estate of Charles McDonough. On
22 October 1947, the heirs of Fausto Barredo filed their belated claim to collect the face value of a
promissory note for P20,000.00 plus interest and attorneys fees against the said estate. The promissory
note was secured by a mortgage in favor of Fausto Barredo over the leasehold rights of McDnough. The
original lease, the extension of its term, and the mortgage were all annotated at the back of the certificate
of title of the land. A deed of extrajudicial partition of the secured credit was also made by the heirs and
was annotated at the back of the aforesaid title. The claim was opposed by the administrator. The lower
court allowed it after hearing, but was reversed by the Court of Appeals. In the case at bar, petitioner
contends that the one month period referred to in Section 2 of Rule 87 of Rules of Court is to be counted
from and after the expiration of the 6 month period fixed in the published notice to claims. The
respondent administrator argues that the one-month period for filing late claims should be counted from
the expiration of the regular 6-month period.

ISSUES:
Whether or not the tardy claim will be allowed.

HELD:
No. The claim was filed outside of the period previously fixed with an insufficient cause. A tardy claim may
be allowed, at the discretion of the court, upon showing of cause for failure to present said claim on time.
The one-month period specified in this section is the time granted claimants, and the same is to begin
from the order authorizing the filing of the claims. It does not mean that the extension of one month
starts from the expiration of the original period fixed by the court for the presentation of claims. (Paulin
vs. Aquino, L-11267, March 20, 1958)

However, the probate courts discretion in allowing a claim after the regular period for filing claims
but before entry of an order of distribution presupposes not only claim for apparent merit but also that
cause existed to justify the tardiness in filing the claim. Here, petitioners alleged as excuse for their
tardiness the recent recovery of the papers of the late Fausto Barredo from the possession of his lawyer
who is now deceased. This ground insufficient, due to the availability, and knowledge by the petitioners,
of the annotation at the back of the certificate of title of the mortgage embodying the instant claim,(as
well as the payment of P20,000.00 made by the Japanese military authorities.)

The order of the trial court allowing the late claim without justification, because under Section 2, Rule 8 of
the Rules of Court, said court has no authority to admit a belated claim for no cause or for an insufficient
cause.

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 SIKAT vs. VDA. DE VILLANUEVA
G.R. No. L-35925 November 10, 1932
(Rule 86 Claims against Estate)

FACTS:
Ricardo Sikat filed a complaint, as judicial administrator of the intestate estate of Mariano P.
Villanueva, against Quiteria Vda. de Villanueva, as judicial administratrix of the intestate estate of Pedro
Villanueva, praying that the decision of the committee on claims and appraisal in the intestate
proceedings of the aforesaid Pedro Villanueva with regard to the credit of the late Mariano P. Villanueva
be confirmed by the court, and the defendant as judicial administratrix, be ordered to pay the plaintiff the
amount of P10,192.92, with legal interest from July 15, 1919 until fully paid, and the costs. In answer to
the complaint, the defendant denied each and every allegation thereof, and set up a special defense of
prescription, and a counterclaim for P15,536.69 which she alleges the estate of Mariano P. Villanueva
owes to the estate of Pedro Villanueva; and she prayed for judgment absolving her from the complaint
and sentencing the plaintiff to pay her said amount with interest and costs.

The plaintiff, Ricardo Sikat, instituted the present action as judicial administrator of the estate of Mariano
P. Villanueva, however questioned the jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance of Albay over the intestate
proceedings of the estate of Pedro Villanueva, and upon appeal the Supreme Court decided that said
Court of First Instance had no jurisdiction to take cognizance of the said intestate proceedings. In view of
this decision of the Supreme Court holding the Court of First Instance of Albay incompetent to take
cognizance of the intestate proceedings in the estate of Pedro Villanueva, these proceedings were
instituted in the Court of First Instance of Manila through the application of Enrique Kare, as judicial
administrator of the intestate estate of Mariano P. Villanueva upon the ground that when Pedro
Villanueva died he owed the estate of Mariano P. Villanueva the sum of P10,192.92, with legal interest
from June 15, 1919.

After the Court of First Instance of Manila had appointed Quiteria Vda. de Villanueva, administratrix of the
estate of Pedro Villanueva, and Mamerto Roxas and Nicanor Roxas as commissioners to compose the
committee on claims and appraisal, Enrique Kare, as administrator of the estate of Mariano P. Villanueva,
filed his claim with the committee on September 22, 1925, and that the same claim appears in the present
complaint. The said committee on claims and appraisal, composed of Mamerto Roxas and Nicanor Roxas,
admitted the claim and decided in favor of the estate of Mariano P. Villanueva, filing their report with the
court accordingly.

ISSUES:
Whether at the time of Pedro Villanueva's death the right of Mariano P. Villanueva's estate to collect the
credit against him has already prescribed.

HELD:
The court decided the question in the affirmative, citing section 49 of the aforecited Act No. 190. This
provision of law speaks of an "action", which, according to section 1 of Act No. 190, "means an ordinary
suit in a court of justice, by which one party prosecutes another for the enforcement or protection of a
right, or the redress or prevention of a wrong". According to this definition, the proceeding here in
question is not an action but a special proceeding, which, according to the same section, is any other
remedy provided by law. The very reference in section 49 to actions brought against debtors before their
death clearly means ordinary actions and not special proceedings.

In re Estate of De Dios (24 Phil., 573), cited in the aforementioned case of Santos vs. Manarang, this court
laid down the following doctrine: The purpose of the law, in fixing a period within which claims against an
estate must be presented, is to insure a speedy settlement of the affairs of the deceased person and the
early delivery of the property, to the persons entitled to receive it.

The speedy settlement of the estate of deceased persons for the benefit of creditors and those entitled to
the residue by way of inheritance or legacy after the debts and expenses of administration have been
paid, is the ruling spirit of our probate law.

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It may be argued in this case that inasmuch as none of the persons entitled to be appointed
administrators or to apply for the appointment of an administrator have taken any step in that direction,
and since no administrator or committee on claims and appraisal has been appointed to fix the time for
filing claims, the right of the plaintiff, as administrator of Mariano P. Villanueva's estate, to present the
latter's claim against Pedro Villanueva's estate could not prescribe.

The plaintiff herein as administrator of Mariano P. Villanueva's estate, was guilty of laches in not
instituting the intestate proceedings of Pedro Villanueva in the Court of First Instance of Manila until after
the lapse of three years after this court had set aside the intestate proceedings begun in the Court of First
Instance of Albay for lack of jurisdiction over the place where the decedent had died, that is, from October
21, 1921, to June 18,1925.

Taking into account the spirit of the law upon the settlement and partition of estates, and the fact that the
administration of Mariano P. Villanueva's estate had knowledge of Pedro Villanueva's death, and
instituted the intestate proceedings for the settlement of the latter's estate in the Court of First Instance
of Albay and filed Mariano P. Villanueva's claim against it, which was not allowed because this court held
those proceedings void for lack of jurisdiction, the estate of Mariano P. Villanueva was guilty of laches in
not instituting the same proceedings in the competent court, the Court of First Instance of Manila, until
after three years had elapsed, and applying the provisions of section 49 of the Code of Civil Procedure by
analogy, we declare the claim of Mariano P. Villanueva to have prescribed. To hold otherwise would be to
permit a creditor having knowledge of his debtor's death to keep the latter's estate in suspense.

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 DE VILLANUEVA vs. PNB
G.R. No. L-18403 September 30, 1961
(Rule 86 Claims against Estate)

FACTS:
For the administration of the estate of her deceased husband, Pascual Villanueva, the widow Mauricia G.
Villanueva, on December 19, 1949, petitioned the Court of First Instance of Agusan, for letters of
Administration (Sp. Proc. No. 67). The petition was set for hearing and Notice thereof was published on
February 25, March 4, and 11, 1950, in the Manila Daily Bulletin. At the hearing, other heirs while agreeing
to the placing of estate under administration opposed the appointment the widow. The name of Atty.
Teodulo R. Ricaforte, suggested and all the parties agreed. After the taking the required oath, Atty.
Ricaforte entered upon the performance of his duties. The defendant-appellant Philippine National Bank
filed in the administration proceedings, Creditor of Pascual Villanueva, deceased, respectfully presents its
claim against the estate of the said deceased.

The administrator, on November 5, 1954, opposed the alleging that he had no knowledge or information
sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the allegations therein. The appellant PNB, on November 14,
1958, more than four (4) Years after the opposition of the claim presented by the administrator, filed a
pleading captioned "Petition for an Extension of time within which to File the Claim of Philippine National
Bank", alleging, among others, that Sec. 2, Rule 87 of the Rules, allows the filing of claims even if the
period stated in the notice to creditors elapsed, upon cause shown and on such terms as equitable; that
its failure to present the claiming with the period stated in the notice, was its lack of knowledge of
administration proceedings, for while said maintains a branch office in Agusan, the employees did not
come to know of the proceedings, the notice has been published in the Morning Times, a newspaper very
limited circulation.

ISSUES:
Whether or not the question is already barred.

HELD:
The claim was filed outside of the period provided for in the Order of the lower court, within which to
present claims against the estate. The period fixed in the notice lapsed or about 1 year and 8 months late.
This notwithstanding, appellant contends that it did not know of such administration proceedings, not
even its employees in the Branch Office in Butuan City, Agusan. It is to be noted that the petition for
Letters of Administration and the Notice to Creditors were duly published in the Manila Daily Bulletin and
in the Morning Times, respectively, which was a full compliance with the requirements of the Rules.
Moreover, the supposed lack of knowledge of the proceedings on the part of appellant and its employees
had been belied by uncontested and eloquent evidence, consisting of a deposit of an amount of money by
the administrator of the estate in said Bank (Agusan Agency). It is quite true that the Courts can extend
the period within which to present claims against the estate, even after the period limited has elapsed;
but such extension should be granted under special circumstances. The lower did not find any justifiable
reason to give the extension and for one thing, there was no period to extend, the same had elapsed.

WHEREFORE, the order subject of the appeal is hereby affirmed.

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 BELAMALA vs. POLINAR
G.R. No. L-24098 November 18, 1967
(Rule 86 Claims against Estate)

FACTS:
On May 24, 1954, a complaint for Frustrated Murder was filed againts Mauricio Polinar, et al, in the Justice
of the Peace of Clarin, Bohol. Mauricio Polinar was convicted of the crime of serious physical injuries and
sentenced him to pay to the offended party Buenaventura Belamala, now claimant herein, the amount of
P990.00, plus the amount of P35.80 as indemnity the amount of P1,000.00 as moral damages. On June 18,
1956, Mauricio appealed and while the appeal of said Mauricio Polinar was pending before the Court of
Appeals, he died and that there was no Notice or Notification of his death has ever been filed in the said
Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the lower court and said decision of the
Court of Appeals was promulgated on March 27, 1958 wherein said Mauricio Polinar has already died on
July 27, 1956. Mauricio Polinar is survived by his wife, Balbina Bongato and his children and the parties
have reserved to present in Court evidence on facts not agreed to herein by the parties.

ISSUES:
Whether or not death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction extinguishes his civil liability.

HELD:
The Supreme Court see no merit in the plea that the civil liability has been extinguished, in view of the
provisions of the Civil Code of the Philippines of 1950 (Rep. Act No. 386) that became operative eighteen
years after the Revised Penal Code. As pointed out by the Court below, Article 33 of the Civil Code
establishes a civil action for damages on account of physical injuries, entirely separate and distinct from
the criminal action. Assuming that for lack of express reservation, Belamala's civil action for damages was
to be considered instituted together with the criminal action, still, since both proceedings were
terminated without final adjudication, the civil action of the offended party under Article 33 may yet be
enforced separately. Such claim in no way contradicts Article 108, of the Penal Code, that imposes the
obligation to indemnify upon the deceased offender's heirs, because the latter acquired their decedents
obligations only to the extent of the value of the inheritance (Civil Code, Art. 774). Hence, the obligation of
the offender's heirs under Article 108 ultimately becomes an obligation of the offender's estate.

Judgment reversed and set aside. No Cost.

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 STRONGHOLD INSURANCE vs. REPUBLIC-ASAHI GLASS CORP.
G.R. No. 147561 June 22, 2006
(Rule 87 Actions by and against Executors and Administrators)

FACTS:
On May 24, 1989, Republic-Asahi Glass Corporation entered into a contract with Jose D. Santos, Jr., the
proprietor of JDS Construction (JDS), for the construction of roadways and a drainage system in Republic-
Asahis compound in Barrio Pinagbuhatan, Pasig City. Republic- Asahi was to pay JDS. JDS posted a
performance bond which executed, jointly and severally with Stronghold Insurance Co., Inc (SICI). Due to
allege slow pace of construction, Republic-Asahi extra judicially rescinded the contract without prejudice
for recovery of damages from JDS and its sureties. Through the filing of the complaint, Republic-Asahi
sought to recover the amount expended to complete the project using another contractor. SICI filed its
answer and interposed the defense that the money claims against it and JDS have been extinguished by
the death of Jose D. Santos, Jr. The lower court dismissed the complaint of Republic-Asahi, but it was
reversed by the Court of Appeals. Hence, SICI filed a petition for review on certiorari with the Supreme
Court.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the death of the party extinguishes the liability of a solidary obligor.

HELD:
No, as a general rule, the death of either the creditor or the debtor does not extinguish the obligation.
Obligations are transmissible to the heirs, except when the transmission is prevented by the law, the
stipulations of the parties, or the nature of the obligation. Only obligations that are personal or are
identified with the persons themselves are extinguished by death. Death is not a defence that he or his
estate can set up to wipe out the obligations under the performance bond.

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 GABRIEL vs. BILON
G.R. No. 146989 February 7, 2007
(Rule 87 Actions by and against Executors and Administrators)

FACTS:
Nelson Bilon, Angel Brazil and Ernesto Pagaygay were jeepney drivers of jeepneys owned by Melencio
Gabriel. They are paying P400/day for their boundary. Later, the drivers were required to pay an
additional P50.00 to cover police protection, car wash, deposit fee, and garage fees.

The three drivers refused to pay the additional P50.00. On April 30, 1995, when the drivers reported to
work, they were not given any jeepney to drive. Eventually, they were dismissed. The three drivers sued
Gabriel for illegal dismissal.

The Labor Arbiter ruled in favor of the drivers and ordered Gabriel to pay the drivers their backwages and
their separation pay amounting to about a total of P1.03M.

On April 18, 1997, the LA promulgated its decision and on the same day sent a copy thereof to Gabriel but
Flordeliza (wife of Gabriel) refused to receive the copy. Apparently, Gabriel died on April 4, 1997. The copy
was re-sent via registered mail on May 28, 1997. Flordeliza appealed to the LA on June 5, 1997. The LA
dismissed the appeal; it ruled that the appeal was not on time because the promulgation was made on
April 18, 1997 and that the appeal on June 5, 1997 was already beyond the ten day period required for
appeal.

The National Labor Relations Commission reversed the LA. It ruled that there was no employee-employer
relationship between the drivers and Gabriel. The Court of Appeals reversed the NLRC but it ruled that the
separation pay should not be awarded but rather, the employees should be reinstated.

ISSUES:
Whether the appeal was filed on time.

HELD:
YES. The Court considers the service of copy of the decision of the labor arbiter to have been
validly made on May 28, 1997 when it was received through registered mail. As correctly pointed out by
petitioners wife, service of a copy of the decision could not have been validly effected on April 18, 1997
because petitioner passed away on April 4, 1997. Section 4, Rule III of the New Rules of Procedure of the
NLRC provides: SEC. 4. Service of Notices and Resolutions. Notices or summons and copies of orders,
resolutions or decisions shall be served on the parties to the case personally by the bailiff or authorized
public officer within three (3) days from receipt thereof or by registered mail; Provided, That where a
party is represented by counsel or authorized representative, service shall be made on such counsel or
authorized representative; Provided further, That in cases of decision and final awards, copies thereof
shall be served on both parties and their counsel. For the purpose of computing the period of appeal, the
same shall be counted from receipt of such decisions, awards or orders by the counsel of record.

The bailiff or officer personally serving the notice, order, resolution or decision shall submit
his return within two (2) days from date of service thereof, stating legibly in his return, his name, and the
names of the persons served and the date of receipt which return shall be immediately attached and shall
form part of the records of the case. If no service was effected, the serving officer shall state the reason
therefore in the return. Section 6, Rule 13 of the Rules of Court which is suppletory to the NLRC Rules of
Procedure states that: "service of the papers may be made by delivering personally a copy to the party or
his counsel, or by leaving it in his office with his clerk or with a person having charge thereof. If no person
is found in his office, or his office is not known, or he has no office, then by leaving the copy, between the
hours of eight in the morning and six in the evening, at the partys or counsels residence, if known, with a
person of sufficient age and discretion then residing therein." The foregoing provisions contemplate a
situation wherein the party to the action is alive upon the delivery of a copy of the tribunals decision. In
the present case, however, petitioner died before a copy of the labor arbiters decision was served upon

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him. Hence, the above provisions do not apply. As aptly stated by the NLRC: In the case at bar, respondent
Melencio Gabriel was not represented by counsel during the pendency of the case.

A decision was rendered by the Labor Arbiter a quo on March 17, 1997 while Mr. Gabriel passed away on
April 4, 1997, without having received a copy thereof during his lifetime. The decision was only served on
April 18, 1997 when he was no longer around to receive the same. His surviving spouse and daughter
cannot automatically substitute themselves as party respondents. Thus, when the bailiff tendered a copy
of the decision to them, they were not in a position to receive them. The requirement of leaving a copy at
the partys residence is not applicable in the instant case because this presupposes that the party is still
living and is not just available to receive the decision. The preceding considered, the decision of the Labor
Arbiter has not become final because there was no proper service of copy thereof to party respondent.
Thus, the appeal filed on behalf of petitioner on June 5, 1997 after receipt of a copy of the decision via
registered mail on May 28, 1997 was within the ten-day reglementary period prescribed.

