Chapter

13

A Berber Spring: the breakthrough of Amazigh minorities in the

uprisings aftermath

Cleo Jay

Introduction
Since the start of the Arab Spring' in late 2010, much has been written about the uprisings

that swept through North Africa. However, the role of Amazigh1 militants in the demonstrations

and their early support for popular contestation movements were barely acknowledged, despite

the distinctive flags and banners used throughout the region2. Those symbols both sought to

assert their separate identity and to challenge the narrative of the Arab Spring as a uniform

phenomenon caused by similar circumstances in different states. In several countries, beyond

the socio-economial difficulties, the protests have revealed cultural claims3 from populations

refusing the assimilation to Arab culture. The Amazigh cultural movement has become

increasingly influent and organised in the last decade, in particular with the development of the

Internet, which has enabled it to become a truly transnational movement incorporating

Amazigh minorities as well as the diaspora. This movement is difficult to define: it is composed

of a multitude of cultural and (increasingly) political associations spread in various states and

aiming at different goals. While some seek to promote the use of Amazigh languages and

associated traditions, others have political ambitions and claim that Amazigh minorities are
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deprived of their basic constitutional rights4. The former tend to keep strong links with the rural

communities constituting the majority of Amazigh dialects speakers5; the latter on the opposite

are generally urban and educated, with ties to the international diaspora.

The Arab Spring has brought to light the new sense of cohesion in Amazigh activists from

different states, and their desire to engage in contentious politics as part of a separate political

current based on their perceived ethnic belonging. This increasing visibility of Amazighit and

its claim to represent a specific minority group obliges us to consider several issues: what are

the demands of Berber activists in the aftermath of the uprisings? Is the concept of a

transnational Amazigh identity a historical reality or a political construction? How is the

growing political prominence of this movement affecting the wider politics of the region? What

is the significance of their engagement with contentious politics?

This paper looks at the development of this movement in the pre and post-Arab Spring era,

during which it is making renewed political demands for recognition and trying to establish

itself as a political force. It also analyses the claim for a uniform Amazigh identity and the

concept of Tamazgha as an Amazigh, indigenous North Africa. Finally, it looks at the risk of co-

optation of this movement both by regimes seeking to promote it to counter-balance the rise of

Islamism in the region, and by foreign agencies.

Contextual background: the birth of an Amazigh consciousness in post-Independence

North Africa
While Amazigh minorities are often deemed to be the original, indigenous inhabitants of

North Africa with roots going back to the Punic empires, the concept of an Amazigh identity

(Amazighit is often used by activists), is quite recent. The word Amazigh itself is controversial:

it is more appropriately reserved for references to Berber militants6. In fact, both Berber and

Amazigh are labels that remain alien for a large part of those populations, who rather describe

themselves as part of a specific tribe as well as belonging to the Muslim ummah7. The Amazigh

movement represents thus both a will to define itself away for the derogatory image associated
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to the French word Berbre (from the latin barbarus), and an elitist group, remaining largely

inaccessible to the very people it claims to empower.

It is important to note that the first distinctions between Berber and Arab populations

were made by the French colons in Algeria, and then in Morocco. Rural Amazigh communities

were perceived as sharing Western ideals, and the French policy was to try to co-opt them as

allies in a bid to divide the population. The Berber decree of 1930 stated that Berber minorities

should not be subject to Islamic Law, and would thus receive a privileged status from the

colonial authorities. The aim was to remove those minorities from the authority of the Sultan,

and to artificially separate North Africans in two groups: one which was perceived as friendlier,

therefore easier to subdue, and one which was considered an enemy8. This decree caused

uproar amongst the population and this policy backfired in many ways, prompting the colonized

populations to ally against French imperialism through a unified Arab/ Berber coalition9.

The roots of the distinction between Berber and Arab are inherently political: it was first a

strategy of the French colons to divide and conquer, and in the post-colonial era, it became a

means of resistance against the standardisation of identity and culture through Arabisation and

globalisation 10 . Although Berberophones represent large minorities (estimated to 40% in

Morocco, 20 to 25% in Algeria11, although numbers vary), they were sidelined in the post-

Independence era as leaders sought to unite the region by re-affirming its Arab, Muslim identity,

which was perceived as being the anti-thesis of what the West stood for. The Arab League

(created in 1945) and the Committee for the Liberation of the Arab Maghreb (1947) both aimed

to unite colonized North African states around shared values and to facilitate their freedom by

reaffirming their belonging to the Arab world, and by extension to the Muslim ummah. Pan-

Arabic ideology was perceived as a challenge to colonialism and its Berberism projections12,

thus an ideal tool for those nations to re-affirm their identity after decades of settlement.

