STATCON REVIEWER Resources, from enforcing its Order of Execution, containing the liability

arising from an alleged encroachment of the petitioner over the timer

LATIN MAXIMS concession of respondent DAVENCOR. The RTC ruled in favor of the
LATIN ENGLISH TRANSLATION petitioner but on the appeal, it was reversed by the Court of Appeals. The
Verba accipienda sunt secundum A word is to be understood in the decision of the CA finds MIWPI, as an alter-ego of Milagros Matuguina
materiam context in which it is used and/or Matuguina Logging Enterprises, to be liable to DAVENCOR for the
Generalia verba sunt generaliter A general statement is understood illegal encroachment. The SC granted the petition, declaring the Order of
intelligenda in a general sense Execution null and void. The SC ruled that no man shall be affected by any
Ubi lex non distinguit, nec nos Where the law does not distinguish, proceeding to which he is a stranger, and strangers to a case are not bound
distinguere debemus we should not distinguish by judgment rendered by the court. In the same manner an execution can
Nosciter a sociis where a word is obscure or be issued only agains a party and not against one who did not have his day
ambiguous (susceptible of various in court. Hence, there was no basis for the issuance of the Order of
meanings), it may be interpreted by Execution against the petitioner.
considering the company of words
in which it is found or with which it is
associated STATCON ISSUE:
Ejusdem generis same kind or specie In the case at bar, the respondents cite Section 61 of P.D. 7051 to establish
Expressio unius est exclusio what is not included is excluded MIWPI's succession to the liability of Milagros Matuguina/MLE.
alterius
Casus omissus pro omisso a person, object or thing omitted The SC ruled that even if it is mandated in the above provision that the
habendus est from an enumeration must be held transferee shall assume all the obligations of the transferor this does not
to have been omitted intentionally. mean that all obligations are assumed indiscriminately. It is not the letter, but
Redendo singula singulis referring each to each each word the spirit of the law and intent of the legislature that is important. When the
is applied to the subject to which it interpretation of a statute according to the exact and literal import of its words
appears, by context, most would lead to absurdity, it should be construed according to the spirit and
appropriately related reason, disregarding if necessary the letter of the law.

I. INTERPRETATION OF WORDS AND PHRASES In construing statutes, the terms used are generally to be given their ordinary
meaning, that is, such meaning which is ascribed to them when they are
MATUGUINA V. COURT OF APPEALS commonly used, to the end that absurdity in the law must be avoided.
GR NO 98310 OCTOBER 24, 1996
Hence, the term obligations as used in the final clause of the second
paragraph of Section 61 of the PD 705 is construed to mean those obligations
incurred by the transferor in the ordinary course of business. It cannot be
SUMMARY: The petitioner, filed for prohibition, damages and injunction,
construed to mean those obligations or liablities incurred by the transferor as
preventing the respondent, secretary of Dept of Environment and Natural
a result of transgressions of the law, as these are personal obligations of the

1 agreement, license, lease or permit; the transferee has all the qualifications and none
"SEC. 61. Transfers. Unless authorized by the Department Head, no licensee,
of the disqualifications to hold a license agreement, license, lease or permit; there is no
lessee, or permittee may transfer, exchange, sell, or convey his license agreement,
evidence that such transfer or conveyance is being made for purposes of speculation;
license, lease or permit, or any of his rights or interests therein, or any of his assets
and the transferee shall assume all the obligations of the transferor.
used in connection therewith.
The transferor shall forever be barred from acquiring another license agreement,
The licensee, lessee, or permittee shall be allowed to transfer or convey his license
license, lease or permit."
agreement, license, lease, or permit only if he has not violated any forestry law, rule or
regulation; has been faithfully complying with the terms and conditions of the license

1
transferor, and could not have been included in the term obligations absent
any modifying provision to that effect.
ERNESTO V. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. NO. L-52178, AUGUST 24, 1984
SUMMARY: The Court of Industrial Relations dismissed the complaint of
petitioners seeking the payment of their 60% share of the alleged
contractual increase in the share of the planters in the proceeds of
sugarcane milled in respondents' sugar mill during the crop years 1958-59
to 1967-68 and all subsequent crop years to which they (petitioners)
maintain they are entitled under the Sugar Act of 1952 (Republic Act No.
809). The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's decision by adopting in
toto the view of the latter that emergency, non-quota, non-district or
accommodation planters should not be counted in determining the
"majority" required under Section 1 of R.A 809. Although the Appellate
Court made a finding implying that factually such "emergency", "non-
quota", "non-district" or "accommodation" planters had no written contracts
with the Central, it held, however, that said classes planters may not be
considered in finding out the existence of the majority of planters with
written milling contracts within the contemplation of Section 1 of the Act.
The issue revolves solely around the point of whether or not so-called
emergency, non-quota and non-district or accommodation planters should
be counted in determining the majority contemplated in the law. After the
parties had filed their memoranda, respondents filed a motion to dismiss
on the ground that the Court of Appeals decision had long become final
and executory and beyond the Supreme Court's authority to alter or modify,
much less reverse.
The Supreme Court held that: (a) the interests of justice and protection to
labor tenet of the Constitution would be better served if the Court passes
on the merits of the basic claim of petitioners, emphasizing that It will never
deny without due hearing, what could be a manifestly meritorious claim of
labor, whenever the failure to secure a full hearing on the merits of its claim
is caused by a lawyer's obvious lack of acquaintance with a technical point
of procedure contained in a relatively new statute, especially, as in this
case, where the erroneous action of the lawyer was compounded by the
Court of Appeals' own resolution betraying its own oversight of the technical
requirement involved, and because of such action of the Appellate Court,
the prescribed period within which labor may complete its quest for redress
to have run out; (b) after the sugar quota system had ceased, the definition
of planters within the district for the purposes of Section 1, of the Sugar Act
should be all planters who delivered their sugarcane to the respondent
Central who milled the same, hence, as such, they should all be counted
in determining the total number of planters in the sugar district in
ascertaining whether or not a majority of them have written milling contracts
with the respondent Central, and it being ineludably implicit from the record
that on that basis those having written contracts were in the minority so that
R.A. 809 applies to the case at bar; and (c) consequently, respondent
Central is liable to its co-respondent planters for the difference between on
the one hand, what they had paid them during crop years 1958-59 and thru
all succeeding crop years thereafter and on the other, what Section 1
prescribes, and in accordance with Section 9 of the Act, 60% of whatever
the Central is bound to pay the planters to their respective laborers under
the supervision of the Minister of Labor.
STATCON ISSUE:
The limitation to sugar quotas, whether export, domestic or reserve among all
the mills continued only until 1955. From that year, emergency, non-quota,
non-district or accommodation planters came into being with the blessings of
the Sugar Quota Administration. With such a change in situation, it would not
be logical to continue adhering to the previous definitions that had already lost
their legal effect. Consequently, we are of the considered opinion that after
the quota system ceased, the definition of planters within the district for the
purposes of Section 1 of the Sugar Act should be all planters who delivered
their sugarcane to the respondent Central who milled the same. Hence, as
such, they should all be counted in determining the total number of planters in
the sugar district in ascertaining whether or not a majority of them have written
milling contracts with the respondent Central. And it being ineludably implicit
from the record that on that basis those having written contracts were in the
minority. We have no alternative but to hold that Section 1 of Republic Act 809
applies to the case at bar.
AMADORA V. COURT OF APPEALS
GR. NO. L-47745, APRIL 15, 1988
SUMMARY: In April 1972, while the high school students of Colegio de
San Jose-Recoletos were in the school auditorium, a certain Pablito Daffon
fired a gun. The stray bullet hit Alfredo Amadora. Alfredo died. Daffon was
convicted of reckless imprudence resulting in homicide. The parents of
Alfredo sued the school for damages under Article 2180 of the Civil Code
because of the schools negligence.