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 UNION BANK vs. SANTIBAEZ
G.R. No. 149926 February 23, 2005
(Rule 88 Payment of the Debts of the Estate)

FACTS:
On May 31, 1980, the First Countryside Credit Corporation (FCCC) and Efraim M. Santibaez entered into a
loan agreement in the amount of P128,000.00. The amount was intended for the payment of the purchase
price of one (1) unit Ford 6600 Agricultural All-Purpose Diesel Tractor. In view thereof, Efraim and his son,
Edmund, executed a promissory note in favor of the FCCC, the principal sum payable in five equal annual
amortizations of P43,745.96 due on May 31, 1981 and every May 31st thereafter up to May 31, 1985. On
December 13, 1980, the FCCC and Efraim entered into another loan agreement, this time in the amount of
P123,156.00. It was intended to pay the balance of the purchase price of another unit of Ford 6600
Agricultural All-Purpose Diesel Tractor, with accessories, and one (1) unit Howard Rotamotor Model AR
60K. Again, Efraim and his son, Edmund, executed a promissory note for the said amount in favor of the
FCCC. Aside from such promissory note, they also signed a Continuing Guaranty Agreement for the loan
dated December 13, 1980. Sometime in February 1981, Efraim died, leaving a holographic will.
Subsequently in March 1981, testate proceedings commenced before the RTC of Iloilo City. On April 9,
1981, Edmund, as one of the heirs, was appointed as the special administrator of the estate of the
decedent. During the pendency of the testate proceedings, the surviving heirs, Edmund and his sister
Florence Santibaez Ariola, executed a Joint Agreement dated July 22, 1981, wherein they agreed to
divide between themselves and take possession of the three (3) tractors; that is, two (2) tractors for
Edmund and one (1) tractor for Florence. Each of them was to assume the indebtedness of their late
father to FCCC, corresponding to the tractor respectively taken by them. On August 20, 1981, a Deed of
Assignment with Assumption of Liabilities was executed by and between FCCC and Union Savings and
Mortgage Bank, wherein the FCCC as the assignor, among others, assigned all its assets and liabilities to
Union Savings and Mortgage Bank. Demand letters for the settlement of his account were sent by
petitioner Union Bank of the Philippines (UBP) to Edmund, but the latter failed to heed the same and
refused to pay. Thus, on February 5, 1988, the petitioner filed a Complaint for sum of money against the
heirs of Efraim Santibaez, Edmund and Florence. Summonses were issued against both, but the one
intended for Edmund was not served since he was in the United States and there was no information on
his address or the date of his return to the Philippines. Accordingly, the complaint was narrowed down to
respondent Florence S. Ariola. On December 7, 1988, respondent Florence S. Ariola filed her Answer and
alleged that the loan documents did not bind her since she was not a party thereto. Considering that the
joint agreement signed by her and her brother Edmund was not approved by the probate court, it was null
and void; hence, she was not liable to the petitioner under the joint agreement. Consequently, trial on the
merits ensued and a decision was subsequently rendered by the court dismissing the complaint for lack of
merit. The decretal portion of the RTC decision reads: The appellate court found that the appeal was not
meritorious and held thatthe petitioner should have filed its claim with the probate court. It further held
that the partition made in the agreement was null and void, since no valid partition may be had until after
the will has been probated.

ISSUES:
Whether or not the joint agreement was valid.

HELD:
No, the joint agreement is invalid. The Court is posed to resolve the following issues: a) whether or not the
partition in the Agreement executed by the heirs is valid; b) whether or not the heirs assumption of the
indebtedness of the deceased is valid; and c) whether the petitioner can hold the heirs liable on the
obligation of the deceased.

In testate succession, there can be no valid partition among the heirs until after the will has been
probated. The law enjoins the probate of a will and the public requires it, because unless a will is
probated and notice thereof given to the whole world, the right of a person to dispose of his property by
will may be rendered nugatory.

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The authentication of a will decides no other question than such as touch upon the capacity of the
testator and the compliance with those requirements or solemnities which the law prescribes for the
validity of a will.

This, of course, presupposes that the properties to be partitioned are the same properties embraced in
the will. In the present case, the deceased, Efraim Santibaez, left a holographic will which contained,
inter alia, the provision which reads as follows:
(e) All other properties, real or personal, which I own and may be discovered later after my demise,
shall be distributed in the proportion indicated in the immediately preceding paragraph in favor of
Edmund and Florence, my children.

The question that now comes to fore is whether the heirs assumption of the indebtedness of the
decedent is binding. We rule in the negative. The partition being invalid as earlier discussed, the heirs in
effect did not receive any such tractor. It follows then that the assumption of liability cannot be given any
force and effect.

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 SHEKER vs. SHEKER
G.R. No. 157912 December 13, 2007
(Rule 88 Payment of the Debts of the Estate)

FACTS:
Alice Sheker died and her estate was left under the administration of Victoria Medina. Alice left a
holographic will which was admitted to probate by the Regional Trial Court of Iligan City. The trial court
issued order for all creditors to file their claims against the estate. In compliance therewith, Alan Joseph
Sheker filed contingent money claim in the amount of 206,250.00 representing the amount of his
commission as an agent for selling some properties of Alice an another 275,000.00 as reimbursements for
the expenses he incurred.

Medina moved for the dismissal of Alan Shekers claim alleging among others that the money claim filed
by Alan Sheker is void because the latter did not attach a certification of non-forum shopping thereto.

ISSUES:
Whether or not the money claim filed by Alan Sheker is void.

HELD:
No. the Supreme Court emphasized that the certification of non-forum shopping is required only for
complaints and other initiatory pleadings. In the case at bar, the probate proceeding was initiated NOT by
Alan Shekers money claim but rather upon the filling of the petition for allowance of the Alice Shekers
will. Under the Section 1 and 5 of Rule 86 of the Rules of Court, after granting letters of testamentary or of
administration, all persons having money claims against the decedent are mandated to file or notify the
court and the estate administrator of their respective money claims, otherwise, they would be barred
subject to certain exceptions.

A money claim in a probate proceeding is like a creditors motion for claims which is to be recognized and
taken into consideration in the proper disposition of the properties of the estate and as a motion, its office
is not to initiate new litigation, but to bring a material but incidental matter arising in the progress of the
case in which the motion is filed. A motion is not an independent right of remedy, but is confined to
incidental matters in the progress of a cause. It relates to some question that is collateral to the main
object of the action and is connected with and dependent upon the principal remedy.

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 PEOPLE vs. BAYOTAS
G.R. No. 102007 September 2, 1994
(Rule 88 Payment of the Debts of the Estate)

FACTS:
Rogelio Bayotas was charged with rape and eventually convicted on June19, 1991. While the appeal was
pending, Bayotas died. The Supreme Court dismissed the criminal aspect of the appeal; however, it
required the Solicitor-General to comment with regard to Bayotas civil liability arising from his
commission of the offense charged. In his comment, the Solicitor-General expressed his view that the
death of accused-appellant did not extinguish his civil liability as a result of his commission of the offense
charged. This comment was opposed by the counsel of accused-appellant, arguing that the death of the
accused while judgment of the conviction is pending appeal extinguishes both criminal and civil penalties,
he cited in support and invoked the ruling of the Court of Appeals in People v. Castillo, which was held
that the civil obligation in a criminal case takes root in the criminal responsibility and therefore civil
liability is extinguished if accused should die before final judgment is rendered.

ISSUES:
Whether or not the death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction extinguishes his civil liability.

HELD:
Yes. The death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction extinguishes his civil liability because tire
liability is based solely on the criminal act committed. Corollarily, the claim for civil liability survives
notwithstanding the death of the accused, if the same may also be predicted as one source of obligation
other than delict. Moreover, when a defendant dies before judgment becomes executory, there cannot
be any determination by final judgment whether or not the felony upon which the civil action might arise
exists, and for the simple reason that there is no party defendant. The Rules of Court state that a
judgment in a criminal case becomes final after the lapse of the period for perfecting an appeal or when
the sentence has been partially or totally satisfied or served, or the defendant has expressly waived in
writing his right to appeal. In addition, where the civil liability does not exist independently of the criminal
responsibility, the extinction of the latter by death, ipso facto extinguishes the former, provided, of
course, that death supervenes before final judgment. As in this case, the right to institute a separate civil
action is not reserved, the decision to be rendered must, of necessity, cover both the criminal and the
civil aspects of the case. The accused died before final judgment was rendered, thus, he is absolved of
both his criminal and civil liabilities based solely on delict or the crime committed. Appeal dismissed.

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 HILADO vs. CA
G.R. No. 164108 May 8, 2009
(Rule 83 Inventory and Appraisal. Provision for Support of Family; Rule 87 Actions By and Against
Executors and Administrators)

FACTS:
The well-known sugar magnate Roberto S. Benedicto died intestate on May 15 2000. he was survived by
his wife, private respondent Juliata Campos Benidicto and his only daughter. At the time of his death there
were two (2) pending civil cases against Benedicto involving the petitioners. First civil case No. 95-9137
was then pending with RTC Bacolod City, br.44 with petitioner Alfredo Hilado. On August 2, 2000, the
Manila RTC issued an order appointing private respondent as administrator of the estate of her husband.
On September 24, 2001, petitioners filed with Manila RTC a Manifestation/ motion Ex Abudanti lautela,
praying that they be furnished with copies of all processes and orders pertaining to the intestate
proceedings. Private respondent opposed, disputing the personality of the petitioners to intervene in the
intestate proceedings. On January 2, 2002, Manila RTC issued an order denying the Manifestation/Motion
on the ground that petitioners are not interested parties within the contemplation of the Rules of Court to
intervene in the intestate proceedings. A petition then for certiorari was filed with the CA. it argued that
petitioners had the right to intervene in the latter being the defendant in the civil case they lodged with
Bacolod RTC. On 27 February 2004, the Court of Appeals promulgated a decision dismissing the petition
and declaring that the Manila RTC did not abuse its discretion in refusing to allow petitioners to intervene
in the intestate proceedings. The allowance or disallowance of a motion to intervene, according to the
appellate court, is addressed to the sound discretion of the court. The Court of Appeals cited the fact that
the claims of petitioners against the decedent were in fact contingent or expectant, as these were still
pending litigation in separate proceedings before other courts. Hence, the present petition.

ISSUES:
Whether or not the administrator is required to return to the court a true inventory and appraisal of all
the real and personal estate of the deceased within three (3) months from appointment; and whether or
not petitioners are allowed to furnish with copies of all processes and orders pertaining to the intestate
proceedings;

HELD:
Yes. Section 1 of Rule 83 requires the administrator to return to the court a true inventory and appraisal of
all the real and personal estate of the deceased within three (3) months from appointment, while Section
8 of Rule 85 requires the administrator to render an account of his administration within one (1) year from
receipt of the letters testamentary or of administration. We do not doubt that there are reliefs available
to compel an administrator to perform either duty, but a person whose claim against the estate is still
contingent is not the party entitled to do so. Still, even if the administrator did delay in the performance of
these duties in the context of dissipating the assets of the estate, there are protections enforced and
available under Rule 88 to protect the interests of those with contingent claims against the estate.

Yes. Petitioners are allowed to be furnished with copies of all processes and orders issued in connection
with the intestate proceedings, as well as the pleadings filed by the administrator of the estate. There is
no questioning as to the utility of such relief for the petitioners. They would be duly alerted of the
developments in the intestate proceedings, including the status of the assets of the estate. Such a running
account would allow them to pursue the appropriate remedies should their interests be compromised,
such as the right, under Section 6, Rule 87, to complain to the intestate court if property of the estate
concealed, embezzled, or fraudulently conveyed. Nonetheless, in the instances that the Rules on Special
Proceedings do require notice to any or all "interested parties" the petitioners as "interested parties" will
be entitled to such notice. The instances when notice has to be given to interested parties are provided in:
(1) Sec. 10, Rule 85 in reference to the time and place of examining and allowing the account of the
executor or administrator; (2) Sec. 7(b) of Rule 89 concerning the petition to authorize the executor or
administrator to sell personal estate, or to sell, mortgage or otherwise encumber real estates; and; (3) Sec.
1, Rule 90 regarding the hearing for the application for an order for distribution of the estate residue.
After all, even the administratrix has acknowledged in her submitted inventory, the existence of the
pending cases filed by the petitioners.

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 NACAR vs. NISTAL
G.R. No. L-33006 December 8, 1982
(Rule 86 Claims against Estate; Rule 87 Actions By and Against Executors and Administrators)

FACTS:
Respondent, Idelfonso Japitana filed the complaint in civil case No. 65 and entitled Claim against the
estate of the late Isabelo Nacar with preliminary attachment to recover an outstanding debt of the late
Nacar due to respondent. He further alleged that Nicanor Nacar is about to remove and dispose the
property (seven carabaos) with intent to deprived him, considering that Mr. Jupitana had given security
according to the rules of Court. Judge Nistal issued the order commanding the provincial sheriff to attach
the seven cattles in the possession of petitioner Nacar. Actually only four carabaos where attached
because 3 carabaos had earlier been slaughtered during the rites preceeding the burial of the late Isabelo
Nicar. The petitioner filed a motion to dismisss the case but it was denied by the Court. Hence this
petition.

ISSUE:
Whether or not private respondents may file an ordinary action in court for the recovery of money against
the administrator or executor of the estate of Isabelo Nacar.

HELD:
No. The filing of an ordinary action to recover money claim is not allowed in any court. Even if settlement
proceedings had been taken to settle the estate of Isabelo Nacar, the suit to recover the claim of the
private respondents may not be filed against the administrator or executor of his estate. This is expressly
provided for in Section 1 of Rule 87 of the Rules of Court, as follows: "No action upon claim for the
recovery of money or debt or interest thereon shall be commenced against the executor or
administrator;." The claim of private respondents, being one arising from a contract, may be pursued
only by filing the same in the administration proceedings that may be taken to settle the estate of the
deceased Isabelo Nacar. If such a proceeding is instituted and the subject claim is not filed therein within
the period prescribed, the same shall be deemed "barred forever." (Sec. 5, Rule 86, Rules of Court). Even if
this action were commenced during the lifetime of Isabelo Nacar, the same shall have to be dismissed,
and the claim prosecuted in the proper administration proceedings.

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 BRIONES vs. HENSON-CRUZ
G.R. No. 159130 August 22, 2008
(Rule 86 Claims against Estate)

FACTS:
Ruby J. Henson filed on February 23, 1999, a petition for the allowance of the will of her late mother, Luz J.
Henson at the RTC of Manila. Lilia Henson- Cruz, deceased daughter and also a respondent in the petition
opposed Rubys Petition. She alleged that Ruby under stated the value of their late mothers estate and
acted with unconscionable bad faith in the management thereof. Lilia prayed that her mothers
holographic will be disallowed and that shall be appointed as the intestate administratix. Lilia
subsequently praying that the Prudential bank and Trust Company- Ermita Branch be appointed as Interim
Special Administrator. The trial court granted the motion and designated petitioner Atty. George S.
Briones as Special Administrator of the estate.

Atty. Briones accepted the appointment, took his oath of office, and started the administration of the
estate. The court ordered the accounting firm of Messrs. Alba, Romeo & Co. to immediately conduct an
audit of the administration, and suspends the approval of the report of the special administrator except
the payment of his commission, which is hereby fixed at 1.8% of the value of the estate. A Petition for
Certiorari, Prohibition, and Mandamus was filed by the respondents to CA. The petition assailed the Order
dated March 12, 2002 which appointed accounting firm Alba,Romeo & Co. as auditors and the Order
dated April 3, 2002 which reiterated the appointment. Prior the filing of the petition for certiorari, the
heirs of Luz Henzon filed a Notice of Appeal with the RTC assailing the Order insofar as it directed the
payment of Atty. Briones commission. They subsequently filed their record on appeal. The trial court,
however, denied the appeal and disapproved the record on appeal on the ground of forum shopping.
Respondents motion for reconsideration was likewise denied. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE:
Whether or not petition for certiorari is the proper remedy in assailing the commission of executor.

HELD:
No, sec. 8 of Rule 86 in special proceedings states for the claim of executor or administrator against an
estate. It provides that:

if the executor or administrator has claim against the estate he represent, he shall give notice
thereof, in writing, to the court, and the court shall appoint a special administrator, who shall, in
the adjustment of such claim, have the same power and be subject to the same liability as the
general administrator or executor in the settlement of other claims. The court may order the
executor or administrator to pay to the special administrator necessary funds to defend such
claim.

Also, under Section 13 of the same Rule, the action of the court on a claim against the estate is
appealable as in ordinary cases. Hence, by the express terms of the Rules, the ruling on the extent of the
Special Administrators commission effectively, a claim by the special administrator against the estate
is the lower courts last word on the matter and one that is appealable.

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 SALIGUMBA vs. PALANOG
G.R. No. 143365 December 4, 2008
(Rule 87 Actions by and against Executors and Administrators)

FACTS:
Spouses Palanog filed a complaint for Quieting of Title with Damages against defendants, Sps.Valeria
Saligumba and Eliseo Saligumba, Sr. (spouses Saligumbas), before the RTC. In the complaint, sps. Palanog
alleged that they have been in actual, open, adverse and continuous possession as owners for more than
50 years of a parcel of land. Spouses Saligumbas allegedly prevented them from entering and residing on
the subject premises and had destroyed the barbed wires enclosing the land.