While anthropological studies up to the 1970s, such as that of Ernest Gellner, didnt record

any Amazigh consciousness13, there has been a clear shift in the last three decades, with
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activists increasingly creating ties with each other to address issues of alienation and lack of

autonomy across borders. Mohammed Chafik, figure of the moderate current Amazigh

movement in Morocco, describes a growing awareness of a racist aspect of pan Arabism,

through which Arab nationalists considered themselves superior to ethnic Muslim groups14.

Mehdi Ben Barka, Moroccan left-wing political leader assassinated in 1965, resumes the

situation: The Berber is simply someone who hasnt gone to school15. While French and

Classical Arabic were spoken by the countrys urban elites, Amazigh languages (as well as

colloquial darija to some extent) were considered to be local dialects of low prestige. The

Berberophone man was inherently Other, illiterate, and unable to participate in the post-

colonial building of the State. The privileged status of the urban Arabic speakers, in particular of

the fassi notables16, led to much resentment; in fact, the two attempted coups against Hassan II

in the early 1970s were perceived as being a Berber challenge17 because some of the officers

responsible were of Berber descent.

Two important events marked the switch of Berberism from a localised cultural movement

to a political, or militant one: first, the Algerian Berber Spring in April-May 1980, which

erupted after the cancellation of a conference dedicated to Kabyle poetry, perceived as a sign of

the regimes hostility towards the Kabyle community. It represented the first popular protest

post-Independence and was violently repressed, but it was successful in terms of breaking the

taboos surrounding Amazigh identity. For the first time, Amazigh minorities asked for their

culture and languages to be officially recognised, and challenged the legitimacy of the State in

terms of defining Algerian collective identity and memory.

Secondly, the Charter of Agadir, signed in 1991 by a number of Amazigh cultural

associations, which is a concerted document calling for a number of new measures aiming to

protect Amazigh dialects by allowing them to be taught in schools, and by the creation of

Amazigh media and cultural institutes in the region. The contentious politics exercised by the

Berber movement both in Algeria and Morocco, conducted outside of political opposition and
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benefitting from an important support amongst Amazigh communities, was successful in that it

obliged North African leaders to acknowledge that the pan-Arab model promoted since

Independence had not been fully successful. In his 1994 speech, King Hassan II, in a context of

growing tensions with Amazigh activists, declared: There is not one of us who cannot be sure

that there is in his dynasty, blood or body a small or large amount of cells which came from an

origin which speaks one of Moroccos dialects18. Those two events led to the collaborations

between Algerian and Moroccan Berbers, creating a sense of community and solidarity.

In the last decade, the focus of the Berberism movement has shifted from a multicultural

stance, seeking inclusion in the states discourses on identity, towards a more political, more

aggressive position, hostile to the Arabo-Muslim conception of the nation19. Essentially, radical

Berberism calls for a return to a pre-colonial, pre-Islamic Tamazgha, free from Arab influence.

The discourse of Amazigh militants relies on a negation of the process of mtissage20 since the

7th century between local populations and waves of migrants from the Gulf.

Thus, to answer what they perceive as Arab hegemony, Amazigh activists have constructed a

homogeneous Amazigh identity, as hegemonic as the Arab one and denying the particularities of

each specific group, such as the Kabyles in Algeria or the Siwa in Egygt. This includes the

creation of a unique language, Tamazight, which they have established as a Modern standard

Berber at the expense of the Berber dialects actually spoken by indigenous populations, in a

similar way to Modern standard Arabic being taught at the expense of regional vernaculars.

These issues are controversial amongst the Amazigh community. When King Mohammed VI

announced the creation of the IRCAM 21 institute in 2001, the news was received with

apprehension. While for some this reflected the opening up of the regime and its will to

recognize all its citizens equally, others denounced it as a tool to co-opt the growing Amazigh

movement. The adoption of the tifinagh alphabet also led to heated debate, as many activists, in

particular online, used French characters to transcribe their language. While the urban Amazigh

elite, led by Mohamed Chafik (author of the Berber Manifesto) welcomed those developments,
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local organisations such as Tilleli refused to take part in the IRCAMs activities and chose to

remain outside of state-approved contention. Silverstein and Crawford note that the

establishment of IRCAM has arguably exacerbated the fragmentation of not only the Amazigh

movement, but also Moroccan oppositional politics in general22.