2

The trial court ruled in favor of Amadora. The trial court ruled that the
principal, the dean of boys, as well as the teacher-in-charge are all civilly
liable. The school appealed as it averred that when the incident happened,
the school year has already ended. Amadora argued that even though the
semester has already ended, his son was there in school to complete a
school requirement in his Physics subject. The Court of Appeals ruled in
favor of the school. The CA ruled that under the last paragraph of Article
2180, only schools of arts and trades (vocational schools) are liable not
academic schools like Colegio de San Jose-Recoletos.
The SC denied the petition.
(1) At the time Alfredo Amadora was fatally shot, he was still in the custody
of the authorities of Colegio de San Jose-Recoletos notwithstanding that
the fourth year classes had formally ended. It was immaterial if he was in
the school auditorium to finish his physics experiment or merely to submit
his physics report for what is important is that he was there for a legitimate
purpose. As previously observed, even the mere savoring of the company
of his friends in the premises of the school is a legitimate purpose that
would have also brought him in the custody of the school authorities;
(2) The rector, the high school principal and the dean of boys cannot be
held liable because none of them was the teacher-in-charge as previously
defined. Each of them was exercising only a general authority over the
student body and not the direct control and influence exerted by the teacher
placed in charge of particular classes or sections and thus immediately
involved in its discipline. The evidence of the parties does not disclose who
the teacher-in-charge of the offending student was. The mere fact that
Alfredo Amadora had gone to school that day in connection with his physics
report did not necessarily make the physics teacher, respondent Celestino
Dicon, the teacher-in-charge of Alfredo's killer;
(3) At any rate, assuming that he was the teacher-in-charge, there is no
showing that Dicon was negligent in enforcing discipline upon Daffon or
that he had waived observance of the rules and regulations of the school
or condoned their non-observance. His absence when the tragedy
happened cannot be considered against him because he was not
supposed or required to report to school on that day. And while it is true
that the offending student was still in the custody of the teacher-in-charge
even if the latter was physically absent when the tort was committed, it has
not been established that it was caused by his laxness in enforcing
discipline upon the student. On the contrary, the private respondents have
proved that they had exercised due diligence, through the enforcement of
the school regulations, in maintaining that discipline;
(4) In the absence of a teacher-in-charge, it is probably the dean of boys
who should be held liable, especially in view of the unrefuted evidence that
he had earlier confiscated an unlicensed gun from one of the students and
returned the same later to him without taking disciplinary action or reporting
the matter to higher authorities. While this was clearly negligence on his
part, for which he deserves sanctions from the school, it does not
necessarily link him to the shooting of Amador as it has not been shown
that the confiscated and returned pistol was the gun that killed the
petitioners' son;
(5) Finally, as previously observed, the Colegio de San Jose-Recoletos
cannot be held directly liable under the article because only the teacher or
the head of the school of arts and trades is made responsible for the
damage caused by the student or apprentice. Neither can it be held to
answer for the tort committed by any of the other private respondents for
none of them has been found to have been charged with the custody of the
offending student or has been remiss in the discharge of his duties in
connection with such custody.
STATCON ISSUE: Whether or not Colegio de San Jose-Recoletos, an
academic school, is liable under Article 2180 of the Civil Code for the tortuous
act of its students.
Yes. The Supreme Court made a re-examination of the provision on the last
paragraph of Article 2180 which provides:
Lastly, teachers or heads of establishments of arts and trades shall be liable for
damages caused by their pupils and students or apprentices so long as they remain in
their custody.
The Supreme Court said that it is time to update the interpretation of the above
law due to the changing times where there is hardly a distinction between
schools of arts and trade and academic schools. That being said, the Supreme
Court ruled that ALL schools, academic or not, may be held liable under the
said provision of Article 2180.
The Supreme Court however clarified that the school, whether academic or
not, should not be held directly liable. Its liability is only subsidiary.
For non-academic schools, it would be the principal or head of school who
should be directly liable for the tortuous act of its students. This is because
historically, in non-academic schools, the head of school exercised a closer
administration over their students than heads of academic schools. In short,
they are more hands on to their students.
For academic schools, it would be the teacher-in-charge who would be directly
liable for the tortuous act of the students and not the dean or the head of
school.
3
The Supreme Court also ruled that such liability does not cease when the
school year ends or when the semester ends. Liability applies whenever the
student is in the custody of the school authorities as long as he is under the
control and influence of the school and within its premises, whether the
semester has not yet begun or has already ended at the time of the happening
of the incident. As long as it can be shown that the student is in the school
premises in pursuance of a legitimate student objective, in the exercise of a
legitimate student right, and even in the enjoyment of a legitimate student
right, and even in the enjoyment of a legitimate student privilege, the
responsibility of the school authorities over the student continues. Indeed,
even if the student should be doing nothing more than relaxing in the campus
in the company of his classmates and friends and enjoying the ambience and
atmosphere of the school, he is still within the custody and subject to the
discipline of the school authorities under the provisions of Article 2180.
At any rate, the REMEDY of the teacher, to avoid direct liability, and for the
school, to avoid subsidiary liability, is to show proof that he, the teacher,
exercised the necessary precautions to prevent the injury complained of, and
the school exercised the diligence of a bonus pater familias.
In this case however, the Physics teacher in charge was not properly named,
and there was no sufficient evidence presented to make the said teacher-in-
charge liable. Absent the direct liability of the teachers because of the
foregoing reason, the school cannot be held subsidiarily liable too.
II. NOSCITER A SOCIIS
CARANDANG V. SANTIAGO
GRN L-8238, MAY 25, 1955
SUMMARY:
The petitioner seeks the help of the Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari
to annul the order of Judge Vicente Santiago suspending the civil case filed
by the petitioner against Tomas Valenton, Sr. and Tomas Valenton, Jr. to
await the result of a criminal case filed by said petitioner against the
defendants.
In his contention, Judge Santiago stated that trial of the civil action must
await the result of the criminal case on appeal. The court anchored its
decision on the contention of the defendants that the plaintiff cannot invoke
article 33 since the defendants were charged with frustrated homicide and
not for physical injuries.
Petitioner invokes Article 33 of the new Civil Code, which is as follows:
"In cases of defamation, fraud, and physical injuries, a civil action for damages,
entirely separate and distinct from the criminal action, may be brought by the injured
party. Such civil action shall proceed independently of the criminal prosecution, and
shall require only a preponderance of evidence."
The SC ruled that the judge committed an error in suspending the trial of the civil
case. Hence, the term physical injuries just like the words defamation and fraud
mentioned in the aforementioned article were used in its generic sense. It does not
pertain to the physical injury stated in the Revised Penal Code, since the defendant
in his attempt to kill the plaintiff caused him bodily injury the court deemed it proper
for the plaintiff to invoke article 33 of the Civil Code.
STATCON ISSUE: Whether the term "physical injuries" used in Article 33
means physical injuries in the Revised Penal Code only, or any physical injury
or bodily injury, whether inflicted with intent to kill or not.
The Article in question uses the words "defamation", "fraud" and "physical
injuries." Defamation and fraud are used in their ordinary sense because there
are no specific provisions in the Revised Penal Code using these terms as
means of offenses defined therein, so that these two terms defamation and
fraud must have been used not to impart to them any technical meaning in the
laws of the Philippines, but in their generic sense. With this apparent
circumstance in mind, it is evident that the term "physical injuries" could not
have been used in its specific sense as a crime defined in the Revised Penal
Code, for it is difficult to believe that the Code Commission would have used
terms in the same article some in their general and another in its technical
sense.