At the trial, only the counsel for sps.Palanogs appeared. It appeared that Eliseo Saligumba, Sr. and Valeria
Saligumba died. No motion for the substitution of the spouses was filed nor an order issued for the
substitution of the deceased spouses Saligumbas despite notices sent to them to appear, never confirmed
the death of Eliseo Saligumba, Sr. and Valeria Saligumba. After a lapse of more than two years, the trial
court rendered a judgment declaring spouses Palanog the lawful owners of the subject land. No motion
for reconsideration nor appeal having been filed. After 10 years, Palanog filed a Complaint seeking to
revive and enforce the said decision. She further requested that the heirs and children of spouses
Saligumbas be impleaded as defendants.Petitioners thus question the decision as being void and of no
legal effect because their parents were not duly represented by counsel of record. Petitioners further
argue that they have never taken part in the proceedings nor did they voluntarily appear or participate in
the case. It is unfair to bind them in a decision rendered against their deceased parents. Therefore, being a
void judgment, it has no legal nor binding effect on petitioners. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE:
Whether or not an action for quieting of title, which is an action involving real property, is extinguished
upon death of the party.

HELD:
No. The case is an action for quieting of title with damages which is an action involving real property. It is
an action that survives pursuant to Section 1, Rule 87 as the claim is not extinguished by the death of a
party. And when a party dies in an action that survives, Section 17 of Rule 3 of the Revised Rules of Court
provides for the procedure, thus:

Section 17. Death of Party. - After a party dies and the claim is not thereby extinguished, the
court shall order, upon proper notice, the legal representative of the deceased to appear and to
be substituted for the deceased, within a period of thirty (30) days, or within such time as may be
granted. If the legal representative fails to appear within said time, the court may order the
opposing party to procure the appointment of a legal representative of the deceased within a
time to be specified by the court, and the representative shall immediately appear for and on
behalf of the interest of the deceased. The court charges involved in procuring such appointment,
if defrayed by the opposing party, may be recovered as costs. The heirs of the deceased may be
allowed to be substituted for the deceased, without requiring the appointment of an executor or
administrator and the court may appoint guardian ad litem for the minor heirs.

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 SARSABA vs. DE TE
G.R. No. 175910 July 30, 2009
(Rule 87 Actions by and against Executors and Administrators)

FACTS:
On February 14, 1995, a decision was rendered by NLRC in the case of Patricio Sereno vs. Teodoro Gasing/
Truck Operator , finding Sereno to have been illegally dismissed. Labor Arbiter issued an Alias Writ of
Execution to satisfy the judgment award in favor of Sereno. NLRC levied a Fuso Truck bearing License Plate
No. LBR-514 which sold at public action , Sereno appaearing as the highest bidder. Meanwhile, respondent
Fe Vda. de Te, represented by her attorney-in-fact Faustino Castaeda, filed with the RTC , Br. 18, Digos,
Davao del Sur, a complaint for recovery of motor vehicle, damages with prayer for the delivery of the
truck pendent elite against petitioner, Sereno, Lavares and the NLRC of Davao City.

Respondent alleged, among others, that: (1) she is the wife of the late Pedro Te, the registered owner of
the truck, as evidenced by the Official Receipt and Certificate of Registration.

Petitioner Sarsaba alleges that that there was no showing that the heirs have filed an intestate estate
proceedings of the estate of Pedro Te, or that respondent was duly authorized by her co-heirs to file the
case; and that the truck was already sold to Gasing on March 11, 1986 by one Jesus Matias, who bought
the same from the Spouses Te. Corollarily, Gasing was already the lawful owner of the truck when it was
levied on execution and, later on, sold at public auction.

On October 17, 2005, petitioner Sarsaba filed an Omnibus Motion to Dismiss the Case on the following
grounds: (1) lack of jurisdiction over one of the principal defendants; and (2) to discharge respondent's
attorney-in-fact for lack of legal personality to sue.

It appeared that the respondent, Fe Vda. deTe, died on April 12, 2005. Respondent, through her lawyer,
argues that respondent's death did not render functus officio her right to sue since her attorney-in-fact,
Faustino Castaeda, had long testified on the complaint on March 13, 1998 for and on her behalf and,
accordingly, submitted documentary exhibits in support of the complaint.

ISSUE:
What is the legal effect of death of the plaintiff during the pendency of the case?

HELD:
When a party to a pending action dies and the claim is not extinguished, the Rules of Court require a
substitution of the deceased. Section 1, Rule 87 of the Rules of Court enumerates the actions that survived
and may be filed against the decedent's representatives as follows:
1. actions to recover real or personal property or an interest thereon;
2. actions to enforce liens thereon, and
3. actions to recover damages for an injury to a person or a property.

In such cases, a counsel is obliged to inform the court of the death of his client and give the name and
address of the latter's legal representative. The rule on substitution of parties is governed by Section 16,
46 Rule 3 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended. The rule on substitution by heirs is not a
matter of jurisdiction, but a requirement of due process.

The rule on substitution was crafted to protect every party's right to due process. It was designed to
ensure that the deceased party would continue to be properly represented in the suit through his heirs or
the duly appointed legal representative of his estate. It is only when there is a denial of due process, as
when the deceased is not represented by any legal representative or heir, that the court nullifies the trial
proceedings and the resulting judgment therein.

In the case before Us, it appears that respondent's counsel did not make any manifestation before the RTC
as to her death. In fact, he had actively participated in the proceedings. Neither had he shown any proof
that he had been retained by respondent's legal representative or anyone who succeeded her. However,

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such failure of counsel would not lead Us to invalidate the proceedings that have long taken place before
the RTC. The Court has repeatedly declared that failure of the counsel to comply with his duty to inform
the court of the death of his client, such that no substitution is effected, will not invalidate the
proceedings and the judgment rendered thereon if the action survives the death of such party. The trial
court's jurisdiction over the case subsists despite the death of the party.

The purpose behind this rule is the protection of the right to due process of every party to the litigation
who may be affected by the intervening death. The deceased litigants are themselves protected as they
continue to be properly represented in the suit through the duly appointed legal representative of their
estate.

Despite the special power of attorney given to Castaneda by Fe Vda. De Te has been extinguished due to
the death of the principal, the case at hand is an action for the recovery of a personal property, a motor
vehicle, is an action that survives and is not extinguished by the death of a party.

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 DEOGRACIAS BERNARDO, executor of the testate estate of the deceased EUSEBIO
CAPILI; and the instituted heirs, namely: ARMANDO CAPILI and ARTURO BERNARDO,
ET AL., vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS and THE HEIRS OF THE LATE HERMOGENA REYES
G.R. No. L-18148 February 28, 1963
(Rule 73 Settlement of Estate of Deceased Persons; Venue and Process)

FACTS:
Eusebio Capili, married to Hermogena Reyes, died testate on July 27, 1958 whose will was probated in the
same year, disposing of his properties in favor of his heirs, among others, his widow Hermogena Reyes,
Armando Capili and Arturo Bernardo, herein petitioners. While his widow died the following year. By
petition, Deogracias Bernardo, herein executor-petitioner of the estate of the deceased Eusebio Capili, she
was substituted by the deceased widows collateral relatives and intestate heirs, namely, among others,
Francisco Reyes; and Jose Isidoro, herein respondents. On June 12, 1959, the executor-petitioner filed a
project of partition in the testate proceeding in accordance with the disposition in the will, adjudicating
the estate of the Testator Eusebio Capili among the petitioners, Eusebios testamentary heirs, with the
exception of Hermogena Reyes, whose share was alloted to her collateral relatives. Few days later the
said respondents filed an opposition to the executor-petitioners project of partition and submitted a
counter-project of partition instead, claiming that half of the properties mentioned in the will of the
deceased Eusebio belonged to the conjugal partnership of the spouses. The probate court sets the two
projects of partition for hearing, where both parties submitted their evidences and memorandum
respectively. In the memorandum of the petitioner, it was averred, among others, that the properties
disposed of in the will of the deceased Eusebio Capili belonged to him exclusively and not to the conjugal
partnership, because Hermogena Reyes had donated to him her half share of such partnership,
respondents had no lawful standing or grounds to question the validity of the donation, and that even
assuming that they could question the validity of the donation, the same must be litigated not in the
testate proceeding but in a separate civil action. The probate court issued an order declaring the donation
void, citing Article 133 of the Civil Code, which prohibits donations between spouses during the marriage,
and for want of compliance with the required formalities of a will pursuant to Article 728 in relation to
Article 805 of the same Code, there being no attestation clause. In the same order, the court disapproved
the said partitions and directed the executor to file another, to include the properties mentioned in the
deed of donation between the instituted heirs and the legal heirs of the deceased spouses, upon the basis
that the said properties were conjugal properties. The motion for new trial by the said executor was
denied and the appellate court affirmed the ordered appealed from, so, petitioners filed their petition for
review by certiorari.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the probate court has the power to adjudicate in the testate proceedings, a property
whose ownership is in question.

HELD:
The matter in controversy is the question of ownership of certain properties involved whether they
belong to the conjugal partnership or to the husband exclusively. This is a matter properly within the
jurisdiction of the probate court which necessarily has to liquidate the conjugal partnership in order to
determine the estate of the decedent which is to be distributed among his heirs who are all parties to the
proceedings, including, of course, the widow, now represented because of her death, by her heirs who
have been substituted upon petition of the executor himself and who have appeared voluntarily. There
are no third parties whose rights may be affected. In a line of decisions, it held as a general rule, question
as to title to property cannot be passed upon on testate or intestate proceedings, except where one of the
parties prays merely for the inclusion or exclusion from the inventory of the property, in which case the
probate court may pass provisionally upon the question without prejudice to its final determination in a
separate action. However, it was also held that when the parties interested are all heirs of the deceased,
it is optional to them to submit to the probate court a question as to title to property, and when so
submitted, said probate court may definitely pass judgment thereon (Pascual v. Pascual, 73 Phil. 561); and
that with the consent of the parties, matters affecting property under judicial administration may be taken
cognizance of by the court in the course of intestate proceeding, provided interests of third persons are
not prejudiced (Cunanan v. Amparo, 80 Phil. 229, 232).

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 HEIRS OF MARCELINO DORONIO vs. HEIRS OF FORTUNATO DORONIO
G.R. No. 169454 December 27, 2007
(Rule 90 - Distribution and Partition of the Estate)

FACTS:
On April 24, 1919, a private deed of donation propter nuptias was executed by the late spouses Simeon
Doronio and Cornelia Gante in favor of their son, Marcelino Doronio and his wife, also both deceased,
who, in this case, are being represented by their heirs as petitioners, while respondents are the heirs of
Fortunato Doronio (also among the several children of the donor spouses). However, the property
described in the said deed of donation is the one covered by OCT No. 352, a registered parcel of land in
the name of the said donor spouses, which has significant discrepancy with respect to the identity of the
owner of adjacent property at the eastern side. Based on OCT No. 352, the owners of the adjacent
property are the Najordas, whereas in the deed of donation, the owner is Fortunato Doronio. The said
donation was never notarized and the property is described, in part as
xxxxx A piece of residential landxxxx, the area is bounded on the north by Gabriel
Bernardino; on the east by Fortunato Doronio; on the south by Geminiano Mendoza and
on the west by a road to Villasis xxxxx

Both parties were occupants of the said property. However, they disputed on the ownership, where the
petitioner heirs claimed that they are the owners of the entire property in view of the donation propter
nuptias in favor of their predecessors. While the respondent heirs argued that only half of the property
was actually donated, in view of the disparity in the OCT and the said deed.

Thereafter petitioner heirs filed a petition for registration of the mentioned deed of donation with the
RTC, which was granted and subsequently led to the cancellation of OCT No. 352 and issuance of a new
Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 44481 in the names of the petitioners predecessors.
Respondent heirs filed a motion for reconsideration with the said RTC, but it was dismissed on the ground
that the decision had already become final as it was not appealed.

Determined to remain in their possessed property, respondent heirs filed an action for reconveyance and
damages with prayer for preliminary injunction against petitioner heirs before the RTC, Branch 45, and
contended, among others, that the subject land is different from what was donated as the descriptions of
the property under OCT No. 352 and under the private deed of donation were different.

RTC ruled in favor of petitioner heirs, It concluded, among others, that a title once registered under the
Torrens system cannot be defeated by adverse, open and notorious possession or by prescription, and
that the deed of donation in consideration of the marriage of the parents of petitioners is valid, hence, it
led to the eventual issuance of TCT No. 44481 in the names of the petitioners predecessor.

On appeal, the appellate court REVERSED and SET ASIDE the decision of the lower court, it based its
conclusion on the disparity of the technical descriptions of the property under OCT No. 352 and the deed
of donation. The CA likewise ruled that the donation of the entire property in favor of petitioners
predecessors is invalid on the ground that it impairs the legitime of respondents predecessor, Fortunato
Doronio.

ISSUES:
Whether or not the Donation Propter Nuptias made in a private instrument was valid.
Whether or not an action for reconveyance is the proper remedy with respect to issues on impairment of
legitime.

HELD:
Donation Propter Nuptias of Real Property Made in a Private Instrument Before the New Civil Code Took
Effect on August 30, 1950 is Void.

It is settled that only laws existing at the time of the execution of a contract are applicable to it and not
the later statutes, unless the latter are specifically intended to have retroactive effect. Accordingly, the

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Old Civil Code applies in this case as the donation propter nuptias was executed in 1919, while the New
Civil Code took effect only on August 30, 1950. Under the Old Civil Code, donations propter nuptias must
be made in a public instrument in which the property donated must be specifically described. Article 1328
of the Old Civil Code provides that gifts propter nuptias are governed by the rules established in the same
Code. Article 633 of that title provides that the gift of real property, in order to be valid, must appear in a
public document. It is settled that a donation of real estate propter nuptias is void unless made by public
instrument. In the instant case, the donation propter nuptias did not become valid. Neither did it create
any right because it was not made in a public instrument. Hence, it conveyed no title to the land in
question to petitioners predecessors. Logically, then, the cancellation of OCT No. 352 and the issuance of
a new TCT No. 44481 in favor of petitioners predecessors have no legal basis. The title to the subject
property should, therefore, be restored to its original owners under OCT No. 352.

Issues on Impairment of Legitime Should Be Threshed Out in a Special Proceeding, Not in Civil Action for
Reconveyance and Damages.

On the other hand, petitioners are correct in alleging that the issue regarding the impairment of legitime
of Fortunato Doronio must be resolved in an action for the settlement of estates of spouses Simeon
Doronio and Cornelia Gante. It may not be passed upon in an action for reconveyance and damages. A
probate court, in the exercise of its limited jurisdiction, is the best forum to ventilate and adjudge the
issue of impairment of legitime as well as other related matters involving the settlement of estate.

An action for reconveyance with damages is a civil action, whereas matters relating to settlement of the
estate of a deceased person such as advancement of property made by the decedent, partake of the
nature of a special proceeding. Special proceedings require the application of specific rules as provided for
in the Rules of Court.

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 FLORANTE C. TIMBOL vs. JOSE CANO
G.R. No. L-15445 April 29, 1961
(Rule 80 Special Administrator; Rule 87 Actions By and Against Executors and Administrators; Rule 89
Sales, Mortgages, and Other Encumbrances of Property of Decedent; Rule 90 Distribution and Partition of
the Estate; Rule 91 Escheats)

FACTS:
Mercedes Cano died intestate in August, 1945, leaving her only heir-son Florante C. Timbol, herein
appellee, who was a minor at that time. Jose Cano, herein appellant Administrator, brother of the
deceased, filed a petition on April 13, 1951, proposing that the agricultural lands of the decedent be
leased to him in order for the rentals be used for the maintenance of the appellee and the payment of
land taxes and other dues. The petition was acted upon by the presiding Judge with favor.

On January 14, 1956 the court, upon motion of the parties, approved the reduction of the said rental of
the same lands and the conversion of 30 hectares thereof into a subdivision. Then on April 2, 1957, upon
motion of the said administrator, a project of partition was approved, designating the minor-appellee as
the sole and exclusive heir of all the properties of the decedent.

When the appellee was appointed administrator in place of appellant, he presented a motion, among
which, he modified the area from 30 hectares to 41.9233 hectares for the projected subdivision. The
appellant objected the motion, contended, among others, that the enlargement of the subdivision would
reduce the land leased to him and would deprive his tenants of their landholdings, and that he is in
possession under express authority of the court, under a valid contract, and may not be deprived of his
leasehold summarily upon a simple petition, and averred that the Probate Court, in the instant
proceedings, cannot pass upon the legality of the aforesaid lease contract, but in its general jurisdiction.
The court granted the motions of the appellee, and ruled the said contract of lease is in all forms illegal,
cited the provisions under article 1646 of the Civil Code that the persons disqualified to buy referred to in
articles 1490 and 1491, are also disqualified to become lessee of the things mentioned therein," and
under article 1491, executors and administrators cannot acquire by purchase the property of the estate
under administration.

The above decision is the subject of the appeal.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the Probate Court has jurisdiction to pass upon the legality of the aforesaid lease contract,
except in its general jurisdiction.

HELD:
The appellants arguments are without merit. In probate proceedings the court orders the probate of the
will of the decedent (Rule 80, See. 5); grants letters of administration to the party best entitled thereto or
to any qualified applicant (Id., Sec. 6); supervises and controls all acts of administration; hears and
approves claims against the estate of the deceased (Rule 87, See. 13); orders payment of lawful debts
(Rule 89, Sec. 14); authorizes sale, mortgage or any encumbrance of real estate (Rule 90, Sec. 2); directs
the delivery of the estate to those entitled thereto (Rule 91, See. 1). It has been held that the court acts as
a trustee, and as such trustee, should jealously guard the estate and see that it is wisely and economically
administered, not dissipated. (Tambunting vs. San Jose, G.R. No. L-8152.)