Although the political Berberist movement as such is recent and has mainly developed in

reaction to what they perceived to be pan-Arab hegemony, it is important to look at Berber

identity politics in a wider context. Commentators have talked about an Amazigh Renaissance

for years before the Arab Spring, supported by the flourishing of events and websites dedicated

to Amazigh cultures and Berberism. Authors, poets and artists have sought to affirm themselves

as Berbers since the early days of the 20th century23, in answer to the French authorities trial to

define their community from outside. Since then, cultural productions have often been used as

a medium to both promote and preserve Amazigh languages, traditions and history, without

directly threatening regimes through political means. In particular, there has been a resurgence

of performance, poetry and literature in Amazigh dialects, facilitated by the adoption of the

standard tifinagh alphabet in Morocco, and thus the development of a new educated audiences.

Theatre is a powerful social tool and has been used to revive pre-colonial traditions of public

storytelling; several theatre troupes now perform in an Amazigh language, mainly in Morocco

and Algeria. The work of popular Algerian playwright Kateb Yacine, who was assassinated

during the Black decade24 is very interesting in this respect, as it tried to fuse a Western

tradition of theatre with Kabyle ancestral performance practices and language.

While these cultural events were previously observed locally, highlighting the diversity of

the people who fall under the Berber category, the last two decades has seen an uniformisation

of the Amazigh movement, seeking to affirm its unity. Sidney Tarrow speaks of several factors

facilitating the formation of transnational movements in the modern era, such as globalisation

and the new means of communication, and the universalisation of culture25. These social

changes are easily observable in North Africa, and the Amazigh movement has grown
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exponentially with increased access to new means of communication, which has allowed them

to not only connect to each other, but also to establish links with other minorities such as the

Basques in Spain and the Native Americans.

The North African youth is particularly active on the Internet, as attest the many Internet

cafs that opened in urban areas and small towns over the last two decades. Those websites

have greatly contributed to the rising awareness of a transnational Amazigh community, with

people from different areas sharing similar values and a common history, and members of the

diaspora play a very important role. Daniela Merolla speaks of a landscape of group identity

which counters cultural and political marginalisation and takes form thanks to the social

formation of Berber intellectuals and groups26. The educated elite, both in North Africa and in

the diaspora is behind a revival of Amazigh languages, with a wealth of literature and research

disseminated online as well as a number of new TV channels, newspapers and other media

addressing the needs of Amazigh populations. Although written material can only be accessed

by a small minority able to read the tifinagh script, they are contributing to the newly found

prestige of Tamazight as a lingua franca.

From the Arab Spring to a Berber Summer: a turning point

In both Western and Arab media, the popular uprisings of 2010-2011 were systematically

described as Arab Spring, affecting the Arab world as if it were a monolithic, homogeneous

group. Although this expression seeks to highlight the common causes that led to similar

protests in different countries, it also hides an important factor: that of North Africas deep

identity crisis, heightened by both Islamism and the increasing visibility of Amazigh minorities.

This official narrative is particularly threatened by the idea of a transnational Amazigh group,

which deeply challenges the construction of North Africas collective identity and national unity

around the two tenets of Arabic and Islam in the post-colonial era. According to Ben Nefissa,

identity claims reveal the failure of the historical construction of national unity, and demand its

renegociation.27. Not only does the Amazigh movement as a whole call for specific reforms
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regarding language and regionalisation, it envisions a radically different society: it seeks to re-

fashion the identity of North African states, to rewrite their history, and fundamentally change

the basis of collective life there. 28 Amazigh activists have been increasingly engaging in

contentious politics in recent years, and they thus naturally joined protests against leaders such

as Ben Ali and Gaddafi, both perceived as hostile to the Berber cause. There have been several

violently repressed demonstrations in the last decade, but most received little media attention

and were a response to local issues: members of association Tilelli were arrested in Morocco in

2004; protests are organised every year in Algeria to commemorate the Berber Spring, often

ending in clashes with the authorities; in Libya in 2010, the Buzkhar brothers were arrested for

allegedly promoting Amazigh culture. On the opposite, the Arab Spring engaged a large part of

the North African population around issues (socio-economic, political and cultural) that were a

concern for many.

One of the most successful aspects of the involvement of Amazigh activists in the Arab

spring popular uprisings was their capacity to mobilize protesters from various backgrounds

throughout the region. While they originally focused on cultural issues, in particular the need

for their dialects to be officially recognized by the State, these protests showed a definite

political turn, with demands for more autonomy and a fairer distribution of resources between

urban centres and the countryside. Those militants joined protest movements very early on,

both because they saw an opportunity to get a wider audience for their own cause, and because

they generally identified with the demands of the demonstrators, focusing on dignity, freedom

and equality. The context of the Arab Spring is therefore crucial to the emergence of Amazigh

groups as a political force: it created a cycle of contentious (as described by Tarrow29), in

which joined both the youth of the wider region and Amazigh activists in search of a political

breakthrough. At the same time, their involvement introduced the idea that identity politics, as

much as the economic and social situation, were key to understanding the roots of the revolts

and of the growing discontent of the population.

