BAKING V.

DIRECTOR OF PRISONS

FACTS: Petitioners concededly had been under detention

for more than eighteen (18) years under the charge of
respondent Director of Prisons when, on May 16, 1969, this Court
in its decision in People vs. Lava, et al., G.R. Nos. L-4974-5-6-7-8,
convicted petitioners for the crime of rebellion and sentenced
each of them to ten (10) years' imprisonment. This decision has
since become final. Petitioner is claiming for allowance for
good conduct as provided for by Art 97 of the RPC.

ISSUE: W/N Art 97 of the RP is applicable to detention

prisoners or prisoners who are just serving preventive
imprisonment

RULING: NO.

The term "any prisoner" in the English text of Art. 97 regarding

good conduct allowance is, in the Spanish text, "el penado,"
who is a convict or a person already sentenced by final
judgment. There is no doubt that Article 97 does not embrace
detention prisoners within its reach because it speaks of the
buena conducta observada por el penado - not one under
"prison preventiva." The allowance for good conduct "for each
month of good behavior" the nun questionably refers to good
behavior of a prisoner while he is serving his term as a convict
and not otherwise. Inasmuch as the Revised Penal Code was
originally approved and enacted in Spanish, the Spanish text
governs.
MANILA RAILROAD COMPANY V. INSULAR COLLECTOR OF CUSTOMS

FACTS: Appellee Manila Railroad Company used dust

shields made of wool on all of its railway wagons to cover the
axle box which protects from the oil deposited therein which
serves as lubricant of the bearings of the wheel. Under par.141
of Sec. 8 of the Tariff Law of 1909, manufactures of woo;, not
otherwise provided for are subject to 40% ad valorem. On the
other hand, under par.197 of same law, vehicles for use on
railways and tramways, and detached parts thereof are
subject to 10% ad valorem. Appellant Insular Collector of
Customs classified dust shields as manufactures of wool, not
otherwise provided for. Upon appeal, however, the CFI
overruled the decision and classified dust shields as detached
parts of vehicles for use on railways.

ISSUE: Whether or not dust shields should be classified as

manufactures of wool or as detached parts of vehicles for use
on railways

RULING: Dust shields are classified for the purposes of tariff as

detached parts of vehicles under par.197. It is a general rule in
the interpretation of statutes levying taxes not to extend their
provisions beyond the clear import of the language used. In
case of doubt, they should be construed strictly against the
government and in favor of the citizen. And when there is in the
same statute a particular enactment and a general one which
in its comprehensive sense would include what is embraced in
the former, the particular enactment must be operative, and
the general one must be taken to affect only such cases within
its general language as are not within the provisions of the
particular enactment.
LAO LIM V. COURT OF APPEALS

FACTS: Records show that Francisco Lim, entered into a

contract of lease with Benito Dy for a period of 3 years, from
1976 to 1979. After the stipulated term expired the respondent
refused to leave the premises, so Francisco Lim filed an
ejectment suit against Benito Dy. This case was then taken over
by a judicially approved compromise agreement which
provides an automatic increase in rent of 20% every 3 years. On
1985 Dy, informed Lim of his intention to renew the lease up to
1988, Lim did not agree to the renewal.
In 1987 another ejectment suit was filed by Lim after the failure
of Dy to vacate the premises. It was dismissed by the RTC and
later affirmed by the CA for the following reasons: (1) the
stipulation in the compromise agreement which allows the
lessee (Benito Dy) to stay on the premises as long as he needs it
and can pay rents is valid, being a resolutory condition, and
therefore beyond the ambit of art 1308 of the NCC; and (2) the
compromise agreement has the effect of res judicata.

ISSUES: Was the stipulation in the compromise agreement

which allows the lessee to stay on the premises as long as he
needs it and can pay rents is valid?

RULING: NO.

Since the stipulation for as long as the defendant needed the

premises and can meet and pay said increases is a purely
potestative condition because it leaves the effectivity and
enjoyment of leasehold rights to the sole and exclusive will of
the lessee. The continuance, effectivity, and fulfillment of a
contract of lease cannot be made to depend exclusively upon
the free and uncontrolled choice of the lessee between
continuing payment of the rentals or not, completely depriving
the owner of any say in the matter. Mutuality does not obtain in
such a contract of lease and no equality exists between the
lessor and the lessee. The decision of the Court of Appeals is
REVERSED AND SET ASIDE. Benito Dy is ordered to immediately
vacate and return the possession of the premises and pay the
monthly rentals due thereon in accordance with the
compromise agreement until he shall have actually vacated
the same. This Judgment is immediately executory.