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IN THE
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA
INDIANAPOLIS DIVISION
Introductory Statement
1. The Indiana Sex Offender Registration Act (SORA), Ind. Code 11-8-8-1, et seq.,
requires certain offenders to register with local law enforcement as a sex or violent offender
where they live, work, or attend school. At the time of registration, the individual must
provide, inter alia, personal identifying information, information concerning his or her
vehicle, information concerning internet identifiers, and [a]ny other information required
re-register at least annually and must also register if any of his or her registration
information changes. Ind. Code 11-8-8-11, 14. Local law enforcement must also visit
an individual either every ninety days or annually, Ind. Code 11-8-8-13, the individual
must maintain a valid drivers license or identification card, Ind. Code 11-8-8-15, and
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the individual is prohibited from petitioning for a name change, Ind. Code 11-8-8-16. An
Scott Rushis subject to more stringent requirements in several respects (Ind. Code 35-
plaintiffsis also limited in where he may live (Ind. Code 35-42-4-11) and where he
may work (Ind. Code 35-42-4-10). And an individual classified as a so-called serious
sex offenderincluding, again, all three plaintiffsis statutorily prohibited from even
2. In Wallace v. State, 905 N.E.2d 371 (Ind. 2009), the Indiana Supreme Court held that
prior to the enactment of that statute violated the ex post facto clause of the Indiana
Constitution, Ind. Const. art. 1, 24. The defendants generally follow this directive with
respect to individuals convicted of sex or violent offenses in Indiana who have never been
required to register in another state, although they may require that these persons formally
petition a court (or take other affirmative steps) before removing them from the registry.
virtue of having been convicted in that state or by virtue of having traveled to that state
person moves or returns to Indiana, even though registration could not have been required
had they never left the state. This interpretation of the ex post facto clause of the Indiana
Constitution is supported by two recent decisions of the Indiana Supreme Court. See Tyson
v. State, 51 N.E.3d 88 (Ind. 2016); State v. Zerbe, 50 N.E.3d 368 (Ind. 2016).
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3. Each of the plaintiffs was convicted of an out-of-state sex offense before the enactment of
they were convicted. Following the enactment of SORA, they were each released from
prison and moved to Indiana. In Indiana, the plaintiffs have now been informed that they
will be required to register as a sex or violent offender for the rest of their lives. This is so
even though they would not be required to register at all if they had been convicted in
Indiana and never left the state. This places an unjustified burden on the plaintiffs right
United States Constitution, and is unconstitutional. To the extent that the plaintiffs are
required to register as sex or violent offendersand are subjected to the numerous burdens
that that designation entailsbut a similarly situated individual who has never left Indiana
is not, this classification is also irrational and violates the Equal Protection Clause of the
4. Finally, the plaintiffs sex offenses were committed before the enactment of SORA. The
burdens imposed by Indiana law are punitive in effect, and SORA therefore violates the ex
post facto clause of the United States Constitution, U.S. Const. art. I, 10, cl. 1.
7. Declaratory relief is authorized by Rule 57 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and 28
8. This action is brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 1983 to redress the deprivation, under color
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Parties
12. The Commissioner of the Indiana Department of Correction is the duly appointed
13. The Delaware County Prosecutor is the duly elected prosecutor of Delaware County, and
14. The Delaware County Sheriff is the duly elected sheriff of Delaware County, and is sued
15. The Pulaski County Prosecutor is the duly elected prosecutor of Pulaski County, and is
16. The Pulaski County Sheriff is the duly elected sheriff of Pulaski County, and is sued in his
official capacity.
Factual Allegations
Indianas Sex Offender Registration Act and the Indiana Sex and Violent Offender Registry
17. Indianas Sex Offender Registration Act (SORA), currently codified at Indiana Code
18. Although several amendments have been made to SORA over the years, in its current form
the statute imposes numerous burdens and obligations on individuals required to register
as sex or violent offenders. These include, but are not limited to, the following:
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b. The individual must re-register at least annually and must also register if any of his
or her registration information changes. Ind. Code 11-8-8-11, 14.
c. Local law enforcement must visit the individual either every ninety days or
annually. Ind. Code 11-8-8-13.
d. The individual must maintain a valid drivers license or identification card. Ind.
Code 11-8-8-15.
e. The individual is prohibited from petitioning for a name change. Ind. Code 11-
8-8-16.