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Although its demands were surprisingly homogeneous, the Amazigh collective movement

manifested itself differently in each country, rallying wider contentious groups. In Morocco,

Amazigh militants joined the 20th February movement and associated themselves with their

calls for social justice and freedom of speech. Those activists actually started working with

human rights associations years before30, asking for more democracy and equality, associating

their plight with a wider discourse on multiculturalism and minority rights, and they used the

growing discontent of the general public to get its approval and to make themselves heard. This

was particularly important because Amazigh populations are often confined to rural areas, and

their concerns are not acknowledged in the urban centres where political decisions are

taken..Through the impulse of King Mohammed VI, Amazighit was finally acknowledged as an

important cultural and historical part of a multicultural Morocco, but Berber minorities

remained isolated in terms of their economic and political power.

Similarly in Libya, Amazigh tribes were amongst the first to join the rebels, in particular the

Infusen tribe in the northwest of the country. While in Morocco, alienation is more the result of

social and economic gaps between rural and urban areas rather than ethnic discrimination,

Libyas minorities were distrusted by the regime and the tribal system put in place by Gaddafi

prevented them from accessing constitutional rights. They thus saw the uprisings as an

opportunity to rebel against their living conditions and their support to the revolution

contributed to the ultimate fall of the regime. They facilitated the liberation of many cities in the

region of the Nafusa Mountains, which became an important front for the resistance, and took

part in the liberation of Tripoli.

In Egypt, where the Berber minority represents less than 30,000 people and is mainly

concentrated around the Western oasis of Siwa, they struggle to protect their traditions and to

survive in difficult economic traditions. Although they are practically non-existent on the

Egyptian political scene, they are active in the wider Amazigh community. A short film

documenting their tribe, entitled The Amazighs of Siwa, was presented at the Tizi Ouzou festival
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of Amazigh cinema in Algeria in 2013, in the presence of a Siwa delegation as guests of honour.

Culture is an important tool for these populations, allowing them to document their quotidian

and to give their customs and dialects status and prestige.

Algeria is perhaps the country where historically the possibility of civil unrest is the most

present and daunting, with memories of the 1990s, the Black decade, and the death of dozens

of thousands of Algerians in fights between the Algerian army and the Islamic salvation front. It

is also one of the only countries in the region that has remained relatively peaceful so far, with

protests being quickly quashed by President Bouteflikas announcements of new reforms and

coming elections. However, the neighbouring uprisings had a deep impact on Algerians, giving

the youth confidence and self-consciousness. Human rights activist Hicham Yezza writes:

Algerias youth are getting better organised, more vocal and less patient than ever31. During

2013, mass protests have been organised in the Southern part of the country, to denounce rising

poverty and unemployment, and they were a success, with no violent incident reported.

Crucially, the Arab Spring uprisings offered the Amazigh movement an opportunity to

gather support from the masses, whereas they had in the past focused on governmental policies

and recognition32, which represents a definite shift in its strategy. They performed as a united

group throughout the region, insisting on their common goals rather than on their cultural and

political differences. Whereas recent protests organised by local militants were confined to the

countryside and didnt reach the urban centres, the Arab Spring saw them work hand in hand

with youth movements based mainly in cities, and they associated their project to that of other

North Africans, motivated by ideals of democracy, freedom and multiculturalism. The uprisings

created a set of circumstances by which the overwhelming need for change allowed activists

with antagonist ideologies to collaborate, but in the aftermath it remains to be seen how they

will work together to build a better future for North Africa.

It has become clear that despite a predominant pattern of peaceful demonstrations (except

in Libya) () the Arab Spring has been a profoundly national experience with quite distinct
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national outcomes33. Each state answered the Amazigh challenge in a different way: Morocco,

where the Imazighen represents a very large minority (or a majority according to genetic

studies)34, answered demands for an official recognition of Amazigh languages, now enshrined

in the new constitution alongside Arabic. In his speech of March 2011, King Mohammed VI

acknowledged the multicultural roots of the country, speaking of Arabic-Islamic, Berber,

Saharan, African, Andalusian, Jewish and Mediterranean components, and spoke of Amazigh

dialects as a heritage belonging to all Moroccans35.