In other words, the term "physical injuries" should be understood to mean
bodily injury, not the crime of physical injuries, because the terms used with
the latter are general terms. In any case the Code Commission recommended
that the civil action for physical injuries be similar to the civil action for assault
and battery in American Law, and this recommendation must have been
accepted by the Legislature when it approved the article intact as
recommended. If the intent has been to establish a civil action for the bodily
harm received by the complainant similar to the civil action for assault and
battery, as the Code Commission states, the civil action should lie whether the
offense committed is that of physical injuries, or frustrated homicide, or
attempted homicide, or even death.
4
CO KIM CHAN V. VALDEZ TAN
GRN L-5, SEPTEMBER 17, 1945
SUMMARY:
Co Kim Chan had a pending civil case, initiated during the Japanese
occupation, with the Court of First Instance of Manila. After the Liberation
of the Manila and the American occupation, Judge Arsenio Dizon refused
to continue hearings on the case, saying that a proclamation issued by
General Douglas MacArthur had invalidated and nullified all judicial
proceedings and judgments of the courts of the Philippines and, without an
enabling law, lower courts have no jurisdiction to take cognizance of and
continue judicial proceedings pending in the courts of the defunct Republic
of the Philippines (the Philippine government under the Japanese).
The SC ordered the respondent judge to take cognizance and continue
final judgment the proceedings in civil case no. 3012 of said court. The
court ruled that It is evident that the Philippine Executive Commission was
a civil government established by military forces and thus a de facto
government of the second kind. Legislative, as well as judicial, acts of de
facto governments, which are not of political complexion, remain valid after
reoccupation. It is presumed that the proclamation of General MacArthur
did not specifically refer to judicial processes thus it has not invalidated all
the judgments and proceedings of the courts during the Japanese regime.
The existence of the courts depend upon the laws which create and confer
upon them their jurisdiction. Such laws, not political in nature, are not
abrogated by a change of sovereignty and continue in force until repealed
by legislative acts. It is thus obvious that the present courts have jurisdiction
to continue proceedings in cases not of political complexion.
STATCON ISSUE: Whether or not the October 23, 1944 proclamation issued
by General MacArthur declaring that all laws, regulations and processes of
any other government in the Philippines than that of the said Commonwealth
are null and void and without legal effect in areas of the Philippines free of
enemy occupation and control has invalidated all judgments and judicial acts
and proceedings of the courts.
The phrase processes of any other government is broad and may refer not
only to the judicial processes, but also to administrative or legislative, as well
as constitutional, processes of the Republic of the Philippines or other
governmental agencies established in the Islands during the Japanese
occupation. Taking into consideration the fact that, as above indicated,
according to the well-known principles of international law all judgements and
judicial proceedings, which are not of a political complexion, of the de facto
governments during the Japanese military occupation were good and valid
before and remained so after the occupied territory had come again into the
power of the titular sovereign, it should be presumed that it was not, and could
not have been, the intention of General Douglas MacArthur, in using the
phrase processes of any other government in said proclamation, to refer to
judicial processes, in violation of said principles of international law.
III. EJUSDEM GENERIS
CORNEJO V. NAVAL
GRN 33642, JULY 30, 1930
SUMMARY:
Miguel R. Cornejo was the municipal president of Pasay, Rizal. Eligio Naval
was the provincial governor, while Jose M. Perez and Celestino de Dios
constitute the provincial board of Rizal. The CFI of Rizal found Cornejo
guilty of the criminal act of falsification of a private document and sentenced
him therefor to one year, eight months, and twenty-one days
imprisonment, to pay a fine of 1,000 pesetas, with subsidiary imprisonment
in case of insolvency, and to suffer the accessory penalties provided by
law. An appeal from this judgment was taken by the accused to the
Supreme Court. Immediately after the conviction in the trial court, the
provincial governor of Rizal filed with the provincial board of that province
an administrative complaint against Cornejo for corruption and improper
conduct unbecoming a public officer. Thereafter, the provincial governor
suspended Cornejo as president of Pasay pending action by the provincial
board on the administrative charges preferred against Cornejo. Aside from
filing an answer and challenging the jurisdiction of the provincial board,
Cornejo did not otherwise defend himself before the board. The provincial
board eventually decided that it had jurisdiction to investigate the charges,
conducted its investigation, and recommended to the Chief of the Executive
Bureau the suspension from the office of Cornejo pending the final
determination by the Supreme Court of his appeal. On the recommendation
of the Chief of the Executive Bureau, the Secretary of the Interior on April
29, 1930, approved the suspension of Cornejo as municipal president of
Pasay, Rizal, for a period of time to extend to the conclusion of his appeal
to the Supreme Court.
The SC ruled that the provincial board acted in excess of jurisdiction. Under
Section 2188 of the Administrative Code, The provincial governor shall
receive and investigate complaints made under oath against municipal
officers for neglect of duty, oppression, corruption, or other form of
5
 maladministration in office. For minor delinquency he may reprimand the
offender; and if a more severe punishment seems to be desirable, he shall
submit written charges touching the matter to the provincial board,
furnishing a copy of such charges to the accused either personally or by
registered mail, and he may in such case suspend the officer (not being the
municipal treasurer) pending action by the board, if in his opinion the
charge be one affecting the official integrity of the officer in question. Where
suspension is thus effected, the written charges against the officer shall be
filed with the board within five days. The SC held that the terms office
officer would limit action to misconduct relating to the office and not
extending to personal misbehavior.
STATCON ISSUE: Whether or not a provincial governor and a provincial
board have the power to suspend a municipal president who has been
convicted for a crime by a trial court.
It is a well-recognized rule of statutory construction and of the law of public
officers that a statute prescribing the grounds for which an officer may be
suspended is penal in nature, and should be strictly construed. Making this
principle the basis of our investigation, it is not possible to reach any other
conclusion than that the prepositional phrase "in office" qualifies the various
grounds for legal suspension. The law says "or other form of maladministration
in office." By the maxim Ejusdem generis, the scope of the word "other" is
limited to that which is of the same kind as its antecedent. Corruption,
therefore, refers to corruption in office.
The crime of which the petitioner was convicted, it will be recalled, was that of
falsification of a private document. As neither the evidence of this case nor the
decision finding the petitioner guilty are before us, it would not be possible to
make any assumptions regarding the facts of the case without prejudging it.
On simply the admitted fact that the petitioner was convicted of the crime of
falsification of a private document, then it becomes evident under the Penal
Code that this crime contrasts sharply with the crime of falsification of a public
document, for a characteristic of the latter crime is the "taking advantage of
his official position"
IV. EXPRESSIO UNIUS EST EXCLUSION ALTERIUS
ESCRIBANO V. AVILA
GRN L-30365, SEPTEMBER 12, 1978
SUMMARY:
On September 25, 1968 Congressman Salipada K. Pendatun, the
governor-elect of Cotabato, filed directly with the Court of First Instance of
that province a complaint for libel against Mayor Jose Escribano of
Tacurong, Cotabato. In that complaint Escribano was charged with having
said in a speech, which was broadcasted on a radio station, that "Mr.
Pendatun is the worst animal that ever live in this province. Escribano
questioned Judge Avila's authority to conduct the preliminary investigation
of the offense. Judge Avila in his orders of March 5, 20 and 27, 1969 ruled
that he had the power to conduct the preliminary investigation. On April 1,
1969 Escribano filed in this Court against Judge Avila and Pendatun the
instant special civil actions of certiorari and prohibition, praying that the said
orders of Judge Avila be set aside. On April 18 Escribano filed a
supplemental petition to annul Judge Avila's order of March 29, 1969. In
that order he found that Pendatun's evidence had "established a probable
cause to believe that" libel by radio had been committed and that Escribano
"probably committed the same". The city fiscal filed an information for libel
against Escribano. Petitioner invokes the provisions of article 360 of the
Revised Penal Code, which were inserted by Republic Act No. 4363, which
do not empower the Court of First Instance to conduct a preliminary
investigation of written defamations.