Even the contract of lease under which the appellant holds the agricultural lands of the intestate and
which he now seeks to protect, was obtained with the court's approval. If the probate court has the right
to approve the lease, so may it order its revocation, or the reduction of the subject of the lease. The
matter of giving the property to a lessee is an act of administration, also subject to the approval of the
court. Of course, if the court abuses its discretion in the approval of the contracts or acts of the
administrator, its orders may be subject to appeal and may be reversed on appeal; but not because the
court may make an error may it be said that it lacks jurisdiction to control acts of administration of the
administrator.

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 JUANITA LOPEZ GUILAS vs. JUDGE OF THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF
PAMPANGA AND ALEJANDRO LOPEZ
G.R. No. L-26695 January 31, 1972
(Rule 90 Distribution and Partition of the Estate)

FACTS:
Jacinta Lopez was married to Alejandro Lopez, respondent herein. They had no children. On April 28, 1936,
Jacinta executed a will instituting her husband Alejandro as her sole heir and executor. In 1953, the
spouses legally adopted Juanita Lopez-Guilas, herein petitioner, and declared her as legal heir.
Nevertheless, the testatrix Doa Jacinta did not execute another will or codicil so as to include Juanita
Lopez as one of her heirs. In an order dated March 5, 1959 in Testate Proceedings No 1426, the
aforementioned WILL was admitted to probate and the respondent was appointed executor without bond
by the Court of First Instance. In March 19, 1960 the respondent and petitioner executed a project
partition where the later inherited the paraphernal lots of the deceased Jacinta Lopez which include Lots
Nos. 3368 and 3441, while the rest of the properties including the 28 other parcels of land were allotted
to the respondent, where the lower court approved the said partition. On April 10, 1964, petitioner filed a
separate ordinary action to set aside and annul the project of partition, in the Court of First Instance of
Pampanga, on the ground of lesion, perpetration and fraud. In Testate Proceedings No. 1426, she also
filed a petition dated July 20, 1964, praying, among others, that respondent be directed to deliver to her
the actual possession of said lots nos. 3368 and 3441. Respondent opposed to the said petition, claimed
that the testate proceedings have already been closed and terminated by virtue of the order dated
December 15, 1960 and the approval of the project of partition submitted by the parties subsequent
thereto in April 23, 1960. Further on contended that he ceased as a consequence to be the executor of the
estate of the deceased; and that petitioner is guilty of laches and negligence in filing the petition of the
delivery of her share 4 years after such closure of the estate, when she could have filed a petition for relief
of judgment within sixty (60) days from December 15, 1960 under Rule 38 of the old Rules of Court citing
A. Austria vs. Heirs of Antonio Ventenilla, L-100808, Sept. 18, 1956.

Petitioner in her reply contended that the actual delivery and distribution of the hereditary shares to the
heirs, and not the order of the court declaring as closed and terminated the proceedings, determines the
termination of the probate proceedings (citing the case of Timbol vs. Cano, April 29, 1961, where it was
ruled that "the probate court loses jurisdiction of an estate under administration only after the payment
of all the taxes, and after the remaining estate is delivered to the heirs entitled to receive the same")

ISSUE:
Whether or not the jurisdiction of the probate court under administration already ceased by virtue of its
approval on the project of partition on the estate which was submitted by the heirs.

HELD:
The position of petitioner should be sustained. The probate court loses jurisdiction of an estate under
administration only after the payment of all the debts and the remaining estate delivered to the heirs
entitled to receive the same. The finality of the approval of the project of partition by itself alone does not
terminate the probate proceeding (Timbol vs. Cano, L-15445, April 29, 1961; Siguiong vs. Tecson, 89 Phil.).
As long as the order of the distribution of the estate has not been complied with, the probate proceedings
cannot be deemed closed and terminated (Siguiong vs. Tecson, supra.); because a judicial partition is not
final and conclusive and does not prevent the heir from bringing an action to obtain his share, provided
the prescriptive period therefor has not elapsed (Mari vs. Bonilla, 83 Phil., 137).

The better practice, however, for the heir who has not received his share, is to demand his share through
a proper motion in the same probate or administration proceedings, or for re-opening of the probate or
administrative proceedings if it had already been closed, and not through an independent action, which
would be tried by another court or Judge which may thus reverse a decision or order of the probate on
intestate court already final and executed and re-shuffle properties long ago distributed and disposed of
(Ramos vs. Ortuzar, 89 Phil., 730, 741-742; Timbol vs. Cano, supra.; Jingco vs. Daluz, L-5107, April 24, 1953,
92 Phil. 1082; Roman Catholic vs. Agustines, L-14710, March 29, 1960, 107 Phil., 455, 460-461).

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 MARI vs BONILLA
G.R. No. L852 March 19,1949
(Rule 74 Summary Settlement of Estate)

FACTS:
Plaintiff Leonida Mari was married to Casimiro Evangelista, a registered owner of a homestead, which is
the property in litigation. They begot two children Caridad and Deogracias Evangelista. When Casimiro
Evangelista died intestate, the property in litigation was acquired as homestead patent. One of their
children, Deogracias, alleged to be the only heir of Casimiro Evangelista and executed a declaration of
heirship. She then sold the subject property to the defendants-spouses. After the sale, a TCT was issued to
the latter and they assumed possession of the lands. In action to recover parcel of land, defendants
contend good faith in purchasing the parcel of land. Judgment was rendered in favor of plaintiffs. Hence,
this appeal.

ISSUE:
Whether or not defendants innocence in the purchase of land is binding in relation to the summary
settlement on the faith and strength of the self-serving affidavit executed by co-owner Deogracias
Evangelista.

HELD:
NO. If as is probably the case defendants relied on the court order adjudicating to Deogracias Evangelista
the entire estate in the distribution held under Rule 74 of the Rules of Court, their innocence avails them
less as against the true owners of the land. That was a summary settlement made on the faith and
strength of the distributes self-serving affidavit; section 4 of the above-mentioned rule provides that, "If it
shall appear at anything within two year after the settlement and distribution of an estate . . . that an heir
or other person has been unduly deprived of his lawful participation in the estate such heir or other
person may compel the settlement of the estate in the court in the manner herein provided for purpose of
satisfying such participation." Far from shielding defendants against loss the adjudication and the rule
under which it was made gave them a clear warning that they were acting at their peril. The SC, in the
case of Lajom v. Viola, 73 Phil., 563) held that: "A judicial partition in probate proceedings does not bind
the heirs who were not parties thereto. No partition, judicial or extrajudicial, could add one iota or particle
to the interest which the partitioners had during the joint possession. Partition is of the nature of a
conveyance of ownership, and certainly none of the co-owners may convey to the others more than his
own true right. A judicial partition in probate proceedings is not final and conclusive, and not being of such
definitive character as to stop all means of redress for a co-heir who has been deprived of his lawful share,
such co-heir may still, within the prescriptive period, bring an action for reinvindication in the province
where any of the real property of the deceased may be situated. Broad perspectives of public policy are
set out in the opinion of the court in support of the wisdom of allowing a co-heir the benefits of the law of
prescription even after a partition, judicial or extrajudicial, has been had."

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 SILVERIO JR. vs. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R No. 178933 September 16, 2009
(Rule 84 General Powers and Duties of Executors and Administrators;
Rule 90 - Distribution and Partition of the Estate)

FACTS:
The instant controversy stemmed from the settlement of estate of the deceased Beatriz Silverio. After her
death, her surviving spouse, Silverio, Sr., filed an intestate proceeding for the settlement of her estate.
During the pendency of the case, Silverio Jr. filed a petition to remove Silverio Sr. as the administrator of
the estate, which the RTC granted in its order, while appointing Silverio Jr. as the new administrator.

On May 2005, the RTC issued an Omnibus Order directing Nelia to vacate the premises of the property
located at Makati. Instead of filing an appeal, she filed MR of the order which was denied in an order
dated December 12, 2005. Notably, such order also recalled its previous order granting Ricardo Silverio, Jr.
with letters of administration over the intestate estate of Beatriz Silverio and reinstating Ricardo Silverio,
Sr. as the administrator.

From the Order, Silverio, Jr. filed MR which was denied by the RTC in an Order dated October 31, 2006. In
the same order, the RTC also allowed the sale of various properties of the intestate estate of the late
Beatriz Silverio to partially settle estate taxes, penalties, interests and other charges due thereon. Among
the properties authorized to be sold was the one located Forbes Park, Makati City.

Upon appeal, CA annulled the the Writ of Execution and the Notice to Vacate dated April 19, 2007.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the respondent Court erred in annulling the Writ of Execution and the Notice to Vacate

HELD:
Yes. The respondent Silverio-Dees occupancy of the Intestate property located at Forbes Park will prevent
the sale authorized by the order to secure funds for the payment of taxes due. Such property cannot be
occupied or appropriated by, nor distributed to Silverio-Dee, since no distribution shall be allowed until
the payment of the obligations mentioned in Rule 90, Revised Rules of Court is made. In fact, the said
property may still be sold to pay the taxes and/or other obligations owned by the estate, which will be
difficult to do if she is allowed to stay in the property. Moreover, the alleged authority given by SILVERIO,
SR. for Nelia S. Silverio-Dee to occupy the property dated May 4, 2004, assuming it is not even antedated
as alleged by SILVERIO, JR., is null and void since the possession of estate property can only be given to a
purported heir by virtue of an Order from this Court.( Sec. 1 Rule 90, supra; and Sec. 2 Rule 84, Revised
Rules of Court). In fact, the Executor or Administrator shall have the right to the possession and
management of the real as well as the personal estate of the deceased only when it is necessary for the
payment of the debts and expenses of administration (Sec. 3 Rule 84, Revised Rules of Court).

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 VDA.DE LOPEZ vs. LOPEZ
G.R No. L-23915 September 28, 1970
(Rule 90 - Distribution and Partition of the Estate)

FACTS:
Saturnina M. Vda.de Lopez, judicial administratrix of the estate of the deceased, filed with the lower court
a project of partition adjudicating the whole to herself and her legitimate children with the deceased. In
an order dated March 30, 1964 the lower court approved the project of partition and declared the
intestate proceeding "terminated and closed for all legal purposes." Seventeen days thereafter, or on April
16, 1964, the minors Dahlia and Roy, both surnamed Lopez, represented by their mother, Lolita B. Bachar,
filed a motion to reopen the proceeding, together with a petition claiming that they were illegitimate
children of, the deceased Emilio Lopez, born out of his extra-marital relations with Lolita B. Bachar, and
asking that their rights as such be recognized and their shares in the estate given to them. The motion was
opposed by the judicial administratrix on the ground that the proceeding had already been ordered
terminated and closed and the estate was already in the hands of the distributees; and that the reopening
of the intestate proceeding was not the proper remedy, which should be an independent action against
the individual distributees.

ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the motion to reopen the estate proceeding was filed too late
2. Whether or not such motion was the proper remedy.

HELD:
1. NO. The court's order declaring the intestate proceeding closed did not become final immediately
upon its issuance. Section 2 of Rule 72 provides that "in the absence of special provisions, the
rules provided for in ordinary actions shall be, as far as practicable, applicable in Special
Proceedings." And judgments or orders in ordinary actions become final after thirty (30) days
from notice to the party concerned. In this case appellants' motion to reopen was led only
seventeen (17) days from the date of the order of closure. The remedy was therefore invoked on
time.

2. YES. In the case of Uriarte vs. Uriarte, et al., there are two alternatives for an acknowledged
natural child to prove his status and interest in the estate of the deceased parent, to wit: (1) to
intervene in the probate proceeding if it is still open; and (2) to ask for its reopening if it has
already been closed.

Also in Ramos vs. Ortuzar, 89 Phil. 730:

The only instance that we can think of in which a party interested in a probate proceeding may
have a final liquidation set aside is when he is left out by reason of circumstances beyond his
control or through mistake or inadvertence not imputable to negligence. Even then, the better
practice to secure relief is reopening of the same case by proper motion within the reglementary
period, instead of an independent action the effect of which, if successful, would be, as in the
instant case, for another court or judge to throw out a decision or order already final and
executed and reshuffle properties long ago distributed and disposed of.

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 NUAL VS. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R No. 94005 April 6, 1993
(Rule 86 Claims against Estates; Rule 90 - Distribution and Partition of the Estate)

FACTS:
In December 1974, the CFI rendered its judgment in favor of private respondents and ordered the
partition of the property of the late spouses Lyon. The order to partition was affirmed in toto by the CA in
July 1982 then remanded to the lower court and two years later, a writ of execution was issued by the
latter.

In July 1984, Mary Lyon-Martin, the daughter of the spouses, filed a motion to quash the order of
execution with preliminary injunction. In her motion, she contends that not being a party to the case, her
rights, interests, ownership and participation over the land should not be affected by a judgment in the
said case; that the order of execution is unenforceable insofar as her share, right, ownership and
participation is concerned, said share not having been brought within the jurisdiction of the court a quo.
She further invokes Sec12, Rule 69 of the Rules of Court.

In January 1987, the lower court issued an order directing the inclusion f Mary Lyon Martin as co-owner
with a share in the partition of the property. Such order was assailed by the petitioner before the CA
contending that Mary was neither a party plaintiff nor a party defendant in the case for partition and
accounting of the property and that the decision rendered in said case has long become final and
executory?

ISSUE:
Whether or not the motion to quash is a proper remedy to enforce a right of an excluded heir to a final
and executory judgment of partition

HELD:
NO. When a final judgment becomes executor, it becomes immutable and unalterable. It may no longer
be modified in any respect, even if the modification is meant to correct what is perceived to be an
erroneous conclusion of fact or law, and regardless of whether the modification is attempted to be made
by the court rendering it or by the highest court of land.
In this case, the remedy of Mary Lyon Martin is to file an independent suit against the parties in Civil Case
No. 872 and all other heirs for her share in the subject property, in order that all the parties in interest can
prove their respective claims.

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 DINGLASAN vs. ANG CHIA
G.R. No. L-3342 April 18, 1951
(Rule 90 - Distribution and Partition of the Estate)

FACTS:
Dinglasan filed a case in the CFI of Capiz on February 16, 1948, against Ang Chia, her son Claro Lee and one
Lee Bun Ting to recover the ownership and possession of a parcel of land located at Capiz. They also filed a
motion for the appointment of a receiver. The counsel for defendants objected on the basis that there
was a pending case in the same court concerning the intestate estate of Lee Liong. The plaintiffs withdrew
the motion and they filed an amended complaint seeking inclusion as party-defendant of the administatrix
of the estate, who is the widow Ang Chia. The plaintiffs also filed in the intestate proceedings a verified
claim in intervention and a motion praying that a co-administrator of the estate be appointed and the
bond of the administatrix be increased. The plaintiffs made of record the pendency of the civil case and
prayed that the intestate proceedings not be closed until said civil case has been terminated. Thereafter,
the administatrix filed a motion to dismiss the claim in intervention and objected to the motions made by
plaintiffs.

On August 1948, the trial court: (a)issued an order denying the petition for a co-administrator but
increasing the bond to P5,000; (b) stated that it would act thereon if a motion to close the intestate
proceedings is presented in due time and is objected to by petitioners; and (c) took cognizance of the
pendency of the civil case.

The administatrix did not appeal from said order nor file a new bond, instead moved for the closing of the
proceedings and her discharge as administatrix on the ground that the heirs had already entered into an
extrajudicial partition of the estate. The petitioners objected. On July 1949, CFI Capiz issued in the
intestate estate proceedings an order holding in abeyance the approval of ther petition for an extrajudicial
partition the closing of said proceedings until after final termination of civil case of the same court. Hence,
this appeal.

ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the lower court erred in taking cognizance of and being guided by the supposed
claim of petitioners-appellees and in ordering the administatrix to file a bond of P5,000
2. Whether or not the lower court erred in holding in abeyance the closing of the intestate
proceedings pending the termination of the separate civil action filed by petitioners-appellees

HELD:
1. NO. The act of the lower court in taking cognizance of the civil case is not tantamount to
assuming jurisdiction over the said case. It merely makes of record its existence because of the
close interrelation of the two cases and cannot be branded as having acted in excess of
jurisdiction.

As to the bond, the lower court did not err in view of the fact that the appellants did not appeal
from the courts order of August 4. An order requiring the filing of a new bond by the
administatrix is interlocutory in nature and is solely addressed to the sound discretion of the
court.

2. NO. A probate case may be held in abeyance pending determination of ordinary case because to
hold otherwise would render some provisions in the Rules of Court nugatory.

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 LORENZO vs. POSADAS JR.
G.R. No. L-43082 June 18, 1937
(Rule 90 - Distribution and Partition of the Estate)

FACTS:
Thomas Hanley died, leaving a will and a considerable amount of real and personal properties. The will
was admitted to probate, and the CFI of Zamboanga appointed a trustee to administer the real properties
which, under the will, were to pass to nephew Matthew ten years after the two executors named in the
will were appointed trustee. Moore acted as trustee until he resigned and the plaintiff Lorenzo was
appointed in his stead.

During the incumbency of the plaintiff as trustee, the defendant Collector of Internal Revenue (Posadas)
assessed against the estate an inheritance tax, together with the penalties for deliquency in payment.
Lorenzo paid said amount under protest, notifying Posadas at the same time that unless the amount was
promptly refunded, suit would be brought for its recovery. Posadas overruled Lorenzos protest and
refused to refund the said amount. Plaintiff went to court. The CFI dismissed Lorenzos complaint and
Posadas counterclaim. Both parties appealed to this court.