In Libya on the other hand, Amazigh tribes face a much more complex situation in the post-

Arab Spring, in a country that is still predominantly tribal and stateless36, without efficient

structures. Despite their determining support for the rebels, their demands were not

acknowledged by the Transitional Council formed in March 2011, resulting in tensions. In 2013,

Amazigh militants stormed the Libyan Parliament in frustration, because of the continued

discriminations against them. The recent election of Nuri Abu Sahmain, a man of Berber

descent, as President of the National Congress represents a positive step towards the inclusion

of ethnic minorities on Libyas political stage, but the situation remains precarious.

The Post revolution: identity politics and the Amazigh movement in the face of new
challenges
The Berber movement, first in Algeria, but now increasingly in Morocco, Libya and Tunisia,

has long had strong political components, with a number of shared demands ranging from

official recognition of their languages, better access to state facilities and more autonomy. The

Arab Spring, which bolstered an seemingly apathetic youth into action and gave them hope of a

better future, presented an unprecedented opportunity for Amazigh activists to be heard and to

raise their demands. It also fostered the sense of community shared by many activists, who

were able to organise themselves across countries and imagine a new North Africa based on a

mythical Tamazgha, land of an imagined community. While the movement displays a strong

unity, in particular through the use of symbols as seen during the Arab Spring protests, there
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are also internal divisions. The MAK (Movement for the Autonomy of Kabylia), founded in 2001

by popular singer Ferhat Mehenni, is specifically concerned by Kabyle Berbers and amongst its

demands are territorial autonomy from Algeria, as well as a focus on secularism and the

recognition of their own specific language (rather than standard Tamazight).

The participation of Amazigh militants in the uprisings has helped consolidate them as a

transnational movement: in July 2011, delegations from all over North Africa as well as from the

Canary Islands met in Tangier and launched a new pan-Maghreb body, the Union of North

African People (UNAP). This is a very important development, stemming directly from the Arab

Spring as states Ahmed Arrehmouch, vice-president of the newly formed group: We felt that the

situation across the region made it a very opportune moment, especially because the Amazigh

movement played an important role in the February 20 movement in Morocco. () This is the

geographical environment in which Amazigh voices expressing a political vision have been

heard37. The UNAP has a strong multicultural ethos, aiming to reconcile the people of North

Africa and demanding for borders to be opened, in particular between Morocco and Algeria. At

the same time, it also asks for the Kabyle Provisional government to be recognized, thus it

ultimately supports a separatist project for Amazigh communities.

In the chaotic era of the post-Arab Spring era, the militant Amazigh movement has been

successful in gaining wider international recognition and fully transforming into an organised,

hierarchised transnational movement involving representants from various Amazigh

communities as well as members of the diaspora. The apparent strength and unity of the

movement, symbolised by the Amazigh symbols carried by protesters, obliged regimes to finally

answer some of their demands as part of a wider project of rebuild North African nation-states.

However, doubts remain regarding the legitimacy of this movement, in particular instances such

as World Amazigh Congress and the Amazigh World Assembly, respectively based in Paris and

Brussels, and which have little relevance for rural Amazigh communities. In fact, the

international Amazigh movement is mistrusted by local populations who accuse activists of

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ignoring local problems and prioritising instead abstract issues (), of reducing the quotidian

experience of material marginalisation to a global demand for cultural or language rights38.

Although some aims of the Arab Spring have been fulfilled, the situation remains unequal

throughout the region. Amazigh activists are still taking part in contentious politics, particularly

in Lybia where their status as a minority is still threatened. According to Chabane Bousseta, who

represented the Nalut region in the National Congress before resigning, Amazigh populations

are still discriminated against by the Transitional Council and are thus considering creating a

separate political entity39. It was reported in 2012 that the country was divided in militia

zones, following the refusal of the National Transitional Council to include minorities such as

the Infusen and the Toubou tribes in a general climate of suspicion and corruption40. While in

Morocco the regime recognised Amazigh demands as pressing and answered swiftly with

constitutional reforms, in Libya on the opposite, Amazigh minorities are still trying to affirm

themselves as a political force in a very unstable situation.

In addition, as the influence of the transnational movement grows, it is increasingly at risk of

co-optation both internally and externally. In a tense context where Islamic parties in Tunisia,

Morocco and Egypt have been brought to power and are heavily criticized, the rise of the

transnational Amazigh movement on the political scene could be used to counterbalance

conservative groups. Although Islamist groups such as the FIS in Algeria originally supported

Kabyle demands regarding language, while an important part of the Kabyle population

supported the Islamic party in the early 1990s41, the Amazigh movement has increasingly

turned towards a liberal, French-inspired rhetoric, calling for state secularism and thus leading

to deep ideological clashes between those two groups. The radical current of the Amazigh

movement has been promoting a return to izerf, Berber customary laws which they imagine to

be evidence of their secular antecedents. Activist Moha Ouhssain notes: By returning to izerf

and by implementing it among the Berber tribes, as was the case in the past, not only before the

arrival of the French, but before the arrival of Islam in the 7th century42. Evidently this is a
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project that would not only alienate Islamic parties and their followers, but also a large part of

the Berberophone populations, who remain attached to their religious heritage. Alliances

between Amazigh groups and secular liberal parties are creating further distrust.