The SC dismissed the petition. The lawmaking body, by means of that
amendment of Art. 360, never intended to take away the jurisdiction of the
proper Court of First Instance to conduct a preliminary investigation in libel
cases. The amendment merely sought to strip the ordinary municipal court
of its power to hold a preliminary investigation of written defamations. The
fact that the Court of First Instance is not mentioned in Article 360 as a
tribunal that may conduct the preliminary investigation of libel cases would
seem to suggest that it cannot conduct such preliminary investigation,
following the maxim inclusio unius est exclusio alterius (the inclusion of one
thing is the exclusion of another or the enumeration of particular things
excludes the Idea of something else not mentioned.)
However, the maxim inclusio unius est exclusio alterius cannot be applied
in this case because, as shown above, the fact that the Court of First
Instance is not mention in the amendment, as being empowered to conduct
a preliminary investigation in cases of written defamation, has nothing to
do with the purpose of the amendment. It should be stressed that in
construing a law, the court must look to the object to be accomplished, the
evils and mischief sought to be remedied, or the purpose to be subserved,
and it should give the law a reasonable or liberal construction which win
best effect its purpose rather than one which win defeat it. The silence of
article 360 on the power of a judge of the Court of First Instance to conduct
an investigation of criminal actions for written defamations does not
preclude a judge of that court from holding such investigation.
6
 V. DOCTRINE OF LAST ANTECEDENT
PEOPLE V. TAMANI
GRN 22160, JANUARY 21, 1974
SUMMARY:
After the appellant had filed his brief, the Solicitor General filed a motion to
dismiss the appeal on the ground that the notice of appeal was forty-seven
days late. The lower court's decision convicting defendant Tamani was
promulgated on February 14, 1963. He filed his notice of appeal only on
September 10, 1963 or forty eight days from July 24th.
The SC dismissed the appeal on the ground that the judgment of the laws
must become final after the lapse of the period for perfecting an appeal.
Section 22, Rule 122 of the Rules of Court provides that an appeal must
be taken within fifteen (15) days from promulgation or notice of judgment
or order appealed from. The court held that the 15-day period should be
counted from the promulgation and not from receipt of copy of judgment.
The word "promulgation" in Section 6 should be construed as referring to
"judgment" under Section 6 of Rule 120, while the word "notice" should be
construed as referring to "order". That construction is sanctioned by the
rule of reddendo singula singulis. Therefore, when the order denying
appellant's motion for reconsideration was served by registered mail on
July 13th on appellant's counsel, he had only one (1) day within which to
file his notice of appeal and not eleven days. Appellant Tamani's notice of
appeal, filed on September 10, 1963, was fifty-eight days late.
VI. PROVISOS, EXCEPTION, SAVING CLAUSES
PEOPLE V. DIASNES
GRN. L-5606, AUGUST 28, 1952
SUMMARY:
The case is an appeal in a quo warranto proceeding in the CFI. The
petitioner sought to have the defendant, who had been elected municipal
mayor of Dumangas, Iloilo, in the general election, declared ineligible to
that office by reason of a previous conviction for a criminal offenses. The
defendant, was found guilty of estafa but eventually released, he alleged
that he had been granted absolute pardon by the Governor General.
The SC affirmed the decision of the lower court.
STATCON ISSUE: Whether the court below erred in not holding that pardon
does not remove the incapacity or disqualifications as a voter in matters of
convictions of crime against property.
Section 99 of Republic Act No. 180 as amended by Republic Act No. 599,
which provides:
The following persons shall not be qualified to vote:
(a) Any person who has been sentenced by final judgment to suffer one year
or more of imprisonment, such disability not having been removed by plenary
pardon.
(b) Any person who has been declared by final judgment guilty of any crime
against property.
(c) Any person who has violated his allegiance to the Republic of the
Philippines.
(d) Insane or feeble-minded persons.
(e) Person who can not prepare their ballots themselves.
Tthere is no conflict between paragraphs (a) and (b), and paragraph (b) in no
way encroaches upon the pardoning power of the Chief Executive.
Paragraph (b) must be construed in conjunction with paragraph (a). Thus
construed, it modifies that part of paragraph (a) which refers to sentences for
less than a year and not that which refers to the nature of the crime committed.
Paragraph (a) is comprehensive, making no distinction between crimes
against property and other classes of crimes. By the terms of this clause
(paragraph [a]), all persons convicted of crime of whatever nature and
sentenced to one year or more are disqualified to vote.
But it makes two exceptions each of which is independent of the other, to wit:
(1) when the penalty imposed is less than one year and (2) when pardon is
granted. Paragraph (b) qualifies or further limits the first exceptions but not the
second. It creates an exception to the exception of paragraph (a) that persons
sentenced to less than one year may vote. It is not meant to say that conviction
for a crime against property bars the convict from voting irrespective of the
penalty and irrespective of whether or not pardon has been granted.
Construing paragraphs (a) and (b) together, as stated, they should read thus:
Absolute pardon for any crime for which one year of imprisonment or more
was meted out restores the prisoner to his political rights. Where the penalty
is less than one year, disqualification does not attach, except when the crime
committed is one against property, in which case, the prisoner has to have a
pardon, as in the cases provided in paragraph (a), if he is to be allowed to
vote. For illustrations: (1) A was prosecuted for physical injuries and
7
condemned to suffer 10 months imprisonment. Though not pardoned, he is
not, under paragraph (a), disqualified. (2) B was prosecuted for theft and
sentenced to imprisonment for 10 months. Under paragrap (b) he may not
vote unless he is pardoned. (3) C was prosecuted and sentenced to four years
for physical injuries or estafa. C has to be pardoned if he is to exercise the
right of suffrage. This is the class of cases envisaged by paragraph (a); the
nature of the crime is immaterial.
VII. STRICT CONSTRUCTION
PEOPLE V. PURISIMA
GRN L-42050, NOVEMBER 20,1978
FACTS:
These twenty-six (26) Petitions for Review were filed by the People of the
Philippines charging the respective accused with "illegal possession of deadly
weapon" in violation of Presidential Decree No. 9. On a motion to quash filed
by the accused, the three Judges issued an Order quashing or dismissing the
Informations, on a common ground, viz, that the Information did not allege
facts which constitute the offense penalized by Presidential Decree No. 9
because it failed to state one essential element of the crime.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Informations filed by the petitioners are sufficient in form
and substance to constitute the offense of illegal possession of deadly
weapon penalized under PD No. 9.
HELD:
No. The Informations filed by petitioner are fatally defective. The two elements
of the offense covered by P.D. 9(3) must be alleged in the Information in order
that the latter may constitute a sufficiently valid charged. The sufficiency of an
Information is determined solely by the facts alleged therein. Where the facts
are incomplete and do not convey the elements of the crime, the quashing of
the accusation is in order.
In the construction or interpretation of a legislative measure, the primary rule
is to search for and determine the intent and spirit of the law. Legislative intent
is the controlling factor, for whatever is within the spirit of a statute is within
the statute, and this has to be so if strict adherence to the letter would result
in absurdity, injustice and contradictions. Because of the problem of
determining what acts fall within the purview of P.D. 9, it becomes necessary
to inquire into the intent and spirit of the decree and this can be found among
others in the preamble or, whereas" clauses.
It is a salutary principle in statutory construction that there exists a valid
presumption that undesirable consequences were never intended by a
legislative measure, and that a construction of which the statute is fairly
susceptible is favored, which will avoid all objectionable, mischievous,
indefensible, wrongful, evil, and injurious consequences.