ISSUES:
1. When does the inheritance tax accrue and when must it be satisfied?
2. Whether or not the inheritance tax be computed on the basis of the value of the estate at the
time of the testators death, or on its value ten years later
3. Whether or not it is proper to deduct the compensation due to trustees, in determining the net
value of the estate subject to tax

HELD:
1. The accrual of the inheritance tax is distinct from the obligation to pay the same. The tax is upon
transmission or the transfer or devolution of property of a decedent, made effective by his death.
In this case, the inheritance tax accrued as of the date of death of the decedent, and such tax
should have been paid before the delivery of the properties in question to Moore as trustee.
2. If death is the generating source from which the power of the estate to impose inheritance taxes
takes its being and if, upon the death of the decedent, succession takes place and the right of the
estate to tax vests instantly, the tax should be measured by the value of the estate as it stood at
the time of the decedents death, regardless of any subsequent contingency value of any
subsequent increase or decrease in value.
3. A trustee is entitled to receive a fair compensation for his services. But from this it does not
follow that the compensation due him may lawfully be deducted in arriving at the net value of
the estate subject to tax. There is no statute in the Philippines which requires trustees
commissions to be deducted in determining the net value of the estate subject to inheritance tax.

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 SALINAS vs. TUAZON
G.R. No. L-33626 March 2, 1931
(Rule 98 Trustees)

FACTS:
Francisco Callejon Salinas, a former resident of the Philippines died in Spain on May 31, 1911 (no record
when he left the Philippines). In 1900, Salinas appointed Teodosio Pintado y Fernandez as his attorney in
fact to administer his properties in the Philippines, with express authority to delegate his powers as such
attorney or to appoint his successors. On April 24, 1905, Fernandez appointed Jose Moreno Lahaba as
attorney in fact or agent for Salinas. Lahaba administered the properties and rendered accounts until
1911, the death of the principal. He had not, however, rendered any report of his administration in spite
inquiries made by the heirs of his principal from July 1911 up to time of his death in 1920. Among the
properties administered were the 2 parcels of land in question. Sometime before the death of Lahaba, the
Spanish Consul in the Philippines, at the request of the heirs of Salinas, made inquiries from Lahaba about
the properties administered by him. He said he had only P2,500 in his possession belonging to his
principal, which he was ready to deliver upon the production of written authority from the heirs for the
consul to receive the same. Pending the receipt of said authority, Lahaba died. The consul presented a
claim for P2,500 to the intestate proceedings of Lahaba which was allowed and paid and delivered to the
heirs of Salinas. After the receipt of the said amount, the heirs of Salinas requested the Spanish Consul to
make further inquiries about the other properties. It was discovered that Lahaba had sold in the name of
Salinas the 2 parcels of land to Thomas Luis for P30,000, on instalment. Five days after the sale, the
vendee executed a mortgage on said lands in favour of Lahaba for P25,000 to secure the unpaid balance
of the price (P5,000 paid already). When Lahaba died, a balance of P20,000 was still unpaid. The said
amount was entered in the inventory of his estate as conjugal property and passed to the heirs of Lahaba.
The trial court concluded that the heirs are entitled to recover the said sum of P30,000 after deducting the
expenses incurred by Lahaba for the survey and registration of said lands and for attorneys fees and
taxes. Both parties appealed. Among the issues include: the court having no jurisdiction over the subject
matter, the claims constitute res judicata, and the action has prescribed.

ISSUE:
Was the lower court correct in deciding in favour of the heirs of Salinas?

HELD:
Yes.
1. The amount of P30,000 which the heirs of Salinas were seeking to recover is not a claim against the
estate of Lahaba, it is not an indebtedness but represents the price of trust property administered by
him, of he and his heirs failed and refused to account. The Lower court acted correctly in taking
jurisdiction of the case.

2. The payment of the heirs of Salinas in the amount of P2,500 constitutes res judicata as to that amount
only, but not as to the amount of P30,000 claimed in this action.

3. As a general rule, a trust estate is exempt from the operation of the statute of limitations. A trustee,
however, may acquire the trust estate by prescription provided there is repudiation of the trust and this
fact is known to the cestui que trust. The repudiation must be clear, open and unequivocal.

4. Prescription in order to be available as a defense, the trustee must prove that there was a direct
repudiation of the trust and that the cestui que trust or beneficiary had knowledge thereof. Mere failure
of the trustee to respond to repeated inquiries addressed to him by the cestui que trust is not enough.

5. There was no open, clear and unequivocal repudiation of the trust by Lahaba. Neither was there any
knowledge on the part of Salinas and his heirs of any such repudiation. On the contrary, there was
concealment and misappropriation on the part of Lahaba of the property entrusted to his
administration and care.

6. None of the alleged errors was committed by the lower court. Judgment affirmed.

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 EMILIA O'LACO and HUGO LUNA vs. VALENTIN CO CHO CHIT, O LAY KIA
and COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 58010 March 31, 1993
(Rule 98 Trustees)
FACTS:
The case at bar involves half-sisters each claiming ownership over a parcel of land. While petitioner Emilia
O'Laco asserts that she merely left the certificate of title covering the property with private respondent O
Lay Kia for safekeeping, the latter who is the former's older sister insists that the title was in her
possession because she and her husband bought the property from their conjugal funds.

It appears that on 31 May 1943, the Philippine Sugar Estate Development Company, Ltd., sold a parcel of
land, situated at Oroquieta St., Sta. Cruz, Manila, with the Deed of Absolute Sale naming Emilia O'Laco as
vendee.

On 17 May 1960, private respondent-spouses Valentin Co Cho Chit and O Lay Kia learned from the
newspapers that Emilia O'Laco sold the same property to the Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila.

On 22 June 1960, respondent-spouses sued petitioner-spouses Emilia O'Laco and Hugo Luna to recover
the purchase price of the land before the then Court of First Instance of Rizal, respondent-spouses
asserting that petitioner Emilia O'Laco knew that they were the real vendees of the Oroquieta property
sold in 1943 by Philippine Sugar Estate Development Company, Ltd., and that the legal title thereto was
merely placed in her name. They contend that Emilia O'Laco breached the trust when she sold the land to
the Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila.

Petitioner-spouses deny the existence of any form of trust relation. They aver that Emilia O'Laco actually
bought the property with her own money; that she left the Deed of Absolute Sale and the corresponding
title with respondent-spouses merely for safekeeping; that when she asked for the return of the
documents evidencing her ownership, respondent-spouses told her that these were misplaced or lost;
and, that in view of the loss, she filed a petition for issuance of a new title, and on 18 August 1944 the
then Court of First Instance of Manila granted her petition.

On 20 September 1976, finding no trust relation between the parties, the trial court dismissed the
complaint together with the counterclaim. Petitioners and respondents appealed.

On 9 April 1981, the Court of Appeals set aside the decision of the trial court and ruled in favor of the
respondents. Hence, this case.

ISSUE:
Whether a resulting trust was intended by the parties in the acquisition of the property.

HELD:
Yes. By definition, trust relations between parties may either be express or implied. Express trusts are
those which are created by the direct and positive acts of the parties, by some writing or deed, or will, or
by words evincing an intention to create a trust. Implied trusts are those which, without being express, are
deducible from the nature of the transaction as matters of intent, or which are superinduced on the
transaction by operation of law as matters of equity, independently of the particular intention of the
parties. Implied trusts may either be resulting or constructive trusts, both coming into being by operation
of law.

Resulting trusts are based on the equitable doctrine that valuable consideration and not legal title
determines the equitable title or interest and are presumed always to have been contemplated by the
parties. They arise from the nature or circumstances of the consideration involved in a transaction
whereby one person thereby becomes invested with legal title but is obligated in equity to hold his legal
title for the benefit of another.

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Unlike express trusts concerning immovables or any interest therein which cannot be proved by parol
evidence, implied trusts may be established by oral evidence. However, in order to establish an implied
trust in real property by parol evidence, the proof should be as fully convincing as if the acts giving rise to
the trust obligation were proven by an authentic document. It cannot be established upon vague and
inconclusive proof.

Indeed, there can be no persuasive rationalization for the possession of these documents of ownership by
respondent-spouses for seventeen (17) years after the Oroquieta property was purchased in 1943 than
that of precluding its possible sale, alienation or conveyance by Emilia O'Laco, absent any machination or
fraud. This continued possession of the documents, together with other corroborating evidence spread on
record, strongly suggests that Emilia O'Laco merely held the Oroquieta property in trust for respondent-
spouses.

As differentiated from constructive trusts, where the settled rule is that prescription may supervene, in
resulting trust, the rule of imprescriptibility may apply for as long as the trustee has not repudiated the
trust. Once the resulting trust is repudiated, however, it is converted into a constructive trust and is
subject to prescription.

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 ARANETA (trustee-appellee) vs. PEREZ (judicial guardian-appellant)
G.R. Nos. L-16185-86 May 31, 1962
(Rule 98 Trustees)

FACTS:
These are two (2) incidents of the trusteeship of the minors Benigno, Angela and Antonio, all surnamed
Perez Y Tuason. The issue in G.R. No. L-16185 is whether or not the trustee, J. Antonio Araneta(1) may be
allowed to pay a sum of money to the law firm, Araneta&Araneta, of which he is a member, for services
rendered to him, in his aforementioned capacity as such trustee, in several judicial proceedings, whereas
G.R. No. L-16186 concerns the question; (2) whether the purchase of certain shares of stock nude by the
appellee for the benefit of the trusteeship merits judicial approval. Both questions were decided by the
Court of First Instance of Rizal (Quezon City Branch) in the affirmative. Hence, this appeal by Antonio M.
Perez.It appears that the law firm Araneta&Araneta, through its assistant, Atty. Francisco T. Papa, had
rendered various services, as counsel for the appellee. All questioned transactions were affirmed by the
lower court to be valid. It even authorized the payment of P5,500.00 for the services thus rendered by
Araneta&Araneta.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the payment of services to Araneta&Araneta is in violation of Section 7 of Rule 86 of the
Rules of Court. (When the executor or administrator is an attorney he shall not charge against the estate
any professional fees for legal services rendered by him)

HELD:
No. Section 7 of Rule 86 refers only to "executors or administrators" of the estate of deceased persons,
and does not necessarily apply to trustees. Though it is true that some functions of the former bear a close
analogy with those of the latter, thus it is basically sound and wise as it is should be applicable to trustees.
However, while the duties of executors or administrators are fixed and/or limited by law, the duties of a
trustee is usually, governed by the intention of the trustor or of the parties, if established by contract.
Besides, the duties of trustees may cover a much wider range than those of executors or administrators of
the estate of deceased persons.

In the case at bar, considering that the appellee was merely defending himself in the proceedings that
required the services of counsel; that in each case the stand taken by the appellee was upheld by the
court; that the will creating the trust and designating the appellee as trustee explicitly grants him the right
to collect for his services such reasonable fees; that, in view of the nature of the relations between the
trustor and the trustee, on the one hand, and the trustor and appellant on the other, there can be little
doubt but that the trustor would have sanctioned the payment of the attorney's fees involved in this
incident; and that it may have been more costly for the trust estate to engage the services of a law firm
other than that of Araneta&Araneta.

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 TAN vs. CITY OF DAVAO
G.R. No. L-44347 September 29, 1988
(Rule 91 Escheats)

FACTS:
The spouses Cornelia Pizarro and Baltazar Garcia adopted Dominga Garcia. Dominga Garcia married a
Chinaman, Tan Seng with whom she had three children: Vicenta, Mariano and Luis. In 1923, Dominga
Garcia and her family migrated to China.

According to the petitioner, Dominga Garcia died intestate and left in the Philippines a parcel of land in
Davao. Since her departure for China with her family, neither she, nor her husband, nor any of their
children has returned to the Philippines to claim the lot.

Dominga's adoptive parent, Cornelia Pizarro died. Her nephew, Ramon Pizarro, occupied a part of
Dominga's property and collected the rentals. Another nephew of Cornelia, Segundo Reyes, informed the
Solicitor General about the property. The City of Davao filed a petition with the CFI, to declare Dominga
Garcia's land escheated in its favor. It alleged that Dominga Garcia and her children are presumed to be
dead and since Dominga Garcia left no heir or person by law entitled to inherit her estate, the same
should be escheated.

Ramon Pizarro opposed the escheat petition on the ground that courts are not authorized to declare that
a person is presumed to be dead and that Dominga Garcia's being in Red China is not a sufficient ground
to deprive her of her property by escheat proceedings. Pizarro alleges that Dominga's daughter, Vicenta
Tan, is alive in China or in Hongkong. Pizarro tried to prove it through: (1) supposed pictures of the missing
heir (2) an Extrajudicial Settlement and Adjudication of Dominga's Estate allegedly executed by Vicenta in
Hongkong; and (3) a Special Power of Attorney in favor of Pizarro.
The trial court found that Pizarro's testimonies "ring with untruthfulness; they are replete with
inconsistencies" and the witnesses who corroborated him were "unworthy of belief. Trial court rendered
judgment declaring that the land escheated and assigned to the City of Davao.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the city of Davao had personality to file the escheat petition. YES
Whether or not the trial court erred in declaring Vicenta Tan presumed dead. NO

HELD:
With respect to the argument that only the Republic of the Philippines, represented by the Solicitor-
General, may file the escheat petition under Section 1, Rule 91 of the Revised (1964) Rules of Court, the
CA correctly ruled that the case did not come under Rule 91 because the petition was filed on September
12, 1962, when the applicable rule was still Rule 92 of the 1940 Rules of Court. Rule 91 of the Revised
Rules of Court, which provides that only the Republic of the Philippines, through the Solicitor General, may
commence escheat proceedings, did not take effect until January 1, 1964. Although the escheat
proceedings were still pending then, the Revised Rules of Court could not be applied to the petition
because to do so would work injustice to the City of Davao.

The Court of Appeals did not err in affirming the trial court's ruling that Dominga Garcia and her heirs may
be presumed dead in the escheat proceedings as they are, in effect, proceedings to settle her estate.
Indeed, while a petition instituted for the sole purpose of securing a judicial declaration that a person is
presumptively dead cannot be entertained if that were the only question or matter involved in the case,
the courts are not barred from declaring an absentee presumptively dead as an incident of, or in
connection with, an action or proceeding for the settlement of the intestate estate of such absentee.

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 DIVINO vs. HILARIO
G.R. No. L- 44658 January 24, 1936
(Rule 91 Escheats)

FACTS:
Tan Kui Sing began the intestate proceeding for the deceased Tan Chay, stating in the petition that the
deceased was a party in civil case no. 1147 of the same CFI. The judgment of which was appealed to this
Court, and asking that, while his properties are yet unknown, a special administrator be appointed to duly
represent said deceased in appeal. The court appointed Ang Liong as special administrator. On the setting
for trial, no notice was published. On August 1935, the court called the petition for hearing and after the
presentation of evidence, declared that Tan Chay had died intestate, that he left no legal heirs, that his
only estate is PhP5,000 deposited with the Philippine Foreign Trading and Company, and decreed the
escheat of said funds to the municipality of Guinga, Davao. The petitioner, in the same capacity as
guardian, filed a motion to set aside the decree escheating the PhP5,000, to declare the minors the only
heirs of Tan Chay, and to adjudicate to them the share. The motion was based on the allegation under
oath that the minors were the only legitimate nephews an niece left by the deceased and that the latter
had not been survived by another; that the decree of reversion was already irrevocable, in any case, the
minors could avail themselves of the procedure under section 752 of the Code of Civil Procedure.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the heirs can recover the amount of PhP5,000.

HELD:
Without the publication, the court cannot have acquired jurisdiction and the petitioner cannot resort to
the remedy granted by section 752, because the court without jurisdiction cannot grant him the relief. The
money should be given to the legal heirs. This is without prejudice to petitioners right, in her capacity as
administratix, to present in the special proceeding No. 314 her claims.

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 REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF MANILA
G.R. No. L-30381 August 30, 1988
(Rule 91 Escheats)

FACTS:
Pursuant to Section 2 of Act No. 3936, otherwise known as the Unclaimed Balance Law, some 31 banks
including herein private respondent Pres. Roxas Rural Bank forwarded to the Treasurer of the Philippines
in January of 1968 separate statements under oath by their respective managing officers of all deposits
and credits held by them in favor, or in the names of such depositors or creditors known to be dead, or
who have not been heard from, or who have not made further deposits or withdrawals during the
preceding ten years or more. In the sworn statement submitted by private respondent Bank, only two (2)
names appeared: Jesus Ydirin with a balance of P126.54 and Leonora Trumpeta with a deposit of P62.91.

Upon receipt of these sworn statements, the Treasurer of the Philippines caused the same to be published
in the February 25, March 3 and March 10, 1968 issues of the "Philippines Herald", an English newspaper,
and the"El Debate", a Spanish newspaper, both of general circulation in the Philippines.

Thereafter, or on July 25, 1968, the Republic of the Philippines instituted before the CFI of Manila a
complaint for escheat against the aforesaid 31 banks, including herein private respondent. Likewise
named defendants therein were the individual depositors and/or creditors

Summonses were accordingly issued to defendant banks and the creditors/depositors requiring them to
file severally their answers to the complaint within 60 days after the first publication of the summons with
notice that should they fail to file their answers, plaintiff would take judgment against them by default.

On October 5,1968, private respondent Bank filed before the CFI a motion to dismiss the complaint as
against it on the ground of improper venue. Opposed by the petitioner, the motion to dismiss was granted
in the first assailed Order. Its motion for reconsideration of said dismissal order having been denied in the
second assailed order, petitioner interposed the instant appeal on pure questions of law among others:
a. Whether or not Pres. Roxas Rural Bank is a real party in interest in the escheat proceedings or in
Civil Case No. 73707 of the Court of First Instance of Manila.
b. Whether or not Section 2(b), Rule 4 of the Revised Rules of Court on venue, likewise, governs
escheat proceedings instituted by the Republic in the Court of First Instance of Manila.