19. Indiana law also imposes additional burdens on persons convicted of specified offenses.
For instance, a person who meets the statutory definition of an offender against children
may not work or volunteer at, or reside within 1,000 feet of, school property, a youth
program center, or a public park. Ind. Code 35-42-4-10, 11. A person who meets the
statutory definition of a serious sex offender may not enter school property. Ind. Code
35-42-4-14. And a person who meets the statutory definition of a sexually violent
20. In Wallace v. State, 905 N.E.2d 371 (Ind. 2009), the Indiana Supreme Court held that
prior to the enactment of that statute violated the ex post facto clause of the Indiana
21. Under Indiana law, the DOC is responsible for determining the registration status of
persons in Indiana who have been convicted of sex or violent offenses. In compliance with
the Wallace decision, the DOC does not require persons to register whose offenses
occurred at a time when they did not require registration and who have never left Indiana,
although it may require that these persons formally petition a court (or take other
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22. However, if a person travels temporarily to another state and is required to register as a sex
offender under the laws of that jurisdiction, the DOC requires that that person register as a
sex or violent offender upon his return to Indiana, even if he would not be required to
register had he never left Indiana. Depending on the offense of which that person was
convicted, he might then be required to register for ten years or for the rest of his life.
23. The upshot of the DOCs registration policy and the recent decisions of the Indiana
Supreme Court in Tyson and Zerbe, therefore, is that, if two persons are convicted of an
identical offense at a time when this offense did not require registration under Indiana law,
and one of those persons thereafter travels in interstate commerce but the other does not,
only one of these persons will now be required to register by the DOCthe individual who
Patrick Rice
24. In 1989, Patrick Rice was charged with and convicted of aggravated criminal sexual assault
in Illinois.
25. As a result of this conviction, Mr. Rice was sentenced to twenty-five years in the Illinois
prison system.
26. While Mr. Rice was convicted of other Illinois offenses contemporaneously with his
conviction for aggravated criminal sexual assault, and while he was convicted of unlawful
possession of a weapon in a penal institution shortly after his incarceration, other than his
conviction of aggravated criminal sexual assault he has not been convicted of an offenses
27. Mr. Rices last conviction for any offense occurred in 1990.
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28. On June 26, 2017, Mr. Rice was released from the Danville Correctional Center in
Danville, Illinois. He was not placed on probation, parole, or any other type of supervised
release.
29. When Mr. Rice was released from prison, he had few if any resources and no place to live
in Illinois. His closest relative was his sister, who lives in Madison County, Indiana. He
therefore decided that, upon his release, he would move in with his sister in Indiana until
30. When Mr. Rice was released from prison, he was informed that he was required to promptly
register as a sex offender under Illinois law. He therefore registered in Danville, Illinois,
where he informed authorities that he intended to move to Indiana that day. The Illinois
authorities informed him that, under Illinois law, he would be required to register for ten
31. On June 26, 2017, Mr. Rice therefore moved to Madison County, Indiana, to live with his
sister. He promptly registered as a sex offender upon his arrival in Madison County, and
was informed that under Indiana law he would be required to register for the remainder of
his life.
32. Mr. Rice resided with his sister in Madison County for approximately two months. While
living in Madison County, he met his partner and decided to move in with that individual
September of 2017, and he promptly registered with officials there. Mr. Rice has continued
to reside in Delaware County since that time, and has ensured that his registration is kept
current.
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33. Mr. Rice has therefore registered as a sex offender in Indiana and has been subjected to the
other requirements of Indianas SORA. This is so even though, as a result of the Wallace
decision and the DOCs policy, he would not be required to register under Indiana law if
he had been convicted in Indiana and had thereafter never left the state.
34. Given his offense and the requirement that he register, the DOC has determined that Mr.
serious sex offender under Indiana law, and he is therefore subject to the additional
Adam Bash
35. In 1990, Adam Bash was charged with a sex offense in Kentucky. He was convicted of
that offense in late 1990 and sentenced to a term of imprisonment in early 1991. The
underlying offense itself, however, occurred in the mid-1980s, when Mr. Bash was in his
36. As a result of this conviction, Mr. Bash served time in the Kentucky prison system,
although for most of the time that he was incarcerated he was assigned to a mental health
37. Following his release from prison, Mr. Bash first lived for a short period of time with his
remained for only a few months. While he resided in Cincinnati, Ohio, Mr. Bash was
informed by local officials that he was required to register as a sex offender for ten years,
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38. In 1999 or 2000, Mr. Bash moved to Indiana. While Mr. Bash has resided in several
different Indiana counties since moving to the state, in 2012 he moved to Muncie (in
Delaware County), and he has resided in Muncie continuously since that time.