PEOPLE V. SUBIDO
GRN L-21734, SEPTEMBER 5, 1975
FACTS:
On September 27, 1958, the accused-appellant filed a motion praying that (1)
the court enter of record that the judgment of the Court of Appeals has been
promulgated and (2) that his appeal bond be cancelled. Accused-appellant
argued that although he could not pay the fine and the indemnity prescribed
in the judgment of the Court of Appeals, he could not be required to serve the
amount of fine and indemnity in the form of subsidiary imprisonment because
said judgment did not expressly and specifically provide that he should serve
the fine and indemnity in form of subsidiary imprisonment in case of
insolvency.
On December 10, 1959, the offended party registered its opposition to
accused-appellant's motion for cancellation of appeal bond and asked the
lower court to require accused-appellant to pay the fine of P500.00 and the
indemnity of P5,000.00 with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency.
The lower court issued an order denying the accused-appellant's motion and
declared in accordance with the terms of the judgment of the Court of Appeals
that the accused-appellant has to suffer subsidiary imprisonment in case he
could not pay the fine and indemnity prescribed in the decision.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the accused-appellant can be required to serve the fine and
indemnity in form of subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency.
HELD:
No. Under Article 355 of the Revised Penal Code "a libel committed by means
of writing, printing, litography, engraving, radio, phonograph, paintings,
theatrical exhibition, cinematographic exhibition or any similar means, shall be
punished by prision correccional in its minimum and medium period or a fine
ranging from 200 to 6000 pesos or both, in addition to the civil action which
may be brought by the offended party". It is evident from the foregoing
provision that the court is given the discretion to impose the penalty of
imprisonment or fine or both for the crime of libel. It will be noted that the lower
court chose to impose upon the accused: three months ofarresto mayor; a fine
of P500.00; indemnification of the offended party in the sum of P10,000.00;
subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency; and the payment of the costs.
8
On the other hand, the Court of Appeals in the exercise of its discretion
decided to eliminate the penalty of three (3) months arresto mayor and to
reduce the indemnity of P10,000.00 to P5,000.00.
A careful scrutiny of the decision of the trial court reveals that the clause "with
subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency" is separated by a comma from
the preceding clause" is hereby sentenced to three months ofarresto mayor
with the accessory penalties of the law, to pay a fine of five hundred (P500.00)
pesos, to indemnify the offended party, Mayor Arsenio Lacson, in the sum of
Ten Thousand Pesos (P10,000.00) pesos." The use of a comma in the part of
the sentence is to make "the subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency"
refer not only to non-payment of the indemnity, but also to non-payment of the
fine.
Fortunately, however, accused-appellant is favored by the retroactive force of
Article 39 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 5465
which exempts an accused person from subsidiary imprisonment in case of
insolvency to pay his civil liability.
It is a well known rule of legal hermeneutics that penal statutes are to be
strictly construed against the government and liberally in favor of the accused.
In the interpretation of a penal statute, the tendency is to give it careful
scrutiny, and to construe it with such strictness as to safeguard the rights of
the defendant. Considering that Article 39 of the Revised Penal Code, as
amended, is favorable to the accused-appellant, the same should be made
applicable to him. Thus applying Article 39 of the Revised Penal Code, as
amended, to the accused-appellant, he cannot also be required to serve his
civil liability to the offended party in form of subsidiary imprisonment in case
of insolvency because this is no longer required by the aforesaid article.
CENTENO V. PORNILLOS
GRN 113092, SEPTEMBER 1, 1994
TOPIC
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION; EXPRESSIO UNIUS EST EXCLUSION
ALTERIUS; CONSTRUED. it is an elementary rule of statutory
construction that the express mention of one person, thing, act, or
consequence excludes all others. This rule is expressed in the familiar maxim
"expressio unius est exclusio alterius." Where a statute, by its terms, is
expressly limited to certain matters, it may not, by interpretation or
construction, be extended to others. The rule proceeds from the premise that
the legislature would not have made specified enumerations in a statute had
the intention been not to restrict its meaning and to confine its terms to those
expressly mentioned.
FACTS:
This petition is an appeal on the decision of the Trial Court convicting Centeno
and Yco for violating P.D. 1564 known as the Solicitation Permit Law when
they both solicited money for the renovation of their chapel without a permit
from the DSWD.
In 1985, the petitioners, officers of Samahang Katandaan ng Nayon ng Tikay,
launched a fund drive for the renovation of their chapel in Bulacan. The
petitioners approached and solicited from Judge Adoracion G. Angeles, a
resident of Tikay, a contribution of P1,500.00. The solicitation was made
without a permit from the Department of Social Welfare and Development
(DSWD). Hon. Angeles filed a complaint against the petitioners for violation of
P.D. 1564 known as the Soliciation Permit Law.
P.D. 1564 provides as follows:
Sec. 2. Any person, corporation, organization, or association desiring to solicit
or receive contributions for charitable or public welfare purposes shall first
secure a permit from the Regional Offices of the Department of Social
Services and Development as provided in the Integrated Reorganization Plan.
In 1992, the trial court found the petitioners guilty of violating the Solicitation
Permit Law. In this instant case, the petitioners assert among others that the
term religious purpose is not expressly included in the provisions of the
statute, hence what the law does not include, it excludes.
Issue: Whether or not the phrase charitable purposes should be construed
in the broadest sense so as to include a religious purpose.
Held/Ratio:
The 1987 Constitution and other statutes treat the words charitable and
religious separately and independently of each other. In P.D. 1564, it merely
stated charitable or public welfare purposes which means that it was not the
intention of the framers of the law to include solicitations for religious
purposes. The world religious purpose is not interchangeable with the
expression charitable purpose. The acts of the petitioners cannot be
punished under the said law because the law does not contemplate solicitation
for religious purposes. The solicitation for religious purposes may be subject
to proper regulation by the State in the exercise of police power. However, in
the case at bar, considering that solicitations intended for a religious purpose
are not within the coverage of Presidential Decree No. 1564, as earlier
demonstrated, petitioner cannot be held criminally liable therefor.
9
The decision appealed from is reversed and set aside, and petitioner Martin
Centeno is acquitted of the offense charged.
To subsume the "religious" purpose of the solicitation within the concept of
"charitable" purpose which under Presidential Decree No. 1564 requires a
prior permit from the Department of Social Services and Development, under
pain of penal liability in the absence thereof, would be prejudicial to petitioner.
Accordingly, the term "charitable" should be strictly construed so as to exclude
solicitations for "religious" purposes. Thereby, we adhere to the fundamental
doctrine underlying virtually all penal legislations that such interpretation
should be adopted as would favor the accused.
For, it is a well-entrenched rule that penal laws are to be construed strictly
against the State and liberally in favor of the accused. They are not to be
extended or enlarged by implications, intendments, analogies or equitable
considerations. They are not to be strained by construction to spell out a new
offense, enlarge the field of crime or multiply felonies. Hence, in the
interpretation of a penal statute, the tendency is to subject it to careful scrutiny
and to construe it with such strictness as to safeguard the rights of the
accused. If the statute is ambiguous and admits of two reasonable but
contradictory constructions, which which operates in favor of a party accused
under its provisions is to be preferred. The principle is that acts in and of
themselves innocent and lawful cannot be held to be criminal unless there is
a clear and unequivocal expression of the legislative intent to make them
such. Whatever is not plainly within the provisions of a penal statute should
be regarded as without its intendment.
VIII. LIBERAL CONSTRUCTION
QUIBUYEN V. COURT OF APPEALS
GRN L-16854, DECEMBER 26, 1963
FACTS:
In this case, the defendants filed three motions but they were denied. On
August 15, 1958, judgment was rendered. On September 29, 1958, they filed
a pleading entitled "Petition for Relief from Judgment", which was denied by
the trial judge on January 5, 1959. On January 10 and 29, 1959 they filed their
notice of appeal and appeal bond, respectively; but the record on appeal was
not registered until February 4, 1959. On February 12, 1959, the plaintiff filed
their opposition to the approval of the defendants' appeal, on the ground that
the order of January 5,1958 and the judgment on the merits of August 15,
1958 are not appealable the latter having already become final and executory.