ISSUES:
a. Whether or not Pres. Roxas Rural Bank is a real party in interest in the escheat proceedings or in
Civil Case No. 73707 of the Court of First Instance of Manila.
b. Whether or not Section 2(b), Rule 4 of the Revised Rules of Court on venue, likewise, governs
escheat proceedings instituted by the Republic in the Court of First Instance of Manila.

HELD:
a. Yes. If the bank were not a real party in interest, the legislature would not have provided for its
joining as a party in the escheat proceedings. Besides, under Section 2, Rule 3 of the Rules of
Court, private respondent bank is a real party in interest as its presence in the action is necessary
for a complete determination and settlement of the questions involved therein. Private
respondent bank being a real party in interest, it may and can file a motion to dismiss on the
ground of improper venue.
b. No. Section 2(b) of Rule 4 of the Revised Rules of Court cannot govern escheat proceedings
principally because said section refers to personal actions. Escheat proceedings are actions in rem
which must be brought in the province or city where the rem in this case the dormant deposits, is
located.

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 REPUBLIC vs. PNB
G.R. No. L-16106 December 30, 1961
(Rule 91 Escheats)

FACTS:
Republic filed a complaint for escheat of certain unclaimed bank deposit balances against several banks
under Act. 3936 which provides that UNCLAIMED BALANCES (Which includes credits or deposit of
money security and other evidence of indebtedness of any kind plus interest) in favor of persons not
heard for 10 years or more, With the increase and proceeds thereof, Shall be deposited with the insular
treasurer to the credit of the PHIL. Government. Among this bank was the first national city bank of New
York who argued that some of its credit didnt fall with the purview of the ACT. The court held that
cashiers checks and demand drafts fall under the act but upon MFR changed its view and excluded drafts.

ISSUE:
Whether or not demand drafts create a creditor-debtor relationship between drawee and payee.

HELD:
No, a demand draft is not the same category as a cashiers check which should fall under the act. In
Banking terminology, The term Bank draft is used in interchangeably with a bill of under the N.I.L does not
operate as an assignment of funds in the hands of the drawee who is not liable on the instrument until he
accepts. In fact , The law requires presentment within reasonable time or else the drawer is discharged
from liability. Since it is admitted in this case that the drafts in question were never presented either for
acceptance or payment , Appellee Bank never became a debtor of the payees, Hence the drafts never
became CREDITS under the Act. Drafts must however be distinguished from cashiers checks which
simply a bill of exchange drawn by the bank on itself; It is equivalent to a certified check and its deposit
passes to the credit of the holder who then becomes a depositor of that amount. Disposition of
TELEGRAPHIC CHECK decision modified; Telegraphic Transfer payment orders should be escheated to
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES.

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 MUNICIPAL COUNCIL OF SAN PEDRO, LAGUNA vs. COLEGIO DE SAN JOSE
G.R. No. L-45460 February 25, 1938
(Rule 91 Escheats)

FACTS:
The Municipality of San Pedro, Laguna filed in the CFI a petition claiming the Hacienda de San Pedro
Tunasan by the right of Escheat. Colegio de San Jose, claiming to be the exclusive owner of the said
hacienda, assailed the petition upon the grounds that the petition does not allege sufficient facts to entitle
the applicants to the remedy prayed for. Carlos Young, claiming to be a lessee of the hacienda under a
contract legally entered with Coelegio de San Jose, also intervened in the case. Municipal Council of San
Pedro, Laguna objected to the appearance and intervention of CdSJ and Carlos Young but such objection
was overruled. Furthermore the lower court dismissed the petition filed for by Municipal Council of San
Pedro.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the petition for escheats should be dismissed.

HELD:
YES. Pursuant to Sec 1 of Rule 91, the essential facts which should be alleged in the petition, which are
jurisdictional because they confer jurisdiction upon the CFI are:
1. That a person died intestate or without leaving any will,
2. That he has left real or personal property and he was the owner thereof,
3. That he has not left any heir or person by law entitled to the property, and
4. That the one who applies for the escheat is the municipality where deceased has his last residence
or in case he should have no residence in the country, the municipality where the property is situated.

Petitioner in this case is not the sole and exclusive interested party. Any person alleging to have a direct
right or Interest in the property sought to be escheated is likewise an interested and necessary party and
may appear and oppose the petition for escheat.

When a petition for escheat does not state facts which entitle the petitioner to the remedy prayed for and
even admitting them hypothetically, it is clear that there is no ground for the court to proceed to the
Inquisition provided by law, an interested party should not be disallowed from filing a motion to dismiss
the petition which is untenable from all standpoint. And when the motion to dismiss is entertained upon
this ground the petition may be dismissed unconditionally.

In this case, Colegio de San Jose and Carlos Young had a right to intervene as an alleged exclusive owner
and a lessee of the property respectively.

The Municipal base its right to escheat on the fact that the Hacienda de San Pedro Tunasan, temporal
property of the Father of the Society of Jesus, were confiscated by the order of the King of Spain. From the
moment it was confiscated, it became the property of the commonwealth of the Philippines. Given this
fact, it is evident that the Municipality cannot claim that the same be escheated to them, because it is no
longer the case of real property owned by a deceased person who has not left any person which may
legally claim it (2nd requirement lacking).

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 LOLITA R. ALAMAYRI vs. ROMMEL, ELMER, ERWIN, ROILER and AMANDA, all surnamed PABALE
G.R. No. 151243 April 30, 2008
(Rule 93 Appointment of Guardians)

FACTS:
This is a Complaint for Specific Performance with Damages filed by Sesinando M. Fernando, representing
S.M. Fernando Realty Corporation on February 6, 1984 before the Regional Trial Court of Calamba, Laguna
presided over by Judge Salvador P. de Guzman, Jr., docketed as Civil Case No. 675-84-C against Nelly S.
Nave [Nave], owner of a parcel of land located in Calamba, Laguna covered by TCT No. T-3317 (27604).
Fernando alleged that on January 3, 1984, a handwritten "Kasunduan Sa Pagbibilihan" (Contract to Sell)
was entered into by and between him and Nave involving said parcel of land. However, [Nave] reneged on
their agreement when the latter refused to accept the partial down payment he tendered to her as
previously agreed because she did not want to sell her property to him anymore. Fernando prayed that
after trial on the merits, Nave be ordered to execute the corresponding Deed of Sale in his favor, and to
pay attorneys fees, litigation expenses and damages.

Subsequently, the Pabale siblings filed a Motion to Intervene alleging that they are now the land owners
of the subject property. Thus, the complaint was amended to include the Pabale siblings as party
defendants. In an Order dated April 24, 1984, the trial court denied Naves Motion to Dismiss prompting
her to file a Manifestation and Motion stating that she was adopting the allegations in her Motion to
Dismiss in answer to Fernandos amended complaint.

Before the motion for reconsideration could be acted upon, the proceedings in this case was suspended
sometime in 1987 in view of the filing of a Petition for Guardianship of Nave with the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 36 of Calamba, Laguna, docketed as SP No. 146-86-C with Atty. Vedasto Gesmundo as the
petitioner. On June 22, 1988, a Decision was rendered in the said guardianship proceedings.

The lower court declared the nullity of the two sale agreements on the ground that Nave was found
incompetent since 1980. The Pabale siblings intervened. The Court of Appeals granted the appeals of both
Fernando and the Pabale siblings and upheld the validity of the Deed of Sale executed by Nelly Nave dated
February 20, 1984. Hence, this petition.

Petitioner alleged that since Nave was judicially determined to be an incompetent, all contracts that she
subsequently entered into should be declared null and void.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the declaration of incompetency constitutes res judicata.

HELD:
No. There was no identity of parties and issues between the special proceeding on the guardianship of
Nave and the civil case. The decision on the former on her incompetency should not therefore bar by
conclusiveness of judgement the finding in the latter case (civil case) that Nave was competent and had
capacity when she entered into the contract of sale over the subject lot in favor of the Pabale siblings.

Herein, the Court expounded on the difference between the two rules on res judicata, namely; 1) bar by
previous judgment, and 2) conclusiveness of judgement. Bar by previous judgement means that the
judgement in the first case will bar the second case due to the identity of parties, subject-matter, and
cause of action. While a bar by virtue of conclusiveness of judgement bars the re-litigation in a second
case of a fact or question already settled in a previous case. Hence, even if there is identity of parties, but
no identity of causes of action, the first judgement can be conclusive only as to those matters actually
controverted and determined and not as to matters merely involved.

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 in re: ADOPTION OF STEPHANIE NATHY ASTORGA GARCIA
GR 148311 March 31, 2005
(Rule 99 Adoption and Custody of Minors)

FACTS:
Petitioner HonoratoCatindig filed a petition to adopt his minor illegitimate child Stephanie, and that
Stephanie has been using her mothers middle andsurname; and that he is now a widower and qualified to
her adopting parent. He prayed that Stephanies middle name Astorga be changed to Garcia, her
motherssurname, and that her surname Garcia be changed to Catindig, his surname.

ISSUE:
May an illegitimate child, upon adoption by her natural father, use the surname of her natural mother as
her middle name?

RULING:
YES. Being a legitimate child by virtue of her adoption, it follows that Stephanie is entitled to all the rights
provided by law to a legitimate child without discrimination of any kind, including the right to bear
surname of her father and her mother. Stephanies continued use of her mothers surname as her middle
name will maintain her maternal lineage. The Adoption Act and the Family Code provide that the adoptee
remains an intestate heir of his/her biological parent. Hence, Stephanie can assert her hereditary rights
from her natural mother in the future.

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 DIWATA RAMOS LANDINGIN vs. REPUBLIC
G.R. NO. 164948 June 27, 2006
(Rule 99 Adoption and Custody of Minors)

FACTS:
Diwata Ramos Landingin, a citizen of the United States of America (USA), of Filipino parentage and a
resident of Guam, USA, filed a petition for the adoption of minors Elaine Dizon Ramos, Elma Dizon Ramos
and Eugene Dizon Ramos who was born on. The minors are the natural children of Manuel Ramos,
petitioners brother (deceased), and Amelia Ramos- who went to Italy, re-married there and now has two
children by her second marriage and no longer communicated with her children .

ISSUE:
Whether or not the petition for adoption is invalid for lack of consent of the biological mother.

HELD:
No. The general requirement of consent and notice to the natural parents is intended to protect the
natural parental relationship from unwarranted interference by interlopers, and to insure the opportunity
to safeguard the best interests of the child in the manner of the proposed adoption. When she filed her
petition with the trial court, Rep. Act No. 8552 was already in effect. Section 9 thereof provides that if the
written consent of the biological parents cannot be obtained, the written consent of the legal guardian of
the minors will suffice. If, as claimed by petitioner, that the biological mother of the minors had indeed
abandoned them, she should, thus have adduced the written consent of their legal guardian.

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 ALEJANO vs. CABUAY
GR 160792 August 25, 2005
(Rule 102 Habeas Corpus)

FACTS:
A directive was issued to all Major Service Commanders to take into custody the military personnel under
their command who took part in the Oakwood incident. Petitioners filed a petition for habeas corpus with
SC. The SC issued a resolution, which required respondents to make a return of the writ and to appear and
produce the persons of the detainees before the CA. CA dismissed the petition because the detainees are
already charged of coup detat. Habeas corpus is unavailing in this case as the detainees confinement is
under a valid indictment.

ISSUE:
What is the objective of the writ of habeas corpus?

HELD:
The duty to hear the petition for habeas corpus necessarily includes the determination of the propriety of
the remedy. The remedy of habeas corpus has one objective: to inquire into the cause of detention of a
person. The purpose of the writ is to determine whether a person is being illegally deprived of his liberty.
If the inquiry reveals that the detention is illegal, the court orders the release of the person. If, however,
the detention is proven lawful, then the habeas corpus proceedings terminate. The use of habeas corpus
is thus very limited. It is not a writ of error. Neither can it substitute for an appeal.

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 GALVEZ vs CA
G. R. No. 114046 October 24, 1994
(Rule 102 Habeas Corpus)

FACTS:
On November 12, 1993, petitioners Honorato Galvez, the incumbent Mayor of San Ildefonso,
Bulacan, and one Godofredo Diego were charged in three separate information with homicide and
two counts of frustrated homicide. Both accused posted their respective cash bail bonds and were
subsequently released from detention. Private complainants filed before the Supreme Court change
of venue purportedly to safeguard the lives of the victims and witnesses and prevent the miscarriage
of justice. Before petitioners could be arraigned in Criminal cases, respondent prosecutor filed an Ex
parte Motion to Withdraw Information in said cases and the cases were considered withdrawn from
the docket of the court. Four new information were later filed in the trial Court of Malolos, Bulacan.
No bail, having recommended for the crime of Murder, an order to arrest herein petitioners was
issued. Before arraignment, petitioners filed a Motion to Quash the new information for lack of merit
which was subsequently denied. When the arraignment was suspended, petitioners filed a petition
for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus with respondent Court of Appeals.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the petition for habeas corpus was properly filed together with the present petition
for certiorari and mandamus.

HELD:
Yes. The writs of habeas corpus and certiorari may be ancillary to each other where necessary to give
effect to the supervisory powers of the higher courts. A writ of habeas corpus reaches the body and
the jurisdictional matters, but not the record. A writ of certiorari reaches the record but not the
body. Hence, a writ of habeas corpus may be used with the writ of certiorari for the purpose of
review. However, habeas corpus does not lie where the petitioner has the remedy of appeal or
certiorari because it will not be permitted to perform the functions of a writ of error or appeal for the
purpose of reviewing mere errors or irregularities in the proceedings of a court having jurisdiction
over the person and the subject matter.

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 SOTTO vs DIRECTOR OF PRISONS
G.R. No. 114046 October 24, 1994
(Rule 102 Habeas Corpus)

FACTS:
Together with Rocindo Brillantes, Eligido Iturralde and Alfredo Valencia, petitioner Eduardo Sotto was
convicted upon a plea of guilty, by the CFI of Zamboanga, for the crime of robbery, and sentenced to serve
an imprisonment of from 12 years and 1 day to 18 years, 2 months and 21 days of reclusion temporal. On
December 8, 1958, he filed his petition for habeas corpus. He alleged in his petition that the penalty
imposed is excessive and not in accordance with law, as the proper penalty imposable, for the offense
charged in the information should be that of Article 302 and not article 299 of the Revised Penal Code:
that at the time of conviction, petitioner was a minor, 16 years old, and as such he was entitled to a
penalty next lower than the one prescribed for the crime committed, to wit, arresto mayor in its
maximum period to prision correccional in its minimum period, or from 4 months and 1 day to 2 years and
4 months, and that having served sentence for a period of 4 years, 11 months and 21 days, he should
already be ordered released from custody and control of the Respondent Director of Prisons or his
representative. Respondent, answering, alleged in his special defense that admitting, but not granting that
the sentence is not in accordance with law, the petition for habeas corpus, is not the proper remedy. The
trial court denied his petition. Petitioner appealed, the Court of Appeals certified the case to us for
determination. The Solicitor General has not filed any brief.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the petition for habeas corpus is the proper remedy in this case.

HELD:
It is already a settled rule that when a court has jurisdiction of the offense charged and the person of the
accused, its judgment, order or decree is valid and is not subject to collateral attack by habeas corpus, for
this cannot be made to perform the function of a writ of error, and this holds true even if the judgment,
order or decree was erroneous (Vda. de Talavera v. Supt., etc., 67 Phil. 538; Cruz v. Martin, et al., 75 Phil.
11). In a recent case, (Cuenca v. Superintendent, etc., L-17400, Dee. 30, 1961)

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 ILUSORIO vs. BILDNER
GR No. 139789 May 12, 2000
(Rule 102 Habeas Corpus)

FACTS:
Erlinda filed with the CA a petition for habeas corpus to have the custody of her husband Potenciano
alleging that respondents refused petitioners demands to see and visit her husband. The CA allowed
visitation rights to Erlinda for humanitarian consideration but denied the petition for habeas corpus for
lack of unlawful restraint or detention of the subject of the petition. Erlinda seeks to reverse the CA
decision dismissing the application for habeas corpus to have the custody of her husband and enforce
consortium as the wife. Potenciano seeks to annul that portion of the CA decision giving Erlinda visitation
rights.

ISSUE:
Whether or not a wife may secure a writ of habeas corpus to compel her husband to live with her in their
conjugal dwelling.

HELD:
No. Marital rights including covertures and living in conjugal dwelling may not be enforced by the extra-
ordinary writ of habeas corpus. A writ of habeas corpus extends to all cases of illegal confinement or
detention, or by which the rightful custody of a person is withheld from the one entitled thereto. It is
available where a person continuous unlawfully denied of one or more of his constitutional freedom. It is
devised as a speedy and effectual remedy to relieve persons from unlawful restrainment, as the best and
only sufficient defence of personal freedom.

The essential object and purpose of the writ of habeas corpus is to inquire into all manner of involuntary
restraint and to relieve a person there from if such restraint is illegal. A person with full mental capacity
coupled with the right choice may not be the subject of visitation rights against free choice. The CA
exceeded its authority when it awarded visitation rights in a petition for habeas corpus where Erlinda
never even prayed for such right. No court is empowered as a judicial authority to compel a husband to
live with his wife. Coverture cannot be enforced by compulsion of a writ of habeas corpus carried out by
the sheriffs or by any other mesne process.

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 JOHANNA SOMBONG vs. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 111876 January 31, 1996
(Rule 102 Habeas Corpus)

FACTS:
Petitioner is the mother of Arabella O. Sombong. She alleged that sometime when Arabella was then only
six months old, was brought to the Sir John Clinic, for treatment. Petitioner did not have enough money to
pay the hospital bill and Arabella could not be then discharged. Despite alleged payments by installments,
the owners of the clinic, spouses Dr. Carmen and Vicente Ty, allegedly refused to turn over Arabella to
her.