39. After he moved to Muncie, Mr. Bash was informed by officials with the Delaware County
Sheriffs Office that, insofar as he moved following the enactment of SORA, he was
required to register as a sex or violent offender in Indiana for the rest of his life. He has
40. Other than his 1990/91 conviction in Kentucky for an offense that occurred in the mid-
1980s, Mr. Bash has not been convicted of any offense that qualifies as a sex or violent
offense under Indiana law. He does have two Indiana convictions for offenses that do not
qualify as sex or violent offenses under Indiana law. While he is currently on probation
for the latter of these two convictions, he is not required to register as a sex or violent
41. Mr. Bash has therefore registered as a sex offender in Indiana and has been subjected to
the other requirements of Indianas SORA. This is so even though, as a result of the
Wallace decision and the DOCs policy, he would not be required to register under Indiana
law if he had been convicted in Indiana and had thereafter never left the state.
42. Given his offense and the requirement that he register, the DOC has determined that Mr.
Bash qualifies as an offender against children. Because the DOC has determined that
the Kentucky statutes that Mr. Bash was convicted of violating are the equivalent of child
molesting and vicarious sexual gratification under Indiana law, it appears that the DOC has
also determined that he qualifies as a serious sex offender, although Mr. Bash has never
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been specifically informed that this is the case. He is thus subject to the additional
Scott Rush
43. In 1992, Scott Rush was charged with and convicted of a sex offense in Florida.
44. As a result of this conviction, Mr. Rush was sentenced to a term of imprisonment in the
Florida state prison system. He was released from prison in July of 1995.
45. After his release from prison, Mr. Rush was placed on probation for ten years. This term
of probation expired in 2005 and he has not been on probation, parole, or any other form
46. While he resided in Florida, Mr. Rush registered as a sex offender as required under state
47. Mr. Rush has not been charged with or convicted of any criminal offense since 1992, nor
48. Mr. Rush has worked for the same company for approximately 15 years. However, in 2017
it was determined that the office where he worked in Florida would be closed. He was
49. Mr. Rush and his familyhis wife and his daughtertherefore moved from Florida to
Pulaski County, Indiana in June 2017. Mr. Rush has resided in Pulaski County since that
time, and his wife has since given birth to a second daughter.
50. Upon moving to Indiana, Mr. Rush promptly visited the office of the Pulaski County
Sheriff, where he was informed that he was required to register as a sex offender and that
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51. Mr. Rush has therefore registered as a sex offender in Indiana and has been subjected to
the other requirements of Indianas SORA. This is so even though, as a result of the
Wallace decision and the DOCs policy, he would not be required to register under Indiana
law if he had been convicted in Indiana and had thereafter never left the state.
52. Given his offense and the requirement that he register, the DOC has determined that Mr.
serious sex offender under Indiana law, and he is therefore subject to the additional
53. The application of Indianas SORA to the plaintiffs thus imposes a burden on them for
54. There is no rational justification for treating the plaintiffs differently than an offender who
has never left Indiana, and who is therefore not required by the DOC to register as a sex or
violent offender.
56. The defendants have, at all times, acted or refused to act under color of state law.
57. As a result of the actions of the defendants, the plaintiffs are suffering irreparable harm for
Legal Claims
58. As applied to the plaintiffs, Indianas Sex Offender Registration Act (Ind. Code 11-8-8-
1, et seq.) violates the right to travel protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
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59. As applied to the plaintiffs, Indianas Sex Offender Registration Act (Ind. Code 11-8-8-
1, et seq.) violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United
States Constitution insofar as a similarly situated individual who never leaves Indiana is
60. As applied to the plaintiffs, Indianas Sex Offender Registration Act (Ind. Code 11-8-8-
1, et seq.) violates the ex post facto clause of the United States Constitution.
2. Declare that the defendants have violated and continue to violate the rights of the plaintiffs
3. Issue a preliminary injunction, later to be made permanent, prohibiting the defendants from
4. Award the plaintiffs their costs and attorneys fees pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 1988.
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