On April 27, 1959, the Judge issued an Order denying the defendants' appeal,
for the reasons stated in plaintiffs' opposition dated February 12, 1959 and
granted the issuance a writ of execution.
Petitioners, in contending that their petition for certiorari filed with the Court of
Appeals was sufficient invokes Rule 67 which provides that petition is issued
only if the petition is sufficient in form and substance to justify such process.
But the Court of Appeals found that the petition was fatally defective, in the
sense that the necessary supporting papers were not attached with the
petition, and most important, the precise order dated January 5, 1959, which
petitioners sought to annul through said petition. Petitioners contended that
the order of January 5, 1959, the order of the trial judge denying the petition
for relief mentioned or designated in the prayer of the petition, was not the
order which was being assailed, but the order of April 27, 1959, which was
attached as Annex A, to the petition for certiorari and this was the one refusing
to give due course to the appeal from the order denying the petition for relief
filed by the petitioners. Petitioners submit that Annex A, order of the trial court
under date of April 27, 1959, having been actually attached to the petition, it
was no longer necessary for petitioners to attach the other supporting papers,
such as the petition for relief, the opposition thereto, the order denying the
said petition for relief and so forth.
ISSUE:
(1) Whether or not the petition for certiorari filed before the Court of Appeals
is sufficient in form and substance, such that a dismissal by said Court of said
petition on the ground that is "fatally defective is invalid.
(2) Whether or not it is necessary petitioners to attach still "other supporting
papers" since a copy of the order sought be annulled was actually attached to
the certiorari petition, as Annex A.
HELD:
(1) No. The court is satisfied that it is a case of lapsus calami. The mistake
consists in mentioning in the prayer of the petition for certiorari in the Court of
Appeals, that the writ be issued "annulling the aforesaid order of the
respondent Judge of January 5, 1959, and directing the respondent Judge to
give due course to the appeal interposed by the herein petitioners", without a
attaching a copy of said order, but accompanying the said petition, as Annex
A, with a copy of the order of the court dated April 27, 1959. The order of
January 5, 1959 was one denying the petition for relief "for lack of merit" while
order of April 27, 1959 was an order denying the defendants' appeal and
granting the issuance of a writ of execution. The petition mentioned the order
of January 5, 1959 as the order assailed, instead of designating that April 27,
1959, as the order appealed from. It is seen, therefore, that the designation of
the order by date, in the petition was a mistake.
10
(2) No. The query invites a negative answer, because it being a special action
of certiorari, Rule 67 governs, at least, in matter of form of petition. All that the
Rules require is that the petition be verified, the facts be alleged with certainty
and it must pray for the annulment of the judgment order complained of (sec.
1, Rule 67). These requisites were met by the petitioner with the respondent
Court. Granting for the sake of argument, that section 2, Rule 49 is applicable,
the same was also substantially complied with. The copy of the order of April
27, 1959 was filed as (Annex A with the petition, on the date the petition was
presented, and the other pleadings such as the Petition for Relief from
Judgment Annex B), opposition to petition for relief (Annex C) order of the
respondent court denying petition for relief (Annex D), Notice of Appeal
(Annex E), Opposition to Defendants' appeal, and Motion for Execution
(Annex F), with the motion for reconsideration, dated March 14, 1960, of the
order of dismissal of the petition, which served to cure the alleged defect, in
form and substance, of the petition in question. If at all, petitioners were guilty
of a technical violation of procedural requirements, a technicality which does
not seem to be of much moment presently, since the reason for its existence
had been satisfied.
IX. MANDATORY AND DIRECTORY STATUTES
IN RE: GUARINA
GRN 1179, JANUARY, 8, 1913
TOPIC:
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION; ACT NO. 1597; ADMISSION TO
PRACTICE LAW. Whether the word "may" in a statute is to be construed
as mandatory and imposing a duty, or merely as permissive and conferring
discretion, is to be determined in each case from the apparent intention of the
statute as gathered from the context as well as from the language of the
particular provision. The question in each case in whether, taken as a whole
and viewed in the light of surrounding circumstances, it can be said that a
purpose existed on the part of a legislator to enact a law mandatory in its
character.
DOUBTFUL LANGUAGE OF A STATUTE. If there is doubt or uncertainty
as to the meaning of the legislator, if the words of provisions of the statute are
obscure, or if the enactment is fairly susceptible of two or more constructions,
that interpretation will be adopted which will avoid the effect of
unconstitutionality, even though it may be necessary, for this purpose, to
disregard the more usual or apparent import of the language employed. (Black
on Interpretation of Laws, p. 93.
CONSTRUCTION OF THE WORD "MAY," ACT NO 1597. The word "may"
as used in the concluding paragraph of section 2 of Act No. 1597, construed
so as to give it its permissive and not its mandatory effect; and as conferring
a discretion and not as imposing a duty upon the Supreme Court to grant
licenses to the officials mentioned in the Act to practice law in the courts of the
Philippine Islands without taking the examination prescribed by general rule.
FACTS:
Section 2 of Act No. 1597, enacted February 28, 1907, is as follows:
"SEC. 2. Paragraph one of section thirteen of Act Numbered One hundred and ninety,
entitled 'An Act providing a Code of Procedure in Civil Actions and Special Proceedings
in the Philippine Islands,' is hereby amended to read as follows:
"'1. Those who have been duly licensed under the laws and orders of the Islands under
the sovereignty of Spain or of the United States and are in good and regular standing
as members of the bar of the Philippine Islands at the time of the adoption of this code:
Provided, That any person who, prior to the passage of this Act, or at any time thereafter,
shall have held, under the authority of the United States, the position of justice of the
Supreme Court, judge of the Court of First Instance, or judge or associate judge of the
Court of Land Registration, of the Philippine Islands, or the position of Attorney-General,
Solicitor-General, Assistant Attorney-General, assistant attorney in the office of the
Attorney-General, prosecuting attorney for the city of Manila, assistant prosecuting
attorney for the city of Manila, city attorney of Manila, assistant city attorney of Manila,
provincial fiscal, attorney for the Moro Province, or assistant attorney for the Moro
Province, may be licensed to practice law in the courts of the Philippine Islands without
an examination, upon motion before the Supreme Court and establishing such fact to
the satisfaction of said court.'"
The applicant in this case seeks admission to the bar, without taking the
prescribed examination, on the ground that he holds the office of provincial
fiscal for the Province of Batanes.
ISSUE: Whether the applicant is entitled as of right to be admitted without
taking the prescribed examination upon motion before the Supreme Court"
accompanied by satisfactory proof that he has held and now holds the office
of provincial fiscal of the Province of Batanes
HELD:
In the case under consideration, however, it affirmatively appears that the
applicant was not and never had been a practicing attorney in this or any other
jurisdiction prior to the date of his appointment as provincial fiscal, and it
further affirmatively appears that he was deficient in the required qualifications
at the time when he last applied for admission to the bar.
In the light of this affirmative proof of his deficiency on that occasion, we do
not think that his appointment to the office of provincial fiscal is in itself
satisfactory proof of his possession of the necessary qualifications of learning
11
and ability. We conclude therefore that this application for license to practice
in the courts of the Philippines should be denied.