These conflicts leaves the Amazigh movement open to political manipulations, in particular

in Morocco and Algeria where there is a long history of Islamists and Berber activists being

pitted against each other in order to re-affirm the authority of the respective regimes and place

them in the position of arbitrator. They play a strategy of both inclusion and containment, as

part of an overall policy of balancing off different social and political forces43, which ensures

that none of these groups are ever able to gain full power. Amazigh militants are thus also co-

opted by their own governments to a certain extend: they are tolerated and even given token

signs of encouragement, in particular on issues regarding language, but only as long as they

serve the regimes strategy and are balanced by other forces on the political chessboard.

Finally, the Amazigh movement is regularly accused of being manipulated or co-opted into

serving foreign interests. It is traditionally well represented and supported in France, as it

perpetuates French values of secularism and democracy, as well as in other countries such as

Holland where there is an important Berber population. Indeed, the Kabyle political movement,

which is at the root of Berber activism, originated from the Algerian diaspora in France, not

from Algeria, and was supported by Francophile elements of the population. This continual

support is perceived by the wider population as a renewed and more successful attempt by

Western states- with France at the forefront- to weaken and undermine the natural unity of the

states of the region through the sponsorship and encouragement of notions of a separate Berber

identity44. In the post-colonial era, it appears that European countries have continued to

support the Amazigh project, both individually and through the European Union. An Amazigh/

Berber friendship group was established in 2010 in the European Parliament, to ensure the

defence of Amazigh minorities on a European level.

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Bruce Maddy-Weiztman, from the Moshe Dayan Center, also talked about the need for Israel

in particular to use non-Arab agents to further their interests in North Africa and the Middle

East and to facilitate a relationship with those countries45. His paper created a controversy

because of the suspicion on radical elements of the Berberist movement with regards to their

involvement in normalization activities with Israel46. As an example, the founder and former

leader of the MAK Ferhat Mehenni, auto-proclaimed president of Kabylia went for an official

visit in Israel in 2012, whereas Algeria officially doesnt have any diplomatic relationship with

the Hebrew state. This is an interesting case of co-optation: Sephardi Jews have very strong

historical and cultural ties with North African Berbers, and there is a large North African Jewish

community in Israel. Israel plays on those affinities to normalise its relationship with Arab

states, bypassing official bodies and using those minorities as proxy.

With the fall of longstanding North African leaders, the collective identity of North Africa is

challenged not only by ethnic minorities, but also by a new religious fervour, as shows the

recent elections of Islamic parties at the power. Tunisia in particular had always been perceived

in the West as the most secular, tolerant, pro-women rights North African state, in spite of rife

corruption. Identity politics in North Africa are challenged not only by ethnic minorities, but

also by an increasing weight of religion in society: The fabric of Middle Eastern society has

fundamentally changed. Being Muslim has replaced being Arab as the primary identifying factor.

The consequences are profound.47. Salem Chaker, specialist of Berber linguistics, however

believes that despite their electoral success, Islamist ideologies will also fail to provide a viable

alternative48. What we observe is an increasing polarisation of North African identity around

religious and ethnic movements, which the regimes, in particular in Morocco and Algeria who

have remained relatively stable so far, use for their own benefits. The new polarisation of the

Amazigh movement around organisations such as UNAP is now opening the possibility for it to

move from contentious activism to opposition politics, and create appropriate political parties.

This would indeed represent a major threat for regimes already weakened by the Arab Spring

events, but it is a shift that doesnt make unanimity in the Amazigh community. The next
Jay

challenge of the movement will thus be to find common groups within itself and create

structures that can truly work towards a better future for Amazigh communities, in particular

for disempowered rural populations who occupy the Amazigh heartland.

Conclusion
The Arab Spring events, which have radically redefined power balances in North Africa, in

particular between secular and Islamic parties, also challenges the myth of a pan-Arab region

united around Arab nationalism. The active participation of Amazigh minorities throughout the

region, who saw in the uprisings an opportunity to promote their own cause, reveals the deep

flaws of this strategy adopted by North African leaders after Independence. Those events have

been very successful for the Berberist movement, as it has provided a wide platform for them to

make their demands heard by local populations and the international community. Ultimately,

their visibility led to the acceptance of several of their demands: the recognition of their

languages as official in Morocco, on par with Arabic, the election of a new Berber President of

Congress in Libya, giving for the first time a political voice to Amazigh minorities, and the

creation of a large number of cultural and social associations throughout the region, dedicated

to promoting their cause in a more open political realm. The use of shared symbols such as the

Amazigh flag in the various revolutions, and the coordination of local Amazigh groups hint at

the rise of a transnational Berber movement as a real political force in the region. This is further

confirmed by the creation of a Union of North African People in 2011.