Petitioner testified that she visited Arabella at the clinic only after two years and her pleas to claim the
child allegedly fell on deaf ears. When a criminal complaint against the spouses Ty was filed, Dr Ty
admitted that petitioners child, was discharged from the clinic in April, 1989, and was turned over to
someone who was properly identified to be the childs guardian.Facing arrest, Dra. Ty disclosed the
possible address where the child may be found. The agents of the NBI went to said address and there
found a female child who answered to the name of Cristina Grace Neri. Quite significantly, the evidence
disclosed that the child had been living with respondent Marietta Neri Alviar since 1988. When she was
just a baby, Cristina was abandoned by her parents at the Sir John Clinic.

Petitioner then filed a petition for the issuance of a Writ of Habeas Corpus with the Regional Trial Court of
Quezon City which granted the Writ.

However, private respondents filed an appeal from the decision to the CA which reversed and set aside
the decision of the trial court.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the CA erred in anulling the Writ of Habeas Corpus issued by the lower court.

HELD:
No. The SC ruled that: Fundamentally, in order to justify the grant of the writ of habeas corpus, the
restraint of liberty must be in the nature of an illegal and involuntary deprivation of freedom of action.
This is the basic requisite under the first part of Section 1, Rule 102, of the Revised Rules of Court, which
provides that except as otherwise expressly provided by law, the writ of habeas corpus shall extend to all
cases of illegal confinement or detention by which any person is deprived of his liberty.

In the second part of the same provision, however, Habeas Corpus may be resorted to in cases where the
rightful custody of any person is withheld from the person entitled thereto. Thus, although the Writ
of Habeas Corpus ought not to be issued if the restraint is voluntary, we have held time and again that the
said writ is the proper legal remedy to enable parents to regain the custody of a minor child even if the
latter be in the custody of a third person of her own free will.

The controversy does not involve the question of personal freedom, because an infant is presumed to be
in the custody of someone until he attains majority age. In passing on the writ in a child custody case, the
court deals with a matter of an equitable nature. Not bound by any mere legal right of parent or guardian,
the court gives his or her claim to the custody of the child due weight as a claim founded on human nature
and considered generally equitable and just. Therefore, these cases are decided, not on the legal right of
the petitioner to be relieved from unlawful imprisonment or detention, as in the case of adults, but on the
courts view of the best interests of those whose welfare requires that they be in custody of one person or
another. Hence, the court is not bound to deliver a child into the custody of any claimant or of any person,
but should, in the consideration of the facts, leave it in such custody as its welfare at the time appears to
require. In short, the childs welfare is the supreme consideration.

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 IN THE MATTER OF APPLICATION FOR THE ISSUANCE OF A WRIT OF HABEAS
CORPUS RICHARD BRIAN THORNTON vs. ADELFA FRANCISCO THORNTON
G.R. No. 154598 August 16, 2004
(Rule 99 Adoption and Custody of Minors; Rule 102 Habeas Corpus)

FACTS:
Petitioner was an American, respondent was a Filipino. They were married and had one daughter. After 3
years, the woman grew restless and bored as a plain housewife and wanted to return to her old job as
GRO in a nightclub. One day, the woman left the family home together with their daughter and told her
servants that she was going to Basilan. The husband filed a petition for habeas corpus in the designated
Family Court in Makati City but was dismissed because the child was in Basilan. When he went to Basilan,
he didnt find them and the barangay office issued a certification that respondent was no longer residing
there. Petitioner filed another petition for habeas corpus in CA which could issue a writ of habeas corpus
enforceable in the entire country. The petition was denied by CA on the ground that it did not have
jurisdiction over the case since RA 8369 (Family Courts Act of 1997) gave family courts exclusive
jurisdiction over petitions for habeas corpus, it impliedly repealed RA 7902 (An Act Expanding the
Jurisdiction of CA) and B.P 129 (The judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980.)

ISSUE:
Whether or not the CA has jurisdiction to issue writs of habeas corpus in cases involving custody of minors
in light of the provision in RA 8369 giving family courts exclusive jurisdiction over such petitions.

HELD:
CA should take cognizance of the case because nothing in RA 8369 revoked its jurisdiction to issue writs of
habeas corpus involving custody of minors. The reasoning of CA cant be affirmed because it will result to
iniquitous, leaving petitioners without legal course in obtaining custody. The minor could be transferred
from one place to another and habeas corpus case will be left without legal remedy since family courts
take cognizance only in cases within their jurisdiction. Literal interpretation would render it meaningless,
lead to absurdity, injustice, and contradiction. The literal interpretation of exclusive will result in grave
injustice and negate the policy to protect the rights and promote welfare of children.

The provisions of RA 8369 reveal no manifest intent to revoke the jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals and
Supreme Court to issue writs of habeas corpus relating to the custody of minors. Further, it cannot be said
that the provisions of RA 8369, RA 7092 and BP 129 are absolutely incompatible since RA 8369 does not
prohibit the Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court from issuing writs of habeas corpus in cases
involving the custody of minors. Thus, the provisions of RA 8369 must be read in harmony with RA 7029
and BP 129 that family courts have concurrent jurisdiction with the Court of Appeals and the Supreme
Court in petitions for habeas corpus where the custody of minors is at issue.

From the foregoing, there is no doubt that the Court of Appeals and Supreme Court have concurrent
jurisdiction with family courts in habeas corpus cases where the custody of minors is involved.

One final note. Requiring the serving officer to search for the child all over the country is not an
unreasonable availment of a remedy which the Court of Appeals cited as a ground for dismissing the
petition. As explained by the Solicitor General: That the serving officer will have to "search for the child all
over the country" does not represent an insurmountable or unreasonable obstacle, since such a task is no
more different from or difficult than the duty of the peace officer in effecting a warrant of arrest, since the
latter is likewise enforceable anywhere within the Philippines.

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 FELIPE MADRIAN vs. FRANCISCA MADRIAN
G.R. No. 159374 July 12, 2007
(Rule 99 Adoption and Custody of Minors; Rule 102 Habeas Corpus)

FACTS:
Petitioner and respondent were married, and after a bitter quarrel, petitioner left the conjugal abode
bringing with him their three sons (2 of which are minors) to Albay and to Laguna subsequently.

Respondent filed a petition for habeas corpus in the Court of Appeals for their their 2 minor sons on the
ground that petitioners act disrupted their education and deprived them of their mothers care.
Petitioner filed a memorandum alleging that respondent was unfit to take custody of their children and
questioned the jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals claiming that under Section 5(b) of RA 8369, family
courts have exclusive original jurisdiction to hear and decide the petition for habeas corpus filed by
respondent. The Court of Appeals rendered a decision asserting its authority to take cognizance and
ruling, that under the Family Code, respondent was entitled to custody of the minors.

Petitioner challenges the jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals over the petition for habeas corpus and
insists that jurisdiction over the case is lodged in the family courts under RA 8369.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over habeas corpus cases involving custody of
minors.

HELD:
Yes. The Supreme Court ruled in a previous jurisprudence that The Court of Appeals should has cognizance
of this case since there is nothing in RA 8369 that revoked its jurisdiction to issue writs of habeas corpus
involving the custody of minors. RA 8369 did not divest the Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court of
their jurisdiction over habeas corpus cases involving the custody of minors.

The concurrent jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals and Supreme Court with family courts in said cases was
further affirmed by A.M. No. 03-03-04-SC (April 22, 2004) in Re: Rule on Custody of Minors and Writ of
Habeas Corpus in Relation to Custody of Minors which provides that:
Section 20. Petition for writ of habeas corpus. A verified petition for a writ of habeas corpus
involving custody of minors shall be filed with the Family Court. The writ shall be enforceable within
its judicial region to which the Family Court belongs.
xxx xxx xxx

The petition may likewise be filed with the Supreme Court, Court of Appeals, or with any of its members
and, if so granted, the writ shall be enforceable anywhere in the Philippines.

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 SECRETARY OF NATIONAL DEFENSE vs. MANALO
G.R. No. 180906 October 7, 2008
(Rule 102 Habeas Corpus)

FACTS:
On 14 February 2006, at past noon, Raymond Manalo (hereafter referred to as Raymond) and Reynaldo
Manalo (hereafter referred to as Reynaldo) were abducted by military men belonging to the Citizen
Armed Forces Geographical Unit (CAFGU) on the suspicion that they were members and supporters of the
New Peoples Army (NPA). After eighteen (18) months of detention and torture, the brothers escaped on
13 August 2007.

On 23 August 2007, Raymond and Reynaldo filed a Petition for Prohibition, Injunction, and Temporary
Restraining Order before the Supreme Court to stop the military officers and agents from depriving them
of their right to liberty and other basic rights. In a Resolution dated 24 August 2007, the Supreme Court
ordered the Secretary of the Department of National Defense and the Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces
of the Philippines (AFP), their agents, representatives, or persons acting in their stead, and further
enjoined them from causing the arrest of Raymond and Reynaldo. Forthwith, they filed a Manifestation
and Omnibus Motion to Treat Existing Petition as Amparo Petition, to Admit Supporting Affidavits, and to
Grant Interim and Final Amparo Reliefs.

While the aforementioned case was pending, the Rule on the Writ of Amparo took effect on 24 October
2007. Raymond and Reynaldo subsequently filed a manifestation and omnibus motion to treat their
existing peti tion as amparo petition.

On 25 October 2007, the Supreme Court resolved to treat the 23 August 2007 Petition as a petition under
the Amparo Rule. The Supreme Court likewise granted the Writ of Amparo and remanded the petition to
the Court of Appeals to conduct the summary hearing and decide the petition.

On 26 December 2007, the Court of Appeals granted the privilege of the writ of amparo. The Court of
Appeals ordered the Secretary of National Defense and the Chief of Staff of the AFP to furnish the
Manalos and the court with all official and unofficial investigation reports as to the custody of Raymond
and Reynaldo, confirm the present places of official assignment of two military officials involved, and
produce all medical reports and records of Raymond and Reynaldo while under military custody.

Aggrieved, the Secretary of National Defense and the Chief of Staff of the AFP filed an appeal with the
Supreme Court.

ISSUES:
Whether or not statements from the victims themselves is sufficient for amparo petitions.
Whether or not actual deprivation of liberty is necessary for the right to security of a person may be
invoked.

ANSWER:
It depends on the credibility and candidness of the victims in their statements.
No.

SUPREME COURT RULINGS:

1. ON EVIDENCE REQUIRED ON AMPARO PETITIONS
Effect of the nature of enforced disappearance and torture to the quantum of evidence required With
the secret nature of an enforced disappearance and the torture perpetrated on the victim during
detention, it logically holds that much of the information and evidence of the ordeal will come from the
victims themselves, and the veracity of their account will depend on their credibility and candidness in
their written and/or oral statements. Their statements can be corroborated by other evidence such as
physical evidence left by the torture they suffered or landmarks they can identify in the places where they
were detained. Where powerful military officers are implicated, the hesitation of witnesses to surface and
testify against them comes as no surprise.

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2. ON RIGHT TO SECURITY AS A GROUND FOR AMPARO PETITION
Permutations of the Right to Security A closer look at the right to security of person would yield various
permutations of the exercise of this right. First, the right to security of person is freedom from fear. In
its whereas clauses, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) enunciates that a world in
which human beings shall enjoy freedom of speech and belief and freedom from fear and want has been
proclaimed as the highest aspiration of the common people. Some scholars postulate that freedom from
fear is not only an aspirational principle, but essentially an individual international human right. It is the
right to security of person as the word security itself means freedom from fear. Article 3 of the
UDHR provides, viz: Everyone has the right to life, liberty and security of person.
xxx

Second, the right to security of person is a guarantee of bodily and psychological integrity or security.
Article III, Section II of the 1987 Constitution guarantees that, as a general rule, ones body cannot be
searched or invaded without a search warrant. Physical injuries inflicted in the context of extralegal killings
and enforced disappearances constitute more than a search or invasion of the body. It may constitute
dismemberment, physical disabilities, and painful physical intrusion. As the degree of physical injury
increases, the danger to life itself escalates. Notably, in criminal law, physical injuries constitute a crime
against persons because they are an affront to the bodily integrity or security of a person.
xxx

Third, the right to security of person is a guarantee of protection of ones rights by the government. In the
context of the writ of amparo, this right is built into the guarantees of the right to life and liberty under
Article III, Section 1 of the 1987 Constitution and the right to security of person (as freedom from threat
and guarantee of bodily and psychological integrity) under Article III, Section 2. The right to security of
person in this third sense is a corollary of the policy that the State guarantees full respect for human
rights under Article II, Section 11 of the 1987 Constitution. As the government is the chief guarantor of
order and security, the Constitutional guarantee of the rights to life, liberty and security of person is
rendered ineffective if government does not afford protection to these rights especially when they are
under threat. Protection includes conducting effective investigations, organization of the government
apparatus to extend protection to victims of extralegal killings or enforced disappearances (or threats
thereof) and/or their families, and bringing offenders to the bar of justice.

Freedom from fear as a right In the context of Section 1 of the Amparo Rule, freedom from fear is the
right and any threat to the rights to life, liberty or security is the actionable wrong. Fear is a state of mind,
a reaction; threat is a stimulus, a cause of action. Fear caused by the same stimulus can range from being
baseless to well-founded as people react differently. The degree of fear can vary from one person to
another with the variation of the prolificacy of their imagination, strength of character or past experience
with the stimulus. Thus, in the amparo context, it is more correct to say that the right to security is
actually the freedom from threat. Viewed in this light, the threatened with violation Clause in the
latter part of Section 1 of the Amparo Rule is a form of violation of the right to security mentioned in the
earlier part of the provision.

Deprivation of liberty is not necessary before the right to security may be invoked While the right to
security of person appears in conjunction with the right to liberty under Article 9, the Committee has ruled
that the right to security of person can exist independently of the right to liberty. In other words, there
need not necessarily be a deprivation of liberty for the right to security of person to be invoked.

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 REPUBLIC vs CA
G.R NO. 88202 December 14, 1998
(Rule 108 - Cancellation or Correction of Entries in the Civil Registry)

FACTS:
The petitioner was born at Capitol Medical Center in Quezon City on January 19, 1971 to parents
Pablo Castro Vicencio and Fe Esperanza de Vega Lebres. On January 10, 1927, after a marital
disagreement, Vicencio left their conjugal property in Meycauayan Bulacan and never returned nor
gave support to his family. Leabres found an ally in Ernesto Yu who would later end up as her
husband. On June 29, 1976, leabres filed a petition with the juvenile and domestic relations court for
the dissolution of her conjugal partnership with Vicencio, and such petition was granted. The
petitioners mother filed another petition in 1983 to drop the surname of her husband therefrom and
it was again approved. Leabres filed a petition to declare Pablo Vicencio an absentee, and Hon.
Corona Ibay-Somera decided in favour of the petitioners mother on April 26, 1984. And the result of
these petitions paved the way for the marriage of the petitioners mother and Ernesto Yu on April 15,
1986. On the other hand, evidence was established that the petitioner had not remembered much
her real father, and that in his absence, it was Ernesto Yu who had taken Vicencios place. Although
petitioner uses the surname Vicencio in her school and other related activities, she contends that in
such situations, confusion arose as to her parentage leading to inquiries as to why she is using
Vicencio s surname causing much embarrassment on her part. The Office of the Solicitor General
having participated in the cross examination of Cynthia Vicencio and her witnesses, manifested
opposition over the petition. The court argued that there was no valid cause for the denial of the
petition and that taking into account the fact that the court cannot compel the stepfather of the
petitioner to consider adoption, failure to observe the process should not be a cause for disallowing
petitioner to legally change her name, in addition to the opportunity of the respondent to improve
her personality and welfare under a socially recognized surname, that of her stepfather. On August
31, 1987, the Manila Regional Trial Court Branch 52 granted private respondent Cynthias petition for
change of surname from Vicencio to Yu. The same was affirmed by the decision of the Court of
Appeals dated April 28, 1989.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the Appellate Court made a mistake or violated standards in affirming the decision of
the trial court to allow the change in private respondents surname to that of her stepfathers
surname.

HELD:
Yes. The Court has reversed and set aside the appealed decision to allow private respondents change
of name from Vicencio to Yu and granted the instant petition to retain surname due to lack of legally
justifiable cause for allowing such change. The court also contends that though confusion may arise
with regard to parentage, more confusion with grave legal consequences could arise if private
respondent is to use his stepfathers surname even if she is not legally adopted by him. Legal
constraints lead the court to reject private respondents desire to use her step- fathers surname and
no assurance exists that the end result would not be even more detrimental to her person, as it may
trigger deeper inquiries regarding her parentage. It is Page 101 of 112 also noteworthy that as a
result of Republic Act 6809, the private respondent although already 18 years old when the Appellate
Court rendered its decision, was still considered a minor.

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 REPUBLIC vs. VALENCIA
G.R. No. L-32181 March 5, 1986
(Rule 108 Cancellation or Correction of Entries in the Civil Registry)

FACTS:
Respondent Leonor Valencia, for and in behalf of her minor children filed with the Court of First Instance
of Cebu a petition for the cancellation and/or correction of entries of birth of Bernardo Go and Jessica Go
in the Civil Registry of the City of Cebu. The case was docketed as Special Proceeding No. 3043-R.