In view, however, of the fact that when he took the examination he fell only
four points short of the necessary grade to entitle him to a license to practice;
and in view also of the fact that since that time he has held the responsible
office of governor of the Province of Sorsogon and presumably gave evidence
of such marked ability in the performance of the duties of that office that the
Chief Executive, with the consent and approval of the Philippine Commission,
sought to retain him in the Government service by appointing him to the office
of provincial fiscal, we think we would be justified under the above-cited
provisions of Act No. 1597 in waiving in his case the ordinary examination
prescribed by general rule, provided he offers satisfactory evidence of his
proficiency in a special examination which will be given him by a committee of
the court upon his application therefore, without prejudice to his right, if he
desires so to do, to present himself at any of the ordinary examinations
prescribed by general rule.
DIZON V. ENCARNACION
GRN L-18615 DECEMBER 24, 1964
TOPIC:
EXCEPTION. Where the libel is published, circulated, displayed, or
exhibited in a province or city wherein neither the offender nor the offended
party resides "the civil and criminal actions may be brought in the court of first
instance thereof."
EXCEPTION IS PERMISSIVE, NOT MANDATORY. The use of the word
"may" in the second sentence of Art. 360 of the Revised Penal Code, as
amended by Republic Act No. 1289, when contrasted with the term "shall" in
the first sentence, clearly suggests that Congress meant the second sentence
to be merely permissive, not mandatory. The provisions to this effect has been
established for the benefit of the offended party, which he may waive.
FACTS:
The plaintiff seeks the review of an order of the CFI, dismissing the complaint.
The plaintiff seeks to recover from the defendant, sum of Php 50,000 by way
of damages allegedly suffered by the consequence of the filing. The defendant
moved to dismiss the case, pursuant to Art. 360 of the Revised penal Code,
as amended by RA. 1289. The motion was granted by the CFI and dismissing
the case.
The appeal hinges on said provision of the Revised Penal Code, as amended
by Republic Act No. 1289, the pertinent part of which reads:
". . . The criminal and civil action for damages in cases of written defamations
as provided for in this chapter, shall be filed - simultaneously or separately
with the court of first instance of the province or city where any of the accused
or any of the offended parties resides at the time of the commission of the
offense: Provided, however, That where the libel is published, circulated,
displayed, or exhibited in a province or city wherein neither the offender nor
the offended party resides the civil and criminal actions may be brought in the
court of first instance thereof: Provided further, at the civil action shall be filed
in the same court where the criminal action is filed and vice versa: Provided,
furthermore, That the court where the criminal action or civil action for
damages is first filed, shall acquire jurisdiction to the exclusion of other courts:
and provided, finally, That this amendment shall not apply to cases of written
defamations, the civil and/or criminal actions to which, have been filed in court
at the time of the effectivity of this law."
which as contended by the defendant, was construed by the lower court to
mean:
". . . that when any of the accused or any of the offended parties resides in a
province or city where a written defamation is published, circularized,
displayed or exhibited, the action, civil or criminal shall be filed simultaneously
or separately with the court of first instance of said province or city; but when
the offender or any of the offenders or the offended party or any of the
offended parties does not reside in a province or city, where the publication,
circulation, display or exhibition were made, such action must be interposed
therein."
ISSUE: Whether the CFI erred in dismissing the case.
HELD:
The Supreme Court ordered the lower court to further proceedings. The
language of the above quoted provision is, to our mind, plain and clear. It
establishes a general rule and an exception thereto. Civil actions for damages
in cases of written defamation "shall" be filed with the court of first instance of
the province or city in which "any of the accused or any of the offended parties
resides." In other words, the plaintiff is limited in his choice of venue to the
court of first instance of his residence or to that of any of the accused. Plaintiff
may not file the action elsewhere, unless the libel is published, circulated,
displayed, or exhibited in a province or city wherein neither the offender nor
the offended party resides, in which case "the civil and criminal actions may
be brought in the court of first instance thereof." The verb "may" is permissive.
Hence, it does not necessarily imply a complete abrogation of the general rule
laid down in the preceding sentence, except in so far as it broadens the two
(2) alternatives therein set forth, by giving the plaintiff a third choice of venue.
12
Although the term "may" should be taken as "must" or "shall," when the
intention of the law maker to give thereto a mandatory or compulsory meaning
is patent or manifest, no such intent appears insofar as the above provision is
concerned. On the contrary, the use of the word "may" in the second sentence
thereof, when contrasted with the term "shall" in the first, clearly suggests that
congress meant the second sentence to be merely permissive, not mandatory.
Indeed, when the libelous imputation has not been published or circulated in
the locality wherein either of the parties resides, the offended party may not
wish to initiate the action therein, for the same would have the effect of giving
additional publicity to the derogatory statements made by the defendant or
defendants, and of increasing the harm already caused to the complainant.
As a consequence, he "may" prefer to file suit where the libel had actually
been published or circulated. Hence, the provision to this effect has been
established, in our opinion, for his benefit, which he may waive.
DE MESA V. MENCIAS
GRN L-24583, OCTOBER 29, 1966
FACTS: Francisco De Mesa and Maximino Argana were opponents for the
mayoralty of Muntinlupa, Rizal in the 1963 elections. De Mesa won the
election and thereafter proclaimed and assumed office. Meanwhile, the
defeated candidate Argana, filed an election protest against De Mesa
charging him of the perpetration of frauds, terrorism and other irregularities in
certain precincts. De Mesa, on the other hand filed a counter-protest and
sought to shift responsibility for irregularities to the protestant and his
followers. However, while the case is pending Mayor De Mesa was
assassinated.
Protestant Argana moved for the constitution of committees on revision of
ballots. Accordingly, the court a quo required the protestee's widow and
children to appear within fifteen days from notice in order to be substituted for
said protestee, if they so desired. They did not, however, comply. Proceeding
ex parte, on June 11, 1964, the protestant Argana reiterated his move for the
appointment of commissioners on revision of ballots,
And so, without notice to the protestee and/or his legal representative as
indeed none had thus far been named the trial court granted the motion
aforesaid. With the constitution of the committee on revision of ballots in
which, incidentally, Ramon Antilon Jr. was motu proprio named and then
served as commissioner for the deceased protestee, the trial court, in its
decision of August 10, 1964 adjudged the protestant Maximino Argana as the
duly elected mayor of Muntinlupa, in the 1963 elections.
De Mesas widow and local chapter of the LP which deceased was member
filed a petition which include among others for the reconsideration of the
August 10, 1964 decision upon the ground that, for failure to order the
protestant to procure the appointment of a legal representative of the
deceased protestee after his widow and children had failed to appear,
pursuant to the applicable provisions of the Rules of Court, it was legally
improper for the trial court to have proceeded ex parte with the election case
The trial court denied the movants' petition for leave to represent the deceased
protestee, and order stricken from the record their motion for reconsideration
and new trial and their cautionary notice of appeal. The movants elevated the
case to CA on a petition for certiorari and mandamus with preliminary
injunction.
ISSUE: WON Sec 17, Rule 3 of the old Rules of Court connotes a directory or
mandatory compliance.
HELD: Yes. The death of the protestee De Mesa did not abate the
proceedings in the election protest filed against him, it may be stated as a rule
that an election contest survives and must be prosecuted to final judgment
despite the death of the protestee. With the death of De Mesa, however,
contingency not expressly provided for by the Revised Election Code was
ushered in.
Nevertheless, precisely by express mandate of Rule 134 of the Rules of Court,
said rules, though not generally applicable to election cases, may however be
applied "by analogy or in a suppletory character and whenever practicable
and convenient."
SEC. 17. Death of party. After a party dies and the claim is not thereby
extinguished, the court shall order, upon proper notice, the legal
representative of the deceased to appear and to be substituted for the
deceased, within a period of thirty (30) days, or within such time as may be
granted. If the legal representative fails to appear within said time, the court
may order the opposing party to produce the appointment of a legal
representative of the deceased within a time to be specified by the court, and
the representative shall immediately appear for and on behalf of the interest
of the deceased. . . . (Rule 3.)