The Berber Renaissance, far from being a new development, is in fact the result of decades

of resistance against oppression and alienation, which has now culminated in a new momentum

thanks to the media and political interest for the region. Its increasing political demands

however are a newer development, emerging from a conception of identity that perceives

Berbers and Arabs as fundamentally different. This is a vision mainly inherited from the

colonial era, as discussed earlier. Because this movement promotes ideals of secularism and

Western-style democracy at odds with both the fallen pan-Arab leaderships and the influent
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Islamic parties throughout North Africa, there are real risks of co-optation. This in turn creates a

climate of distrust and tensions between Amazigh militants and Islamists, who previously had

supported each others visions (as in the case of Algeria). However, it is undeniable that the

Amazigh Spring has been successful in ensuring the protection and sustainability of

endangered Amazigh languages and traditions, as well as strengthening the Amazigh movement

as a transnational entity with a clear political voice. Through the use of Internet and new media,

militants have successfully created networks dedicated to the promotion of their culture

amongst the wider population, as well as abroad, and they now have a real political

representation in the region.

Jay

1 Amazigh (pl. Imazighen) is the preferred term used by Berber tribes to refer to
themselves. It literally means free man and it is derived from the world Tamazgha,
employed to refer to the North African region as a whole. Note that the use of those terms is
relatively recent: they were first employed in Algeria in the 1940s, in the context of Kabylia.
2
See S Smith (2011), Flying the flag for North Africas Berber Spring, BBC News.
Available at: http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-14650257
3
M Oiry-Varacca (2012) Le Printemps arabe lpreuve des revendications amazighes
au Maroc. Analyse des enjeux territoriaux et politiques des discours sur lidentit, Lespace
Politique. Available online at: http://espacepolitique.revues.org/2504
4
See D Crawford & K Hoffman (2000), Essentially Amazigh: Urban Berbers and the
Global Village in K. Lacey ( ed) The Arab-African and Islamic World: Interdisciplinary
Studies (New York: Peter Lang), p.124. Activists claim that Berber communities are denied
access to education, healthcare and other services because those services are provided in
Arabic only.
5
Tamazight here is employed to refer to the standard Amazigh language used as a
lingua franca by militants throughout North Africa, and usually employed in publications and
media. It is not to be confused with the Tamazight dialect spoken by 4 to 5 million inhabitants
of the High and Middle Atlas. For clarity this essay will use the term Berberophone to refer
to populations speaking a Berber dialect as their native language, by opposition to Tamazight
speakers.
6
K Hoffman (2008), We Share Walls: Language, Land and Gender in Berber Morocco
(Oxford: Blackwell Publishing), p14
7
M Willis (2008) The Politics of Berber (Amazigh) Identity: Algeria and Morocco
compared in Y. Zoubeir & H. Amirah-Fernandez (eds.) North Africa: Politics, Region and the
Limits of Transformation (London: Routledge), p226
8
See P Vermeren (2011), Maghreb, les origines de la rvolution dmocratique (Paris :
Fayard/ Pluriel) p63.
9
D Crawford & K Hoffman (2000), Ibid, 118.
10
See M Elkouche (2013) The question of the Amazigh Language and Culture in
Morocco in M Dellal and A Sellam (eds.) Moroccan Culture in the 21 st Century (New York :
Nova Publishers) p6.
11
See M Willis (2008), Ibid, p241. Amazigh minorities also exist in Tunisia, Libya and
Egypt but they are too small to have any real political power.
12
P Vermeren (2011), Maghreb, Les origines de la Rvolution dmocratique (Paris:
Edition Fayard/ Pluriel), p66
13
According to social anthropologist Gellner, Berber minorities did not perceive
themselves as part of a transnational communitiy. He wrote : the Berber sees himself as a
member of this or that tribe () and not as a member of a linguistically defined ethnic group
(1973 : 13).
14
Quoted in S Ben-Layashi (2007), Secularism in the Moroccan Amazigh discourse,
The Journal of North African Studies, 12:2, 154-171, p158
15
Quoted in B Maddy-Weitzman (2011) The Berber Identity Movement and Challenge to
North African States (Austin, TX: University of Texas Press), p90.
16
The fassi (from Fes) francophone elite long dominated the Moroccan political and
economical scenes in the post-Independance era, and were particularly influent through the
nationalist Istiqlal party.
17
B Maddy-Weitzman (2011), Ibid. p 92.
18
Quoted in B Maddy-Weitzman, (2013), The Amazigh factor: state-movement relations
under Mohammed VI in B Maddy-Weitzman & D Zisenwine (eds) Contemporary Morocco:
State, Politics and Society under Mohammed VI (Abingdon: Routledge), p112
Jay