The Solicitor General filed an opposition to the petition alleging that the petition for correction of entry in
the Civil Registry pursuant to Article 412 of the New Civil Code of the Philippines in relation to Rule 108 of
the Revised Rules of Court, contemplates a summary proceeding and correction of mere clerical errors.
Those harmless and innocuous changes such as the correction of a name that is merely misspelled,
occupation of parents, etc., and not changes or corrections involving civil status, nationality, or citizenship
which are substantial and controversial.

Finding the petition to be sufficient in form and substance, the trial court issued an order directing the
publication of the petition and the date of hearing thereof in the Cebu Advocate, a newspaper of general
circulation in the city and province of Cebu, once a week for three (3) consecutive weeks, and notice
thereof, duly served on the Solicitor General, the Local Civil Registrar of Cebu City and Go Eng.

Respondent Leonor Valencia, filed her reply to the opposition wherein she admitted that the present
petition seeks substantial changes involving the civil status and nationality or citizenship of respondents,
but alleged that substantial changes in the civil registry records involving the civil status of parents, their
nationality or citizenship may be allowed if (1) the proper court suit is filed, and (2) evidence is submitted
either to support the allegations of the petition or to disprove the same. That respondents have complied
with these requirements.

The local Civil Registrar of Cebu City filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that since the petition seeks
to change the nationality or citizenship of Bernardo Go and Jessica Go from Chinese to Filipino and
their status from Legitimate to Illegitimate, and changing also the status of the mother from married
to single the corrections sought are not merely clerical but substantial, involving as they do the
citizenship and status of the petitioning minors.

The lower court denied the motion to dismiss.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the proper suit or appropriate action was filed by the respondent.

HELD:
The Court held in the affirmative. We are of the opinion that the petition filed by the respondent in the
lower court by way of a special proceeding for cancellation and/or correction of entries in the civil register
with the requisite notice and publication and the recorded proceedings that actually took place thereafter
could very well be regarded as that proper suit or appropriate action.

It is undoubtedly true that if the subject matter of a petition is not for the correction of clerical errors of a
harmless and innocuous nature, but one involving nationality or citizenship, which is indisputably
substantial as well as controverted. Affirmative relief cannot be granted in a proceeding summary in
nature. However, it is also true that a right in law may be enforced and a wrong may be remedied as long
as the appropriate remedy is used. The Court adheres to the principle that even substantial errors in a civil
registry may be corrected.

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 REYES vs. ALEJANDRO
G.R. No. L-32026 January 16, 1986
(Rule 107 Absentees)

FACTS:
In October 1969, Erlinda Reynoso Reyes prayed for the declaration of absence of her husband Roberto L.
Reyes who have been absent in their house since April 1962 due to a misunderstanding over personal
matters. Since then she doesnt know his whereabouts. He left no will or debts. Erlinda claimed that they
acquired no proprerties or debts during their marriage. Her only purpose in filing the petition is to
establish the absence of her husband, invoking the provisions of Rule 107 of the New Rules of Court and
Article 384 of the Civil Code.

Court of First Instance dismissed the case.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Roberto Reyes must be judicially declared absent.

HELD:
No. The purpose of the declaration is to provide an administrator of the property. Rule 107 of the Rules of
Court is based on the provisions of Title XIV of the New Civil Code on absence. The provision is concerned
with the interest or property of the absentee.

When to declare for absence: 1. When he has properties which have to be taken cared of or administered
by a representative appointed by the court. 2. The spouse of the absentee is asking for separation of
property or 3. His wife is asking the Court that the administration of all classes of property in the marriage
be transferred to her.

For civil marriage, it is necessary to judicially declare spouse an absentee only when 1. There are
properties which have to be taken cared of or administered by a representative appointed by the Court. 2.
The spouse of the absentee is asking for separation of property. 3. Wife is asking the Court that the
administration of property in the marriage be transferred to her. Otherwise, law only require that the
former spouse has been absent for seven consecutive years at the time of the second marriage, that the
spouse present does not know his or her former spouse to be living, that such former spouse is generally
reputed to be dead and the spouse present so believes at the time of the celebration of the marriage.

In this case, since there were no properties to speak of, it was right for the Trial Court to dismiss the case.

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 REPUBLIC vs. BENEMERITO
G.R. No. 146963 March 15, 2004
(Rule 108 Cancellation or Correction of Entries in the Civil Registry)

FACTS:
Respondent Petronio L Benemerito, filed a verified petition before the RTC of Nueva Ecija asking for the
correction of certain entries in the record of birth of his son, Joven Lee Benemerito, on file with the Local
Civil Registrar of Guimba, Nueva Ecija. The entries sought to be corrected includes: 1. A change of the
fathers name from Peter Laurente Benemerito to Petronio L. Benemerito; and 2. The date of the marriage
Joven Lees parents, Edna V. Sicat and Petronio L. Benemerito appearing therein from September 01, 1989
to January 25, 1998.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the entries sought to be corrected are innocuous.

HELD:
No. Rule 108 of the Rules of Court, in relation to Article 412 of the Civil Code, states the procedure by
which an entry in the civil register may be cancelled or corrected. The proceeding there contemplated
therein may generally be used only to correct clerical, spelling typographical and other innocuous errors in
the civil registry. A clerical error is one which visible to the eyes or obvious to the understanding; an error
made by a clerk or transcriber is a mistake in copying or writing or harmless changes such as a correction
of a name that is clearly misspelled or of a misstatement of the occupation of the parent. On the other
hand, substantial or contentious alterations may be allowed only in adversarial proceedings, in which all
interested parties are impleaded and due process is properly observed.

The obvious effect of the enactment of RA 9048 is merely to make possible the administrative correction
of clerical or typographical errors or change of first name or nickname in entries in the civil register,
leaving to Rule 108 the correction of substantial changes in the civil registry in appropriate adversarial
proceedings.

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 REPUBLIC vs. KHO
G.R. No. 170340 June 29, 2007
(Rule 109 Appeals in Special Proceedings)

FACTS:
Petitioner appealed the RTC Decision to the CA, faulting the trial court in granting the petition for
correction of entries in the subject documents despite the failure of respondents to implied minors
mother, Marivel, as an indispensable party and to offer sufficient evidence to warrant the corrections with
regard to the questioned married status of Carlito and his siblings parents and the latters citizenship
from Filipino to Chinese.

In the present petition, petitioner contends that since the changes sought by respondents were
substantial in nature, they could be only granted through and adversarial proceeding in which
indispensable parties such as Marivel and respondents parents should have been notified or impleaded.

ISSUE:
Whether or not failure to implead Marivel and Carlitos parents rendered the trial courts judgment void.

HELD:
No. The court held that the publication of the order of hearing cured the failure to implead an
indispensable party. Whether Marivel or respondents parents should have been impleaded as parties to
the proceedings is necessary. It may not be amiss to mention, that during the hearing on January 31, 2002,
the city prosecutor who was acting as representative of the OSG did not raise any objection to the non-
inclusion of Marivel and Carlitos parents as parties to the proceeding.

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 RE: FINAL REPORT ON THE JUDICIAL AUDIT CONDUCTED AT THE REGIONAL
TRIAL COURT, BR. 67, PANIQUI, TARLAC
Adm. Matter No. 06-7-414-RTC October 19, 2007
(Rule 103 Change of Name; Rule 108 Cancellation or Correction of Entries in the Civil Registry)

FACTS:
This administrative matter arose from the judicial audit and physical inventory of cases conducted at the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Paniqui, Tarlac, Branch 67, then presided by Judge Cesar M. Sotero who
compulsorily retired on 23 February 2006. During the course of the audit it was observed by the Audit
Team that almost all of the petitions are pro-forma and notarized by Clerk of Court Paulino Saguyod as ex-
officio notary public. There are even unsigned, unverified and not notarized petitions granted by the
Court. Further, almost all of them have no hearings conducted that it will be improbable if not possible
that the court orders be published in a newspaper of general circulation as required by the Rules of Court.
Moreover, there are petitions where the date of filing were simultaneous or ahead of the date of the
alleged hearing/decision and were found to have either no court action or no further action for a
considerable length of time.

Judge Sotero and Clerk of Court Saguyod jointly filed an Explanation.

As to the petitions for correction of entry/ies without hearing and publication, they explained that almost
all of these petitions may be covered by Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9048 which authorizes city or municipal
civil registrars to correct clerical or typographical errors in an entry and/or change the first name or
nickname in the civil registry without need for a judicial order. Since R.A. No. 9048 allows corrections of
entries without hearing and publication for as long as the necessary documents are submitted, the trial
court considered the same procedure as applicable to the petitions for correction of entries filed before it.
As to the petitions that were resolved on the same date as the date of filing or date of hearing, they
contended that these petitions were for correction of entry/ies and involved innocuous errors that may be
subject of administrative corrections under R.A. No. 9048. The trial court resolved these petitions with
dispatch to accommodate the petitioners need to have their civil registry documents immediately
corrected to conform with their passport applications, applications to take board examinations and
petitions to travel abroad. Judge Sotero was more lenient in such instances since in his view no substantial
prejudice would ensue.

ISSUES:
1. Whether trial courts still have jurisdiction over petitions for correction of clerical errors and
change of first name and nickname in the civil registry.

2. Whether the summary procedure prescribed in R.A. No. 9048 should be adopted in cases filed
before the courts.

HELD:
1. Yes. There was no intent on the part of the lawmakers to remove the authority of the trial courts
to make judicial corrections of entries in the civil registry. The local civil registrar has primary, not
exclusive, jurisdiction over such petitions for correction of clerical errors and change of first name
or nickname, with R.A. No. 9048 prescribing the procedure that the petitioner and local civil
registrar should follow.

2. No. Since R.A. No. 9048 refers specifically to the administrative summary proceedings before the
local civil registrar, it would be inappropriate to apply the same procedure to petitions for the
correction of entries in the civil registry before the courts. The promulgation of rules of
procedure for courts of justice is the exclusive domain of the Supreme Court. Moreover, there is
nothing in R.A. No. 9048 and its Implementing Rules and Regulations that warrants the adoption
of the procedure set therein for petitions before the courts even for the purpose of expediting
the resolution of said petitions. The procedure provided in the Revised Rules of Court for such
petitions remains binding and should be followed by the courts. The procedural requirements laid
down in Rules 103 and 108 still have to be complied with.

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 ROMMEL JACINTO DANTES SILVERIO vs. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 174689 October 22, 2007
(Rule 103 Change of Name; Rule 108 Cancellation or Correction of Entries in the Civil Registry)

FACTS:
On November 26, 2002, petitioner Rommel Jacinto Dantes Silverio filed a petition for the change of his
first name and sex in his birth certificate in the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 8. The petitioner
impleaded the civil registrar of Manila as respondent. Petitioner alleged in his petition that he was born in
the City of Manila on April 4, 1962. His name was registered as "Rommel Jacinto Dantes Silverio" in his
certificate of live birth. His sex was registered as "male."

He further alleged that he is a male transsexual, that is, "anatomically male but feels, thinks and acts as a
female" and that he had always identified himself with girls since childhood. He underwent psychological
examination, hormone treatment and breast augmentation. His attempts to transform himself to a
"woman" culminated on January 27, 2001 when he underwent sex reassignment surgery in Bangkok,
Thailand.

From then on, petitioner lived as a female and was in fact engaged to be married. He then sought to have
his name in his birth certificate changed from "Rommel Jacinto" to "Mely," and his sex from "male" to
"female."

ISSUE:
Whether sex reassignment a valid ground for the change of petitioners name and sex in his birth
certificate.

HELD:
No. RA 9048 does not sanction a change of first name on the ground of sex reassignment. Rather than
avoiding confusion, changing petitioners first name for his declared purpose may only create grave
complications in the civil registry and the public interest. Before a person can legally change his given
name, he must present proper or reasonable cause or any compelling reason justifying such change. In
addition, he must show that he will be prejudiced by the use of his true and official name. In this case, he
failed to show, or even allege, any prejudice that he might suffer as a result of using his true and official
name.

The petition in the trial court in so far as it prayed for the change of petitioners first name was not within
that courts primary jurisdiction as the petition should have been filed with the local civil registrar
concerned, assuming it could be legally done. It was an improper remedy because the proper remedy was
administrative, that is, that provided under RA 9048. It was also filed in the wrong venue as the proper
venue was in the Office of the Civil Registrar of Manila where his birth certificate is kept. More
importantly, it had no merit since the use of his true and official name does not prejudice him at all.
Also, under RA 9048, a correction in the civil registry involving the change of sex is not a mere clerical or
typographical error. It is a substantial change for which the applicable procedure is Rule 108 of the Rules
of Court.

Under the Civil Register Law, a birth certificate is a historical record of the facts as they existed at the time
of birth. Thus, the sex of a person is determined at birth, visually done by the birth attendant (the
physician or midwife) by examining the genitals of the infant. Considering that there is no law legally
recognizing sex reassignment, the determination of a persons sex made at the time of his or her birth, if
not attended by error, is immutable.

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 REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. JENNIFER B. CAGANDAHAN
G.R. No. 166676 September 12, 2008
(Rule 103 Change of Name; Rule 108 Cancellation or Correction of Entries in the Civil Registry)

FACTS:
Respondent Jennifer Cagandahan filed a Petition for Correction of Entries in Birth Certificate before the
RTC, Branch 33 of Siniloan, Laguna. In her petition, she alleged that she was born on January 13, 1981 and
was registered as a female in the Certificate of Live Birth but while growing up, she developed secondary
male characteristics and was diagnosed to have Congenital Adrenal Hyperplasia (CAH) which is a condition
where persons thus afflicted possess both male and female characteristics. She alleged that for all
interests and appearances as well as in mind and emotion, she has become a male person. Thus, she
prayed that her birth certificate be corrected such that her gender be changed from female to male and
her first name be changed from Jennifer to Jeff.

ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioner can change her sex and name in the birth certificate based upon her condition.

HELD:
Yes. Biologically, nature endowed respondent with a mixed (neither consistently and categorically female
nor consistently and categorically male) composition. Respondent has female (XX) chromosomes.
However, respondents body system naturally produces high levels of male hormones (androgen). As a
result, respondent has ambiguous genitalia and the phenotypic features of a male. The Court views that
where the person is biologically or naturally intersex the determining factor in his gender classification
would be what the individual, like respondent, having reached the age of majority, with good reason
thinks of his/her sex. Respondent here thinks of himself as a male and considering that his body produces
high levels of male hormones (androgen) there is preponderant biological support for considering him as
being male. Sexual development in cases of intersex persons makes the gender classification at birth
inconclusive. It is at maturity that the gender of such persons, like respondent, is fixed.

As for respondents change of name under Rule 103, the Court has held that a change of name is not a
matter of right but of judicial discretion, to be exercised in the light of the reasons adduced and the
consequences that will follow. The respondents change of name from Jennifer to Jeff implies a change of
a feminine name to a masculine name. Considering the consequence that respondents change of name
merely recognizes his preferred gender, the Court finds merit in respondents change of name. Such a
change will conform with the change of the entry in his birth certificate from female to male.

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 In the Matter of the Heirship (Intestate Estates) of the Late Hermogenes Rodriguez,
Antonio Rodriguez, Macario J. Rodriguez, Delfin Rodriguez, and Consuelo M. Rodriguez
and Settlement of their Estates, RENE B. PASCUAL vs. JAIME M. ROBLES
G.R. No. 182645 December 15, 2010
(Rule 109 Appeals in Special Proceedings)

FACTS:
Jaime Robles, in his opposition, prayed that he be appointed regular administrator to the estates of
Antonio Rodriguez and Hermogenes Rodriguez (Hermogenes) and be allowed to sell a certain portion of
land included in the estate of Hermogenes covered by OCT No. 12022.

After hearing on Robles' application for appointment as regular administrator, the RTC issued an Order
dated 15 December 1994 declaring him to be an heir and next of kin of decedent Hermogenes and thus
qualified to be the administrator. Accordingly, the said order appointed Robles as regular administrator of
the entire estate of Hermogenes and allowed him to sell the property.

On 27 April 1999, the RTC dismissed the oppositions of Robles for his failure to substantiate his claim of
heirship to the late Hermogenes.

On 13 August 1999, the RTC issued an Amended Decision reversing its earlier finding. It, however, re-
affirmed its earlier verdict dismissing the opposition of Robles.

Robles then appealed the August 13, 1999 Decision of the RTC by filing a Notice of Appeal, but the same
was denied by the trial court in its Order dated November 22, 1999 for Robles' failure to file a record on
appeal.

Robles questioned the denial of his appeal by filing a petition for review on certiorari with the Supreme
Court.

In a Resolution dated February 14, 2000, the Court referred the petition to the CA for consideration and
adjudication on the merits on the ground that the said court has jurisdiction concurrent with the Court
and that no special and important reason was cited for the Court to take cognizance of the said case in the
first instance.

On April 16, 2002, the CA rendered judgment annulling the August 13, 1999 Amended Decision of the RTC.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Robles has timely made an appeal before the RTC.

HELD:
No. In special proceedings, such as the instant proceeding for settlement of estate, the period of appeal
from any decision or final order rendered therein is 30 days, a notice of appeal and a record on appeal
being required. The appeal period may only be interrupted by the filing of a motion for new trial or
reconsideration. Once the appeal period expires without an appeal being perfected, the decision or order
becomes final.

In the case under consideration, it was on 13 August 1999 that the RTC issued an Amended Decision. On
12 October 1999, Jaime Robles erroneously filed a notice of appeal instead of filing a record on appeal.
The RTC, in an order dated 22 November 1999, denied this for his failure to file a record on appeal as
required by the Rules of Court. Petitioner failed to comply with the requirements of the rule; hence, the
13 August 1999 Amended Decision of the RTC lapsed into finality. It was, therefore, an error for the Court
of Appeals to entertain the case knowing that Jaime Robles' appeal was not perfected and had lapsed into
finality.

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