The trial court, it will be recalled in its order of May 6, 1964, required the widow
and children of the deceased protestee to appear and be substituted for and
on his behalf and to protect his interest in the case. But when they failed to
comply at the instance of the protestant, declared said widow and children
nonsuited, proceeded with the case ex parte, and effectively blocked all
attempts at intervention and/or substitution in behalf of the deceased
protestee.
13
It is our considered view that Section 17, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court applies
to election contests to the same extent and with the same force and effect as
it does in ordinary civil actions. And we declare that unless and until the
procedure therein detailed is strictly adhered to, proceedings taken by a court
in the absence of a duly appointed legal representative of the deceased
protestee must be stricken down as null and void.
Considering that, in the case at bar, the trial court failed to order the protestant
to procure the appointment of a legal representative of the deceased protestee
after the latter's widow and children had failed to comply with the court order
requiring their appearance to be substituted in lieu of their predecessor, but
instead in derogation of the precepts of the Rule in question and in the total
absence of a legal representative of the deceased protestee. It is no argument
against this conclusion to contend that the requirement for the procurement of
a legal representative of a deceased litigant is couched in the permissive term
"may" instead of the mandatory word "shall."
While the ordinary acceptations of these terms may indeed be resorted to as
guides in the ascertainment of the mandatory or directory character of
statutory provisions, they are in no wise absolute and inflexible criteria in the
vast areas of law and equity. Depending upon a consideration of the entire
provision, its nature, its object and the consequences that would follow from
construing it one way or the other, the convertibility of said terms either as
mandatory or permissive is a standard recourse in statutory construction.
"Where the statute provides for the doing of some act which is required by
justice or public duty, or where it invests a public body, municipality or public
officer with power and authority to take some action which concerns the public
interest or rights of individuals, the permissive language will be construed as
mandatory and the execution of the power may be insisted upon as a duty"
(Black, Interpretation of Laws, pp. 540-543).
DIOKNO V. REHABILITATION FINANCE CORPORATION
FACTS:
Petitioner, the holder of a back pay certificate of indebtedness issued under
RA 304, sought to compel Respondent Company to accept his back pay
certificate as payment of his loan from the latter. His basis was Sec. 2 of RA
304, which provides that investment funds or banks or other financial
institutions owned or controlled by the government shall subject to availability
of loanable funds accept or discount at not more than two per centum
per annum for ten years such certificate for certain specified purposes.
Respondent company contended however that the word shall used in this
particular section of the law is merely directory. The lower court sustained
Respondent Company.
ISSUE:
W/N Petitioner can use his back pay certificate to pay for his loan to
Respondent company.
HELD:
No. It is true that in its ordinary signification, the word shall is imperative.
However, the rule is not absolute; it may be construed as may when required
by the context or by the intention of the statute. The modifier, at not more
than two per centum per annum for ten years., the interest to be charged,
that the verb phrase is mandatory because not only the law uses at not more
but the legislative purpose and intent, to conserve the value of the back pay
certificate for the benefit of the holders, for whose benefit the same have been
issued, can be carried out by fixing a maximum limit for discounts. But as to
when the discounting or acceptance shall be made, the context and the sense
demand a contrary interpretation. If the acceptance or discount of the
certificate is to be subject to the condition of the availability of loanable
funds, it is evident the legislature intended that the acceptance shall be
allowed on the condition that there are available loanable funds. In other
words, acceptance or discount is to be permitted only if there are loanable
funds.
X. PROSPECTIVE AND RETROACTIVE EFFECT OF
STATUTES
FERRER V. PECSON
GRN L-5221, OCTOBER 27, 1952
FACTS:
On March 1, 1949, the petitioner Benito Ferrer Y Rodriguez was accused
before the municipal court of Manila of serious physical injuries through
reckless imprudence in the said court. After trial, the Municipal Court of Manila
found him guilty and sentenced him to three (3) months of arresto mayor.
Defendant appealed the case to the Court of First Instance of Manila.
Petitioner through counsel filed a motion to dismiss the case on the ground
that the Municipal Court of Manila had no jurisdiction over the offense and,
consequently, the Court of First Instance had no appellate jurisdiction.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Municipal Court of Manila had jurisdiction over the offense.
HELD:
No. The jurisdiction of the court to try a criminal case is to be determined by
the law at the time of the institution of the action. Sec. 67 of the Revised Motor
Vehicle Law and not under the Revised Penal Code. The criminal jurisdiction
of a justice of the peace or a municipal court as defined in the Judiciary Act of
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1948 is confined to offenses in which the penalty is not more than six (6)
months. From this it is clear that the Municipal Court of Manila had no
jurisdiction over this case where a maximum penalty of six (6) years may be
imposed; and if it had no original jurisdiction, the Court of First Instance
presided over by Judge Pecson had likewise no appellate jurisdiction.
It is true that section 67 of the Revised Motor Vehicle Law was amended by
section 16 of Republic Act No. 587, in the sense that acts of negligence or
reckless or unreasonably fast driving resulting in death or serious bodily injury
upon any person shall be prosecuted and punished under the provisions of
the Revised Penal Code. But this act may not be given retroactive effect so
as to confer on the municipal court jurisdiction which it did not have when it
tried and decided the case against petitioner. It may be true that the provisions
of the penal code are more favorable to the petitioner in this case as regards
the penalty, but when the very accused, herein petitioner, far from invoking
the benefits of said Republic Act No. 587, disregards it and instead, invokes
the Revised Motor Vehicle Law which was in force at the time that the acts
imputed to him were committed, at least for that reason alone the question of
retroactivity cannot and will not be considered.
HELD:
Resolution No. 27 prevails over the contract stipulations. Section 3 of RA 2264
of the Local Autonomy Act empowers a Municipal Council to adopt zoning and
subdivision ordinances or regulations for the Municipality. Section 12 or RA
2264 states that implied power of the municipality should be liberally
construed in its favour, to give more power to the local government in
promoting economic conditions, social welfare, and material progress in the
community. This is found in the General Welfare Clause of the said act.
Although non-impairment of contracts is constitutionally guaranteed, it is not
absolute since it has to be reconciled with the legitimate exercise of police
power, e.g. the power to promote health, morals, peace, education, good
order or safety and general welfare of the people. Resolution No. 27 was
obviously passed in exercise of police power to safeguard health, safety,
peace and order and the general welfare of the people in the locality as it
would not be a conducive residential area considering the amount of traffic,
pollution, and noise which results in the surrounding industrial and commercial
establishments.
Decision dismissing the complaint of Ortigas is AFFIRMED.

ORTIGAS & CO. V. FEATI BANK

GRN L-24670, DECEMBER 14, 1979

FACTS:
On March 4, 1952, Ortigas sold Lot 5 and 6, Block 31 of the Highway Hills
Subdivision at Mandaluyong to Augusto Padilla y Angeles and Natividad
Angeles. The latter transferred their rights in favour of Emma Chavez, upon
completion of payment a deed was executed with stipulations, one of which is
that the use of the lots are to be exclusive for residential purposes only. This
was annotated in the Transfer Certificate of Titles No. 101509 and 101511.
Feati then acquired Lot 5 directly from Emma Chavez and Lot 6 from Republic
Flour Mills. On May 5, 1963, Feati started construction of a building on both
lots to be devoted for banking purposes but could also be for residential use.
Ortigas sent a written demand to stop construction but Feati continued
contending that the building was being constructed according to the zoning
regulations as stated in Municipal Resolution 27 declaring the area along the
West part of EDSA to be a commercial and industrial zone. Civil case No.
7706 was made and decided in favour of Feati.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Resolution number 27 declaring Lot 5 and 6 to be part of an
industrial and commercial zone is valid considering the contract stipulation in
the Transfer Certificate of Titles.

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