19
H Roberts (2001) Co-opting Identity: the manipulation of Berberism, the frustration of
Democratisation and the generation of violence in Algeria, LSE: Crisis State Programme 6,
p29
20
M Oiry-Varacca (2012) Ibid.
21
The Royal Institute for Amazigh Culture was created in 2001 by royal decree and was
an important step in Mohammed VIs strategy to allow more transparency and openness into
his regime.
22
P Silverstein & D Crawford (2004) Amazigh Activism and the Moroccan State, Middle
East Report, 233, p44
23
See H Roberts (2001) Ibid.
24
The Algerian Civil war started in december 1991 with a military coup and the
cancellation of national elections. The following decade was marked by conflicts between the
Algerian government and Islamist groups, estimated to have cost up to 150 000 lives.
25
S Tarrow (1998) Power in movement: Social Movements and Contentious Politics
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), p181
26
D Merolla (2002) Digital Imagination and the landscapes of group identities: the
flourishing of theatre, video and Amazigh Net in the Maghrib and Berber diaspora. The
Journal of North African Studies. 7: 4, 122-131, p129
27
S Ben Nefissa (2011) Mobilisations et revolutions dans les pays de la Mditerrane
arabe lheure de lhybridation du politique, Revue Tiers Monde,5, p12..
28
B Maddy-Weitzman (2013), Ibid, p111
29
S Tarrow (1998), Ibid, p141-160
30
M Oiry-Varacca (2012), Ibid.
31
H Yezza (2013), Algeria: Bouteflika strikes back, Open Democracy. Available online
at; https://www.opendemocracy.net/arab-awakening/hicham-yezza/algeria-bouteflika-strikes-
back
32
K Hoffman (2008), Ibid, 21
33
G Joff (2013), North Africas Arab Spring Revisited in G Joff (ed.) North Africas
Arab Spring (Abingdon: Taylor& Francis), p197.
34 See studies by Robino & all (2008), Arredi and all (2004) and Ennafaa and all (2011)
which found that up to a very large majority of Moroccans are of Amazigh descent, as well as
large numbers of North Africans more generally.
35 For a full transcript of King Mohammed VIs speech translated into English, see the
Morocco News Board website: http://www.moroccoboard.com/news/5302-morocco-text-of-
kings-speech-english (accessed October 2013)
36
A Brahimi (2013), Libyas Revolution in GJoff (ed) North Africas Arab Spring
(Abingdon: Routledge), p115
37
Quoted in I Binoual, (2011), Amazigh activists launch pan-Magheb body. Magharebia.
Available online at: http://magharebia.com/en_GB/articles/awi/features/2011/08/22/feature-
02
38
P. Silverstein (2013) The pitfalls of transnational consciousness: Amazigh activism as
a scalar dilemma, The Journal of North African Studies, 18: 5, 768-778, p7
39
Quoted in M Ferkal (2013) Libye: LAmazighit nest pas ngocier!. Tamazgha.fr
40
See C Stephen (2012), After Gaddafi, Libya splits into disparate militia zones The
Guardian. Available online at: http://www.theguardian.com/world/2012/jun/10/libya-split-
between-militias
41
See H Roberts (2001), Ibid, 36
42
M A Ouhssain (2003), Face au terrorisme, la lacit simpose comme choix, Le Monde
Amazigh 35, p16
43
B Maddy Weitzman (2013), Ibid, p113
44
M Willis (2008), Ibid, p228.
45
B Maddy-Weitzman (2010), The limits and potentials of Israeli-Maghreb relations.
IPRIS Maghreb Review, 4, p15
Jay

46
M Masbah (2011) The Amazigh in Morocco: between the Internal and the External.
Doha Institute, 1. Available online at: http://english.dohainstitute.org/release/b40ace5f-5491-
4734-b7cf-0d05c6b7934d
47
G Bannerman (2012), The key to understanding the Arab Spring. Reuters. Available
online at: http://blogs.reuters.com/great-debate/2012/10/11/the-key-to-understanding-the-
arab-spring/
48
See R Moussaoui (2013) A lombre des printemps arabes, le rveil des Berbres,
LHumanit.